WAYNE AND FALLEN TIMBER
The defeat of St. Clair's army cast a nation into gloom. As the terrible
tidings sped eastward a thousand frontier cabins were filled with
dismayed men, women, and children. The passion into which it is said the
patient Washington was thrown, upon hearing the melancholy story, was
typical of the feeling of a whole people. There could be no doubt, now,
what the future would bring forth; a deluge of raiding savages, such as
had never overrun the frontiers since Braddock's defeat in 1755, would
certainly come; the desperate cry, "White men shall not plant corn north
of the Ohio," would now ring out over the thin fringe of frightened
settlements on the Miami and Muskingum, and with that cry would come
frenzied raiders from whose tomahawks men would do well to escape death
and women be fortunate if they were quickly killed. From all the
western settlements in Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania a cry, anxious
and often piteous, was hurried over the mountains to Philadelphia for
aid and protection.
The young government now faced a problem difficult in the extreme with
fine courage, fully conscious of its own dignity and its own latent
power. Within six weeks of St. Clair's annihilation, the Secretary of
War submitted a statement to Congress which summed up the situation
briefly and clearly. The former treaties with the Indians, the efforts
for peace, the sorry details of the campaign were all described.
Peaceful and warlike efforts, alike, had failed. So much for the past.
For the future, the plan was already formulated and ready for adoption
by Congress. First, the war must be brought to an end; if peace could be
secured without further resort to arms, well and good; "it is
submitted," read the Secretary's communication, "that every reasonable
expedient be again taken ... that the nature of the case, and a just
regard to the national reputation, will admit." Those in best position
to judge, however, were sure that the pride of victory was so strong
among the confederated nations that "it would be altogether improper to
expect any favorable result from such [peaceful] expedients," and
Congress was warned accordingly that it was "by an ample conviction of
superior force only, that the Indians can be brought to listen to the
dictates of peace on reasonable terms." It was properly insisted that
relinquishment of territory formerly ceded by the savages could not be
arranged "consistently with a proper regard to national reputation." The
plan included the organization of a new army, comprising three hundred
cavalry, three hundred artillerymen, and five regiments of infantry of
four thousand five hundred and sixty men. It was to be styled "The
Legion of the United States," and was to be divided into four
sub-legions of one thousand two hundred and eighty non-commissioned
officers and privates each. The mistakes of the past dictated the
necessity of having this force disciplined "according to the nature of
the service;" its ultimate object was to establish a strong post on the
present site of Fort Wayne, Indiana.
To secure a comprehensive grasp of the interesting campaign now
undertaken, it is necessary to keep in mind simultaneously three
situations: this new army, the moving companies of peace commissioners,
and that ragged pathway northward from Fort Washington with the little
stockade forts which guarded it. These varying phases will be treated
chronologically, at the risk of coherency, and the scattered threads
gathered much in the tangled order in which they were spun amid many
hopes and many fears.
One of the first important matters, in this as in previous campaigns,
was to retain the neutrality of the Six Nations. The efforts in the year
preceding had been approximately successful, though, according to his
biographer, Stone, Joseph Brant with a party of Mohawks was present at
St. Clair's defeat. As early as January 9, 1792, an express was hurried
off to the Reverend Samuel Kirtland, veteran missionary among the
Iroquois, informing him that Colonel Pickering had invited the
principal chiefs of the Six Nations to visit Washington. He was urged to
assist in securing their acquiescence, especially Joseph Brant's, and to
accompany them on the journey.
The next act of Secretary Knox is peculiarly significant and
interesting. Captain Peter Pond, a trader, and one William Steedman were
ordered to proceed westward to the hostile tribes on the Maumee,
feigning to be traders. "No doubt can exist," wrote Knox, "that our
strength and our resources are abundant to conquer, and even extirpate
the Indians.... But this is not our object. We wish to be at peace with
those Indians--to be their friends and protectors--to perpetuate them on
the land. The desire, therefore, that we have for peace, must not be
inconsistent with the national reputation. We cannot ask the Indians to
make peace with us, considering them as the aggressors: but they must
ask a peace of us. To persuade them to this effect is the object of your
mission. Insinuate, upon all favorable occasions, the humane disposition
of the United States; and, if you can by any means ripen their
judgement, so as to break forth openly [disclose yourselves], and
declare the readiness of the United States to receive, with open arms,
the Indians, ... do it.... You might persuade some of the most
influential chiefs to repair to our posts on the Ohio, and so, from post
to post, to this place."[126] Perhaps never in warfare were spies sent
amongst an enemy on so remarkable a mission.
In response to the Government's invitation, fifty Indian chieftains from
the Six Nations arrived in Philadelphia on March 13. They were treated
with utmost courtesy by the government officials and proper gifts
distributed. Among other benefits, fifteen hundred dollars a year was
promised by the United States to be spent encouraging education and
agriculture in the Iroquois land. The chief boon secured by this display
of hospitality and liberality was the promise that the Six Nations would
wholly abstain from war and would immediately send a delegation to the
western tribes to mediate between them and the United States, secure an
armistice, and make plans for a final treaty of peace. In this promise
the Government placed great hope. The Six Nations were the most
prominent of their race on the continent and their chieftains exerted an
influence equaled by none. Having received, in person, from the nation's
highest executive officers, protestations of friendliest nature, they
were the best emissaries that could possibly treat with the hostile
tribes on the Maumee on behalf of the Government.
Yet efforts to avert war did not stop here. By May it was determined to
send an envoy extraordinary to the Maumee, if the hazard could possibly
be accomplished. The Iroquois chiefs would, it was believed, keep their
solemn pledges, yet affairs of such a nature usually developed very
slowly among red-men and in the present crisis there was no time to be
lost. Accordingly a fitting personage was chosen by President Washington
to make the perilous attempt. His choice fell quickly on the brave
leader of the Ohio Company pioneers to Marietta--General Rufus Putnam.
Sufficient provision for his family in case of a disastrous termination
of his journey being promised by the Government, the quiet, bold pioneer
departed from his frontier home on May 22 for Fort Washington. His
instructions were explicit. He was first to assure the hostile nations
that the United States did not in the least desire any of the Indian's
land, but rather solemnly pledged itself to "guaranty all that remain,
and take the Indians under our protection." In turn the Indians were to
agree to a truce and call in all war-parties. The most prominent chiefs
were to be invited to Philadelphia to make a treaty; on his way westward
General Putnam was empowered to release all Indian prisoners retained at
Fort Washington and give the women presents to carry home with them in
token of the Government's pacific intentions.[127]
The frontier to which Putnam now came was in need of brave men and
strong. These had been long months since that dark November day when the
remains of St. Clair's shattered army poured back upon Fort Jefferson
and Fort Hamilton, Brigadier-general Wilkinson now commanded at Fort
Washington and with a firm hand was managing affairs on the firing-line.
His outposts, Forts Hamilton and Jefferson, were frequently surrounded
by Indian scouts sent down the narrow trace from Little Turtle's
cantonments on the Maumee, but no attack on these posts had yet been
made in force. Such an attack was frequently anticipated, and many
sudden calls to arms sounded now and again within the little garrisons
lost so far within the northern forests. The brave Captain John
Armstrong still commanded at Fort Hamilton, guarding the strategic ford
of the Great Miami and the narrow roadway toward Fort Jefferson and the
silent corpse-strewn battle-ground beyond. Wilkinson's principal duty
was to keep the garrisons of his three little forts alive and in heart,
and keep a watchful eye on the victorious enemy. In January, calling on
volunteers from the country about Cincinnati, Wilkinson organized a
little company to visit St. Clair's slaughter-ground. The snow was two
feet deep--a depth seldom if ever exceeded in southwestern Ohio.
Kentucky volunteers crossed the Ohio on ice above the mouth of the
Little Miami. Leaving Fort Washington January 25, the fatal field was
reached February 1. Such was the depth of snow that comparatively few
bodies could be found, save as here and there, on knolls and ridges, a
white mound of driven snow marked where a wolf had left a scalped and
mangled corpse. The winter of 1791-92 likewise witnessed the erection of
an intermediary post between Forts Hamilton and Jefferson, most
appropriately named Fort St. Clair. It was erected by a body of men
under command of Captain John S. Gano, under whom William Henry Harrison
served, half a mile west of the present site of Eaton, Preble County, at
St. Clair's Crossing of "Garrison Branch" of Seven Mile Creek.
As the spring of 1792 opened, and the forest roads became passable, it
was expected that the Indians, by a concerted movement, would attempt to
sweep the three forts north of the Ohio and make good their unjust claim
to possession of that northern shore.
Accordingly spies were kept well out on the trails for any sign of an
advancing army. Others were sent nearer the Indian's lair. On April 7
two messengers, Freeman and Gerrard, were sent from Fort Washington with
a speech to the hostile tribes, being ordered to follow Harmar's Trace
up the Little and Great Miamis. Three days later Wilkinson sent word to
Armstrong to order out a spy by way of St. Clair's road, who should
carefully study the route all the way to the Miami towns. Accordingly
one of the boldest men on the frontier, William May, was ordered to
"desert" to the enemy and, shaving his head and adopting their dress and
manner of living, to learn all that was being planned and done in the
red-men's camps. On May 12 Sergeant Reuben Reynolds was ordered to
"desert" from Fort St. Clair and also follow St. Clair's route to the
Maumee and reside with the Indians until a favorable opportunity to
return occurred. On May 20 Colonel Hardin and Captain Alexander Trueman
left Fort Washington for the Maumee, bearing an official message from
the Government, of similar tenor to that given to General Putnam. Thus
six men had preceded Putnam to the Maumee, and only two of them went
merely as spies--May and Reynolds. The fate of four of these men
dampened the ardor of the frontier people for peaceful efforts. Freeman,
Gerrard, Trueman, and Hardin were all murdered before reaching the
Maumee. Reynolds and May returned in safety later in the year.
General Putnam learned at Fort Washington of the fate of his
predecessors and determined not to throw life away uselessly. Favorable
messages having been received from the upper Wabash, he turned all his
efforts toward securing a meeting with the Wabash Indians in the fall of
the year at Vincennes, Indiana. No more attempts were made to reach the
Maumee over the "Bloody Way," as the Indians termed the route north from
Fort Washington. "The President of the United States must know well why
the blood is so deep in our paths," exclaimed a Shawanese chieftain,
"... he has sent messengers of peace on these bloody roads, who fell on
the way." A messenger was even now preparing to come this way to whom
bloody roads were not new and for whom they had no fear. Leaving the
Indian commissioners going slowly on their way to a conference with the
hostile tribes at "Auglaize"--the mouth of the Auglaize River where
Defiance, Ohio, now stands--and Putnam waiting for the Weas and
Kickapoos to assemble at Vincennes, let us look back to the gathering
"Legion of the United States" into whose ready hands the matter of peace
would go when the Indians got courage enough to throw off the mask.
