CHAPTER XII.

1811.

Buonaparte declares he will conquer a "Maritime

Peace."--Illness of George III.--Prince of Wales Regent.--Sir

James obtains leave of absence.--The Victory sent to Lisbon

with troops.--Attack on Anholt.--Gallant defence of the

garrison.--Sir James continues in the Baltic at the request of

ministers.--Letters respecting Anholt.--Letters from the Duke

of Brunswick and answers thereto.--Arrival in Sweden of Sir

James.--Letters to Mr. Yorke and Admiral

Reynolds.--Negotiations on the sequestration of English ships

at Carlscrona.--Conference with Baron Tawast.--Written document

from the Baron unsatisfactory.--Letter from the Admiralty.--Sir

James remonstrates with the Swedish Government.--Evasive

answer.--Further correspondence.--Value of sequestered

property.--Capture of two Danish privateers.--Gallant conduct

of Lieut. St. Clair and Mr. Purcell.--Determination of Russia

not to accede to the terms of France.--The Crown Prince places

implicit confidence in Sir James.--Arrival of Mr. Thornton.--He

is smuggled into the city of Gothenburg.--Amicable confirmation

of the Ghent treaty.--Situation of the fleet.--Sir James's

letter.--Disaster of the St. George and convoy.--Admiral

Reynolds's letter.--Arrival of St. George at Wingo.--Sailing of

the fleet.--St. George and Hero's convoy put back.--Sail

again.--Melancholy wrecks of the St. George and

Defence.--Captain Pater's narrative.--Remarks.--Loss of the

Hero and convoy.--Proceedings of the Victory.--Remarks on

crossing the North Sea.--Sir James arrives at Spithead.

The beginning of the year 1811 was remarkable, as being the period at

which the tyrant of France had arrived at the summit of his career. He

had seized upon Hamburg and every other place on the Continent,

whence a seaman could be procured, and had declared that with one

hundred and fifty sail of the line he would humble the navy of England

and conquer a "Maritime Peace." The disasters of 1810, that ended with

the loss of his Majesty's ship Minotaur, and a large convoy on the

Haake Sands, and the illness of his Majesty George the Third, which

terminated only with the life of that excellent Monarch, threw a damp

on the spirits of the nation, and caused a suspension of all Royal

functions until the appointment of the Regency, on which his Royal

Highness the Prince of Wales took the reins of government at one of

the most eventful periods that ever occurred in the history of the

empire.

Sir James, immediately after his communications with the Admiralty and

the Ministers, applied for and obtained leave of absence. His ship,

the Victory, with seven sail of the line under Sir Joseph Yorke, was

employed in transporting troops to Lisbon, which was surrounded by

Massena's army; but she returned in time to receive Sir James's flag,

which was hoisted on the 2nd of April.

The island of Anholt, which had been garrisoned by seamen and marines

under the command of Captain James W. Maurice, of the Royal Navy, was

attacked on the 23rd of March by a body of Danish troops, amounting to

1600 men; but they were so well received by the Governor and his

brave crew (for the island was on the establishment of a vessel of

war) that they were forced to capitulate, with the loss of their

leader Major Melstedt, two officers, and 500 of their people in

killed, wounded, and prisoners; while Capt. Baker, of the Tartar, and

Captain J.P. Stewart, of the Sheldrake, chased and took several of

their gun-boats employed on that expedition.

Sir James had finished his three years in the Baltic, the time

generally prescribed for an Admiral commanding-in-chief to remain on

one station, and it was now his turn to have a command in the

Mediterranean, which was considered more lucrative; but his conduct

during his command in the Baltic had so completely gained the

confidence and good-will of the Swedes, and it had now become of such

importance to keep them, with such a general as Bernadotte at their

head, on good terms, that he was requested to continue on that most

important command, as the only chance of accomplishing the desirable

object of a Northern coalition. Nothing could be more delicate or more

difficult than the situation in which Sir James was now placed, for

while it required firmness to uphold the dignity of the empire which

he represented, as the only diplomatic functionary as well as

commander-in-chief in the North, tact, wisdom, and forbearance were

equally indispensable. These qualities Sir James possessed in a

superlative degree, and the Author, who from his knowledge of the

Swedish language was employed confidentially on all the communications

which subsequently took place, can testify that it is to the wise

policy of the Admiral that the nation owes the success of these

negociations. It is the opinion of Swedish and Russian diplomatists

that had Sir James not been employed, the Northern Coalition, which

was so fatal to the ambitious views of Buonaparte, never would have

taken place; and for such a service no reward which it was in the

power of Government to bestow on him would have been too great. There

can be no doubt, had the lamented Perceval not met with an untimely

end by the hand of an assassin, that he would at the close of 1812

have been rewarded by the Peerage which was so long unaccountably

withheld.

Sir James was still in London when he received the statement of the

discomfiture of the Danish attack on Anholt, a particular account of

which may be seen in James's Naval History.

The following letters on this gallant affair, which have not yet been

published, will be perused with interest.

London, 10th April 1811.

MY DEAR SIR,

I most heartily congratulate you on the brilliant success of

the brave garrison under your command in having repulsed an

attack of the enemy's select troops, consisting of as many

thousands as the whole band opposed to them amounted to

hundreds, and by the gallantry and intrepid conduct of your

valiant heroes, succeeded in taking a greater number of

prisoners than your whole collected force. Mr. Yorke having

signified to me that he should write to you, I can only assure

you that this gallant affair is the theme of every one's

praise, and has excited the admiration of all, and I have no

doubt but your services upon this occasion will be duly

appreciated by the Admiralty. I have great pleasure in adding

that Lieutenant Baker is made a commander, and that Captain

Torrens and Lieut. Fisher are recommended to his Royal Highness

the Prince Regent for Brevet rank.

I have, &c. with high regard,

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

Captain Maurice, Governor of Anholt.

In Captain Maurice's letter the Danish force was estimated at 4,000

men, but it does not appear that their numbers exceeded 3,000,

including the crews of the gun-vessels. Sixteen hundred men only were

landed, and the defence which these made was highly creditable to

them. It has therefore been justly said, that "if the British gained

honour by their victory, the Danes lost none by their defeat." The

unexpected arrival of the Tartar frigate and Sheldrake sloop turned

the scale; the Danish gun-boats being unable to cope with that naval

force, abandoned the brave troops they had landed as soon as the

frigate and sloop were discovered. Before the fleet left England, Sir

James received the following letter from his Serene Highness the Duke

of Brunswick:

Great George Street, London, 6th April 1811.

SIR,

I take the liberty to recommend to your kindness Major

Nordenfeldt, who is gone to Germany on private affairs of my

family. I imagine that the difficulties he has met with in

returning to England are the cause of his having been more than

six months absent. If circumstances should allow him to pass

from Colberg to this country, I request your interference on

his behalf, and that you would have the goodness to communicate

to him the inclosed order of Government[12] for landing either

at Portsmouth or Yarmouth.

I am, &c.

William, Duke of Brunswick.

To Vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez.

[12] The order alluded to was from the Treasury to the Customs,

desiring the officers to transmit the effects of the Duchess of

Brunswick to London under the office seal.

To this letter Sir James wrote the following answer:

St. James's Place, London, 6th April 1811.

SIR,

I have received the honour of your Serene Highness's letter

respecting Major Nordenfeldts, and inclosing one from Mr.

Harrison of the Treasury, which I shall have great pleasure in

delivering to Major Nordenfeldts, should I meet with him on his

way from Colberg, and I shall also use my endeavours to

facilitate his means of returning to England.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect, &c.

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick.

