EXPULSION OF VON LETTOW-VORBECK FROM
GERMAN EAST AFRICA
On the 19th October patrols sent out at dawn reported that the enemy had
retired. The 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African
Rifles accordingly occupied the mission _boma_ and the church, while the
remainder of No. 1 Column camped on the crest of the hill to the north,
overlooking the valley of the Lukuledi, from which on the preceding day
Captain Methven had caught his first view of the mission buildings.
Before this move was made, I Company of the Gold Coast Regiment was
dispatched to occupy a ridge to the north-east of the camp in which the
Regiment had passed the night; and from here a strong officer’s patrol
was sent out along the road which runs in an easterly direction from
Lukuledi to Chikukwe. At 3 p.m. a detachment of the 1st Battalion of the
3rd King’s African Rifles took over this post from I Company; and at 6
p.m. the patrol along the Chikukwe road returned and reported that it
had obtained touch with the enemy at a point about four miles down the
road.
During the day the Battery rejoined the Gold Coast Regiment, and the
129th Baluchis rejoined No. 1 Column.
On the 20th October the enemy delivered an attack in force upon the 1st
Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, who were in
occupation of the Mission Hill. This attack was the result of certain
rapid movements that von Lettow-Vorbeck had made during the past few
days, which are of sufficient importance to warrant some detailed
description.
As we have seen, he had last been heard of at Ruwanga, a point some
sixteen miles north-east of Ruponda; and on the arrival of No. 1 Column
at the Mission Station of Mnero, it had been confidently anticipated
that he would take energetic steps to defend his food depôts at Ruponda.
Instead, leaving perhaps three companies with six machine-guns to resist
the British advance at Lukuledi, he marched rapidly eastward, and joined
forces with the troops which were opposing “Linforce” near Mtama, on the
Lindi-Massassi road. He here fought two severely contested actions with
“Linforce,” at Njengao and at Mahiwa, which places are only two or three
miles apart, the former being about four miles further down the Linda
road than Mtama. The brunt in both these engagements was borne by the
Nigerians and by General O’Grady’s Brigade, which was mainly composed of
battalions of the King’s African Rifles, who succeeded in inflicting
unusually heavy losses on von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces, but themselves
suffered even more serious casualties. It was estimated at the time,
that the enemy lost 800 men killed and wounded, and that the British
loss was approximately 2000.
Satisfied that he had now done enough temporarily to paralyse the
advance of “Linforce,” von Lettow-Vorbeck forthwith set off post-haste
down the main road in the direction of Massassi, taking with him four of
the companies which had been in action with the Nigerians both at
Njengao and at Mahiwa. Pushing on very rapidly to Chigugu, he left two
companies there, and picked up three fresh ones which had been in action
at Lukuledi on the 18th October.
His plan was to approach the last-named place from the south with the
men under his command, advancing from the direction of Massassi, while
the two companies which he had left at Chigugu simultaneously attacked
the left flank of the British from the east. These concerted movements
were timed to be executed on the morning of the 20th October.
On that day the 1st Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles,
supported by the 25th Cavalry, had orders to advance toward Massassi,
and it had actually set forth upon its march when it suddenly found
itself confronted by von Lettow-Vorbeck’s five companies, with which
were two guns. The King’s African Rifles took up a position south of the
church, which completely dominated the German attack, and though the
bulk of the 25th Cavalry failed to support them, they, in the fight
which ensued, not only inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy but caused
him to abandon two of his machine-guns, and took from him also a number
of prisoners.
It is worth noting that during the British attack upon the Mission Hill
at Lukuledi, on the 18th October, care had been exercised to avoid
shelling the church. Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s gunners were hampered by no
corresponding scruples, and one of their first acts was to bring the
tall spire down with a crash.
Meanwhile the two German companies left by von Lettow-Vorbeck at Chigugu
had made their way across to a spot north of the main camp and a mile or
so up the road, where the 25th Cavalry had their encampment. They found
it practically undefended, and they in a few moments reduced it to a
woeful state of chaos. The horses left in it were slaughtered, stores
and equipment were destroyed, and everything which was spoilable was
completely ruined.
