For many years previous to the war, the relations between England and
Afghanistan had been unsatisfactory. Shere Ali, the ruler of the latter
country, received an annual subsidy from us, and had, besides, been
presented with large quantities of arms and other warlike weapons. The
events which led to the war have been debated with great acrimony, and
are viewed in opposite manners by persons of different political
opinions, and it is enough here to say that the approach of Russia to
the northern frontier of Afghanistan caused considerable uneasiness to
the Ameer, and that, unable to obtain from us any positive assurances of
support in case of attack from the north, he appears to have determined
that his best course would be to throw himself into the arms of Russia,
even at the risk of breaking with us.
For some time all communications with the Ameer had ceased, and it was
from a native news-writer that the intelligence that a Russian general
with a mission had arrived in Cabul, and had been honourably received,
came to the ears of our authorities.
Upon the news being made public, the Viceroy of India wrote to Shere
Ali, requesting him to receive also an English mission. The answer of
the Ameer was evasive, and Major Cavaignari, an officer of great
experience in Afghanistan, was sent up with an escort as a precursor of
a larger and more important mission to follow. Upon the 21st September
he arrived at Ali-Musjid, an Afghan fort in the Khyber Pass, and was
there stopped by an officer of the Ameer with a large force. A long
parley took place; but the officer refused to allow him to pass, and
Major Cavaignari, not having a sufficient number of men with him to
force his way up, retired, with an intimation that the Ameer would be
held responsible for the conduct of his officer.
As it was clearly impossible that the Indian Government could put up
with this insult, and that, moreover, England could not submit to see
Russian envoys received by a country upon her border which refused to
admit her own officers, preparations were at once made for war. It was
decided to invade Afghanistan in three columns, one starting from
Jumrood, at the north of the Khyber Pass, the second to advance through
Tull by the Kuram Valley, and the third to move _via_ the Bolan Pass
upon Candahar. The first of these was to be commanded by General Sir S.
Browne, the second by General Roberts, the third by General Biddulph.
The preparations for the concentration of these columns occupied
considerable time, as India had been for some time in a state of
profound peace, and the commissariat and transport service had to be
entirely organised. The greatest efforts were, however, made, and the
troops were rapidly got into place.
On the 26th of October a defiant reply to the Viceroy's letter was
received from the Ameer, and an ultimatum was in consequence sent to
him, to the effect that unless the British demands were complied with,
the troops would advance across the frontier. No reply having been
received from him up to the night of the 20th November, orders were
given to the troops to advance, and upon the following morning Generals
Roberts and Browne advanced across the frontier with their respective
columns.
The division of General Browne was divided into four brigades. The
first, under General Macpherson, consisted of the fourth battalion of
the Rifle Brigade, the 20th Bengal Infantry, and the 4th Ghurkas, with a
mountain battery. These were to go round by a mountain road, to make a
long circuit, and to come down into the pass at a village lying a mile
or two beyond Ali-Musjid. The second brigade, under Colonel Tytler,
consisting of the first battalion of the 17th Foot, the Infantry of the
Guides, the 1st Sikhs, and a mountain battery, were to take a hill
opposite to Ali-Musjid, and capture some batteries which the Afghans had
erected there; while the third and fourth brigades were to advance
direct up the valley. The former of these brigades consisted of the
81st, the 14th Sikhs, and the 24th Native Infantry. The fourth brigade
was composed of the 51st Foot, the 6th Native Infantry, and the 45th
Sikhs. With them was a mountain battery, and a battery of Horse
Artillery.
The fort of Ali-Musjid is situated on a rock standing out in the valley,
at a distance of some six miles from the frontier. It is a most
commanding position, and, flanked as it was by batteries on the
hillsides, was a most formidable place to capture. The advancing column
marched forward until from a rise in the valley they could see
Ali-Musjid at a distance of a mile and a half. The fort at once opened
fire. The gunners there had been practising for some weeks, and had got
the range with great accuracy. The column was therefore halted, and the
men allowed to eat their dinners, as it was desired that the flanking
columns should get into position before the front attack began. The
guns of the battery answered those upon the fort, and a battery of
40-pounders coming up and opening fire, their effect upon the fort was
at once visible.
The Sikhs were now thrown out upon the hillside, and these began a heavy
musketry fire against the Afghans in the batteries there. Presently a
general advance was ordered. The 81st and 24th Native Infantry advanced
on the right-hand slopes of the valley, while the 51st and 6th Native
Infantry and the Sikhs worked along on the left.
The scene is described as one of the most picturesque ever seen in
warfare. From the fortress standing on the perpendicular rock in the
centre of the valley, the flashes of the great guns came fast and
steadily, while the edges of the rocks and forts were fringed with tiny
puffs of musketry. On the British side the heavy 40-pounders and the
batteries of Horse and Royal Artillery kept up a steady fire, while both
sides of the steep hill-slopes were alive with British infantry, the
quick flash of the rifles breaking from every rock and bush.
Gradually our skirmishers advanced until they were nearly abreast of the
fort; but, so far, there was no sign that Macpherson's brigade had
accomplished its task and carried the hill, or that Tytler had worked
round to the village in the rear. Some attacks, however, were made upon
the Afghan intrenchments. These, however, were unsuccessful, and some
valuable lives were lost. Major Birch and Lieutenant Fitzgerald, both
of the 27th Native Infantry, were killed; Captain Maclean, of the 14th
Sikhs, was wounded; and between thirty and forty rank and file killed
and wounded.
As the fort and its defences could not have been carried without vast
loss of life, it was now determined to halt, in order to give the
flanking columns time to get in their places. These, who had met with
enormous obstacles on their march, arrived in the night at their
respective destinations, and the defenders of Ali-Musjid, taken by alarm
at the news that forces were advancing which would cut off their
retreat, precipitately abandoned their posts and fled. A great number
were taken prisoners, and in the morning the troops occupied Ali--Musjid
without resistance. So completely taken by surprise were the Afghans at
the easy capture of a fort which they believed to be absolutely
impregnable, that they fled without further resistance; and the British,
moving quietly up the valley, occupied place after place with scarcely a
shot fired until they reached Jellalabad.
In the meantime, General Roberts was advancing up the Kuram Valley. The
tribes here greeted our advance with pleasure, for they were tributary
to Cabul, and viewed the Afghan rule with aversion. It was upon the
Peiwar Khotal, a steep and extremely strong position, that the Afghans
determined to take their stand.
On the 30th of November the forces approached this position. The
Afghans remained silent, and preparations were made for encamping at the
commencement of the pass. The enemy, however, were nearer and more
active than had been supposed, and scarcely had the troops taken up
their position, when a heavy fire was opened upon them from above, and
the force had to retire hastily out of range. Some of the infantry were
pushed forward, and for a time brisk firing took place. The troops then
encamped for the night out of range of shot. The next day was passed in
endeavouring to feel the position of the enemy, who occupied the line
upon the top of the crest, and it was not until the 2nd that an attack
was delivered.
