NAPOLEON declared war against Russia June 22, four days after the
American declaration against England; crossed the Niemen June 24,
and August 1 was already at Vitebsk, about three hundred miles south
of St. Petersburg, and about equally distant from the frontier and
from Moscow. There, in the heart of Russia, he paused to collect his
strength for some blow that should lay the Russian empire at his feet;
and while he hesitated, the Czar, August 3, returned to his capital to
wait. At that moment the chances of war favored Napoleon. Nothing was
more likely than his success in destroying the Russian army, and in
dictating terms of peace in St. Petersburg.
News of the American declaration of war reached St. Petersburg August
6, and added a new anxiety to the overburdened mind of Alexander. The
American minister at that court found himself in a delicate position.
His Government declared war against England and became for military
purposes an ally of France at the moment when Russia entered into
formal alliance with England and went to war with France. If Napoleon
caught and crushed the Russian army and marched on St. Petersburg,
the American minister would certainly be no favorite with Russians;
if Napoleon were beaten, the American minister need expect no
consideration, for in that case every influence at the Russian Court
was certain to be English, and from England could come no favors.
At the moment when Brock, with his force of a few hundred men attacked
Detroit, Napoleon with two hundred thousand men moved upon Smolensk and
the Russian army. August 15, he celebrated his fête-day on the banks
of the Dnieper; and while Hull was surrendering the fort of Detroit,
the Russian army, hardly in better humor than the Ohio militia, were
preparing to abandon Smolensk to save themselves from Hull’s fate.
Napoleon took possession of the town August 18, but failed to destroy
the Russian army, and then, turning away from St. Petersburg, pursued
his retreating enemy toward Moscow. The battle of Borodino, or Moscowa,
followed, September 6, and the French army entered Moscow September 14.
There it remained more than a month.
During these weeks of alarm and incessant fighting, the Czar still
found time to think of American affairs. The influence of Count
Roumanzoff, though lessening every day, still controlled the regular
course of foreign relations. September 21 Roumanzoff sent for Adams,
and said that the Emperor had been much concerned to find the interests
of his subjects defeated and lost by the new war, and it had occurred
to him that perhaps an arrangement might be more easily made by an
indirect than by a direct negotiation: he wished to know whether an
offer of mediation on his part would meet with any difficulty on the
part of the United States.[14] Adams replied that his Government could
not fail to consider it as a new evidence of the Czar’s friendship, but
suggested that there was a third party to be consulted,--the British
government. Roumanzoff answered that he had already sounded the British
minister, who had written to Lord Castlereagh on the subject.
The British minister, lately arrived in Russia, was not a person
calculated to aid Roumanzoff. Lord Cathcart, who had been chosen by
Castlereagh for the post of ambassador at St. Petersburg, was best
known as the commander of the Copenhagen expedition in 1807. Some
Americans might perhaps remember that he had served in America during
the Revolutionary War. A well-informed writer in the London “Times,”
who belonged to the Wellesley interest, seemed to doubt Lord Cathcart’s
qualifications for his new post. “He is only better fitted for it than
the horse he rides,” was the criticism;[15] but the better he had been
fitted for it, the worse he would have suited Roumanzoff’s purpose,
for his first object could be no other than to overthrow Roumanzoff
and thwart his policy. No serious support of Russian mediation could
be expected from him. He began his career by seeking access to the
Emperor through other channels than the chancellor.[16]
Adams, September 30, advised his Government of the Czar’s proposed
mediation. October 15, Roumanzoff announced that his proposal was
ready, and would be sent at once to Washington,--which was actually
done, before receiving a reply from London. The step could hardly
please the British government; but Roumanzoff seemed almost to take
pleasure in disregarding England, and perhaps felt that the course of
events must either remove him entirely from the government, or make him
independent of British support. He clung to the American mediation as
the last remnant of his anti-British policy.
The British government would have preferred to make no answer to the
Russian offer of mediation. To English statesmen the idea was absurd
that England could allow Russia, more than France or the United States
themselves, to mediate on blockade and impressment, or upon points of
neutrality in any form; but Castlereagh had every reason to conciliate
the Czar, and rather than flatly reject a suggestion from such a
source, he replied that he thought the time had not yet come, and that
the offer would not be accepted by America.[17] So it happened that the
offer of Russian mediation went to America without positive objection
from England, finding its way slowly across the Atlantic during the
winter months.