The 129th Baluchis had been sent forward to support the 1st Battalion of
the 3rd King’s African Rifles on the Mission Hill, and the camp was
taken over by the Gold Coast Regiment with the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
King’s African Rifles in reserve. The enemy force which had demolished
the camp of the 25th Cavalry, twice attempted to attack during the day,
but on both occasions were beaten off without difficulty. That was all
that these two companies were able to achieve, and von Lettow-Vorbeck’s
main attack having met with no success, the Germans drew off, probably
in the direction of Massassi. The enemy’s troops had been worked with
merciless severity during the past few days. They had fought two severe
actions on the Lindi road, and thereafter had covered by dint of forced
marches a distance of not less than fifty miles. Without rest or
refreshment they had then been launched upon an attack against Lukuledi,
where they had encountered very effective resistance from the 1st
Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles. The prisoners captured were
pitifully exhausted; and there can be little doubt that von
Lettow-Vorbeck on this occasion subjected his willing troops to a strain
beyond their strength.
In these circumstances it is all the more regrettable that at this
moment orders were received by No. 1 Column to fall back on Ruponda.
This order was dictated not by choice but by necessity. “Hanforce” was
still based for its supplies upon Kilwa Kisiwani, which was distant from
Ruponda by road very nearly one hundred and fifty miles. It had been
hoped that by this time the provisioning of the columns might be
supplemented by supplies landed at Lindi, which is only seventy odd
miles from Lukuledi; but the very stout resistance which “Linforce” had
encountered had prevented it from advancing westward from its base for
much more than half that distance. Already, after the fight at Nahungu,
difficulties of supply and transport had compelled the British Command
to detach the Nigerian Brigade from the troops thrusting south from the
Kilwa area, and had caused it to transfer itself to “Linforce.” Now,
once again, the ever-lengthening lines of communication behind
“Hanforce” had imposed upon the machinery of transport a strain which
threatened it with a serious break-down. There was no alternative,
therefore, but temporarily to shorten those lines, and though it was
realized that the moral effect which a retirement would produce at this
juncture could not but be deplorable, orders were issued for the column
to fall back.
Accordingly, at 8.30 p.m. on the 22nd October, No. 1 Column began its
march back to Ruponda. To the Gold Coast Regiment which, during the
advance, had so often acted as advanced guard, the position of
rear-guard was now assigned, and it was not till 3 a.m., after the last
of the long train of laden men and animals had finally crawled out of
camp, that the Regiment, too, set forth upon the road. All fires were
left burning, and everything was done to prevent the enemy from
detecting the movement which was in progress. Chingwea, twelve miles up
the road, was reached without incident, and at 3.30 p.m. the retirement
to Ruponda was continued. Ruponda was reached by the Gold Coast Regiment
and the perimeter of the camp was taken over by it at 9.40 a.m. on the
23rd October.
From this date until the 7th November the Gold Coast Regiment remained
in the standing camp which had now been formed at Ruponda, furnishing
patrols which kept in touch with No. 2 Column to the east, drilling the
men for three hours daily, and training gun-teams for the Stokes Battery
with which it had now been provided.
On the 7th November No. 1 Column resumed operations in the
Chigugu-Lukuledi area, and marched without incident to Chingwea. Here it
learned that “Linforce,” which was still fighting its way down the
Lindi-Massassi road, had the day before been in action against eight of
von Lettow-Vorbeck’s companies, and that after the engagement the enemy
had retired in the direction of Nangus, which is on the main road at a
spot about twenty miles east by north of Lukuledi, and about the same
distance north-east of Massassi.
On the 8th November No. 1 Column marched to Igumi on the left bank of
the Lukuledi River, seven miles below the mission station; and on the
following day, it pushed on to Chigugu, on the main Lindi-Massassi road.
This place is distant only about ten miles south-west of Nangus, where
von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces were reported to be encamped.
Meanwhile No. 2 Column had crossed the rear of No. 1 Column and had
occupied Lukuledi, whence it made a strong reconnaissance to Ndomondo on
the Lukuledi River, two and a half miles up-stream from Igumi. None of
these movements met with any opposition from the enemy.
On the 10th November, No. 1 Column pushed on east by south to the
mission station at Ndanda, and a high ridge on the south of this place
was occupied by the 129th Baluchis and the 55th Rifles, which had now
joined the Column. Only slight opposition was met with and four
Europeans were captured, and an enemy hospital was found containing 54
sick and wounded German combatants, and 120 _Askari_. There were also at
this place a number of civilians and several European women and
children.
The 1st Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles occupied the village,
and the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles took up a
position on the road leading from Ndanda to Nangus. The rest of No. 1
Column encamped at the mission station. Word was here received that
“Linforce” was only three miles to the east of Nangus, and that No. 2
Column had occupied Chigugu, where No. 1 Column had spent the preceding
night. Thence they had advanced toward the mission station at Jumbe
Nwinama, which lies about two and a half miles to the east, where they
had come into collision with the enemy.
