MIAMI VALLEY CAMPAIGNS
The various campaigns directed from Kentucky and western Pennsylvania
had, by 1779, comparatively freed what is now eastern and central Ohio
of red-men. Little by little they had been pushed in a northwesterly
direction until the headwaters of the Great and Little Miami and Scioto
were reached. Here on the backbone of Ohio, near the headwaters of the
St. Mary and Auglaize Rivers--a pleasant country which the Indians
always loved--the most heroic stand was yet to be made against the
encroaching white men.
The point of vantage was well chosen, as the bloody years of 1780-1795
proved. The forests were divided by large stretches of open land, which
were easily cultivated and exceedingly rich. To the northward flowed the
Auglaize River affording a highway to the great Maumee Valley and Lake
Erie. The St. Mary offered a roundabout water route to the same goal--a
goal fortified by the line of British forts on the Lakes. Here
encouragement of every description was to be had at all times--at the
price of steadily resisting and ravaging the advancing American frontier
line.
The three rivers, the Scioto and the two Miamis, offered thoroughfare
from this vantage ground southward toward the Kentucky stations. The
important Indian towns were located on the upper waters of the Little
Miami, the Auglaize, and Maumee, with other villages on the portages
between these streams and in the lower valleys of the Auglaize and
Maumee. The largest Indian villages were the settlements at the
junctions of the Maumee and Auglaize and the St. Mary and St. Joseph.
The key of the region was the junction of the St. Mary with the St.
Joseph--four water avenues, leading east (Maumee), west (Wabash), south
(St. Mary), and north (St. Joseph), and each filled with Indian
clearings and villages.
The land was covered with a network of Indian trails running in every
direction, of which surprisingly little can be definitely stated.
Considering how numerous are the old-time maps which show the roads of
the red-men in eastern and central Ohio and in Kentucky, it is
remarkable that almost none give the routes in western Ohio and eastern
Indiana. By comparison of contemporaneous authorities it is certain
there were three important landward thoroughfares leading northward from
the Ohio River into the region here under view. In general terms, the
most easterly of these ascended the valley of the Little Miami; another
passed northward on the watershed between the two Miamis; the third ran
north from the present site of Cincinnati on the watershed to the west
of the Great Miami, with branches running into and up the river valley
itself. All of these routes led to the strategic portages which
connected the two Miamis and the Scioto with the St. Mary and Auglaize
tributaries of the Maumee.[63]
The unfortunate Bowman expedition of 1779[64] went up the Little Miami
to the Shawanese villages along that river. In the year following George
Rogers Clark waged his campaign against the celebrated Shawanese town of
Piqua on the Mad River tributary of the Little Miami, cutting a road for
his packhorses and mounted six-pounder on the east side of the Little
Miami.[65] Two years later Clark executed one of the most successful
campaigns yet made into the region north of the Ohio. Moving from near
the mouth of the Licking (the usual place of rendezvous of all the
Kentucky expeditions into Ohio) it is believed the expedition took the
central track between the Miamis, reaching the Great Miami near the site
of Dayton. From thence the route was up that river to the portage. "The
British trading-post," wrote Clark to the governor of Virginia,[66] "at
the head of the Miami and carrying-place to the waters of the lake
shared the same fate [as the towns Clark attacked in person] at the
hands of a party of one hundred and fifty horse, commanded by Colonel
Benjamin Logan." This post was, undoubtedly, historic Loramie's Store,
the trading-post on Loramie's Creek, Shelby County, Ohio, at the
southern end of the portage to the St. Mary River.
Thus after a number of years of fighting, the Kentuckians had at last
struck at the vital spot. This blow ended the Revolutionary warfare in
the West. The British having lost, some time ago, the war in the East,
had until now assisted the Indians in an attempt to retrieve the
situation by ousting the brave pioneers from the West. The presence of
the hero of Vincennes so far north as the portage to the St. Mary and
Auglaize was proof enough that their hope of conquest in the West was
idle.
