If the Report of the State Department is a confession, that of
the Navy Department is an authentic record of acts flagrant and
indefensible,--unless we are ready to set aside the Law of Nations and
the Constitution of the United States, two paramount safeguards. Both
of these are degraded in order to advance the scheme. If I called it
plot, I should not err; for this term is suggested by the machination.
The record is complete.
The scheme first shows itself in a letter from the Secretary of State
to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of May 17, 1869, informing
the latter that the President deems it “desirable that _a man-of-war_,
commanded by a discreet and intelligent officer, should be ordered _to
visit the several ports of the Dominican Republic_, and to report upon
the condition of affairs in that quarter.” The Secretary adds:--
“It is also important that we should have full and accurate
information in regard to the views of the Dominican people
of all parties in regard to annexation to the United States,
or the sale or lease of the Bay of Samana, or of territory
adjacent thereto.”[42]
No invitation from the island appears,--not a word even from any of its
people. The beginning is in the letter of the Secretary; and here we
see how “a man-of-war” formed part of the first stage. A mere inquiry
is inaugurated by “a man-of-war.” Nor was it to stop at a single place;
it was to visit the several ports of the Dominican Republic.
The Secretary of the Navy obeyed. Orders were given, and under date
of June 29, 1869, Rear-Admiral Hoff reports that the Nipsic, with an
armament of one 11-inch and two 9-inch guns, “is to visit all the
ports of the Dominican Republic.”[43] Here again is a revelation,
foreshadowing the future; all the ports are to be visited by this
powerful war-ship. Why? To what just end? If for negotiation, then was
force, _force_, FORCE our earliest, as it has been since our constant
plenipotentiary. Already we discern the contrast with Old Spain.
The loss of a screw occurred to prevent this war-breathing
perambulation. The Nipsic did not go beyond Port-au-Prince; but
Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge, in his report, under date of July 14,
1869, lets drop an honest judgment, which causes regret that he did not
visit the whole island. Thus he wrote:--
“While my short stay in the island will not permit me to
speak with authority, it is my individual opinion, that, if the
United States should annex Hayti _on the representation of a
party_, it would be found an elephant both costly in money and
lives.”[44]
The whole case is opened when we are warned against annexion “on the
representation of a party.”
Still the scheme proceeded. On the 17th July, 1869, General Babcock
sailed from New York for San Domingo, as special agent of the State
Department. The records of the Department, so far as communicated
to the Senate, show no authority to open negotiations of any kind,
much less to treat for the acquisition of this half-island. His
instructions, which are dated July 13, 1869, are simply to make certain
inquiries;[45] but, under the same date, the Secretary of the Navy
addresses a letter to Commander Owen, of the Seminole, with an armament
of one 11-inch gun and four 32-pounders, of 4,200 pounds, in which he
says:--
“You will remain at Samana, or on the coast of San Domingo,
while General Babcock is there, _and give him the moral support
of your guns_.”[46]
The phrase of the Secretary is at least curious. And who is General
Babcock, that on his visit the Navy is to be at his back? Nothing on
this head is said. All that we know from the record is that he was to
make certain inquiries, and in this business “guns” play a part. To
be sure, it was their “_moral_ support” he was to have; but they were
nevertheless “guns.” Thus in all times has lawless force sought to
disguise itself. Before any negotiation was begun, while only a few
interrogatories were ordered by the State Department, under which this
missionary acted, “the moral support of guns” was ordered by the Navy
Department. Here, Sir, permit me to say, is the first sign of war,
being an undoubted usurpation, whether by President or Secretary. War
is hostile force, and here it is ordered. But this is only a squint,
compared with the open declaration which ensued. And here again we
witness the contrast with Old Spain.
But the “guns” of the Seminole were not enough to support the
missionary in his inquiries. The Navy Department, under date of August
23, 1869, telegraphed to the commandant at Key West:--
“Direct a vessel to proceed without a moment’s delay to San
Domingo City, _to be placed at the disposal of General Babcock
while on that coast_. If not at San Domingo City, to find
him.”[47]
Here is nothing less than the terrible earnestness of war itself.
Accordingly, the Tuscarora was dispatched; and the missionary finds
himself changed to a commodore. Again the contrast with Old Spain!
How many days the Tuscarora took to reach the coast does not appear;
but on the 4th September the famous protocol was executed by Orville
E. Babcock, entitling himself “Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency,
General Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America,”
where, besides stipulating the annexion of Dominica to the United
States in consideration of $1,500,000, it is further provided that
“his Excellency, General Grant, President of the United States,
promises, privately, to use all his influence in order that the idea
of annexing the Dominican Republic to the United States may acquire
such a degree of popularity among members of Congress as will be
necessary for its accomplishment.”[48] Such was the work which needed
so suddenly--“without a moment’s delay”--a second war-ship besides the
Seminole, which was already ordered to lend “the _moral_ support of its
guns.” How unlike that boast of Old Spain, that there was not a Spanish
bottom in those waters!
Returning to Washington with his protocol, the missionary was now
sent back with instructions to negotiate two treaties,--one for the
annexion of the half-island, and the other for the lease of the Bay
of Samana. By the Constitution ambassadors and other public ministers
are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate; but our missionary held no such commission. How the
business sped appears from the State Department. The Report of the
Navy Department shows how it was sustained by force. By a letter under
date of December 3, 1869, on board the ship Albany, off San Domingo,
addressed to Lieutenant-Commander Bunce on board the Nantasket, the
missionary, after announcing the conclusion of a treaty for the lease
of Samana and other purposes, imparts this important information:--
“In this negotiation the President has guarantied to the
Dominican Republic protection from all foreign interposition
during the time specified in the treaties for submitting the
same to the people of the Dominican Republic.”