It was one thing to plan an army on paper but a far more serious task to
raise and organize it. And first and foremost arose the trebly difficult
task of choosing a leader. The officers of Revolutionary days were fast
passing into old age, and as Washington looked about him to the comrades
of former years, there were few left capable of taking up the difficult
task that St. Clair laid down. A memorandum left by Washington indicates
the serious necessity of a wise choice and the nature of the possible
candidates. Lincoln was sober, honest, and brave, but infirm and past
the vigor of life; Baron Steuben, a stickler for tactics, was likewise
sober and brave and sensible, but a foreigner; Moultrie was brave and
had fought against the Cherokees, but Washington knew little of him;
McIntosh was considered honest and brave but was not well known and
consequently not popular, and was infirm; Wayne was "More active and
enterprising than Judicious and cautious. No oeconomist it is
feared:--open to flattery--vain--easily imposed upon and liable to be
drawn into scrapes. Too indulgent (the effect perhaps of some of the
causes just mentioned) to his Officers. Whether sober--or a little
addicted to the bottle I know not;" Weedon was not deficient of resource
and was of a convivial nature though not unduly so; Hand was sensible
and judicious and not intemperate; Scott was brave and "means well" but
not suited for extensive command, convivial; Huntington, sober,
sensible, discreet; Wilkinson, lively, sensible, pompous, and ambitious,
"whether sober or not I do not know;" Gist, activity and attention
doubtful, but of noble spirit; Irvine, sober, tolerably sensible,
prudent, an "oeconomist;" Morgan, fortunate and had met with _éclat_,
possibly intemperate, troubled with palpitation and illiterate; Williams
sensible though vain, in poor health; Putnam, (Rufus) strong-minded,
discreet, "nothing conspicuous in character ... known little out of his
own State and a narrow circle;" Pinckney, brave, honorable, erudite,
sensible and a stickler for tactics.[128]
No other officers are named as possible candidates for a position no one
could possibly desire. As the list stands, it forms a startling
refutation of the oft repeated saying that though drinking was common in
the old days it was not carried to excess. The problem with Washington
seems to have been, speaking mildly, to find a responsible man with a
clear head. His decision at first seems to have wavered between Lincoln
and Moultrie; under these men as major-generals, Wayne, Morgan, and
Wilkinson might serve as brigadiers. What may have induced the final
decision cannot be stated definitely, but the command was at last
offered to Brevet Major-general "Mad" Anthony Wayne and it was accepted.
Brevet Brigadier-generals Wilkinson and Thomas Posey were second in
active command. Major-general Scott was to command fifteen hundred
mounted Kentucky militia.
As with Washington, so with Wayne, the most serious task was to choose
his officers from the recruits which early in 1792 were hurried on to
Pittsburg to defend the frontier under the dashing hero of Stony
Point--Wayne's appointment having been well received everywhere save in
Virginia and Kentucky. If the army was to be disciplined "according to
the nature of the service"--Indian-fighting--Indian-fighters must do the
training. "We will be under the necessity," wrote Wayne to Knox from
Pittsburg, "of discharging many of the men--who never were--nor never
will be fit for service, they are at present a nuisance to the Legion &
a useless expense to the publick.... You may rest assured I will
carefully guard against improper appointments or recommendations--we
shall have some difficulty before we can purge the Legion of Characters
who never were fit for Officers."[129] Such administrative ability as
this was the very thing needed on the frontier; it drove from the
gathering army many useless characters and made possible the
encouragement and promotion of such valuable men as Lieutenant William
Clark (of Lewis and Clark fame), Eaton, and William Henry Harrison. The
fine spirit of Wayne infused courage throughout the frontier and made
men eager to serve and win promotion, though sometimes "without shoez or
shirts called upon to do the hardest duty & 7 mo. pay due--while they
have not money to buy a chew of tobacco."[130]
One of the most interesting manuscripts now extant of Wayne, his army,
its marches and battles, is preserved in the library of the State
Historical Society of Wisconsin. Its author was no less a personage than
Brigadier-general Thomas Posey, associated with General Wilkinson as
second in command of the army. General Posey's journal continually
emphasizes the human element in the scenes through which he passed, and
frequent side-lights from this hitherto unused source will be introduced
in this narrative.[131] Posey reached Pittsburg on August 2. "As we
passed through the upper part of Virginia," he leaves record of the
journey across the mountains, "the people would often say what a pitty,
such a likely parcel of young men were Going to be Slaughtered by the
indians as Gen^l St Clair's army was." One of the most striking
observations of Pittsburg was the ominous statement, "at least one half
of the People of Pittsburg are in mourning for Gen^l Richard Butler."
Throughout the summer the gathering troops remained at Pittsburg while
rigid examinations and drilling exercises were begun. On November 28 the
army moved down the Ohio to a distance of seven miles above Fort
McIntosh at the mouth of Beaver Creek and twenty-two miles below
Pittsburg; this place was accordingly named Legionville. Here, "out of
the reach of whisky, which baneful poison is prohibited from entering
this camp," as Wayne wrote the Secretary of War,[132] winter quarters
were established, houses for the soldiers being erected first and those
for officers afterward. Severe daily drilling was the order of the day
at Legionville, the result of which, though delayed, was sure.
While Wayne was whipping an army into shape on the upper Ohio two events
were on the tapis at opposite corners of the Black Forest of the West to
which the officials at Philadelphia were paying much heed. At Vincennes,
on the twentieth of September, Putnam was scheduled to meet the
delegates of the Wabash Nations for a treaty of peace, and early in
October the commissioners from the Six Nations were to meet the chiefs
of the disaffected northwestern tribes at the mouth of the Auglaize on
the broad Maumee. At Vincennes Putnam accomplished all that could have
been expected, and a treaty was signed by thirty-one Wabash chiefs on
September 27. The treaty, finally, was not ratified by the United
States Senate because of an objectionable clause which was not
compatible with the law of eminent domain.[133]
Where Defiance, Ohio, now stands, flanked by its two rivers, one of the
most unique conventions in our history assembled as the autumn winds
stirred the forests. From the east, Cornplanter and a stately retinue of
forty-eight chiefs of the Six Nations proceeded to "Au Glaize." From
even the far-away Canadian Nations emissaries arrived. When at last the
famous convention assembled, and the pipe passed from chieftain to
chieftain, two speakers, only, addressed the assembly. Red Jacket spoke
for the Senecas and the delegation from the Iroquois land. A Shawanese
chieftain, whose name was not recorded, answered on the part of the
hostile tribes. His words were a bold rebuke to the Six Nations for
maintaining friendship with the United States. "... although you
consider us your younger brothers," sneered the Shawanese, "your seats
are not at such a distance, but what we can see your conduct plainly;
these are the reasons why we consider you to speak from the outside of
your lips; for whenever you hear the voice of the United States, you
immediately take your packs and attend their councils.... We see plainly
folded under your arm the voice of the United States--wish you to unfold
it to us, that we may see it freely and consult on it." So saying he
threw a triple string of wampum across the fire to the Senecas rather
than handing it across in a friendly way. That Philadelphia conference
of last March did not please the western tribes.
In turn the Seneca sketched the story of the French and English
domination and of the birth of the United States, which, he said,
desired peace with the confederated Indians. The Shawanese repeated the
story of St. Clair's disaster of the year before and asserted that the
Indians claimed certain lands east of the Ohio and all lands west of
that river. Those to the eastward would be given up for proper
compensation. In reply to the Seneca's desire to bring about a treaty
with the hostile nations, the Shawanese replied: "Inform General
Washington we will treat with him, at the Rapids of Miami, next spring,
or at the time when the leaves are fully out.... We will lay the bloody
tomahawk aside, until we hear from the President of the United
States...."[134] Cornplanter returned eastward with his delegation and
the reports of the convention were hurried on to Philadelphia with the
ominous hint that no boundary would ever be consented to by the
northwestern Indians save only the Ohio River. The message as it spread
across the Alleghenies brought dark days and anxious nights to cabins on
the thin fringe of pioneer settlements from the Muskingum to the Miami.
As the winter winds came down from the north, two of the spies sent out
from Fort Washington came in from the forests--May from Niagara and
Reynolds from Montreal. Leaving Fort Hamilton, May crossed St. Clair's
battlefield; beyond, in Harmar's trail, he found Trueman and two other
men killed and scalped; captured, he was saved from death by Simon Girty
and sold to Matthew Elliott, in whose employ he labored on the lakes. In
numerous instances he identified scalps of friends, in particular that
of Colonel Hardin. In September Girty had gone on a raiding expedition
to "Fallentimber" between Forts St. Clair and Hamilton to capture
horses, saying that he would "do every mischief in his power" and "raise
hell to prevent a peace."[135] Reuben Reynolds, after varied
experiences, came down from Montreal through the Vermont forests to
Philadelphia, where his deposition was taken by Washington's secretary,
Lear, October 19. The Lake Superior Indians had joined the confederacy
and "they expected to have three thousand or three thousand five
hundred Indians in the field against the Americans."[136] May, with
equally exaggerated reports, affirmed that there were "3,600 warriors"
at the Auglaize River.[137] Not long after this Wayne entertained at his
camp at Legionville several of the chiefs of the Allegheny, Cornplanter,
New Arrow, Big Tree, and Guasutha. Pointing to the Ohio from where he
sat, one of them--according to Posey's journal--said: "My Heart & mind
is fixed on that River & may that water Continue to run & remain the
boundary of everlasting Peice, between the white & Red People on its
opposite shores."
Few who had been watching the western situation believed but that spring
would bring war. The Indians did not even keep the promised truce. Major
Adair, encamped beside the "Bloody Way" within sight of Fort St. Clair,
was murderously attacked by Indians early in the morning of November 6.
Six whites were killed and five wounded and a large number of packhorses
purloined. However few attacks such as this occurred along the
frontier. In March, President Washington appointed the commissioners who
were to treat with the Indians at the rapids of the Maumee "when the
leaves are fully out." Benjamin Lincoln, Beverly Randolph, and Timothy
Pickering were appointed, and received their commissions April 26.
