The bill for the security and protection of trade and navigation being
this day read a second time in the house of lords, the earl of
WINCHELSEA, who had lately accepted the chair at the admiralty board,
rose and spoke as follows:
My lords, I know not by what accident the numerous defects and general
impropriety of this bill have escaped the attention of the other house;
nor is there any necessity for examining the motives upon which it
passed, or of inquiring whether its reception was facilitated by the
popularity of the title, the influence and authority of those by whom it
was proposed, or the imaginary defects of our present regulations, which
have been on some occasions represented to be such as it is scarcely
possible to change but for the better.
The knowledge and experience of those who concurred in sending this bill
for your lordships' approbation, cannot but produce some degree of
prepossession in its favour; for how can it be imagined, my lords, that
men of great abilities and continual opportunities of observation,
should not be well versed in questions relating chiefly to their private
interest, and discover the nearest way to their own success!
And yet, my lords, it will be found that their sagacity has, perhaps,
never so apparently forsaken them as on this occasion, that no
proposition was ever laid before this house, in which more contracted
motives were discovered, and that the bill is such as might rather have
been expected from petty traders, unacquainted with the situation of
kingdoms, the interests of princes, the arts of policy, the laws of
their own country, and the conduct of former wars; than by merchants of
extensive traffick, general correspondence, and great attainments.
Before I proceed, my lords, to confirm the character of the bill by a
distinct consideration of the particular paragraphs, and an enumeration
of the several improprieties and defects which may be found in it, I
think it not superfluous or unseasonable to remark one general errour,
common to this with all other laws of the same kind, the errour of
prescribing rules to military operations, of attempting to fix what is,
in its own nature, variable, as it must depend upon external causes to
which the British legislature has yet found no means of extending its
authority.
To direct, upon remote conjectures and uncertain prospects, the conduct
of a commander, is, in my opinion, my lords, not more rational than to
trace upon a chart the course of a ship, and pronounce it criminal to
deviate from it. The one supposes a foreknowledge of the motions of the
wind, and the other of the counsels of our enemies; nor can any thing be
expected from such regulations, but overthrow and disgrace. I believe,
my lords, that in running over the histories of the world, and examining
the originals of the mightiest empires, and the sudden revolutions which
have been produced by the overpowering torrents of war, which, at
different periods of time, have swept the powers of the earth before
them, it will be found that all rapid conquests, and sudden extensions
of empire, have been effected by sovereign princes at the head of armies
which acted only by immediate command, that few memorable actions have
been performed by delegated commanders, and that of those few whose
names have descended to posterity, those have generally been most
successful who were invested with the largest powers, who acted without
control, and were at liberty to snatch every opportunity, and improve
every favourable conjuncture, without any necessity of communicating
their schemes, of waiting for the result of tedious deliberations, or of
soliciting a relaxation of former orders.
But, my lords, though, perhaps, all positive prescriptions of the
conduct of military undertakings have a tendency rather to obstruct than
promote success, yet as they may be drawn up with different degrees of
wisdom and sagacity, they may have a greater or less appearance of
usefulness and reason. Such as have been well concerted may afford
useful hints, though they ought not to be enacted with indispensable
obligations. And to consider even those in which less proofs of skill
and foresight can be discovered, may have, at least, this advantage,
that the proposals may not be speedily repeated, nor our counsels
embarrassed with absurd expedients. I shall, therefore, lay before your
lordships my opinion of every paragraph, and show what are the
objections which may be raised, both to the whole bill in general, and
to its particular clauses.
To the bill in general, it must be objected, that it is filled with
vague expressions, and ideas so indeterminate, that no man can tell when
he has obeyed it. Here are many rules ordered to be observed, when
_there shall be no just and sufficient reason_ for neglecting them, and
some operations to be performed as often _as there shall be occasion,_
and ships are to cruise in a certain latitude, unless _there is a
necessity of employing them elsewhere._
Did not the title of this bill, my lords, give it some claim to a
serious consideration; and did not the integrity and capacity of those
by whom it was drawn up, exempt them from contempt and ridicule, I
should be inclined to treat a law like this with some degree of levity;
for who, my lords, can be serious when his consent is desired to a bill,
by which it is enacted, that men shall act on certain occasions, as they
shall think most expedient?
Nor is this, my lords, the only instance of precipitancy and want of
consideration, for many of the injunctions are without any penal
sanction; so that though we should pass this bill with the greatest
unanimity, we should only declare our opinion, or offer our advice, but
should make no law, or what, with regard to the purposes of government,
is the same, a law which may be broken without danger.
But general objections, my lords, will naturally produce general
evasions; and a debate may be prolonged without producing any clear view
of the subject, or any satisfactory decision of a single question: I
shall, therefore, endeavour to range my objections in order, and, by
examining singly every paragraph of the bill, show the weakness of some
expedients, the superfluity of others, and the general unfitness of the
whole to produce the protection and security intended by it.
In the first clause alone may be found instances of all the
improprieties which I have mentioned to your lordships. It is proposed
that in a time of war between this empire and any other state, such a
number of ships shall be employed as cruisers or convoys in the Channel,
as the admiralty shall judge most proper for that purpose. What is this,
my lords, but to continue to the admiralty the power which has been
always executed? What is it but to enact that the ships shall be
stationed in time of war as the commissioners of the admiralty shall
determine and direct?
Of these ships, it is farther enacted, that they shall be careened three
times a-year, or oftener if there shall be occasion; but it is not
declared who shall judge of the necessity of careening, or who shall be
punished for the neglect of it when it is requisite, or for the
permission or command of it when it is superfluous.
There is yet another regulation, my lords, in this clause, which ought
not to be passed without remark. It is provided, that the sailors
employed in the cruisers and convoys in the Channel, shall not be turned
over but to other cruisers and convoys; by which, I suppose, it was
intended, that our outguards should be prevented from being weakened,
and that our merchants should never be destitute of protection; an end
truly laudable, and which deserves to be promoted by some establishment
better concerted. The expedient now proposed, seems to have been
contrived upon the supposition that the admiralty may not always be very
solicitous for the safety of the merchants, and that, therefore, it is
necessary to secure them by a law from the danger of being deprived of
protection; for, upon the present establishment, the removal of men from
one ship to another must be made by the permission of the admiralty; and
when the right of such permission shall by this law be taken away, what
new security will the merchants obtain? The admiralty will still have
the power, though not of turning over the men, yet of recalling the
ships, and commerce suffer equally in either case.
By the second clause, my lords, there is still a power reserved to the
admiralty, of dismissing these guardians of commerce from their
stations, and employing them _in case of great necessity_ in the line of
battle, on this side cape Finisterre. Not to cavil, my lords, at the
term of _great necessity,_ of which it is apparent that the
commissioners of the admiralty are to judge, I would desire to be
informed what measures are to be taken, if a royal navy should unluckily
rove beyond this cape, which is marked out as the utmost bound of the
power of the admiralty, and should there be reduced to the necessity of
engaging desperately with a superiour force, or retiring ignominiously
before it. Are not our ships to pass a single league beyond their
limits, in the honour or preservation of their country? Are they to lie
unactive within the sound of the battle, and wait for their enemies on
this side the cape?
The third clause, my lords, is, if not absurd like the former, yet so
imperfectly drawn up, that it can produce no advantage; for of what use
will it be to station an officer _where his majesty shall think fit?_ At
all the royal docks there are officers already stationed, and in any
other place what can an officer, deputed by his majesty, do more than
hire workmen, who will as cheerfully and as diligently serve any other
person? And why may not the captain of the vessel procure necessaries
for money, without the assistance of a commissioner?
