DURING the month of April, 1813, four American frigates lay in Boston
Harbor fitting for sea. The “President” and “Congress” returned to
that port Dec. 31, 1812. The “Constitution,” after her battle with the
“Java,” arrived at Boston February 27, 1813. The “Chesapeake” entered
in safety April 9, after an unprofitable cruise of four months. The
presence of these four frigates at Boston offered a chance for great
distinction to the British officer stationed off the port, and one
of the best captains in the service was there to seize it. In order
to tempt the American frigates to come out boldly, only two British
frigates, the “Shannon” and “Tenedos,” remained off the harbor. They
were commanded by Captain P. B. V. Broke of the “Shannon.” Broke
expected Rodgers with his ships, the “President” and “Congress,” to
seize the opportunity for a battle with two ships of no greater force
than the “Shannon” and “Tenedos;” but either Rodgers did not understand
the challenge or did not trust it, or took a different view of his
duties, for he went to sea on the night of April 30, leaving Broke
greatly chagrined and inclined to be somewhat indignant with him for
escaping.[400]
After May 1, Broke on the watch outside, as he ran in toward Nahant,
could see the masts of only the “Constitution” and “Chesapeake” at
the Charlestown navy-yard, and his anxiety became the greater as he
noticed that the “Chesapeake” was apparently ready for sea.[401] May 25
Broke sent away his consort, the “Tenedos,” to cruise from Cape Sable
southward, ostensibly because the two frigates cruising separately
would have a better chance of intercepting the “Chesapeake” than if
they kept together.[402] His stronger reason was to leave a fair field
for the “Chesapeake” and “Shannon,” as he had before kept all force at
a distance except the “Shannon” and “Tenedos” in order to tempt Rodgers
to fight.[403] That there might be no second misunderstanding, he sent
several messages to Captain Lawrence commanding the “Chesapeake,”
inviting a combat.
Nothing showed so clearly that at least one object of the war had been
gained by the Americans as the habit adopted by both navies in 1813 of
challenging ship-duels. War took an unusual character when officers
like Hardy and Broke countenanced such a practice, discussing and
arranging duels between matched ships, on terms which implied that
England admitted half-a-dozen American frigates to be equal in value
to the whole British navy. The loss of a British frigate mattered
little to a government which had more than a hundred such frigates
actually at sea, not to speak of heavier ships; but the loss of the
“Chesapeake” was equivalent to destroying nearly one fourth of the
disposable American navy. Already the “Constellation” was imprisoned at
Norfolk; the “United States” and “Macedonian” were blockaded for the
war; the “Congress” though at sea was unseaworthy and never cruised
again; the “Adams” was shut in the Potomac; the “Essex” was in the
Pacific. The United States Navy consisted, for active service on the
Atlantic, of only the “President,” 44, at sea; the “Constitution,” 44,
replacing her masts at the Charlestown navy-yard; the “Chesapeake,”
38, ready for sea; and a few sloops-of-war. Under such circumstances,
British officers who like Broke considered every American frigate bound
to offer them equal terms in a duel, seemed to admit that the American
service had acquired the credit it claimed.
The first duty of a British officer was to take risks; the first
duty of an American officer was to avoid them, and to fight only at
his own time, on his own terms. Rodgers properly declined to seek a
battle with Broke’s ships. Captain James Lawrence of the “Chesapeake”
was less cautious, for his experience in the war led him to think
worse of the British navy than it deserved. Lawrence commanded the
“Hornet” in Bainbridge’s squadron at the time of the “Java’s” capture.
Bainbridge and Lawrence blockaded the “Bonne Citoyenne,” a twenty-gun
sloop-of-war at San Salvador in Brazil. Lawrence sent a message to
the captain of the “Bonne Citoyenne” inviting him to come out and
meet the “Hornet.” The British captain declined, doubtless for proper
reasons; but the reason he gave seemed to Lawrence insufficient, for
it was merely that Commodore Bainbridge, in spite of his pledged
word, might interfere.[404] Bainbridge sailed about Christmas, and
was absent till January 3, capturing the “Java” in the interval.