General Lincoln left on the twenty-seventh with the baggage for Niagara
by way of the Mohawk Valley; Pickering and Randolph left Philadelphia by
way of the Susquehanna on April 30.
On the same day another delegation departed from the upper Ohio for the
West but not altogether on a peaceful mission; it was Wayne's army,
disciplined, hardened, and eager for the long-anticipated conflict. To
Wayne, war seemed inevitable; when informed that the commissioners were
to be sent to the Maumee according to agreement, he playfully expressed
a desire to be present "with 2500 of his commissioners in company, with
not a single Quaker among them!" Before leaving Legionville he had
ordered a number of color flags for the sub-legions of the Secretary of
War saying, with the confidence of a man who could not but win, "they
shall never be lost."
Thus the third army of the United States floated down the winding Ohio
in April, 1793. No other army on the Ohio, since the day Forbes's and
Bouquet's British regulars left Fort Pitt, could be compared with it in
discipline and trustworthiness. Harmar's and St. Clair's armies were
rabbles beside it. Yet there had been a great struggle to secure proper
subordination of officers and proper loyalty on the part of the rank and
file. Liberty meant license on the frontier, and here lay Wayne's
heaviest task and greatest victory. With a trained, sober army victory
was a matter of time only. However, the Government still looked for a
happy outcome of the convention at the rapids of the Maumee; and Wayne
was strictly ordered to make no hostile movement until the result of
that meeting was known. It was expected that, by August 1, the question
of war or peace would have been decided. Wayne landed, and encamped
about a mile below Fort Washington, where the high waters left only one
convenient spot, which was accordingly dubbed "Hobson's Choice." The
encampment extended to within four hundred yards of the village of
Cincinnati, according to the Posey journal. From this village and its
stock "of ardent spirit and caitiff wretches to dispose of it" Wayne was
anxious to be separated.
The summer passed slowly, and each day's tidings from the north was
awaited with such patience as could be mustered. Faithful drilling,
interrupted by fevers and influenza, was the order of the day, according
to General Posey's record. The number of challenges and duels suggests
something of the social order. On one occasion an officer challenged one
of his superiors who, in reply, had him arrested to obviate an
encounter. In June a premature report came that the peace commissioners
had failed in their mission. "We now have but one alternative left,"
wrote Posey, "and this is We must meet the Savage foe, The Emortal
Washington at the Head of our Government, and the Old hero Gen^l Wayne
and His well disciplined Legion, we have little to fear accept our god
and fear him in love." The summer wore on with little or no definite
tidings from the north. The troops were exercised daily and the
necessities of the possible campaign were pushed on up the line of forts
from the Ohio River to Fort Jefferson. Contractors and quartermasters
were kept busy supplying the comparatively large army. The army and the
nation waited for word from the rapids of the Maumee. What would that
word be?
As the leaves began to open, the emissaries of a hundred Indian nations
were threading the forests of the Old Northwest and Canada upon trails
converging on the western shore of Lake Erie. Roche de Bout,[138] as the
locality of the "Rapids of the Miami of the Lakes" was known, was on the
present site of Maumee City, Ohio. Great fields of Indian corn spread up
and down both sides of the broad valley; a score of vegetable plants
thrived amid the corn. In the same area probably no such amount of
ground was under cultivation by Indian squaws as in the Maumee Valley.
The spreading fields supported many villages and it was from these
important centers of Indian life that so many marauding parties
descended upon Kentucky, calling forth retaliating armies such as those
of Clark, Harmar, and St. Clair. And Harmar, only, had actually reached
this populous and fertile lair. Here the convention was to be held. The
United States commissioners had proceeded to Niagara where they were
entertained generously by Governor Simcoe at Navy Hall, a mile distant
from Fort Niagara, being advised that the delegates from the various
nations would undoubtedly be late arriving on the ground. On July 5,
Colonel Brant and fifty Indians arrived at Fort Erie from the Maumee to
meet and interview the American commissioners. This delegation alleged
that the warlike actions of General Wayne had prevented the meeting at
the rapids and inquired specifically whether or not the commissioners
were properly authorized to run a new boundary line. Before this
advanced deputation returned it was clear that the Indians would refuse
to recognize any treaty made since the famous Stanwix treaty of
1768.[139] By their instructions the commissioners[140] were ordered to
insist upon the boundaries established at the Treaty of Fort
Harmar.[141] From the beginning, despite the liberality of the offers of
the United States--trading-posts north of the Ludlow Line to be
evacuated and fifty thousand dollars to be paid to settle any
miscellaneous claims by Indians not benefited in previous
treaties--there was no hope of reconciliation. In fact there was no
agreement even among the "hostile" and the "peaceful" nations at Roche
de Bout. The delegates from the Six Nations did not agree with the
ill-disposed councils of the embittered Shawanese and Miami warriors and
were not advised of the final decision of the council. The American
commissioners were ever held off at arm's length. On the twenty-first of
July they reached the mouth of the Detroit River, and took quarters with
Captain Matthew Elliott. From this point communications passed to and
fro between the real convention at Roche de Bout and the Americans
fifty miles away. The last message from the Indians was sent August 13.
Its important paragraph read: "At our general council, held at the
Glaize last fall, we agreed to meet commissioners from the United
States, for the purpose of restoring peace, provided they consented to
acknowledge and confirm our boundary line to be the Ohio: and we
determined not to meet you, until you gave us satisfaction on that
point: that is the reason we have never met."[142] On the sixteenth day
of August the commissioners replied that the above message was a virtual
declaration of war, and declared that "impartial judges will not
attribute the continuance of the war to them."[143]
A glimpse into the council of Indians at the rapids is afforded us in
the deposition made by an unknown Pennsylvanian youth, who was captured
by Wea Indians in 1783 and who had lived among the Indians throughout
the ten years since that time. He attended the treaty. On the tenth of
July there were fourteen hundred Indians present; on the twentieth,
twenty-four hundred. Of these, eighteen hundred were warriors. It was
unanimously agreed that the Ohio should be made the boundary line and
that the Indians be paid for Kentucky. Simon Girty, Governor Simcoe's
aide-de-camp, a Lieutenant Silvy of the Fifth (British) Regiment, and
another British officer remained at Colonel McKee's house, which was
fifty yards distant from the council fire.
In the evenings the head chiefs, especially those of the Shawanese and
Delaware nations, met with Colonel McKee and his guests. "McKee always
promised that the King, their Father, would protect them & afford them
every thing they wanted in case they went to war.... Advise that they
ought not to make Peace upon any other terms than to make the Ohio the
boundary line. After the final decision, McKee furnished the savages
with arms, ammunition, scalping knives and Tomahawks even more than they
could use this winter." On the twenty-eighth of July the Indians
separated to reassemble "at au-Glaize twenty-four days from that time"
to watch Wayne and attack him if opportunity offered.[144]
Instantly a score of Indian runners were hurrying south and east to Knox
and Wayne with the secret code message to prepare for war.[145] The
exact date of Wayne's receipt of this message (sent from Niagara, August
23) is not recorded. It was two hours after midnight, September 24, when
the express thundered into Petersburg, Kentucky, with an order to
General Scott "to take the field with the Mounted Volunteers & to be at
Fort Jefferson By the first of October."[146] Hobson's Choice was the
scene of intense activity as September drew to a close, and by October 5
all was in readiness for the northward movement. Excluding invalids,
and garrisons to be left at the four forts on the line of march, Wayne
estimated his available force at twenty-six hundred regulars and three
hundred and sixty mounted volunteers. "... you may rest assured," Wayne
wrote Knox upon leaving Fort Washington, "that I will not commit the
legion [risk an engagement] unnecessarily; and unless more powerfully
supported ... I will content myself by taking a strong position advanced
of [Fort] Jefferson, and by exerting every power, endeavor to protect
the frontiers, and to secure the posts and army during the winter."[147]
Already the far-sighted Wayne had anticipated the matter of
road-building, an important department of a pioneer general's duty in
which he particularly excelled. As early as July 10, the American
commissioners to the hostile tribes wrote Secretary Knox that the Indian
scouts reported that Wayne "has cut and cleared a road, straight from
fort Washington, into the Indian country, in a direction that would
have missed fort Jefferson; but that, meeting with a large swamp, it
was, of necessity, turned to that fort, and then continued six miles
beyond it."[148] The very fact that when Wayne left Fort Washington,
October 7, he covered the seventy-five odd miles to the site of Fort
Greenville (Greenville, Ohio) in six days is proof enough that the
Indians' spies were well within the mark in saying that a road had been
built; more than that, packhorses had been wearing it deep into the
ground with heavy loads of food for mouths and guns, and large droves of
cattle had already rough-stamped Wayne's Trace from the Ohio to the
Stillwater. Faithful James O'Hara was quartermaster and Elliott and
Williams the contractors. Colonel Robert Elliott, a native of
Hagerstown, Pennsylvania, met his death at the hands of the savages at
the "bigg hill" near Fort Jefferson while engaged in hurrying on
provisions to the northern posts. "Mr Elliott had on a wig," records
General Posey in a strain of gloomy defiance, "the indians will not get
his skulp."
Mad Anthony Street, in Cincinnati, is the beginning of Wayne's Road
northward up Mill Creek Valley, thence running northwest to Fort
Hamilton on the watershed south of the head branches of the West Fork.
The route through Hamilton is given by Everts as across the sites of
Snider's paper-mill, Niles tool works, and Cape and Maxwell's
plant.[149] The old track crossed the Miami a few rods south of the
eastern end of the High Street bridge and from there circled around the
west end of what is locally known as the "Devil's Backbone" on what was
L. D. Campbell's peninsula but which is now an island. Wayne's first
camp was at Five Mile Spring, southeast of the village of Five Mile. The
old route passed over the present site of that village and kept on the
eastern side of Seven Mile Creek all the way to Fort St. Clair (Eaton,
Preble County). Two Mile, Four Mile, Seven Mile, and Nine Mile Creeks
were all so named from Wayne's crossing-places. Following up the valley
of Seven Mile about two miles, the old track leaves it near Nine Mile
Creek and turns due north, leaving Butler County in Wayne Township,
section 6. In Preble County the "south end" of Wayne's Trace has always
been used as a highway and known as "Wayne's Trace Road." The trace
passes through Washington Township east of Eaton, crossing the
Greenville Road on a bluff near a sycamore-tree on the east side of the
road. It crossed Banta's Fork at or near the "Forty-foot Pitch" and
ascended the high bank at a point on the east side of the present road.