But hope would not down, and much of the hard story to which these pages
are to be devoted would never have had a part in American history had
the British now, once for all, given up the design of countenancing the
Indians in an attempt to hem in and push back the frontiers of
expanding America. The contest until now, 1783, had been one solely of
retaliation on the part of the Kentuckians; by treaties, oft confirmed,
the Indians had given up all title and claim to the lands south of the
Ohio River. From 1785, when the treaty of Fort McIntosh was made with
the Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa, and Ottawa nations, and 1786, when the
treaty of Fort Finney was made with the Shawanese, the United States
ceded to these Indians all the lands lying between the Muskingum and
Wabash Rivers north of a line drawn from Fort Laurens to the Miami-St.
Mary portage and thence to the mouth of River de la Panse on the Wabash.
The northern valley of the Ohio River, for a long distance into the
interior, now coming into the possession of the United States, the
inevitable struggle to hold it drew on apace. The tribes of the Miamis
nation, Twightwees or Miamis proper, Weas or Ouiatenons, Piankeshaws,
and Shockeys, on the upper Wabash, being troublesome, George Rogers
Clark moved northward from Vincennes with nearly a thousand troops in
the fall of 1786; but Clark's deportment was demoralizing and his
campaign was a practical failure. However, before starting on the Wabash
campaign, Clark had ordered Colonel Logan to strike again at the towns
at the head of the Great Miami. With four or five hundred mounted
riflemen Logan accomplished the task of destroying eight Indian villages
and taking several score of prisoners.
The foregoing details form a necessary introduction to the new era in
the West, heralded by the passage of the Ordinance of 1787 and the
forming of the government of the Territory Northwest of the Ohio River
at Marietta July 16, 1788. Until this time the question of western
defense had been a problem for Pennsylvania and Virginia to solve by
means of their frontier militia. Now the United States Government took
up the tangled problem, by empowering President Washington, on September
29, 1789, to call out the militia of the frontier states to repel the
incursions of the savages.
From the time of the organization of the Northwest Territory until 1790,
the Indians of the Maumee region steadily increased their marauding
expeditions, striking at every point along the Ohio River from the mouth
of the Scioto to the mouth of the Wabash. The Government was overwhelmed
with petitions and remonstrances from citizens of all classes in
Kentucky. Judge Innes addressed the Secretary of War from Kentucky: "I
have been intimately acquainted with this district from November
1783.... I can venture to say, that above 1500 souls have been killed
and taken in the district, and migrating to it; that upwards of 20,000
horses have been taken ... and other property ... carried off and
destroyed by these barbarians, to at least £15,000."[67]
The ringleaders of these marauding bands were the Miami tribes of the
upper Wabash and Miami Rivers, and Shawanese who dwelt with them. The
Delawares and Wyandots, who now, in 1789, signed the Treaty of Fort
Harmar (which only confirmed the previous treaties of Fort Stanwix and
Fort McIntosh) were not, at first, guilty of connivance; though soon
they joined the Indian confederacy regardless of their promises.
It is interesting to note at the outset that the savages to whom the
attention of the nation was now about to be attracted were styled,
generally, the "Northwestern Indians." The significance of this is that
now, when at last run to bay, the final campaigns in that long series of
conflicts begun by Washington and Braddock and Forbes on the heads of
the Ohio (1754-58), continued by Bouquet on the Muskingum (1764),
Dunmore on the Scioto (1774), Crawford on the Sandusky (1781), and Clark
on the Miami (1782), were to be fought to a triumphant conclusion in the
region of the Wabash. These savages were the same that had ever fought
the advancing fire-line of civilization--the Miamis, Delawares,
Shawanese, Wyandots, and their confederates. Driven westward for nearly
half a century, they made a final stand at the western extremity of Lake
Erie, almost under the guns of the British forts, and are known
collectively now in 1790 as the "Northwestern Indians." The story of our
actual conquest of the interior of America from the aboriginal
inhabitants is practically the story of the campaigns which resulted in
the acquisition successively of the Allegheny, Beaver, Muskingum,
Scioto, Miami, Maumee, and Wabash river valleys. Fallen Timber sealed
the doom of the Indian and ended a struggle begun at Fort Necessity in
1754. The conquest would not have taken one-half the time it did had the
Indian not become allied now to France and now to England, alliances
which introduced perplexing and delicate international questions which
prolonged the pitiful struggle.
On the sixth of October, 1789, President Washington, acting under the
new powers conferred upon him, addressed a communication to Governor St.