January 6 he sailed for Boston, leaving Lawrence in the “Hornet” still
blockading the “Bonne Citoyenne,” which showed no more disposition to
fight the “Hornet” in Bainbridge’s absence than before, although the
British captain’s letter had said that “nothing could give me greater
satisfaction than complying with the wishes of Captain Lawrence” if the
single alleged objection were removed.
The conduct of the “Bonne Citoyenne”--a vessel at least the equal of
the “Hornet”[405]--gave Lawrence a low opinion of the British service,
and his respect was not increased by his next experience. A British
seventy-four arrived at San Salvador, January 24, and obliged the
“Hornet” to abandon the “Bonne Citoyenne.” During the next month the
little vessel cruised northward along the Brazil coast, making a few
prizes, until February 24 off the mouth of Demerara River, at half-past
three o’clock in the afternoon, Captain Lawrence discovered a sail
approaching him. Within the bar at the mouth of the river, seven or
eight miles distant, he saw another vessel at anchor. Both were British
sloops-of-war. The one at anchor was the “Espiègle,” carrying eighteen
thirty-two-pound carronades. The other, approaching on the “Hornet’s”
weather-quarter, was the “Peacock,” carrying eighteen twenty-four-pound
carronades, two long-sixes, and one or two lighter pieces.
The “Peacock,” according to British report,[406] had long been “the
admiration of her numerous visitors,” and was remarkable for the
elegance of her fittings; but in size she was inferior to the “Hornet.”
Lawrence reported his ship to be four feet the longer, but the British
believed the “Hornet” to measure one hundred and twelve feet in length,
while the “Peacock” measured one hundred.[407] Their breadth was the
same. The “Hornet” carried eighteen thirty-two-pounders, while the
British captain, thinking his sloop too light for thirty-twos, had
exchanged them for twenty-fours, and carried only sixteen. The American
crew numbered one hundred and thirty-five men fit for duty; the British
numbered one hundred and twenty-two men and boys.
At ten minutes past five, Lawrence tacked and stood for the brig.
Fifteen minutes afterward the two vessels, sailing in opposite
directions, passed each other and exchanged broadsides within a
stone’s-throw. The British fire, even at point-blank range of forty
or fifty feet, did no harm, while the “Hornet’s” broadside must have
decided the battle; for although both vessels instantly wore, and
Lawrence at thirty-five minutes past five ran his enemy close aboard,
the “Peacock” almost immediately struck at thirty-nine minutes past
five in a sinking condition, and actually went down immediately
afterward, carrying with her nine of the “Peacock’s” wounded and three
of the “Hornet’s” crew.
The ease of this victory was beyond proportion to the odds. The British
captain and four men were killed outright, thirty-three officers
and men were wounded, and the brig was sunk in an action of less
than fifteen minutes; while the “Hornet” lost one man killed and two
wounded, all aloft, and not a shot penetrated her hull. If the facility
of this triumph satisfied Lawrence of his easy superiority in battle,
the conduct of the “Espiègle” convinced him that the British service
was worse than incompetent. Lawrence, expecting every moment to see the
“Espiègle” get under weigh, made great exertions to put his ship in
readiness for a new battle, but to his astonishment the British brig
took no notice of the action.[408] Subsequent investigation showed that
the “Espiègle” knew nothing of the battle until the next day; but
Lawrence, assuming that the British captain must have seen or heard,
or at least ought to have suspected what was happening, conceived that
cowardice was a trait of the British navy.
When Lawrence reached New York he became famous for his victory, and
received at once promotion. The “Hornet,” given to Captain Biddle,
was attached to Decatur’s squadron and blockaded at New London, while
Lawrence received command of the “Chesapeake.” Lawrence was then
thirty-two years old; he was born in New Jersey in 1781, entered
the navy in 1798, and served in the war with Tripoli. He was first
lieutenant on the “Constitution,” and passed to the grade of commander
in 1810, commanding successively the “Vixen,” the “Wasp,” the “Argus,”
and the “Hornet.” His appointment to the “Chesapeake” was an accident,
owing to the ill health of Captain Evans, who commanded her on her
recent cruise. The “Chesapeake’s” reputation for ill luck clung to her
so persistently that neither officers nor men cared greatly to sail in
her, and Lawrence would have preferred to remain in the “Hornet;”[409]
but his instructions were positive, and he took command of the
“Chesapeake” about the middle of May. Most of the officers and crew
were new. The old crew on reaching port, April 9, had been discharged,
and left the ship, dissatisfied with their share of prize-money, and
preferring to try the privateer service. The new crew was unequal in
quality and required training; they neither knew their officers nor
each other.
