GENERAL HARRISON, waiting at Seneca on the Sandusky River, received,
September 12, Perry’s famous despatch of September 10: “We have met the
enemy, and they are ours.” The navy having done its work, the army was
next to act.
The force under Harrison’s command was ample for the required purpose,
although it contained fewer regular troops than Armstrong had intended.
The seven regular regiments assigned to Harrison fell short in numbers
of the most moderate expectations. Instead of providing seven thousand
rank-and-file, the recruiting service ended in producing rather
more than twenty-five hundred.[122] Divided into two brigades under
Brigadier-Generals McArthur and Lewis Cass, with a light corps under
Lieutenant-Colonel Ball of the Light Dragoons, they formed only one
wing of Harrison’s army.
To supply his main force, Harrison had still to depend on Kentucky;
and once more that State made a great effort. Governor Shelby took the
field in person, leading three thousand volunteers,[123] organized
in eleven regiments, five brigades, and two divisions. Besides the
militia, who volunteered for this special purpose, Harrison obtained
the services of another Kentucky corps, which had already proved its
efficiency.
One of Armstrong’s happiest acts, at the beginning of his service as
War Secretary,[124] was to accept the aid of Richard M. Johnson in
organizing for frontier defence a mounted regiment of a thousand men,
armed with muskets or rifles, tomahawks, and knives.[125] Johnson and
his regiment took the field about June 1, and from that time anxiety
on account of Indians ceased. The regiment patrolled the district from
Fort Wayne to the river Raisin, and whether in marching or fighting
proved to be the most efficient corps in the Western country. Harrison
obtained the assistance of Johnson’s regiment for the movement into
Canada, and thereby increased the efficiency of his army beyond the
proportion of Johnson’s numbers.
While the mounted regiment moved by the road to Detroit, Harrison’s
main force was embarked in boats September 20, and in the course of a
few days some forty-five hundred infantry were safely conveyed by way
of Bass Island and Put-in-Bay to Middle Sister Island, about twelve
miles from the Canadian shore.[126] Harrison and Perry then selected
a landing place, and the whole force was successfully set ashore,
September 27, about three miles below Malden.
Although Proctor could not hope to maintain himself at Malden or
Detroit without control of the Lake, he had still the means of
rendering Harrison’s possession insecure. According to the British
account, he commanded at Detroit and Malden a force of nine hundred
and eighty-six regulars, giving about eight hundred effectives.[127]
Not less than thirty-five hundred Indian warriors had flocked to
Amherstburg, and although they greatly increased the British general’s
difficulties by bringing their families with them, they might be
formidable opponents to Harrison’s advance. Every motive dictated to
Proctor the necessity of resisting Harrison’s approach. To Tecumthe and
his Indians the evacuation of Malden and Detroit without a struggle
meant not only the sacrifice of their cause, but also cowardice; and
when Proctor announced to them, September 18, that he meant to retreat,
Tecumthe rose in the council and protested against the flight, likening
Proctor to a fat dog that had carried its tail erect, and now that it
was frightened dropped its tail between its legs and ran.[128] He told
Proctor to go if he liked, but the Indians would remain.
Proctor insisted upon retiring at least toward the Moravian town,
seventy miles on the road to Lake Ontario, and the Indians yielded.
The troops immediately began to burn or destroy the public property
at Detroit and Malden, or to load on wagons or boats what could not
be carried away. September 24, three days before Harrison’s army
landed, the British evacuated Malden and withdrew to Sandwich, allowing
Harrison to establish himself at Malden without a skirmish, and
neglecting to destroy the bridge over the Canards River.
Harrison was surprised at Proctor’s tame retreat.
“Nothing but infatuation,” he reported,[129] “could have governed
General Proctor’s conduct. The day that I landed below Malden he
had at his disposal upward of three thousand Indian warriors; his
regular force reinforced by the militia of the district would have
made his number nearly equal to my aggregate, which on the day of
landing did not exceed forty-five hundred.... His inferior officers
say that his conduct has been a series of continued blunders.”
This crowning proof of Proctor’s incapacity disorganized his force.
Tecumthe expressed a general sentiment of the British army in his
public denunciation of Proctor’s cowardice. One of the inferior British
officers afterward declared that Proctor’s “marked inefficiency” and
“wanton sacrifice” of the troops raised more than a doubt not only of
his capacity but even of his personal courage, and led to serious
thoughts of taking away his authority.[130] The British at Sandwich
went through the same experience that marked the retreat of Hull and
his army from the same spot, only the year before.