Clair requesting accurate information as to whether or not "the Wabash
and Illinois Indians are most inclined for war or peace."[68] If found
to favor the former course the governor was empowered "to call on the
lieutenants of the nearest counties of Virginia and Pennsylvania, for
such detachments of militia as you may judge proper, not exceeding,
however, one thousand from Virginia and five hundred from
Pennsylvania."[69] With the prophetic foresight which so frequently
marked Washington's estimate of the future he added: "As it may be of
high importance to obtain a precise and accurate knowledge of the
several waters which empty into the Ohio, on the northwest, and of those
which discharge themselves in the lakes Erie and Michigan, the length of
the portage between, and nature of the ground, an early and pointed
attention thereto is earnestly recommended."[70] Anthony Gamelin, a
trusty scout, was sent up the Wabash River to test the sentiments of the
Wabash and Miami Indians in April 1790; the gist of his report was that
the young men of the nations could not be restrained from war, that the
majority of the savages had "a bad heart." The influence of McKee and
Girty was in absolute authority.[71] "I now enclose the proceedings of
Mr. Gamelin," wrote Major Hamtramck to Governor St. Clair from
Vincennes, May 22, 1790, "by which your excellency can have no great
hopes of bringing the Indians to a peace with the United States."[72]
The reasons are thus stated by Governor St. Clair to the Secretary of
War: "The confidence these [Indians] have in their situation, the
vicinity of many other nations, either much under their influence, or
hostilely disposed towards the United States, and pernicious councils of
the British traders, joined to the immense booties obtained by their
depredations on the Ohio."[73]
By July 16 Governor St. Clair was ready to put in motion the campaign
which was voted by all concerned to be inevitable. There was a double
danger in further delay; the Indians were growing more bold each day,
and the people along the western frontier were beginning to distrust the
strength of the Government which, while claiming them, failed utterly to
protect them. Only a week before (July 7) Judge Innes wrote these
startling words to the Secretary of War: "I will, sir, be candid on
this subject.... The people say they have long groaned under their
misfortunes, they see no prospect of relief.... They begin to want faith
in the Government, and appear determined to revenge themselves: for this
purpose a meeting was lately held in this place, by a number of
respectable characters, to determine on the propriety of carrying on
three expeditions this fall."[74]
Accordingly by circular letters to the county lieutenants dated Fort
Washington, July 16, 1790, St. Clair called upon three hundred men from
Nelson, Lincoln, and Jefferson Counties, Virginia, to rendezvous at Fort
Steuben (Steubenville, Ohio) September 12; seven hundred men from
Madison, Mercer, Fayette, Bourbon, Woodford, and Mason Counties to
rendezvous at Fort Washington September 15; and five hundred men from
Washington, Fayette, Westmoreland, and Allegheny Counties, Pennsylvania,
to rendezvous four miles below Wheeling on September 3. From this on
affairs moved swiftly. On July 14--the day before the circular letters
were sent off--General Harmar contracted with Elliott and Williams of
Kentucky for one hundred and eighty thousand rations of flour, two
hundred thousand rations of meat, eight hundred and sixty-eight horses
equipped, one horse-master general, eighteen horse-masters, one hundred
and thirty drivers, to be delivered at Fort Washington by October 1. On
August 23, Secretary of War Knox wrote Governor St. Clair that he had
ordered two tons of best rifle and musket powder, four tons of lead
bullets, cartridge paper, case shot for five and a half inch howitzers
and for three- and six-pounders to be hurried on from Philadelphia to
the Ohio River. A thousand dollars was forwarded to Fort Washington for
contingent expenses. Knox hurried a letter on to the governor of
Virginia asking him to use his influence to induce the veteran Kentucky
colonels Logan and Shelby to join the army at Fort Washington as
volunteers for "the accomplishment of the public good," and a letter to
Harmar requesting him to invite "those characters," and to treat them
with "the greatest cordiality." St. Clair wrote immediately to the
British commander at Detroit explaining candidly the nature of the
campaign now on foot, explicitly stating its object and asking that the
enemy should receive no assistance from British traders "from whose
instigation," he made bold to add, "there is good reason to believe,
much of the injuries committed by the savages has proceeded."