After thoroughly reconnoitring the ground, it was found that the
position of the Afghans was too strong to be attacked in front, and it
was determined to turn it by a long and very difficult night-march of
nine miles, up a path leading to the extreme left of the enemy's
position. The 72nd Highlanders, the 5th Ghurkas, and the 29th Native
Infantry were told off for the service, and started after nightfall. At
daybreak they came upon the enemy's pickets, and a fierce fight took
place, the Afghans defending themselves desperately. Captain Kelso
brought up his battery of mountain guns, and did good service in aiding
the infantry, who were all fiercely engaged. He himself, however, was
shot dead.
After three hours' hard fighting the enemy's left wing was beaten, and
the British, pressing forward, drove them in confusion upon the centre.
The 2nd Punjaub Infantry, the 23rd Pioneers, and four artillery guns on
elephants now arrived on the scene. It was well that they did so, for
the enemy were again found in a strong position in a thick wood, and an
obstinate fight ensued. It was some hours before they were dislodged
from this point, as they continually brought up fresh troops. So severe
was their resistance that it was found impossible to force them back by
a direct attack, and General Roberts now directed his men to advance in
such a direction as to still further turn their position and threaten
their line of retreat. This had the desired effect. The Afghans, as
usual, lost heart as soon as it appeared that their retreat was menaced,
and, leaving the strong positions on the Peiwar itself, fled hastily.
While this fight had been going on, the second battalion of the 8th Foot
had advanced direct from the camp below. Hitherto they had made no
great progress, but had succeeded in attracting the attention of the
enemy and keeping a large body of men in their intrenchments, and so
aided the main attack on the right. The moment the Afghans yielded, the
8th pushed forward and occupied the enemy's position.
The total loss on our side was 2 officers killed, 2 wounded, and 90 rank
and file (Europeans and natives) killed and wounded. The troops were
too much fatigued with their hard marching and fighting to be able to
pursue the enemy. But no ill effect was caused by this, as the Afghans
had completely lost heart, and in their retreat threw away arms and
abandoned baggage of all kinds, most of their guns being left behind,
and one battery falling into the hands of the British when they advanced
to the Shaturgurdan Pass. General Roberts with a small party went on to
this point, which they found abandoned, and from whence they commanded a
view across the heart of Afghanistan almost to Cabul. It was considered
unnecessary to occupy this position, as the winter was now at hand,
during which time the pass is absolutely closed by snow. There was,
then, no fear of the Afghans taking the offensive from this quarter.
Thus in two engagements the military strength which Shere Ali had been
building up for many years, and which he considered sufficient to defend
his country against the attacks of the British, fell absolutely to
pieces; and a few days later he himself left Cabul, and started, a
fugitive, for the northern frontier with the intention of passing into
Russia. It was necessary, however, that letters should be sent asking
permission for him to take this step, and during the delay which ensued
the Ameer was seized by fever, and expired.
General Roberts determined to leave a force to garrison the Peiwar, and
to take up his headquarters in the lower valley, there to winter. On
the way down he followed a route hitherto unknown, leading through the
defile of the Chappri. It turned out to be extremely wild and
difficult, and the people of this part, a tribe called Mongols, attacked
the baggage, which was proceeding under a small escort only, the troops
having passed through ahead. The attack was sudden and unexpected; but
the men of the baggage guard stood their way well. Captain Goad,
assistant-superintendent of transport, was shot through the legs, and
fell while fighting bravely. The natives made a rush towards him, but
four soldiers of the 72nd stood over him and gallantly defended him
against a crowd of enemies until the 5th Ghurkas, under Major Fitzhugh,
came up from the rear. Heavy as the fire was, singularly enough, only
one of these gallant fellows was wounded.
The Mongols stood boldly, and, taking to the rocks, kept up a very rapid
fire, while the Ghurkas repeatedly charged home with the bayonet, using
their terrible knives with great effect, and finally putting them to
flight, three of the 5th being killed and 13 wounded. Farther up the
defile the Mongols made another rush upon the train, but were here more
easily beaten back. The attack was made with the hope of plunder only,
and from no political animosity.
The population in the valley, although not hostile to British rule, were
eager to plunder British waggons, and constant outrages of this kind
took place, many soldiers and camp followers being killed. The
marauders were in some cases taken and executed upon the spot.
Early in January, General Roberts started with a force up the valley of
the Khost. The General reached Khost without much opposition. The
villages round sent in their submission, and all appeared likely to
terminate quietly. But upon the day after their arrival at the fort,
the natives from around mustered in great numbers, and advanced to an
attack upon the camp, occupying a number of steep hills around it, and
massing in the villages themselves. A troop of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry
advanced to attack them, with orders, if possible, to tempt them out on
to the plain. This was well managed. The enemy, seeing the smallness
of the force, poured out of the villages, when Major Bulkeley with the
10th Hussars swept down upon them, and the Afghans fled and took post on
the hills.
They again advanced on all sides, and attacked the camp, and for four
hours the 72nd, with two guns to assist them, could get but little
advantage of them. Then, unable to withstand the fire of our
breechloaders and the effect of our shell, they fell back to the hills.
Near the villages on the south side Major Stewart with thirty men of the
5th Punjaub Cavalry made a notable charge. A body fully a thousand
strong of the enemy was making from the hills, when, with his handful of
men, he dashed down upon them, scattering them in all directions,
cutting down twenty, and wounding a large number.
When the enemy had retired to the hills, the villages were searched; and
as the inhabitants of these had taken part in the fight, and large
numbers of arms were found concealed there, these were burnt, the
inhabitants being expelled, and those whom their wounds showed to have
taken part in the fight--over 100 in number--brought as prisoners. The
loss on our side was but two killed and eight wounded, showing that the
Afghans, courageous as they are, are contemptible as marksmen.
This brought the fighting to a close. General Roberts, finding his
force too small to hold the Kuram and Khost valleys, evacuated the
latter, and the force went into winter quarters.
This step had already been taken in the Khyber. It had not been
intended from the first to push the advance as far as Cabul before the
winter came on, as the difficulties in the way of so doing would have
been enormous, and the troops would have had great difficulty in
maintaining their position, even should they capture Cabul before the
snow set in. The flight of the Ameer, too, and the accession to power
as his father's representative of Yakoob Khan, his eldest son, who had
for many years been kept by his father as a prisoner, naturally arrested
the course of affairs. It was hoped that Yakoob would at once treat
with us, and that our objects would be attained without further advance.
These anticipations were to some extent verified. Negotiations were
opened, and upon the 3rd of March Yakoob offered to negotiate terms of
peace.