In the fourth clause, my lords, nothing is proposed but what is every
day practised, nor any authority conferred upon the court of admiralty,
than that which it always possessed, of punishing those who disobey
their orders. The provision against the crime of wilfully springing a
mast, is at least useless; for when did any man admit that he sprung his
mast by design? Or why should it be imagined that such an act of
wickedness, such flagrant breach of trust, and apparent desertion of
duty, would in the present state of the navy escape the severest
punishment? Would not all the officers and mariners on board the ship
see that such a thing was wilfully done? Would not they cry out--"You
are springing the mast," and prevent it, or discover the crime, and
demand punishment?
The fifth clause, my lords, is without any penal sanction, and,
therefore, cannot be compulsive; nor is any thing of importance proposed
in it, which is not already in the power of the senate. Either house may
now demand an account of the stations and employments of the ships of
war; nor does the senate now omit to examine the conduct of our naval
affairs, but because our attention is diverted by more important
employments, which will not by this bill be contracted or facilitated.
The use of the provision in the sixth clause, my lords, I am not able to
conceive; for to what purpose, my lords, should the ships appointed for
any particular service be nominated at any stated time? What consequence
can such declarations of our designs produce, but that of informing our
enemies what force they ought to provide against us? In war, my lords,
that commander has generally been esteemed most prudent, who keeps his
designs most secret, and assaults the enemy in an unguarded quarter,
with superiour and unexpected strength.
In the seventh clause, many regulations are prescribed to the commanders
of those ships which are appointed to convoy the trading vessels. These
regulations, my lords, are not all equally unreasonable, but some of
them are such as it may, on many occasions, be impossible for the
commanders of his majesty's ships to observe in such a manner as that
the masters of merchant ships may not imagine themselves neglected or
forsaken. The captain of the convoy may be, therefore, harassed by them
with prosecutions, in which it may be difficult to make his innocence
appear. The convoy may be sometimes accused of deserting the traders,
when the traders in reality have forsaken the convoy, in confidence that
they should either arrive safe at the port without protection, or be
able, if they should happen to fall into the enemy's hands, to charge
their misfortune upon the negligence of their protector.
The eighth clause, my lords, is so far from being such as might be
expected from merchants, that it seems rather to have been drawn up by
men who never saw the sea, nor heard of the violence of a storm. For who
that had the slightest idea of the uncertainty and hazard of a sailor's
condition, who that had been ever told of a shipwreck, or but looked on
the pictures of naval distress, would propose that no ship should retire
to a harbour, or quit the station to which it was assigned, _on any
pretence whatsoever_ without permission, which sometimes could not be
obtained in many months, and which never could be received soon enough
to allow of a remedy for sudden disasters, or pressing calamities. It
might with equal reason be enacted, that no man should extinguish a fire
without an act of the senate, or repel a thief from his window, without
a commission of array.
It is happy, my lords, that this clause is not enforced by a penalty,
and, therefore, can never have the obligatory sanction of a law; but
since it may reasonably be supposed, that the authors of it intended
that the observation should be by some means or other enjoined, let us
examine how much security it would add to our navigation, and how much
strength to our naval power, if the breach of it had been made capital,
which is in itself by no means unreasonable; for what punishment less
than death can secure the observation of a law, which, without the
hazard of life, cannot be obeyed?
Let us, therefore, my lords, suppose a crew of gallant sailors surprised
in their cruise by such a hurricane as is frequent in the American seas,
which the highest perfection of skill, and the utmost exertion of
industry has scarcely enabled them to escape; let us consider them now
with their masts broken, their ship shattered, and their artillery
thrown into the sea, unable any longer either to oppose an enemy, or to
resist the waves, and yet forbidden to approach the land, and cut off
from all possibility of relief, till they have represented their
distress to some distant power, and received a gracious permission to
save their lives.
Misery like this, my lords, admits no exaggeration, nor need I dwell
long on the absurdity of establishing regulations which cannot be
observed, and which if they were enforced by any sanctions,
proportioned, as all penal sanctions ought to be, to the temptations of
violating them, must drive all our sailors into foreign service, or urge
them, upon the first distress, to defiance of law, and fill America with
pirates, and with rebels.
By the ninth clause, my lords, nothing is proposed but a relaxation of
the present discipline. It requires, that the commanders of ships of war
shall send only once in six months those accounts of their conduct and
their service, which they are at present obliged to transmit by every
ship that returns from America; so that by passing this bill, we shall
only be disabled from receiving regular and seasonable informations of
the transactions of our distant squadrons and colonies, shall be
disturbed with groundless suspicions, and tortured with unnecessary
suspense.
I have arrived at length at the last clause, a clause, my lords, worthy
to be the concluding paragraph of a bill like this; a clause in which
the power of the admiralty is communicated to the governours of our
colonies; men, my lords, not hitherto much celebrated for their
superiour wisdom, moderation, or integrity; of whom, at least, it is no
reproach to assert, that they are known to be, for the most part, wholly
unacquainted with maritime affairs, and very little famed for military
knowledge; and of whom it is above all to be considered, that they
generally commence merchants at their arrival in America, and may more
probably direct ships sent to guard the colonies, to stations in which
they may preserve their own vessels, than to those where they may
contribute most to the general security of trade.
Thus my lords, I have examined without prejudice every paragraph of this
bill, and believe, that from the objections which I have made, it
appears now plainly to your lordships, that all the regulations which
are of any use, are such as are already established by long custom, or
by former statutes; and such, therefore, as it is unnecessary to mention
in a new law; and that whatever is here to be found new, is absurd,
unintelligible, or pernicious.
This bill, my lords, is said to be founded on the act made for the same
purpose, in the wars of the queen Anne; but I cannot forbear to observe,
that the original law, though not one of those to which much of the
success of that war is to be ascribed, was drawn up with more
discernment than the bill before us. It was, at least, intelligible; the
number of cruisers was limited, and it was, therefore, possible to know
when it was obeyed; but of this bill I can confidently assert, that as
no man can understand, so no man can observe it.
I have spoken more largely, my lords, on this occasion, because this
bill relates particularly to my present employment, in which, as I
desire to do my duty, I desire to know it; and, surely, I cannot be
condemned by your lordships for opposing a bill, of which the only
tendency is to make my province difficult, to render one part of my
office inconsistent with another, and engage me in the task of
superintending the execution of impracticable measures.
What influence my arguments will have upon your lordships, I cannot
foresee. As every man flatters himself that his own opinions are right,
I hope to find this house concurring in my sentiments; but whatever may
be the determination of your lordships, I am so fully convinced of the
pernicious tendency of this bill, and the embarrassments which must be
produced by an attempt to execute it, that if it be not rejected by this
house, I shall willingly resign my office to others of more courage, or
of greater abilities; for I can have no hopes of performing my duty
under these restrictions, either to my own honour, or to the advantage
of my country.
The duke of BEDFORD spoke next, to the following effect:--My lords,
though the noble lord has produced very specious arguments against every
paragraph of the bill before us, and though many of his observations are
just, and some of his objections not easily to be answered, yet I cannot
admit that it will produce those fatal consequences which he seems to
foresee, nor am yet convinced that it will be either pernicious or
useless.
It has always, my lords, been the practice of this house, to attend to
every proposal for the publick advantage, to consider it without any
regard to the character of those by whom it is offered, and to approve
or reject it upon no other motives than those of justice and reason.
The same equity and prudence has always influenced your lordships to
distinguish between the several parts of the same bill; to reject those
expedients, of which, however plausible, either experience or reason may
discover the impropriety, and to retain those from which any real
benefit can reasonably be expected. We should never throw away gold
because it is mingled with dross, or refuse to promote the happiness of
the nation, because the expedients which were offered for that end
happened to be conjoined with some others of a disputable nature.
