Winston so far succeeded in his design, that by hastening from Genoa,
and leaving Pisa unvisited, he was enabled to view the galleries of
Florence without being disturbed by any other beauty than that which
looked on him from the walls, or lived in the creations of the sculptor.
From Florence he had proceeded to Rome, and had surveyed its antiquities
and the marvels of art it contained, still undistracted by the too
fascinating Mildred.
But although he had secured his solitude from interruption by a person
likely to interest him too keenly, he was not equally resolute, or
equally successful, in keeping himself aloof from certain
fellow-travellers with whom he had scarce one thought or one taste in
common. Our readers may remember a young lady whom we attempted to
describe, figuring not very advantageously at the ball-room at Brussels.
This damsel belonged to a mamma who, in her own way, was a still greater
oddity, and who, indeed, ought to be made responsible for the grotesque
appearance of her daughter on that occasion. She insisted upon it that,
as all the world knew they were travellers, just looking in, as it were,
as they were passing through the town, they might very well go to the
ball in their travelling dresses; and as she was one of those who held
rigidly to the prudent maxim that “any thing was good enough to travel
in,” these dresses were not likely, be the occasion what it might, to be
remarkable for their freshness.
Mrs. Jackson was the widow of a citizen of London who had lately died,
leaving her and her daughter a very ample fortune. Now, although Mr.
Jackson had, ever since his marriage, been adding hundred to hundred by
the sale of wax and tallow candles in the city, yet had he continued to
inhabit the same little house at Islington into which he had first
packed himself with dear Mrs. Jackson immediately after the honeymoon;
nor had he, in any one way, made an effort to enjoy his increasing
income. An effort it would have been. What more did Mr. Jackson want?
What more _could_ he have enjoyed? The morning took him to his warehouse
in the city, and the afternoon brought him back with an excellent
appetite for an excellent dinner, and quite sufficiently fatigued to
enjoy that comfortable digestive nap, in which Mrs. Jackson also joined
him; and from which he woke up only the better prepared for the hearty
slumbers of the night. His wealth, had he been obliged to spend it,
would have added to his discomfort, instead of diffusing over him, as it
did, a perpetual pleasant glow of self-importance. A larger and finer
house, with the toil of receiving company in it, would have distressed
him beyond measure. It was bad enough to be compelled, occasionally, to
take his spouse to the theatre, or to a Christmas party: such
enterprises were looked forward to with uneasy apprehension; and the
gratification of having _got over_ them was the only one they afforded
him. His ledger--his newspaper--his dinner and a fireside, quiet but not
solitary, this was the summary of his happiness. His little wine-glass,
as Boswell would have expressed it, was quite full; you would only have
made a mess of it, and spoilt all, by attempting to pour in a whole
tumbler-full of happiness.
One daughter only had blessed the nuptials of Mr. and Mrs. Jackson. She
was still at boarding-school when her father died. But, after this
event, her fond mamma could no longer bear the separation; and home she
came, bringing with her that accurate and complete stock of human
knowledge and female accomplishments which is usually derived from such
establishments, namely, infinite scraps of every thing and every thing
in scraps, with the beginning of all languages, of all arts, and all
sciences. There was in her portfolio a map of China, faithfully
delineated, and a group of roses not quite so faithful. She had strummed
one sonata till she played it with all the certainty of animal instinct,
and she had acquired the capability of saying, “How d’ye do?” in at
least three several languages beside the English.
But the loss of “Jackson” even the society of the accomplished Louisa
could not compensate. The widow was very dull. Her comfortable house at
Islington ceased to bring comfort to her; and she was tormented by a
most unusual restlessness. Her daughter, who had heard from her
favourite companion at the boarding-school, of the charms of foreign
travel,--of the romantic adventures, and the handsome counts and barons
that are sure to be encountered on the road, took advantage of this
restlessness to persuade her mamma to take a tour on the Continent.
After much discussion, much hesitation, infinite talking, and reading of
guide-books, and exploring of maps--they started.
Absurd!--impossible!--exclaims the intelligent reader--that good Mrs.
Jackson should commit herself and her daughter to all the casualties of
travel without a male companion. And for what purpose? What pleasure
could rocks and mountains, or statues and pictures, give to her, that
would be worth the trouble of getting to them? Very absurd and quite
impossible! we ourselves should, perhaps, have exclaimed, had we been
inventing incidents, and not recording a mere sober matter of fact. But
so it was. And, indeed, let any one call to mind the strange groups he
has encountered--scrambling about the Continent, the Lord knows why or
wherefore--and whatever difficulty he may have in explaining Mrs.
Jackson’s motives, he will have none in believing her conduct, were it
twice as absurd. Of pleasure, indeed, she had little, and very much
tribulation. To be sure she felt quite at home upon the steam-boat on
the Rhine;--“it did so remind her” of a trip she once took to Greenwich
with the dear departed. And then it was very amusing and instructive to
both herself and her daughter to find out all the places as they passed
on that “Panorama of the Rhine” which lay extended on their laps before
them. Being on the spot, they could study the map with singular
advantage. But it was not always they had a map of the country to look
at, nor even anyone to tell them the names of the places. The idea of
seeing a place and not knowing its name!--this always put Mrs. Jackson
in a perfect fever: as well, she would say, shake hands with the Lord
Mayor, and not know it _was_ the Lord Mayor! And then what she suffered
who can tell, from the strange outlandish viands put before, and alas!
too often put within her? and that daily affliction--imposed on her
with such unnecessary cruelty--of eating her meat without vegetables, or
her vegetables without meat?
Still on she went--bustling, elbowing, sighing, scolding,
complaining--but nevertheless travelling on. Being at Rome, in the same
hotel with Winston, and finding that he had answered one or two of her
questions very civilly and satisfactorily, both she and her daughter had
frequently applied to him in their difficulties. And these difficulties
generally resulted from a lack of knowledge so easily supplied, that it
would have been mere churlishness to withhold the necessary information.
These difficulties, however, seemed to increase rather than diminish
with their sojourn at Rome; and well they might. Louisa Jackson found
them the most convenient things imaginable. She had been all the way on
the look-out for adventures, counts, and barons, and had hitherto met
with nothing of the sort. But Alfred Winston was as handsome as any
count need be--why not fall in love with him? A gentleman she was
convinced he was; of wealth she had sufficient, and to do her justice,
had quite generosity enough to be indifferent as to his possessions; and
for the rest, she would let her eye, let her heart, choose for her. The
brave Louisa! And her eye and her heart--which mean here pretty much the
same thing--had made no bad selection. As she had mentally resolved to
bestow herself, and all her “stocks, funds, and securities,” upon our
hero, and as she had wit enough to see that her only hold upon him at
present, was through his compassion for their embarrassments, she was
determined to keep an ample supply of them on hand.
They came sometimes without being called for, and without the least
collusion on her part. It was from no principle of economy, but from a
curiosity which could not be gratified so well in any other manner, that
Mrs. Jackson and her daughter occasionally ventured to thread their way
on foot through the streets of Rome. On one of these expeditions they
found themselves in the neighbourhood of the Pantheon. Opposite this
building there is a sort of ambulatory market, outrivalling all other
markets, at least in the commodity of noise--a commodity in which the
populace of Rome generally abound. On approaching it you think some
desperate affray is going on; but the men are only parading and vaunting
their disgusting fish, or most uninviting vegetables. The merits of
these they proclaim with a perfect storm of vociferation. Mrs. Jackson,
who had heard of revolutions on the Continent, did not doubt for a
moment but that one of these frightful things was taking place before
her. She and her daughter hurried back with precipitation, haunted by
all the terrors of the guillotine and the lamp-post. Louisa remembered a
certain beautiful princess she had read of, who had been compelled to
drink a cup of blood to save her father. What if they should treat her
as they did the beautiful princess, and offer her such another cup, and
force her to drink it, as the only means of saving her mother? Her
heroism did not desert her. She resolved she would _drink half_. But as
they were hurrying away full of these imaginary dangers, they rushed
upon one of a more real though less imposing description. It is no joke
in the narrow streets of Rome, to meet with a string of carts drawn by
huge oxen, wallowing along under their uneasy yokes. Just such a string
of carts encountered them as they turned one of the many narrow streets
that conduct to the Pantheon. The enormous brutes went poking their
spreading horns this way and that, in a manner very quiet perhaps in the
animals apprehensions, but very alarming to those of Mrs. Jackson; huge
horns, that were large enough, she thought, to spit an alderman, and
still have, room for her at the top. The two ladies, seeing the first of
these carts approach, had drawn-up close against the wall, and placed
themselves on a little heap of rubbish to be more completely out of the
way. To their dismay the line of these vehicles seemed to be
endless--there was no escape--in that position they had to stand, while
each brute as he passed turned his horns round to them, not with any
ferocious intention, but as if he had a great curiosity to feel them,
and examine their texture--an attention which would have been highly
indecorous, to say the least of it.