Nothing has been said as yet of the doings of the third column of
invasion under General Stewart, who had taken the command originally
assigned to General Biddulph. The difficulties in the way of advance of
this column were immense. First, a sandy desert almost destitute of
water, extending between the Indus and the foot of the mountains, had to
be crossed; then the ascent of the Bolan Pass had to be made, a work of
the most tremendous difficulty. This pass, whose ascent occupies three
days, is in fact the mere bed of a stream, full of boulders and stones
of all sizes, in which the baggage and artillery horses sank fetlock
deep. In making this passage vast quantities of camels and other
animals died, and a long delay took place in assembling the force at
Quettah, a post occupied by us at the top of the pass. The arrangements
were completed at last, and General Stewart advanced upon Candahar,
which he captured on the 8th of January, having met with, a small amount
of resistance only.
The negotiations with Yakoob, who had now succeeded to the dignity of
Ameer, continued for some time; and upon the 8th of May he arrived at
the British camp at Gundamuck, where he was received by General Sir S.
Browne and staff. Three or four days were spent in visits and
negotiations, Yakoob assenting to the British terms, and expressing the
strongest hopes that a permanent friendship would be established between
England and Afghanistan.
Previous to this a sad accident had occurred, which cast a gloom over
the British camp. Upon the 1st of April a squadron of the 10th Hussars,
following a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, had, in crossing the
river after nightfall, missed the ford, and had been carried off by the
current. Lieutenant Harford and no less than fifty men were drowned.
This was an accident almost without precedent.
The treaty made at Gundamuck had for its chief object the representation
of the British Government at the court of Yakoob Khan; and in accordance
with the terms of the treaty, and of a direct invitation on the part of
the Ameer, Sir Louis Cavaignari, accompanied by Mr William Jenkyns, of
the Indian Civil Service, as secretary, and by 25 cavalry and 50
infantry of the Guides under Lieutenant Hamilton, went up to Cabul,
where they arrived on the 24th of July. Doctor Kelly, surgeon of the
Guides, accompanied the mission as medical officer. Some doubt had been
entertained as to the prudence of sending this mission, but the Ameer's
promises of protection had been given with such solemnity, that it was
deemed advisable to carry out the provisions of the treaty.
For some time all went well at Cabul. But the arrival of some regiments
from Herat altered the complexion of affairs. From the date, August
5th, when these regiments arrived, turbulent outbreaks commenced in the
town. These regiments had not, like those of Cabul, suffered defeat at
our hands, and they taunted the Cabul people with cowardice. The
position of the Embassy became full of danger. Sir Louis Cavaignari, a
man of most extraordinary courage, was aware of the threatening danger,
but determined to remain at his post and do his duty. When told by the
native _rissaldar_ of one of our cavalry regiments, who was spending his
furlough at a village near Cabul, that the Afghan soldiers would be
likely to break into open mutiny, and that the danger was very real, he
replied quietly, "They can only kill the three or four of us here, and
our death will be avenged." It appears, however, that Cavaignari to the
last believed that the Ameer's authority would be sufficient to protect
the little British force.
On the night of the 2nd of September the Heratee troops attacked the
Embassy. The party were lodged in a wooden building in the Bala Hissar.
Although numbering but fifty fighting men, headed by four British
officers, the little band for hours held out heroically against
thousands of the enemy. These at last brought cannon to bear upon the
place. Yakoob Khan, in his palace close by, heard the roar of the
battle, but made no movement. Some of his councillors urged upon him to
call out the loyal regiments at Bala Hissar, and to suppress and punish
the mutiny. But the Ameer remained vacillating and sullen until the
terrible night was over, and the last of the defenders, after performing
prodigies of valour, and killing many more times than their own number
of the enemy, succumbed to the attack, the British officers rushing out
and dying sword in hand.
Twenty-four hours later, natives from Cabul brought the news over the
Shaturgurdan Pass into the Kuram Valley. Thence it was telegraphed to
Simla. The terrible news created a shock throughout all India. But no
time was lost in taking measures to avenge the massacre. On the 5th
orders were sent to Brigadier-General Massy, commanding at that time the
Kuram field forces, to move the 23rd Pioneers, the 5th Ghurkas, and
mountain train to the crest of the Shaturgurdan, and to intrench
themselves there. The 72nd Highlanders and 5th Punjaub Infantry
followed in a few days to secure the road between Ali Kheyl and the
pass. On the 13th, General Baker took command of the troops at the
Shaturgurdan, where the 23rd Pioneers and 5th Ghurkas had been
strengthened by the arrival of the 72nd Highlanders.
General Roberts now set about the work of collecting transport. As
usual, the moment the first campaign had terminated, the transport had
been scattered, with the view of saving expense, and had now, at a great
outlay, to be renewed. All the available animals in Peshawur and near
the frontier were ordered to be sent up. But the drain had told
heavily, and only 2000 mules, 700 camels, and 600 bullocks could be
collected. The tribes in the valley, however, furnished many animals
for local transport.
The Ameer at this time wrote to General Roberts, saying that he was
trying to restore order and put down the mutineers, and to punish them
for their conduct. But it was clear that he had lost all authority. On
26th September, General Roberts joined the troops at Ali Kheyl. On the
way up from this point to the Shaturgurdan, two or three attacks were
made upon baggage convoys by the natives; but these were all repulsed.
The advance now commenced. It consisted of the 12th and 14th Bengal
Cavalry, two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, two companies of the
72nd Highlanders, and the 5th Punjaub Native Infantry. These moved out
as far as the Zerghun Shahr; and here the Ameer, with some of his
principal nobles, came into camp, declaring that they could not control
the soldiery of Cabul, but that he had come to show his friendship to
the English. The brigades of Generals Baker and Macpherson joined the
advance at Zerghun; and on the 29th a _durbar_ was held. Yakoob,
although received with all honour, was strongly suspected of treachery,
and his conduct at the rising in Cabul had forfeited for him all claim
upon our friendship. All matters were, however, deferred until after
the arrival at Cabul. Before the force moved forward, a proclamation
was issued and sent forward among the people, stating that all loyal
subjects of the Ameer would be well treated, and that the object of the
expedition was only to punish those concerned in the rising at Cabul.
Owing to the shortness of transport, some difficulty was experienced in
moving forward, and the force was obliged to advance in two divisions.
On the 3rd of October Macpherson's brigade, with the cavalry, reached
Suffed Sang. There they halted, while the baggage animals went back to
bring up Baker's brigade. Upon this day an attack was made by the
villagers upon the rearguard; but these were driven off, and several of
them captured.