It looked at the moment as though von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces were at
last in a fair way to be surrounded, and it was anticipated that his
main body would try to escape _viâ_ Chiwata, leaving strong rear-guards
to keep both “Linforce” and “Hanforce” in play, and to delay their
advance.
On the 11th November No. 1 Column remained encamped at Ndanda Mission
Station, two strong patrols being sent out; the one toward Nangus and
the other toward Chiwata. The latter was undertaken by B Company of the
Gold Coast Regiment, which went some miles down the track without seeing
any traces of the enemy.
On the 12th November No. 1 Column marched back to Chigugu, its objective
being Mwiti, which is situated on the right bank of the river of that
name—a tributary of the Rovuma—and lies fourteen miles due east of
Massassi and about half that distance almost due south of Chiwata.
Moving from Chigugu to Chikukwe on the 13th November, No. 1 Column
attacked and occupied Mwiti on the 14th November. The Gold Coast
Regiment, however, was in reserve upon this day and took no part in the
action beyond sending a patrol, furnished by I Company, to occupy a
ridge on the right of the advance of the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
Regiment of the King’s African Rifles. This was achieved without
opposition from the enemy.
The country in which “Hanforce” was now operating consisted of a
succession of hills which rise from the plain to the height of anything
from 1000 to 2000 feet, and are grouped about the western and southern
flanks of the great Makonde plateau. The latter, which towers above the
highest of its foothills by a good 1000 feet or more, is an elevated
piece of flat land, roughly circular in shape, situated between the
Lukuledi and Rovuma rivers to the north-east of Newala, and measuring
approximately forty miles from north to south and again from east to
west. The slopes of all these hills and those which lead up to the
plateau are covered by grass and trees; and though the latter are
sparsely scattered over the hillsides, they grow more thickly in the
valleys, which seen from above seem to be choked with vegetation. The
foothills are intersected by deep ravines and gorges, and it was through
these that von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces were now making their way in the
direction of Newala, the last German base in this part of the country.
Word had been received from the War Office on the 9th November that a
German airship was _en route_ for East Africa, and later it was reported
that it had started, that it intended to effect a landing on the summit
of the Makonde Plateau, and that it might be expected to arrive on the
14th November. This was precisely the sort of spectacular performance,
dear to the German heart, in which the enemy so frequently indulged
during the war, and which usually involved him in expense and risk
altogether disproportionate to the military value that could thereby
conceivably be secured. It was doubtless thought by simple folk in
Berlin that the dramatic arrival of a Zeppelin on the battlefields of
East Africa would fill the native troops fighting against von
Lettow-Vorbeck with awe, terror and despair, and would produce upon them
the demoralizing effect which a belief that the Germans stood possessed
of supernatural powers might be expected to inspire. But the Oriental
and African native of to-day is a thoroughly _blasé_ person who has long
ago outgrown such childish weaknesses. To put the matter colloquially,
he is “fed up” with European inventions, which have almost ceased to
amuse or interest him, and have long ago ceased to excite his wonder,
much less his fear. The arrival of a German Zeppelin at this juncture
would have been welcomed by the men of the Gold Coast Regiment, for
instance, as a bright spot breaking the drab monotony of their days;
while the British airmen, who by now were heartily sick of the practical
inutility of most of the work that they were doing in East Africa, would
have hailed its coming with even greater joy. The Zeppelin is believed
to have actually made a start from Aleppo, or from some other place in
Asia Minor, but if so it was recalled before it had proceeded far upon
its journey. Perhaps von Lettow-Vorbeck, who throughout received
frequent messages from his Government by wireless, and who may
occasionally have been able to communicate with it in his turn, warned
the Great General Staff that an airship could produce no effect,
military or moral, that it was pretty certain to be wrecked, and that,
in a word, the game was not worth the candle.
The mission station at Mwiti, unlike most of its counterparts in East
Africa, has been built upon flat land, shut in toward the north and east
by a semicircular range of hills; and from this place the Pioneer
Company of the Gold Coast Regiment was sent on the 15th November to
patrol to Manyambas, six and a half miles to the south-east, which is
connected with Mwiti by a track skirting the base of the hills. The
Pioneers left half a company at Maruchiras, a place on this track beyond
the Miwale River, a left affluent of the Mwiti, which in its turn is a
left tributary of the Rovuma; for the enemy had now been driven south of
the Mambir, the last river of note in erstwhile German East Africa, and
had been definitely pushed into the valley of the Rovuma, which is the
northern boundary of the Portuguese possessions.