The deposed King of Sweden, after having spent the winter in England,

was embarked on board the Horatio to return to the Continent, but

choosing to remain longer than necessary on board that ship, Sir James

wrote instructions how to act respecting him; but he had fortunately

disembarked before Sir James's arrival in the Baltic. He sailed from

the Downs on the 28th of April and arrived at Gothenburg on the 2nd of

May 1811, where he was received joyfully by the Swedes, although they

could not publicly give vent to their feelings.

On Sir James's arrival he wrote the following letter to the Admiralty:

Victory, in Wingo Sound, 3rd May 1811.

I have the honour to acquaint you with my arrival here

yesterday morning, after a short passage of only four days from

the Downs. Admiral Reynolds arrived here with the detachment

from Hosley Bay ten days before, and Admiral Dixon yesterday

evening. The weather proving unfavourable, I have received no

communication from Gothenburg, except by a letter from Mr.

Consul Smith, informing me that, on his having signified my

arrival to the Governor, he immediately despatched a courier to

Stockholm, agreeably to orders he had received from thence, and

that when the courier reached Stockholm, it would determine the

commander-in-chief Count Essen's journey to Gothenburg, which

had been postponed until the account of my arrival was

received.

The Consul adds, that everything was very tranquil hitherto,

and that I should see him soon on board the Victory. I

received letters from Mr. Fenwick informing me that the Danes

were fitting out more than double the number of privateers and

armed vessels than they did last year, intending, if possible,

to obstruct the passage of the convoys through the Belt. This

is a service that I fear will be attended with much hazard and

difficulty, if the trade is carried on to any considerable

extent.

The island of Anholt is threatened with a second attack, and

will require stationary force for its protection.

I am, &c.

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To the Right Hon. C. Yorke, &c. &c. &c.

On the 4th of May Sir James received the alarming intelligence that

the cargoes of both goods and colonial produce at Carlshamn, were

ordered by the Governor of Carlscrona to be discharged and conveyed up

the country. Admiral Puke had also ordered three of the largest

merchant ships to be fitted as block ships for the additional defence

of Carlshamn, which was considered as a bad omen.

No one, excepting Sir James, doubted that this was an act of

hostility, and that a retaliation on our part would speedily take

place. The Admiral, however, judged that it was only to keep quiet the

French agents. He accordingly forbore to proceed to hostilities, and

wrote the following letter to Mr. Yorke:

Victory, Wingo Sound, 11th May 1811.

SIR,

I received two days ago the enclosed from Mr. Fenwick,

informing me of the unloading of the cargoes on board the

neutral vessels at Carlshamn, and that the British goods and

colonial produce had been conveyed up the country. Although Mr.

Fenwick appears under very considerable alarm at the

circumstance, I do not believe it to have been with any hostile

views against our commerce, although it certainly requires

explanation, and I have written to Mr. Smith upon the subject.

I expected to have received some communication from Stockholm,

in consequence of the courier which was despatched upon my

arrival; but nothing has as yet reached me. This is rather a

dubious crisis, and I trust soon to be better informed of the

sentiments of the Swedish Government towards us; at the same

time, I have no reason to believe they are more hostile than

last year.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Jas. Saumarez.

To the Right Hon. C. Yorke, &c. &c. &c.

At the same time Sir James wrote the following letter to Rear-admiral

Reynolds, who had been ordered to Hano, the place of rendezvous, which

is only six leagues from Carlshamn.

Victory, in Wingo Sound, 11th May 1811.

MY DEAR REYNOLDS,

This will be delivered to you by Mr. Wilkinson, the gentleman I

mentioned to you on leaving the Victory: he proposes

establishing himself upon Hano Island for the furtherance of

commercial arrangements, and as he is well known as a person of

respectability, I beg leave to introduce him to your friendly

offices.

I have not been able as yet to obtain any explanation of the

extraordinary circumstance that has taken place at Carlshamn,

and I am as yet uninformed whether it has been a business of

the merchants only, or by direction of the Government. As soon

as I can receive any information, I shall write to you by a

courier; in the mean time, we cannot act with too great

moderation in the present state of affairs.

Believe me,

With the highest regard, &c. &c. &c.

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To Rear-admiral Reynolds, &c. &c. &c.

Meanwhile Sir James, instead of making any hostile demonstration, most

readily complied with the request of Count Rosen, the Governor of

Gothenburg, to grant him a licence for a vessel to sail to Lubeck for

medicine and drugs for the use of Sweden, and enclosed him passports

for Baron Stedinck for the purpose of allowing two vessels to proceed

to St. Petersburg, to convey his excellency from thence to Stockholm.

He concludes his letter thus: "I take this opportunity to express the

satisfaction it affords me to have it in my power to comply with your

wishes," &c. (14th May) making no mention of the affair at Carlshamn.

On the 17th Mr. Smith came on board the Victory, being desired by

Count Rosen to inquire whether, in the event of differences between

Sweden and Norway, the hostile measures of Sweden would be opposed by

Sir James, to which he replied that he was not authorised to make any

opposition to such an attack, but that he did not consider himself

justified in supporting it without having instructions from

Government; at the same time Sir James received information by an

officer who had been some time a prisoner at Christian Sand,

representing that place as open to an attack in order to capture the

merchant vessels therein, as well as the flotilla.

It was evident that the Swedes were very intent on the possession of

Norway, either by negotiation or otherwise; but it was questionable

whether such an addition would be advisable. Sir James was of opinion

that if Norway could be rendered independent of Denmark or of any

other country, it was not improbable that the inhabitants of that

country would accede to proposals to that effect, if assured of the

support of our Government and the advantage of our trade to them. Sir

James both personally and by letter, previously to his coming on

board, had expressed to Mr. Smith that the sequestration of the

British property at Carlshamn had been by no means satisfactorily

explained, and requested that an account of this apparently

unjustifiable measure should be speedily given, assuring them that

nothing short of the full restitution of the property would be

accepted, and requiring that his strongest remonstrances should be

transmitted to Stockholm without delay. The consequence was the

appearance of the Baron Tawast, who came with a flag of truce

ostensibly to treat for the exchange of prisoners, but virtually to

explain the affair of Carlshamn. The usual articles for the cartel

were exchanged, ratified, and published, and need not be inserted

here; but the true mission of the Swedish general will be best

understood from the following letter, which Sir James wrote

immediately after the conference.

Victory, in Wingo Sound, 23rd May 1811.

SIR,

I request you will please to inform the Lords Commissioners of

the Admiralty that Major-General Baron Tawast,

commander-in-chief of the Swedish forces at Gothenburg and the

coast adjacent, in the absence of his excellency Count Essen,

having yesterday come on board his Majesty's ship Victory,

under a flag of truce, for the purpose of entering into an

arrangement with me for the exchange of prisoners, and other

points connected with the present state of affairs between our

respective nations, informed me, that he was instructed to

communicate to me, in the most confidential manner, that it was

the earnest wish of the Swedish Government to keep up the most

amicable terms with Great Britain; and that it was not

intended, under any circumstances, to commit any acts of

hostility whatever; that the supplies of water and fresh

provisions for the use of the squadron should be facilitated

both at Hano Bay and Gothenburg, for which purpose picquets

should be withdrawn from the points the most convenient for

these articles to be received; that the correspondence, both by

post or by courier, should be continued unmolested; and that,

in the event of any British subjects being made prisoners on

any part of the coast, they would be immediately liberated, for

which purpose the cartel intended to be ratified had been

proposed. That the appearance of any hostile measure was only

intended for demonstration, and in order to elude the

vigilance of French spies, who might be dispersed in the

country.

With respect to the late transaction at Carlshamn in landing

the cargoes from the Russian or Danish vessels, it was in

retaliation for the Swedish property sequestered last year in

the ports of those nations, but that the measure was not

intended to operate against merchandise belonging to British

merchants under any other flag, the whole of which would be

secured, and the underwriters, _secretement_, indemnified for

the value of the cargoes that were insured in England.