Harrison on his side made no extreme haste to pursue. His army marched
into Malden at four o’clock on the afternoon of September 27,[131]
and he wrote to Secretary Armstrong that evening: “I will pursue the
enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of my overtaking
him, as he has upwards of a thousand horses, and we have not one in
the army.”[132] The pursuit was not rapid. Sandwich, opposite Detroit,
was only thirteen miles above Malden, but Harrison required two days
to reach it, arriving at two o’clock on the afternoon of September 29.
From there, September 30, he wrote again to Secretary Armstrong that
he was preparing to pursue the enemy on the following day;[133] but he
waited for R. M. Johnson’s mounted regiment, which arrived at Detroit
September 30, and was obliged to consume a day in crossing the river.
Then the pursuit began with energy, but on the morning of October 2
Proctor had already a week’s advance and should have been safe.
Proctor seemed to imagine that the Americans would not venture to
pursue him. Moving, according to his own report,[134] “by easy
marches,” neither obstructing the road in his rear nor leaving
detachments to delay the enemy, he reached Dolson’s October 1, and
there halted his army, fifty miles from Sandwich, while he went to the
Moravian town some twenty-six miles beyond. He then intended to make a
stand at Chatham, three miles behind Dolson’s.
“I had assured the Indians,” said Proctor’s report of October 23,
“that we would not desert them, and it was my full determination
to have made a stand at the Forks (Chatham), by which our vessels
and stores would be protected; but after my arrival at Dover
[Dolson’s] three miles lower down the river, I was induced to take
post there first, where ovens had been constructed, and where there
was some shelter for the troops, and had accordingly directed that
it should be put into the best possible state of defence that time
and circumstances would admit of; indeed it had been my intention
to have opposed the enemy nearer the mouth of the river, had not
the troops contrary to my intention been moved, during my absence
of a few hours for the purpose of acquiring some knowledge of the
country in my rear.”
The British army, left at Dolson’s October 1, without a general or
orders,[135] saw the American army arrive in its front, October 3,
and retired three miles to Chatham, where the Indians insisted upon
fighting; but when, the next morning, October 4, the Americans advanced
in order of battle,[136] the Indians after a skirmish changed their
minds and retreated. The British were compelled to sacrifice the
supplies they had brought by water to Chatham for establishing their
new base, and their retreat precipitated on the Moravian town the
confusion of flight already resembling rout.
Six miles on their way they met General Proctor returning from the
Moravian town, and as much dissatisfied with them as they with him.
Pressed closely by the American advance, the British troops made what
haste they could over excessively bad roads until eight o’clock in the
evening, when they halted within six miles of the Moravian town.[137]
The next morning, October 5, the enemy was again reported to be close
at hand, and the British force again retreated. About a mile and a
half from the Moravian town it was halted. Proctor had then retired as
far as he could, and there he must either fight, or abandon women and
children, sick and wounded, baggage, stores, and wagons, desert his
Indian allies, and fly to Lake Ontario. Probably flight would not have
saved his troops. More than a hundred miles of unsettled country lay
between them and their next base. The Americans had in their advance
the mounted regiment of R. M. Johnson, and could outmarch the most
lightly equipped British regulars. Already, according to Proctor’s
report, the rapidity of the Americans had destroyed the efficiency of
the British organization:[138]--
“In the attempt to save provisions we became encumbered with boats
not suited to the state of navigation. The Indians and the troops
retreated on different sides of the river, and the boats to which
sufficient attention had not been given became particularly exposed
to the fire of the enemy who were advancing on the side the Indians
were retiring, and most unfortunately fell into possession of the
enemy, and with them several of the men, provisions, and all the
ammunition that had not been issued to the troops and Indians. This
disastrous circumstance afforded the enemy the means of crossing
and advancing on both sides of the river. Finding the enemy were
advancing too near I resolved to meet him, being strong in cavalry,
in a wood below the Moravian town, which last was not cleared of
Indian women and children, or of those of the troops, nor of the
sick.”
The whole British force was then on the north bank of the river Thames,
retreating eastward by a road near the river bank. Proctor could hardly
claim to have exercised choice in the selection of a battleground,
unless he preferred placing his little force under every disadvantage.
“The troops were formed with their left to the river,” his report
continued, “with a reserve and a six-pounder on the road, near the
river; the Indians on the right.” According to the report of officers
of the Forty-first regiment, two lines of troops were formed in a
thick forest, two hundred yards apart. The first line began where the
six-pound field-piece stood, with a range of some fifty yards along
the road. A few Canadian Light Dragoons were stationed near the gun.