The next march was a short one to Charasia. Beyond this place the enemy
had taken up their position. Here a mass of hills shuts in the wild
valley, and this narrows to a mere defile. Upon both sides of this the
enemy had placed guns in position, and lined the whole circle of the
hills. In the afternoon a cavalry reconnaissance was made; but they did
not succeed in getting the enemy to show themselves in force.
At daybreak on the 6th a working party was sent forward to improve the
road through the defile. But they had scarcely started when the cavalry
patrol announced that the enemy were in great strength on the hills, and
had guns in position commanding the road.
Sir Frederick Roberts determined to attack at once without waiting for
the division in the rear, as he feared that any inaction before the
mutinous troops now facing them would lead to a general rising, and that
in another twenty-four hours there might be not only the regulars, but
the whole tribal force of the country to contend with.
The following were the troops who, under the command of
Brigadier-General Baker, marched out at eleven o'clock to attack the
position:--Four guns Number 2 mountain battery, two Gatling guns, the
7th company of Sappers and Miners, the 72nd Highlanders, six companies
of the 5th Ghurkas, 200 men of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and 450 of the
23rd Pioneers. On the right, the attack was to be made under the
command of Major White of the 72nd Highlanders, who had three guns Royal
Artillery, two squadrons of cavalry, a wing of the 72nd, and 100 men of
the 23rd Pioneers. It was determined to attack the enemy by both
flanks, as their power of resisting a front attack was considerable, and
flank attacks are always found the most certain against foes of this
kind. A reserve was left in Charasia, as the temper of the villagers
around was very uncertain, and these would have been sure to rise and
attack the baggage left there if the least reverse happened to the
advancing force.
The attack was completely successful, both columns effecting their
objects and driving the enemy before them. The Afghans, however, fought
with great courage, for it was an hour and a half before any advantage
was gained. The enemy were armed with Sniders and Enfields, and their
fire was rapid and continuous. They were, however, bad shots, and our
loss was extremely small. The 72nd were in advance, and these, after
some hard fighting, carried the first position. The enemy rallied on
some low hills about 600 yards to the rear. But the mountain guns and
Gatlings opened upon them, the 72nd fired volleys into them, and a
general advance being made, the enemy were driven back.
Major White, in the meantime, on the right had been doing excellent
service with his column. It was but a weak one, and the operation had
been intended as a feint rather than a real attack. However, they
pushed forward, drove the enemy from their position, and captured 20
guns; and having done the work allotted to him, Major White was able to
send a portion of his force to co-operate with General Baker's brigade.
Unfortunately our cavalry were in the rear; the road through the pass
was difficult; and before they could get through, the masses of Afghans
had fallen back into strong villages on the plain, and could not be
attacked by cavalry. The enemy had altogether from 9000 to 10,000 on
the ridges, including 13 regiments of regular troops. They left 300
dead on the field; but their losses in killed and wounded must have been
much greater. Upon our side 20 were killed and 67 wounded. Among the
latter were three officers.
This defeat, by a small portion only of the British force, of the whole
of their troops placed in a position considered well-nigh impregnable,
struck a complete panic into the Afghans, and no further resistance was
offered. In the night a great portion of the Afghan troops scattered
and fled. The cavalry under General Massy swept round Cabul, and came
upon the Sherpur intrenched camp, where 75 guns were captured.
Unfortunately considerable delay took place in the operations of our
infantry; and in the face of the troops, who could easily have crushed
them, the regiments which had taken the principal part in the massacre
of Major Cavaignari marched off unmolested. The villagers were to a man
hostile, and seized every opportunity of firing upon bodies of our
troops. It was necessary to show considerable severity, and all
captured with arms in their hands in such cases were shot at once.
Cabul was now open to us; and upon the 11th October, Sir Frederick
Roberts and his staff entered the Bala Hissar, and visited the ruins of
the Embassy. The Bala Hissar is a large enclosure containing many
important buildings, and situate on the hill above Cabul, which town its
guns command. Even had the Afghans made a stand here, the place could
not have resisted the British guns, as the walls were old and ruinous.
On the 12th of October formal possession was taken of Cabul, the troops
occupying the Bala Hissar. Delay had taken place in this operation, as
it was feared that the Afghans might explode large quantities of
ammunition known to be stored there. A _durbar_ was held after we had
entered the Bala Hissar. The whole of the sirdars and principal men of
Cabul and its neighbourhood attended. Of these the leaders, who had
been more than suspected of heading the plot against us, were at once
seized and held as prisoners. A proclamation was issued by Sir
Frederick Roberts, warning the people that any attempt against our
authority would be severely punished; forbidding the carrying of weapons
within the streets of Cabul, or within a distance of five miles from the
city gates; and commanding that all arms issued to, or seized by, the
Afghan troops should be given up, a small reward being given for the
delivery of each. A reward also was offered for the surrender of any
person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the attack on the
British Embassy.
For some time things went quietly. The people were clearly intensely
hostile to us. But except in the case of the women, no open insults
were ventured upon. But it was unsafe in the extreme for small parties
to ride about the country. On the 16th the camp was startled by a
tremendous explosion at the Bala Hissar, where the 67th Foot were
encamped, and where a body of Engineers, under Captain Shafto, were
examining the various small buildings in which powder was stored. The
southern wall of the arsenal was blown down, and great damage was done;
but, singularly enough, no soldiers of the British regiment were killed,
but of the Ghurkas, who were on guard at the arsenal at the time, twelve
were killed and seven wounded. Captain Shafto was unfortunately killed.
No examination could for a time be made, as some of the buildings were
on fire, and explosions continued frequent. In the afternoon another
tremendous explosion occurred; four Afghans were killed and several
soldiers hurt at a distance of 300 or 400 yards from the spot. Although
it was never proved, it was believed that these explosions were caused
by the Afghans; and as large quantities of powder still remained in the
Bala Hissar, it was determined that, for the present, the place should
remain unoccupied.
The little force at Cabul was now isolated. Between that place and the
Shaturgurdan the natives were in a restless and excited state. Two
attacks by 3000 men had been made on the garrison holding the crest of
the Shaturgurdan, 300 in number. These bravely sallied out, attacked
the enemy in the open, and killed large numbers of them. General Gough,
with the 5th Punjaub Cavalry and 5th Punjaub Infantry and four guns, was
therefore sent from Cabul to bring down from the Shaturgurdan all the
stores accumulated there and the garrison, and then to desert the place,
which would shortly be closed by snow.
Several executions now took place at Cabul, of men who had shared in the
attack on the Embassy. Many of the villagers were also hung for
shooting at bodies of our troops; and the position of the British force
at Cabul was that of a body holding only the ground they occupied in the
midst of a bitterly hostile country. The Ameer was powerless, and,
indeed, his goodwill was more than doubtful. He was regarded as a
prisoner, although treated with all courtesy; and feeling his own
impotence, and being viewed with hostility by both parties, he resigned
his position as Ameer, and asked to be sent into India, which was done.