What could Winston do, who encountered them in this predicament, but
offer his escort? He calmed their various terrors--both of mad bulls and
of revolutions--reconducted them to the Pantheon, and secured an
exceedingly happy day for one at least of the party.
Winston had now been some time in Rome, and with an inconsistency so
natural that it hardly merits the name of inconsistency, he found
himself looking about in the galleries and churches for Mr. Bloomfield
and his party, and with a curiosity which did not bespeak a very violent
determination to avoid them. He began to think that they had lingered a
long while at Florence. He had forgot the danger--he remembered the
charm.
One morning--having stolen out early and alone from his hotel--as he was
engaged in viewing, for perhaps the last time, the sculpture of the
Vatican, he observed standing before the statue of the Amazon, a female
figure, as beautiful as it, and in an attitude which had been
unconsciously moulded into some resemblance of the pensive, queen-like
posture which the artist has given to the marble. It was Mildred. He
hesitated--he approached. She, on her part, met him with the utmost
frankness. His half-uttered apologies were immediately dropped. He
hardly knew whether to be pleased or mortified, as she made him feel
that the peculiar footing on which they stood tasked him to no
apologies, no ceremonial, that he was free to go--and withal very
welcome to return.
“You are before the Amazon,” said he: “it is the statue of all others
which has most fascinated me. I cannot understand why it should bear the
name it does. I suppose the learned in these matters have their reasons:
I have never inquired, nor feel disposed to inquire into them; but I am
sure the character of the statue is not Amazonian. That attitude--the
right arm raised to draw aside her veil, the left hand at its elbow,
steadying it--that beautiful countenance, so full of sadness and of
dignity--no, these cannot belong to an Amazon.”
“To a woman,” said Mildred, “it is allowed to be indifferent on certain
points of learning; and, in such cases as this, I certainly take
advantage to the full of the privilege of my sex. I care not what they
call the statue. It may have been called an Amazon by Greek and
Roman--it may have been so named by the artist himself when he sent it
home to his patron: I look at it as a creation standing between me and
the mind of the artist; and sure I am that, bear what name it may, the
sculptor has embodied here all that his soul had felt of the sweetness,
and power, and dignity of woman. It is a grander creation than any
goddess I have seen; it has more of thought----”
“And, as a consequence, more of sadness, of unhappiness. How the mystery
of life seems to hang upon that pensive brow! I used to share an
impression, which I believe is very general, that the deep sorrow which
comes of thought, the reflective melancholy which results from pondering
on the bitter problem of life, was peculiar to the moderns. This statue,
and others which I have lately seen, have convinced me that the sculptor
of antiquity has occasionally felt and expressed whatever could be
extracted from the mingled poetry of a Byron or a Goethe.”
“It seems that the necessity of representing the gods in the clear light
of happiness and knowledge, in some measure deprived the Greek artist of
one great source of sublimity. But it is evident,” continued Mildred,
“that the mysterious, with its attendant sorrow, was known also to him.
How could it be otherwise? Oh, what a beautiful creation is this we
stand before! And what an art it is which permits us to stand thus
before a being of this high order, and note all its noble passions! From
the real life we should turn our eyes away, or drop them, abashed, upon
the ground. Here is more than life; and we may look on it by the hour,
and mark its graceful sorrow, its queen-like beauty, and this
over-mastered grief which we may wonder at, but dare not pity.”
They passed on to other statues. They paused before the Menander,
sitting in his chair. “The attitude,” said she, “is so noble, that the
simple chair becomes a throne. But still how plainly it is _intellectual
power_ that sits enthroned there! The posture is imperial; and yet how
evident, that it is the empire of thought only that he governs in!”
“And this little statue of Esculapius,” she added, “kept me a long while
before it. The healing sage--how faithfully is he represented! What a
sad benevolence! acquainted with pain--compelled to inflict even in
order to restore.”
They passed through the Hall of the Muses.
“How serene are _all_ the Muses!” said Winston. “This is as it should
be. Even Tragedy, the most moved of all, how evidently her emotion is
one of thought, not of passion! Though she holds the dagger in her
down-dropt hand, how plainly we see that she has not used it! She has
picked it up from the floor after the fatal deed was perpetrated, and is
musing on the terrible catastrophe, and the still more terrible passions
that led to it.”
They passed through the _Hall of the Animals_; but this had
comparatively little attraction for Mildred. Her companion pointed out
the bronze centaur for her admiration.
“You must break a centaur in half,” said she, “before I can admire it.
And, if I am to look at a satyr, pray let the goat’s legs be hid in the
bushes. I cannot embrace in one conception these fragments of man and
brute. Come with me to the neighbouring gallery; I wish to show you a
Jupiter, seated at the further end of it, which made half a Pagan of me
this morning as I stood venerating it.”
“The head of your Jupiter,” said Winston, as they approached it, “is
surpassed, I think, by more than one bust of the same god that we have
already seen; and I find something of stiffness or rigidity in the
figure; but the impression it makes, as a whole, is very grand.”
“It will grow wonderfully on you as you look at it,” said Mildred. “How
well it typifies all that a Pagan would conceive of the supreme ruler of
the skies, the controller of the powers of nature, the great
administrator of the world who has the Fates for his council! His power
irresistible, but no pride in it, no joy, no triumph. He is without
passion. In his right hand lies the thunder, but it reposes on his
thigh; and his left hand rests calmly upon his tall sceptre surmounted
by an eagle. In his countenance there is the tranquillity of
unquestioned supremacy; but there is no repose. There is care; a
constant, wakefulness. It is the governor of a nature whose elements
have never known one moment’s pause.”
“I see it as you speak,” said Winston. Winston then proposed that they
should go together and look at the Apollo; but Mildred excused herself.
“I have paid my devotions to the god,” she said, “this morning, when the
eyes and the mind were fresh. I would not willingly displace the
impression that I now carry away for one which would be made on a
fatigued and jaded attention.”
“Is it not godlike?”
“Indeed it is. I was presumptuous enough to think I knew the Apollo. A
cast of the head--esteemed to be a very good one--my uncle had given me.
I placed it in my own room; for a long time it was the first thing that
the light fell upon, or my eyes opened to, in the morning; and in my
attempts at crayons I copied it, I believe, in every aspect. It seemed
to me therefore that on visiting the Apollo I should recognise an old
acquaintance. No such thing. The cast had given me hardly any idea of
the statue itself. There was certainly no feeling of old
acquaintanceship. The brow, as I stood in front of the god, quite
overawed me; involuntarily I retreated for an instant; you will smile,
but I had to muster my courage before I could gaze steadily at it.”
“I am not surprised; the divinity there is in no gentle mood. How
majestic! and yet how lightly it touches the earth! It is buoyant with
godhead.”
“What strikes me,” continued Mildred, “as the great triumph of the
artist, is this very anger of the god. It is an anger, which, like the
arrow he has shot from his bow, spends itself entirely upon his victim;
there is no recoil, as in human passion, upon the mind of him who feels
it. There is no jar there. The lightning strikes _down_--it tarries not
a moment in the sky above.”
We are giving, we are afraid, in these reports of Mildred’s
conversation, an erroneous impression of the speaker. We collect
together what often was uttered with some pauses between, and, owing to
a partiality to our heroine, we are more anxious to report her
sentiments than those of her companion. She is thus made to speak in a
somewhat elaborate style, very different from her real manner, and
represented as rather the greater talker of the two; whereas she was
more disposed to listen than to speak, and spoke always with the
greatest simplicity--with enthusiasm, it is true, but never with effort,
or display of diction.
The delight which Winston experienced, (having already surveyed them for
and by himself,) in retracing his steps through the marvels of Rome with
such a companion, is indescribable. The pictures in the Borghese, and
other palaces, broke upon him with a second novelty, and often with a
deeper sentiment. But was there no danger in wandering through galleries
with one by his side to whose living beauty the beauty on the canvass
served only to draw renewed attention and heightened admiration? If he
fled at Genoa, why does he tarry at Rome? There are some dangers, alas!
that are seen the less the greater they become. He was standing with her
before that exquisite picture in the Borghese palace representing the
Three Ages; a youth is reclining in the centre, and a nymph is playing
to him upon two flutes. He had seen it before, but he seemed now to
understand it for the first time. “How plainly,” he murmured to himself,
“is youth the _all_ of life! How plainly is love the _all_ of youth!”
As he was now somewhat familiar with Rome, he could be serviceable to
the Bloomfield party in the capacity of cicerone. They were pleased with
his services, and he found every day some incontrovertible reason why he
should bestow them. The embarrassments of Louisa Jackson and her mamma
were quite forgotten; nor could their difficulties excite a moment’s
compassion or attention. In vain did Louisa sigh; no inquiry was made
into the cause of her distress. In vain did she even, with plaintive
voice, ask whether, “being a Protestant, she could take the veil, and be
a nun?” the question was unheeded, and its deep significance
unperceived.