I strongly represented to Baron Tawast that the merchandise and

colonial produce on board the Russian vessels were positively

the property of British merchants trading to the Baltic, under

licences from one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of

State, and which had been left in one of the ports of Sweden

upon the strength of the declaration made to me in the month of

November last year, that the property of British merchants

would be secured to them, notwithstanding the imperious

necessity which Sweden had been under of declaring war against

England; and that his Majesty's Government would doubtless

expect the same to be restored; or that the merchants would be

indemnified for the full value of the cargoes landed from the

vessels under the Prussian flag; and I requested him to put in

writing what were the real intentions of the Swedish Government

upon that subject; but this he positively declined, nor would

he allow Mr. Consul Smith, who was present when this discussion

took place, to insert any part of it in writing. I signified to

Baron Tawast, for the information of the Swedish Government,

that it was far from my intention to commit any act of

hostility against Sweden, and that I was confident it was the

wish of my Government to keep upon an amicable footing as long

as circumstances would possibly admit; that I received

instructions to allow the coasting trade of Sweden to pass

unmolested, and that I had reason to hope it might be extended

to the ports in Swedish Pomerania, on which the Baron laid so

great a stress, but that I was very apprehensive that the late

measures adopted against the British property at Carlshamn, and

the want of more satisfactory explanations than he appeared

instructed to make to me upon that subject, could not fail

being very ill received by my Government.

Baron Tawast was particularly solicitous that the communication

which he made to me should be considered in the strictest

confidence, and expressed his hopes that the whole of the

conference would be kept a profound secret, which I assured him

I should take particular care to signify in the statement I

transmitted for the information of Government.

I have, &c. &c. &c.

Jas. Saumarez.

To J.W. Croker, Esq. &c. &c. &c.

On the 24th May, the Author being sent confidentially by the Admiral

to insist on some written document to explain the views of the Swedish

Government in the sequestration of British property at Carlshamn, he

obtained a promise, in presence of Mr. Smith, that the demand should

be complied with after the arrival of the Stockholm post that evening;

and accordingly on the following day the Baron Tawast transmitted what

he termed the substance of his verbal communication with Admiral

Saumarez.

1. That the ships under Prussian colours loaded with colonial

produce were detained as reprisals for Swedish ships detained

and confiscated in Prussian ports.

2. That the same step has been taken with the Danish ships, in

consequence of their having captured vessels belonging to

Sweden.

3. That Sweden has been forced by imperious demands to

confiscate all colonial produce found at Carlshamn under

whatever flag, that the cargoes are put into safe stores, and

that the ships are permitted to depart paying nothing, and that

these steps are taken to avoid great inconvenience and to hope

for better times.

4. We engage to indemnify all merchandise insured in England,

therefore, only those merchants who have neglected to insure

will lose.

5. Colonial produce belonging to Swedish subjects will not be

seized or confiscated.

6. Ships having made false declarations, and found loaded with

warlike stores, will be confiscated, as also in time of peace.

7. It is engaged to give every possible facility for watering

and supplying the English fleet with provisions: the same shall

be given to Admiral Reynolds at Hano.

The above explanations stating the substance of the conference,

according to Baron Tawast, being by no means satisfactory to Sir

James, and indeed at variance with what he had inferred from it, he

wrote the following letter to Mr. Smith:

Victory, in Wingo Sound, 25th May 1811.

SIR,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date,

enclosing Baron Tawast's explanations of the late transactions

at Carlshamn. With regard to the first article, it does not

appear that any indemnification is held out for the property

landed from the vessels under the Prussian flag at Carlshamn,

which is represented as an act of retaliation for similar

cargoes, belonging to Sweden, having been confiscated in the

Prussian ports. Neither does the 4th article hold out any

indemnification but to such property as may have been insured

in England, it stating that the loss would fall only upon those

merchants who have neglected to insure their cargoes. I request

you will be pleased to report to Baron Tawast, what I had

before the honour of stating to him, that Government will

naturally expect that the British merchants will be indemnified

for whatever property belongs to them which has been landed

from vessels in Sweden, trading under licences from one of his

Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, at the same time

informing him that I shall transmit by the earliest opportunity

to Government, under strict secrecy, a copy of the document you

enclosed to me, and you will also be pleased to express to him

my acknowledgments for the facility with which the supplies are

proposed to be conveyed to the squadron at this anchorage and

in Hano Bay.

I have, &c. &c. &c.

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To J. Smith, Esq. Gothenburg.

Sir James at the same time enclosed the document to the Secretary of

the Admiralty, as a confidential communication to the Board. He also

wrote a private letter to Mr. Yorke, which we prefer inserting, as it

gives a more full and explicit detail of all the circumstances of the

transaction, and because it is an answer to the following letter from

him which precedes it, and which was received by Sir James at that

moment.

Admiralty, 21st May 1811.

SIR,

I had the honour to receive your letters of the 3rd, 4th, and

11th inst. and am glad to hear that the first divisions of your

squadron made so favourable a passage to their rendezvous in

Wingo Sound. The four ships with Linzee, which have been ready

for some days, have been detained by the strong easterly winds;

and though they sailed from St. Helen's the day before

yesterday, I should not wonder to hear that they have put back

again. Impetueux is getting forward, and we shall send her to

you as soon as we can spare her from the reserve. Fisguard

ought to be ready, but is to call at Deal for M. de Begenhas,

Minister from Portugal to Russia, whom you will have the

goodness to land as well as you can at Gothenburg, that he may

find his own way forward.

I think we ought not to listen for a moment to any Swedish

projects on Norway; my own opinion is that Bernadotte is

playing us false, and at any rate I, for one, should dread to

see a consolidation of the Swedish and Norwegian power, such as

it is, in his, or indeed in any hand.

Since the arrival of the accounts of the landing the cargoes at

Carlshamn, and the accompanying measures, considerable distrust

appears to prevail here about alternate views of the Swedish

Government. A little more time will develop their plans in all

probability; in the mean time it seems very desirable that the

bulk of your efficient force should remain where it is (in the

Sleeve) to be ready to receive the requisite orders. Admiral

Young has taken his station off West Cassel, and has fifteen

sail of the line. Enemy, eleven in the Scheldt, three in Texel,

and two at Helvoet. When the Impetueux joins, you will have

eighteen, which is as many as we shall be able to give you for

some time at least.

The public letters will have apprised you of the views of the

Board of Trade and of the Government in the several points on

which it was important that you should be informed. The Swedes

should be gently but steadily convinced that it is in our power

to resent this ill usage, and to turn the consequence of

perfidy on the inventors; but the evil day should be postponed

as long as possible and every practicable chance should be

given them of remaining in the right path.

Accounts have been received this morning from Oporto via

Bristol in eight days, which give us reason to suppose that

Massena has had a good beating near Almeida on the 3rd, 4th,

and 5th inst., and has been obliged to retire towards

Salamanca, with the loss of four thousand killed, and seven

hundred prisoners. The British loss is stated at twelve

hundred. It is very probable, as when the last accounts came

away a battle was shortly expected.

I have, &c. &c. &c.

C. Yorke.

To Vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez, Bart., K.B. &c. &c.

Victory, in Wingo Sound, 28th May 1811.