The abdication of the Ameer really took place on October the 12th, but
it was not publicly known until the 28th.
On the 4th of November, Brigadier-General Gough returned with the
garrison of Shaturgurdan, which he had safely brought off just as their
position was becoming almost untenable, so large was the body of men
assembling round them. The roads were now carefully examined upon the
way down to Jellalabad, and communication was opened with the force
occupying that valley. Some of the cavalry were sent down to the
valley, as it was clear that with all the efforts the commissariat could
make, sufficient quantities of forage could not be collected for their
support during the winter. Up the Khyber Pass troops were slowly
coming, destined in the spring to join the force at Cabul, should it be
necessary to carry on further operations.
The Sherpur cantonments were now occupied, and were made the
headquarters of the force. These cantonments consisted of barracks
surrounded on three sides by a lofty wall, steep hills rising at the
back. They had been built by the Ameer for his own troops, but had
never been used for the purpose. The winter was now setting in. Snow
began to fall on the hills around, and ice formed in the pools every
night. Several expeditionary columns were sent out round the country to
bring in provisions and grain, and these were attended with great
success. The enemy were, however, collecting in several places,
specially at Kohdaman and Maidan, and had stopped the influx of
provisions, which the natives were ready enough to sell for sums which
to them were handsome indeed.
Two columns were told off to march out and attack these parties of the
enemy. But the movement was an unfortunate one. The force under
General Macpherson found Mahommed Jan near Chardeh, and pushed on the
14th Bengal Lancers, who came across several thousand men on their way
to join Mahommed Jan. A sharp fight ensued. The guns shelled the
enemy, but the water-courses prevented our cavalry from being of any
service. Mahommed Jan had with him 10,000 men, and, passing General
Macpherson, placed himself between him and Cabul, and there watched the
movements of our troops.
Shortly afterwards, four Horse Artillery guns, under Major Smith
Wyndham, moved along the Argandeh road to join the infantry. Brigadier
Massy, with a squadron of the 9th Lancers, and 44 men of the 14th Bengal
Lancers, escorted the guns. After a four-mile march, the advanced troop
reported the enemy to be in sight. It was apparent that the Afghans had
thrown themselves between the infantry and the guns; but as only 2000 or
3000 appeared, it was thought that they were fugitives, flying either
from General Macpherson or General Baker.
As they came streaming down the hill, General Massy got his guns into
action. After a few shells had been fired, the enemy advanced in full
force. Four thousand men were extended in the shape of a crescent,
marching in good order, and in rear was an irregular body numbering
6000. The four guns pitched their shell rapidly into the thick of the
enemy; but no effect was produced in the way of breaking the line of
advance. It never wavered, but came steadily on; and as General Massy
had no infantry with him, he was obliged to retire. The guns fell back
a little, and again opened fire. The enemy's bullets were now dropping
fast among the cavalry and guns. Thirty of the 9th Lancers dismounted
and opened fire with their Martini carbines, but the enemy were too
numerous to be checked by so small a body of men.
While the artillery were in action, Sir F. Roberts with his staff joined
General Massy. General Roberts ordered him to send the Lancers at the
enemy at a charge. Colonel Cleland led his squadron of 126 Lancers of
the 9th full at the advancing mass, the 14th Bengal Lancers, 44 in
number, following in his wake. On the right, Captain Gough, with his
troop of the 9th, also took his men into action at the enemy's left
flank. Two hundred and twenty men, however, against 10,000 could
scarcely be expected to conquer. The three bodies of cavalry
disappeared in a cloud of dust. They were received with a terrific
fire, which killed many horses and men, and, charging bravely on into
the midst of the enemy's infantry, were surrounded, and their progress
blocked by sheer weight of numbers. The _melee_ was a desperate one.
Many of the soldiers were struck from their horses. Some were dragged
up again by their comrades, others were killed upon the ground. The
chaplain of the force, the Reverend Mr Adams, had accompanied the
troopers in the charge, and extricated one man from the midst of the
enemy under a heavy fire, for which he was recommended for the Victoria
Cross.
When the dust cleared away, it was seen that the cavalry charge had made
no impression upon the enemy, who were still steadily advancing across
the fields. The Lancers had fallen back, having suffered terribly. Two
of their officers, Lieutenants Hersee and Ricardo, had been left on the
ground dead, with sixteen of their men. The colonel and Lieutenant
Mackenzie were both wounded, as were seven of the troopers. This
squadron rallied upon Captain Gough's troop, which had kept better
together, and still held its post between the guns and the enemy. A
second charge was ordered; but it was not pushed home, the country being
of extraordinary difficulty for cavalry, owing to the water-courses
which cut it up. As Major Smith Wyndham was falling back with his two
guns, which had been advanced after the first charge, he found one of
the other guns stuck in a water-course. The greatest efforts of the
remaining horses were insufficient to draw it from the mire in which it
was bogged. Lieutenant Hardy was killed by a shot through the head, and
the gun was abandoned. The other three guns were taken back 400 or 500
yards farther. They were then stopped by a channel, deeper and steeper
than any which had been before met, and here they became hopelessly
bogged. They were spiked and left in the water, and the drivers and
gunners moved off with the cavalry just as the long line of the enemy
came upon them.
General Macpherson's troops, which had been sent for by General Roberts,
were now showing down the Chardeh Valley. At their sight the enemy
turned off from the Sherpur road and made direct for the city. General
Roberts sent a message to Brigadier Gough, commanding at Sherpur,
ordering 200 men of the 72nd Highlanders to go out to the gorge at a
double. The cavalry retired steadily, keeping up a fire with their
carbines, and checking the advance of the enemy. But they could not
have stemmed the rush had not Colonel Brownlow, with 200 rifles of the
72nd, arrived at the nick of time. These opened fire instantly upon the
enemy, who charged down upon the village. The steady fire of the
Highlanders checked the rush, and after half an hour's persistent fire
the enemy were forced back, their entrance to Cabul having been
frustrated. They occupied, however, a position on the heights to the
south of the Balar Hissar region.
General Macpherson had broken up a large body of Afghans higher up the
valley, and pursued them towards Argandeh. As he came back, he came
upon the scene of the charge, and recovered the bodies of Lieutenants
Hersee and Ricardo, and the troopers who had been killed. The guns had
already been carried off by Colonel Macgregor, who, with a small scratch
lot of Lancers and artillerymen whom he had collected, worked round into
the village, which had been left by the main body of the enemy, and,
putting down the opposition of the villagers, carried off the guns.