With it went the tale of Napoleon’s immense disaster. October 23 he
began his retreat; November 23 he succeeded in crossing the Beresina
and escaping capture; December 5 he abandoned what was still left of
his army; and December 19, after travelling secretly and without rest
across Europe, he appeared suddenly in Paris, still powerful, but in
danger. Nothing could be better calculated to support the Russian
mediation in the President’s mind. The possibility of remaining without
a friend in the world while carrying on a war without hope of success,
gave to the Czar’s friendship a value altogether new.
Other news crossed the ocean at the same time, but encouraged no hope
that England would give way. First in importance, and not to be trifled
with, was the British official announcement, dated December 26, 1812,
of the blockade of the Chesapeake and Delaware. Americans held that
this blockade was illegal,[18]--a blockade of a coast, not of a port; a
paper-blockade, one of the grievances against which the war was waged;
but whatever they might choose to call it, they could not successfully
disprove its efficiency, or deny that it made Chesapeake Bay, Delaware
River, and the Vineyard Sound little better than British waters. Export
of American produce from the Chesapeake and Delaware ceased.
The blockade, though serious beyond all other military measures,
roused less attention and less protest than another measure of the
British government which had the character of a profitable insult. A
circular dated November 9, addressed to the governors of West Indian
colonies by the British government, authorized them to issue licenses
for importation of necessary supplies during the war,--a precaution
commonly taken to meet the risk of famine in those regions. The
Governor of the Bermudas, in issuing a proclamation January 14, 1813,
published the circular, which contained one unusual provision:[19]--
“Whatever importations are proposed to be made, under the order,
from the United States of America, should be by your licenses
confined to the ports in the Eastern States exclusively, unless
you have reason to suppose that the object of the order would not
be fulfilled if licenses are not also granted for the importations
from the other ports in the United States.”
Probably the discrimination was intended, like the exemption from
blockade, as a favor to New England, and must have been meant to be
more or less secret, since publication was likely to counteract its
effect; but in time of war the British government was at liberty to
seek supplies where it chose.
Madison thought differently. He sent to Congress, February 24, 1813, a
special Message expressing indignation at the conduct of England.
“The policy now proclaimed to the world,” he charged, “introduces
into her modes of warfare a system equally distinguished
by the deformity of its features and the depravity of its
character,--having for its object to dissolve the ties of
allegiance and the sentiments of loyalty in the adversary nation,
and to seduce and separate its component parts the one from the
other. The general tendency of these demoralizing and disorganizing
contrivances will be reprobated by the civilized world.”
Although many persons shared Madison’s view of war as a compulsory
process of international law, Federalists and Republicans were at a
loss to understand his view of “deformity” and “depravity” in modes
of warfare. The whole truth in regard to West and East Florida was
not known, but so much was notorious, even in 1811, as to warrant the
British minister in protesting “against an attempt so contrary to every
principle of public justice, faith, and national honor.”[20] What the
United States could do in Florida in time of peace, England could
surely do in Massachusetts in time of war; but if England’s conduct
was in reality deformed and depraved, as charged, the celebrated
proclamation of William Hull to the Canadians in 1812, inviting them
to quit their allegiance and to “choose wisely” the side of the United
States, should have been previously disavowed by the United States
government. No little ridicule was caused by the contrast between
Madison’s attitude toward Canada and his denunciation of England’s
attitude toward Massachusetts.
Taken together, the news from Europe in the last days of winter gave
ground for deep reflection. With the overthrow of Napoleon’s authority
and the close alliance between Great Britain and Russia, the last
chance of forcing concessions from England vanished. A long war,
with no prospect of success, lay before the United States. New York
harbor, the Delaware River, and Chesapeake Bay were already so nearly
closed to commerce as to foreshadow complete stoppage; and if Boston
was still open, its privileges must soon cease unless Great Britain
deliberately intended to regard New England as neutral. All this,
though alarming enough, might be met with courage; but against the
pronounced disaffection of Massachusetts and Connecticut no defence
existed; and whenever those States should pass from stolid inertia into
the stage of active resistance to the war, the situation would become
hopeless. Under such circumstances England would have a strong motive
for refusing peace on any terms.