DEAR SIR,

I have received the honour of your letter of the 21st, and I

beg to assure you that I shall pay particular attention to that

part of it which relates to the measures to be pursued with

this country. With the exception of the affair at Carlshamn,

which took place previously to my arrival, nothing has occurred

to cause any interruption to the same intercourse as was held

last year. The usual supplies are continued, and the places

pointed out whence they can be most readily received. There

certainly appears great prevarication on the part of the

Swedish Government relative to the property landed from the

neutral vessels at Carlshamn; and in an object of such

importance, I beg to suggest the expediency of one or two

persons, duly authorised by the merchants and underwriters

concerned in the Baltic trade, repairing to Stockholm for the

purpose of asserting their claims, and seeing how far this

Government may be disposed to indemnify them for the property

sequestered. The sooner such a measure is adopted the better,

as should it be delayed, and any alteration take place betwixt

the two Governments, the whole will be lost. From what passed

between Baron Tawast and myself, I have reason to believe that

Sweden would accede to this proposal.

In my letter to the Board I have recommended that the two bomb

vessels that were intended for this station, should be

expedited; their appearance alone would have the best effect in

intimidating the Swedes to a compliance with our just demands.

I am in hourly expectation of seeing the ships from Spithead;

the addition of the Impetueux will, I hope, make us

sufficiently strong in line-of-battle ships, but two or three

good frigates are much required.

I beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on the continued

success of the army under Lord Wellington, and I trust the

accounts from Spain will prove equally splendid.

With the highest regard,

I have, &c. &c. &c.

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

The Right Hon. Chas. Yorke.

P.S.--I have received no further accounts from Mr. Smith

relative to the rupture between Russia and France, which makes

me apprehend that the reports have not been confirmed.

It now became Sir James's duty to make a strong remonstrance to the

Swedish Government. Anticipating the worst, he had made dispositions

of the force under his command, which were at least sufficient to

ensure respect. This was well known to Baron Tawast, whose visit was

probably, in addition to other objects, to ascertain whether or not

resistance could be effectually made in the event of hostile measures

being taken. The following is the remonstrance alluded to.

His Britannic Majesty's ship Victory, Wingo Sound,

30th May 1811.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform your excellency that intelligence

having been received by his Majesty's Government, that the

cargoes belonging to British subjects, and that have been

insured to a considerable amount in England, embarked in

vessels belonging to Prussia, Denmark, Mecklenburg, and other

States, have been landed in Sweden by order of the Swedish

Government, under pretext of making reprisals for the Swedish

property said to have been confiscated in Prussia and

Denmark,--I have been directed to remonstrate in the strongest

manner against measures so deeply affecting the interest of his

Majesty's subjects, and at the same time to signify to the

Swedish Government that I cannot permit such proceedings, under

whatever pretext they may be disguised, and that if acts of so

injurious a tendency are persevered in, I shall be obliged to

depart from that indulgent course I have hitherto pursued

towards Sweden.

In requesting your excellency will be pleased to make known the

above communication to your Government, I beg to renew the

assurances of the perfect consideration with which I have the

honour to be, Sir, &c.

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To his Excellency M. General Baron de Tawast,

Commander-in-chief, &c. Gothenburg.

Baron Tawast's reply to this letter was a simple assurance that no

hostile act was intended, and that the Swedish Government had been

compelled to act as it had done. He had no doubt but eventually the

English merchants would be indemnified, and he trusted that Sir James

would not insist on sending his remonstrance to Government as he had

no doubt that Baron Von Essen, who was expected in a few days, would

explain all to his satisfaction, and that a rupture would thereby be

avoided. The same assurances were given to Mr. Consul Smith, but their

proceedings had so evidently the appearance of gaining time that Sir

James firmly insisted that his remonstrance should be transmitted to

Government through the medium of Baron Essen, and in reply to a note

from Consul Smith and Baron Tawast he wrote the following:

Victory, in Wingo Sound, 6th June 1811.

SIR,

I request you will signify to Baron Tawast, that I can have no

objection to the letter I had the honour to address to him on

the 30th ultimo being communicated to the Swedish Government

through the means of his Excellency Count Essen; but having

received directions from England to make the remonstrance it

contained on the very unexpected measures adopted against the

property of the British, I hold it my indispensable duty to

require that it should be transmitted to the Government at

Stockholm.

It could never be expected by this country that England would

pass with indifference a measure so seriously affecting the

interests of British merchants; and Government will naturally

expect some satisfactory explanation upon the subject. Those

made to me by Count Rosen and Baron Tawast have been

transmitted without delay, and I hope those in reply to the

remonstrance I have made by order of Government will prove of a

satisfactory nature.

I have, &c. &c. &c.

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To J. Smith, Esq., Gothenburg.

P.S.--You will be pleased to signify to his Excellency Count

Rosen and General Baron Tawast, that I have not replied to the

confidential communications they have done me the honour to

make, as you would more fully convey to them any sentiments

upon the subject to which they relate, and at the same time

express to them my most ardent hope that the amicable

intercourse that has existed between both countries, may not be

interrupted by the present unfortunate altercation.

His Britannic Majesty's ship Victory, in Wingo Sound,

6th June 1811.

Vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez has the honour to signify to M.

General Baron Tawast that he has lost no time in transmitting

to his Government the note his excellency has been pleased to

address to him on the 4th inst. in reply to his letter of the

30th ultimo, remonstrating by order of his Government against

the late measures pursued in Sweden upon the British property

landed from the neutral vessels in the Swedish ports, and which

Baron Tawast was requested to communicate to his Government.

Notwithstanding the reasons assigned by Baron Tawast for

wishing to delay transmitting to Stockholm the remonstrance

above mentioned, the Vice-admiral thinks it his indispensable

duty (having received instructions from his Government to that

effect) to request that it should be communicated either

through the means of his Excellency Count Essen, or direct to

the Ministers at Stockholm, according as Baron Tawast may judge

most advisable; and the Vice-admiral hopes that the reply from

the Swedish Government will be of a nature to convince England

of the uprightness of its intentions in the proceedings

adverted to, and that the amicable course hitherto pursued will

meet with no further interruption.

The Vice-admiral requests Baron Tawast will receive the

assurance of his perfect consideration.

At the same time Sir James sent a detail of his proceedings to the

Admiralty, with a disposition of the fleet, which was now prepared for

the worst. He recommended that proper persons should be sent to Sweden

for the purpose of making claims for the merchants and underwriters,

and he also desired that bomb-vessels might be sent to him, which

would show that his remonstrance was serious. By letters from Mr. Foy

at Stockholm, and from Mr. Consul Fenwick at Helsingburg, Sir James

learnt that the amount of property confiscated at Carlshamn amounted

to 500,000_l._, about half of which was insured; that the measure of

confiscation was very unpopular in Sweden, but that every one relied

on his moderation and forbearance. From this time forward the

situation of Sweden was extraordinary beyond precedent, as fully

represented in the following extract of a letter which the Swedish

Admiral Krusenstjerna subsequently wrote to the Author:

I know nothing, says he, of politics, but I find our situation

very singular. Our _friends_ the French and Danes express their

friendship to us with unremitted zeal in capturing and robbing

from us our merchant vessels, whilst our _enemies_ the English

let them pass unmolested from one port to another. We did not

suffer by one hundred times as much from these two nations, the

time we were at war against them, as we do now when they call

themselves our friends and allies.

The Danes, not content with attacking ships passing through the Sound

and Belt, had the audacity to send their privateers to the coast of

Sweden, only eight leagues to the southward of Wingo, where the

Victory was at anchor. Information being given of their position, a

small one was surprised and taken without resistance by two of the

Victory's boats under Lieutenants Ross and Brenton. In September,

accounts were obtained that two of superior force had taken a position

among the small islands ten leagues to the southward of Gothenburg,

when Lieut. D.L. St. Clair and Mr. E. Purcell, midshipman, were

detached from the Victory in search of them. The Danes, not

calculating on the prowess of British officers and men, left their

vessels in a small creek, probably as a decoy, landed their guns, and

planted them on an eminence which commanded them, and on the approach

of the Victory's boats had promised themselves the capture of a part

of the crew and the boats of the English commander-in-chief. But

Lieutenant St. Clair, to the astonishment of the enemy, pushed

directly for the battery, and ascending the hill gallantly stormed and

carried it at the point of the sword, the Danes having fled on the

approach of the assailants. Few prisoners were made, but both

privateers were taken and carried to the Victory on the following

morning.