To the left of the road was the river; to the right a forest, free
from underbrush that could stop horsemen, but offering cover to an
approaching enemy within twenty paces of the British line.[139] In the
wood about two hundred men of the British Forty-first took position as
well as they could, behind trees, and there as a first line they waited
some two hours for their enemy to appear.
The second line, somewhat less numerous, two hundred yards behind the
first, and not within sight, was also formed in the wood; and on the
road, in rear of the second line, Proctor and his staff stationed
themselves. The Indians were collected behind a swamp on the right,
touching and covering effectually the British right flank, while the
river covered the left.
Such a formation was best fitted for Harrison’s purposes, but the mere
arrangement gave little idea of Proctor’s weakness. The six-pound
field-piece, which as he afterward reported “certainly should have
produced the best effect if properly managed,” had not a round of
ammunition, and could not be fired.[140] The Forty-first regiment
was almost mutinous, but had it been in the best condition it could not
have held against serious attack. The whole strength of the Forty-first
was only three hundred and fifty-six rank-and-file, or four hundred
and eight men all told.[141] The numbers of the regiment actually in
the field were reported as three hundred and fifteen rank-and-file,
or three hundred and sixty-seven men all told.[142] The dragoons were
supposed not to exceed twenty. This petty force was unable to see
either the advancing enemy or its own members. The only efficient
corps in the field was the Indians, who were estimated by the British
sometimes at five hundred, at eight hundred, and twelve hundred in
number, and who were in some degree covered by the swamp.
[Illustration:
A. B. Advance Guard on foot at head of 5 Collumns--the 1st
Battalion of the mounted Regiments.
C. D. Capt. Slecker’s Comp. of 100 men on foot at head of 2 Collumns
Note: five Brigades & Reserved Corps, Governor Shelbys troops
G. D. E. represents the whole of the 2d Battalion after I was
wounded & finding it impracticable on account of logs & the
thickness of the woods to break through the Indian line & form
in their rear, I ordered the men to dismount & fight the Indians
in their own way, part of the time the Indians contended for the
ground at the 2d Swamp.
ACCOMPANYING COL. R. M. JOHNSON’S LETTER OF NOV. 21st 1813, DETAILING
THE AFFAIR OF THE 5th AT THE RIVER THAMES, ETC.--WAR DEPARTMENT
ARCHIVES, MSS.]
Harrison came upon the British line soon after two o’clock in the
afternoon, and at once formed his army in regular order of battle. As
the order was disregarded, and the battle was fought, as he reported,
in a manner “not sanctioned by anything that I had seen or heard
of,”[143] the intended arrangement mattered little. In truth, the
battle was planned as well as fought by Richard M. Johnson, whose
energy impressed on the army a new character from the moment he joined
it. While Harrison drew up his infantry in order of battle, Johnson,
whose mounted regiment was close to the British line, asked leave to
charge,[144] and Harrison gave him the order, although he knew no rule
of war that sanctioned it.
Johnson’s tactics were hazardous, though effective. Giving to his
brother, James Johnson, half the regiment to lead up the road against
the six-pound gun and the British Forty-first regiment, R. M. Johnson
with the other half of his regiment wheeled to the left, at an angle
with the road, and crossed the swamp to attack twice his number of
Indians posted in a thick wood.
James Johnson, with his five hundred men, galloped directly through
the British first line,[145] receiving a confused fire, and passing
immediately to the rear of the British second line, so rapidly as
almost to capture Proctor himself, who fled at full speed.[146] As the
British soldiers straggled in bands or singly toward the rear, they
found themselves among the American mounted riflemen, and had no choice
but to surrender. About fifty men, with a single lieutenant, contrived
to escape through the woods; all the rest became prisoners.
R. M. Johnson was less fortunate. Crossing the swamp to his left, he
was received by the Indians in underbrush which the horses could not
penetrate. Under a sharp fire his men were obliged to dismount and
fight at close quarters. At an early moment of the battle, Johnson
was wounded by the rifle of an Indian warrior who sprang forward to
despatch him, but was killed by a ball from Johnson’s pistol. The
fighting at that point was severe, but Johnson’s men broke or turned
the Indian line, which was uncovered after the British defeat, and
driving the Indians toward the American left, brought them under fire
of Shelby’s infantry, when they fled.
In this contest Johnson maintained that his regiment was alone engaged.