The next day a body of 560 men, composed of portions of the 67th Foot,
the 72nd Highlanders, the 3rd Sikhs, and 5th Ghurkas, made an attack
upon the enemy, who had established themselves on a lofty peak south of
Cabul. The enemy occupied the crest in strength, and away on the south,
hidden from our view, had 5000 or 6000 men waiting for our attack to
develop. After several hours of fighting, the little British force
drove the Afghans from the low hill, but were unable to carry the
position above. No more troops could be spared, and ammunition ran
short. It was determined, therefore, to put off the attack until
morning. At eight o'clock General Baker left Sherpur with a strong
force, and attacked the enemy's position. After desperate fighting, he
stormed the ridge. Great masses of the enemy in the meantime were
moving round, so as to threaten the road to Sherpur. The 9th Lancers
charged with great gallantry among them, and defeated them. Captain
Butson, who commanded the Lancers, was, however, killed, and two other
officers wounded. Several other brilliant charges were made, and the
plain was kept clear of the enemy.
Our position, however, although actually victorious in the field, was
getting more and more serious. The city was now in open revolt. Large
numbers of natives continued to arrive and reinforce the enemy; and it
was rapidly becoming clear that the British force, although strong
enough to hold the Sherpur cantonments or the Bala Hissar, would not be
able to maintain itself in both. Upon the next day, the 15th, desperate
fighting again took place. General Baker, with 1200 bayonets and 8
guns, left the cantonments to make another attempt to clear the hills,
and in this he succeeded, but only after the greatest efforts. Several
officers were killed or wounded, but the enemy were driven from their
first position. Just as they had done this, a body of from 15,000 to
20,000 of the enemy marched out upon the plain, and made towards the
position captured by General Baker.
Steadily they advanced, and the shells which our mountain guns sent
among them, and the volleys poured down from the hills, did not suffice
to cause the slightest faltering in their advance. Steadily they came
forward, and desperate fighting took place. A position held by the 5th
Punjaub Infantry was carried by their attack; two guns were lost; but
the rest of the positions were held. There were now 40,000 men, at
least, gathered round the British forces, and General Macpherson was
ordered to fall back to Sherpur with all his force. General Baker was
to hold the village he had occupied since the morning, until all the
troops from the heights were within the walls. The movement was well
carried out, and although some loss took place as the troops fell back,
by nightfall all the British forces were gathered in the cantonments of
Sherpur.
For some days fighting was suspended, the Afghans being busy in
plundering the Hindoo portions of the city, and in preparing for an
attack. The British forces in Sherpur were now fairly besieged, and it
was considered certain that nothing could be done until the arrival of
troops from Jugdulluck and Gundamuck, down in the Jellalabad Valley.
Unfortunately the position had been considered as so secure from attack,
that no steps had been taken to demolish the old forts and villages
standing round Sherpur, and these were now occupied by the enemy, who
kept up a steady fire upon the cantonments. Upon the 18th the enemy
made an attack upon the place, but this, although hotly kept up, was
repulsed without much difficulty.
On the 19th, General Baker made an assault upon a small fort situate at
a few hundred yards from the cantonment, from which the enemy had
greatly annoyed us. A portion of the place was blown up, the Afghans
being driven from it after severe fighting. Skirmishing went on each
day; but the Afghans could not bring themselves to make another attack
until the night of the 22nd, when 20,000 men advanced to storm the
British position.
The garrison had received warning, and at four in the morning signal
fires were seen burning, and the fire of the enemy's skirmishers began.
The enemy crept quietly up, and at six o'clock, with a shout, the whole
body rushed out from the villages and orchards round the place, and
charged upon the walls. They opened fire with a tremendous roar, but
this was drowned by the roll of musketry which broke out from the whole
circuit of the walls, where the men had been lying for the last three
hours, rifle in hand, awaiting the attack. Some of the enemy pushed
forward to within eighty yards of our rifles, but beyond this even the
bravest could not advance. For a few hours they skirmished round the
place; but finally fell back, and the attack was abandoned.
With the morning came the welcome news that General Gough had reached
the Cabul plain, and the cloud of dust arising in the distance showed
that the enemy had also heard of our reinforcement, and was marching out
to attack him. The garrison of Sherpur at once sallied out and attacked
the Afghans, creating a diversion, and killing large numbers of the
enemy. By nightfall the whole of the Afghans were driven into Cabul.
Upon the following day General Cough's force arrived, and the British
were again masters of the country. The whole of the Afghans engaged in
the attack fled during the night, and the British marched into Cabul
without resistance. This was virtually the end of the fighting at this
point.
The time now passed quietly, and it was not until the month of May that
any serious fighting took place. Then the tribesmen again began to
muster. General Stewart was on his way from Candahar, and the tribes,
feeling that if any hostile movement against us was to be successful it
must be undertaken before the arrival of the reinforcements, assembled
in great numbers. General Macpherson moved out against them, and
another battle took place at Charasia, and after some very severe
fighting the enemy were scattered.
Sir Donald Stewart's march had been uneventful as far as Shahjui, the
limit of the Candahar province. Here the Teraki country begins, and the
Mollahs had been actively preaching a holy war, and had collected
several thousand men. As we advanced the villages were deserted. Upon
arriving at Ahmed Khel, the enemy were found to have taken up a position
in front. Our baggage stretched far in the rear, and it was
all-important to prevent the column being outflanked. General Stewart
therefore determined to attack at once. The two batteries of artillery
opened fire upon the enemy, who numbered from 12,000 to 15,000, and who,
at a signal, rushed headlong down from their position, and charged upon
General Stewart's force.
This charge was executed by some 3000 or 4000 Ghazees, as they were
called--that is to say, fanatics sworn to give their lives to carry out
their object of exterminating the hated infidel. These men were armed,
some with rifles and matchlocks, some with heavy swords, knives, and
pistols, others with pikes made of bayonets or pieces of sharpened iron
fastened upon long sticks. Some were on foot; some on horseback. So
sudden and unexpected was the attack, so swiftly did they cross the four
or five hundred yards of intervening ground, that they came upon the
British before preparations could be made for their reception.
Cavalry were moving in front of the infantry, and these, before they
could be got into line for a charge, were surrounded by the enemy. In
an instant they were lost to sight in the cloud of dust and smoke caused
by the battle; and in the confusion a troop charged to the right in rear
of our infantry line, and burst into the 19th Punjaub Native Infantry,
in rear of the General and his staff. All was for a moment confusion.
The ammunition mules were stampeded, riderless horses dashed hither and
thither, and behind the cavalry came in the Ghazees with a furious rush,
and a hand-to-hand fight took place.
So impetuous were they, that on the left they swept round in the rear of
our infantry; and the results would have been most terrible, had not
Colonel Lister, V.C., commanding the 3rd Ghurkas, formed his men rapidly
into company squares, and poured a tremendous fire into the fanatics.