Sir James duly appreciated the bravery of these officers, and having

represented their gallant conduct to the Lords of the Admiralty,

Lieut. St. Clair was promoted to the rank of commander, and

subsequently employed in the Baltic and coast of Spain. Mr. Purcell,

who had particularly distinguished himself, was made Lieutenant, and

is now a Captain of the Royal Navy.

Sir James's remonstrances had at length the desired effect. After

several confidential interviews which the Author had with Count Rosen,

it was agreed that the Count should come privately on board the

Victory, to explain everything to the commander-in-chief, which he did

on the 25th of June. The following letter to Mr. Yorke will show the

happy result of Sir James's wise conduct and well-timed firmness in

this important crisis.

Victory, Wingo Sound, 26th June 1811.

DEAR SIR,

If I could have had any further doubts upon my mind relative to

the sincerity of the intentions of this Government, they have

been perfectly removed by the conversation I had yesterday with

Count Rosen, who came on board the Victory, by desire of the

Crown Prince, in consequence of my remonstrance upon the affair

at Carlshamn, as will appear by my public letter. Count Rosen

assured me that it was the earnest desire of the Crown Prince

to render Sweden independent of France whenever he could do so

consistent with her security, but they are so apprehensive

that, in the event of the difference between Russia and France

being settled, Bonaparte will bring that country to act against

Sweden, they dare not openly avow that sentiment. I informed

Count Rosen that so long as Sweden acted up to the system he

mentioned to be intended towards England, I had every reason to

believe that his Majesty's Government would be satisfied with

it; but that if it should be deviated from, I had the

authority, and they might be assured I would exert the utmost

in my power to resent any aggression on the part of Sweden,

with which he was perfectly satisfied, and informed me that he

would communicate to the Crown Prince precisely what I stated

to him. There have been very serious commotions in Scania on

account of the conscriptions, wherein several of the peasantry

have lost their lives, and about three thousand guards under

the Prince, and a strong body of troops, have been ordered to

that province to restore order. I have had the honour to

receive your letter of the 14th by the Impetueux, and since

that one of the 8th, with a commission for Mr. Delisle, for

which I beg to return my thanks.

I have, &c. &c. &c.

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To the Right Hon. Chas. Yorke, &c. &c. &c.

Soon after this letter was despatched, Sir James received information

that Russia had determined not to accede to the terms of Bonaparte,

and that a rupture was likely to take place; the situation of Sweden,

therefore, became every day more critical. She had now to determine

whether she would throw herself into the arms of France for

protection, or still depend on England for independence, Had

hostilities actually commenced, the former would, doubtless, have been

her decision, and it is impossible to say what might have been the

consequences. On the one hand the restoration of Finland was the

probable result of an alliance with France, while the whole force of

Russia was employed in repelling the invaders; and on the other hand,

Norway might be added, as an indemnification for the loss of

Pomerania.

Trusting in the honour of the British Admiral, the Crown Prince of

Sweden did not hesitate to place the most implicit confidence in Sir

James. The negotiation for a treaty of peace, and for a coalition

against the tyrant of France, only wanted the presence of an

accredited Plenipotentiary to make it complete.

The Oberon sloop of war arrived with an officer of distinction, who

proceeded through Sweden to the Continent, and soon after several

Russian noblemen arrived from St. Petersburg with despatches of

importance. The despatches received by the Oberon contained

instructions respecting the affair of Carlshamn; and notwithstanding

the opinions and assurances of Sir James to the contrary, the

Ministers continued to suspect the Crown Prince of Sweden to be

insincere. Being, however, still desirous of remaining at peace with

Sweden, Sir James continued his friendly and courteous policy. The

bomb-ships he sent for had arrived, and his force, both within and

without the Baltic, being formidable, gave Sweden a good excuse for

not proceeding to hostilities, although she had declared war.

Sir James having declared that he "would not fire the first gun,"

things went on as usual, and the restrictions which he found necessary

to put on the Swedish trade, to prevent supplies being thrown into

Norway, was also a good proof to Bonaparte that Sweden was not

favourable to England. During this summer the Tartar frigate was

lost, and two gun-brigs were captured by the Danes, from whom several

privateers and gun-boats were taken, and an exchange of prisoners was

made. At length it was communicated that war between France and Russia

was inevitable, and Sweden having refused to permit French troops to

pass into Norway, ostensibly for the invasion of Scotland, determined

to join England; but it was advisable to keep this state of affairs a

profound secret.

In the mean time the negotiations for an offensive and defensive

alliance continued, and were ready for ratification when the Oberon

arrived with Mr. (now Sir Edward) Thornton. This ship, on leaving

Portsmouth, was supposed to be bound for the West Indies, and letters

were actually on board her for the Leeward Islands; but on opening her

sealed orders, Capt. Murray, her commander, found he was destined for

Gothenburg, and that he was to have no communication on his passage

with any other ship. Being unacquainted with the coast of Sweden, and

having no pilot on board, his ship unfortunately ran on shore in a

thick fog; the guns were thrown overboard, and every exertion made in

vain to get the ship off. It is scarcely possible to describe the

anxiety of Mr. Thornton (who had been hitherto supposed to be a

passenger for the West Indies) until the morning gun of the Victory

informed them that their ship was on the rocks to the northward of

Wingo Beacon, over which the flag of the Victory (white at the fore)

could be plainly distinguished, and in an hour afterwards he was safe

in the Admiral's cabin.

The utmost caution was still necessary in communicating with Count

Rosen, and so strictly were the orders given by the commandant of the

castle complied with, that several attempts to get Mr. Thornton on

shore were unsuccessful. He was at length smuggled into the fort as a

servant of the Author, who had, from his knowledge of the Swedish

language, no difficulty in passing the gates as a Swedish officer.

Thus were all differences happily adjusted: it was determined to keep

up the appearance of war without committing any act of hostility on

either side.

We shall now turn to the situation of the fleet. Admiral Reynolds had

been stationed at Hano, which is near Matvick, where the convoys

assembled, and which were with very little loss protected through the

Belt. On the 9th of November, the St. George sailed from Hano with the

last homeward bound convoy, which had been put back by a gale on the

1st.

The account of the disasters that befel this unfortunate fleet, which,

as a prelude to the losses which afterwards took place, must be

interesting to every reader, will be best given from the lamented

Admiral's own report to Sir James, which has not before appeared in

print.

St. George, off Nystad, bearing N.N.E. 1/4 E., 19th November

1811.

SIR,

It gives me inexpressible concern to inform you of the sad

disaster which has befallen his Majesty's ship St. George,

bearing my flag. I have already detailed to you, sir, the gale

of the 1st instant, which caused the merchant ships to return

to Matvick for shelter, and transmitted you convoy lists of one

hundred and twenty sail, which sailed from Hano Bay with us on

the 9th instant, besides twelve more which had no instructions.

