CHAPTER XVI

LOSS OF THE LITTLE SLOOP _ARGUS_

SHE WAS CAPTURED BY THE _PELICAN_, A VESSEL THAT WAS OF SLIGHTLY

SUPERIOR FORCE--A CLEAN VICTORY FOR THE BRITISH, BUT ONE THAT IN NO

WAY DISHEARTENS THE FIERCEST OF THE AMERICAN PATRIOTS--ILL-LUCK OF

“THE WAGGON.”

The story of the American Navy during the first eighteen months of the

War of 1812 is by no means completed. There were battles which, in

spite of the fact that only small forces were involved, were really no

less significant in demonstrating the character of the sea-power of the

new American nation than were the great victories already described.

There was at least one defeat that was in one way most significant. And

there were other events that were matters of consideration then and are

now.

For instance there was the act of the Congress on January 2,

1813, when it was ordered that the Navy be increased by four

ships-of-the-line (rating at seventy-four guns), six frigates to rate

with the _Constitution_, and six sloops to rate with the _Hornet_,

that eventually thrashed the _Peacock_ so effectually. Tremendous,

comparatively speaking, as was this addition to the naval strength of

the nation, the real significance of the act was found in the change

of spirit in the national administration and legislature. For it was

but five months to the day since Captain Hull had sailed from Boston

_contrary to orders_ that were en route--had sailed on the cruise that

ended with the destruction of the boastful _Guerrière_. It was on

August 2, 1812, that the _Constitution_ sailed, and at that time the

Administration at Washington fully believed that to allow an American

frigate to go to sea was to insure that she would be captured and added

to the British Navy, and so, like the pusillanimous French Government

of the day, it preferred seeing the ships rot to taking the chances of

battle. But the magnificent courage and skill of the American naval

seaman, in spite of the pusillanimity of the politicians in power--in

spite of the fact that they received but half-hearted support from the

nation as a whole--had, in five months, shot under water the porcupine

policy in naval affairs and replaced the eagle on the American

coat-of-arms. And there the eagle remains to this day, albeit he lowers

his head with a tinge of shame when he looks for the gridiron flag

among the merchant fleets of the world.

As the reader will remember, the _United States_ sailed on the cruise

during which she captured the _Macedonian_ with Commodore John Rodgers

of the _President_, the _Congress_ and the _Argus_ being also of the

squadron. The _President_ proved unlucky on that voyage, for she

got nothing. Her hard luck continued in the cruise that followed.

In company with the _Congress_, Captain John Smith, the _President_

sailed from Boston on April 30, 1813. Two days later the little British

sloop-of-war _Curlew_, Captain Michael Head, was seen, but after a

protracted chase the _Curlew_ escaped. A little later the two frigates

separated and the _Congress_ cruised in the South Atlantic all the

summer and part of the fall, and finally returned to Portsmouth, New

Haven, having been at sea two hundred and nineteen days and taken four

merchant-ships. The _President_ cruised first on the Grand Banks, then

near the Azores, and from there sailed to the north and around the

Shetland Islands to the port of Bergen, where she stopped for supplies.

Sailing thence she eventually got back to the Nantucket Shoals on

September 23d. There she fell in with the British schooner _Highflyer_,

and by posing as a British frigate and sending a lieutenant dressed in

a British uniform on board of her, succeeded in getting the book of

private signals and instructions.

Meantime, while off North Cape in company with the American privateer

_Scourge_, Rodgers was chased by two British ships. He said in his

journal that the two were “a line-of-battle ship and a frigate.” The

British say that the two were the thirty-two-gun frigate _Alexandria_

(she carried long twelves for her main battery) and the sloop

_Spitfire_, of about twenty guns. There seems to be no reason for

doubting that Rodgers did make the mistake attributed to him. Others

made mistakes like that, as will appear farther on.

