BRITISH RULE
When negotiations were being carried on seventy years ago for the
cession of Hongkong to the British Crown the only interests that
were properly consulted were those of commerce. Military and naval
requirements were so far overlooked that one side of the harbour,
with its dominating range of mountains, was allowed to remain in the
hands of China, the small island of Hongkong alone passing into the
hands of Great Britain. The strategic weakness of the position was
soon recognised; it was obvious that the Chinese, or any hostile Power
allied with China, could hold the island and the harbour, with its
immense shipping, entirely at its mercy by the simple expedient of
mounting guns on the Kowloon hills. The first favourable opportunity
was taken by the British Government to obtain a cession of a few square
miles of the Kowloon peninsula, but from the strategic point of view
this step was of very little use; and it was not till 1898 that the
Hongkong "New Territory"--a patch of country which, including the
mountain ranges and some considerable islands, has an area of several
hundred square miles--was "leased" to Great Britain "for a period of
ninety-nine years."
When, in the same year, arrangements were being made for the "lease"
of Weihaiwei, no decision had been come to as to whether the place was
to be made into a fortress, like Hongkong, or merely retained as a
flying base for the fleet or as a depôt of commerce: but to make quite
sure that there would be enough territory for all possible or probable
purposes the British Government asked for and obtained a lease not only
of the island of Liukung but also of a strip of land measuring ten
miles round the entire bay. The bay itself, with its various inlets, is
so extensive that this strip of land comprises an area of nearly three
hundred square miles, with a coast-line of over seventy miles; while
the beeline frontier from the village of Ta-lan-t'ou in the extreme
east to Hai Chuang in the extreme west measures about forty miles.
This land-frontier is purely artificial: in one or two cases, while
it includes one portion of a village it leaves the rest in Chinese
territory. This considerable area is under direct British rule, and
within it no Chinese official has any jurisdiction whatever except,
as we have seen,[52] within the walls of the little city from which
the Territory derives its name. Beyond the British frontier lies a
country in which the British Government may, if it sees fit, "erect
fortifications, station troops, or take any other measures necessary
for defensive purposes at any points on or near the coast of the region
east of the meridian 121° 40' E. of Greenwich." The British "sphere of
influence" may thus be said to extend from about half-way to Chefoo on
the west to the Shantung Promontory on the east: but Great Britain has
had no necessity for the practical exercise of her rights in that wide
region.
Of the general appearance of the Territory and its neighbourhood
something has been said in the second chapter. Hills are very numerous
though not of great altitude, the loftiest being only about 1,700 feet
high. A short distance beyond the frontier one or two of the mountains
are more imposing, especially the temple-crowned Ku-yü hills to the
south-west, which are over 3,000 feet in height.[53] There are about
three hundred and fifteen villages in the leased Territory under direct
British rule; of these none would be described as a large village
in England, and many are mere hamlets, but they have been estimated
to contain an aggregate population of 150,000. Considering that
agriculture is the occupation of all but a small portion of the people,
and that large areas in the Territory are wholly unfit for cultivation,
this population must be regarded as very large, and its size can only
be explained by the extreme frugality of the people and the almost
total absence of a leisured or parasitic class.
The Weihaiwei Convention was signed in July 1898. For the first
few years the place was controlled by various naval and military
authorities, of whom one was Major-General Sir A. Dorward, K.C.B.,
but it can hardly be said to have been administered during that time,
for the whole Territory beyond Liukungtao and the little mainland
settlement of Ma-t'ou (now Port Edward) was almost entirely left to
its own devices. The temporary appointment of civil officers lent by
the Foreign and Colonial Offices led to the gradual extension and
consolidation of civil government throughout the Territory. One of
these officers was the late Mr. G. T. Hare of the Straits Settlements
Government, and another--whose excellent work is still held in
remembrance by the people--was Mr. S. Barton, of the British Consular
Service in China. The appointment of Mr. R. Walter[54] as Secretary
to Government shortly preceded that of Mr. (now Sir) J. H. Stewart
Lockhart, Colonial Secretary of Hongkong, as first civil Commissioner.
By this year (1902) Weihaiwei had been placed under the direct
control of the Colonial Office, since which time it has occupied a
position practically identical with that of a British Crown Colony,
though (owing to technical considerations) its official designation is
not Colony but Territory. The Commissioner is the head of the Local
Government, and is therefore subject only to the control of His Majesty
exercised through the Secretary of State for the Colonies. His official
rank corresponds with that of a Lieutenant-Governor: that is to say,
he receives (while in office at Weihaiwei) a salute of fifteen guns
as compared with the seventeen of a first-class Crown-colony Governor
(such as the Governors of Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, Ceylon
and Jamaica), or the nine accorded to a British Consul in office. His
actual powers, though exercised in a more limited sphere, are greater
than those of most Crown-colony Governors, for he is not controlled by
a Council.
As in Gibraltar and St. Helena, laws in Weihaiwei are enacted by
the head of the executive alone, not--as the phrase usually runs
elsewhere--"with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council."