Meanwhile, at 2 p.m., the rest of the Gold Coast Regiment marched out of
camp at Mwiti, and breasting a long slope in an easterly direction,
ascended to the summit of a hill lying immediately under the lee of the
escarpment which, across a deep valley, leads up to the Makonde Plateau.
The latter rising directly to the north of Miwale Hill, the eminence
occupied by the Gold Coast Regiment, soared above it to a height of
perhaps 2000 feet.
The object of this movement was, if possible, to locate a German camp
which was believed to exist at Luchemi, in the ravine between Miwale
Hill and the slope leading up to the plateau; but looking down from this
height, the valley was revealed as a sea of tree-tops and vegetation to
the depths of which the eye could not penetrate. At 6.15 p.m. a camp was
selected on a spur jutting out into the valley. To the east, however,
there rose yet another and a higher spur, connected with that upon which
the camp was pitched by a saddle, the whole covered by grass and trees.
This spur was reported by a patrol from a picket of the 55th Rifles,
which had taken up a position on the northern flank of Miwale Hill prior
to the arrival of the Gold Coast Regiment on its eastern summit, to be
held by the enemy. This rendered the position of the camp somewhat
precarious, and that night no lights or fires were permitted.
Word was received that evening that the Nigerians had occupied Chiwata,
five miles to the north, at one o’clock that afternoon, and that on the
morrow they would operate from that place against the enemy camp at
Luchemi.
At dawn on the 16th November, Captain Briscoe with twenty rifles drawn
from A Company set out from the camp to patrol down into the valley in a
northerly direction; and Captain McElligott started at the same time, in
command of a similar patrol, to reconnoitre the high spur across the
saddle to the east of the camp. Captain Briscoe’s patrol was fired upon
very shortly after he left camp; and a little later a party of the enemy
were seen moving about down in the valley. It was one of the many trials
of the campaign in East Africa that even a glimpse of the folk against
whom they were fighting was very rarely vouchsafed to the attacking
forces. It was the rôle of the former to keep well under cover at all
times, to let their pursuers discover their whereabouts if they could,
and to make them pay as heavy a price as possible for the knowledge so
obtained. The spectacle of a number of German soldiers, visible to the
naked eye, and scuttling about in the valley, accordingly created
considerable excitement, and fire was at once opened upon them with the
Gold Coast Regiment’s machine-guns. There are few feats more difficult,
however, than accurately to find the range of an object situated far
below and aimed at from a considerable height above it. Almost
invariably the fire is not sufficiently depressed, and the bullets fly
well over the target. It may be doubted, therefore, whether on this
occasion much execution was done. The enemy, however, quickly took
cover, and was presently seen to be in action with the 55th Rifles, who
were working up the valley from west to east.
Between eight and nine o’clock in the morning the rest of No. 1 Column
joined the Gold Coast Regiment on Miwale Hill; and the 1st Battalion of
the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles was sent south to work
round the high spur on the east, which was being patrolled by Captain
McElligott and his party.
The latter had reached the spur without encountering any opposition, but
he reported that the northern slopes were occupied by the enemy, and
that patrols sent out by him in that direction had been fired upon. At
1.45 p.m. Captain McElligott, signalling by flag-wagging from the
western slope of the spur, confirmed this report; and in the meantime B
Company had been dispatched to reinforce his patrol. With B Company also
flag-communication was established, and the 55th Rifles and the 2nd
Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles were sent forward to occupy
the spur.
No sooner had Captain McElligott’s signaller set to work on the western
slope of the spur than the enemy from the bottom of the valley began
shelling the British position with quite extraordinary accuracy. The
first shot was aimed at Captain McElligott’s signaller and scored a
direct hit, blowing the poor fellow to pieces. The shelling which
followed was no less accurate, and the target this time was the crowded
perimeter camp in which No. 1 Column had that morning joined up with the
Gold Coast Regiment. As all the carriers and troops were inside the
perimeter, the position was rendered peculiarly vulnerable, and great
commotion and consternation were caused among the non-combatants by the
extreme precision of the enemy’s aim. As soon, therefore, as the 55th
Rifles and the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles had
established themselves upon the spur to the east, the whole of the
remainder of No. 1 Column moved across to that less dangerous spot,
where another perimeter camp, sheltered this time from the guns in the
valley, was formed. During the night the enemy retired from his
positions on the northern flank of this spur.