The swamp which the Indian spies said had turned Wayne's route nearer
Fort Jefferson than was originally intended evidently lay in the
vicinity of Ithaca, Twin Township, Darke County. The first settler in
Brown Township, John Woodington, made his clearing beside Wayne's Trace
on the farm owned by William Herdman in section 28 on the Greenville
Pike. Through these parts the explorer will find the famous old track
partially marked out by the growths of young sycamores which sprang up
here when the forests were cut down. Many of the first settlers "saw on
the uncovered roots of trees, along the trace, the indisputable marks
of wagon wheels or of the heavy ordinance trains."[150]
[Illustration: DR. BELKNAP'S MAP OF WAYNE'S ROUTE IN THE MAUMEE VALLEY,
1794 [_From the original in the library of Harvard University_]]
A happy interest attaches to an old route like Wayne's, from the very
fact that the labor spent in hewing it out and in transporting over it
vast quantities of provisions and ammunition was not expended in vain.
Wayne's Road, like Forbes's route across the Alleghenies, led to
victory; the dark winding tracks of the armies of Braddock and St. Clair
possess a romantic element that is fascinating in the extreme, but
wholly unsatisfactory. There is an inspiration in following the rough
tracks of men who won which is not found in the paths of men who, after
struggles perhaps more heroic because facing greater odds, failed. Wayne
was a thousand times better equipped for his campaign than was St.
Clair. Before his campaign, the savage war was not taken very seriously.
Now proper preparations had been made, approximately sufficient stores
accumulated, the official personnel sifted down; and as the "Legion of
the United States" went swiftly forward in the October sunlight of that
Indian summer, there was a sane consciousness of preparedness and power
which was all but victory. The Indians were quick to recognize and
describe, in their figurative way, the two chief characteristics of
Wayne as a frontier commander--he was both the "Black Snake" and the
"Whirlwind." When in motion, he swept through the forests like a
cyclone; the record of no pioneer army in America equals the marching
records of Wayne's Legion. It was a standing order that every march
should be under high pressure and that no break or interruption should
in any case delay the movement of the main body a single moment. This
impressed the savages tremendously; they had known no such army as
this--which advanced into their country almost as fast as others had run
out of it. Thus they talked of the "Whirlwind" around their northern
fires. Wayne, too, was a "Black Snake." He was as cunning as he was
impetuous. As will be seen, he built roads he never traversed, doubled
his track, and over and again completely outwitted the astonished Indian
spies that attempted, with sharp eyes in the brown leaves, to fathom
his purposes.
The lateness of the season prevented a more elaborate campaign than
Wayne had suggested to the Secretary of War. The army swept northward to
Greenville Creek and on the present site of Greenville, Ohio, erected
Fort Greenville--named by Wayne in honor of his dead friend General
Nathaniel Greene of Revolutionary fame. By November 16, Posey records,
all the houses were completed and once more the drilling and
manoeuvering began. We have it under the hand of the same authority
that General Wayne affirmed that never in the Revolutionary War had he
commanded such well-drilled troops as these which spent the winter with
him buried deep in those Ohio forests. It is sure that a general never
needed well-drilled soldiers more; and no less sure that no troops
needed encouragement more than these. There were, however, the bright
sides to life even here. Though coffee was a dollar and brown sugar
seventy-five cents a pound, and whiskey five dollars a gallon, yet there
was good cheer and merrymaking. A battery was built for the officers to
play "fiver," of which the younger men became very fond. On one evening
the veteran General Scott entertained the officers in his apartments and
was drawn out to tell of pioneer Kentucky in whose battles he had
displayed so much courage and lost his three sons. "He told us how Col^o
Boon first discovered Kentucky," wrote Posey; "'Col^o Boon was a very
enterprizing, smart man,' said General Scott, 'but very whimsical.'"
There were frequent scouting expeditions in which the whole garrison was
interested. On one occasion Wells's audacious rangers fell upon three
Indians at their midday repast; one of the three in the pursuit was
compelled to leap into a creek and when he "came up" he was found to be
a white man, Christopher Miller. His life being saved, he renounced the
wild career, visited his aged parents in Kentucky, and then returned to
become one of Wayne's most successful spies. No doubt the soldiers
laughed at this transformation of a red into a white man, and perhaps
swore that if other Indians were dowsed equally well they would be found
to be equally white and to be wearing British uniforms!
There was one duty that fell now to Wayne that was not congenial. Posey
was one of the detachment which pushed forward in the December snow to
St. Clair's slaughter-ground and erected there the most advanced of the
chain of forts between the Ohio and Maumee. As the company neared the
spot, Captain Edward Butler touched Posey on the shoulder and said:
"When you reach the ground go to a large spreading oak which you cannot
fail to see. Under that oak my brother's marquee was pitched and there
you will find his bones which you can identify by a fracture of one
thigh bone."
"We went to the place," writes Posey, "and found part of his [General
Richard Butler's] bones, his skull and both thy bones, one we discovered
had been broken.... We collected all the bones and laid them in one
Pile, on every skul bone you might see the mark of the skulping knife a
round every skul bone." The pieces of guns--many barrels bent double by
fiendish Indians--were collected, and four cannon were discovered just
where an Indian prisoner had said they would be found. A strong fort
was built and very appropriately named Fort Recovery, Captain Alexander
Gibson commanding the garrison. On the sixth day, a portion of the party
returned to Fort Greenville. The erection of Fort Recovery was another
leap toward the Maumee and soon Indians began to arrive at Fort
Greenville bearing white flags and talking of an armistice and peace.
Wayne, obeying orders from the Secretary to end the war without another
campaign if possible, received the emissaries as though he believed
their lying rôle. Deceived by Wayne's attitude, one of the Allegheny
chiefs, Big Tree, committed suicide. He had sworn to kill three hostile
Indians to avenge the death of his "very dear friend" General Butler;
exasperated at the hint of peace he made way with himself.
The peace emissaries, and all talk of an armistice, faded with the
winter snows, and by early summer every plan for the crucial campaign
had been made both by the Indians and by Wayne. It was July before
Scott's fifteen hundred mounted volunteers arrived at Greenville.
Already one bloody skirmish had taken place near the walls of Fort
Recovery in which near a thousand Indians had participated. Large
quantities of stores had been forwarded to Greenville and Fort Recovery,
and the grand advance on the Maumee was on the eve of starting. Of this
campaign we have Lieutenant Boyer's official narrative,[151]
supplemented by the slight records of Posey and Lieutenant William
Clark, a brother of George Rogers Clark.[152]
At eight o'clock in the morning of July 28 Wayne with two thousand
regulars and fifteen hundred mounted volunteers set out for the Maumee
Valley from Fort Greenville. The route followed by St. Clair and used
during the winter by the Fort Recovery garrison was the course pursued,
and camp was pitched in the afternoon on Stillwater Creek after a
twelve-mile march. The next day the army was off before sunrise; we
"pushed forward without regard to bag or baggage," records Clark, "as if
not in search, but in actual pursuit of a flying & disorderly enemy."
Fort Recovery was reached at noon and the army camped a mile beyond. On
the day following the army crashed onward, following the winding stream
called a tributary of the "St. Mary's" by St. Clair, but which was in
fact the head of the Wabash. Clark says the stream was crossed "more
than a dozen times" and "Camp Beaver Swamp" was pitched where the stream
was found to be impassable, eleven miles from Fort Recovery. Much of the
journey today had been through wide prairies covered with nettles, the
water unfit to drink and mosquitoes, "larger than I ever saw," observed
Boyer. Today the road was opened as the army advanced and the route was
up the Wabash from the present village of Fort Recovery, Mercer County,
Ohio.
The construction of a bridge at Camp Beaver Swamp seventy yards in
length delayed the army one day but enabled the road-cutters to hew a
way through to the St. Mary River.[153] On August 1, the army pressed on
over the backbone of Ohio and down the northern slope into the basin of
the Maumee River, and encamped beside the famous little St. Mary River.
Today, emerging suddenly from the vast stretch of nettles and brush that
grew in the swampy district, the army suddenly drew out into a beautiful
level meadow, every corps of the army having the first view of all the
other divisions. This day Clark affirms that the army crossed the trace
followed by General Harmar in 1790 to the Miami village. Tonight the
army encamped by the St. Mary and on the morrow the erection of what was
first called Fort Randolph and later Fort Adams was begun.[154] This was
the seventh fortified post in the chain from the Ohio and was located on
the south bank of the St. Mary, four miles above Rockford (the old
Shane's Crossings), Mercer County, Ohio.
On the fourth the army hurried on about eleven miles to "a small, dirty
water," as Clark described it, "a branch of the Glaize [Auglaize]
River," where camp was fortified for the night. The day after, a march
of equal length "down the creek" to the camp described by Boyer as "Camp
forty-four miles in advance of Fort Recovery." Wayne's camps were each
proof against insult from the enemy, which accounts for his encamping
early each afternoon. On the afternoon of August 6, the army reached the
banks of the celebrated "Glaize," the Auglaize River. Here, according to
Posey, a stronger encampment than usual was built, named Fort Loramie.
As the Maumee was neared the feeling of the army was intense. While at
Fort Adams, Wayne had made feints at cutting two roads, one down the St.
Mary River and another northwest straight toward Roche de Bout. These
routes were both opened for some distance, that down the St. Mary at
least as far as the famous ford at Shane's Crossing--the present
Rockford.[155] That the Indian spies would report the building of these
roads, there was no doubt. But when on August 4 the swift advance was
renewed neither road was followed! A straight course northward into the
Auglaize Valley was taken--a route that could not have been pursued in
any but the driest weather. It ran northward from Fort Adams, probably
near the Fort Jennings of the War of 1812, situated on the left bank of
the Auglaize in the northwest part of Jennings Township, Putnam County,
Ohio. Thence the route was straight down the Auglaize in general
alignment with the present Defiance Road.
Wayne's tactics in road-building as he neared the enemy's villages is
perhaps quite unparalleled; indeed, as will be emphasized, this
remarkable campaign was not less impressive to the savages--these swift
plunges through the forests, the sudden pauses and the astonishing
feints--than was the battle which soon crushed the Indian confederacy.