The Order-in-Council indicates, of course, on what lines legislation
may take place, and all laws (called Ordinances) must receive the Royal
assent, or rather, to put it more accurately, His Majesty is advised by
the Secretary of State "not to exercise his powers of disallowance."
This is in accordance with the usual Colonial procedure. In practice,
as we saw in the first chapter, it has been found unnecessary to enact
more than a very small number of Ordinances for Weihaiwei. The people
are governed in accordance with their own immemorial customs, and it
is only when the fact of British occupation introduces some new set of
conditions for which local custom does not provide, that legislation
becomes necessary. The legal adviser to the local Government is _ex
officio_ the Crown Advocate at Shanghai, and he it is who, when
necessary, drafts the legal measures to be promulgated in the name of
the Commissioner. Such measures are generally copied from or closely
modelled on laws already in force in England or in the Colony of
Hongkong.
[Illustration: _Photo by Ah Fong._
THE HARBOUR WITH BRITISH WARSHIPS, FROM LIUKUNGTAO (see p. 81).]
The China Squadron of the British Fleet visits the port every summer.
The fact that Weihaiwei is under British rule gives the Naval
commander-in-chief perfect freedom to carry out target-practice or
other exercises ashore and afloat under highly favourable conditions.
But the greatest advantage that Weihaiwei possesses--from the naval as
from the civilian point of view--is its good climate. It is perhaps not
so superlatively excellent as some writers, official and other, have
made out: but none will deny that the climate is "a white man's," and
most will agree that it is, on the whole, the finest on the coast of
China.
The rainfall is not, on the average, much greater or much less than
that of England, though it is much less evenly distributed than in
our own country. This is perhaps an advantage; there is no doubt that
the average year in Weihaiwei contains a greater number of "fine
days"--that is, days when the sun shines and no rain falls--than the
average year in England. The other side of the shield shows us droughts
and floods; how frequent and how destructive are these calamities may
have been gathered from statements made in the last chapter. The winter
is much colder and the summer much warmer than is usually the case in
England: in addition to which both cold and heat are more steady and
continuous. But there are not the same extremes that are met with in
Peking and other inland places. The temperature in winter has been
known to fall to zero, but the average minimum may be put at about
6° (F.). The snowfall is not great and the roads are rarely blocked.
Skating, owing to the lack of rivers and lakes, can only be indulged in
to a minute extent.
The winter north winds are intensely cold: even the Chinese go about
muffled up to the ears in furs. The autumn months--September to
November--are the most delightful of the year. The heat and rains of
summer have passed away and the weather at this period is equal to
that of a superb English summer and early autumn. The spring months
are often delightful: but this is the season of those almost incessant
high winds that constitute one of the chief blemishes of the Weihaiwei
climate. Yet they are as nothing compared with the terrible dust-storms
of the Chihli plains, such as make the European resident in Peking
wish himself anywhere else. July and August are the months of rain,
damp, and heat: yet the temperature rarely goes higher than 94° (F.),
and the summer climate is much less trying than that of Hongkong or
of Shanghai. It is during those two months, indeed, that Weihaiwei
receives most of its European summer visitors from the southern ports.
When the British Squadron and the European visitors leave Weihaiwei in
or about the month of September, the place is left to its own resources
until the month of May or June in the following year. From the social
point of view Weihaiwei suffered severely from the disbandment of the
well-known Chinese Regiment, the British officers of which did much to
cheer the monotony of the winter months. A pack of harriers was kept by
the Regiment, and hunting was indulged in two days a week during that
period. From November, when the last crops were taken off the fields,
and cross-country riding became possible, until the end of March,
when the new crops began to come up and confined equestrians to the
roads, hunting the hare was the favourite recreation of the British
community. The Regiment itself, after undergoing many vicissitudes,
was disbanded in 1906. During its short career of about seven years
it proved--if indeed a proof were needed, after the achievements of
General Gordon--that the Chinese, properly treated and well trained and
led, could make first-rate soldiers.
The appearance of the rank and file of the Chinese Regiment on parade
was exceptionally good, and never failed to excite admiration on the
part of European visitors; but their soldierly qualities were not
tested only in the piping times of peace. They did good service in
promptly suppressing an attempted rising in the leased Territory, and
on being sent to the front to take part in the operations against the
Boxers in 1900 they behaved exceedingly well both during the attack on
Tientsin, and on the march to Peking. Among the officers who led them
on those occasions were Colonel Bower, Major Bruce, Captain Watson and
Captain Barnes.[55]
At its greatest strength the Regiment numbered thirteen hundred
officers and men, but before the order for disbandment went forth
the numbers had been reduced to about six hundred. With the Chinese
Regiment disappeared Weihaiwei's only garrison. A few picked men
were retained as a permanent police force, and three European
non-commissioned officers were provided with appointments on the
civil establishment as police inspectors. These men, in addition to
an already-existing body of eight Chinese on Liukungtao and twelve in
the European settlement at Port Edward, constitute the present (1910)
Police Force of the Territory, which now numbers altogether fifty-five
Chinese constables and three inspectors.