Lawrence’s opponent, Captain Broke of the “Shannon,” was an officer
whose courage could as little be questioned as his energy or skill.
Among all the commanders in the British service Broke had profited
most by the lessons of the war. More than seven years’ experience of
his ship and crew gave him every advantage of discipline and system.
Nearly every day the officers at the Charlestown navy-yard could
see the “Shannon” outside, practising her guns at floating targets
as she sailed about the bay. Broke’s most anxious wish was to fight
the “Chesapeake,” which he considered to be of the same size with
the “Shannon.”[410] The two frigates were the same length within
a few inches,--between one hundred and fifty, and one hundred and
fifty-one feet. Their breadth was forty feet within a few inches.
The “Chesapeake” carried eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades
on the spar-deck; the “Shannon” carried sixteen. Each carried
twenty-eight long eighteen-pounders on the gun-deck. The “Chesapeake”
carried also two long twelve-pounders and a long eighteen-pounder,
besides a twelve-pound carronade. The “Shannon” carried four long
nine-pounders, a long six-pounder, and three twelve-pound carronades.
The “Chesapeake’s” only decided advantage was in the number of her
crew, which consisted of three hundred and seventy-nine men, while the
“Shannon” carried three hundred and thirty all told.
Broke sent the “Tenedos” away May 25, but Lawrence was not aware of
it, and wrote, May 27, to Captain Biddle of the “Hornet” a letter,
showing that till the last moment he hoped not to sail in the
“Chesapeake:”[411]--
“In hopes of being relieved by Captain Stewart, I neglected writing
to you according to promise; but as I have given over all hopes
of seeing him, and the ‘Chesapeake’ is almost ready, I shall sail
on Sunday, provided I have a chance of getting out clear of the
‘Shannon’ and ‘Tenedos,’ who are on the look-out.”
Sunday, May 30, the ship was ready, though the crew was not as good or
as well disciplined as it should have been, and showed some discontent
owing to difficulties about prize-money. On the morning of June 1
the frigate was lying in President’s Roads, when between eight and
nine o’clock the second lieutenant, George Budd, reported a sail in
sight. Captain Lawrence went up the main rigging, and having made out
the sail to be a large frigate, ordered the crew to be mustered, and
told them he meant to fight. At midday he stood down the harbor and
out to sea. The “Shannon,” outside, stood off under easy sail, and
led the way until five o’clock, when she luffed and waited till the
“Chesapeake” came up. As the wind was westerly, Lawrence had the
choice of position, but he made no attempt to profit by his advantage,
although it might have been decisive. Bringing the “Chesapeake” with
a fresh breeze directly down on the “Shannon’s” quarter, at half-past
five he luffed, at about fifty yards distance, and ranged up abeam on
the “Shannon’s” starboard side.
The “Shannon” opened fire as her guns began to bear, but discharged
only her two sternmost guns when the “Chesapeake” replied. The
two ships ran on about seven minutes, or about the length of time
necessary for two discharges of the first guns fired, when, some of the
“Shannon’s” shot having cut away the “Chesapeake’s” foretopsail tie and
jib-sheet, the ship came up into the wind and was taken aback. Lying
with her larboard quarter toward the “Shannon’s” side, at some forty
or fifty yards distance, she began to drift toward her enemy. None of
the “Chesapeake’s” guns then bore on the “Shannon,” and the American
frigate wholly ceased firing.
From the moment the “Chesapeake” was taken aback she was a beaten ship,
and the crew felt it. She could be saved only by giving her headway,
or by boarding the “Shannon;” but neither expedient was possible. The
effort to make sail forward was tried, and proved futile. The idea
of boarding was also in Lawrence’s mind, but the situation made it
impracticable. As the “Chesapeake” drifted stern-foremost toward the
“Shannon,” every gun in the British broadside swept the American deck
diagonally from stern to stem, clearing the quarter-deck and beating
in the stern-ports, while the musketry from the “Shannon’s” tops killed
the men at the “Chesapeake’s” wheel, and picked off every officer,
sailor, or marine in the after-part of the ship. Boarders could not be
rallied under a fire which obliged them to seek cover. The men on the
spar-deck left their stations, crowding forward or going below.