EUGENE, MARLBOROUGH, FREDERICK, NAPOLEON, AND WELLINGTON.
Five generals, by the common consent of men, stand forth pre-eminent in
modern times for the magnitude of the achievements they have effected,
and the splendour of the talents they have displayed--Eugene,
Marlborough, Frederick, Napoleon, and Wellington. It is hard to say
which appears the greatest, whether we regard the services they have
rendered to their respective countries, or the durable impress their
deeds have left on human affairs. All had difficulties the most serious
to contend with, obstacles apparently insurmountable to overcome, and
all proved in the end victorious over them. All have immortalized their
names by exploits far exceeding those recorded of other men. All have
left their effects durably imprinted in the subsequent fate of nations.
The relative position of the European states, the preservation of public
rights, the maintenance of the balance of power, the salvation of the
weak from the grasp of the strong, has been mainly owing to their
exertions. To their biography is attached not merely the fortune of the
countries to which they belonged, but the general destinies of Europe,
and through it of the human race.
To give a faithful picture, in a few pages, of such men, may seem a
hopeless, and to their merits an invidious task. A brief summary of the
chief actions of those of them to ordinary readers least known, is,
however, indispensable to lay a foundation for their comparison with
those whose deeds are as household words. It is not impossible to convey
to those who are familiar with their exploits, a pleasing _resumè_ of
their leading features, and salient points of difference; to those who
are not, to give some idea of the pleasure which their study is
calculated to afford. Generals, like poets or painters, have certain
leading characteristics which may be traced through all their
achievements; a peculiar impress has been communicated by nature to
their minds, which appears, not less than on the painter’s canvass or in
the poet’s lines, in all their actions. As much as grandeur of
conception distinguishes Homer, tenderness of feeling Virgil, and
sublimity of thought Milton, does impetuous daring characterize Eugene,
consummate generalship Marlborough, indomitable firmness Frederick,
lofty genius Napoleon, unerring wisdom Wellington. Greatness in the
military, as in every other art, is to be attained only by strong
natural talents, perseveringly directed to one object, undistracted by
other pursuits, undivided by inferior ambition. The men who have risen
to the highest eminence in war, have done so by the exercise of
faculties as great, and the force of genius as transcendent, as that
which formed a Homer, a Bacon, or a Newton. Success doubtless commands
the admiration of the multitude; military glory captivates the
unthinking throng; but to those who know the military art, and can
appreciate real merit, the chief ground for admiration of its great
masters, is a sense of the difficulties, to most unknown, which they
have overcome.
PRINCE EUGENE, though belonging to the same age, often acting in the
same army, and sometimes commanding alternately with Marlborough, was a
general of an essentially different character. A descendant of the House
of Savoy, born at Paris, in 1663, and originally destined for the
church, he early evinced a repugnance for theological studies, and,
instead of his breviary, was devouring in secret Plutarch’s lives of
ancient heroes. His figure was slender, and his constitution at first
weak; but these disadvantages, which caused Louis XIV. to refuse him a
regiment, from an opinion that he was not equal to its duties, were soon
overcome by the ardour of his mind. Immediately setting out for Vienna,
he entered the imperial service; but he was still pursued by the enmity
of Louvois, who procured from Louis a decree which pronounced sentence
of banishment on all Frenchmen in the armies of foreign powers who
should fail to return to their country. “I will re-enter France in spite
of him,” said Eugene; and he was more than once as good as his word.
His genius for war was not methodical or scientific like that of Turenne
or Marlborough, nor essentially chivalrous like that of the Black Prince
or the Great Condé. It was more akin to the terrible sweep of the Tartar
chiefs; it savoured more of oriental daring. He was as prodigal of the
blood of his soldiers as Napoleon; but, unlike him, he never failed to
expose his own with equal readiness in the fight. He did not reserve his
attack in person for the close of the affray, like the French Emperor,
but was generally to be seen in the fire from the very outset. It was
with difficulty he could be restrained from heading the first assault of
grenadiers, or leading on the first charge of horse. His first
distinguished command was in Italy, in 1691, and his abilities soon gave
his kinsman, the Duke of Savoy, an ascendant there over the French. But
it was at the great battle of Zenta, on the Teife, where he surprised
and totally defeated Cara-Mustapha, at the head of 120,000 Turks, that
his wonderful genius for war first shone forth in its full lustre. He
there killed 20,000 of the enemy, drove 10,000 into the river, took
their whole artillery and standards, and entirely dispersed their mighty
array.
Like Nelson at Copenhagen, Eugene had gained this glorious victory by
acting in opposition to his orders, which were positively to avoid a
general engagement. This circumstance, joined to the envy excited by his
unparalleled triumph, raised a storm at Court against the illustrious
general, and led to his being deprived of his command, and even
threatened with a court-martial. The public voice, however, at Vienna,
loudly condemned such base ingratitude towards so great a benefactor to
the imperial dominions: the want of his directing eye was speedily felt
in the campaign with the Turks, and the Emperor was obliged to restore
him to his command, which he, however, only agreed to accept on being
given _carte blanche_ for the conduct of the war. The peace of
Carlowetz, in 1699, between the Imperialists and the Ottomans, soon
after restored him to a pacific life, and the study of history, in
which, above any other, he delighted. But on the breaking out of the war
of the Succession, in 1701, he was restored to his military duties, and
during two campaigns measured his strength, always with success, in the
plains of Lombardy, with the scientific abilities of Marshal Catinat,
and the learned experience of Marshal Villeroi, the latter of whom he
made prisoner during a nocturnal attack on Cremona, in 1703. In 1704, he
was transferred to the north of the Alps to unite with Marlborough in
making head against the great army of Marshal Tallard, which was
advancing, in so threatening a manner, through Bavaria; and he shared
with the illustrious Englishman the glories of Blenheim, which at once
delivered Germany, and hurled the French armies with disgrace behind the
Rhine. Then commenced that steady friendship, and sincere and mutual
regard, between these illustrious men, which continued unbroken till the
time of their death, and is not the least honourable trait in the
character of each. But the want of his protecting arm was long felt in
Italy: the great abilities of the Duke de Vendôme had well-nigh
counterbalanced there all the advantages of the allies in Germany; and
the issue of the war in the plains of Piedmont continued doubtful till
the glorious victory of Eugene, on the 7th Sept. 1706, when he stormed
the French intrenchments around Turin, defended by eighty thousand men,
at the head of thirty thousand only, and totally defeated Marshal Marsin
and the Duke of Orleans, with such loss, that the French armies were
speedily driven across the Alps.
Eugene was now received in the most flattering manner at Vienna: the
lustre of his exploits had put to silence, if not to shame, the
malignity of his enemies. “I have but one fault to find with you,” said
the Emperor when he was first presented to him after his victory, “and
that is that you expose yourself too much.” He was next placed at the
head of the Imperial armies in Flanders; and shared with Marlborough in
the conduct, as he did in the glories, of Oudenarde and Malplaquet.
Intrusted with the command of the corps which besieged Lille, he was
penetrated with the utmost admiration for Marshal Boufflers, and
evinced the native generosity of his disposition, by the readiness with
which he granted the most favourable terms to the illustrious besieged
chief, who had with equal skill and valour conducted the defence. When
the articles of capitulation proposed by Boufflers were placed before
him, he said at once, without looking at them, “I will subscribe them at
once: knowing well you would propose nothing unworthy of you and me.”
The delicacy of his subsequent attentions to his noble prisoner evinced
the sincerity of his admiration. When Marlborough’s influence at the
English Court was sensibly declining, in 1711, he repaired to London,
and exerted all his talents and address to bring the English council
back to the common cause, and restore his great rival to his former
ascendency with Queen Anne. When it was all in vain, and the English
armies withdrew from the coalition, Eugene did all that skill and genius
could achieve to make up for the great deficiency arising from the
withdrawal of Marlborough and his gallant followers; and when it had
become apparent that he was over-matched by the French armies, he was
the first to counsel his Imperial master to conclude peace, which was
done at Rastadt on the 6th March, 1714.