Weihaiwei, then, is entirely destitute of troops and of fortifications,
and in the long months of winter--when there is not so much as a
torpedo-boat in the harbour--the place is practically at the mercy
of any band of robbers that happened to regard it with a covetous
eye. This state of things cannot be regarded as ideally good: yet--to
touch upon a matter that might once have been regarded as bearing on
politics, but is now a mere matter of history--it may be admitted that
from the imperial point of view the abolition of the Chinese Regiment
was a wise step. This view is not shared by most Englishmen in China:
and as for the British officers, who had given several of the best
years of their lives to the training of that regiment, and had learned
to take in it a most justifiable pride, one can easily understand how
bitter must have been their feelings of dismay and disappointment when
they heard of the War Office's decision. Similar feelings, perhaps, may
have agitated the mind of the "First Emperor" when the beautiful bridge
to Fairyland, on which he had spent so much time and energy, began to
crumble away before his sorrowing eyes. The position of the Chinese
Regiment was not analogous to that of the native troops in India and in
our other large imperial possessions. Its very existence was anomalous.
The great majority of its men were recruited not in British but in
Chinese territory,[56] and as their employment against a European enemy
of Great Britain was scarcely conceivable, their only function could
have been to fight against their own countrymen or other Orientals.
To persuade them to fight against China would necessarily have
become more and more difficult as the Chinese Empire proceeded in
the direction of reform and enlightenment. The Boxers, indeed, were
theoretically regarded as rebels against China, so that Chinese troops
in British pay could fight them with a clear conscience, believing
or pretending to believe that they were fighting for the cause of
their own Emperor as well as (incidentally) that of Great Britain.
But the Regiment outlived the Boxer movement by several years, and
the maintenance of a considerable body of troops (at an annual cost
to the British taxpayer of something like £30,000) with a sole view
to the possibility of a similar rising at some uncertain date in the
future was hardly consistent with British common sense. Moreover, its
position in the event of an outbreak of regular warfare between England
and China would have been peculiar in the extreme, inasmuch as the
men had never been required, under the recruiting system, to abjure
their allegiance to the Chinese Emperor. They were, in fact, Chinese
subjects, not British. Even over the inhabitants of Weihaiwei, from
whom a small proportion of the men was drawn, the Emperor of China
retains theoretical sovereignty. This has been expressly admitted by
the British Government, which has declared that as Weihaiwei is only a
"leased territory," its people, though under direct British rule, are
not in the strictly legal sense "British subjects."[57]
The officers of the Regiment would no doubt have denied that the
loyalty of the men to their British leaders was ever likely to fall
under suspicion, but the fact remains that in the event of an outbreak
of regular warfare between China and Great Britain the Chinese
authorities might, and probably would, have done their utmost to induce
the men of the Regiment to desert their colours and take service
with their own countrymen. Many methods of inducement could have
been employed, over and above the obvious one of bribery. It is only
necessary to mention one that would have been terribly forcible--the
imprisonment of the fathers or other senior relatives of the men who
refused to leave the British service, and the confiscation of their
ancestral lands. The men who deserted, in these circumstances, would
not, perhaps, feel that they had much to reproach themselves with. They
had taken service under the British flag: but did that entitle them to
become traitors to their own country, and to violate the sacred bonds
of filial piety? Even if the Chinese soldier in British employment
had been formally absolved from all allegiance to his own sovereign
it would have been unreasonable to expect him to evolve a spirit of
loyalty to a European monarch of whose existence he had but the vaguest
idea, and to whom he was bound by no ties of sentiment.
But it may be urged that new conditions of service might have been
devised, under which the men of the Chinese Regiment would have been
exempted from the obligation of fighting against their own countrymen.
Against whom, then, could they have fought? They might possibly have
been led against the Japanese, but no one ever supposed for a moment
that they were being trained with a view to action against a Power with
whom Great Britain will probably be the last to quarrel: and in any
case they would have been too few in number to be of effective service
on the field, and by their inability to take an appropriate place among
the other units they might even have been a source of embarrassment.
As for the assistance they might have rendered in the event of an
attack on Weihaiwei by any European Power, it is only necessary to
point out that an infantry regiment would have been totally powerless
to prevent the shelling of Weihaiwei by a naval force, and that if the
British fleet had lost command of the sea, not only the entire Chinese
regiment (or what remained of it after desertions had taken place), but
Weihaiwei itself and all that it contained would have speedily become
prizes of war to the first hostile cruiser that entered the harbour.
It may be said, in conclusion of this topic, that if the British
Government had taken the cynical view that China was doomed to remain
in a chronic state of administrative inefficiency and national
helplessness, it would no doubt have been fully justified, from its own
standpoint, in maintaining the Regiment. That it decided on disbandment
may be regarded as welcome evidence that Great Britain did not, in
1906, take an entirely pessimistic view of China's future.