By the prosecution of this method, a method, my lords, too rational and
just to be neglected or forgotten, I doubt not but this bill, which, as
I shall readily admit, is not yet perfect, may be improved into a law,
from which the nation will receive great advantages, by which our trade
will be extended, and our riches increased.
Many of the clauses, my lords, may, in my opinion, admit of an easy
vindication, others may be amended by very slight alterations, and very
few are either wholly useless, or manifestly improper.
The chief defect of the first clause is such, that the noble lord has,
by declaring his disapprobation of it, given a very uncommon proof of
his integrity, disinterestedness, and moderation; for it is imperfect
only by placing too much confidence in the admiralty, which is left in
full power to determine the number of cruisers in or near the Channel
and soundings.
The noble lord has remarked, that the act of queen Anne, on which the
present bill is founded, exacted a determinate number of ships to be
employed in this particular service, and that it was, therefore, more
prudently drawn up than the present bill. But I cannot see the wisdom of
diminishing the authority of the lord high admiral; for had that act
been extended in the same manner to other services, it would have left
him only the name and shadow of an office, without power and without
use.
This clause, my lords, rightly understood, is only a declaration of
confidence in his majesty's officers, an evident confession of their
abilities to discern the interest of the publick, and of their zeal for
the prosecution of it.
With as little reason, my lords, can it be objected, that the ships are
required to be careened three times a-year. The necessity of careening
frequently those ships, of which the chief use arises from their
celerity, every sailor can declare to your lordships; nor will any man
whom his employments or his amusements have made acquainted with
navigation, allege that any thing is proposed in the bill, which it
would not be detrimental to the publick service to neglect.
It has been objected by the noble lord, that they are directed to be
careened _oftener, if there be occasion_; terms by which a discretionary
power is implied, of which yet it does not appear in whose hands it is
lodged. Let us consider, my lords, what inconvenience can arise from the
clause as it now stands, and what corruption or negligence can be
encouraged by it.
The discretionary right of bringing the ship into the ports to be
careened oftener than thrice a-year, must be, without controversy,
placed in the captain; for none but those that are in the ship can
discover the necessity of careening it, or know the inconveniencies that
are produced by the adhesion of extraneous substances to its sides and
bottom.
I own, my lords, it may be objected, that every captain will, by this
clause, be furnished with an excuse for deserting his station at
pleasure; that under pretence of uncommon ardour to pursue the enemy, he
may waste his time in endless preparations for expedition; that he may
loiter in the port to careen his ship; that before it is foul he may
bring it back again, and employ the crew in the same operation; and that
our merchants may be taken at the mouth of the harbours in which our
ships of war lie to be careened.
But, my lords, it is to be remembered, that in the third clause a
commissioner is appointed, by whom accounts are regularly to be
transmitted to the admiralty, of the arrival and departure of every
ship, and by whom the conduct of every captain is to be inspected; and
that he may easily detect such truant commanders, as shall careen their
ships only for the sake of deserting their stations.
Nor can the merchants suffer by any negligence or corruption of the
captains, because it is intended that the place of every ship returning
into port shall be supplied by another; and that the same number shall
be always in the same station, unless more important service makes them
more necessary in another place.
This proviso, my lords, a proviso undoubtedly reasonable, is established
in the second clause, but has not had the good fortune to escape the
censure of the noble lord, who has inquired, what must be the conduct of
the commanders of cruising vessels, if a seafight should happen beyond
the cape, which they are in this clause forbidden to pass?
That the clause may admit of expressions not only more proper, but more
agreeable to the intention of those by whom it was drawn up, I cannot
deny; for I suppose it very far from their design to limit the
operations of our navy to any part of the ocean, and am confident that
they meant only that the cruisers should not be despatched to such a
distance from their stations, as that our coasts should be left long
unguarded, or the enemy have time to collect his forces, and pour his
navies or his privateers upon our defenceless traders.
If by the commissioners mentioned in the third clause be intended a new
swarm of officers, the proposition is such as I confess myself very far
from approving; for it will be to little purpose that we protect the
trade, if we invent new commissioners to devour its profits; nor can we
hope for any other consequence from additional wealth, if it be procured
by increasing the influence of the crown, but that we should become a
more tempting prey to the harpies of a court.
But, my lords, to accomplish all that is intended by this clause, there
is not any need of new officers; for there are not many ports in which
ships of war can be commodiously careened, and perhaps there is not one
which can be used for this purpose, in which there is not already some
officer of the crown, whose employment allows him leisure sufficient for
the execution of a new charge, and whose present salary will afford an
ample recompense for some casual addition of employment.
The fourth clause, in which is provided that no commander shall wilfully
spring his mast, or desert his station, is such as I should be willing,
with the noble lord, to think unnecessary; but must appeal to your
lordships, whether the late conduct of the convoys has not too evidently
shown the defect of our present establishment.
The injuries, my lords, which the publick may suffer by the negligence
of the commanders of the ships of war, are such as it is worthy of the
legislature to obviate with the utmost caution; and, therefore, it is by
no means improper to enact a punishment for those who shall, upon any
false pretences, leave their station; for though such neglect of duty
is, in the present state of our naval establishment, considered as
disreputable and irregular, yet it does not appear that it has been
censured with the detestation which it deserves, or punished with the
severity necessary to its prevention.
It is observed, my lords, with relation to the following paragraph, that
either house may, at present, require accounts of the conduct of the
captains of the navy, and that, therefore, it is unnecessary to provide,
by any new law, that they shall be laid before them; but if it be
considered, my lords, how many inquiries, which we have a right to make,
are year after year constantly omitted, and how many may be excited by
curiosity to read accounts which lie before them, who yet will not move
the house to demand the accounts, or engage in the debate which such a
motion may produce, it will not be thought unnecessary to provide, that
they shall be subject to examination without the formality of a regular
vote.
As to the sixth clause, my lords, which regards the nomination of
convoys at a certain time, I can discover no reasonable objection to
such a provision, or none that can preponderate against the advantages
which may arise from it. By the certain establishment of convoys, the
value of insurance may be nearly fixed; merchants will know what
confidence is to be reposed in the force of the ships, and, what they
have, perhaps, had of late equal reason to examine, how much trust can
be placed in the fidelity of the commanders.
The nomination of convoys, my lords, is, in my opinion, more likely to
affright our enemies, and to deter their attempts, than to encourage
them by the information which it will afford them; for nothing but our
own negligence can conceal from us the naval strength of any power on
earth; and we may always, while we are careful to preserve our maritime
superiority, protect our merchants so powerfully, that none of our
enemies shall be incited to attack them by the knowledge of the number
and force of the ships appointed for their defence.
I come now, my lords, to the seventh clause; and surely to ascertain the
duties of the captains to whose protection our trading vessels are
intrusted, cannot appear superfluous to any of your lordships, who have
read the lists of our losses, heard the complaints of our merchants, or
made any inquiry into the conduct of our sea captains. There is, I fear,
too much reason to believe, that some of them have, with premeditated
design, deserted the traders in places where they have known them most
exposed to the incursions of the enemy; and it is to the last degree
evident, that others have manifested such contempt of the merchants, and
such a disregard of their interest, as may most justly expose them to
the suspicion of very criminal negligence, of negligence which no
community can be too watchful against, or too severely punish.
