RUANGWA CHINI TO MNERO MISSION STATION
The operations which have formed the subject of the three preceding
chapters were designed to drive von Lettow-Vorbeck’s main force in a
south-easterly direction, until its progress should be stayed by
“Linforce.” This latter column, in the face of stubborn resistance, and
hampered, too, by the inadequate harbour facilities available at Lindi,
was fighting its way mile by mile down the road which leads from that
place to Massassi, where, as we have seen, von Lettow-Vorbeck had
established his General Headquarters. As must inevitably happen in
fighting of this character, all the British columns engaged occupied the
anomalous, one might almost say the paradoxical, position of attacking
forces which were incessantly and perpetually on the defensive. For them
were combined all the risks of the attack upon prepared and
unreconnoitred positions with all the moral and actual disadvantages
which ordinarily attach to the defence. They were, indeed, only properly
to be described as attacking forces because it was they that were
advancing, the enemy which was retreating before them; but in the daily
conflicts with the enemy, in which they were so constantly entangled,
the actual attack was usually delivered by the latter. It was he, not
the British, who selected the spot where fighting should take place; to
him, not to them, were secured, in practical perpetuity, the advantages
of surprise and of being the first to open fire; and while he could
concentrate all his attention upon the task of hampering, embarrassing
and resisting the advance of his opponents, the commanders of British
columns and units alike were for ever distracted from the actual
fighting by a knowledge of the extreme vulnerability of the formation in
which they were compelled to move, and by the precautions necessary to
protect it, as far as possible, from assaults upon its flanks. In this
rough country, where an advance was only possible along the main roads
or along well-worn paths, each column, with its inevitable train of
pack-animals and loaded carriers, sprawled down the tracks for miles in
the rear of the advancing force, men and beasts alike being often
compelled to go in single file. The pace of such a column is that of the
slowest man in it, for it is essential that straggling should, as far as
possible, be prevented. It is fortunate if the progress made averages a
modest two miles an hour—it will much more often approximate to half
that rate of advance; yet the actual fighting force, which can be spared
from the work of mere protection, cannot abandon the transport and press
on ahead for any great distance without the risk of becoming paralyzed
for lack of supplies and ammunition, or without exposing the long,
snake-like column of unarmed men and terrified animals to an attack that
may work in a few moments its complete disintegration.
The circumvention or outflanking of an enemy in these circumstances and
in such country, and still more the envelopment of him, are for the most
part impossible military feats. Such movements are generally dependent
upon the rapid man[oe]uvring of troops, and upon the enemy being kept in
complete ignorance of the strategy which his opponent is adopting; but
rapidity of movement was the one thing which could not be insured in the
East African bush, save only where a very small body of men was
concerned; and the forces at von Lettow-Vorbeck’s command were
sufficiently numerous to expose any weak unit, temporarily detached from
the main body, to imminent danger of being cut off or overwhelmed. As
for secrecy, that was unattainable in country where the enemy’s scouts
could creep up to within a few yards of a British column without running
any save the most slender risk of being observed, and where, when once
the main roads were quitted, the passage of any large body of men
through the bush inevitably caused an amount of noise and commotion that
was nicely calculated to advertise its presence to even the least
watchful and suspicious of enemies. When to these things are added the
fact that the British attack was always delivered upon an opponent who
was perfectly familiar with the geography of the country in which the
operations were being conducted, and to whom it was a matter of complete
indifference which point of the compass he should select as the
direction of his temporary retreat, the handicaps under which the
British commanders laboured can be to some extent appreciated.
Where possible mechanical transport was used, and this fact alone served
in a great measure to anchor the British columns to the main roads.
Sooner or later, however, there came a time or a place at which it was
no longer possible to depend even mainly upon motor transport, and
thereupon hosts of pack-animals and of head-carriers became the machine
of military supply, and the clamorous, snake-like column thus evolved
wriggled, with incredible slowness and clamour, into the wilderness of
grass and bush. Of the transport mule much has been written, and much
more has been said—most of it being unprintable. As for the East African
carrier, the late Sir Gerald Portal said the last word about him a full
quarter of a century ago. “As an animal of burden,” he wrote, “man is
out and out the worst. He eats more, carries less, is more liable to
sickness, gets over less ground, is more expensive, more troublesome,
and in every way less satisfactory than the meanest four-footed creature
that can be trained, induced, or forced to carry a load.”