That the complete withdrawal of all troops was followed by no shadow
of disorder among the people and no increase of crime, strikingly
refutes the argument, sometimes advanced, that the real justification
of the existence of the Regiment was the necessity of relying on a
local armed force for the maintenance of British rule and prestige,
which would otherwise have been outraged or treated with open contempt.
No doubt the Regiment fulfilled a most useful function in suppressing
or preventing disorder and in helping to consolidate British rule
during the eventful year of 1900: and it may very well be that the
people of the Territory then learned the futility of resistance to the
British occupation. But it may be stated with emphasis that since the
disbandment of the Regiment the people--perhaps from a knowledge of the
fact that British troops and warships though not stationed at Weihaiwei
are never very far away--have given no sign whatever of insubordination
or restlessness.[58]
So far from crime and lawlessness having increased since that time,
they have shown a distinct tendency to diminish, while no trouble
whatever has arisen with the Chinese beyond our frontier. The
significance of this will be realised by those who know how easily the
official classes in China can, by secret and powerful means, foster or
stir up a general feeling of antagonism to foreigners.
Perhaps it may not be out of place to mention here that the relations
between the British officials of Weihaiwei and the Chinese officials
of the neighbourhood have always been intimate and friendly: much more
intimate, indeed, than those normally existing between the Government
of Hongkong and the magistrates and prefects of the neighbouring
regions of Kuangtung. The result is that through the medium of informal
or semi-official correspondence, and by personal visits, a great deal
of business is satisfactorily carried through without "fuss" or waste
of time, and that frontier-matters which might conceivably grow into
difficult international questions requiring diplomatic intervention,
are quickly and easily settled on the spot.
But it must be remembered that these friendly relations might at any
time be interrupted by the Chinese officials if they were to receive a
hint from the provincial capital or from Peking that the position of
Great Britain was to be made difficult and unpleasant. One important
reason why the people of Weihaiwei acquiesce with a good grace in
British rule is their vague belief that we are in Weihaiwei at the
request and with the thorough goodwill of the Chinese Government, and
are in some way carrying out the august wishes of the Emperor. They
still speak of us as the foreigners or "ocean men," and of China as _Ta
Kuo_, the Great Country. When they erect stone monuments, after the
well-known Chinese practice, to the memory of virtuous widows and other
good women, they still surmount the tablet with the words _Shêng Chih_,
"By decree of the Emperor." There is not the faintest vestige of a
feeling of loyalty to the British sovereign, even among those who would
be sorry to see us go away. Most of the people have but the haziest
idea of where England is; some think it is "in Shanghai" or "somewhere
near Hongkong"; others, perhaps from some confused recollection of the
dark-skinned British troops who took part in the operations of 1900,
suppose that Great Britain and India are interchangeable terms.
I have been asked by one of our village headmen (in perfect good faith)
whether England were governed by a _tsung-tu_ (governor-general) or
by a _kuo-wang_ (king of a minor state)--the implication in either
case being that England was far inferior in status to China. Thus
arises among the people the notion that their own Emperor has for
some mysterious reason, best known to himself, temporarily entrusted
the administration of Weihaiwei to some English officials, and will
doubtless decide in his own good time when this arrangement is to be
rescinded. The notion does not, indeed, attain this definiteness, and
the majority of the people well know from actual experience that no
Chinese official, however exalted, has a shadow of direct authority in
Weihaiwei at the present time; but any attempt to persuade them that
the Emperor could not, if he willed, cause the immediate departure of
the foreigners would probably be a miserable failure. The long and
short of the matter is that the Chinese of Weihaiwei acquiesce in
British rule because their sovereign, as represented by the Governor
of Shantung, shows them the example of acquiescence; but if diplomatic
troubles were to arise between Great Britain and China, and the
command, direct or indirect, were to go forth from the Governor that
the British in Weihaiwei were no longer to be treated with respect, a
few days or weeks would be sufficient to bring about a startling change
in the direction of anti-foreign feeling among the inhabitants of the
leased Territory.
Incessant troubles, also, would suddenly and mysteriously arise
on the frontier; the magistrates of the neighbouring districts,
notwithstanding all their past friendliness, would become distant and
unsympathetic; difficulties internal and external would become so
serious and incessant that it would be no longer possible to administer
the Territory without the presence of an armed force. In the absence
of a local garrison the Government would be compelled to requisition
the services of the ever-ready British marines and bluejackets; and
His Excellency the Vice-Admiral, obliged to detach some of the vessels
of his squadron for special service at Weihaiwei, might begin ruefully
to wonder whether, after all, Weihaiwei was worth the trouble of
maintenance.