[Illustration: _Chesapeake_ _Shannon_]
Nevertheless, Lawrence ordered up his boarders,--he could do nothing
else; but the affair hurried with such rapidity to its close that
almost at the same instant the “Chesapeake’s” quarter touched the
“Shannon” amidships. From the moment when the “Chesapeake” was taken
aback until the moment when she fell foul, only four minutes were given
for Lawrence to act. Before these four minutes were at an end, he was
struck and mortally wounded by a musket-ball from the “Shannon.” His
first lieutenant, Ludlow, had already been carried below, wounded. His
second lieutenant, Budd, was stationed below. His third lieutenant,
Cox, improperly assisted Lawrence to reach the gun-deck. Not an officer
remained on the spar-deck, and neither an officer nor a living man was
on the quarter-deck when the “Chesapeake’s” quarter came against the
“Shannon’s” gangway, as though inviting the British captain to take
possession.
As the ships fouled, Broke ran forward and called for boarders. With
about twenty men he stepped on the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck, and
was followed by thirty more before the ships parted. The error should
have cost him his life and the lives of all who were with him, for the
Americans might easily have killed every man of the boarding-party in
spite of the fire from the “Shannon.” For several moments Broke was in
the utmost peril, not only from the American crew but from his own. His
first lieutenant, Watt, hastening to haul down the American ensign,
was killed by the discharge of a cannon from the “Shannon;” and when
Broke, leaving the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck, went forward to clear
the forecastle, enough of the American crew were there to make a sharp
resistance. Broke himself was obliged to take part in the scuffle.
According to his report, he “received a severe sabre-wound at the first
onset, whilst charging a part of the enemy who had rallied on their
forecastle.” According to another British account he was first knocked
down with the butt-end of a musket, and then was cut by a broadsword.
Of his fifty boarders, not less than thirty-seven were killed or
wounded.[412]
Had the American crew been in a proper state of discipline, the
struggle would have taken an extraordinary character, and the two
ships might have renewed the combat, without officers, and in a more
or less unmanageable condition. Fortunately for Broke, his fifty men
outnumbered the Americans on the spar-deck, while the men below, for
the most part, would not come up. About a score of sailors and marines
were on the forecastle, and about a dozen more rushed up from below,
led by the second lieutenant, George Budd, as soon as he, at his
station on the main-deck, learned what was happening above; but so
rapidly did the whole affair pass, that in two minutes the scuffle was
over, the Americans were killed or thrown down the hatchway, and the
ship was helpless, with its spar-deck in the hands of Broke’s boarders.
The guns ceased firing, and the crew below surrendered after some
musket-shots up and down the hatchways.
The disgrace to the Americans did not consist so much in the loss of a
ship to one of equal force, as in the shame of suffering capture by a
boarding-party of fifty men. As Lawrence lay wounded in the cockpit, he
saw the rush of his men from the spar-deck down the after-ladders, and
cried out repeatedly and loudly, “Don’t give up the ship! blow her up!”
He was said to have added afterward: “I could have stood the wreck if
it had not been for the boarding.”
Doubtless the “Shannon” was the better ship, and deserved to win.
Her crew could under no circumstances have behaved like the crew of
the “Chesapeake.” In discipline she was admittedly superior; but
the question of superiority in other respects was not decided. The
accident that cut the “Chesapeake’s” jib-sheet and brought her into the
wind was the only decisive part of the battle, and was mere ill luck,
such as pursued the “Chesapeake” from the beginning. As far as could be
seen, in the favorite American work of gunnery the “Shannon” showed no
superiority.
On that point the reports agreed. The action began at half-past
five o’clock in the afternoon at close range. In seven minutes the
“Chesapeake” forged ahead, came into the wind and ceased firing, as
none of her guns could be made to bear. Seven minutes allowed time at
the utmost for two discharges of some of her guns. No more guns were
fired from the “Chesapeake” till she drifted close to the “Shannon.”