The men who took part in the East African campaign are louder than any
in the expression of their admiration for von Lettow-Vorbeck, for the
pluck and grit and resource which he displayed, for his dogged
resolution, and for the fine resistance which he put up, and which may
justly be attributed to his individual energy and force of character.
Members of the British public, who happily for themselves have no
personal experience of bush-fighting, would do well to realize, however,
how heavy was the balance of the military advantages which he throughout
enjoyed, how completely these discounted any that could be derived by
his opponents from mere numerical superiority, and how practically
impossible is the task of rounding up in the bush a well-armed and
elusive enemy, which had been entrusted to the British commanders. It
may even be said that von Lettow-Vorbeck did not really make the most of
his opportunities, and that, given the superiority of his armament, he
played this game of bush-fighting less skilfully and successfully than
it had been played in their time by the Burman and by the Malay. Had he
realized, as the Burmese and the Malays both realized, how small a force
is needed to check and delay the advance of an enemy column through the
bush, and had he thereafter devoted most of his attention to constant
harassing attacks upon the terribly vulnerable transport trains, it
would have been altogether impossible for the British to drive him, in
the course of two dry-weather campaigns, steadily southward from the
country north of the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika Railway to beyond the
Rovuma River into Portuguese territory.
When all the facts above noted are borne in mind, therefore, it ceases
to be in any degree wonderful that von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces—which
from first to last never numbered more than five or six thousand
_Askari_ and perhaps a thousand to fifteen hundred white men—were able
to keep their British pursuers chasing them to and fro and up and down
the jungles of East Africa for nearly four years, with all the grotesque
lack of success with which a dignified middle-aged person runs after his
hat upon a windy day.
On the 4th October the Gold Coast Regiment, rested and refreshed, and
above all clean once more, took the field again.
As far as could be ascertained, the enemy appeared to be holding
positions on the right bank of the Mbemkuru River on the road to Namehi,
approximately four and a half miles to the west of Mitoneno. Patrols
sent out on the preceding day had drawn fire from him from the hills to
the south of the river, and it was General Hannyngton’s intention to
attempt to hold the enemy by a frontal attack delivered by one battalion
drawn from No. 1 Column, while the remainder of that force worked round
his right and sought to possess itself of the hilly country to the
south. The reserve of “Hanforce” was simultaneously to detail a weak
battalion to hold the enemy’s left flank, the rest being held ready in
support. Meanwhile, across the river on the British right, the 25th
Indian Cavalry were to remain at Kihindi, holding themselves in
readiness to move, at fifteen minutes’ notice, in any direction in which
their services might be required.
At dawn on the 4th October No. 1 Column moved out of its camp at
Mitoneno, and speedily found itself in action with the enemy. The Gold
Coast Regiment, however, was in reserve on this day, and so did not take
part in the action. The column fought its way forward for a distance of
four miles, and when, fairly late in the afternoon, the Regiment arrived
at the place where it was proposed that a perimeter camp should be
formed for the night, B Company, under Captain Methven, was sent to hold
a flat-crested hill upon the south, from which the camp was commanded.
At dusk the enemy fired a few shells over the camp, but the night passed
otherwise without incident.