This is a picture of gloomy possibilities which, it is to be hoped,
will never be realised so long as the British occupation of Weihaiwei
subsists. Unfortunately, diplomatic difficulties are not the only
possible causes of trouble. If eastern Shantung were afflicted with
long-continued drought and consequent famine--not an uncommon event--or
if it were visited by some of those lawless bands of ruffians, too
numerous in China, who combine the business of robbery and murder with
that of preaching the gospel of revolution, the position of Weihaiwei
would not be enviable. And parts of China, be it remembered, are
in such a condition at present that almost any day may witness the
outbreak of violent disorder. A small band of hungry and desperate
armed men with a daring leader, a carefully-prepared plan and a good
system of espionage--were it not for the Boy Scouts of the Weihaiwei
School, who are fortunately still with us!--descend upon Port Edward,
glut themselves with booty, and be in a safe hiding-place beyond the
British frontier before noon the next day. Much more easily could
any village or group of villages be ransacked and looted, and its
inhabitants killed or dispersed: and the local Government, except by
summoning extra assistance, would be powerless under present conditions
to take any vigorous action.
Trouble of this kind is much more likely to come from the Chinese of
some distant locality than from the people of the Territory itself. In
one very important respect the British have been highly favoured by
fortune. It happens that harvests in Weihaiwei for several years past
have been on the whole very good, and the people are correspondingly
prosperous. There has not been a really bad year since British rule
began; moreover certain agricultural developments (especially the
cultivation on a large scale of ground-nuts intended for export) have
been beneficial to the soil itself, and are a steadily-increasing
source of wealth to the farmers. With the loose conceptions of cause
and effect common to most peasant-folk, many of the villagers believe
that the good harvests and general prosperity are somehow due to the
"luck" of their alien rulers, of which they derive the benefit. The
gods and spirits of the land, they imagine, must be satisfied with the
presence of the British: is it not obvious that they would otherwise
show their discontent by bringing a blight on the fields or sending a
plague of insects?
Such is the popular argument, indefinitely felt rather than definitely
expressed; and there is no doubt that it has had some effect in
inducing a feeling of contentment with British rule. I have also heard
it remarked by the people that since the coming of the English the
villages have ceased to be decimated by the deadly epidemics that
once visited them. A sage old farmer whom I asked for an explanation
of the recent remarkable increase in the value of agricultural land
explained it as due to the fact that the British Government had
vaccinated all the children. This prevented half the members of each
family from dying of smallpox, as had formerly been the case, and
there was naturally an increased demand for land to supply food for a
greater number of mouths! The medical work carried out by Government is
doubtless of great value; but the reduced mortality among the people is
probably chiefly due to the succession of good harvests, the increased
facilities for trade, and the consequent improvement in the general
conditions of life. A few successive years of bad crops may, it is
to be feared, not only reduce the people to extreme poverty--for as
a rule the land represents their only capital--but will also produce
the epidemics that inevitably follow in the wake of famine. That such
disasters may be expected from time to time in the natural course of
events the reader will have gathered from the lists of notable local
events given in the last chapter. When they come, the people's faith
in the fortune-controlling capacities of the foreigners may then suffer
a painful shock, and the results may not be unattended by something
like disaffection towards their alien rulers.
At the beginning of British rule in Weihaiwei many wild rumours passed
current among certain sections of the people with reference to the
intentions and practices of the foreigners. One such rumour was to
the effect that the English wanted all the land for settlers of their
own race and were going to remove the existing population by the
simple expedient of poisoning all the village wells. In a few cases
it was believed that the Government had actually succeeded in hiring
natives to carry out this systematic murder; whereupon the villagers
principally affected, growing wild with panic, seized and tortured
the unhappy men whom they suspected of having taken British pay for
this nefarious purpose. One man at least was buried alive and another
was drowned. These cases did not come to the knowledge of the British
authorities for some years afterwards, long after the well-poisoning
story had ceased to be credited even by the most ignorant. One of
them I discovered by chance as lately as the summer of 1909, though
the incident occurred nine years earlier. An unlucky man who for some
unknown reason was understood to be a secret emissary of the foreigners
was seized by the infuriated villagers and drowned in the well which he
was said to have poisoned. The well was then filled up with earth and
stones and abandoned. The poor man's wife was sold by the ringleaders
to some one who wanted a concubine, for a sum equivalent to about ten
pounds.
No doubt the many horrible stories that were circulated about the
foreigners were deliberately invented by people who, whether from some
feeling akin to patriotism or from more selfish motives, were intensely
anxious to arouse popular feeling against their alien rulers. Their
plan failed, for popular fury was directed less against the English
than against those of their own countrymen whom the English were
supposed to have bribed.
It may be said that on the whole the chief fear of the people in
the early days of British administration was not that they or their
families would be slaughtered or dispossessed of their property,
or personally ill-treated, but that they would be overtaxed; and
the disturbances which arose at the time of the delimitation of the
frontier in 1899 and 1900 were in part traceable to wild rumours as to
the means to be adopted by the foreigners for the raising of revenue.