It has been affirmed by the noble lord, that it is not equitable to
subject the commanders of convoys to penalties for the loss of the
trading vessels, which may, perhaps, either rashly or negligently quit
their protection. That it is not reasonable to subject them to
penalties, is undoubtedly true; but, my lords, it is far from being
equally certain, that it is not just to expose them to a trial, in a
case in which it must be almost impossible to determine falsely; in a
case where the crews of, perhaps, twenty ships may be called as
witnesses of their conduct, and where none, but those whose ship is
lost, can be under the least temptation to offer a false testimony
against them.
On this occasion, my lords, it may not be improper to obviate the
objection produced by the seeming omission of penal sanctions, which is
only another proof of implicit confidence in the officers of the
admiralty, who have already the power, allowed to military courts, of
proceeding against those who shall deviate from their orders. This
power, which is in a great degree discretionary, it was thought improper
to limit, by ascertaining the punishment of crimes, which so many
circumstances may aggravate or diminish; and, therefore, in my opinion,
this clause is far from being so defective as the noble lord represented
it.
The last three clauses, by which the ships in America are prohibited to
leave their station, by which it is required that accounts should be
once in six months transmitted to the admiralty, and by which the
captains are subjected to the command of the governours of our colonies,
are, in my opinion, justly to be censured. The first is impossible to be
observed, the second is unnecessary, and the third will probably produce
more inconveniencies than benefits.
Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show, that this bill, though not
perfect, is yet such as, with some emendations, may produce great
advantages to the traders of this empire. For, though it is undoubtedly
a just observation, that the success of military attempts cannot be
promoted by rigid restrictions and minute regulations, yet it is equally
certain that no nation has yet been so fortunate as to be served by men
of integrity superiour to laws, or of wisdom superiour to instructions;
and every government has found it necessary to direct the conduct of its
officers by general rules, though they have been allowed to comply with
particular circumstances, and to give way to sudden accidents.
I think it, therefore, my lords, necessary to propose, that this bill
shall be more particularly examined in a committee, that, after having
received the necessary explanations and amendments, it may be referred
again to the other house.
Lord DELAWARE rose next, and spoke to the purpose following:--My lords,
the noble duke has, by his arguments in favour of this bill, given a
very eminent proof of great abilities; he has shown every clause in that
light which may least expose to view its improprieties and defects; but
has at length only shown, that it is not impossible to make a useful
law, for the purposes mentioned in the title of this bill; not that any
of the expedients, now proposed, will afford the desired advantage to
the publick, or obviate any of the inconveniencies of which the traders
have been so long and so importunately complaining.
This bill, my lords, is, indeed, founded upon a law made in a reign
celebrated for the wisdom of our conduct and the success of our arms;
but it will not, I suppose, be asserted, that nothing was, even in that
period, ill conducted; nor will it be an argument, sufficient for the
justification of an expedient, that it was practised in the victorious
reign of queen Anne.
If we inquire into the consequences of that law, we shall find no
inducement to revive it on this or any future occasion. For it had no
other effect than that of exposing us to our enemies by dividing our
forces; a disadvantage of which we soon found the effects, by the loss
of two large ships of seventy guns, and of a multitude of trading
vessels, which, by that diminution of our naval armament, necessarily
fell into the hands of privateers and small cruisers, that ravaged the
ocean without fear or molestation.
If we examine the present establishment of our navy, my lords, it will
be discovered, that nothing is proposed in this bill, which is not more
efficaciously performed by the methods now in use, and more judiciously
established by laws, of which long experience has shown the usefulness.
This, my lords, will easily appear from the perusal of the orders which
every commander of a convoy regularly receives, and of the printed
rules, established by his majesty in council, for the royal navy.
In these, my lords, much more is comprehended than can properly be
inferred in a law not occasionally variable; nor do I think any thing
omitted, which an experienced and candid inquirer will think useful to
the increase of our naval strength, or necessary to the protection of
our commerce.
In considering this bill, I shall not trouble your lordships with a
minute consideration of every single paragraph, though every paragraph
might furnish opportunity for animadversions; but shall content myself
with endeavouring to evince the reasonableness of some of the objections
made by the noble lord who spoke first, and enforcing his opinion with
such arguments as have occurred to me, though, indeed, it requires no
uncommon sagacity to discover, or superiour skill in ratiocination to
prove, that where this bill will produce any alteration in our present
scheme, it will manifestly change it for the worse.
For surely, my lords, it will not be necessary to show, by any elaborate
and refined reasoning, the absurdity of confining cruisers to particular
stations, with an absolute prohibition to depart from them, whatever may
be the certainty of destruction, or prospect of advantage.
If the intention of cruising ships is to annoy the enemies of the
nation, ought they to be deprived of the liberty of pursuing them? If
they are designed for the protection of our merchants, must they not be
allowed to attend them till they are out of danger.
Every one, my lords, has had opportunities of observing, that there are
men who are wholly engrossed by the present moment, and who, if they can
procure immoderate profit, or escape any impending danger, are without
the least solicitude with regard to futurity, and who, therefore, live
only by the hour, without any general scheme of conduct, or solid
foundation of lasting happiness, and who, consequently, are for ever
obliged to vary their measures, and obviate every new accident by some
new contrivance.
By men of this disposition, my lords, a temper by which they are
certainly very little qualified for legislators, the bill now before us
seems to have been drawn up; for their attention is evidently so engaged
by the present occurrences, that there is no place left for any regard
to distant contingencies. The conclusion of this war is to them the
period of human existence, the end of all discord and all policy. They
consider Spain as the only enemy with whom we can ever be at variance,
and have, therefore, drawn up a law, a law without any limitation of
time, to enable us to oppose her. They have with great industry and long
searches discovered, that cruisers on this side cape Finisterre, may be
of use against the Spaniards, and propose, therefore, that in all times
of war they are to be despatched to that individual station, though we
should be engaged in disputes with the northern crowns, or fit out
fleets to make conquests in the East Indies.
In all our wars, my lords, however judiciously concerted, and however
happily concluded, the pleasures of success have been abated by the
mortification of losses, and some complaints have been at all times
mingled with the shouts of triumph. How much soever the glory of the
nation has been elevated, the fortunes of particular persons have been
impaired, and those have never thought themselves recompensed by the
general advantages of the publick, who have suffered by the acquisition
of them; they have always imagined themselves marked out for ruin by
malevolence and resentment, and have concluded that those disasters
which fell upon them only by the common chance of war, were brought on
them by negligence or design.
The losses of our merchants in the present war must be acknowledged to
have been more than common, but if we examine accurately into the causes
that may be assigned for so great a number of captures, we shall find
them such as this law will have no tendency to remove, such as might be
easily imagined before the commencement of hostilities, and such as it
will be extremely difficult on any future occasion of the same kind, to
hinder from producing the same effects.
The first and greatest cause, my lords, of the number of our losses, is
the number of our ships, which cannot all be sufficiently protected. The
extent, therefore, of our commerce, in proportion to that of our
enemies, exposes us to double disadvantage; we necessarily lie open in
more parts to the depredations of privateers, and have no encouragement
to attempt reprisals, because they have few ships of value to be seized.
The profit of our commerce naturally withholds our sailors from our
ships of war, and makes part of our navy an idle show; the certainty of
plunder incites them to turn their merchant ships into cruisers, and to
suspend their trade for more profitable employment. Thus they at once
increase the number of plunderers, and take away from us the opportunity
of repairing our losses by the same practice.
And, my lords, if the losses of our merchants have been greater than in
former wars, our trade is more extensive, and our ships far more
numerous. Nor is it to be forgotten that a very important part of our
commerce is carried on before the eyes of the Spaniards, so that they
may issue out upon our merchants from their own coasts, and retire
immediately beyond danger of pursuit.