Great as had been the services then performed by Eugene for the
Imperialists, they were outdone by those which he subsequently rendered
in the wars with the Turks. In truth it was he who first effectually
broke their power, and for ever delivered Europe from the sabres of the
Osmanlis, by which it had been incessantly threatened for three hundred
years. Intrusted with the command of the Austrian army in Hungary, sixty
thousand strong, he gained at Peterwardin, in 1716, a complete victory
over an hundred and fifty thousand Turks. This glorious success led him
to resume the offensive, and in the following year he laid siege, with
forty thousand men, to Belgrade, the great frontier fortress of Turkey,
in presence of the whole strength of the Ottoman empire. The obstinate
resistance of the Turks, as famous then, as they have ever since been,
in the defence of fortified places, joined to the dysenteries and fevers
usual on the marshy banks of the Danube in the autumnal months, soon
reduced his effective force to twenty-five thousand men, while that of
the enemy, by prodigious efforts, had been swelled to an hundred and
fifty thousand around the besiegers’ lines, besides thirty thousand
within the walls. Every thing presaged that Eugene was about to undergo
the fate of Marshal Marsin twelve years before at Turin, and even his
most experienced officers deemed a capitulation the only way of
extricating them from their perilous situation. Eugene himself was
attacked and seriously weakened by the prevailing dysentery: all seemed
lost in the Austrian camp. It was in these circumstances, with this
weakened and dispirited force, that he achieved one of the most glorious
victories ever gained by the Cross over the Crescent. With admirable
skill he collected his little army together, divided it into columns of
attack, and though scarcely able to sit on horseback himself, led them
to the assault of the Turkish intrenchments. The result was equal to the
success of Cæsar over the Gauls at the blockade of Alesia, seventeen
centuries before. The innumerable host of the Turks was totally
defeated--all their artillery and baggage taken, and their troops
entirely dispersed. Belgrade, immediately after, opened its gates, and
has since remained, with some mutations of fortune, the great frontier
bulwark of Europe against the Turks. The successes which he gained in
the following campaign of 1718 were so decisive, that they entirely
broke the Ottoman power; and he was preparing to march to
Constantinople, when the treaty of Passarowitz put a period to his
conquests, and gave a breathing time to the exhausted Ottoman empire.[3]
From this brief sketch of his exploits, it may readily be understood
what was the character of Eugene as a general. He had none of the
methodical prudence of Turenne, Marlborough, or Villars. His genius was
entirely different: it was more akin to that of Napoleon, when he was
reduced to counterbalance inferiority of numbers by superiority of
skill. The immortal campaigns of 1796, in Italy, and of 1814, in
Champagne, bear a strong resemblance to those of Eugene. Like the French
Emperor, his strokes were rapid and forcible; his _coup-d’œil_ was at
once quick and just; his activity indefatigable; his courage undaunted;
his resources equal to any undertaking. He did not lay much stress on
previous arrangements, and seldom attempted the extensive combinations
which enabled Marlborough to command success; but dashed fearlessly on,
trusting to his own resources to extricate him out of any difficulty--to
his genius, in any circumstances, to command victory. Yet was this
daring disposition not without peril. His audacity often bordered on
rashness, his rapidity on haste; and he repeatedly brought his armies
into situations all but desperate, and which, to a general of lesser
capacity, unquestionably would have proved so. Yet in these difficulties
no one could exceed him in the energy and vigour with which he
extricated himself from the toils: and many of his greatest victories,
particularly those of Turin and Belgrade, were gained under
circumstances where even the boldest officers in his army had given him
over for lost. He was prodigal of the blood of his soldiers, and, like
Napoleon, indifferent to the sacrifices at which he purchased his
successes; but he was still more lavish of his own, and never failed to
share the hardships and dangers of the meanest of his followers. He was
engaged in thirteen pitched battles, in all of which he fought like a
common soldier. He was in consequence repeatedly, sometimes dangerously,
wounded; and it was extraordinary “that his life escaped his reiterated
perils.” He raised the Austrian monarchy by his triumphs to the very
highest pitch of glory, and finally broke the power of the Turks, the
most persevering and not the least formidable of its enemies. But the
enterprises which his genius prompted the cabinet of Vienna to
undertake, were beyond the strength of the hereditary states; and for
nearly a century after, it achieved nothing worthy, either of its
growing resources, or the military renown which he had spread around its
annals.
FREDERICK II., surnamed THE GREAT, with more justice than that title has
elsewhere been applied in modern times, was born at Berlin on the 24th
January, 1712. His education was as much neglected as ill-directed.
Destined from early youth for the military profession, he was in the
first instance subjected to a discipline so rigorous, that he conceived
the utmost aversion for a career in which he was ultimately to shine
with such eclat, and, as his only resource, threw himself with ardour
into the study of French literature, for which he retained a strong
predilection through the whole of his subsequent life. Unfortunately his
education was almost entirely confined to that literature. That of his
own country, since so illustrious, had not started into existence. Of
Italian and Spanish he was ignorant. He could not read Greek; and with
Latin his acquaintance was so imperfect, as to be of no practical
service to him through life. To this unfortunate contraction of his
education his limited taste in literature, in subsequent life, is
chiefly to be ascribed. He at first was desirous of espousing an English
princess; but his father, who was most imperious in his disposition,
decided otherwise, and he was compelled, in 1733, to marry the Princess
Elizabeth of Brunswick. This union, like most others contracted under
restraint, proved unfortunate; and it did not give Frederick the
blessing of an heir to the throne. Debarred from domestic enjoyments,
the young prince took refuge with more eagerness than ever in literary
pursuits; the chateau of Rhinsberg, which was his favourite abode, was
styled by him in his transport the “Palace of the Muses;” and the
greatest general and most hardy soldier of modern times spent some years
of his youth in corresponding with Maupertuis, Voltaire, and other
French philosophers, and in making indifferent verses and madrigals,
which gave no token of any remarkable genius. He had already prepared
for the press a book entitled “Refutation of the Prince of Machiavel,”
when, in 1740, the death of his father called him to the throne, its
duties, its dangers, and its ambition.
The philosophers were in transports, when they beheld “one of
themselves,” as they styled him, elevated to a throne: they flattered
themselves that he would continue his literary pursuits, and acknowledge
their influence, when surrounded by the attractions, and wielding the
patronage of the crown. They soon found their mistake. Frederick
continued through life his literary tastes: he corresponded with
Voltaire and the philosophers through all his campaigns: he made French
verses, in his tent, after tracing out the plans of the battles of
Leuthen and Rosbach. But his heart was in his kingdom: his ambition was
set on its aggrandizement: his passion was war, by which alone it could
be achieved. Without being discarded, the philosophers and madrigals
were soon forgotten. The finances and the army occupied his whole
attention. The former were in admirable order, and his father had even
accumulated a large treasure which remained in the exchequer. The army,
admirably equipped and disciplined, already amounted to 60,000 men: he
augmented it to 80,000. Nothing could exceed the vigour he displayed in
every department, or the unceasing attention he paid to public affairs.
Indefatigable day and night, sober and temperate in his habits, he
employed even artificial means to augment the time during the day he
could devote to business. Finding that he was constitutionally inclined
to more sleep than he deemed consistent with the full discharge of all
his regal duties, he ordered his servants to waken him at five in the
morning; and if words were not effectual to rouse him from his sleep, he
commanded them, on pain of dismissal, to apply linen steeped in cold
water to his person. This order was punctually executed, even in the
depth of winter, till nature was fairly subdued, and the king had gained
the time he desired from his slumbers.
It was not long before he had an opportunity of evincing at once the
vigour and unscrupulous character of his mind. The Emperor Charles VI.
having died on the 20th October, 1740, the immense possessions of the
house of Austria devolved to his daughter, since so famous by the name
of MARIA THERESA. The defenceless condition of the imperial dominions,
consisting of so many different and discordant states, some of them but
recently united under one head, when under the guidance of a young
unmarried princess, suggested to the neighbouring powers the idea of a
partition. Frederick eagerly united with France in this project. He
revived some old and obsolete claims of Prussia to Silesia; but in his
manifesto to the European powers, upon invading that province, he was
scarcely at the pains to conceal the real motives of his aggression. “It
is,” said he, “an army ready to take the field, treasures long
accumulated, and perhaps the desire to acquire glory.” He was not long
in winning the battle, though it was at first rather owing to the skill
of his generals, and discipline of his soldiers, than his own capacity.
On the 10th April, 1741, the army under his command gained a complete
victory over the Austrians, at Mollwitz, in Silesia, which led to the
entire reduction of that rich and important province. The king owed
little to his own courage, however, on this occasion. Like Wellington,
the first essay in arms of so indomitable a hero was unfortunate. He
fled from the field of battle, at the first repulse of his cavalry; and
he was already seven miles off, where he was resting in a mill, when he
received intelligence that his troops had regained the day; and at the
earnest entreaties of General afterwards Marshal Schwerin, he returned
to take the command of the army. Next year, however, he evinced equal
courage and capacity in the battle of Czaslau, which he gained over the
Prince of Lorraine. Austria, on the brink of ruin, hastened to disarm
the most formidable of her assailants; and, by a separate peace,
concluded at Breslau on June 11, 1742, she ceded to Prussia nearly the
whole of Silesia.
This cruel loss, however, was too plainly the result of necessity to be
acquiesced in without a struggle by the Cabinet of Vienna. Maria Theresa
made no secret of her determination to resume possession of the lost
province on the first convenient opportunity. Austria soon united the
whole of Germany in a league against Frederick, who had no ally but the
King of France. Assailed by such a host of enemies, however, the young
king was not discouraged, and, boldly assuming the initiative, he gained
at Hohenfriedberg a complete victory over his old antagonist the Prince
of Lorraine. This triumph was won entirely by the extraordinary genius
displayed by the King of Prussia: “It was one of those battles,” says
the military historian, Guibert, “where a great master makes every thing
give way before him, and which is gained from the very beginning,
because he never gives the enemy time to recover from their disorder.”