It was thought, for example, that taxes were to be imposed on farmyard
fowls. Taxation has been increased, as a matter of fact, under British
rule. The land-tax (the principal source of revenue) has been doubled,
and licence-fees and dues of various kinds have had the natural result
of raising the price of certain commodities. But these unattractive
features of British rule are on the whole counterbalanced, in the
opinion of the majority of the people, by comparative (though by no
means absolute) freedom from the petty extortions practised by official
underlings in China, by the gradual development of a fairly brisk local
trade, by the influx of money spent in the port by British sailors, by
the facilities given by British merchant ships for the cheap and safe
export of local produce, and by the useful public works undertaken by
Government for direct public benefit.
The amount spent on public improvements is indeed minute compared with
the enormous sums devoted to these purposes in Hongkong, Singapore,
and Kiaochou, yet it forms a respectable proportion of the small local
revenue. That the construction of metalled roads, in particular,
is heartily welcomed throughout the Territory is proved by three
significant facts: in the first place the owners of arable land through
which the new roads pass hardly ever make any demand for pecuniary
compensation, unless they happen to be almost desperately poor;
in the second place, wheeled traffic, which a few years ago would
have been a ludicrous impossibility in any part of the Territory, is
rapidly becoming common; and in the third place the people, on their
own initiative, are extending the road-system in various localities at
their own expense. It may seem almost incredible that, in one case at
least, certain houses that obstructed traffic in a new village road
were voluntarily pulled down by their owners and built further back:
yet not only did they receive no compensation from Government, but
they did not even trouble to report what they had done. Very recently
a petition was received praying the Weihaiwei Government to urge
the Government of Shantung to extend the Weihaiwei road-system into
Chinese territory, especially to the extent of enabling cart traffic
to be opened up between the port of Weihaiwei and the neighbouring
district-cities of Jung-ch'êng, Wên-têng and Ning-hai. The Shantung
Government has been addressed on the subject by the Commissioner of
Weihaiwei, and the Governor has smiled upon the project; though as he
has since been transferred to another province it is doubtful whether
anything will be done in the matter at present. So long as Weihaiwei
remains in British hands the Provincial Government, naturally enough,
has no desire to extend the trade facilities of that port to the
possible disadvantage of the Chinese port of Chefoo.
On the whole, the more intelligent members of the native community in
Weihaiwei may be said to be fully conscious of the advantages directly
and indirectly conferred upon them by British rule, though this is far
from implying that they wish that rule to be continued indefinitely.
Some of them are even aware of the fact that they owe many of those
advantages to a philanthropist whom they have never seen--the
uncomplaining (or complaining) British taxpayer. The Territory is, in
fact, so far from being self-supporting that a subsidy of several
thousands of pounds from the British Exchequer is required to meet the
annual deficit in the local budget.[59] The Government is conducted on
extremely economical lines, indeed expenditure has been cut down to
the point of parsimony, yet it is as well to remember that from the
point of view of local resources the administration is costly in the
extreme. A large increase of trade would no doubt soon enable the local
Government to balance its books without assistance from England, but
there are no indications at present that such an expansion is likely to
take place.
British colonial methods do not, as a rule, tolerate a lavish
expenditure on salaries or on needless multiplication of official
posts. In these respects Weihaiwei is not exceptional. There are less
than a dozen Europeans of all grades on the civil establishment, and
of these only four exercise executive or magisterial authority. Since
1906 the whole Territory has been divided for administrative purposes
into twenty-six districts: over each district, which contains on the
average about a dozen villages, presides a native District Headman
(_Tsung-tung_) whose chief duties are to supervise the collection of
the land-tax, to distribute to the separate Village Headmen copies
of all notices and proclamations issued by Government, to distribute
deed-forms to purchasers and sellers of real property, and to use his
influence generally in the interests of peace and good order and in the
discouragement of litigation. For these services he is granted only
five (Mexican) dollars a month from Government, but he is also allowed
a small percentage on the sale of Government deed-forms (for which a
fee is charged) and receives in less regular ways occasional presents,
consisting chiefly of food-stuffs, of which the Government takes no
notice unless it appears that he is using his position as a means of
livelihood or for purposes of extortion.
The land-tax is based on the old land-registers handed over by the
Chinese magistrates of Wên-têng and Jung-ch'êng, and as they had been
badly kept up, or rather not kept up at all, for some scores of years
previously, the present relations between the land under cultivation
and the land subject to taxation are extremely indefinite. It is but
very rarely that a man can point to his land-tax receipts as proof
that he owns or has long cultivated any disputed area. Only by making
a cadastral survey of the whole Territory would it be possible to
place the land-tax system on a proper basis. At present the tax is in
practice (with certain exceptions) levied on each village as a whole
rather than on individual families. For many years past every village
has paid through its headman or committee of headmen a certain sum of
money which by courtesy is called land-tax. How that amount is assessed
among the various families is a matter which the people decide for
themselves, on the general understanding that no one should be called
upon to pay more than his ancestors paid before him unless the family
property has been considerably increased.