The book captured from the _Highfiyer_ proved valuable in a variety of

ways, but chiefly because it gave the numbers and stations of British

war-ships on the American coast, and so enabled American commanders

to avoid the British squadrons. A private circular from the British

Admiralty ordered the captains of all British war-ships to make special

efforts to capture the _President_.

Just why the British Navy should have felt such great animosity toward

this ship is hard to understand in this day. Certainly she was not

the most formidable of the American ships. In fact she had been so

overloaded with guns that she proved a poor sailer (witness the escape

of the _Belvidera_ and the _Curlew_), and eventually, she was hogged so

that she was captured (as will be told farther on) in a race where the

_Constitution_ would have escaped easily. Nevertheless, the Admiralty,

as said, were especially anxious to capture her, and the animosity of

the British nation against her was so great that even thirty years

after the war was over, the “British Naval Chronicle” still spoke of

her as “the waggon”--a term, by the way, that suggests the naval tar’s

contempt for hay-makers, and recalls the deeds of the Yankee hay-makers

when afloat in the war of the Revolution.

Quite different was the luck of the sloop _Argus_, the smallest of the

ships that sailed with Rodgers in that first Yankee squadron cruise of

the War of 1812. When she returned from that cruise, William H. Allen,

who had gained fame for his part in the capture of the _Macedonian_,

was placed in command of her. The reader will remember that it was

Allen who fired on the _Leopard_ when she attacked the _Chesapeake_ in

time of peace to re-impress some American seamen, carrying a coal from

the galley fire in his naked hand for the purpose for lack of matches.

With this incident in mind to indicate his character, the uninformed

reader will be prepared for the story of his fate which follows.

[Illustration: The _Argus_ Burning British Vessels.

_From an old wood-cut._]

The sailing orders which Allen, who now had the rank of

master-commandant, received, directed him to carry to France Mr.

William H. Crawford, the newly appointed American Minister to that

nation. The _Argus_ sailed on this errand from New York on June 18,

1813, and reached L’Orient twenty-three days later. Having refitted

his ship, Captain Allen emulated the famous deeds of John Paul Jones

and other Revolutionary heroes by sailing boldly into the English

Channel and thence around Land’s End into the Irish Sea. It was a

short but a brilliant cruise. The _Argus_ sailed on July 14, 1813.

Ship after ship was taken, some of them right under the cliffs of the

British coast. Some were sunk and some were burned. A few of the more

valuable were manned and sent to French ports. Indeed, so many prizes

were taken that the crew became worn out with the work. The _Argus_

was at sea but one month and yet twenty ships, valued at $2,500,000,

were taken in that time. Of course all hands had to be on deck, and at

work during every chase, and while each prize was disposed of. They

were far too successful for their own personal welfare. As in the days

when the _Reprisal_, under Captain Lambert Wickes, and the _Surprise_,

under Captain Gustavus Connyngham, so now the British ship-merchants

were filled with dismay and the insurance companies put up the rate

on war-risks to a fabulous per cent. Cruisers were sent hurriedly to

sea in search of the bold Yankee, and the _Argus_ must needs fight or

run very soon. Just one month from the day she sailed, the hour for a

choice between these two courses had arrived.

At 5 o’clock on August 14, 1813, the lookout saw a big British

brig coming down the wind under a full press of canvas. It was the

_Pelican_, Captain John Fordyce Maples. Maples had put into Cork three

days before, and had learned that a Yankee cruiser, of no great force,

was destroying the British coastwise trade, and he at once sailed in

search of the bold offender.

He was enabled to find the _Argus_ by what had seemed to the Americans

a continuance of their good-luck. The _Pelican_ came into view at

5 o’clock in the morning after the crew of the _Argus_ had been up

about all night chasing and destroying a vessel loaded with wine from

Oporto, Portugal. They had destroyed her by setting fire to her, and

the light of the flames had served as a beacon to guide the _Pelican_

to the scene.

Very soon it became apparent that the enemy was one of the largest of

the British war-brigs and therefore more than a match in force for the

American sloop. Captain Allen, in consideration of his position and the

condition of his crew--especially the condition of his crew--would have

been justified in crowding sail and leaving the slower Englishman. But

Allen was not that kind of a man.