But, my lords, neither the situation of Spain, nor the extent of our
commerce, would have made this war so destructive, had not our merchants
sometimes facilitated the attempts of our enemies by their own
negligence or avarice.
I have been informed, my lords, that as the masters of trading vessels
complain of having been deserted by their convoys, the captains of the
ships of war have, in their turn, exhibited such representations of the
conduct of the trading masters, as may prove that their caution is not
proportioned to their clamour, and that in however melancholy terms they
may recount the miseries of captivity, the calamities of ruined
families, and the interruption of the trade of Britain, they will not
endeavour to escape their enemies at the expense of much circumspection,
and that the prospect of no large profit will be sufficient to
overbalance the danger of those evils which they so pathetically lament.
It is not uncommon, my lords, when the fleet has entered the open seas,
for the traders to take different courses both from the convoy and from
each other, and to disperse themselves beyond the possibility of
receiving assistance in danger or distress; and what wonder is it if
part of them be lost, since only part of them can be protected?
It may be imagined, my lords, that this is only an excuse forged by the
commanders to cover their own negligence or treachery. It may be asked,
what motives could induce the merchants to expose themselves to
unnecessary dangers, or what proofs they have ever given of such wild
negligence of their own interest or safety, as that they should be
suspected of rushing precipitately into the jaws of rapine?
This, my lords, is an objection specious in itself, and such as those
who have not inquired into the present state of our traffick will not
very readily discover to be fallacious; but it may easily be removed, by
showing that the danger of being taken by the enemy is generally not so
great to those who have the direction of the ship as it is commonly
believed.
By the present custom of insurance, my lords, the merchant exempts
himself from the hazard of great losses, and if he insures so much of
the value of the ship and cargo, that the chance of arriving first at
market is equivalent to the remaining part, what shall hinder him from
pressing forward at all events, and directing his course intrepidly
through seas crowded with enemies?
It is well known, my lords, that there is, in a great part of mankind, a
secret malignity, which makes one unwilling to contribute to the
advantage of another, even when his own interest will suffer no
diminution; nor is it to be imagined, that this disposition is less
predominant in traders than in the other classes of the community,
though it is exerted on different occasions. The envy of one part of
mankind is excited by reputation, or interest, or dignity, or power. The
trader, for the most part, envies nothing but money, in which he has
been taught from his infancy that every human excellence is
comprehended, and contributes to the increase of the riches of another,
with the same unwillingness with which a soldier would concur in the
advancement of an inferiour officer to a post of higher rank and
authority than his own.
For this reason, my lords, there is generally a malevolence in the
merchant against the insurer, whom he considers as an idle caterpillar,
living without industry upon the labours of others, and, therefore, when
he lays down the sum stipulated for security, he is almost in suspense,
whether he should not prefer the loss of the remaining part of the value
of his vessel to the mortification of seeing the insurer enjoy that
money, which fear and caution have influenced him to pay.
This disposition, undoubtedly, inclines him to proceed with less regard
to his own security, and betrays him into dangers which it was, at
least, possible to avoid; for to what purpose, says he, have I insured
my ship if I am not to be set free from the necessity of anxiety and
caution? If I arrive safely at the port, I shall dispose of my
commodities with uncommon advantage; if I miscarry, the insurer will at
least suffer with me, and be deservedly punished for his suspicions and
extortion.
I doubt not but some of your lordships will imagine, that I am now
indulging chimerical speculations, that I am ascribing great force to
weak motives, and supposing men to act upon principles which, in
reality, never operated in the human breast. When I think
disadvantageously of others, my lords, I am, indeed, always desirous to
find myself mistaken, and shall be pleased to hear on this occasion from
any of your lordships, who have conversed at large among mankind, that
it is not common for one man to neglect his own interest for fear of
promoting that of another. In the present question, my lords, I have
only supposed that envy may be one motive among many, and wish its
influence were so small, as that it might have been less proper to
mention it.
The practice of insurance, my lords, whether it contributes or not to
the number of the captures, undoubtedly increases the clamour which they
occasion; for as the loss is extended, the complaint is multiplied, and
both the merchant and insurer take the liberty of censuring the conduct
of the naval officers, and of condemning the measures of the government.
The ministry is charged with neglecting the protection of commerce, with
oppressing the merchants, and with conniving at the enemy's
preparations; that they who most eagerly solicited the war, may be the
first that shall repent it.
Another cause of the frequency of our losses in the present war, is the
general circulation of intelligence throughout Europe, by which it is
made impossible to conceal from our enemies the state of our armies, our
navies, or our trade. Every regiment that is raised, every ship that is
built, every fleet of trading vessels that lies waiting for the wind, is
minutely registered in the papers of the week, and accounts of it
transmitted to every nation of the world, where curiosity or interest
will pay for information. The Spaniards, therefore, need only regulate
their schemes according to their instructions from Britain, and watch
those fleets which are frequently sent out, for they may be confident
that some masters will wander from their protectors, enticed by avarice,
negligence, or temerity, and that they shall have opportunities of
enriching themselves without the necessity of engaging the convoy.
To protect ships which are to be steered each at the will of the master,
is no less impossible, my lords, than to conduct an army of which every
private man is at liberty to march according to his own caprice, to form
and pursue his own plan of operation, and to dispute and neglect the
orders of his leader. Nor is it more reasonable to subject the captains
of the ships of war to penalties for the loss of a vessel, over which
they have no authority, than to require from an officer in the army an
account of the lives of men, who perished by disobeying his commands.
In my opinion, my lords, we might, with far greater probability of
success, revive a precedent that may be found in the reign of king
William, in which it was appointed by an order of council, that the name
of every ship which went out with a convoy should be registered, and
that the owners should give security to provide a sufficient number of
arms and a proper quantity of ammunition to assist the imperial ships in
annoying or repelling the enemy; with one injunction more of the utmost
importance to the efficacious protection of our commerce, and which,
therefore, in every war ought to be repeated and enforced; an injunction
by which the masters of the ships of trade were required to obey the
directions of the commander of the convoy.
That some measures ought to be concerted for the preservation of our
trade I am very far from denying, and shall willingly concur in such as
shall to me appear likely to promote the end proposed by them. Our
losses, my lords, are undoubtedly great, though I believe far less than
they are reported by discontent and malevolence; for if a ship be
delayed by an accidental hinderance, or kept back by contrary winds for
a few days, there are men so watchful to snatch every opportunity of
reproaching the measures of the government, that a clamour is
immediately raised, the ship is taken, the merchants are sacrificed, and
the nation betrayed.
While this report is conveyed from one to another, and, like other
falsehoods, increasing in its progress; while every man adds some
circumstance of exaggeration, or some new proof of the treachery of the
ministry, the ship enters the port, and puts an end, indeed, to the
anxiety of the owners and insurers, but by no means pacifies the people,
or removes their prejudices against the conduct of their governours; for
as no man acknowledges himself the first author of the report, no man
thinks himself under any obligation to retract or confute it, and the
passions of the multitude, being once in commotion, cannot be calmed
before another opportunity of the same kind may be offered for agitating
them afresh.
To the expectations of the people, my lords, it is always proper to have
some regard, nor is there any valuable use of power but that of
promoting happiness, and preventing or removing calamities; but we are
not to endeavour to pacify them by the appearance of redress, which, in
reality, will only increase those evils of which they complain, nor to
depress the reputation of this assembly by passing laws which the
experience of a single month will prove to be of no use.
Of this kind, my lords, the bill now before us has been shown by the
noble lord that spoke first on this occasion; by whom every clause has
been discovered to be either defective or unnecessary, and who has
evinced, beyond all possibility of reply, that the regulations here
proposed can be divided only into two kinds, of which one is already
established either by law or prescription, and the other cannot be
admitted without apparent injury both to our navy and our trade.