In a letter to Secretary Armstrong, dated six weeks after the battle,
he said:[147]--
“I send you an imperfect sketch of the late battle on the river
Thames, fought solely by the mounted regiment; at least, so much
so that not fifty men from any other corps assisted.... Fought the
Indians, twelve hundred or fifteen hundred men, one hour and twenty
minutes, driving them from the extreme right to the extreme left
of my line, at which last point we came near Governor Shelby, who
ordered Colonel Simrall to reinforce me; but the battle was over,
and although the Indians were pursued half a mile, there was no
fighting.”
Harrison’s official report gave another idea of the relative share
taken by the Kentucky infantry in the action; but the difference in
dispute was trifling. The entire American loss was supposed to be
only about fifteen killed and thirty wounded. The battle lasted, with
sharpness, not more than twenty minutes; and none but the men under
Johnson’s command enjoyed opportunity to share in the first and most
perilous assault.
The British loss was only twelve men killed and thirty-six wounded.
The total number of British prisoners taken on the field and in the
Moravian town, or elsewhere on the day of battle, was four hundred
and seventy-seven; in the whole campaign, six hundred. All Proctor’s
baggage, artillery, small arms, stores, and hospital were captured in
the Moravian town. The Indians left thirty-three dead on the field,
among them one reported to be Tecumthe. After the battle several
officers of the British Forty-first, well acquainted with the Shawnee
warrior, visited the spot, and identified his body. The Kentuckians
had first recognized it, and had cut long strips of skin from the
thighs, to keep, as was said, for razor-straps, in memory of the river
Raisin.[148]
After Perry’s victory on Lake Erie, Tecumthe’s life was of no value
to himself or his people, and his death was no subject for regret;
but the manner chosen for producing this result was an expensive mode
of acquiring territory for the United States. The Shawnee warrior
compelled the government to pay for once something like the value
of the lands it took. The precise cost of the Indian war could not
be estimated, being combined in many ways with that of the war with
England; but the British counted for little, within the northwestern
territory, except so far as Tecumthe used them for his purposes. Not
more than seven or eight hundred British soldiers ever crossed the
Detroit River; but the United States raised fully twenty thousand men,
and spent at least five million dollars and many lives in expelling
them. The Indians alone made this outlay necessary. The campaign of
Tippecanoe, the surrender of Detroit and Mackinaw, the massacres at
Fort Dearborn, the river Raisin, and Fort Meigs, the murders along the
frontier, and the campaign of 1813 were the price paid for the Indian
lands in the Wabash Valley.
No part of the war more injured British credit on the American
continent than the result of the Indian alliance. Except the capture of
Detroit and Mackinaw at the outset, without fighting, and the qualified
success at the river Raisin, the British suffered only mortifications,
ending with the total loss of their fleet, the abandonment of their
fortress, the flight of their army, and the shameful scene before the
Moravian town, where four hundred British regulars allowed themselves
to be ridden over and captured by five hundred Kentucky horsemen, with
hardly the loss of a man to the assailants. After such a disgrace
the British ceased to be formidable in the northwest. The Indians
recognized the hopelessness of their course, and from that moment
abandoned their dependence on England.
The battle of the Thames annihilated the right division of the
British army in Upper Canada. When the remnants of Proctor’s force
were mustered, October 17, at Ancaster, a hundred miles from the
battlefield, about two hundred rank-and-file were assembled.[149]
Proctor made a report of the battle blaming his troops, and Prevost
issued a severe reprimand to the unfortunate Forty-first regiment on
the strength of Proctor’s representations. In the end the Prince Regent
disgraced both officers, recognizing by these public acts the loss of
credit the government had suffered; but its recovery was impossible.
So little anxiety did General Harrison thenceforward feel about the
Eighth Military District which he commanded, that he returned to
Detroit October 7; his army followed him, and arrived at Sandwich,
October 10, without seeing an enemy. Promptly discharged, the Kentucky
Volunteers marched homeward October 14; the mounted regiment and its
wounded colonel followed a few days later, and within a fortnight only
two brigades of the regular army remained north of the Maumee.
At Detroit the war was closed, and except for two or three distant
expeditions was not again a subject of interest. The Indians were for
the most part obliged to remain within the United States jurisdiction.
The great number of Indian families that had been collected about
Detroit and Malden were rather a cause for confidence than fear,
since they were in effect hostages, and any violence committed by
the warriors would have caused them, their women and children, to be
deprived of food and to perish of starvation. Detroit was full of
savages dependent on army supplies, and living on the refuse and offal
of the slaughter-yard; but their military strength was gone. Some
hundreds of the best warriors followed Proctor to Lake Ontario, but
Tecumthe’s northwestern confederacy was broken up, and most of the
tribes made submission.