At the same time the careful historian would greatly err should he not
give Wayne credit for obeying, even now, the earnest commands of his
superiors to secure an armistice and a peace without a battle. Secretary
Knox had, over and again, urged Wayne to secure peace without bloodshed
if possible. A battle in any case was hazardous; there were
possibilities of defeat; there were greater promises of a continuous war
even in case of an American victory. The British had displayed
characteristic arrogance in building a fort at Roche de Bout this very
spring, around which the Indian cohorts were probably gathering.
Complications with England were undoubtedly possible, if not entirely
probable. From Lieutenant Clark's journal it is clear that General
Wilkinson proposed, as soon as the Auglaize was reached, to make a dash
with a flying column upon the populous district at the junction of the
Auglaize with the Maumee. Wayne refused to consider the plan[156]--and
throughout the remainder of Clark's journal his words are well-nigh
abusive of General Wayne's whole management of the campaign.[157] The
dare-devil Wayne's caution at this strategic juncture of this important
campaign portrays an element of steadiness for which the hero of Stony
Point has perhaps never received sufficient credit.
On the eighth of August, after marching through five miles of
cornfields, where were "vegetables of every kind in abundance,"
according to Boyer, the tired Legion came in view of the Maumee, of
which they and a whole nation had heard so much. The spot of encampment
was the site of the present city of Defiance on the commanding point
between the rivers, and here in the three days succeeding, Fort Defiance
was erected. To the Indians the name of the spot was Grand Glaize.[158]
Wells's rangers reported that the Indian army was lying two miles above
the British fort, on the west bank of the Maumee. According to Posey,
Wayne on the eleventh despatched an old Indian to the hostile camp with
offers of peace; two days later an old squaw was posted off with a
similar message. Neither returned. On the sixteenth, the fort being
nearly completed, Major Hunt was left in command, and the grand advance
began. The route was down the left bank of the Maumee straight toward
the painted lines of Little Turtle's army. Christopher Miller--the
red-man made white by that plunge in the creek--met the army today with
a message from the chieftain White Eyes, Clark records, asking Wayne to
remain ten days at Grand Glaize, not erecting a fort, and the Indians
would perhaps treat with him. "This letter," Lieutenant Clark states,
"was generally considered as a challenge."[159]
Nineteen miles was made the first day (August 16) and twelve the day
following. As the road was "generally bad," as Boyer affirms, these
tremendous marches must be considered remarkable, for each camp was
heavily fortified and the enemy was just at hand. The spies in advance
were unceasing in their vigilance and activity; and on the eighteenth
poor May, who had lived with the Indians as a spy the preceding winter
at Wayne's command, was entrapped and captured, suffering a most cruel
death. This day the army encamped forty-one miles from Fort Defiance and
made a strong entrenchment which was named Fort Deposit. Here the heavy
baggage was stored that the troops might go into action unencumbered.
On the twentieth, at seven in the morning, the Legion advanced in
fighting order. The Indian army, its left wing lying on Presque Isle,
was stretched across the valley for two miles in a well-chosen position.
A tornado had swept the forest here and the mass of fallen trees offered
a particularly advantageous spot for the Indians' favorite method of
fighting. Such spots were very common in the old Black Forest of the
West and were generally known as "fallen timber" by the Indians and
pioneers;[160] in them cavalry was almost useless. Thus the mounted
volunteers, the Indians believed, would be debarred from the fight.
At eleven o'clock the advanced lines met. At the first burst of sudden
flame the American vanguard of volunteers was staggered, perhaps
surprised at the fire from an unseen enemy lying beneath the tangled
wind-rack of the forest. The guards on the right fell back through the
regulars commanded by Cook and Steele. The regulars were thrown into
confusion. It was fifteen minutes before order was restored but when
joined by the riflemen and legionary cavalry, a charge with trailed arms
was ordered and the savages were pricked out from their lairs with the
point of the bayonet. A heavy firing on the left announced that the
battle now was raging there, but only for a moment. The whole Indian
plan of battle was destroyed by the impetuous bayonet charges of troops
hard-drilled in the dull days at Legionville, Hobson's Choice, and in
the snows of Greenville. The redskins hid where a tornado had
passed--not expecting another more destructive than the first! For two
miles the scattering horde was pursued headlong through the forests. A
halt was ordered just within sight of the British fort, whose guns were
silent though menacing. The Indians poured on down the valley toward the
present site of Toledo and Lake Erie.
The battle of Fallen Timber was a decisive and important victory. The
Indians numbered about fifteen hundred; a considerable number of
advancing allies never reached the battle-ground. The rapid strides of
Wayne had forced the meeting unexpectedly. Those ten days the Indians
had requested for conference would have largely increased their
strength. The number killed and wounded on either side was
inconsiderable; forty Indians, only, were found on the two-mile field of
conflict. Twenty-six killed and eighty-seven wounded, was the Legion's
loss. Of the Kentuckians, who hardly got into the action on account of
the swift success of the Legion, seven privates were killed, and ten
privates and three officers were wounded.
Remaining three days on the battle-field, Wayne destroyed many acres of
corn and many Indian huts and then returned to Fort Defiance. Thence he
ascended the Maumee to the junction of the St. Mary and St.
Joseph--Harmar's battle ground--and built a fort which he permitted the
oldest officer (Posey?) to name "Fort Wayne in honor of the hero of
Stony Point." From Fort Wayne the army ascended the St. Mary to Fort
Adams, and thence passed to Loramie's, where a new Fort Loramie was
erected. The troops from there opened a new route across to Fort
Greenville. Here, in the following year, the awed and broken Indian
nations signed the Treaty of Fort Greenville which practically
reaffirmed the previous Treaty of Fort Harmar.
Viewed as a whole, Wayne's campaign is most interesting from the
standpoint of road-building. It was Wayne's advance which awed the
savages, not the battle of Fallen Timber. The army crashing northward
through the forests as though ever in the pursuit of a foe, the
impregnable forts that arose here and there, the strongly fortified
camps, the fleet and active scouting parties, the stern but even temper
of Wayne's exhortations for peace, and at last, the fierce bayonet
charge amid the prostrate trees, accomplished the very mission of the
hour. That winding line of a road from the Ohio to Roche de Bout, and
the five new forts that sprang up on it in 1793 and 1794, have left
their impress strongly upon western history. The Indians never forgot
the "Whirlwind," who was also a "Black Snake." Since that road was
built, the Indian race has never been a national menace. Bloody battles
there have been, but at no time has the expansion of the United States
been seriously jeopardized by Indian hostility.
Clark's conquest of Vincennes was now made good by the conquest of the
Maumee Valley; Harmar's reverses and St. Clair's annihilation were
avenged--the Old Northwest was won.
Appendixes
APPENDIX A
PORTIONS OF CLARK'S MEMOIR[161] WHICH REFER TO THE MARCH TO KASKASKIA
"... on the [24th] of June 1778 we left our Little Island and Run about
a mile up the River in order to gain the main Channel and shot the Falls
at the very moment of the sun being in a great Eclipse which caused
Various conjectures among the superstitious as I knew that spies were
kept on the River below the Towns of the Illinois I had resolved to
march part of the way by Land and of course left the whole of our
baggage, except as much as would equip us in the Indian mode. The whole
of our force, after leaving such as was Judged not competent to the
expected fatiegue, Consisted only of four companies, commanded by Captns
Jno. Montgomery, J. Bowman, L. Helm, and W. Harrod my force being so
small to what I expected owing to the various circumstances already
mentioned I found it necessary to alter my plans of operations, as post
St. Vincent at this time was a Town of considerable force consisting of
near four Hundred militia with an Indian Town adjoining and great
numbers continually in the Neighborhood, and in the scale of Indian
affairs of More Importance than any other. [I] had thought of attacking
it first but now found that I could by no means venture near it Resolved
to begin my career in the Illinois where there was more Inhabitants but
scattered in different Villages, and less danger of being immediately
overpowered by the Indians, and in case of necessity, [we could]
probably make our retreat good to the Spanish side of the Mississippi,
but if Successful here [we] might pave our way to the possession of Post
St. Vincent.... As I intended to leave the Ohio at Ft. Massiac 3 leagues
below the Tennessee I landed on Barritaria a small island in the mouth
of that River in order to prepare for the march ... having every thing
prepared we moved down to a little gul[ley] a small distance above
Massiac in which we concealed our Boats and set out a Northwest course,
nothing remarkable on this rout, the weather was favorable, in some
parts water scarce as well as game, of course we suffered drought and
Hunger but not [to] excess, on the third Day, John Saunders, our
principal guide, appeared confused we soon discovered that he was
totally lost without there was some other cause of his present conduct I
asked him various question, and from his answers I could scarcely
determine what to think of him, whether or not he was sensible that he
was lost the thought of which [?] or that he wished to deceive us the
cry of the whole Detachment was that he was a Traitor, he beged that he
might be suffered to go some distance into a plain that was in full view
to try to make some discovery whether or not he was right. I told him he
might but that I was suppitious [suspicious] of him from his conduct
that from the first of his being employed always said that he knew the
way well that there was now a different appearance that I saw the nature
of the Cuntry was such that a person once acquainted with it could not
in a short time forget it that a few men should go with him to prevent
his escape--and that if he did not discover and take us into _the
Hunters Road_ that lead from the East into Kaskaskia that he had
frequently described that I would have him Immediately put to death
which I was determined to have done, but after an Hour or two's search
he came to a place that he perfectly knew and we discovered that the
poor fellow had been as they call it bewildered. On the eavining of the
fourth of July we got with in a few miles of the Town."
APPENDIX B
ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF CLARK'S PLACE OF CROSSING THE "TWO
WABASHES"[162]
Mr. Draper founds his conclusion that the "two Wabashes" were the Little
Wabash and the Fox wholly on present-day (1878-90) reports[163] of the
nature of the country at the Little Wabash above the mouth of the Fox
and above the mouth of the Big Muddy. The reports he received from
residents of the neighborhoods carry evidence that the ground between
the Little Wabash and Fox most nearly agrees with Clark's and Bowman's
descriptions of the crossing-place.[164] This is true, and is of
importance. But Clark's and Bowman's use of the word "heights" was
merely relative; Mr. Draper's correspondents speak of high grounds and
low grounds as the land lies today. With water but three or four feet
deep, a few acres of land might have been uncovered, though not
sufficiently elevated today to be termed a hill or even high ground.