The _Argus_ was promptly cleared for action, and the men, though in

many cases drunk with the wine of the captured wine-ship, and in all

cases weary from lack of sleep, took their stations. For an hour the

_Argus_ tacked and filled, trying to get up to windward of the enemy,

but without avail, and so shortened sail and at 6 o’clock wore around

before the wind with her port-guns bearing on the enemy, and at that

moment opened fire at a range of perhaps two hundred yards.

The _Pelican_ replied with a full broadside and at 6.04 A.M. a ball

struck Captain Allen, hurling him across the deck and tore off one leg.

It was a mortal wound, but Allen struggled up till he rested his weight

on his elbow and then continued to direct the battle until, after

four minutes, he fainted from loss of blood and was carried below.

Lieutenant William H. Watson then took command, but four minutes later

he, too, was cut down. A grape-shot struck his head and he was carried

below unconscious. Then came William Howard Allen to take command of

the quarter-deck and carry on the battle.

It had been a losing fight, thus far, and so it continued for the

reason that the British guns were served better than the American. The

rigging of the _Argus_ was already badly cut up. Nevertheless, when the

_Pelican_ strove to wear across the stern of the _Argus_, Lieutenant

Allen luffed up across the bows of the _Pelican_, where at short range

he was able to deliver a raking broadside. But the Yankee crew, instead

of cutting the life out of the enemy, merely fired into the air.

[Illustration: The _Argus_ Captured by the _Pelican_, _August 14, 1813_.

_From an engraving by Sutherland of the painting by Whitcombe._]

Then the after-sails of the unfortunate _Argus_ became unmanageable

because the braces were all shot away, and she swung around before

the wind so that the _Pelican_ was able to pass astern of her at 6.18

P.M. and rake her aft and fore. Holding this position by a skilful use

of her sails, the _Pelican_ fired broadside after broadside into the

helpless Yankee, for fifteen minutes, cutting the stern, the rudder,

and wheel-ropes to pieces, while the Americans could scarcely make a

reply. Then the _Pelican_ filled away and, running ahead, took a

position off the starboard bow of the _Argus_, and there raked her

with a fresh battery for ten minutes more, while the wind drifted the

_Argus_ down until she fell aboard the _Pelican_.

At that the British prepared to board, but the American flag was hauled

down and the fighting ceased.

Looking at the details of the fight from the present time, the most

remarkable fact in connection with it seems to be that the _Argus_

endured the raking fire of her antagonist from 6.18 P.M. until 6.45

P.M., although scarcely able to fire a gun in return. With men who were

either worn out, or drunk, or both, Lieutenant Allen stubbornly endured

the sulphurous and iron storm. That an American crew would do this

after the loss of the captain, and of the executive officer as well,

was a fact that did not escape the notice of the enemy at the time.

However much the report of the affair was exaggerated by the British

writers, the British authorities knew the real facts. It was a defeat,

but the Americans compelled respect even in this, that was, all things

considered, one of the most unfortunate defeats suffered at sea during

the war.