The Austrians made great exertions to repair the consequences of this
disaster, and with such success, that in four months Prince Charles of
Lorraine again attacked him at the head of 50,000 men near Soor.
Frederick had not 25,000, but with these he again defeated the Austrians
with immense loss, and took up his winter quarters in Silesia. So vast
were the resources, however, of the great German League, of which
Austria was the head, that they were enabled to keep the field during
winter, and even meditate a _coup-de-main_ against the king, in his
capital of Berlin. Informed of this design, Frederick lost not a moment
in anticipating it by a sudden attack on his part on his enemies.
Assembling his troops in the depth of winter with perfect secrecy, he
surprised a large body of Saxons at Naumberg, made himself master of
their magazines at Gorlitz, and soon after made his triumphant entry
into Dresden, where he dictated a glorious peace, on 25th December,
1745, to his enemies, which secured, permanently, Silesia to Prussia. It
was full time for the Imperialists to come to an accommodation. In
eighteen months Frederick had defeated them in four pitched battles,
besides several combats; taken 45,000 prisoners, and killed or wounded
an equal number of his enemies. His own armies had not sustained losses
to a fifth part of this amount, and the chasms in his ranks were more
than compensated by the multitude of the prisoners who enlisted under
his banners, anxious to share the fortunes of the hero who had already
filled Europe with his renown.
The ambitious and decided, and, above all, indomitable character of
Frederick, had already become conspicuous during these brief campaigns.
His correspondence, all conducted by himself, evinced a vigour and
_tranchant_ style, at that period unknown in European diplomacy, but to
which the world has since been abundantly accustomed in the
proclamations of Napoleon. Already he spoke on every occasion as the
hero and the conqueror--to conquer or die was his invariable maxim. On
the eve of his invasion of Saxony, he wrote to the Empress of Russia,
who was endeavouring to dissuade him from that design:--“I wish nothing
from the King of Poland (Elector of Saxony) but to punish him in his
Electorate, and make him sign an acknowledgment of repentance in his
capital.” During the negotiations for peace, he wrote to the King of
England, who had proposed the mediation of Great Britain:--“These are my
conditions. I will perish with my army before departing from one iota of
them: if the Empress does not accept them, I will rise in my demands.”
The peace of Dresden lasted ten years; and these were of inestimable
importance to Frederick. He employed that precious interval in
consolidating his conquests, securing the affections by protecting the
interests of his subjects, and pursuing every design which could conduce
to their welfare. Marshes were drained, lands broken up and cultivated,
manufactures established, the finances were put in the best order,
agriculture, as the great staple of the kingdom, sedulously encouraged.
His capital was embellished, and the fame of his exploits attracted the
greatest and most celebrated men in Europe. Voltaire, among the rest,
became for years his guest; but the aspiring genius and irascible temper
of the military monarch could ill accord with the vanity and insatiable
thirst for praise in the French author, and they parted with mutual
respect, but irretrievable alienation. Meanwhile, the strength of the
monarchy was daily increasing under Frederick’s wise and provident
administration. The population nearly reached 6,000,000 of souls; the
cavalry mustered 30,000, all in the highest state of discipline and
equipment; and the infantry, esteemed with reason the most perfect in
Europe, numbered an hundred and twenty thousand bayonets. These troops
had long been accustomed to act together in large bodies; the best
training next to actual service in the field which an army can receive.
They had need of all their skill, and discipline, and courage, for
Prussia was ere long threatened by the most formidable confederacy that
ever yet had been directed in modern times against a single State.
Austria, Russia, France, Sweden, and Saxony, united in alliance for the
purpose of partitioning the Prussian territories. They had ninety
millions of men in their dominions, and could with ease bring four
hundred thousand men into the field. Prussia had not six million of
inhabitants, who were strained to the uttermost to array a hundred and
fifty thousand combatants--and even with the aid of England and Hanover,
not more than fifty thousand auxiliaries could be relied on. Prussia had
neither strong fortresses like Flanders, nor mountain chains like Spain,
nor a frontier stream like France. It was chiefly composed of flat
plains, unprotected by great rivers, and surrounded on all sides by its
enemies. The contest seemed utterly desperate; there did not seem a
chance of escape for the Prussian monarchy.
Frederick began the contest by one of those strokes which demonstrated
the strength of his understanding and the vigour of his determination.
Instead of waiting to be attacked, he carried the war at once into the
enemy’s territories, and converted the resources of the nearest of them
to his own advantage. Having received authentic intelligence of the
signature of a treaty for the partition of his kingdom by the great
powers, on 9th May 1756, he suddenly entered the Saxon territories, made
himself master of Dresden, and shut up the whole forces of Saxony in the
intrenched camp at Pirna. Marshal Brown having advanced at the head of
60,000 men to relieve them, he encountered and totally defeated him at
Lowositz, with the loss of 15,000 men. Deprived of all hope of succour,
the Saxons in Pirna, after having made vain efforts to escape, were
obliged to lay down their arms, 14,000 strong. The whole of Saxony
submitted to the victor, who thenceforward, during the whole war,
converted its entire resources to his own support. Beyond all question,
it was this masterly and successful stroke, in the very outset, and in
the teeth of his enemies, adding above a third to his warlike resources,
which enabled him subsequently to maintain his ground against the
desperate odds by which he was assailed. Most of the Saxons taken at
Pirna, dazzled by their conqueror’s fame, entered his service: the Saxon
youth hastened in crowds to enrol themselves under the banners of the
hero of the North of Germany. Frederick, at the same time, effectually
vindicated the step he had taken in the eyes of all Europe, by the
publication of the secret treaty of partition, taken in the archives at
Dresden, in spite of the efforts of the electress to conceal it.
Whatever might have been the case in the former war, when he seized on
Silesia, it was apparent to the world, that he now, at least, was
strictly in the right, and that his invasion of Saxony was not less
justifiable on the score of public morality, than important in its
consequences to the great contest in which he was engaged.
The allies made the utmost efforts to regain the advantages they had
lost. France, instead of the 24,000 men she was bound to furnish by the
treaty of partition, put 100,000 on foot; the Diet of Ratisbon placed
60,000 troops of the empire at the disposal of Austria; but Frederick
still preserved the ascendant. Breaking into Bohemia, in March 1757, he
defeated the Austrians in a great battle under the walls of Prague, shut
up 40,000 of their best troops in that town, and soon reduced them to
such extremities, that it was evident, if not succoured, they must
surrender. The cabinet of Vienna made the greatest efforts for their
relief Marshal Daun, whose cautious and scientific policy were
peculiarly calculated to thwart the designs, and baffle the audacity of
his youthful antagonist, advanced at the head of 60,000 men to their
relief. Frederick advanced to meet them with less than 20,000
combatants. He attacked the Imperialists in a strong position at Kolin,
on the 18th July, and, for the first time in his life, met with a bloody
defeat. His army, especially that division commanded by his brother, the
prince-royal, sustained severe losses in the retreat, which became
unavoidable, out of Bohemia; and the king confessed, in his private
correspondence, that an honourable death alone remained to him. Disaster
accumulated on every side. The English and Hanoverian army, his only
allies, capitulated at Closterseven, and left the French army, 70,000
strong, at liberty to follow the Prussians; the French and troops of the
empire, with the Duke of Richelieu at their head, menaced Magdeburg,
where the royal family of Prussia had taken refuge; and advanced towards
Dresden. The Russians, 60,000 strong, were making serious progress on
the side of Poland, and had recently defeated the Prussians opposed to
them. The king was put to the ban of the empire, and the army of the
empire, mustering 40,000, was moving against him. Four huge armies, each
stronger than his own, were advancing to crush a prince who could not
collect 30,000 men round his banners. At that period he carried a sure
poison always with him, determined not to fall alive into the hands of
his enemies. He seriously contemplated suicide, and gave vent to the
mournful, but yet heroic, sentiments with which he was inspired, in a
letter to Voltaire, terminating with the lines--
Pour moi, menaçé de naufrage,
Je dois, en affrontant l’orage
Penser, vivre et mourir en roi.