It is not thought that any large body of the enemy was present on this
day, but a strong rear-guard—for such it probably was—had been able to
check the British advance, and had succeeded in giving von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s main body the time it needed to escape from a desperate
situation, and to slip away in the direction of Newala.
The casualties sustained by the Gold Coast Regiment on the 16th November
were 1 colour-sergeant, who had been attached to the Gold Coast Regiment
from the South African Infantry, killed, and Captain Dawes and 1
colour-sergeant wounded, 3 soldiers and 1 carrier killed, and 9 soldiers
and 8 carriers wounded.
On the 17th November No. 1 Column moved forward in an easterly direction
to a camp which had been occupied on the preceding night by the 1st
Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles; and the
latter marched east and occupied a big water-hole near Luchemi. On the
following day Luchemi was occupied by No. 1 Column, no resistance being
offered by the enemy; and on the 19th November the column pushed on to
Mkundi, which lies almost due west of the hills upon which Massassi is
situated, and at a distance of perhaps two and a half miles from that
station. It will be remembered that Massassi had been chosen by von
Lettow-Vorbeck, after he had been driven across the Rufiji, as his
General Headquarters. He had now, however, abandoned it and was basing
his present operations upon Newala, which is distant only a dozen miles
from the Portuguese frontier on the Rovuma River. It was for Newala that
the enemy’s forces were now believed to be heading; and it was
understood that the troops under von Tafel’s command, who had been
driven in a south-easterly direction by the advance of the Belgians and
of General Northey’s column, had been ordered to join forces with von
Lettow-Vorbeck at this place.
At Mkundi information was received that the Nigerians had captured a
German hospital on the previous day, containing 25 British, 2 Belgian
and 5 Portuguese officers prisoners, and 250 German and 700 natives,
most of whom, however, were believed to be carriers, though there were
100 or more _Askari_ among them. Twenty German officers and 242
_Askari_, and 4 European and 10 native non-combatants had also
surrendered on this day. Von Lettow-Vorbeck, with the Governor of German
East Africa—Herr Schnee—were believed to have with them some 800 to 1200
men, and to be about to quit the erstwhile German colony and to cross
over into Portuguese territory.
On the evening of the 19th November the disposition of the British
forces operating in this area was approximately as follows. No. 2 Column
had reached Nairombo on the left bank of the Mwiti River, twelve miles
south of Chiwata. One battalion of the Nigerians was at Mpoto, on the
main road from Massassi to Newala, and distant about fourteen miles to
the north-west of the latter place. Two Nigerian battalions were at
Manyambas, the village to which the Pioneer Company of the Gold Coast
Regiment had marched from the mission station at Mwiti on the 15th
November; No. 3 Column was halting further north with orders not to
advance for the present; and the 25th Cavalry were near Lulindi,
fourteen miles east of Mpoto.
On the 20th November No. 1 Column marched from Mkundi, in a
south-easterly direction, to Lulindi, a distance of fourteen miles; and
here information was received that Lieutenant Isaacs, who, it will be
remembered, had been captured by the Germans during the fight at Nkessa
in the Uluguru Mountains on the 12th September, 1916, was among the
British officers who had been released by the Nigerians on the 18th
November. During his fourteen months’ captivity Lieutenant Isaacs had
lost about two stone in weight, and had suffered severely from the
shortage of all supplies, by which the Germans themselves had for many
months been acutely pinched. Apart from these inevitable hardships,
however, he and his fellow-European captives appear to have been well
treated. The absence of any British native soldiers among the men
released was, however, of sinister significance.
On the 21st November No. 1 Column advanced with the intention of making
a reconnaissance in force towards Newala for the purpose of attacking
and capturing this the last of the enemy’s strongholds in his African
colonies. The advance was led by the 55th Rifles and the 1st Battalion
of the 3rd King’s African Rifles, the Gold Coast Regiment following in
support. The 55th Rifles, however, occupied Newala without resistance,
and it was there ascertained that von Lettow-Vorbeck, with the remainder
of his war-worn forces and carrying the unhappy Herr Schnee with him,
had early that morning marched south to Nakalala on the northern bank of
the Rovuma, where a number of canoes had been assembled, and intended
thence to cross over into Portuguese territory.
At Newala 126 Germans surrendered to No. 1 Column.
[Illustration:
GOLD COAST REGIMENT.
2·95 Battery.
To face p. 196.
]