At Ruangwa Chini, which is the name of the place in the neighbourhood of
which No. 1 Column had been held up all day, the road at the spot near
which the camp was being established runs east and west and roughly
parallel to the river, which is distant from it a few hundred yards on
the north—the right of the British advance. On the left the country was
very difficult, the road being overlooked by a succession of red,
laterite hills, for the most part bare of vegetation, though long rank
grass sprouted wherever there was a foothold for its roots. The slopes
of these hills were covered and strewn with outcrops and boulders of the
same red rock, the colour of which is the deep, rich hue that in England
is associated with the coombs and lanes of Devon. The principal feature
was the high hill which, late in the afternoon, B Company of the Gold
Coast Regiment was detailed to occupy in conjunction with the 129th
Baluchis. This hill, of naked red rock, rose in an almost precipitous
slope, from near the southern edge of the road, to a flat summit, barely
fifty yards in breadth, but extending in a position parallel to the
track for perhaps ten times that distance. Its southern and western
slopes, which were both accessible to the enemy, were much less abruptly
graded; but the approach from the east was again very steep. Near the
western extremity of this hill the road curved about its foot in a
south-westerly direction; and in the thickish bush, which lay between
the road and the river on the right front of the British advance, the
enemy had got a gun into position, whence it shelled the head of the
column from a safe distance. Early in the day the Germans had contrived
to shoot down a British aeroplane into the tree-tops in that locality;
but the pilot and the observer both escaped without any serious injury,
and were able to make their way back to No. 1 Column.
When that morning the British were advancing along the road from their
camp at Mitoneno, the 129th Baluchis had scaled the eastern face of the
flat-topped hill above described, and had worked along its summit to a
point near to its western extremity. Here, however, they had come into
contact with an enemy post, which had opened fire upon them with a
machine-gun. The Baluchis had twice retired, but later in the day they
had dug their way from the road to the base of the northern face of the
hill, and thence had climbed the steep ascent to its summit, where they
had dug themselves in in a line of rifle-pits drawn across the flat top
at a point about halfway along its length.
Meanwhile Lieutenant Foster of the 27th Mountain Battery had climbed
with his orderly up the eastern face of the hill, and from there was
engaged in observing for his unit the German fire from the gun posted in
the bush on the right front of the British advance. He presently became
aware that a party of the enemy was working its way up the gentle slope
on the southern side of the hill at a spot to the rear of the place
where the Baluchis were dug in; and Lieutenant Foster and his orderly,
taking cover behind a boulder, opened fire upon the enemy with revolver
and rifle, and for a time actually succeeded in staying or delaying his
advance.
This was the position of affairs when B Company, under Captain Methven,
who had been ordered to dig himself in at a spot near the foot of the
eastern extremity of the hill, in order to guard the left and left rear
of the column, was instructed to quit his entrenchments and go to the
assistance of the Baluchis on the summit. He and his men scaled the
steep eastern face of the hill, which the Baluchis had climbed in the
course of their first advance that morning, and were in time to relieve
Lieutenant Foster and his orderly, who were still maintaining their
plucky lone-hand fight. B Company then worked along the southern edge of
the crest until it had lined up abreast of the Baluchis in their shallow
rifle-pits, and thence pushed forward to the western extremity of the
hill, from whence the enemy was already retiring down the slope leading
to his main position. Here B Company dug itself in for the night, having
effectually relieved the camp from the menace to which the occupation of
this summit by the enemy had exposed it.
In the course of this operation B Company lost 1 private killed, 5
wounded, and 1 machine-gun carrier wounded.
On the 5th October, patrols sent out at dawn came almost immediately
into touch with the enemy, who was estimated to have some five companies
in position at Ruangwa Chini, about two miles to the west—namely, in the
direction of the column’s advance. The 129th Baluchis, the 1st Battalion
of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, and the 2nd Battalion
of the 2nd Regiment of that corps were dispatched to attack the
position, supported by the 27th Mountain Battery and the Kilwa Battery.
This hilly and rocky laterite country was very difficult, however, and
by 3.30 p.m. so little progress had been made that Colonel Orr decided
to break off the attack, and to withdraw the units that had been engaged
in it to the camp which the column had occupied on the preceding
afternoon.
The Gold Coast Regiment was not engaged during the day, but one of its
carriers was wounded by a stray bullet.