Part of the clauses the noble duke has, indeed, attempted to defend, but
has been obliged by his regard to reason and to truth, to make such
concessions, as are, in my opinion, sufficient arguments for the
rejection of the bill. He has admitted of almost every clause that it is
imperfect, that it may be amended by farther consideration, and that,
though not wholly to be neglected, it yet requires some farther
improvements to become effectual to the advantage of our merchants.
The last three clauses, his natural abilities and just discernment
immediately showed him to be indefensible; and he has too much regard to
the interest of his country to attempt the vindication of a bill, which
could not be passed without weakening it by impairing its naval force,
and, yet more sensibly, by diminishing the reputation of its
legislature.
I hope, therefore, my lords, that I shall not undergo the common censure
of disregard to our commercial interest, or be ranked amongst the
enemies of the merchants, though I declare, that in my opinion, this
bill ought to be rejected as unnecessary and injudicious, and that we
should only, by considering in a committee what no consideration can
amend, waste that time in a fruitless attempt, which may be spent much
more usefully upon other subjects.
Lord CARTERET spoke next, to the following purpose:--My lords, though I
do not approve equally of every part of the bill now before us, though I
think some of the provisions unnecessary, others unlikely to produce any
beneficial effects, and some already established by former acts of the
senate, or rules of the admiralty, yet I cannot agree with the noble
lord that it is unworthy of farther consideration.
In my opinion, my lords, it is necessary, for many reasons, to amend
this bill rather than reject it; and I hope, that when I shall have laid
before you the result of those inquiries and those reflections which I
have made on this occasion, your lordships will judge it not improper to
refer it to a committee.
Nothing, my lords, is more necessary to the legislature than the
affection and esteem of the people; all government consists in the
authority of the _few_ over the _many_, and authority, therefore, can be
founded only on opinion, and must always fall to the ground, when that
which supports it is taken away.
For this reason, my lords, it is worthy of this most august and awful
assembly, to endeavour to convince the people of our solicitude for
their happiness, and our compassion for their sufferings; lest we should
seem elevated by the casual advantages of birth and fortune above regard
to the lower classes of mankind; lest we should seem exalted above
others only to neglect them, and invested with power only to exert it in
acts of wanton oppression; lest high rank should in time produce hatred
rather than reverence, and superiority of fortune only tempt rapine and
excite rebellion.
The bill now under our consideration, my lords, cannot be rejected
without danger of exasperating the nation, without affording to the
discontented and malevolent an opportunity of representing this house as
regardless of the publick miseries, and deaf to the cries of our
fellow-subjects languishing in captivity, and mourning in poverty. The
melancholy and dejected will naturally conceive us inebriated with
affluence, and elated with dignity, endeavouring to remove from our eyes
every spectacle of misery, and to turn aside from those lamentations
which may interrupt the enjoyment of our felicity.
Nor, indeed, can it be justly said, that such representations are
without grounds, when we consider the important occasion on which this
bill is drawn up, the bitterness of those calamities which it is
intended to redress, and the authority by which it is recommended to us.
It may naturally be expected, my lords, that the title of a bill for the
protection and security of trade, should raise an uncommon degree of
ardour and attention; it might be conceived that every lord in this
house would be ambitious of signalizing his zeal for the interest of his
country, by proposing, on this occasion, every expedient which
experience or information had suggested to him; and that instead of
setting ourselves free from the labour of inquiry and the anxiety of
deliberation, by raising objections to the bill and rejecting it, we
should labour with unanimous endeavours, and incessant assiduity, to
supply its defects, and correct its improprieties; to show that a design
so beneficial can never be proposed to us without effect, and that
whenever we find honest zeal, we shall be ready to assist it with
judgment and experience.
Compassion might likewise concur to invigorate our endeavours on this
occasion. For who, my lords, can reflect on families one day flourishing
in affluence, and contributing to the general prosperity of their
country, and on a sudden, without the crime of extravagance or
negligence, reduced to penury and distress, harassed by creditors, and
plundered by the vultures of the law, without wishing that such
misfortunes might by some expedient be averted? But this, my lords, is
not the only nor the greatest calamity, which this bill is intended to
prevent. The loss of wealth, however grievous, is yet less to be dreaded
than that of liberty, and indigence added to captivity is the highest
degree of human misery. Yet even this, however dreadful, is now the lot
of multitudes of our fellow-subjects, who are languishing with want in
the prisons of Spain.
Surely, my lords, every proposal must be well received that intends the
prevention or relief of calamities like these. Surely the ruin of its
merchants must alarm every trading nation, nor can a British senate sit
unconcerned at the captivity of those men by whom liberty is chiefly
supported.
Of the importance of the merchants, by whom this bill is recommended to
our consideration, and by whose influence it has already passed the
other house, it is not necessary to remind your lordships, who know,
that to this class of men our nation is indebted for all the advantages
that it possesses above those which we behold with compassion or
contempt, for its wealth and power, and perhaps for its liberty and
civility. To the merchants, my lords, we owe that our name is known
beyond our own coasts, and that our influence is not confined to the
narrow limits of a single island.
Let us not, therefore, my lords, reject with contempt what is proposed
and solicited by men of this class; men whose experience and knowledge
cannot but have enabled them to offer something useful and important,
though, perhaps, for want of acquaintance with former laws, they may
have imagined those provisions now first suggested, which have only been
forgotten, and petitioned for the enaction of a new law, when they
needed only an enforcement of former statutes.
That our naval force has, in the present war, been misapplied; that our
commerce has been exposed to petty spoilers, in a degree never known
before; that our convoys have been far from adding security to our
traders; and that with the most powerful fleet in the world, we have
suffered all that can fall upon the most defenceless nation, cannot be
denied.
Nor is it any degree of temerity, my lords, to affirm, that these
misfortunes have been brought upon us by either negligence or treachery;
for, besides that no other cause can be assigned for the losses which a
powerful people suffer from an enemy of inferiour force, there is the
strongest authority for asserting, that our maritime affairs have been
ill conducted, and that, therefore, the regulation of them is very
seasonably and properly solicited by the merchants.
For this assertion, my lords, we may produce the authority of the other
house, by which a remonstrance was drawn up against the conduct of the
commissioners of the admiralty. This alone ought to influence us to an
accurate discussion of this affair. But when an authority yet more
venerable is produced, when it appears that his majesty, by the
dismission of the commissioners from their employments, admitted the
justice of the representation of the commons, it surely can be of no use
to evince, by arguments, the necessity of new regulations.
It is, indeed, certain, that men of integrity and prudence, men of
ability to discern their duty, and of resolution to execute it, can
receive very little assistance from rules and prescriptions; nor can I
deny what the noble lord has affirmed, that they may be sometimes
embarrassed in their measures, and hindered from snatching opportunities
of success, and complying with emergent occasions; but, my lords, we are
to consider mankind, not as we wish them, but as we find them,
frequently corrupt, and always fallible.
If men were all honest and wise, laws of all kinds would be superfluous,
a legislature would become useless, and our authority must cease for
want of objects to employ it; but we find, my lords, that there are men
whom nothing but laws and penalties can make supportable to society;
that there are men, who, if they are not told their duty, will never
know it, and who will, at last, only perform what they shall be punished
for neglecting.
Were all men, like the noble lord whom I am now attempting to answer,
vigilant to discover, sagacious to distinguish, and industrious to
prosecute the interest of the publick, I should be very far from
proposing that they should be constrained by rules, or required to
follow any guide but their own reason; I should resign my own
prosperity, and that of my country, implicitly into their hands, and
rest in full security that nothing would be omitted that human wisdom
could dictate for our advantage.