The shadow of these fears lay over the Inaugural Address which the
President pronounced March 4, 1813, after taking for a second time the
oath of office at the Capitol. His speech contained only the defence
of a war that needed no defence, and complaints against England which
were drowned in the tumult of war, the loudest complaint that man could
make. Every tone showed that Madison felt doubtful of support, and that
in proving the war to be just he betrayed consciousness that it was not
energetic. Perhaps the most characteristic sentence in the Address was
that in which he congratulated the country “with a proud satisfaction,”
that in carrying on the war, “no principle of justice or honor, no
usage of civilized nations, no precept of courtesy or humanity, have
been infringed; the war has been waged on our part with scrupulous
regard to all these relations, and in a spirit of liberality which was
never surpassed.” Madison’s phrases were the more remarkable because
at about the same time the British government announced its intention
of making America feel what war meant. The courtesy and humanity of
the war were to be all on the American side; while not a word in the
Inaugural Address gave the pledge which could win victories,--the
assurance that the President himself had energy and meant to exert it.
Besides the alarming difficulties which rose partly from failure of
military calculations at home and abroad, but chiefly from want of
national experience in the business of war, other annoyances surrounded
the President, and could not fail to make him wish for peace. Armstrong
had not been six weeks in the War Department before he set the
members of Administration at odds. The factious days of Robert Smith
returned, and the President found the task of maintaining discipline
as great in the Cabinet as it was in the army. One of the strongest
characters called into prominence by the war, who was himself destined
to have charge of the War Department, spoke of Armstrong, four months
later, in language hinting impatient consciousness of something too
complicated to describe. “And Armstrong!--he was the devil from the
beginning, is now, and ever will be.”[21] Only by studying what
Armstrong did, could the causes be understood of the passion which he
excited in every man he crossed.
Monroe was the first to resent Armstrong’s proceedings. Monroe’s
character, the opposite of Armstrong’s, was transparent; no one could
mistake his motives, except by supposing them to be complex; and in
his relations with Armstrong his motives were simpler than usual, for
Armstrong’s views could not be carried into effect without loss of
pride to Monroe. Already Monroe had surrendered the War Department to
him, with the expectation that if any one was to have general command
of the armies in the field, Monroe was to be the man. Down to the time
when Armstrong took control, the idea was universal that the next
campaign was to be fought by Monroe. Jan. 13, 1813, Serurier wrote to
his Government:[22]
“There is much talk of Mr. Monroe for the command of the army, and
he has shown a zeal in organizing his Department which tends to
confirm me in that belief.... Mr. Monroe is not a brilliant man,
and no one expects to find a great captain in him; but he served
through the War of Independence with much bravery under the orders
and by the side of Washington. He is a man of great good sense,
of the most austere honor, the purest patriotism, and the most
universally admitted integrity. He is loved and respected by all
parties, and it is believed that he would soon gain the hearts
of all his officers and soldiers. He would be given a staff as
good as possible, and with this assistance as well as all his own
recognized resources, it is believed that he would be perfectly
suited to carry on the campaign about to open against the last
continental possession of England in America.”
As acting Secretary of War, Monroe had urged Congress to increase
the number of major-generals; and after Armstrong took charge of the
Department Congress passed the Act of February 24, 1813, authorizing
the increase. February 27 the nominations were sent to the Senate. In a
letter to Jefferson, Monroe told the story:[23]--
“On the day that the nomination of these officers was made to the
Senate the President sent for me and stated that the Secretary of
War had placed me in his list of major-generals, at their head, and
wished to know whether I would accept the appointment, intimating
that he did not think I ought to do it, nor did he wish me to leave
my present station. I asked where I was to serve. He supposed it
would be with the Northern army under General Dearborn. I replied
that if I left my present office for such a command it would be
inferred that I had a passion for military life, which I had not;
that in such a station I could be of no service in any view to
the general cause or to military operations, even perhaps with
the army in which I might serve; that with a view to the public
interest the commander ought to receive all the support which the
government could give him, and by accepting the station proposed,
I might take from General Dearborn without aiding the cause by
anything that I might add. I stated, however, that the grade made
no difficulty with me, a desire to be useful being my only object;
and that if the command was given me even with a lower grade than
that suggested, admitting the possibility, I would accept it. The
difficulty related to General Dearborn, who could not well be
removed to an inactive station.”