Everything considered, the young government responded nobly to the call
of its western citizens. This was its first war, and one has to know
only a little of the struggles for mere equipoise and maintenance since
the close of the Revolution to realize that a war at this time, of any
proportions, was a most trying and exhausting undertaking. This has
never been sufficiently emphasized. His first inauguration now two years
past, the labors of his new honors were already bearing heavily upon the
first president. If greater trials had ever been his portion, even in
the struggle for independence, they had in a measure been anticipated
and borne with a patience commensurate with the great interests at
stake. He had been able to manoeuver his armies from red-coat
generals' grasp, and the fretful complainings of the "times that tried
men's souls" were alternately hushed in the presence of gloom and
scattered in the hour of victory. But now the clash of personal interest
and state pride rose loud about the chief executive, and advisers, who
had once lost all thought of self in the common danger, now became
uncertain quantities in the struggle for personal advancement, and
bickered spitefully over matters of preferment and policy. The country
which Washington loved never needed his services more than now when
these untried problems of currency, debt, and policy--and now of
war--came rapidly to the front.
The President's call for militia was answered with too great alacrity. A
motley collection of Kentucky militia was assembling by the middle of
September, and those from Pennsylvania reached Fort Washington on the
twenty-fourth. The Kentuckians were formed into three battalions under
Majors Hall, M'Mullen, and Bay, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel
Trotter--under whom they were anxious to serve. The Pennsylvanians were
formed in one battalion under Lieutenant-colonel Trubley and Major Pond,
the whole commanded by Colonel John Hardin, subject to General Harmar's
orders. The regulars were formed in two battalions under Major John P.
Wyllys and Major John Doughty. The company of artillery, having three
pieces of ordnance, was under the command of Captain William Ferguson. A
battalion of flying militia or light mounted troops was commanded by
Major James Fontaine. The entire army numbered one thousand four hundred
and fifty-three, of which three hundred and twenty were regulars. The
"army" had assembled quickly; the stores had been forwarded to the place
of rendezvous with exceeding despatch and faithfulness. The army was
fatally weak in two particulars: many undisciplined old men and boys had
volunteered as substitutes; and the arms, furnished by the volunteers
themselves, were in lamentably poor condition. Taken all in all, with
the exception of armament, which was somewhat bettered at Fort
Washington, this first little American army that now began an invasion
of the Maumee Valley was in no better or no worse condition than the
ordinary militia forces formerly put into the field by Pennsylvania or
Kentucky.
On the twenty-sixth of September the militia, eleven hundred strong,
under Colonel Hardin, set forth from Fort Washington, striking in a
northwesterly direction toward the valley of the Little Miami, on
General Clark's route of 1780. David H. Morris, making a slight error in
dates, leaves this account, which gives, as the first day's march of the
militia, four miles: "On the 29th of September, we took up our march for
the Maumee Villages, near where Fort Wayne now stands, and proceeded
four miles."[75]
Of the start from Fort Washington Thomas Irwin leaves record: "My Second
visit to Said Cincinnati was as a volunteer from Washington, Pa. on
Harmars Campaign about the first week in October 1790.... Fort
Washington was Built, not finished, in my absence. The Militia from
Kentucky and Pennsylvania Rendezvoused There at the same time Marched
from Thence for the Indian Towns Between the 10th and 15th of october
1790 on the Trace made By General Clark from Kentucky in october
1782[76] which crossed the river hill[77] north of Fort Washington
passed Mcmillins[78] Spring as it was afterwards Called Encamped at
reading until Harmar came up with the regular Troops."
At the beginning of the last century Harmar's route was easily traced
through Warren County, running north of Mason and west of Lebanon.[79]
On September 30 the regulars under General Harmar left Fort Washington,
by way of the same route, it would seem, as the militia. Captain
Armstrong's record for the day reads: "The army moved from Fort
Washington, at halfpast ten o'clock, A. M.,--marched about seven miles
N. E. course--hilly, rich land. Encamped on a branch of Mill creek."
How one can understand from this record that Harmar's route followed
what later became known as the "old Wayne Road" or "old Hamilton Road"
up Mill Creek Valley is beyond the ken of the present writer. Encamping
on the night of September 2 on Muddy Creek, Warren County, General
Harmar lay one mile south of the militia encampment.[80] On the day
following he moved through Hardin's camp, which was located a few miles
southwest of Lebanon, and rested one mile in advance on Turtle Creek.