How it was particularly unfortunate appears from a consideration first

of the losses. The _Argus_ sailed with one hundred and thirty-seven

men, but had manned enough prizes to reduce her crew to one hundred and

four. The _Pelican_ carried one hundred and sixteen men, but since the

_Argus_ had enough men to handle her guns the superiority of numbers

on the _Pelican_ was a matter of no importance. But the _Argus_ had

ten killed and fourteen wounded, while the _Pelican_ lost but two

killed and five wounded. The _Argus_ was a much smaller vessel--she

measured but two hundred and sixty-eight tons to the _Pelican’s_

four hundred and sixty-seven, and she could fight with but ten guns,

throwing two hundred and ten pounds of metal at a broadside, to the

_Pelican’s_ eleven guns throwing two hundred and eighty pounds of

metal. Nevertheless, the difference in losses was much greater than

the difference in forces. It has been asserted that the American fire

proved ineffective because the powder used after the first few rounds

was from a lot taken from a prize that was bound to South America,

loaded with what is known in commercial circles as “export powder”--a

very inferior quality. If Captain Allen permitted this it shows he

was not well posted in the tricks of the British export trade of his

day. It is not denied that the _Pelican’s_ sides were full of dents

where the Yankee’s shot struck but did not penetrate. Still the most

reasonable explanation of the inferiority of the Americans’ fire is in

the fact that they had captured a wine-ship. By the modern standard

of morals it would be disgraceful to allow a ship’s crew to drink

of a captured cargo of wine. In that day the standard of morals was

different. Then, and for many years afterward, grog was served to all

hands at least once every day in every naval ship afloat in the world.

The men of the _Argus_ had been working as never before in their lives

for a month. It was entirely natural that some extra grog should be

allowed them when the wine was captured, and it was entirely natural

for the men to take too much.

A writer who lived at the time of the battle said of the result of it:

“We admit that the _Argus_ was taken by a British sloop-of-war whose

force was not materially greater than hers. It is one of those rare

accidents which sometimes occur in the course of worldly events, and

which, defying all calculation, and being in direct contradiction,

not only to the usual course of events, but to the ordinary effects

of known and acknowledged causes, are set down by the worldly as

resulting from chance; by the orthodox as the effect of a miracle. _We

will not stain the memory of gallant but unsuccessful men by stating

in extenuation of defeat that they were unskilful, negligent and

physically inferior to their opponents._” And that is a very proper

view to take of the whole matter. Even the British historian Allen says

“no disgrace attached to the vanquished.”

For the consolation of the American patriot, however, it is worth

comparing this fight with that between the _Hornet_ and the _Peacock_.

In the _Hornet-Peacock_ fight the American forces were just about as

much superior to the British as was the _Pelican_ to the _Argus_, for

the _Argus_ carried short twenty-fours as did the British _Peacock_.

But the _Hornet_ sank the _Peacock_ in fourteen minutes, while the

_Pelican_ was not able to subdue the _Argus_ until after forty-five

minutes. Worse yet, although firing at the closest range, the crew

of the _Pelican_ scarcely hurt the hull of the _Argus_--although

she drifted practically as an idle target for almost twice fourteen

minutes, the British gunners made so little impression on her hull

that no writer of the time thought it worth while to tell just what

they really did accomplish on her hull. And if the victories which the

second American _Wasp_ won over the _Frolic_, and the third American

_Wasp_ won over the British _Avon_, and the American _Peacock_ won

over the British _Epervier_ be considered, it is found that they, too,

outweighed the victory of the _Pelican_ as did that of the _Hornet_.

But if this fails to console the extreme American patriot--the “jingo”

of these days--he has only to consider the effect of this victory of

the British, together with that over the _Chesapeake_, upon the British

themselves. That the announcement of the victory of the _Shannon_

should have been cheered vociferously in Parliament; that the guns of

London Tower should have been fired to express the national jubilation;

that Broke should have been made a baronet; that the victory over the

little _Argus_ should have filled the nation anew with joy--where can

one find as flattering an acknowledgment of the prowess of the American

Navy as all this? The people whose “maritime supremacy had become a

part of the law of nations” were not now fighting either Frenchmen or

Spaniards.

The _Argus_ was at once taken by a prize-crew to Plymouth. Captain

Allen had had his leg amputated by his own surgeon when carried below.

On arrival at Plymouth, he was taken to the Mill Prison hospital, where

he died on August 18th. He was buried on August 21st, with the highest

military honors, because in his treatment of both the passengers and

the crews of all the ships he had captured, he had shown that he was a

typical American gentleman. His name was given to a street in New York

City to remind the wayfarer of his deeds.

The history of our Navy from its origin to the present day, 1775-1897, vol. 2 (of 4) · 第 16 / 19 章