Monroe said, in effect, that he would have the command in chief
or nothing. Armstrong said, in effect, that he meant to be
commander-in-chief himself. The new major-generals were James
Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, William R. Davy of South Carolina, Morgan
Lewis of New York, William Henry Harrison of Indiana Territory, and
Aaron Ogden of New Jersey. The command of the Northern army was left
to Dearborn, and as the world knew Dearborn’s incompetence to conduct
a campaign, no one was surprised to learn that Armstrong meant to
conduct it as Secretary of War, at the army headquarters in the field,
performing the duties of lieutenant-general.
No sooner was Monroe satisfied that Armstrong meant to follow this
course than he took the unusual step of writing to the President a
formal remonstrance against his colleague’s supposed plan. The act
appointing six major-generals was approved February 24. The same
evening Monroe had a conversation on the subject with the President,
and the next day, February 25, submitted the substance of his remarks
in writing.[24] His argument chiefly regarded the inconvenience and
unconstitutionality of separating the War Department from the President
and of mixing military with civil functions:--
“As soon as General Armstrong took charge of the Department at
War, I thought I saw his plan; that is, after he had held it a few
days. I saw distinctly that he intended to have no grade in the
army which should be competent to a general control of military
operations; that he meant to keep the whole in his own hands; that
each operation should be distinct and separate, with distinct and
separate objects, and of course to be directed by himself, not
simply in outline but in detail. I anticipated mischief from this,
because I knew that the movements could not be directed from this
place. I did not then anticipate the remedy which he had in mind.”
From that moment began a feud between the two Cabinet ministers. The
cause was obvious. Armstrong had found that if a general command were
to be created, it must be given to Monroe. Probably he felt no more
confidence in Monroe’s military abilities than in those of Dearborn;
but determined that his hand should not be thus forced, Armstrong
decided to retain Dearborn, although his opinion of Dearborn, as shown
afterward,[25] made the retention an act of grave responsibility. The
decision once taken, he had no choice but to supply Dearborn’s wants
by his own presence with the army,--a course certain to challenge
attack from all Virginia. Had Armstrong been bent on destroying his
rival by means which the world could have found no chance to oppose or
criticise, he would have removed Dearborn, and would have sent Monroe
to waste his reputation in the task of conquering and holding Canada.
The retention of Dearborn was an unfortunate beginning for the new
Secretary of War.
The first effect of Armstrong’s administration was to turn Monroe into
a vindictive enemy; the second was to alienate Gallatin. Of all the
old Republican leaders, Gallatin cared least for office and most for
consistency. Under any reasonable distribution of party favors, the
Presidency should have fallen to him after Madison, not only because he
was the fittest man, the oldest, ablest, and most useful member of the
Executive government, but also because he represented Pennsylvania; and
if any State in the Union had power to select a President, it was she.
Madison would have been glad to secure for Gallatin the succession;
he had no special love or admiration for Monroe, while his regard for
Gallatin was strong and constant; but Pennsylvania cared more for
interests than for men, while Virginia cared so much for men that she
became prodigal of interests. Pennsylvania allowed Virginia, through
the agency of William B. Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib, to
thrust Gallatin aside and to open the path for a third Virginian at
the risk of the Union itself. Gallatin, too proud to complain, had no
longer an object of ambition; and from the moment ambition ceased
abstract ideas of duty alone remained to counteract the disgusts of
disappointment.
Gallatin’s abstract ideas were those of 1801,--simplicity, economy,
and purity. Financiering--the providing of money for wasteful
expenditure--was his abhorrence. “I cannot consent to act the part of
a mere financier,” he wrote to Jefferson in 1809;[26] “to become a
contriver of taxes, a dealer of loans, a seeker of resources for the
purpose of supporting useless baubles, of increasing the number of idle
and dissipated members of the community, of fattening contractors,
pursers, and agents, and of introducing in all its ramifications that
system of patronage, corruption, and rottenness which you so justly
execrate.” These words were meant to apply only to a state of peace,
but they applied equally well to a state of war from the moment war
became useless. In the beginning of Madison’s second term, no man of
intelligence denied that the war had failed; that its avowed objects
could not be gained; that every month of war increased the danger of
disunion, brought national bankruptcy nearer, and fastened habits
of extravagance and corruption on the country. From his post at the
Treasury, Gallatin could see better than most men the dangers, both
financial and political, engendered by the war, while his acquaintance
with European affairs showed him the need of rapid diplomacy.