Here the divisions of the army united, and here the line of march was
formed, according to Armstrong's journal, on September 3.
A. H. Dunlevy, a pioneer in this neighborhood west of Lebanon in 1798,
left record that near his home on the old route was the site of one of
Harmar's camps--possibly that of Colonel Hardin. A half acre was cleared
and several graves were then visible there. "The brush," he wrote, "was
piled in heaps around the camp. These brush heaps were decayed in 1798
but made fine harbors for snakes and as the warm sun of spring came out,
I think hundreds of them could be seen in an hour passing from one brush
heap to another. I used to amuse myself in watching their movements and
noting their peculiar colors. Every kind of snake seemed to nestle
together in those brush heaps."[81]
On the fourth the combined army moved in a northwesterly direction
through the Turtle Creek Valley and, continuing over the hilly region
northeast of Lebanon, crossed the Little Miami at what has long been
known as Fish-pot Ford about six miles northeast of Lebanon.[82] Moving
up the east bank of the river, camp was pitched one mile north of the
crossing-place on Cæsar's Creek.[83] The route the day following was up
the river on the famous war path toward the Indian Chillicothe and Piqua
towns in the valleys of that and the Mad River, along the general
alignment of the Little Miami Railroad. Marching ten miles, according to
Captain Armstrong, the army encamped "at five o'clock on Glade creek, a
very lively, clear stream."
On the sixth, the site of old Chillicothe was reached; "recrossed the
Little Miami," says Armstrong, "at half past one o'clock, halted one
hour, and encamped at four o'clock on a branch." Morris's account from
the thirtieth of September reads: "Thirtieth, we moved forward on the
old Indian trail leading to the old Chilcothie town, on the little
Miami, and after several days marching, arrived at the place where the
town once stood. Here we fired off our guns; and in the evening, having
recrossed the river, encamped about a mile above, near where James
Galloway now lives."
The old Indian trail ran from Chillicothe to Old Piqua across Mad River
Township, Clark County, where, five miles west of Springfield, Tecumseh
was born. After Clark's destruction of this village in 1780, its
inhabitants moved across to the Great Miami where New Piqua was built,
and which was destroyed by Clark in 1782. The path Harmar now followed
bore toward the northwest, taking him to the site of the later Piqua on
the Great Miami. Armstrong's journal reads: "7^{th}.... Passed through
several low praries, and crossed the Pickaway fork of Mad river....
Encamped on a small branch, one mile from the former. Our course the
first four miles north, then northwest.--Nine miles."
The Irwin MS., from the point of union of Harmar and Harding, reads:
"formed the Line of march there which was in Two Lines one on the right
and one on the Left of s^d Trace a strong front and Rear guard on Said
Trace the Baggage in the Center Passed near where the Town of Lebanon
Stands in Warren County west of Waynesville and Xenia Crossed Mad river
perhaps 10 miles from Dayton Struck the great Miami near the old Piqua
Towns that was Detroyed By s^d Gen^l. Clark Crossed the Miami some
Distance above Them."
For the journey between the two Miamis the Morris journal is perhaps
most definite: "On the day following, we crossed Mad river, and camped
near New Carlisle,[84] in Clark county, and within one mile of Epee
town, located precisely where Elnathan Cory now lives. This town gave
name to the creek on which it stood, now called Honey-creek.... Here we
killed 20 cows intended for beef.... The next day we crossed Indian
creek ... and same day crossed Lost Creek in Miami county.... On this
evening, we encamped at a spring, on the farm formerly owned by
Nathaniel Gerrard, and about two miles from the town of Troy. Gen.
Harmar gave to this spring, the name _Tea Spring_, as he and his
officers refreshed themselves there, on that beverage."
Armstrong's record for the eighth and ninth is: "The army moved at
halfpast nine o'clock. Passed over rich land, in some places a little
broken: passed several ponds, and through one small prarie, a N. W.
course.--Seven miles. 9th--The army moved at halfpast nine o'clock.
Passed through a level, rich country, well watered: course
N. W.,--halted halfpast four o'clock, two miles south of the Great
Miami.--Ten miles."