Then it was that the astonishing vigour and powers of his mind shone
forth with their full lustre. Collecting hastily 25,000 men out of his
shattered battalions, he marched against the Prince of Soubise, who, at
the head of 60,000 French and troops of the empire, was advancing
against him through Thuringia, and totally defeated him, with the loss
of 18,000 men, on the memorable field of Rosbach. Hardly was this
triumph achieved, when he was called, with his indefatigable followers,
to stem the progress of the Prince of Lorraine and Marshal Daun, who
were making the most alarming progress in Silesia. Schweidnitz, its
capital, had fallen: a large body of Prussians, under the Duke de
Bevorn, had been defeated at Breslau. That rich and important province
seemed on the point of falling again into the hands of the Austrians,
when Frederick reinstated his affairs, which seemed wholly desperate, by
one of those astonishing strokes which distinguish him, perhaps, above
any general of modern times. In the depth of winter he attacked, at
Leuthen, on the 5th December, 1757, Marshal Daun and the Prince of
Lorraine,--who had 60,000 admirable troops under their orders,--and, by
the skilful application of the _oblique_ method of attack, defeated them
entirely, with the loss of 30,000 men, of whom 18,000 were prisoners! It
was the greatest victory that had been gained in Europe since the battle
of Blenheim. Its effects were immense: the Austrians were driven
headlong out of Silesia; Schweidnitz was regained; the King of Prussia,
pursuing them, carried the war into Moravia, and laid siege to Olmutz;
and England, awakening, at the voice of Chatham, from its unworthy
slumber, refused to ratify the capitulation of Closterseven, resumed the
war on the continent with more vigour than ever, and intrusted its
direction to Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who soon rivalled Turenne in
the skill and science of his methodical warfare.
But it was the destiny of the King of Prussia--a destiny which displayed
his great qualities in their full lustre--to be perpetually involved in
difficulties, from the enormous numerical preponderance of his enemies,
or the misfortunes of the lieutenants to whom his subordinate armies
were intrusted. Frederick could not be personally present every where at
the same time; and wherever he was absent, disaster revealed the
overwhelming superiority of the force by which he was assailed. The
siege of Olmutz, commenced in March 1758, proved unfortunate. The
battering train, at the disposal of the king, was unequal to its
reduction, and it became necessary to raise it on the approach of Daun
with a formidable Austrian army. During this unsuccessful irruption
into the south, the Russians had been making alarming progress in the
north-east, where the feeble force opposed to them was well-nigh
overwhelmed by their enormous superiority of numbers. Frederick led back
the flower of his army from Olmutz, in Moravia, crossed all Silesia and
Prussia, and encountered the sturdy barbarians at Zorndorf, defeating
them with the loss of 17,000 men, an advantage which delivered the
eastern provinces of the monarchy from this formidable invasion; dearly
purchased, however, by the sacrifice of 10,000 of his own best soldiers.
But, during the king’s absence, Prince Henry of Prussia, whom he had
left in command of 16,000 men, to keep Marshal Daun in check, was
well-nigh overwhelmed by that able commander, who was again at the head
of 50,000 combatants. Frederick flew back to his support, and, having
joined his brother, took post at Hohenkirchen. The position was
unfavourable: the army inferior to the enemy. “If Daun does not attack
us here,” said Marshal Keith, “he deserves to be hanged.” “I hope,”
answered Frederick, “he will be more afraid of us than the rope.” The
Austrian veteran, however, saw his advantage, and attacked the
Prussians, during the night, with such skill, that he threw them into
momentary confusion, took 150 pieces of cannon, and drove them from
their ground, with the loss of 7000 men. Then it was that the courage
and genius of the king shone forth with their full lustre. Though
grievously wounded in the conflict, and after having seen his best
generals fall around him, he rallied his troops at daybreak,--formed
them in good order behind the village which had been surprised, and led
them leisurely to a position a mile from the field of conflict, where he
offered battle to the enemy, who did not venture to accept it. Having
remained two days in this position to re-organize his troops, he
decamped, raised the siege of Niesse, and succeeded in taking up his
winter quarters at Breslau, in the very middle of the province he had
wrested from the enemy.
The campaign of 1759 was still more perilous to Frederick; but, if
possible, it displayed his extraordinary talents in still brighter
colours. He began by observing the Austrians, under Daun and the Prince
of Lorraine, in Silesia, and reserved his strength to combat the
Russians, who were advancing, 80,000 strong, through East Prussia.
Frederick attacked them at Cunnersdorf, with 40,000 only, in an
intrenched position, guarded by 200 pieces of cannon. The first onset of
the Prussians was entirely successful: they forced the front line of the
Russian intrenchment, and took 72 pieces of cannon. But the situation of
the king was such, pressed on all sides by superior armies, that he
could not stop short with ordinary success; and, in the attempt to gain
a decisive victory, he had well-nigh lost all. The heroism of his troops
was shattered against the strength of the second line of the Russians; a
large body of Austrians came up to their support during the battle, and,
after having exhausted all the resources of courage and genius, he was
driven from the field with the loss of 20,000 men and all his artillery.
The Russians lost 18,000 men in this terrible battle, the most bloody
which had been fought for centuries in Europe, and were in no condition
to follow up their victory. Other misfortunes, however, in appearance
overwhelming, succeeded each other. General Schmellau capitulated in
Dresden; and General Finch, with 17,000 men, was obliged to lay down his
arms in the defiles of the Bohemian mountains. All seemed lost; but the
king still persevered, and the victory of Minden enabled Prince
Ferdinand to detach 12,000 men to his support. The Prussians nobly stood
by their heroic sovereign in the hour of trial; new levies supplied the
wide chasms in his ranks. Frederick’s great skill averted all future
disasters, and the campaign of 1759, the _fourth_ of the war, concluded
with the king still in possession of all his dominions in the midst of
the enormous forces of his enemies.
The campaign of 1760 began in March by another disaster at Landshech,
where ten thousand Prussians were cut to pieces, under one of his
generals, and the important fortress of Glatz invested by the Austrians.
Frederick advanced to relieve it; but soon remeasured his steps to
attempt the siege of Dresden. Daun, in his turn, followed him, and
obliged the Prussian monarch to raise the siege; and he resumed his
march into Silesia, closely followed by three armies, each more numerous
than his own, under Laudon, Daun, and Lacey, without their being able to
obtain the slightest advantage over him. Laudon, the most active of
them, attempted to surprise him; but Frederick was aware of his design,
and received the attacking columns in so masterly a manner, that they
were totally defeated, with the loss of 12,000 men. Scarcely had he
achieved this victory, when he had to make head against Lacey, withstand
Daun, repel an enormous body of Russians, who were advancing through
East Prussia, and deliver Berlin, which had been a second time occupied
by his enemies. Driven to desperate measures by such an unparalleled
succession of dangers, he extricated himself from them by the terrible
battle and extraordinary victory of Torgau, on November 3, 1761, in
which, after a dreadful struggle, he defeated Daun, though intrenched to
the teeth, with the loss of 25,000 men--an advantage dearly purchased by
the loss of 18,000 of his own brave soldiers. But this victory saved the
Prussian monarchy: Daun, severely wounded in the battle, retired to
Vienna; the army withdrew into Bohemia; two-thirds of Saxony was
regained by the Prussians; the Russians and Swedes retired; Berlin was
delivered from the enemy; and the fifth campaign terminated with the
unconquerable monarch still in possession of nearly his whole dominions.
The military strength of Prussia was now all but exhausted by the
unparalleled and heroic efforts she had made. Frederick has left us the
following picture of the state of his kingdom and army at this
disastrous period:--“Our condition at that period can only be likened to
that of a man riddled with balls, weakened by the loss of blood, and
ready to sink under the weight of his sufferings. The noblesse was
exhausted, the lower people ruined; numbers of villages burnt, many
towns destroyed; an entire anarchy had overturned the whole order and
police of government: in a word, desolation was universal. The army was
in no better situation. _Seventeen pitched battles_ had mowed down the
flower of the officers and soldiers; the regiments were broken down and
composed in part of deserters and prisoners: order had disappeared and
discipline relaxed to such a degree that the old infantry was little
better than a body of newly-raised militia.”[4] Necessity, not less than
prudence, in these circumstances, which to any other man would have
seemed desperate, prescribed a cautious defensive policy; and it is
doubtful whether in it his greatness did not appear more conspicuous
than in the bolder parts of his former career. The campaign of 1761
passed in skilful marches and countermarches, without his numerous
enemies being able to obtain a single advantage, where the king
commanded in person. He was now, literally speaking, assailed on all
sides: the immense masses of the Austrians and Russians were converging
to one point; and Frederick, who could not muster 40,000 men under his
banners, found himself assailed by 120,000 allies, whom six campaigns
had brought to perfection in the military art. It seemed impossible he
could escape: yet he did so, and compelled his enemies to retire without
gaining the slightest advantage over him. Taking post in an intrenched
camp at Bunzelwitz, fortified with the utmost skill, defended with the
utmost vigilance, he succeeded in maintaining himself and providing his
troops for two months within cannon-shot of the enormous masses of the
Russians and Austrians, till want of provisions obliged them to
separate. “It has just come to this,” said Frederick, “who will starve
first?” He made his enemies do so. Burning with shame, they were forced
to retire to their respective territories, so that he was enabled to
take up his winter quarters at Breslau in Silesia. But, during this
astonishing struggle, disaster had accumulated in other quarters. His
camp at Bunzelwitz had only been maintained by concentrating in it
nearly the whole strength of the monarchy, and its more distant
provinces suffered severely under the drain. Schweidnitz, the capital
of Silesia, was surprised by the Austrians, with its garrison of 4000
men. Prince Henry, after the loss of Dresden, had the utmost difficulty
in maintaining himself in the part of Saxony which still remained to the
Prussians: in Silesia they had lost all but Glogau, Breslau, and Neiss;
and, to complete his misfortune, the dismissal of Lord Chatham from
office in England, had led to the stoppage of the wonted subsidy of
£750,000 a-year. The resolution of the king did not sink, but his
judgment almost despaired of success under such a complication of
disasters. Determined not to yield, he discovered a conspiracy at his
head-quarters, to seize him, and deliver him to his enemies. Dreading
such a calamity more than death, he carried with him, as formerly in
similar circumstances, a sure poison, intended, in the last extremity,
to terminate his days.