Armstrong represented everything antagonistic to Gallatin; his methods
were arbitrary and underhand; his political training was that of
the New York school, tempered by personal contact with the court of
Napoleon; from him economy could hardly be expected. Yet perhaps
the worst feature of his administration was likely to be his use of
patronage. The number of Gallatin’s personal enemies was small, and
the use of patronage in a way that would outrage him seemed difficult;
yet within a few weeks Armstrong offended him deeply. March 18, 1813,
William Duane, of the “Aurora” newspaper, was appointed to the post
of adjutant-general. The appointment was improper, and the motives to
which it was sure to be attributed made it more scandalous than the
unfitness of the person made it harmful to the service. Gallatin’s
anger was deep: “Duane’s last appointment has disgusted me so far as to
make me desirous of not being any longer associated with those who have
appointed him.”[27]
Into this embroglio of national and personal difficulties Daschkoff,
the Russian _chargé_ at Washington, suddenly dropped the Czar’s offer
to mediate a peace. Of its prompt acceptance, under such circumstances,
no one could doubt, and on this point the Administration was united.
Daschkoff’s letter bore date March 8, and Monroe’s reply was sent
March 11. The letter of reply was a civil and somewhat flattering
compliment to Alexander;[28] the mission itself was a matter to be more
deliberately arranged.
The next decision regarded the character of the mission. The necessary
powers might have been sent, without further form, to Minister Adams
at St. Petersburg, but the President and his advisers thought with
reason that the addition of other negotiators to the mission would give
more weight and political effect to the measure.[29] They decided to
send two new envoys to join Adams; and on the same reasoning to select
prominent men. As a guaranty of their wish for peace, they decided
that one of these men should be a Federalist, and they chose James
A. Bayard of Delaware for the post. For the other, Monroe thought
of naming some Western man, to secure the confidence of the Western
country, and reconcile it to the result; but a different turn was given
to the measure by Gallatin, who asked the appointment for himself.
Gallatin’s exceptional fitness for the task outweighed all objections.
The President consented to appoint him; and Monroe, who had from the
first attached himself to Gallatin, acquiesced, although he saw the
consequences to the Cabinet and the Treasury.
A question less easy to decide was whether the new mission should
be despatched at once, or should wait until England should formally
accept the mediation. There again political motives dictated immediate
action. If England should accept, much time might be saved if the
mission were on the spot; if she did not accept, the peace-party in
America would be more effectually silenced. In either case, Russia
would be deeply pledged to support her own undertaking.
The President did not intend to lose Gallatin in the Treasury. Abundant
precedents warranted the double employment of government officers. In
1794 John Jay, then chief-justice, had been sent to negotiate with
England, and the Senate had approved the appointment. In 1799 Oliver
Ellsworth, also chief-justice, was sent to negotiate with France,
and the Senate had again approved. These were Federalist precedents,
supposed to be binding, at least on the Federalist party. If the
chief-justice, the head of an independent branch of government, could
be sent abroad as an Envoy Extraordinary in Executive employment, no
objection could exist to sending an Executive officer on a temporary
service of the same kind, unless on the score of expediency. To prevent
difficulty on that account, the Secretary of the Navy consented to
act as head of the Treasury until Gallatin’s return. Gallatin himself
inclined to look on his separation from the Treasury as final,[30] but
made his arrangements in agreement with the President’s views, which
looked to his return in the autumn.