The Chinese Government did not and the British Government does not
make any close enquiries as to whether each cultivator pays his proper
proportion or whether a certain man is paying too much or is paying
nothing at all. It is undoubtedly true that a great deal of new land
has been brought under cultivation since the Chinese land-tax registers
were last revised, and that the cultivators are guilty of technical
offences in not reporting such land to Government and getting it duly
measured and valued for the assessment of land-tax: but these are
offences which have been condoned by the Chinese authorities in this
part of China for many years past, and it would be unjust or at least
inexpedient for the British Government to show greater severity in
such matters than is shown on the Chinese side of the frontier. The
British Government has, indeed, by a stroke of the pen doubled the
land-tax, that is, it takes twice as much from each village as it did
six years ago, so it may at least congratulate itself on deriving
a larger revenue from this source than used to come to the net of
Chinese officialdom. The total amount of the doubled tax only amounts
to about $24,000 (Mex.) a year, which is equivalent to not much more
than £2,000 sterling. The whole of this is brought to the coffers of
the Government without the aid of a single tax-collector and without
the expenditure of a dollar. In the autumn of each year proclamations
are issued stating the current rate of exchange as between the local
currency and the Mexican dollar and announcing that the land-tax will
be received, calculated according to that rate, upon certain specified
days. The money is brought to the Government offices at Port Edward by
the headmen, receipts are issued, and the matter is at an end until the
following year. Litigation regarding land-tax payments is exceedingly
rare and the whole system works without a hitch.
For administrative and magisterial purposes the Territory is divided
into two Divisions, a North and a South. The North Division contains
only nine of the twenty-six Districts, and is much smaller in both
area and population than the South, but it includes the island of
Liukung and the settlement of Port Edward. Its southern limits[60]
extend from a point south of the village of Shuang-tao on the west to
a short distance south of Ch'ang-fêng on the east. A glance at the
map will show that it comprises the narrower or peninsular portion
of the Territory. The headquarters of this Division are at Port
Edward, where is also situated the office of the Commissioner. The
North Division is under the charge of the North Division Magistrate,
who is also Secretary to Government and holds a dormant commission
to administer the government of the Territory in the Commissioner's
absence. The South Division comprises all the rest of the leased
Territory, including seventeen out of the twenty-six Districts, and is
presided over by the South Division Magistrate, who is also District
Officer. His headquarters are at Wen-ch'üan-t'ang[61] or Hot Springs, a
picturesque locality near the old boundary-line between the Jung-ch'êng
and Wên-têng districts and centrally situated with regard to the
southern portion of the leased Territory. Separate courts, independent
of one another and co-ordinate in powers, are held by the North and
South Division Magistrates at their respective headquarters.
The District Officer controls a diminutive police force of a sergeant
and seven men, all Chinese. His clerks, detectives and other persons
connected with his staff, are also Chinese. Besides the District
Officer himself there is no European Government servant resident in
the South Division, which contains 231 out of the 315 villages of the
Territory and a population estimated at 100,000. The whole of the land
frontier, nearly forty miles long, lies within this Division.
Under the Commissioner, the Secretary to Government and Magistrate
(North Division), and the District Officer and Magistrate (South
Division), are the executive and judicial officers of the Government.
There is also an Assistant Magistrate, who has temporarily acted
as District Officer, and who, besides discharging magisterial work
from time to time, carries out various departmental duties in the
North Division. The functions of the North and South Division
Magistrates are quite as miscellaneous as are those of the prefects
and district-magistrates--the "father-and-mother" officials--of China.
There are no posts in the civil services of the sister-colonies of
Hongkong and Singapore which are in all respects analogous to those
held by these officers; but on the whole a Weihaiwei magistrate may be
regarded as combining the duties of Registrar-General (Protector of
Chinese), Puisne Judge, Police Magistrate and Captain-Superintendent
of Police. Most of the time of the Magistrates is, unfortunately,
spent in the courts. Serious crime, indeed, is rare in Weihaiwei.
There has not been a single case of murder in the Territory for seven
years or more, and most of the piracies and burglaries have been
committed by unwelcome visitors from the Chinese side of the frontier.
But the Weihaiwei magistrates do not deal merely with criminal and
police cases. They also exercise unlimited civil jurisdiction; and as
litigation in Weihaiwei has shown a steady increase with every year of
British administration, their duties in this respect are by no means
light.
Beyond the Magisterial courts there are no other courts regularly
sitting. There is indeed a nebulous body named in the Order-in-Council
"His Majesty's High Court of Weihaiwei," but this Court very rarely
sits. It consists of the Commissioner and a Judge, or of either
Commissioner or Judge sitting separately. The Assistant Judge of the
British Supreme Court at Shanghai is _ex officio_ Judge of the High
Court of Weihaiwei; but the total number of occasions on which his
services have been requisitioned in connection with both civil and
criminal cases during the last five or six years--that is, since his
appointment--is less than ten. The Commissioner, sitting alone as High
Court, has in a few instances imposed sentences in the case of offences
"punishable with penal servitude for seven years or upwards,"[62] and
the Judge has on three or four occasions visited Weihaiwei for the
purpose of trying cases of manslaughter. The civil cases tried by the
High Court--whether represented by Commissioner or by Judge--number
only two, though the civil cases on which judgment is given in
Weihaiwei (by the magistrates acting judicially) number from one
thousand upwards in a year.