“Nevertheless,” as he himself said, “affairs which seemed desperate, in
reality were not so; and perseverance at length surmounted every peril.”
Fortune often, in real life as well as in romance, favours the brave. In
the case of Frederick, however, it would be unjust to say he was
favoured by Fortune. On the contrary, she long proved adverse to him;
and he recovered her smiles only by heroically persevering till the
ordinary chance of human affairs turned in his favour. He accomplished
what in serious cases is the great aim of medicine; he made the patient
survive the disease. In the winter of 1761, the Empress of Russia died,
and was succeeded by Peter III. That prince had long conceived the most
ardent admiration for Frederick, and he manifested it in the most
decisive manner on his accession to the throne, by not only withdrawing
from the alliance, but uniting his forces with those of Prussia against
Austria. This great event speedily changed the face of affairs. The
united Prussians and Russians under Frederick, 70,000 strong, retook
Schweidnitz in the face of Daun, who had only 60,000 men; and, although
the sudden death of the Czar Peter in a few months deprived him of the
aid of his powerful neighbours, yet Russia took no farther part in the
contest. France, exhausted and defeated in every quarter of the globe by
England, could render no aid to Austria, upon whom the whole weight of
the contest fell. It was soon apparent that she was over-matched by the
Prussian hero. Relieved from the load which had so long oppressed him,
Frederick vigorously resumed the offensive. Silesia was wholly regained
by the king in person: the battle of Freyberg gave his brother, Prince
Henry, the ascendant in Saxony; and the cabinet of Vienna, seeing the
contest hopeless, were glad to make peace at Hubertsbourg, on 15th
February, 1763, on terms which left Silesia and his whole dominions to
the King of Prussia.
He entered Berlin in triumph after six years’ absence, in an open
chariot, with Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick seated by his side. No words
can paint the enthusiasm of the spectators at the august spectacle, or
the admiration with which they regarded the hero who had filled the
world with his renown. It was no wonder they were proud of their
sovereign. His like had never been seen in modern times. He had founded
and saved a kingdom. He had conquered Europe in arms. With six millions
of subjects he had vanquished powers possessing ninety millions. He had
created a new era in the art of war. His people were exhausted,
pillaged, ruined; their numbers had declined a tenth during the contest.
But what then? They had come victorious out of a struggle unparalleled
in modern times: the halo of Leuthen and Rosbach, of Zorndorf and
Torgau, played round their bayonets; they were inspired with the energy
which so speedily repairs any disaster. Frederick wisely and
magnanimously laid aside the sword when he resumed the pacific sceptre.
His subsequent reign was almost entirely pacific; all the wounds of war
were speedily healed under his sage and beneficent administration.
Before his death, his subjects were double, and the national wealth
triple what it had been at the commencement of his reign: and Prussia
now boasts of sixteen millions of inhabitants, and a population
increasing faster in numbers and resources than any other state in
Europe.
No laboured character, no studied eulogium, can paint Frederick like
this brief and simple narrative of his exploits. It places him at once
at the head of modern generals,--if Hannibal be excepted, perhaps of
ancient and modern. He was not uniformly successful: on the contrary, he
sustained several dreadful defeats. But that arose from the enormous
superiority of force by which he was assailed, and the desperate state
of his affairs, which were generally so pressing, that a respite even in
one quarter could be obtained only by a victory instantly gained, under
whatever circumstances, in another. What appears rashness was often in
him the height of wisdom. He could protract the struggle only by strong
and vigorous strokes and the lustre of instant success, and they could
not be dealt out without risking receiving as many. The fact of his
maintaining the struggle against such desperate odds proves the general
wisdom of his policy. No man ever made more skilful use of an interior
line of communication, or flew with such rapidity from one threatened
part of his dominions to another. None ever, by the force of skill in
tactics and sagacity in strategy, gained such astonishing successes with
forces so inferior. And if some generals have committed fewer faults,
none were impelled by such desperate circumstances to a hazardous
course, and none had ever so much magnanimity in confessing and
explaining them for the benefit of future times.
The only general in modern times who can bear a comparison with
Frederick, if the difficulties of his situation are considered, is
Napoleon. It is a part only of his campaigns, however, which sustains
the analogy. There is no resemblance between the mighty conqueror
pouring down the valley of the Danube, at the head of 180,000 men,
invading Russia with 500,000, or overrunning Spain with 300,000, and
Frederick the Great with 30,000 or 40,000, turning every way against
quadruple the number of Austrians, French, Swedes, and Russians. Yet a
part, and the most brilliant part of Napoleon’s career, bears a close
resemblance to that of the Prussian hero. In Lombardy in 1796, in Saxony
in 1813, and in the plains of Champaigne in 1814, he was upon the whole
inferior in force to his opponents, and owed the superiority which he
generally enjoyed on the point of attack to the rapidity of his
movements, and the skill with which, like Frederick, he availed himself
of an interior line of communication. His immortal campaign in France in
1814, in particular, where he bore up with 70,000 men against 250,000
enemies, bears the closest resemblance to those which Frederick
sustained for six years against the forces of the Coalition. Rapidity of
movement, skill in strategy, and the able use of an interior line of
communication, were what enabled both to compensate a prodigious
inferiority of force. Both were often to appearance rash, because the
affairs of each were so desperate, that nothing could save them but an
audacious policy. Both were indomitable in resolution, and preferred
ruin and death to sitting down on a dishonoured throne. Both were from
the outset of the struggle placed in circumstances apparently hopeless,
and each succeeded in protracting it solely by his astonishing talent
and resolution. The fate of the two was widely different: the one
transmitted an honoured and aggrandized throne to his successors; the
other, overthrown and discrowned, terminated his days on the rock of St.
Helena. But success is not always the test of real merit: the verdict of
ages is often different from the judgment of present times. Hannibal
conquered, has left a greater name among men than Scipio victorious. In
depth of thought, force of genius, variety of information, and splendour
of success, Frederick will bear no comparison with Napoleon. But
Frederick’s deeds as a general were more extraordinary than those of the
French emperor, because he bore up longer against greater odds. It is
the highest praise of Napoleon to say, that he did in one campaign--his
last and greatest--what Frederick had done in six.
If the campaigns of Eugene and Frederick suggest a comparison with those
of Napoleon, those of Marlborough challenge a parallel with those of the
other great commander of our day--Wellington. Their political and
military situations were in many respects alike. Both combated at the
head of the forces of an alliance, composed of dissimilar nations,
actuated by separate interests, inflamed by different passions. Both had
the utmost difficulty in soothing their jealousies and stifling their
selfishness; and both found themselves often more seriously impeded by
the allied cabinets in their rear, than by the enemy’s forces in their
front. Both were the generals of a nation, which, albeit covetous of
military glory, and proud of warlike renown, is to the last degree
impatient of previous preparation, and frets at the cost of wars, which
its political position renders unavoidable, or its ambitious spirit had
readily undertaken. Both were compelled to husband the blood of their
soldiers, and spare the resources of their governments, from the
consciousness that they had already been strained to the uttermost in
the cause, and that any farther demands would render the war so
unpopular as speedily to lead to its termination. The career of both
occurred at a time when political passions were strongly roused in their
country; when the war in which they were engaged was waged against the
inclination, and, in appearance at least, against the interests of a
large and powerful party at home, which sympathized from political
feeling with their enemies, and were ready to decry every success and
magnify every disaster of their own arms, from a secret feeling that
their party elevation was identified rather with the successes of the
enemy than with those of their own countrymen. The Tories were to
Marlborough precisely what the Whigs were to Wellington. Both were
opposed to the armies of the most powerful monarch, led by the most
renowned generals of Europe, whose forces, preponderating over the
adjoining states, had come to threaten the liberties of all Europe, and
at length produced a general coalition to restrain the ambition from
which so much detriment had already been experienced.
But while in these respects the two British heroes were placed very much
in the same circumstances, in other particulars, not less material,
their situations were widely different. Marlborough had never any
difficulties approaching those which beset Wellington to struggle with.