I am not persuading your lordships to lay restraints upon virtue and
prudence, but to consider how seldom virtue and authority are found
together, how often prudence degenerates into selfishness, and all
generous regard for the publick is contracted into narrow views of
private interest. I am endeavouring to show, that since laws must be
equally obligatory to all, it is the interest of the few good men to
submit to restraints, which, though they may sometimes obstruct the
influence of their virtue, will abundantly recompense them, by securing
them from the mischiefs that wickedness, reigning almost without limits,
and operating without opposition, might bring upon them.
It may not be improper to add, my lords, that no degree of human wisdom
is exempt from errour; that he who claims the privilege of acting at
discretion, subjects himself likewise to the necessity of answering for
the consequences of his conduct, and that ill success will at least
subject him to reproach and suspicion, from which, he whose conduct is
regulated by established rules, may always have an opportunity of
setting himself free.
Fixed and certain regulations are, therefore, my lords, useful to the
wisest and best men; and to those whose abilities are less conspicuous,
and whose integrity is at best doubtful, I suppose it will not be
doubted that they are indispensably necessary.
Some of the expedients mentioned in this bill, I shall readily concur
with the noble lord in censuring and rejecting; I am very far from
thinking it expedient to invest the governours of our colonies with any
new degree of power, or to subject the captains of our ships of war to
their command. I have lived, my lords, to see many successions of those
petty monarchs, and have known few whom I would willingly trust with the
exercise of great authority. It is not uncommon, my lords, for those to
be made cruel and capricious by power, who were moderate and prudent in
lower stations; and if the effects of exaltation are to be feared even
in good men, what may not be expected from it in those, whom nothing but
a distant employment could secure from the laws, and who, if they had
not been sent to America to govern, must probably have gone thither on a
different occasion?
The noble duke, who has vindicated the bill with arguments to which very
little can be added, and to which I believe nothing can be replied, has
expressed his unwillingness to concur in any measures for the execution
of which new officers must be appointed. An increase of officers, my
lords, is, indeed, a dreadful sound, a sound that cannot but forebode
the ruin of our country; the number of officers already established is
abundantly sufficient for all useful purposes, nor can any addition be
made but to the ruin of our constitution.
I am, therefore, of opinion, that no new officer was intended by those
that drew up the bill, and that they proposed only to furnish those that
loiter in our ports, at the expense of the publick, with an opportunity
of earning their salaries by some useful employment.
I know not, indeed, my lords, whether any good effects can be reasonably
hoped from this provision; whether men accustomed to connivance and
negligence in affairs of less importance, ought to be trusted with the
care of our naval preparations, and engaged in service, on which the
prosperity of the publick may depend; and cannot conceal my
apprehensions, that such men, if commissioned to superintend others, may
themselves require a superintendent.
But, my lords, this and every other clause may, in a committee, be
carefully examined and deliberately corrected; and since it appears
evident to me, that some law is necessary for the security of our
commerce, I think this bill ought not to be rejected without farther
consideration.
Lord WINCHELSEA rose again, and spoke thus:--My lords, as the known
sincerity of that noble lord allows no room for suspecting, that he
would bestow any praises where he did not believe there was some desert,
and as his penetration and acuteness secure him from being deceived by
any false appearances of merit, I cannot but applaud myself for having
obtained his esteem, which I hope will not be forfeited by my future
conduct.
Having happily gained the regard of so exact a judge of mankind, I am
the less solicitous what opinion may be conceived of my abilities or
intentions by those whose censures I less fear, and whose praises I less
value, and shall, therefore, cheerfully hazard any degree of popularity,
which I may have hitherto possessed, by continuing my opposition to this
bill, of which I am still convinced that it will produce nothing but
embarrassment, losses, and disgrace.
The necessity of gaining and preserving the esteem of the people I very
willingly allow, but am of opinion that though it may sometimes be
gained by flattering their passions and complying with their
importunities, by false appearances of relief, and momentary
alleviations of their grievances, it is only to be preserved by real and
permanent benefits, by a steady attention to the great ends of
government, and a vigorous prosecution of the means by which they may be
obtained, without regard to present prejudices or temporary clamours.
I believe, my lords, it will always be found that it is dangerous to
gratify the people at their own expense, and to sacrifice their interest
to their caprices; for I have so high a veneration of their wisdom, as
to pronounce without scruple, that however they may, for a time, be
deceived by artful misrepresentations, they will, at length, learn to
esteem those most, who have the resolution to promote their happiness in
opposition to their prejudices.
I am, therefore, confident, my lords, of regaining the popularity which
I may lose by declaring, once more, that this bill ought to be rejected,
since no endeavours shall be wanting to show how little it is necessary,
by an effectual protection of every part of our trade, and a diligent
provision for the naval service.
The duke of BEDFORD rose, and spoke to this effect:--My lords, I am
convinced that this bill is very far from being either absurd or
useless, nor can imagine that they by whom it was drawn up could fail of
producing some expedients that may deserve consideration.
It is probable, that a farther inquiry may show the propriety of some
clauses, which at present appear most liable to censure; and that, if we
reject this bill thus precipitately, we shall condemn what we do not
fully comprehend. No clause appeared to me more unworthy of the judgment
and penetration of the merchants than the last, nor was there any which
I should have rejected at the first perusal with less regret; yet,
having taken this opportunity of considering it a second time, I find it
by no means indefensible, for the direction of ships stationed for the
defence of our American territories, is not committed to the governours
alone. The council of each province is joined with them in authority, by
whom any private regards may be overborne, and who cannot be supposed to
concur in any directions which will not promote the general interest of
the colony.
I doubt not, my lords, but other clauses have been equally mistaken,
and, therefore, think it necessary to consider them in a committee,
where every lord may declare his sentiments, without the restraint of a
formal debate, and where the bill may be deliberately revised, and
accommodated more exactly to the present exigencies of the nation.
Lord WINCHELSEA spoke again, in substance as follows:--My lords, the
only reason which has been urged for considering this bill in a
committee, is the necessity of gratifying the merchants, and of showing
our concern for the prosperity of commerce. If therefore it shall
appear, that the merchants are indifferent with regard to its success, I
hope it will be rejected without opposition.
I was this morning, my lords, informed by a merchant, who has many
opportunities of acquainting himself with the opinions of the trading
part of the nation, that they were fully convinced of the impossibility
of adapting fixed rules to variable exigencies, or of establishing any
certain method of obviating the chances of war, and defeating enemies
who were every day altering their schemes; and declared that they had no
hopes of security but from the vigilance of a board of admiralty,
solicitous for the welfare of the merchants, and the honour of the
nation.
Lord CHOLMONDELEY rose and spoke to the following purpose:--My lords, as
three clauses of this bill have been universally given up, and almost
all the rest plainly proved by the noble lord to be either absurd or
superfluous, I cannot see why it should not be rejected without the
solemnity of farther consideration, to which, indeed, nothing but the
title can give it any claim.
The title, my lords, is, indeed, specious, and well fitted to the design
of gaining attention and promoting popularity; but with this title there
is nothing that corresponds, nor is any thing to be found but confusion
and contradictions, which grow more numerous upon farther search.
That the whole bill, my lords, is unnecessary, cannot be denied, if it
be considered that nothing is proposed in it which is not already in the
power of your lordships, who may call at pleasure for the lists of the
navy, the accounts of the cruisers, the duties of their commissions, and
the journals of their commanders, (as you did in the sixth of queen
Anne,) and detect every act of negligence or treachery, and every
instance of desertion, or of cowardice.