On the evening of the 10th we had severe weather, and anchored

between Moen Island and Dars Head. On the morning of the 12th

we weighed, and (the wind heading us before dark) anchored off

Nystad with the convoy pretty well collected. At the close of

the evening of the 15th, the weather was remarkably fine, but

about ten at night it began to blow strong with a heavy, swell

from W.S.W., and we veered to a cable and half on the small

bower. The gale increasing, we veered to two cables, and should

probably have rode the gale out safe had not a large ship of

the convoy drove athwart hawse and parted our cable. The best

bower was immediately let go, and veered to two cables, which

did not check her. We then let go the sheet anchor and gave her

two cables on that also, but she would not look at it. By this

time we had shoaled our water from ten to eight fathoms, and

the fury of the gale increasing, we continued to shoal into

seven and six fathoms, when the pilots and officers advised the

cutting away the masts as the only means of saving the ship and

the lives of the people. I resisted their advice for some

time, in hopes that a favourable lull might bring the ship up;

but when she had drifted into a quarterless five, and still

driving before a tempest of wind and rain, I ordered the axe to

be laid to the mast, and soon after they were over the side:

the ship struck violently several times, and the rudder was

torn away with a tremendous crash. About four in the morning

the strength of the gale abated, and her shocks were less

violent. Every officer and man in the ship were now employed

erecting jury-masts, hoping that by lightening her we should be

able to float her off; and at daylight I telegraphed Captain

Pater of the Cressy to prepare us a Pakenham rudder; and it

still blowing too strong for boats to come to us, I made

signals for the Rose and Bellete to anchor a cable's length

from us and from each other, upon our larboard bow, that when

it moderated we might send hawsers to them to endeavour to

heave us off. Nystad now bore N.N.E. 1/2 E. distant about five

miles, and Skielbye church E.N.E., and the ship lay in four

fathoms water. On the 16th we were busily employed rigging

jury-masts. Towards the evening it moderated, and about four in

the morning of the 17th we had the cheering happiness to find

she had swung to her anchor. The hands were instantly turned to

the capstan, and we hove short on the sheet cable. The night

signal was then made for the assistance of boats, and having

happily succeeded in warping her into deep water, we made sail

(with which we steered her) with a fine breeze from the

eastward, and anchored near the convoy in eleven fathoms.

I have much pleasure in acquainting you, sir, that the officers

and ship's company merit my warmest praise for the constant

exertions and cheerful obedience with which they conducted

themselves throughout this distressing scene. Captain Guion

was unwearied and indefatigable, and his abilities could never

have been better shown than on this trying occasion. It is no

small consolation to me that in the awful moment of the masts

going over the side, and throughout the whole terrific gale,

not a man was hurt.

I have now, sir, to acquaint you that out of one hundred and

twenty sail which were at anchor here when the gale began, only

seventy-six are now remaining; twelve are seen wrecked upon the

Danish coast and in the enemy's possession; two ran foul of

each other, and both went to the bottom, and in the midst of

the gale several of the smaller vessels were observed

dismasted, and the sea making an entire breach over them; it is

much to be feared they foundered at their anchors. Many

remaining here are so much disabled that I doubt whether they

will be able to proceed with us, although they have had every

assistance from his Majesty's ships which could be given them.

I am happy, sir, to tell you that the St. George has her

jury-masts rigged, and her rudder hung, and is in every respect

as complete to proceed with the convoy (the first favourable

wind) as hands can make her in our present situation.

Before I conclude this narrative, permit me to insert my public

acknowledgments of the prompt and timely assistance I received

from every Captain of his Majesty's ships under my orders,

which accelerated our equipment much sooner than otherwise

could be expected.

I have, &c. &c. &c.

R.C. REYNOLDS.

Vice-admiral Sir James Saumarez, Bart. K.B.

&c. &c. &c.

James received the above letter on the 29th of November, when

he despatched a vessel with the disastrous intelligence to

England. In his answer to Admiral Reynolds we find the

following paragraph:

Greatly as I lament the severe injury sustained on board the

St. George, and the melancholy loss of so many vessels of the

convoy by the tempestuous weather, I am fully persuaded that

every possible means, which judgment and skill could dictate,

were employed by you for the safety of his Majesty's ships and

the preservation of the convoy under such perilous

circumstances, and I highly applaud the good conduct manifested

by the officers and men of the St. George during the whole of

so trying an occasion, and the alacrity and exertions displayed

by them in having jury-masts erected during the continuance of

the gale, which reflects the highest credit on Captain Guion,

for the good order and discipline preserved in the ship. I also

feel great satisfaction in observing your marked approval of

the prompt and ready assistance you received from all the

Captains of his Majesty's ships and vessels under your orders.

Accounts from Captain Dashwood informed Sir James that thirty out of

the fifty-six vessels supposed to be lost had reached Matvick with the

loss of their anchors and cables, and that he would take them under

his convoy as soon as they could be got ready to sail.

Admiral Reynolds received assistance from Admirals Dixon and Bertie,

who were stationed in the Belt, and the St. George with her convoy

reached Wingo Sound in safety on the 2nd of December. As the season

was so far advanced, it was proposed to leave the St. George at

Gothenburg during the winter, but Admiral Reynolds entreated that he

might be permitted to navigate the ship to England, which, he said in

hearing of the Author, was "as fit to make her passage with the

assistance of another ship of the line as any in the fleet." Sir James

did not accede to his wishes until he had also taken the opinion of

Capt. Guion; and it was at length determined that she should be

attended by the Cressy, Capt. Pater, and the Defence, Capt. Atkins,

while the Hero, Capt. Newman, took charge of the convoy.

During the stay of the fleet in Wingo Sound, court-martials were held

on the Commanders and crews of the Manly and Safeguard gun-brigs,

which had been captured by the Danes, and the crews exchanged; also on

the boatswain of the Anholt Island, which had been considered a ship,

but as the pendant had not been flying in the island, doubts had

arisen in the minds of the members of the court, and reference was

made to the Admiralty, with a request that the law officers of the

Crown might be consulted as to the legality of holding a naval

court-martial on the accused.

The St. George had topmasts as lower masts, and top-gallant masts as

topmasts. Her temporary rudder was well fitted and secured. The

Cressy, which had towed her from the Belt, was ordered to take her

again in tow. Everything was prepared for the departure of the whole,

but the wind and weather continued unfavourable, and Sir James again

repeated his wish that the St. George should remain instead of the

Ardent, into which Sir George Hope had hoisted his flag, having orders

to remain in Wingo Sound until the Pyramus, Captain Dashwood, and

Ranger, Captain Acklom, should arrive with the last convoy, which

Captain Dashwood subsequently succeeded in bringing safely through the

Sound, much to his credit, at that late season of the year.

On the 18th of December the wind came from the N.E. when the whole

fleet weighed and made sail. The first squadron consisted of the

Victory, Vigo, Dreadnought, Orion, Mercury, and Snipe; the second

comprised the St. George in tow of the Cressy, the Defence, and

Bellete, and the third the convoy under the Hero and the Grasshopper;

but the wind coming too far to the northward to enable the convoy to

weather the Scaw, the signal was made from the Victory for it to

return into port. At sunset on the 19th the St. George was seen well

to windward of that dangerous headland; but it appeared that she, with

her division, bore up during the night, when the wind came to the

westward of north, as will be seen by the following account of the

proceedings of H.M.S. Cressy, given officially to Sir James by Captain

Pater.

Narrative of the circumstances relating to the St. George since

parting company with the Victory, on the 19th December 1811.

On the night of the 19th December, lost sight of the Victory,

Dreadnought, Vigo, and Orion. On the 20th at half past eight

A.M. signal from the St. George to wear; at ten A.M. the St.