Then her two sternmost guns, the thirteenth and fourteenth on the
main deck, again bore on the enemy, and were depressed and fired by
Lieutenant Cox while the boarders were fighting on the spar-deck.[413]
Thus the number of discharges from the “Chesapeake’s” guns could be
known within reasonable certainty. She carried in her broadside nine
thirty-two-pounders and fourteen or fifteen eighteen-pounders, besides
one twelve-pounder,--twenty-five guns. Assuming them to have been
all discharged twice, although the forward guns could scarcely have
been discharged more than once, the “Chesapeake” could have fired
only fifty-two shot, including the two eighteen-pounders fired by
Lieutenant Cox at the close.
According to the official report nearly every shot must have taken
effect. The “Shannon” was struck by thirteen thirty-two-pound shot;
the “Chesapeake” fired only eighteen, if she discharged every gun
twice. The “Shannon” was struck by twelve eighteen-pound shot, fourteen
bar-shot, and one hundred and nineteen grape-shot; the “Chesapeake’s”
fifteen eighteen-pounders could hardly have done more in the space of
seven minutes. In truth, every shot that was fired probably took effect.
The casualties showed equal efficiency of fire, and when compared
with other battles were severe. When the “Guerriere” struck to the
“Constitution” in the previous year, she had lost in half an hour of
close action twenty-three killed or mortally wounded and fifty-six more
or less injured. The “Shannon” seems to have lost in eleven minutes,
before boarding, twenty-seven men killed or mortally wounded and
nineteen more or less injured.[414]
The relative efficiency of the “Shannon’s” gunnery was not so
clear, because the “Shannon’s” battery continued to fire after the
“Chesapeake” ceased. As the “Chesapeake” drifted down on the “Shannon”
she was exposed to the broadside of the British frigate, while herself
unable to fire a gun.
“The shot from the ‘Shannon’s’ aftermost guns now had a fair
range along the ‘Chesapeake’s’ decks,” said the British
account,[415] “beating in the stern-ports and sweeping the men
from their quarters. The shots from the foremost guns at the same
time entering the ports from the mainmast aft did considerable
execution.”
Broke’s biographer[416] said that the “Chesapeake” fired but one
broadside, and then coming into the wind drifted down, “exposed while
making this crippled and helpless movement to the ‘Shannon’s’ second
and most deliberate broadside.” The “Chesapeake” was very near, almost
touching the British frigate during the four or five minutes of this
fire, and every shot must have taken effect. Broke ordered the firing
to cease when he boarded, but one gun was afterward discharged, and
killed the British first lieutenant as he was lowering the American
flag on the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck.
The “Shannon’s” fire lasted eleven or twelve minutes. She
carried twenty-five guns in broadside.[417] Eight of these were
thirty-two-pound carronades, and the official report showed that the
“Chesapeake” was struck by twenty-five thirty-two-pound shot, showing
that three full broadsides were fired from the “Shannon,” and at least
one gun was discharged four times. The “Shannon’s” broadside also
carried fourteen eighteen-pounders, which threw twenty-nine shot into
the “Chesapeake,” besides much canister and grape. Considering that
at least half the “Shannon’s” shot were fired at so close a range
that they could not fail to take effect, nothing proved that her guns
were better served than those of the “Chesapeake.” The “Shannon,”
according to the British account, fired twice as many shot under twice
as favorable conditions, but the injury she inflicted was not twice
the injury inflicted in return. Setting aside the grape-shot, the
“Chesapeake” struck the “Shannon” thirty-nine times; the “Shannon”
struck the “Chesapeake” fifty-seven times. Including the grape-shot,
which Broke used freely, the “Shannon” probably did better, but even
with a liberal allowance for grape and canister, nothing proved her
superiority at the guns.
The loss in men corresponded with the injury to the ships. The
“Shannon” lost eighty-three killed and wounded; the “Chesapeake” lost
one hundred and forty-six. Thirty-three of the “Shannon’s” men were
killed or died of their wounds; sixty-one of the “Chesapeake’s” number
were killed or mortally wounded.