This curious state of things is primarily due to the fact that
Weihaiwei, with its slender resources, cannot afford to support a
resident judge, and has therefore to content itself with the help,
in very exceptional circumstances, of one of the judges of a court
situated hundreds of miles away; but the existing conditions, whereby
the magistrates perform the work of judges, are legally sanctioned by a
clause in the Order-in-Council, which lays it down that "the whole or
any part of the jurisdiction and authority of the High Court for or in
respect of any district may, subject to the provisions of this Order,
and of any Ordinance made thereunder, be exercised by the magistrate
(if any) appointed to act for that district and being therein."[63]
The rights of the High Court are safeguarded by the declaration that
it "shall have concurrent jurisdiction in every such district, and may
order any case, civil or criminal, pending before a magistrate, to be
removed into the High Court."[64] In practice, it may be said, all
criminal cases except the most serious, and all civil cases of any and
every kind, are tried in Weihaiwei by the magistrates of the North and
South Divisions, acting either as magistrates merely, or as judges with
the delegated powers of the High Court.
[Illustration: DISTRICT OFFICER'S QUARTERS (see p. 100).]
[Illustration: THE COURT-HOUSE, WÊN-CH'ÜAN-T'ANG (see p. 98).]
The Court of Appeal from the High Court of Weihaiwei (and therefore
from the magistrates acting as High Court) is the Supreme Court of
Hongkong. This arrangement has been in force since the promulgation of
the Weihaiwei Order-in-Council in July 1901; yet during nine subsequent
years not a single appeal has been made. This is due to three main
causes: firstly, there are in Weihaiwei neither barristers nor
solicitors by whom litigants might be advised to appeal. Every party to
a suit appears in court in his own person, and states his case either
orally or by means of written pleadings called Petitions. If he loses
his case the matter is at an end unless he can show just cause why a
re-hearing should be granted. Secondly, the legal costs of an appeal to
a Hongkong court would be prohibitive for all but a minute fraction of
the people of Weihaiwei. It is questionable whether, outside Liukungtao
and Port Edward, there are more than a dozen families that would not
be totally ruined if called upon to pay the costs of such an appeal.
Thirdly, there are probably not twenty Chinese in the Territory who are
aware that an appeal is possible.
Apart from the magistrates, there are very few Europeans employed
under the Government of Weihaiwei. There is a Financial Assistant, who
also (somewhat incongruously) supervises the construction of roads
and other public works and the planting of trees; and there are, as
already mentioned, three Inspectors of Police. These officers (with the
exception of one Inspector stationed at Liukungtao) all reside at Port
Edward. Finally there are two Medical Officers, of whom one resides on
the Island, the other on the Mainland. Such is the European section of
the Civil Service of Weihaiwei,--a little body of sober and industrious
persons who, like the members of similar services elsewhere, are
frequent grumblers, who always consider themselves ill-used and their
services under-estimated, but who will generally admit, if pressed,
that the British flag floats over many corners of the earth less
attractive and less desirable than Weihaiwei.
FOOTNOTES:
[52] See p. 29.
[53] Ku-yü Shan is the northern peak of the Ta K'un-yü hills, 40 _li_
south-east of Ning-hai city. The highest peak is Ta Pei Ting (the
"Great Pity Peak") or Ta Pai Ting (the "Great White Peak"). There are
many temples and hermitages, some of unknown antiquity, others dating
from the last decade of the ninth century A.D. There are also tablets
and inscriptions of the Han dynasty (ending 220 A.D.).
[54] Formerly of the Federated Malay States Civil Service.
[55] Captain (now Lieut.-Col.) Barnes has written a book entitled _On
Active Service with the Chinese Regiment_, which should be consulted by
those interested in the subject.
[56] On the eve of disbandment, when the Regiment was some six hundred
strong, only forty men were natives of the leased Territory.
[57] It follows that when they go abroad they have no right to the
support of British consuls, though they have often claimed it and have
sometimes been granted it through the courtesy of the consul concerned.
[58] As one reason for this it should be noted that the people still
hold in vivid remembrance the Japanese march through their villages
and fields in 1895. They have had some practical experience of modern
warfare, and they are not anxious for more.
[59] For details of revenue and expenditure, as well as trade returns
and other statistics, the reader is referred to the _Colonial Office
List_ (published yearly by authority) and to the local Government's
Reports which are printed annually and presented to both Houses of
Parliament.
[60] See the blue line in map.
[61] See pp. 53, 54, 70, 400.
[62] See _Weihaiwei Order-in-Council_, Clause 21 (3).
[63] See _Weihaiwei Order-in-Council_, Clause 18.
[64] _Ibid._, Clause 18 (1).