George cast off the tow rope; moderate breezes and hazy

weather; hauled up to the S.E. to get soundings on the Jutland

shore, in order to round the Scaw the better. During the night

fresh breezes and hazy weather; a strong current from the S.W.

setting to the N.E. swept the squadron close to Saloe beacon, on

the Swedish coast. On the morning of the 21st light airs and

hazy, a strong current setting about north at the rate of three

miles per hour: very great difficulty in keeping the ships from

falling on the rocks, they not being further than three miles

off, with a heavy swell right on, and no wind to command the

ships, or stem the current. Telegraph from the St. George to

the Cressy about half past eleven, A.M. "What shall we do this

night?" Cressy's answer, "In a few minutes I will give my

opinion." At three quarters past eleven, A.M., telegraph from

Cressy to St. George, "Anchor in Saloe if possible." About noon

got a Swedish pilot from Saloe, brought by the Bellete. At one

P.M. a strong breeze sprung up from N.N.E. and N.E. St. George,

Cressy, Defence, and Bellete made sail (close-reefed the

topsails, reefed courses, top-gallant masts struck) to the

westward, and continued our course all night through the

Sleeve. St. George steered and sailed very well about five

knots per hour. At ten A.M. on the 22nd, saw the land on the

lee beam, distance eight leagues; made the same known to the

St. George. At half-past eleven made the signal to the St.

George for the Holmes, bearing S.S.W. distance six or seven

leagues. At four P.M. Bovenbergen bore south about seven

leagues; stood to the westward all night; moderate weather,

wind about N. or N. by W. On the 23rd, at nine A.M., Cressy to

the St. George by signal, "Shall I take you in tow?" answered

with the negative flag: observed one of her rudder guys gone,

and the people repairing it. Wind had shifted to N.W. by W. the

squadron wore about seven hours thirty minutes A.M. and stood

to the N.E., with a view to open the Sleeve, the weather

appearing to indicate a gale of wind from that quarter. At ten

A.M. strong gales and squally with rain; St. George

close-reefed courses and topsails, then stood to the N.E. At

half-past eleven P.M. very strong gales split our foresail; St.

George took in topsails and courses. At one P.M. strong gales;

St. George set her foresail. At half-past two P.M. strong and

heavy squalls of wind and rain from the N.W. with a heavy sea;

observed the St. George to labour very much and roll very deep.

St. George shortened all sail except the mizen-staysail and

try-sail; St. George drifting to leeward so much as to oblige

us to bear up three or four times in a watch, each time one

mile, or three quarters at least, in order to keep to leeward

of her; the land of Bovenbergen on her lee bow about three

points, the Holmes right a head of her. The wind had at four

P.M. shifted to the N.N.W.; the land on her lee beam, nine

leagues, was that part of Jutland a few miles to the southward

of Bovenbergen. At eight o'clock the Horn Reef, bearing S.S.W.

distance forty miles; at this time a tremendous heavy sea was

setting on the shore in the direction of E.S.E. At six lost

sight of the Bellete; the last sight we had of the Defence she

was standing with her head in shore, E.N.E. under storm

mizen-stay-sail and try-sail. At nine P.M. the gale still

increasing; St. George, as before, drifting about N.E. or N.E.

by E. with storm mizen-stay-sail and try-sail only, appearing

from some cause to be unable to wear, as she never attempted

it, although it was the most safe and profitable tack to be

upon, there being no possibility of getting off on the larboard

tack, but on the contrary must inevitably go on shore; this I

particularly remarked with great anxiety and concern from three

o'clock that afternoon, and was constantly in expectation of

his wearing, and carrying what sail he could on the starboard

tack, in order, if possible, to clear the Horn Reef: although

the clearing of the reef might be doubtful, it was the only

chance left, and would at least have given him a longer drift;

but from his not doing so, I am of opinion _his masts had

complained and were unable to carry any more sail_, as well as

the rudder, which certainly wanted securing. At ten P.M. as no

steps were taken by the St. George to wear, and finding from

our soundings and reckoning we were only nine leagues from the

land on our lee beam, that we could not possibly clear the land

on the larboard tack, and having drifted so far to the

eastward, it became a doubt whether we should be able to clear

the Horn Reef, and that there was no time to lose, on which to

resolve either to cut away all our masts and try to hold on by

our anchors, after having run into shoal water, which we have

reason to believe was nearer than our reckoning gave us. Had we

taken such a step our success would have been very doubtful,

although we might previously have cut away our masts, and made

the ship a complete wreck for that purpose, as we had only two

bower anchors and two cables on each, (the bower cables in each

being half worn,) no spare anchor to trust to, the sheet anchor

being broken in the shank, and only an old worn-out bower cable

(kept to be surveyed) which was bent to it. The Defence, I

believe, was differently situated in this respect; but that is

a mere conjecture. Thus the situation of the Cressy was very

alarming, which had most sensibly struck every individual on

board; the officers particularly, who had been so strongly

impressed with our perilous situation for some time before,

lamenting and verbally stating to me their opinion of our

inability and impossibility of being able to render any service

to the St. George, even in any way whatever, risk the Cressy as

much as I would. I desired them all to consult and let me know

their opinion in writing, which they did in the accompanying

hasty scrawl: No. 1, delivered about ten o'clock, and No. 2,

about quarter before eleven. Their sentiments and opinion being

the same as my own on the subject, namely, that we could not be

of any service to the St. George or to any person on board,

whatever might be her fate under the existing circumstances,

and that our destruction was certain if we lost any time in

getting on the other tack,--I then (after having ordered every

thing to be ready to cut away our masts) embraced the

alternative to wear and carry sail to save the ship, which I

did at half-past ten P.M. and passed close to the St. George

with our reefed fore-sail only, in order to induce him to wear,

and give him the opportunity of signifying his wish for me to

remain with him, if he did not approve of what we did, which he

might have done by four lights, in a diamond signal No. 30, or

by firing three guns, also night signal No. 30, "Keep your wind

on the larboard tack." Heavy and severe as the gale was, there

was considerable light, as we had a moon; although not seen,

yet it enlightened the atmosphere so as to enable us to see

every mast, sail, or any object that was above her hammocks: we

were so close in passing, that we could in moderate weather, at

such a distance, have conversed with great ease; and were about

a quarter of an hour in passing her; so that his not making any

signal, and his still keeping the St. George's head on the same

tack, I considered I had his approbation to use every endeavour

to clear the land and save the ship from being wrecked on the

lee shore.

The remainder of Captain Pater's narrative need not be given, as it

relates only to the proceedings in his own ship, and his arrival in

the Downs on the 30th December; neither need we give the opinions

alluded to, as they are a repetition of that of the Captain, and

signed by the five lieutenants, the master, the pilot, and the purser.

The first account of the wreck of the St. George and Defence was

received by a flag of truce, sent by the Danish General Tellequist

from Randers, that on the night between the 23rd and 24th of December,

a few miles to the southward of the Holmes, the fatal catastrophe took

place. The Danish commander-in-chief, after expressing much sympathy

and feeling on the sad disaster, informs Captain Maurice that the

bodies of Captain Atkins and other officers had been found and

interred with military honours, but they had not then discovered the

body of the Admiral. It appeared from the account of the survivors,

eighteen in number, (twelve belonging to the St. George and six to the

Defence,) that the St. George struck about one o'clock on the morning

of the 24th, and soon afterwards the Defence, a short distance to the

northward of her. The anchors in both ships were immediately let go,

and the masts cut away; the St. George came for a short time head to

wind. About four she parted in the middle; the sea making a fair

breach over the ships, many of the crew were washed overboard, while

others were killed or frozen to death where they had tied themselves

to the weather-railing, among whom were the Admiral and his young and

gallant friend Captain Guion. It is related that one tremendous sea

struck the Defence with such inconceivable force that it lifted the

spare anchor out of its berth, threw it upon end, and in its fall it

killed about thirty men! The fury of the waves had swept all before

them; two of the men were saved in a little Norway yawl belonging to

the Author, which his lamented friend Captain Guion had offered to

take home for him, and which was the only boat that reached the shore;

some were saved on the poop of the St. George when torn from her about

five o'clock.