The injuries suffered by the “Chesapeake” told the same story, for
they were chiefly in the stern, and were inflicted by the “Shannon’s”
second and third broadsides, after the “Chesapeake” ceased firing. The
“Chesapeake’s” bowsprit received no injury, and not a spar of any kind
was shot away. The “Shannon” carried her prize into Halifax with all
its masts standing, and without anxiety for its safety.
The news of Broke’s victory was received in England and by the British
navy with an outburst of pleasure that proved the smart of the
wound inflicted by Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge. The two official
expressions of Broke’s naval and civil superiors probably reflected the
unexaggerated emotion of the service.
“At this critical moment,” wrote Admiral Warren[418] by a curious
coincidence the day before his own somewhat less creditable defeat
at Craney Island, “you could not have restored to the British naval
service the pre-eminence it has always preserved, or contradicted
in a more forcible manner the foul aspersions and calumnies of
a conceited, boasting enemy, than by the brilliant act you have
performed.”
A few days later he wrote again:[419]--
“The relation of such an event restores the history of ancient
times, and will do more good to the service than it is possible to
conceive.”
In Parliament, July 8, John Wilson Croker said:[420]
“The action which he [Broke] fought with the ‘Chesapeake’ was in
every respect unexampled. It was not--and he knew it was a bold
assertion which he made--to be surpassed by any engagement which
graced the naval annals of Great Britain.”
The Government made Broke a baronet, but gave him few other rewards,
and his wound was too serious to permit future hard service. Lawrence
died June 5, before the ships reached Halifax. His first lieutenant,
Ludlow, also died. Their bodies were brought to New York and buried
September 16, with formal services at Trinity Church.
By the Americans the defeat was received at first with incredulity and
boundless anxiety, followed by extreme discouragement. The news came at
a dark moment, when every hope had been disappointed and the outlook
was gloomy beyond all that had been thought possible.
“I remember,” wrote Richard Rush in later life,--“what American
does not!--the first rumor of it. I remember the startling
sensation. I remember at first the universal incredulity. I
remember how the post-offices were thronged for successive days
by anxious thousands; how collections of citizens rode out for
miles on the highway, accosting the mail to catch something by
anticipation. At last, when the certainty was known, I remember the
public gloom; funeral orations and badges of mourning bespoke it.
‘Don’t give up the ship!’--the dying words of Lawrence--were on
every tongue.”
Six weeks afterward another American naval captain lost another
American vessel-of-war by reason of the same over-confidence which
caused Lawrence’s mistakes, and in a manner equally discreditable to
the crew. The “Argus” was a small brig, built in 1803, rating sixteen
guns. In the summer of 1813 she was commanded by Captain W. H. Allen,
of Rhode Island, who had been third officer to Barron when he was
attacked in the “Chesapeake” by the “Leopard.” Allen was the officer
who snatched a coal from the galley and discharged the only gun that
was fired that day. On leaving the “Chesapeake,” Allen was promoted to
be first officer in the “United States.” To his exertions in training
the men to the guns, Decatur attributed his superiority in gunnery over
the “Macedonian.” To him fell one of the most distinguished honors
that ever came to the share of an American naval officer,--that of
successfully bringing the “Macedonian” to port. Promoted to the rank
of captain, he was put in command of the “Argus,” and ordered to take
William Henry Crawford to his post as Minister to France.
On that errand the “Argus” sailed, June 18, and after safely landing
Crawford, July 11, at Lorient in Brittany, Captain Allen put to sea
again, three days afterward, and in pursuance of his instructions
cruised off the mouth of the British Channel. During an entire
month he remained between the coast of Brittany and the coast of
Ireland, destroying a score of vessels and creating a panic among the
ship-owners and underwriters of London. Allen performed his task with
as much forbearance as the duty permitted, making no attempt to save
his prizes for the sake of prize-money, and permitting all passengers
to take what they claimed as their own without inspection or restraint.
The English whose property he destroyed spoke of him without personal
ill-feeling.
The anxiety and labor of such a service falling on a brig of three
hundred tons and a crew of a hundred men, and the impunity with which
he defied danger, seemed to make Allen reckless. On the night of August
13 he captured a brig laden with wine from Oporto. Within sight of
the Welsh coast and within easy reach of Milford Haven, he burned his
prize, not before part of his crew got drunk on the wine. The British
brig “Pelican,” then cruising in search of the “Argus,” guided by the
light of the burning prize, at five o’clock on the morning of August
14 came down on the American brig; and Captain Allen, who had often
declared that he would run from no two-masted vessel, waited for his
enemy.