These commonplace records do not in any way represent the real state of
affairs; perhaps they suggest only the topics of conversation of the
vanguard of scouts and guides that led the army. The little band of
troops was now in the heart of the enemy's country. The face of the land
was covered with forests, broken here and there by patches of bush and
prairie. That the Indians knew of their advance, there was little doubt.
When, where, or how they would oppose that advance, no one knew. The
Great Miami was now reached and soon the strategic portage of the St.
Mary would be taken possession of. The course would then be down grade
to the Miami towns on the Maumee. Would the enemy rally here on the
watershed crest near the old French fort on the Loramie? Such
speculations as these occupied many more minds, it may confidently be
believed, than thoughts of the streams or prairies crossed. The records
left us tell only of the commonplaces, leaving the human element to the
imagination. Yet this can be better conceived if the route is correctly
outlined.
On the tenth of September Harmar crossed the Great Miami River. "At the
crossing," wrote Armstrong, "there is a handsome high prairie on the
S. E. side." "On the following day," reads the Morris record, "we
crossed the big Miami, a little above the town of Piqua, near Manning's
old mill.... This evening we encamped not far from upper Piqua." This
agrees with the Irwin MS. previously quoted.
On the eleventh the army moved to and crossed Loramie's Creek, seven
miles from its camping-place of the preceding night (ten miles from the
camp near the Great Miami of September 9). Of the route from the Great
Miami onward, Irwin states: "Crossed Loirimous Creek a short Distance
from its mouth into the great Miami river had a pretty good Indian Trace
from there to what was Called the old french store or Trading house at
St marys had a good Trace from there to the Maumee towns." The Morris
record reads: "Next day, we took up our march for Lorrimiers, a French
trader at St. Marys--... We crossed Lorrimie creek on the next morning,
at a village that had been burned by Clark or Logan, some ten years
before. From here, we passed over the summit level for St. Marys, where
we encamped.... Having crossed St. Marys we encamped on its eastern
bank."[85]
On September 12, by Armstrong's journal, the army "crossed a stream at
seven miles and a half running N. E. on which there are several old
camps, much deadened timber, which continues to the river Auglaize,
about a mile. Here has been a considerable village--some houses still
standing. This stream is a branch of the Omi [Maumee] river, and is
about twenty yards wide."
From this on the route was along the old trace which followed the St.
Mary, some distance to the northward of the immediate bank, to its
junction with the Maumee, where the army arrived on the seventeenth of
September, having accomplished the hard march of over one hundred and
sixty miles in eighteen days by the regulars and twenty by the militia.
On the thirteenth, "I think the 1^{st} or 2^d morning after we Left St
Marys," according to Mr. Irwin, "8 or 10 mounted men went out in Search
of some horses that had Been Lost or missing over night Started a Smart
young Indian without a gun in the open woods--Took him prisoner Brought
him into Camp ... he give Every information respecting the movements of
the Indians Stated they had Determined to move Their families and
property out of the Towns and Burn Them. Six hundred men was Detached or
Drafted from the army placed under the Command of Col. Hardin he Being
the 2^d in Command with orders to proceed as quick as possible to the
Towns. When We arrived found what the prisoner Stated was True 2 Indians
happened to Be under the Bank of the river when the army came up they
tried to Escape the Troops Discovered them and about 100 guns was
Discharged at them one was found Dead the Next Day in the Brush, The
Ballance of the army arriv'd at the Towns two Days after the first got
there I was with the rear."[86]
Signs that the Indians had retreated in a northwesterly direction being
discovered, General Harmar, on the eighteenth, ordered Colonel Trotter
of the militia to follow and attack them with a force of three hundred
men. The detachment was provided with three days rations. About one mile
from camp an Indian was pursued and killed. A little later a second
solitary Indian scout was killed--after wounding one of his assailants.
Trotter moved hither and thither with apparent aimlessness until
nightfall when he returned to camp--to Harmar's disgust. The militia in
camp had scattered in various directions searching for corn and other
plunder which the savages had buried. The gun fired to call these into
camp, Trotter affirmed, was thought to be an alarm signal for him to
return. The men under Trotter displayed no more military characteristics
than the prowling militia left at the encampment. Such men, it was sure,
would suffer at the hands of the fierce, watchful enemy, if ever their
turn should come.