Before he could depart he was obliged to complete the necessary
financial arrangements for the coming year, on which he was busily
engaged at the moment when Daschkoff’s letter arrived. First in
importance was the loan of sixteen million dollars. March 12,
subscription books were opened in all the principal towns, and the
public was invited to take the whole amount at seven per cent interest,
to be reduced to six per cent at the end of thirteen years. About four
million dollars were offered on these terms. Proposals in writing were
then invited by a Treasury circular, dated March 18, and after an
active negotiation between Gallatin and three or four capitalists of
New York and Philadelphia,--John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard, David
Parish,--the remainder of the loan was provided. In all about eighteen
millions were offered. Fifteen and a half millions were taken, in the
form of six per cent stock, issued at eighty-eight dollars for every
hundred-dollar certificate, redeemable after the year 1825. About half
a million was taken at par, with an annuity of 1½ per cent for thirteen
years, in addition to the six per cent interest.
Calculated as a perpetual annuity, as English borrowers would have
viewed it, the rate of this loan was less than seven per cent; but if
the nominal capital must or should be repaid after twelve years, the
rate was about 7.50 per cent. In the end, the government paid 7.487
per cent, for the use of these sixteen millions for thirteen years.
The terms were not excessive when it was considered that New England
in effect refused to subscribe. Perhaps the loan could not have been
taken at all, had not credit and currency been already expanded to the
danger-point, as the allotment showed; for while New England, where
most of the specie was held, subscribed less than half a million, and
Boston took but seventy-five thousand, Pennsylvania, where banking had
become a frenzy, took seven million dollars. New York and Baltimore
together contributed only half a million more than was given by
Philadelphia alone. Ten million dollars were taken by Astor, Girard,
and Parish,--three foreign-born Americans, without whose aid the money
could not have been obtained on these terms, if at all. Doubtless they
were bold operators; but Americans were supposed to be not wanting in
the taste for speculation, and the question could not but rise how
these men knew the secret of distributing the load which no native
American dared carry.
The bargain was completed April 7. At that moment the Treasury was
empty, and could not meet the drafts of the other departments; but
with sixteen millions in hand, five millions of Treasury notes, and
an estimated revenue of something more than nine millions, Gallatin
collected about thirty million dollars, and April 17 wrote to the
Secretaries of War and Navy,[31] allotting to the one thirteen millions
and a quarter, to the other four and a half millions, which could not
be exceeded without the consent of Congress. This done, and every
question having been settled that could be foreseen,--the tax-bills
ready to be laid before Congress, and even the draft for a new
bank-charter prepared,--Gallatin bade farewell to the Treasury, and May
9 sailed from the Delaware River, with Bayard, for the Baltic.
Twelve years had passed since Gallatin took charge of the finances,
and his retirement was an event hardly less serious than a change of
President; for it implied that the political system he had done so
much to create and support stood so near the brink of disaster as to
call him from the chosen field of his duties into a new career, where,
if anywhere, he could save it. As Monroe felt called to the army, so
Gallatin turned naturally to diplomacy. He knew that after another
year of war the finances must be thrown into disorder like that of
the Revolutionary War, beyond the reach of financial skill; and he
believed that if any one could smooth the path of negotiation, that
person was likely to serve best the needs of the Treasury. Yet he took
grave responsibility, of which he was fully aware, in quitting his
peculiar post at a moment so serious. Success alone could save him from
universal censure; and perhaps nothing in his career better proved the
high character he bore, and the extraordinary abilities he possessed,
than the ease with which he supported responsibility for this almost
desperate venture.
The task he had set for himself was hopeless, not so much because of
the concessions he was to require, as on account of the change in
European affairs which made England indifferent for the moment to
any injury the United States could inflict. Monroe’s instructions
to the new commission, though long, consisted largely in arguments
against the legality of impressment as a part of the _jus gentium_;
although the legality of European war-measures had long ceased to be
worth discussing. As the solution of the dispute, Monroe could offer
only the new Foreign Seamen Act, which England had refused from the
first to consider, and which was certainly open to objections,--on
the American side because it offered too much; on the British side
because it offered more than could in practice be performed. To make
the utmost possible concession, Monroe proposed that no native-born
British subject, thenceforward naturalized in America, should be
allowed to serve either in the national or the private vessels of the
United States,--a provision which carried one step further the offer to
naturalize no British seamen except on condition of leaving the sea,
and which went to the verge of conceding the right of impressment.
Notwithstanding these concessions, the instructions were still positive
on the main point. Without a clear and distinct stipulation against
impressments, no treaty was to be signed; negotiations must cease, and
the negotiators must return home.[32]