There is a point on the Little --abash above the mouth of the Fox that
can be made to answer in a general way Clark's and Bowman's
descriptions--going on the doubtful supposition that their descriptions
were entirely accurate. In order to find a spot where Clark saw nearly
five miles of water before him, Mr. Draper suggests a point about two
miles above the mouth of the Fox, where there is a wide bottom on the
west of the Little --abash, another bottom between that stream and the
Fox, and another east of the Fox.[165] The possibility that the distance
was exaggerated by Clark (who said Vincennes was two hundred and forty
miles from Kaskaskia when it was not over one hundred and seventy-five)
is not considered. As a matter of fact, the whole plan of finding today
five miles of low ground from any point west of the Little --abash to
the east of either the Fox or the Big Muddy, is overthrown by Clark's
statement in the _Memoir_ that (on the western side of the Little
Wabash) "we formed a camp on a height which we found on the bank of the
river." Mr. Draper's objection to the Little Wabash and Big Muddy
crossing-place was because the high ground on the bank of the Little
Wabash (seemingly here referred to by Clark) prevented there being five
miles of low ground to the opposite side of the Big Muddy.[166] If Clark
and Bowman gave the distance of width of water correctly, the
crossing-place was two miles above the mouth of the Fox, and Clark's
statement of forming a camp on a height on the river bank is totally
inexplicable--for there is no height at this point to answer such a
description. If, by "nearly" five miles, Clark meant three miles,
misjudging distance on water inversely with the usual way, his camp
could have been on the immediate high bank of the Little Wabash above
the mouth of the Big Muddy.[167]
Certain other considerations have a tendency to influence the present
writer in believing that the crossing-place was here--above the mouth of
the Big Muddy. It was exceedingly wet from the day Clark left Kaskaskia;
even on the watersheds he found deep standing water. On reaching the
Petit Fork he found the rivers at flood-tide. By turning north to the
Clay County route he would strike the Little Wabash at a more northerly
point, and would almost completely head the deep little Bonpas which lay
between the Fox and the Big Wabash. The Clay County route was in one
sense, then, a watershed route, compared with the Wayne County route. It
is difficult to believe that Clark's guides would ignore this after
having been compelled to cross the Petit Fork on felled trees. Again, on
the second day out from the crossing-place of the Little Wabash, Bowman
records: "16th. Marched all day through rain and water; crossed Fox
river." If this entry is correct, of course the Little Wabash and Big
Muddy crossing-place is completely established. Mr. Draper, holding that
the Fox was crossed simultaneously with the Little Wabash on the
fifteenth, suggests that Bowman meant Bonpas for Fox.[168] Choosing
between possible errors, the present writer finds it easier to believe
that Bowman misjudged the width of water crossed on the fifteenth, than
that he called the Bonpas the Fox. For on the seventeenth the heads of
the Bonpas are specifically accounted for by Bowman as follows: "17th.
Marched early; crossed several runs, very deep." Mr. Draper does not
account for these, and it is difficult to do so if they were not the
heads of the Bonpas. For, if Clark crossed the Little Wabash just above
the mouth of the Fox, his route, after crossing the Bonpas, was
northeast, and would, without any sort of question, have been on
watersheds between little tributaries, first of the Bonpas, and then of
the Embarras. Again, by every account, it is sure Clark and Bowman
expected to strike the Embarras, and strike it at about seven or eight
miles due west from Vincennes. If, as Draper believed, they were
pursuing an old trail, which, it is well known,[169] ran from the
crossing-place of the Little Wabash two miles above the mouth of the
Fox to the Wabash just below the mouth of the Embarras, how can it be
explained that the army reached, or ever intended to reach, the Embarras
seven or eight miles above its mouth? The very name would warn them away
and it seems highly improbable that, if what was later known as the
southern route was traversed, the army would ever have seen the
Embarras.
APPENDIX C
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY ON THE MAUMEE AS GIVEN IN THE IRWIN
MANUSCRIPT[170]
"The next Day after the rear arrived a Detachment of 400 men was ordered
out under the Command of Col. Trotter of Kentucky with orders to
assertain what Course the Indians had went to Draw 2 Days provisions and
Be out over night I was a volunteer in S^d. Detachment There was about
25 Mounted men attached to the Same a short Distance after we crossed
the St Joseph River from where part of the Town stood fell in with 2
Indians Killed Both and Lost one man marched all Day after in good order
Seen considerable Signs Could not assertain which way They had gone The
Six pounders was Shot about Sun Set at the main Camp The Col Concluded
it was Done to Call the Command in we returned to Camp a short time
after Dark Lay out side of Camp all night had our own guards out, Turned
out next morning to perform the 2d Day under Command of Col Hardin went
a northwest Course from whence we Crossed s^d river after going 3 or 4
mile found a Large fresh Indian trail pursued it with all Speed in
Single file or in any way they Could get allong from front to the rear
was over half a mile The Indians retreated with a view to draw the front
into ambuscade which they Done Completely with Two fires Cut off the
front Entirely our Company being in front the first Day had to take the
rear the Second Day when the front was Cut off we formed a Line in the
rear Cols Hardin Hall and Major Fountain was all on horse Back halted
with us when we formed, The Indians pursued the front untill they Come
within one hundred yards Then halted we had But about 75 in our Company
had all treed in Line across the trace They Could see the officers on
horse Back with us we Stood in that situation untill near Dark Then
Covered the retreat got into Camp a short time after Dark I never could
assertain how many men we Lost in that Scrap a Captn Scott son of Gen or
governor Scott of Kentucky was killed in that Scrap our Troops was very
much scattered a Number Came in after Night as the Cannon was fired
Every hour through the Night at the main Camp perhaps there was 15 or 20
killed, perhaps more or Less The Commencement was one of the most
unexpected Surprises Ever any troops met with Two of us went out and
Examined their Encampment where their trace was first Discovered over 2
mile on this Side where the Battle was as there was there a general Halt
for a short time I would have Said there was 4 or 5 hundred Indians and
we had not Near as many Men that Day as was out the Day Before There was
Experienced officers along that ought to have known Better they was too
anxious on the pursuit the Troops should have Been marched in such a
Situation that no advantage Could have Been Taken of them as was the
Case the Day Before The army remained in Camp perhaps 2 Days making
ready to return to Fort Washington when the army moved from Camp perhaps
about the 10th or 12th of November 1790 four or five mounted men with
an officer placed themselves on a high Eminence so that they could see
over all the place where the Indian town Stood about two hours after the
army Cleared out the Indians Came in from Different Quarters to get
provision as they had Considerable hid under ground Said Spies remained
there untill Dark Came into Camp which was about 4 or 5 mile Informed
Harmar and the officers what Discoveries they had made a Detachment of 4
or 5 hundred men was Drafted from the Different Companies of s^d army
that Night to be on the ground Next morning by Day Light and to Be
placed under the Command of Col Hardin the plan of attack was made By
the officers previous to their march and was well Executed By the
officers and troops Engaged in the Same There was too few troops in said
Detachment for the number of the Enemy they had to Contend with if 200
men had arrived there about Sunrise they would have give the Enemy a
Complete Defeat They give them a pretty good Drubing as it was There was
about 60 regulars under the Command of Major ---- They fought well Done
great Execution Lost Their major and Lieutenant in the Battle. Col
Hardins post in The aforesaid plan was on The west side of The St.
Joseph river opposite to where The Indian town stood he was There in
good Time The other Troops Crossed the Maumee went right to where The
Town Stood The Indians was Encamped in and round where it stood Major
Fountain had the Command of The Light horse and mounted men he Charged
right in among The Enemy fired off his pistols and Drew his Sword Before
They Could recover The Shock George Adams informed them that he was Near
The Major at That Time That it appeared when The Enemy got over Their
surprise Ten or Twelve Indians Discharged Their guns at him The Major
kind of fell or hung on his horse They then Discharged Several Guns at
said Adams he received Several flesh wounds But recovered By this Time
The Militia and regulars Come up. The Indians fought with Desperation
was Drove from Their Encampment By The Militia and regulars Down The
Bank into the river which was perhaps 20 yards wide and perhaps 6
inches Deep Col Hardins men on The opposite Side which placed them
Between two fires The Indians charged on Hardins troops having no other
Chance to Escape Hardins troops give way and retreated the Same way They
went out and was not in That Battle any more. Some of the Troops
informed me That Major Fountain was Living when our Troops Drove the
Indians from The Battle ground. Major Mcmillin of Kentucky Collected The
Troops and Tarried on The Battle Ground untill They Indians had entirely
Disappeared and not one to Be Seen or heard I never understood what was
the Number of our Troops Killed by the Enemy on That Campaign Though it
was Considerable my oppinion is There was more Indians Killed in That
Battle Than was Killed when Gen^l --ayne defeated Them in 1794 if Harmar
had Sent out a Detachment of Six hundred men Next Day to Collected The
Dead and Buried Them and assertained how many of The Enemy was Killed I
think There would have Been no risk in it as The Indians was So
Completely Cut up on The Day of The Battle Such a move would have Been
an honor and Credit to that Campaign I can Never agree That Harmars
Campaing was a Defeated one."
FOOTNOTES:
[1] For a sketch of the position of this campaign in the Revolution, and
its leading details see _Historic Highways of America_, vol. vi, pp.
161-166.
[2] Our principal source of information concerning the Kaskaskia
campaign is George Rogers Clark's _Memoir_, written probably in 1791,
the original of which is preserved in the Draper Manuscripts in the
library of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Extracts of such
portions as refer to the march to Kaskaskia will be found in Appendix A.
[3] Page's _History of Massac County_, p. 35.
[4] _Draper MSS._, xxi J, fols. 40, 44.
[5] _Id._, fol. 51.
[6] _Id._, fol. 27.
[7] _Id._, fol. 76.
[8] _Id._, fol. 83; xxii, fol. 6.
[9] _Id._, xxii, fol. 5.
[10] _Id._, xxi, fol. 42; cf. p. 65.
[11] _Id._, xxi, fols. 40, 42. Probably the route of the later St.
Louis-Shawneetown trace; see p. 34.
[12] _Id._, xxii, fols. 11, 35.
[13] _Id._, xxii, fol. 35.
[14] _Id._, xxi, fols. 16, 27, 29, 51, 52; and xxii, fols. 30, 35.
[15] _Id._, xxii, fols. 30, 37. Cox's Creek was crossed twice, the east
fork in section 7, township 7, range 4, and the west fork in section 12,
township 7, range 5.
[16] _Id._, xxi, fols. 80, 81; xxii, fol. 37.