On the 6th October, No. 1 Column marched at dawn, working through the
bush in a southerly direction for the purpose of outflanking the right
of the enemy’s position, and of cutting off his retreat, should he
attempt to make use of any of the paths leading toward the south. The
troops in reserve remained in camp to hold the enemy in front, and to be
ready to thrust forward if the flanking movement proved successful. The
27th Cavalry, meanwhile, had instructions to co-operate from the left
bank of the Mbemkuru.
No. 1 Column was able to get into a position well to the rear of that
which the enemy had occupied on the preceding day, but the Germans had
retired from it during the night, leaving only a party of some forty men
to watch and delay the movements of the British troops. On the approach
of the latter this small band dispersed, and a part of it, which had
apparently got “bushed,” consisting of one German and ten _Askari_, was
captured.
No. 1 Column, suffering somewhat from the disillusionment and
disappointment which are the prevailing sentiments that bush-fighting
commonly inspires in a pursuing force, accordingly worked its way
laboriously back to the main road, where it learned that the rest of the
column, which had encountered no resistance, was encamped about two and
a half miles ahead of it.
The check at Ruangwa Chini is, in a measure, typical of military
operations in the bush. By it the enemy had been able to reduce the
advance achieved in the space of three days by a force, greatly its
numerical superior, to a matter of seven or eight miles; and in
accomplishing this he had exposed himself to no inconvenience and to
negligible danger.
On the 7th October No. 1 Column resumed its interrupted march down the
main road, which here runs west, with the river parallel to it upon the
right. The Gold Coast Regiment, less two companies and the battery,
furnished the advance guard. A distance of between eight and nine miles
was traversed during the day, and a camp was taken up for the night near
Kiperele Chini.
The 25th Cavalry were encamped, with one company of the Gold Coast
Regiment, at a spot about a mile and a quarter further down the road.
On the 8th October No. 1 Column marched down the main road, and camped
for the night at Mbemba, which is distant some ten miles from Kiperele
Chini.
From this point the road which No. 1 Column had been following more or
less continuously ever since it started pushing south from Narungombe,
runs on, in a south-westerly direction, still adhering closely to one or
another bank of the river. About ten miles from Mbemba it strikes the
main Liwale-Massassi road, at a place named Mangano, and here the 25th
Cavalry captured large quantities of stores belonging to the Germans.
These stores, however, consisted exclusively of native food-stuffs such
as mealies, the kind of millet locally called _mantana_, cassava and a
little rice—bulky stuff which, since it could not be carried off, was
burned to prevent it again falling into the enemy’s hands.
On the 9th October No. 1 Column left the main road and the banks of the
Mbemkuru River, and turning off to the left along a narrow track, pushed
forward in a south-south-easterly direction to Lihonja, distant from
Mbemba a matter of some seven miles. Here the main Liwale-Massassi road
was struck by the Column for the first time—a really first-class
laterite highway, some twenty to twenty-five feet in width, running
through grass country and open bush, with a surface consolidated by
constant traffic. This road was now followed for a distance of about
nine miles, and the Column camped for the night at a mission station
named Mnero. This is a pretty little station, with mission buildings and
church perched upon a low hill, and with at least a mile square of
well-cultivated land lying around it. The church was subsequently used
by the British as an advance hospital for their sick and wounded.
[Illustration:
GOLD COAST REGIMENT.
Men in marching order.
To face p. 160.
]
During October 9th, as on the two preceding days, the advance of No. 1
Column had been accomplished without incident.
Eight miles down the road from Mnero Mission Station, to the east and
slightly to the south of that place, lies Ruponda, where yet another
large food depôt was known to have been established by the enemy, and
this was now the Column’s immediate objective.
Having quitted the banks of the Mbemkuru, the British troops were once
again dependent upon water-holes, but the country was here less arid
than it had been further north between Narungombe and Nahunga; and at
Mnero itself, and thence all along the line of march eastward and
southward, a sufficient, and at times even an abundant, supply of water
was available either in existing water-holes or to be obtained by
digging.
With the quitting of Mbemkuru Valley and the push to the south upon
which No. 1 Column was now embarked, the second phase of the advance may
be said to have ended and the third phase to have begun.