It came on the very next day! It was now Colonel Hardin's turn to strike
a blow, and he was ordered out on the Indian path which ran northwest
toward the Kickapoo towns. Proceeding about eleven miles from camp (Fort
Wayne, Indiana) to near the point where the Goshen state road crosses
the Eel River, the keen scouter John Armstrong saw important "signs"
and heard an alarm gun in front. Hardin did not act on the advice and
made no disposition of his troops for battle. Soon after, Armstrong
discovered the fires of the Indian camp--but Hardin, scorning the enemy,
pushed straight on. The Indian commander--the famous Miami warrior,
Little Turtle--based his plans on just such recklessness. Deep in the
brush and grass on either side of the trail his dogs of war crouched
silent as cougars. The army had walked well into the trap before two
crimson streaks of fire flashed out in the very faces of the troopers.
The militia bolted at breakneck speed--some never stopping in their
flight until they reached the Ohio River. A small band of regulars under
Armstrong retired slightly and held their ground temporarily; then they
retreated to Harmar's camp. This savage stroke cost heavily, the Indians
killing almost an average of a white man apiece--the loss, about one
hundred, equalling, probably, the number of the waylaying savage force.
It was one of the bloodiest ambuscades in western history. Armstrong's
journal for the nineteenth reads: "Attacked about one hundred Indians
fifteen miles west of the Miami village; and from the dastardly conduct
of the militia, the troops were obliged to retreat. I lost one sergeant,
and twenty-one out of thirty men of my command. The Indians on this
occasion gained a complete victory--having killed, in the whole, near
one hundred men, which was about their number. Many of the militia threw
away their arms without firing a shot, ran through the federal troops
and threw them in disorder." Of the Indians Armstrong adds "they fought
and died hard."
When Hardin's troops returned, they found that Harmar had moved two
miles down the Maumee in the work of destroying the Indian villages and
crops. From this camp, an old Shawanese village, various companies were
sent out in different directions to finish the work of destroying the
Indian settlements. On the night of the twenty-first, when seven miles
distant from the Miami village, Colonel Hardin proposed to Harmar that
he be allowed his pick of the militia with which to return secretly upon
the Indians. It was believed, and spies no doubt so reported, that the
Indians had returned to their central villages at the junction of the
St. Mary and St. Joseph. Harmar acquiesced, feeling that another blow
would undoubtedly prevent the savages from following the army.
The force was composed of three hundred and forty militia, under Majors
Hall and McMullen, Major Fontaine's mounted militia, and sixty regulars
under Major Wyllys. The Miami town was reached after sunrise. Hardin's
plan was to surround secretly the village and make a simultaneous attack
from all sides. Major Hall's battalion was sent to cross the St. Mary
and hold themselves in readiness to attack from the rear when the main
body, which would cross the Maumee at the common ford, fell upon the
village in front. Hall's men wantonly fired on a fugitive Indian before
the signal for attack was given; to make matters worse the militia under
McMullen and Fontaine began pursuing the various parties of flying
redskins, leaving Major Wyllys and the regulars unsupported. The latter
crossed the Maumee, according to the fixed scheme, but were suddenly
assailed by an overpowering force led by Little Turtle and were
compelled to return with loss of many men, including Major Wyllys
himself. The militia then hastened back to the main army. Miserable as
had been the deportment of the militia, their muskets had done severe
execution, and Harmar had no fear now of an Indian attack--nor the
slightest remnant of confidence in any but the fragment of regular
troops left to him.
On the twenty-third the army took up the line of outward march for Fort
Washington and reached the Ohio on the fourth day of November, having
lost one hundred and eighty-three killed and thirty-one wounded. Major
Wyllys and Lieutenant Frothingham of the regulars, and Major Fontaine
and Captains Thorp, McMurtrey, and Scott, and Lieutenants Clark and
Rogers of the militia were the principal officers sacrificed.
On the other hand there is ground for partly agreeing with Irwin that
Harmar's campaign was not wholly a defeat. The Indian loss was as large
as the American--and this was a great deal accomplished. Few armies
before had entered the Indian land and not been followed by the Indians
on the return with distinct losses. Harmar's repeated though costly
operations on the Maumee had given the Indians all the battle they
wished; indeed it is not too much to say that they were stunned.