All along the line the attack raged, and so hurriedly had the affair
come on that many of the men had not even fixed bayonets. Desperate was
the hand-to-hand fighting; and valour more conspicuous than that of the
Ghazees was never shown. But the three regiments, British, Sikh, and
Ghurka, to whom they were exposed, held their own, and poured rolling
volleys into the ranks of the enemy. So fiercely did these charge that
they came up to within thirty yards of the muzzles of Major Waters'
guns, which were firing case and reversed shrapnel, and mowed them down
in hundreds. The 2nd Punjaub Cavalry charged again and again in the
most gallant manner, and protected the guns from the Ghazees' attacks.
The General, surrounded by his escort, was in the midst of the fight,
the enemy having burst in between the guns and the 59th Foot, and
officers and troopers had alike to fight for their lives, several of the
escort being killed. At last, however, the Ghazees fell back before the
terrific fire, and the 1st Punjaub Cavalry, coming up from the rear,
took up the pursuit.
The fighting had lasted but an hour; but of the enemy 1000 dead lay upon
the field, besides those bodies which had been carried off, and their
wounded must have been even more numerous. Among our troops 17 were
killed and 126 wounded. Our native allies, the Hazaras, seeing the
Afghans defeated, took up the pursuit, and the rout of the enemy was
complete.
Ghuznee fell without opposition, the fighting men having been engaged in
the battle of Ahmed Khel, and having had enough of hostilities. A force
was sent out from Ghuznee on the 23rd of April, under Brigadier-General
Palliser; and this had a severe engagement with the natives near the
village of Shalez, where they fought with a desperation equal to that
shown by the fanatics in the previous battle. Our men, however, were
this time prepared, and were able to inflict very heavy losses upon the
enemy, without allowing them to get to such close quarters as before.
This was the end of the Afghan resistance, and General Stewart moved on
to Cabul, and effected a junction with General Roberts. This brought
the second period of the Afghan war to a close.
For some months the forces remained quiet at Cabul. Negotiations were
now going on. Abdul Rahman was advancing upon Cabul. This chief had
long been a resident among the Russians, and had assumed the Ameership,
and had been received cordially in the north of Afghanistan. As no
other competitor appeared to have equal chances with him, and as the
British Government were most desirous to retire from the country, his
authority was recognised by us, and upon his approach to Cabul the
British force was ordered to retire.
Just at this moment, however, news came which showed that the work was
not yet over.
When General Stewart left Candahar in his march towards Cabul, a strong
British force had been left at that city. A protege of the British,
named Wali Shere Ali, had been appointed by us Governor of Candahar.
His native army was not, however, regarded as reliable; and when the
news came that Ayoub, a brother of Yakoob, was moving down from Herat,
of which town he was the governor, with a large force, a body of British
troops advanced with the Wali's army towards Girishk on the river
Helmund.
On July the 14th the conspiracy which had been going on among the Wali's
troops came to a head. The whole of them deserted, and the small
British brigade found itself alone on the Helmund. General Burrows had
with him but 1500 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 6 guns, a force clearly
inadequate to meet the large body with which Ayoub was advancing, and
which would be swelled by the addition of the Wali's late troops.
General Primrose, who commanded at Candahar, decided that no more troops
could be sent forward to strengthen this brigade.
Ayoub was advancing steadily, and, after deliberation, General Burrows
fell back from Girishk to a point upon the road near Maiwand. Ayoub had
crossed the Helmund higher up, and was moving in a parallel line to that
taken by the British; and the object of the English commander was to
take up a position which would at once bar the road to Candahar and
would prevent Ayoub striking by a more northern road, by which he would
place himself north of the city and on the road to Cabul. The
camping-ground was a village called Khussk-i-Nakhud. Reconnaissances
were made by General Nuttal's cavalry in the direction of the enemy; but
General Burrows had but bad information, and had no idea of the real
strength of the force with which Ayoub was advancing.
It was not until the 26th that the forces came into collision. It was
known then that Ayoub was trying to reach Maiwand without fighting, and
General Burrows at once marched from Khussk-i-Nakhud to Maiwand to
anticipate this movement. At half-past six the troops marched, the
general belief being that it was only Ayoub's cavalry with which he
should have to deal. Upon arriving near Maiwand, however, our spies
brought in the news that the whole of Ayoub's force was in front.
The morning was thick, and but little could be seen of Ayoub's army.
The cavalry were indeed found moving about in large masses, but these
fell back on our advance. Lieutenant Maclean, with two Horse Artillery
guns and a small cavalry escort, galloped out on the extreme left, and
got his guns into action on the Afghan cavalry. The position was
considered a dangerous one, and the guns were withdrawn. Large numbers
of the enemy, led by Ghazees, were now seen swarming down over the low
hills.
The British infantry were formed in the following order:--On the right
were the 66th Regiment, the Bombay Grenadiers formed the centre, and
Jacob's Rifles the left. Two guns were placed in position to support
the 66th on the right, the remaining ten--for the six British guns had
been increased to twelve by a battery captured from the Wali's
mutineers--between the Grenadiers and the main body of Jacob's Rifles.
There was no reserve, nor, indeed, with so small a force could there
have been any. The cavalry, the 3rd Scinde Horse and 3rd Bombay
Cavalry, formed up in the rear of the left centre.
Our guns shelled the enemy as they advanced, and it was fully an hour
before his artillery opened in reply, when five batteries unmasked and
opened fire. Under cover of this artillery fire, the enemy's irregulars
advanced. When within 600 or 700 yards of the 66th, the Martini fire of
the latter checked them, and in this quarter for a moment the attack
ceased.
Unfortunately our position was in every way a bad one. Deep ravines ran
both to the right and left of our force. By these the enemy could
advance until within a short distance of us. The position, too, was
dominated by the hills on either side, and after an artillery duel
lasting for some time, the enemy's guns were moved on to the hills and a
terrible fire opened upon our infantry. At about two o'clock the
smooth-bore guns began to run short of ammunition, and as only sixty
rounds had been captured with them and there was no reserve, these were
abandoned. The enemy's battery now came boldly up, their cavalry
manoeuvred on the left flank of the brigade, large numbers of their
infantry and irregulars got into the villages behind us, and the
position became more and more serious.
Half an hour later the two companies of Jacob's Rifles on the extreme
left began to waver. The retirement from the smooth-bore guns
demoralised them, and they broke their ranks and fell into utter
confusion, breaking in upon the Grenadiers, who had up to that time
fought steadily. The Ghazees swept down in great masses, and the
Grenadiers likewise gave way. The remaining companies of Jacob's Rifles
shared in the panic. The enemy now swept in in all directions, their
guns from the heights poured volleys of shell into the ranks of the
crowded British, and the 66th, borne in upon by the rush of native
troops on the one side, pressed by the Ghazees on the other, and cut
down by the artillery fire, began to fall back also.