Of the absolute futility and nullity of this Presidential guaranty
until after the ratification of the treaties I shall speak hereafter.
Meanwhile we behold the missionary changed to plenipotentiary:--
“For this purpose the honorable Secretary of the Navy was
directed to place _three armed vessels in this harbor, subject
to my instruction_.”
Why three armed vessels? For what purpose? How unlike the boast of Old
Spain! What follows reveals the menace of war:--
“I shall raise the United States flag on shore, and shall leave
a small guard with it.”
Here is nothing less than military occupation. Besides war-ships in the
waters, the flag is to be raised on shore, and soldiers of the United
States are to be left with it. Again the contrast with Old Spain,
boasting not only that there was not a single Spanish “bottom” on the
coast, but not a single Spanish soldier on the land. Then follows an
order to make war:--
“Should you find any foreign intervention intended, _you will
use all your force_ to carry out to the letter the guaranties
given in the treaties.”
Nothing could be stronger. Here is war. Then comes a direct menace by
the young plenipotentiary, launched at the neighboring Black Republic:--
“The Dominican Republic fears trouble from the Haytian border,
about Jacmel. You will please inform the people, in case you
are satisfied there is an intended intervention, that such
intervention, direct or indirect, will be regarded as an
unfriendly act toward the United States, _and take such steps
as you think necessary_.”[49]
The Dominican Republic fears trouble, or in other words the usurper
Baez trembles for his power, and therefore the guns of our Navy are
to be pointed at Hayti. Again, how little like Old Spain! And this
was the way in which our negotiation began. We have heard of an
“_armed_ neutrality,” and of an “_armed_ peace”; but here is an _armed_
negotiation.
The force employed in the negotiation naturally fructified in other
force. Violence follows violence in new forms. Armed negotiation was
changed to armed intervention, being an act of war,--all of which
is placed beyond question. There is repetition and reduplication of
testimony.
The swiftness of war appears in the telegram dated at the Navy
Department January 29, 1870, addressed to Rear-Admiral Poor, at Key
West. Here is this painful dispatch:--
“Proceed at once with the Severn and Dictator to
Port-au-Prince; communicate with our Consul there, and inform
the present Haytian authorities that this Government is
determined to protect the present Dominican Government _with
all its power_. You will then proceed to Dominica, and use
your force to give the most ample protection to the Dominican
Government _against any Power attempting to interfere with it_.
Visit Samana Bay and the capital, _and see the United States
power and authority secure there_. _There must be no failure in
this matter._ If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their
ships, _destroy or capture them_. See that there is a proper
force at both San Domingo City and Samana.
“If Admiral Poor is not at Key West, this dispatch must be
forwarded to him without delay.”[50]
“Proceed at once.” Mark the warlike energy. What then? Inform the
Haytian Government “that this Government is determined to protect the
present Dominican Government [the usurper Baez] with _all its power_.”
Strong words, and vast in scope! Not only the whole Navy of the United
States, but all the power of our Republic is promised to the usurper.
At Dominica, where the Admiral is to go next, he is directed to use his
force “to give the most ample protection to the Dominican Government
[the usurper Baez] _against any Power attempting to interfere with
it_.” Then comes a new direction. At Samana and the City of San Domingo
“see the United States power and authority secure there.” Here is
nothing less than military occupation. Pray, by what title? Mark again
the warlike energy. And then giving to the war a new character, the
Admiral is told: “If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their
ships, _destroy or capture them_.” Such is this many-shotted dispatch,
which is like a mitrailleuse in death-dealing missives.
This belligerent intervention in the affairs of another country, with
a declaration of war against the Black Republic, all without any
authority from Congress, or any sanction under the Constitution, was
followed by a dispatch dated January 31, 1870, to Lieutenant-Commander
Allen, of the Swatara, with an armament of six 32-pounders, 4,500
pounds, and one 11-inch gun, where is the breath of war. After hurrying
the ship off to the City of San Domingo, the dispatch says:--
“If you find, when you get there, that the Dominican Government
require any assistance against the enemies of that Republic,
_you will not hesitate to give it to them_.”[51]
What is this but war, at the call of the usurper Baez, against the
enemies of his Government, whether domestic or foreign? Let the usurper
cry out, and our flag is engaged. Our cannon must fire, it may be upon
Dominicans rising against the usurper, or it may be upon Haytians
warring on the usurper for their rights, or it may be upon some other
foreign power claiming rights. The order is peremptory, leaving no
discretion. The assistance must be rendered. “You will not hesitate to
give it to them”: so says the order. On which I observe, This is war.
This was not enough. The Navy Department, by still another order, dated
February 9, 1870, addressed to Commodore Green, of the ship Congress,
with an armament of fourteen 9-inch guns and two 60-pounder rifles,
enforces this same conduct. After mentioning the treaty, the order
says:--
“While that treaty is pending, the Government of the United
States has agreed to afford countenance and assistance to the
Dominican people _against their enemies now in the island and
in revolution against the lawfully constituted Government_,
and you will use the force at your command to resist any
attempts by the enemies of the Dominican Republic to invade the
Dominican territory, _by land or sea_, so far as your power can
reach them.”[52]
Here again is belligerent intervention in Dominica, with a declaration
of war against the Black Republic, included under the head “enemies of
the Dominican Republic,” or perhaps it is a case of “running amuck,”
according to Malay example, for the sake of the usurper Baez.
Thus much for the orders putting in motion the powers of war. I have
set them forth in their precise words. Soon I shall show wherein they
offend International Law and the Constitution. Meanwhile the case is
not complete without showing what was done under these orders. Already
the State Department has testified. The Navy Department testifies in
harmony with the State Department. And here the record may be seen
under two heads,--first, belligerent intervention in Dominica, and,
secondly, belligerent intervention in Hayti.