Captain Atkins and Mr. Royston, Secretary to the Admiral, were both

picked up by the Danes ere life was quite extinct, but all the

kindness and humane endeavours of that hospitable people failed in

keeping up animation. It was affirmed by the survivors of the Defence,

that on the Cressy wearing, the master went to Captain Atkins, and

reported that the St. George must inevitably be wrecked, and that

destruction would also attend the Defence if she did not follow the

Cressy! To this Captain Atkins said, "Has the Defence's signal been

made to part company?" and being answered in the negative, he replied,

"Then I will not leave him." Such heroic sentiments, however worthy of

the gallant Captain, cannot be justified when it was impossible to

render assistance, and the sacrifice not only of his own men, but the

valuable lives of seven hundred others, must have been the well-known

consequence.

Captain Pater's conduct became the subject of a court-martial, by

which he was honourably acquitted. Could he by staying longer with his

Admiral have rendered him any relief he never would have quitted him,

nor did he do so until it became his bounden duty to preserve his own

ship and the gallant crew he commanded.

From the testimony of the survivors of the St. George, who arrived on

board the Victory in April 1812, we learnt that the St. George lost

all her jury-masts and rudder before midnight, that she was many hours

in nine fathoms water, and that the anchors were not let go until she

struck the ground. We do not mean to argue on the probability, if she

had anchored, that she would have brought up or rode out the gale, but

after masts and rudder were gone, surely there was a chance. We

mention it to call the attention of those who may be at some future

period in a similar situation, and as a circumstance which appears by

the following extract of a letter to have struck Sir James, who had

often successfully depended on his anchors under trying occasions.

After a minute perusal of Captain Pater's narrative, I cannot

but express my serious apprehension for the safety of the St.

George upon so dangerous a coast and under such perilous

circumstances; at the same time there still exists a hope that

she may have been brought up at her anchors, and weathered the

severity of the gale, of which I fervently pray their lordships

may soon receive information.

We have dwelt longer on the mournful subject than we intended to do,

in consequence of opinions having been entertained that Sir James had

not consulted Admiral Reynolds and Captain Guion on the subject of the

return of the St. George from Gothenburg, and that therefore some

blame might be attached to him as commander-in-chief. Now, we are not

only able from personal knowledge to contradict these reports, but to

assure our readers that the opinions of these experienced and gallant

officers were actually taken, and likewise those of Captains Pater and

Atkins, immediately on the arrival of the ship at Gothenburg. The

fleet having been detained at Wingo Sound by storms and westerly winds

until the 18th, Admiral Reynolds repeatedly entreated Sir James to

permit the ship to cross the North Sea, and in a conversation the

Author had with Captain Guion, there was in his opinion not the

smallest doubt of her capability of performing the voyage. So well did

she sail that she beat many of the ships of the convoy that sailed at

the same time, and on the morning of the 19th she was still in sight

of the squadron. The loss of the Hero and her convoy, on the Hawk

Sands off the Texel, took place on the same disastrous night, and with

no less fatal consequences.

It appears from letters received from Sir George Hope, that this

convoy returned to Wingo Sound in obedience to signals from the

Victory, but sailed on the 21st with the same breeze, which induced

the St. George to leave Saloe. She succeeded in getting out of the

Sleeve, and having a fair N.W. gale, unfortunately shaped her course

too far to the eastward. Captain Newman and all the crew, excepting

about forty men, perished.

The account of this event, having been published by Capt. Brenton and

other naval historians, need not be further dwelt on. The loss of the

three ships and convoy, as well as that of the Saldanha, in which not

less than five thousand men perished, was made a question in the

House of Commons, when Mr. Yorke, first Lord of the Admiralty, touched

on the mournful subject with so much feeling that it drew forth an

elegant and well-merited expression from Mr. Whitbread, who observed,

that "the calamities were the effect of misfortune alone, and that it

was a consolation to reflect that no blame could be imputed to any

one."

Although Sir James was conscious that such was really the case, it

need scarcely be added that his mind was deeply affected when the

melancholy news arrived, nor could he for many months conceal his

affliction.

The last convoy under Captain Dashwood of the Pyramus, arrived safely.

Instead of passing through the Belt as intended, he availed himself of

a strong S.S.W. wind, and boldly pushed through the Malmoe Channel, led

by the Ranger, Captain Acklom, who so much distinguished himself on

this occasion as to gain his promotion to the rank of post-captain as

a reward for his services.

This convoy consisted of one hundred and twenty sail, leaving only

twelve vessels at Carlshamn, which were a part of the St. George's

convoy that could not obtain anchors and cables. They were off

Falsterbo on the 20th of December, when the wind, which had been

northerly, shifted to the S.W.; on the 23rd they reached Elsineur

Roads, and on the 28th Gothenburg, whence they sailed in company with

Rear-admiral Hope in the Ardent, who had thus finished the service of

the Baltic for the season.

Colonel Dornberg, who had been employed on the Continent

confidentially, had ascertained that Prussia would be forced to join

France against Russia, therefore the Government transports with arms

intended for their assistance were sent back, and formed part of the

Hero's unfortunate convoy.

The Victory, after parting with the St. George, was detained by

baffling winds and thick weather. Fortunately on the 21st good

altitudes of the sun were obtained for the chronometers, and thereby

the situation of the fleet was determined before the storm began on

the 22nd: at noon it blew a strong gale from N.W. (by compass);

Leostoff bore N. 31, W. 203 miles, the Texel S. 136 miles; but an

allowance of two points was made for what was called _indraft_, and

the course steered was S.W. by W. On the 23rd the storm increased with

inconceivable violence: the Victory was scudding under close-reefed

main-top-sail. At noon the signal was made for longitude, when it

appeared that the reckoning of the whole fleet was much to the

westward of the Victory, particularly the Vigo, no less than

eighty-four miles; but none of the ships had observations for the

chronometers, and therefore the commander-in-chief determined on

running by the reckoning of his own ship; and had he not done so, the

whole fleet would have shared the fate of the Hero in the same spot!

At ten P.M. soundings were struck on the broad fourteen, which cleared

up all doubts on the subject; on the next day the gale moderated, the

fleet passed the Gallopere light and anchored to stop tide; on

Christmas-day passed down Channel, and in the evening anchored in St.

Helen's.

I may here observe with propriety, that I have since found the

deviation from the true course, which by pilots and masters of ships

had been attributed to _indraft_, &c. was occasioned entirely by the

_deviation_ of the magnetic needle when steering to the S.W. the point

on which the attraction found in almost every ship was, by a series of

experiments, established to be, from one to two points; (see Ross's

voyage 1818;) while it is notorious that if the ship was standing N.E.

the opposite point, it had been always found that not only no

allowance for _indraft_ was necessary, but that the error in the

reckoning was on the opposite way; and we therefore conclude that many

ships have been lost for want of making the necessary allowance for

the _deviation_ of the compass in steering across the North Sea, in a

storm from N.W.

A correspondence was carried on with the Captains of this squadron

without leading to any satisfactory reason for the extraordinary

errors in the reckonings of each ship, and it is mentioned here to

warn those who may be in a similar situation, and to induce them to

obtain the errors of their compasses, for which plain rules have been

given, if they are not provided with Professor Barlow's apparatus.

On the arrival of the Victory at Spithead, Sir James applied for leave

of absence, and arriving in town received the unqualified approbation

of Ministers, and of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, for his

wise and firm conduct on this critical situation of affairs in the

Baltic, and for the important service he had rendered the country in

maintaining peace, and in supporting the dignity of the Crown and the

best interests of the community.

Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez. Vol II · 第 12 / 16 章