By great exertions, both on his own part and that of the British and
Dutch governments, his force was generally equal to that with which he
had to contend. It was often exactly so. War at that period, in the Low
Countries at least, consisted chiefly of a single battle during a
campaign, followed by the siege of two or three frontier fortresses. The
number of strongholds with which the country bristled, rendered any
farther or more extensive operations, in general, impossible. This state
of matters at once rendered success more probable to a general of
superior abilities, and made it more easy to repair disaster. No
vehement passions had been roused, bringing whole nations into the
field, and giving one state, where they had burnt the fiercest, a vast
superiority in point of numbers over its more pacific or less excited
neighbours. But in all these respects, the circumstances in which
Wellington was placed, were not only not parallel--they were contrasted.
From first to last, in the Peninsula, he was enormously outnumbered by
the enemy. Until the campaign of 1813, when his force in the field was,
for the first time, equal to that of the French, the superiority to
which he was opposed was so prodigious, that the only surprising thing
is, how he was not driven into the sea in the very first encounter.
While the French had never less than 200,000, sometimes as many as
260,000 effective troops at their disposal, after providing for all
their garrisons and communications, the English general had never more
than 30,000 effective British and 20,000 Portuguese around his standard.
The French were directed by the Emperor, who, intent on the subjugation
of the Peninsula, and wielding the inexhaustible powers of the
conscription for the supply of his armies, cared not though he lost
100,000 men, so as he purchased success by their sacrifice in every
campaign. Wellington was supported at home by a government, which,
raising its soldiers by voluntary enrolment, could with difficulty
supply a drain of 15,000 men a-year from their ranks, and watched by a
party which decried every advantage, and magnified every disaster, in
order to induce the entire withdrawal of the troops from the Peninsula.
Napoleon sent into Spain a host of veterans trained in fifteen years’
combats, who had carried the French standards into every capital of
Europe. Wellington led to this encounter troops admirably disciplined,
indeed, but almost all unacquainted with actual war, and who had often
to learn the rudiments even of the most necessary field operations in
presence of the enemy. Marlborough’s troops, though heterogeneous and
dissimilar, had been trained to their practical duties in the preceding
wars under William III., and brought into the field a degree of
experience noways inferior to that of their opponents. Whoever weighs
with impartiality those different circumstances, cannot avoid arriving
at the conclusion that as Wellington’s difficulties were incomparably
more formidable than Marlborough’s, so his merit, in surmounting them,
was proportionally greater.
Though similar in many respects, so far as the general conduct of their
campaigns is concerned, from the necessity under which both laboured of
husbanding the blood of their soldiers, the military qualities of
England’s two chiefs were essentially different, and each possessed some
points in which he was superior to the other. By nature Wellington was
more daring than Marlborough, and though soon constrained, by necessity,
to adopt a cautious system, he continued, throughout all his career, to
incline more to a hazardous policy. The intrepid advance and fight at
Assaye; the crossing of the Douro and movement on Talavera in 1809; the
advance to Madrid and Burgos in 1812; the actions before Bayonne in
1813; the desperate stand made at Waterloo in 1815--place this beyond a
doubt. Marlborough never hazarded so much on the success of a single
enterprise: he ever aimed at compassing his objects by skill and
combination, rather than risking them on the chance of arms. Wellington
was a mixture of Turenne and Eugene: Marlborough was the perfection of
the Turenne school alone. No man could fight more ably and gallantly
than Marlborough: his talent and rapidity of eye in tactics were, at
least, equal to his skill in strategy and previous combination. But he
was not partial to such desperate passages at arms, and never resorted
to them, but from necessity or the emergency of a happy opportunity for
striking a blow. The proof of this is decisive. Marlborough, during ten
campaigns, fought only five pitched battles. Wellington in seven fought
fifteen, in every one of which he proved victorious.[5]
Marlborough’s consummate generalship, throughout his whole career, kept
him out of disaster. It was said, with justice, that he never fought a
battle which he did not gain, nor laid siege to a town which he did not
take. He took above twenty fortified places of the first order,
generally in presence of an enemy’s army superior to his own.
Wellington’s bolder disposition, more frequently involved him in peril,
and on some occasions caused serious losses to his army; but they were
the price at which he purchased his transcendent successes. But
Wellington’s bolder strategy gained for him advantages which the more
circumspect measures of his predecessor never could have attained.
Marlborough would never, with scarcely any artillery, have hazarded the
attack on Burgos, nor incurred the perilous chances of the retreat from
that town; but he never would have delivered the South of the Peninsula
in a single campaign, by throwing himself, with 40,000 men, upon the
communications, in the North, of 200,000. It is hard to say which was
the greater general, if their merits in the field alone are considered;
but Wellington’s successes were the more vital to his country, for they
delivered it from the greater peril; and they were more honourable to
himself, for they were achieved against greater odds. And his fame, in
future times, will be proportionally brighter; for the final overthrow
of Napoleon, and destruction of the revolutionary power, in a single
battle, present an object of surpassing interest, to which there is
nothing in history, perhaps, parallel, and which, to the latest
generation, will fascinate the minds of men.
The examination of the comparative merits of these two illustrious
generals, and the enumeration of the names of their glorious triumphs,
suggests one reflection of a very peculiar kind. That England is a
maritime power, that the spirit of her inhabitants is essentially
nautical, and that the sea is the element on which her power has chiefly
been developed, need be told to none who reflect on the magnitude of her
present colonial empire, and how long she has wielded the empire of the
waves. The French are the first to tell us that her strength is confined
to that element; that she is, at land, only a third-rate power; and that
the military career does not suit the genius of her people. How, then,
has it happened that England, the nautical power, and little inured to
land operations, has inflicted greater wounds upon France by _military_
success, than any other power, and that in almost all the pitched
battles which the two nations have fought, during five centuries, the
English have proved victorious? That England’s military force is
absorbed in the defence of a colonial empire which encircles the earth,
is indeed certain, and, in every age, the impatience of taxation in her
people has starved down her establishment, during peace, to so low a
point, as rendered the occurrence of disaster, in the first years
consequent on the breaking out of war, a matter of certainty; while the
military spirit of its neighbours has kept theirs at the level which
ensures early success. Yet with all these disadvantages, and with a
population which, down to the close of the last war, was little more
than half that of France, she has inflicted far greater _land_ disasters
on her redoubtable neighbour than all the military monarchies of Europe
put together.
English armies, for 120 years, ravaged France: they have twice taken its
capital; an English king was crowned at Paris; a French king rode
captive through London; a French emperor died in English captivity, and
his remains were surrendered by English generosity. Twice the English
horse marched from Calais to the Pyrenees; the monuments of Napoleon in
the French capital at this moment, owe their preservation from German
revenge to an English general. All the great disasters and days of
mourning for France, since the battle of Hastings,--Tenchebray, Cressy,
Poitiers, Azincour, Verneuil, Blenheim, Oudenarde, Ramilies, Malplaquet,
Minden, Quebec, Egypt, Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria, Orthes, the
Pyrenees, Waterloo,--were all gained by English generals, and won, for
the most part, by English soldiers. Even at Fontenoy, the greatest
victory over England of which France can boast since Hastings, every
regiment in the French army was, on their own admission, routed by the
terrible English column, and victory was snatched from its grasp solely
by want of support on the part of the Dutch and Austrians. No coalition
against France has ever been successful, in which England did not take a
prominent part; none, in the end, failed of gaining its objects, in
which she stood foremost in the fight. This fact is so apparent on the
surface of history, that it is admitted by the ablest French historians,
though they profess themselves unable to explain it.
Is it that there is a degree of hardihood and courage in the Anglo-Saxon
race which renders them, without the benefit of previous experience in
war, adequate to the conquest, on land, even of the most warlike
Continental military nations? Is it that the quality of dogged
resolution, determination not to be conquered, is of such value in war,
that it compensates almost any degree of inferiority in the practical
acquaintance with war? Is it that the North brings forth a bolder race
of men than the South, and that, other things being equal, the people in
a more rigorous climate will vanquish those in a more genial? Is it that
the free spirit which, in every age, has distinguished the English
people, has communicated a degree of vigour and resolution to their
warlike operations, which has rendered them so often victorious in land
fights, albeit nautical and commercial in their ideas, over their
military neighbours? Or is it, that this courage in war, and this vigour
in peace, and this passion for freedom at all times, arise from and are
but symptoms of an ardent and aspiring disposition, imprinted by Nature
on the races to whom was destined the dominion of half the globe?
Experience has not yet determined to which of these causes this most
extraordinary fact has been owing; but it is one upon which our military
neighbours, and especially the French, would do well to ponder, now that
the population of the British isles will, on the next census, be _thirty
millions_. If England has done such things in Continental warfare, with
an army which never brought fifty thousand native British sabres and
bayonets into the field, what would be the result if national distress
or necessities, or a change in the objects of general desire, were to
send two hundred thousand?
LAYS AND LEGENDS OF THE THAMES.