Nothing is necessary to the regulation of our naval force, but that your
lordships vigilantly exert that power which is conferred upon you by the
constitution, and examine the conduct of every officer with attention
and impartiality; no man then will dare to neglect his duty, because no
man can hope to escape punishment.
Of this bill, therefore, since it is thus useless and inconsistent, I
cannot but suspect, my lords, that it was concerted for purposes very
different from those mentioned in the title, which it has, indeed, no
tendency to promote. I believe, my lords, the projectors of it intended
not so much to advance the interest of the merchants, as to depress the
reputation of those whom they have long taken every opportunity of
loading with reproaches, whom they have censured as the enemies of
trade, the corrupters of the nation, and the confederates of Spain.
To confirm these general calumnies, it was necessary to fix on some
particular accusation which might raise the resentment of the people,
and exasperate them beyond reflection or inquiry. For this purpose
nothing was more proper than to charge them with betraying our merchants
to the enemy.
As no accusation could be more efficacious to inflame the people, so
none, my lords, could with more difficulty be confuted. Some losses must
be suffered in every war, and every one will necessarily produce
complaints and discontent; every man is willing to blame some other
person for his misfortunes, and it was, therefore, easy to turn the
clamours of those whose vessels fell into the hands of the Spaniards,
against the ministers and commanders of the ships of war.
These cries were naturally heard with the regard always paid to
misfortune and distress, and propagated with zeal, because they were
heard with pity. Thus in time, what was at first only the outcry of
impatience, was by malicious artifices improved into settled opinion,
that opinion was diligently diffused, and all the losses of the
merchants were imputed, not to the chance of war, but the treachery of
the ministry.
But, my lords, the folly of this opinion, however general, and the
falsehood of this accusation, however vehement, will become sufficiently
apparent, if you examine that bulky collection of papers which are now
laid before you, from which you will discover the number of our fleets,
the frequency of our convoys, the stations of our ships of war, and the
times of their departure and return; you will find that no provision for
war, no expedient likely to promote success has been neglected; that we
have now more ships equipped than in the late war with France, that
nothing can be added to the exactness with which our maritime force is
regulated, and that there is not the least reason to doubt of the
fidelity with which it has been employed.
In every war, my lords, it is to be expected that losses will be
suffered by private persons on each side, nor even in a successful war
can the publick always hope to be enriched; because the advantage may
arise, not immediately from captures, but, consequently, from the
treaties or conditions in which a prosperous war may be supposed to
terminate.
What concessions we shall in this war extort from the Spaniards, what
security will be procured for our merchants, what recompense will be
yielded for our losses, or what extent will be added to our commerce, it
cannot yet be expected that any man should be able to declare; nor will
his majesty's counsellors be required to give an account of futurity. It
is a sufficient vindication of their conduct, and an evident proof of
the wisdom with which the war has been conducted, that we have hitherto
gained more than we have lost.
This, my lords, will appear from a diligent and minute comparison of the
captures on each side, and an exact computation of the value of our
losses and our prizes. It will be found that if the Spaniards have
taken, as it is not improbable, a greater number of ships, those which
they have lost have been far more wealthy.
The merchants, indeed, seem to have distrusted the strength of the
evidence which they produced in support of their allegations, by
bringing it only before the other house, where, as an oath could not be
administered, every man delivered what he believed as what he knew, and
indulged himself without scruple in venting his resentment, or declaring
his suspicions; a method of allegation very proper to scatter reproaches
and gratify malevolence, but of very little use for the discovery of
truth.
Had they come before your lordships, every circumstance had been
minutely examined, every assertion compared with other evidence, all
exaggerations repressed, and all foreign considerations rejected; each
part would have been impartially heard, and it would have plainly been
known to whom every loss was to be imputed. The negligence or treachery
of the commanders of the convoys, wherever it had been found, would have
been punished, but they would not have charged them with those
miscarriages which were produced only by the obstinacy or inattention of
the masters of the trading vessels.
Such inquiries, my lords, they appear to have thought it their interest
to decline, and, therefore, did not proceed on their petition to this
house; and if they did in reality avoid a rigorous examination, what can
be inferred, but that they intended rather to offer insinuations than
proofs, and rather to scatter infamy than obtain justice.
And, that nothing was indeed omitted that could secure our own commerce,
or distress our enemies, may reasonably be collected from the number and
great strength of our fleet, to which no empire in the world can oppose
an equal force. If it has not been supplied with sailors without some
delays, and if these delays have given our enemies an opportunity of
adding to their securities, of fortifying their ports, and supplying
their magazines, it must be ascribed to the nature of our constitution,
that forbids all compulsory methods of augmenting our forces, which must
be considered as, perhaps, the only inconvenience to be thrown into the
balance against the blessings of liberty.
The difficulty of manning our ships of war, is, indeed, extremely
perplexing. Men are naturally very little inclined to subject themselves
to absolute command, or to engage in any service without a time limited
for their dismission. Men cannot willingly rush into danger without the
prospect of a large advantage; they have generally some fondness for
their present state of life, and do not quit it without reluctance. All
these reasons, my lords, concur to withhold the sailors from the navy,
in which they are necessarily governed with higher authority than in
trading vessels, in which they are subjected to punishments, and
confined by strict regulations, without any certain term of their
bondage; for such they, who know not the necessity of subordination, nor
discover the advantages of discipline, cannot but account subjection to
the will and orders of another.
By serving the merchants, they not only secure to themselves the liberty
of changing their masters at pleasure, but enjoy the prospect of a near
and certain advantage; they have not, indeed, any expectations of being
suddenly enriched by a plate ship, and of gaining by one engagement such
wealth as will enable them to spend the rest of their lives in ease and
affluence; but they are sure of a speedy payment of their wages,
perhaps, of some profits from petty commerce, and of an opportunity of
squandering them at land in jollity and diversions; their labour is
cheerful, because they know it will be short, and they readily enter
into an employment which they can quit when it shall no longer please
them.
These considerations, my lords, have no influence upon the preparations
of France and Spain, where no man is master of his own fortune, or time,
or life, and where the officers of the state can drive multitudes into
the service of the crown, without regard to their private views,
inclinations, or engagements. To man a fleet, nothing is necessary but
to lay an embargo on the trading vessels, and suspend their commerce for
a short time; therefore no man dares refuse to enter into the publick
service when he is summoned; nor, if he should fly, as our sailors, from
an impress, would any man venture to shelter or conceal him.
Absolute monarchs have, therefore, this advantage over us, that they can
be sooner prepared for war, and to this must be ascribed all the success
which the Spaniards have obtained. This, my lords, will not be obviated
by the bill now before us, nor will it, indeed, procure any other
benefit to the trade, or any addition to the power of the nation.
Of the ten clauses comprised in the bill, the greatest part is
universally allowed to be injudiciously and erroneously proposed; and
those few, which were thought of more importance, have been shown to
contain no new expedients, nor to add any thing to the present
regulations.
I cannot, therefore, discover any reason, my lords, that should induce
us to refer to a committee this bill, of which part is confessedly to be
rejected, and the rest is apparently superfluous.
[Then the question being put, whether the bill should be referred to a
committee; it passed in the negative. Content, 25. Not content, 59.
On the rejection of this bill by the lords, a bill which related to an
affair of no less importance than the security of trade and navigation,
and which had been unanimously passed by the commons, it was satirically
remarked, that the upper house understood trade and navigation _better_
than the lower. However, the circumstances that attended it, made the
publication of the bill, with the amendments and the reasons offered by
the lords on both sides, expected with the more impatience.]