[17] _Id._, xxii, fol. 37.
[18] Clark approached Kaskaskia by the route and the ford over the
Kaskaskia River which he pursued on the Vincennes campaign in the
February following. (English's _Conquest of the Northwest_, vol. i, p.
288.)
[19] _Historic Highways of America_, vol. vii, p. 168.
[20] A galley-batteau, armed with two four-pounders and four swivels,
and carrying forty-six men, under the command of Captain John Rogers,
left Kaskaskia February 4, for Vincennes by the river route. It was
named "The Willing."
[21] Probably at "a small branch about three miles from Kaskaskia"
mentioned by Clark in his letter to Mason (English's _Conquest of the
Northwest_, vol. i, p. 430).
[22] The map of Clark's route from Kaskaskia to Vincennes in the
standard work on his campaigns of 1778-79, English's _Conquest of the
Northwest_ (vol. i, pp. 290-291), gives only the later Kaskaskia trace
of the eighteenth century--the modern route which it is sure Clark did
not pursue.
[23] _Draper MSS._, xxv J, fol. 76. See map on page 21.
[24] It seems to the writer useless to spend time and space in
attempting to place exactly Clark's camping-spots. He has made several
exhaustive schedules of these camps and all the contradictions discussed
pro and con. At best, any outline of camps must be purest conjecture,
and therefore not authoritative or really valuable. In certain instances
the camping-spots are definitely fixed by contemporaneous records. Only
these will be definitely described in this record--the others being
placed more or less indefinitely.
[25] In possession of the Kentucky Historical Society; first published
in the _Louisville Literary News_, November 24, 1840; see English's
_Conquest of the Northwest_, vol. i, pp. 568-578, from which our
quotations are made.
[26] _Draper MSS._, xxv J, fols. 37, 57, 58, 77.
[27] _Id._, fol. 78.
[28] _Id._, fol. 77.
[29] _Id._
[30] _Id._
[31] _Id._, xxiv, fols. 6-8.
[32] _Id._, xxv, fol. 50.
[33] Volney's _A View of the Soil and Climate of the United States of
America_ (Brown's translation) 1808, pp. 339-341.
[34] These are the _Memoir_ and the _Letter to Mason_ previously
described.
[35] No explanation of "Cot plains" was offered to Mr. Draper by his
Illinois correspondents. If the present writer be allowed a pure guess
it would be that "Cot" was the American spelling of the French _Quatre_,
"four;" "Cot plains" would then be a "Four Mile Prairie" east or
northeast of Skillet Creek. The Clay County route cut off a corner of
Romaine Prairie just here--which may have been known as "Four Mile
Prairie" in earliest days. It is not known that such was the case.
[36] See Appendix B.
[37] _Draper MSS._, xxv J, fol. 112. Clark's men marched two leagues
before reaching "Sugar Camp." Mr. English's map (_Conquest of the
Northwest_, vol. i, p. 313) and Bowman's _Journal_ are therefore utterly
at variance.
[38] _Draper MSS._, xxv J, fol. 91.
[39] The British Fort Sackville.
[40] Referring to the fact that Hamilton was accused of buying scalps of
Americans from the Indians. The shrewdness of this communication is
conspicuous, the result of the experiences at Kaskaskia.
[41] English's _Conquest of the Northwest_ vol. i, p. 572.
[42] The author bases his remarks wholly on the belief, it will be
observed, that Clark crossed the Little Wabash east of Clay City.
[43] See note 10.
[44] An interesting English version of Embarras--denoting the Creole
pronunciation. On Hutchins's old map of 1768 the Embarras is called the
"Troublesome River"--see map, p. 35.
[45] The western branch of the Bonpas, or the Fox?
[46] All efforts to find any locality bearing this name have failed.
Possibly it was a double bend of the Little Wabash, east of Clay City,
which may resemble an ox yoke. "Ox Bow" is not an uncommon name for such
reverse curves of rivers in several of our states.
[47] A well-known salt spring lies just west of the McCauley settlement
crossing of the Little Wabash.--_Draper MSS._, xxv J, fol. 25.
[48] Mr. Draper suggests that this may have been near Enterprise, Wayne
County, in keeping with the idea that the route here described was the
route that Clark followed. The most definite point known on Volney's
route west of the Embarras was the Salt Spring, above mentioned, and
this was on the more northerly route which crossed the Little Wabash
east of Clay City. Slaves Gibbet must therefore have been just east of
Xenia.
[49] Probably Harvey's Point, six or eight miles southeast of Salem.
[50] Skillet Creek.
[51] At the crossing of "Petit Fork"--Adams tributary of Skillet.
[52] Near Walnut Hill.
[53] Perhaps on head of Big Muddy in Grand Prairie.
[54] There seem to have been two old-time routes around Grand Prairie;
the points of junction seem to have been in Grand Prairie and Elkhorn
Prairie. Pointe aux Fesses is identified as Elkhorn Point, northeast of
Oakdale.
[55] In Grand Prairie.
[56] See note 54.
[57] Oakdale.
[58] Coultersville.
[59] Northwest of Steel's Mills.
[60] Mr. Draper reduces these estimates to "probabilities," giving as
the total distance 156 miles (_Draper MSS._, xxv J, fol. 49).
[61] This point of junction is eighteen miles east of Salem, which is
given as the point of junction on Mr. English's map of Clark's
route.--_Conquest of the Northwest_, vol. i, pp. 290, 291. Salem is the
junction of the modern route from Kaskaskia with the St. Louis Trace.
[62] Additional testimony to the same effect is found in _Draper MSS._,
xxv J, fol. 76.
[63] Evans's _History of Scioto County and Pioneer Record of Southern
Ohio_ contains the best map of western Ohio extant.
[64] _Historic Highways of America_, vol. vi, p. 166.
[65] Josiah Morrow, to whom the author is indebted for much help in the
study of Harmar's route, affirms that in the land records of Warren
County he has found reference to this as "Clark's old war-road."
[66] November 27, 1782.
[67] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 88.
[68] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 97.
[69] _Id._
[70] _Id._
[71] _Id._, pp. 93, 94; St. Clair to Knox, _Id._, p. 87.
[72] _Id._
[73] _Id._
[74] _Id._, p. 88.
[75] The authorities used in connection with Harmar's route and march
are: the Journal of Captain John Armstrong, of the Regulars (Dillon's
_History of Indiana_, pp. 245-248); Thomas Irwin's account of Harmar's
and St. Clair's campaigns, in the _Draper MSS._, iv U, fols. 3-17; Hugh
Scott's Narrative, _Id._, fol. 99, and David H. Morris's Narrative, in
the Troy (Ohio) _Times_ of January 29, 1840. Hereafter these will be
referred to by name only. Harmar's route out of Cincinnati is thus
described by J. G. Olden in his _Historical Sketches and Early
Reminiscences of Hamilton County, Ohio_: "Moved from Ft. Washington up
the little ravine that runs into Deer Creek near what is now the head of
Sycamore street, Cincinnati, thence through Mt. Auburn and along the
general course of what is now the Reading turnpike to the little stream
since known as Ross run where he encamped for the night in what is now
Section 4 Mill creek township near where Four Mile tavern was built. The
next day he moved, still on Clark's old trace, now Reading turnpike,
passing near where the school-house now stands in Reading, thence on to
the little run east of where Sharonville now is, where he encamped for
the [second] night."
[76] An error for 1780. As noted, three well-known expeditions had gone
northward from the present site of Cincinnati before Harmar's: Bowman in
1779, Clark in 1780, and Clark again in 1782. In 1782 Clark passed
northward on the watershed between the Miamis. It was therefore Clark's
route of 1780 which Harmar's militia followed.
[77] Mt. Auburn. Dr. Daniel Drake, writing in 1801, says: "Main street,
beyond Seventh, was a mere road nearly impassable in muddy weather
which, at the foot of the hills, divided into two, called the Hamilton
and the Mad-river road. The former took the course of the Brighton
House; the latter made a steep ascent over Mount Auburn."
Of a later road on Harmar's Trace we have this record: "1795 Road laid
out from Main Street, Cincinnati, northeast nearly on Harmar's trace
(six miles) to the road connecting Columbia and White's Station [Upper
Carthage]" (_History of Hamilton County_, p. 223).
[78] Lick Schoolhouse, Deerfield Township, Warren County?
[79] _History of Warren County_ (Chicago, 1882), p. 410.
[80] Josiah Morrow offers this correction for future editions of
Armstrong's _Journal_: "The printed journal of Armstrong's makes the
first ten miles of the third day in a northwest course. Even if this be
understood as meaning west of north, it would take the army to the west
of West Chester in Butler County. If we assume northwest to be an error
for northeast, 'the first five miles over a dry ridge to a lick' would
bring the army to the lick at Lick School-house in Deerfield township,
Warren county; and the next 'five miles through a low swampy country to
a branch of the waters of the Little Miami' would be over the swampy
land of early times in the vicinity of Mason, and there is a tradition
that the army stopped for a time on Little Muddy creek, on the farm
formerly owned by Joseph McClung, north of Mason."
[81] MSS. in possession of Josiah Morrow, Lebanon, Ohio.
[82] A western tributary of the Little Miami, down which Harmar is
supposed to have marched to Fish-pot Ford, was formerly known as
Harmar's Run.
[83] Armstrong's printed _Journal_ reads Sugar Creek for Cæsar's Creek.
Either this was an older name or the result of a typographical error. As
the name Cæsar comes from a negro who resided here with the Indians, it
is probable that, as Josiah Morrow assumes, "the soldier wrote Seezar or
Seizar, which the printer mistook for Sugar."
[84] A station on the Big Four Railway, twelve miles northeast of Troy.
[85] In General Wayne's campaign in 1794 a trace known as "Harmar's
Trace" was crossed just south of the St. Mary River in Mercer County
(see p. 207). If Harmar recrossed the St. Mary and proceeded south of
the river to "Shane's Crossing" (Rockford, Mercer County) this is the
only record of it.
[86] The Irwin MS. account of the operations of the army on the Maumee
is intensely vivid, and, though incomplete, should be preserved in
lasting form. It will be found in Appendix C.
[87] _Historic Highways of America_, vol. ix, ch. 2.
[88] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 129.
[89] _Id._, p. 171.
[90] _Id._, p. 172. This project was suggested by General St. Clair the
year previous, but was not countenanced by the Government. _American
State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 100.
[91] _Id._, p. 172.