The confusion became hopeless. The artillery fired until the Ghazees
were within a few yards of them, and two of the guns were lost. The
cavalry were ordered to charge; but they had already been much
demoralised by the artillery fire, and could not be persuaded to charge
home. In the walled enclosures behind, the 66th and the Grenadiers
rallied, and fought nobly. Here Colonel Galbraith was killed and nine
other officers of the 66th. Some bodies of troops, entirely cut off
from the rest, fought desperately to the end, and, dying, surrounded
themselves with a ring of slaughtered enemies. But at length the
surviving troops were extricated from the villages, and the retreat
commenced.
Fortunately the pursuit lasted only two or three miles, the enemy having
themselves suffered terribly, and being, moreover, anxious to take part
in the loot of the camp. The retreat was a terrible one. Fifty miles
had to be passed, and no water was obtainable on the way. Along the
whole line the villagers rose upon the fugitives, and the loss was
terrible.
Had the cavalry remained, as was their duty, behind the infantry,
protected the retreat, and so given time to the fugitives to rally, the
result would have been different. But the conduct of the native cavalry
regiments was the reverse of creditable.
Fortunately Ayoub's army had been to a great extent demoralised by the
tremendous losses which it had incurred in the defeat of this handful of
British troops, and some days elapsed before it could continue its
advance. This gave time to the garrison at Candahar to put all in
readiness. The doubtful portion of the population was cleared out of
the city, provisions collected, and all put in readiness for a siege.
The news of Maiwand aroused tremendous excitement throughout India, and
orders were at once issued for the carrying out of relieving operations.
General Roberts was to march from Cabul with a strong division,
consisting of tried troops, while General Phayre, with another force,
was to move from Quettah. Unfortunately the same false economy which
had so delayed the advance after the massacre of Cavaignari, by the
instant break-up of the transport trains, again operated to delay
General Phayre; and although every possible effort was made, the force
advancing from the Bolan could not reach Candahar until after that
coming down from Cabul, although the latter had many times the distance
to march.
The forces which took part in the memorable march of General Roberts
were the 92nd Highlanders, 23rd Pioneers, 24th Punjaub Infantry, 2nd
Ghurkas, 72nd Highlanders, 2nd Sikhs, 3rd Sikhs, 5th Ghurkas, 2nd, 60th,
15th Sikhs, 25th Punjaub Infantry, and the 4th Ghurkas. There were
three batteries of artillery, and four cavalry regiments--the 9th
Lancers, the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, the 3rd Punjaub Cavalry, and the
Central India Horse. This gave a total of about 10,000 men. The march
would be between three and four weeks. There would, in addition, be
8000 followers to feed, 2000 horses, and some 8000 transport and
artillery mules and ponies.
The new Ameer did his best, by sending orders that all should be done to
assist the march. But the operation was in any case a dangerous one,
and it was questionable whether the force would be able to subsist upon
the road. However, it started, and marching steadily day by day, passed
through Ghuznee and down to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, where Colonel Tanner had
been besieged. No difficulties were met with, and scarce a shot was
fired on the way down. In seven days Ghuznee was reached, in fifteen
Khelat-i-Ghilzai, the marching being no less than 15.7 miles per day,--
not an extraordinary distance for a single regiment to perform, but a
wonderful feat for a force containing some 18,000 persons, and 9000
baggage animals, marching through mountainous valleys.
Candahar had held out during the advance of General Roberts. Indeed,
Ayoub's forces had never ventured upon anything like a formidable attack
upon it, believing that they would be able to starve out the garrison in
time. A sortie had been made, but with disastrous effects, and the
garrison were now standing strictly on the defensive.
As the relieving force advanced, Ayoub drew off and took ground on some
hills near the town. On the 27th of August the cavalry established
heliographic communication, this being the nineteenth day of their march
from Cabul. On the 31st the entry was made into Candahar. There was
little delay here. Ayoub's army had taken up its position on the Baba
Wali Hills. On the south-west his right was protected by the Pir-Paimal
Hill. This, however, was liable to be turned. A reconnaissance was at
once made by the cavalry, and the enemy unmasked five guns and opened
upon them. The Afghans poured out to the attack of the 15th Sikhs. But
these retired steadily, as there was no wish to bring on an engagement.
General Macpherson's brigade, with those of Generals Baker and
Macgregor, were to take part in the fray, the latter being in reserve.
The men breakfasted at eight o'clock, and at nine were ready for the
advance. The attack commenced by General Macpherson's brigade carrying
a village which the Afghans had occupied in advance of the range.
Without maps, it is difficult in the extreme to describe battles; but it
may be briefly said that Generals Macpherson and Baker advanced round
the end of the Pir-Paimal, carried village after village, in some of
which a desperate defence was made by the enemy, and so at last, winning
every foot of the ground by hard fighting, they swept round the hill,
and turned the enemy's left. Many of the men were killed by Ghazees,
who shut themselves up in the houses of the villages and sold their
lives dearly, firing upon our troops until house after house was carried
by storm. The whole ground was orchard and enclosed fields, and each of
these was the scene of a conflict. Behind the northern hill, where the
country is cut up by water-courses and canals between the river and the
slopes, the Afghans made their last stand. A deep water-cut, twelve
feet broad, with banks two or three feet high, and with cultivated
fields in front, served them as an excellent defence. The banks had
been ingeniously loopholed for rifle fire, and two camps lay in rear of
it. The Highlanders, however, carried the place with a rush, losing
upwards of 40 men as they did so. The rest of the enemy, numbering from
8000 to 10,000, who had been gathered in the orchards, were driven round
the rear of the line of hills. Wherever they tried to rally, the
British were upon them, and at last the fugitives reaching their camp,
the whole body of Ayoub's army took to flight, although his regular
regiments had never been engaged during the day, the whole fighting
having been done by the irregulars.
In four hours from the time the fight began, the Afghan army was driven
from the position it had taken up, its camp and all its appurtenances
falling into our hands, as well as thirty-one guns and two Horse
Artillery guns, which had been captured at Maiwand. They had made
certain of victory, for not a tent was struck, nor a single mule-load of
baggage off.
This action, which completely crushed the force of Ayoub, concluded the
campaign.
The battle cost the lives of three officers--Lieutenant-Colonel
Brownlow, commanding 72nd Highlanders, Captain Frome, 72nd Highlanders,
and Captain Straton, 2nd battalion 22nd Foot. Eleven officers were
wounded, 46 men were killed and 202 wounded. The enemy's loss was about
1200 in killed alone. Their work was over; and as General Stewart, with
the army of Cabul, had retired from beyond the borders of Afghanistan on
the one side, so General Roberts, with his relieving force, fell back on
the other, and the Afghan Campaign came to a close.