According to British measurements, the “Argus” was ninety-five and
one-half feet long; the “Pelican,” one hundred. The “Argus” was
twenty-seven feet, seven and five-eighths inches in extreme breadth;
the “Pelican” was thirty feet, nine inches. The “Argus” carried
eighteen twenty-four-pound carronades, and two long twelve-pounders;
the “Pelican” carried sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades, four long
six-pounders, and a twelve-pound carronade. The number of the “Argus’s”
crew was disputed. According to British authority, it was one hundred
and twenty-seven,[421] while the “Pelican” carried one hundred and
sixteen men and boys.[422]
At six o’clock in the morning, according to American
reckoning,[423]--at half-past five according to the British
report,--the “Argus” wore, and fired a broadside within grape-distance,
which was returned with cannon and musketry. Within five minutes
Captain Allen was struck by a shot which carried away his left leg,
mortally wounding him; and five minutes afterward the first lieutenant
was wounded on the head by a grape-shot. Although the second lieutenant
fought the brig well, the guns were surprisingly inefficient. During
the first fifteen minutes the “Argus” had the advantage of position,
and at eighteen minutes after six raked the “Pelican” at close range,
but inflicted no great injury on the enemy’s hull or rigging, and
killed at the utmost but one man, wounding only five. According to an
English account,[424] “the ‘Argus’ fought well while the cannonading
continued, but her guns were not levelled with precision, and many
shots passed through the ‘Pelican’s’ royals.” The “Pelican,” at the
end of twenty-five minutes, succeeded in cutting up her opponent’s
rigging so that the “Argus” lay helpless under her guns. The “Pelican”
then took a position on her enemy’s starboard quarter, and raked her
with eight thirty-two-pound carronades for nearly twenty minutes at
close range, without receiving a shot in return except from musketry.
According to the report of the British captain, the action “was kept
up with great spirit on both sides forty-three minutes, when we lay
her alongside, and were in the act of boarding when she struck her
colors.”[425]
The “Argus” repeated the story of the “Chesapeake,” except that the
action lasted three quarters of an hour instead of fifteen minutes.
During that time, the “Pelican” should have fired all her broadside
eight or ten times into the “Argus” at a range so close that no shot
should have missed. Sixty thirty-two-pound shot fired into a small brig
less than one hundred feet long should have shivered it to atoms. Nine
thirty-two-pound shot from the “Hornet” seemed to reduce the “Peacock”
to a sinking condition in fifteen minutes; yet the “Argus” was neither
sunk nor dismasted. The British account of her condition after the
battle showed no more injury than was suffered by the “Peacock,” even
in killed and wounded, by one or at the utmost two broadsides of the
“Hornet.”
“The ‘Argus’ was tolerably cut up in her hull. Both her lower masts
were wounded, although not badly, and her fore-shrouds on one side
nearly all destroyed; but like the ‘Chesapeake,’ the ‘Argus’ had no
spar shot away. Of her carronades several were disabled. She lost
in the action six seamen killed; her commander, two midshipmen,
the carpenter, and three seamen mortally, her first lieutenant and
five seamen severely, and eight others slightly wounded,--total
twenty-four; chiefly, if not wholly by the cannon-shot of the
‘Pelican.’”[426]
The “Pelican” lost seven men killed or wounded, chiefly by musketry. On
both sides the battle showed little skill with the guns; but perhaps
the “Pelican,” considering her undisputed superiority during half the
combat, showed even less than the “Argus.” As in the “Chesapeake’s”
battle, the discredit of the defeated ship lay in surrender to boarders.
Two such defeats were calculated to shake confidence in the American
navy. That Allen should have been beaten in gunnery was the more
strange, because his training with the guns gave him his chief credit
with Decatur. Watson, the second lieutenant of the “Argus,” attributed
the defeat to the fatigue of his crew. Whatever was the immediate
cause, no one could doubt that both the “Chesapeake” and “Argus” were
sacrificed to the over-confidence of their commanders.