[92] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 192.
Officers who had orders from Butler to march were, in some instances,
delayed nearly a week before they received the necessary provisions with
which to do so.--St. Clair's _Narrative of the Campaign against the
Indians_ (1812), p. 228.
[93] _Id._, p. 193.
[94] St. Clair's _Narrative_, p. 12.
[95] _Id._, p. 207.
[96] Cummingsville--"six miles from the fort [Washington], along what is
now 'Mad Anthony Street.'"--_History of Hamilton County_, (Cleveland,
1881), p. 78.
[97] Knox to Washington, October 1, 1791, _American State Papers_, vol.
iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 244.
[98] The site of Fort Hamilton was in the present city of Hamilton,
Ohio, and was described in 1875 as located on the ground reaching from
Stable Street to the United Presbyterian Church, and stretching from the
Miami River eastward to the site of the Universalist Church.
[99] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 173.
[100] _Historic Highways of America_, vol. ix, ch. 2.
[101] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 245.
St. Clair had ordered Butler to proceed in three parallel paths each ten
feet in width.
[102] Everts's _Atlas of Butler County, Ohio_, p. 23.
[103] _History of Preble County, Ohio (1881)_, p. 19.
[104] _St. Clair Papers_, vol. ii, p. 252.
[105] _St. Clair Papers_, vol. ii, p. 247. This letter may have been
written at Fort Hamilton.
[106] St. Clair's _Narrative_, p. 32. It is difficult to harmonize St.
Clair's own words concerning the width of the roadway with those of the
editor of _The St. Clair Papers_, vol. ii, p. 292, note.
[107] _Historic Highways of America_, vol. v, p. 144. Cf. Harmar's order
of march p. 96.
[108] St. Clair's _Narrative_, p. 31.
[109] _Id_., p. 32.
[110] _The St. Clair Papers_, vol. ii, pp. 251, 262.
[111] St. Clair's _Narrative_, p. 210.
[112] _The St. Clair Papers_, pp. 254, 255.
[113] St. Clair wrote Hodgdon regarding supplies as follows: "Forty-five
thousand rations of provisions should move with the army; ... twice in
every ten days forty-five thousand rations should move from Fort
Washington to the next post, until three hundred and sixty thousand
rations were sent forward; ... forty-five thousand rations should again
move with the army from the first post to a second, and an equal number
twice in every ten days until the residue of the three hundred and sixty
thousand were carried forward, and so on from post to post, still moving
with forty-five thousand rations. They have failed entirely in enabling
me to move with forty-five thousand rations, and from the letter above
mentioned, the agent seems not to expect to move any beyond this place;
for he says: 'If you move from thence (meaning this place) shortly, and
take ten days' provisions with you, it will deprive us of the means to
transport what may be necessary after that is exhausted.' After, then,
that you know _exactly_ what the contractors can do as to
transportation, (for so far as they can do it, it is their business, and
must not be taken out of their hands) you will take your measures so, as
that, on the 27th instant, I may be able to move with three hundred
horse-loads of flour, and that one hundred and fifty horse-loads succeed
that every seven days; one hundred and fifty horses being sent back
every seven days. For whatever expense may attend the arrangement, this
shall be your warrant; and I am certain, from your personal character,
as well as from your zeal for the public good, that no unnecessary
expense will be incurred. It is to be observed, that our beef will be
expended about the 5th or 6th of next month. When I left Fort
Washington, the agent of the contractors informed me that he expected a
drove of cattle very soon; whether they are arrived or not I am not
informed. I have written to him on this occasion; but I request you to
inform yourself, and, if necessary, to make provision there also; and,
indeed, there is not a moment to lose about it, and to provide for any
deficiency. He writes me that the measures he has taken will give a
supply to the last of December or a month longer, but nothing must be
left to hazard."--_The St. Clair Papers_, vol. ii, pp. 248-249.
[114] St. Clair's _Narrative_, p. 33.
[115] _The St. Clair Papers_, vol. ii, p. 257.
[116] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 137.
[117] _Id._, p. 137.
[118] See p. 89.
[119] St. Clair's _Narrative_, pp. 213-219.
[120] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 138;
St. Clair's _Narrative_, p. 55.
[121] Albach's _Annals of the West_, p. 584.
[122] Atwater's _History of Ohio_, p. 142.
[123] Captain Robert Buntin to Governor St. Clair, February 13, 1792
(Dillon's _History of Indiana_, p. 283).
[124] _Annals of the West_, p. 590.
[125] MS. of Thos. Posey, _Draper MSS._, xvi U, vol. 3. Cf. page 203.
[126] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 227.
[127] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), pp.
234-236.
[128] MSS. in the New York State Library in Washington's handwriting;
_Magazine of American History_, vol. iii (February, 1879), pp. 81-88.
[129] Wayne to Knox, October 5, 1792, _Draper MSS._, v U, fol. 21.
[130] _Id._, Armstrong to Wilkinson, September 13, 1792.
[131] Journal of Thomas Posey, _Draper MSS._, xvi U, vol. 3. Hereafter
this will be referred to merely by name.
[132] March 30, 1793.
[133] The fourth article was the objectionable one. It read: "The United
States solemnly guaranty to the Wabash, and Illinois nations, or tribes
of Indians, all the lands to which they have a just claim; and no part
shall ever be taken from them, but by a fair purchase, and to their
satisfaction. That the land originally belonged to the Indians; it is
theirs, and theirs only. That they have a right to sell, and a right to
refuse to sell. And that the United States will protect them in their
said just rights." _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs,
vol. i), p. 338. No citizen of the United States had or has a right to
refuse to sell land to the Government. Such a right could not be given
to an Indian tribe.
[134] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), pp.
323-324.
[135] _Id._, p. 244.
[136] _Id._
[137] _Id._, p. 243.
[138] A standing rock in the Maumee River.
[139] _Historic Highways of America_, vol. vi, pp. 21-23.
[140] _American State Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), pp.
340-342.
[141] _Historic Highways of America_, vol. ix, ch. 2.
[142] _Id._, p. 356.
[143] _Id._, p. 375.
[144] Deposition of an unknown, but in Wayne's handwriting. _Draper
MSS._, v U, fol. 24.
[145] The following innocent sentence was to signify that war should
immediately begin: "Although we did not effect a peace, yet we hope that
good may hereafter arise from the mission." Wayne was provided with the
commissioners' signatures as a guard against forgery.--_American State
Papers_, vol. iv (Indian Affairs, vol. i), P. 359.
[146] Scott to Governor Shelby of Kentucky, "Petersburg 24th Sept 1793 2
oclock in the morning." _Draper MSS._, v U, fol. 25.
[147] Wayne to Knox, October 5, 1793. _American State Papers_, vol. iv
(Indian Affairs, vol. i), p. 361.
[148] _Id._, p. 351.
[149] _Atlas of Butler County, Ohio_ (1875), p. 23.
[150] _History of Preble County, Ohio_ (1881), p. 22.
[151] _A Journal of Wayne's Campaign._ Being an Authentic Daily Record
of the most Important Occurrences during the Campaign of Major General
Anthony Wayne, against the Northwestern Indians; Commencing on the 28th
day of July, and ending on the 2d day of November, 1794; including an
account of the great battle of August 20th. By Lieutenant Boyer
(Cincinnati, 1866).
[152] A copy of Clark's journal is in the _Draper MSS._ (v U, fols.
33-92). The original is owned by Mrs. A. J. Ballard of Louisville,
Kentucky.
[153] Relics made from logs of this bridge, well preserved by their
position in swampy ground, are not uncommon in Mercer County.
[154] Posey refers to this fort only as Fort Adams; Clark mentions it
only as Fort Randolph. Boyer gives no name, referring to it as "the
garrison."
[155] A venerable resident of Rockford, Mr. Bronson Roebuck, aged
eighty-one, informs the writer that the road from Fort Adams passed down
the north bank of the St. Mary through an Indian village, Old Town, on
the farm of Rouel Roebuck, about two miles east of Rockford, and
continued down the valley to the present site of Willshire; thence it
continued to Fort Wayne but at a further distance from the river.
[156] Just as St. Clair refused Butler's proposal at Fort Jefferson in
the campaign of 1791.
[157] "The scheme [of surprising the Indians] was proposed, and certain
success insured if attempted. Gen Wilkinson suggested the plan to the
Commander-in-Chief, but it was not his plan, nor perhaps his wish, to
embrace so probable a means for ending the war by compelling them to
peace. This was not the first occasion or opportunity which presented
itself to our observant General [Wilkinson] for some grand stroke of
enterprise, but the commander-in-chief rejected all and every of his
plans"--fol. 42. Clark's criticisms and objections fill his remaining
pages--fols. 42-50, 52, 57, 58, 59.
[158] _Glaize_ was from the French meaning "clay;" Auglaize River was
the "river of the clay banks."
[159] Clark adds, in thoroughly hostile tone, that Wayne would have
answered it but for the intervention of General Wilkinson.--Fol. 50.
[160] As mentioned in our narrative, p. 182, it was to a "fallen timber"
on the Bloody Way between Forts Hamilton and St. Clair that Girty with a
party of Indians went in the fall of 1792 on a raiding expedition. The
name is preserved, at least in one instance, in West Virginia in Fallen
Timber Run, Wetzel County. The modern spelling is "Fallen Timbers."
[161] See _ante_, page 18, note 2. The original of Clark's _Memoir_ is
found in the _Draper MSS._, xlvii J, fols. 1-128.
[162] See _ante_, page 53.
[163] _Draper MSS._, xxv J, fols. 14-60.
[164] _Id._, xxiv, fol. 9; xxv, fols. 14-20, 60.
[165] _Id._, fols. 14, 43.
[166] _Id._, xxiv, fol. 9.
[167] _Id._
[168] _Id._, fols. 49, 50.
[169] _Id._, xxiv, fol. 13.
[170] See _ante_, page 101, note 86. The extract here given is from
_Draper MSS._, iv U, fols. 3-17.
* * * * *
Transcriber's Notes:
1. Passages in italics are surrounded by _underscores_.
2. Obvious errors in spelling and punctuation have been corrected except
for narratives and letters included in this text.
3. Footnotes have been moved to the end of the main text body.
4. Images have been moved from the middle of a paragraph to the closest
paragraph break.
5. Certain words use an oe ligature in the original.
6. Carat character (^) followed by a single letter or a set of letters
in curly brackets is indicative of subscript in the original book.