THE HALT AT NARUNGOMBE
Although the Germans had abandoned their position at Narungombe, the
severe losses which they had inflicted upon the British were out of all
proportion to any advantages which the latter could claim to have
secured. The check, too, impressed the British command with the
difficulty of dealing with the enemy unless the pursuit could be
rendered not only rapid but continuous, and above all with the fact that
an adequate supply of water was the hinge upon which all future
operations must turn. At Narungombe the very machine-guns of the Gold
Coast Regiment had for a time been put out of action through lack of
water wherewith to cool the jackets, and the men in the firing-line had
been cruelly tortured by thirst during the greater part of that day.
After the fight at Narungombe, therefore, the column under General
Beves’ command remained in camp at that place to refit. There
reinforcements speedily arrived, and General Hannyngton, returning from
sick-leave, presently resumed command of the force. A large fortified
camp was established; a space to the north of it was cleared and made
into an aerodrome; supplies of every description were accumulated; and
all things were made as ready as circumstances permitted for a renewed
advance. Meanwhile no forward movement was attempted from July 20th to
September 17th, a delay during two precious months of the dry season
which unfortunately gave the enemy also time to rest and reorganize, to
complete his preparations for further resistance to the advance, and to
accumulate supplies at his advanced bases and depôts. It was desired,
however, that General Hannyngton’s new advance should form part of a
much larger scheme; and its timing, so as to ensure co-operation with
another column whose movements will be described in the following
paragraph, imposed perhaps a longer period of inactivity than was
necessary merely for the purpose of refitting.
The Nigerian Brigade, which had arrived in East Africa some months after
the Gold Coast Regiment, had endured unspeakable things during the wet
season of 1916-17 in its camp on the northern bank of the Rufiji. Here
the Brigade had suffered from an insufficiency of supplies and the
difficulties occasioned by a water-logged countryside. Now three
battalions, under General Cunliffe, had been brought round by sea to
Kilwa Kisiwani, and were about to operate as a separate column on the
right of General Hannyngton’s force, at present encamped at Narungombe.
The task of these columns would be to endeavour to drive the enemy
southward into the Lindi area; and meanwhile a large force, of which the
remaining battalion of the Nigerians formed a part, had been landed at
Lindi, and was trying to slip in behind the enemy for the purpose of
helping to encircle him.
Meanwhile, Belgian troops from the Congo were advancing in a
south-easterly direction, with Mahenge as their immediate
objective,—Mahenge being an important place, two hundred miles due west
of Kilwa, on the main road which runs north and south from Songia to
Kilossa on the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika railway. Simultaneously,
General Northey’s force, which had worked through from Northern Rhodesia
and had had a certain amount of fighting in the neighbourhood of Lake
Tanganyika, was advancing, in a north-easterly direction, upon Mpepo, a
place that lies fifty miles south-west of Mahenge. The object of both
these forces, and of a third which was advancing southward with its base
at Dadome on the Dar-es-Salaam railway, was the envelopment or
dislodgment of the German European and native troops which, under the
command of Major von Tafel, were operating in the western part of the
territory, mostly to the south of the Ulanga, which is an upper branch
of the Rufiji River.
The position at Narungombe, which as we have seen is situated on a main
road that runs north and south some thirty miles to the east of the
highway that leads from Kilwa Kivinje to Liwale, was as follows. The
enemy had retired down the former of these roads to Mihambia, which is
distant only twelve miles from Narungombe, and where there are another
set of water-holes; and he had established here his main advanced
position. From the high-road at Mihambia, a footpath leads west to a
place called Kitiia, three miles away, where four tracks meet. One of
these runs for five miles in a westerly direction till a ravine, which
bears the name of Liwinda, is struck; one runs south-east to rejoin the
high-road at Mpingo five miles south of Mihambia, and northward to
Mikikole, which is some five and a half miles off. At Mikikole the Gold
Coast Regiment had an outpost; and from this place footpaths lead, one
north-west to Narungombe; one east to a point on the main road four and
a half miles south of Narungombe, occupied by the company of the 2nd
Battalion of the King’s African Rifles, to which the name of Gregg’s
Post was given; and a third in a south-westerly direction, crossing
Liwinda Ravine, and running on to some water-holes nine miles further
off near the native village of Mbombomya, and thence to Ndessa. This
latter place and Mnitshi on the high-road, some ten miles south of
Mihambia, were at this time the principal advanced bases and supply
depôts of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces in this portion of the territory,
though at neither of them had any fortification been attempted. On a
hill near Mpingo, however, the enemy had established a signal-station.
The country hereabouts is for the most part a wide expanse of undulating
flat, studded with frequent trees, smothered in thick, and often tall
grass, and broken here and there by patches of dense bush. At this
season of the year it was waterless, save for a few ponds spattered very
sparsely over the face of the land. Bush-fires had been raging
intermittently for weeks, and in many places the country was bare and
blackened. Though now and again glades occur among the trees, it is
rarely possible to obtain an extended view in any direction; and though
the vegetation did not impede the movements of troops so completely as
it does in real tropical forest country, the character of the locality
gave great advantages to a force whose main object was to fight a
delaying campaign, and presented proportionate disadvantages to the
force that aimed at enveloping its enemy. The British were further
hampered by their ignorance of the district, and above all by the
scarcity of water. Aeroplanes were being used, and by them bombs were
frequently dropped upon the German camp at Ndessa; but for the most part
the efforts of the airmen illustrated the eternal triumph of hope over
experience. Even when to the landsman’s eye the country appeared to be
fairly open, the whole area, seen from above, was revealed as one
continuous expanse of grass and tree-tops, devoid of all distinguishing
landmarks. It was difficult, in such circumstances, to pick out even
well-known localities, while the detection of small posts established by
the enemy in the bush, and carefully screened from observation, was for
the most part impossible. The infantry patrols had generally to smell
out such danger-points for themselves.
A peculiar feature of this district is the Liwinda Ravine, of which
mention has already been made. It consists of a natural hollow, some two
hundred feet in depth and from four hundred to eight hundred yards in
breadth, which traverses the country for many miles from the north-west
to the south-east. The ground along its edges differs in no way from the
rest of the surrounding areas of bush and orchard-country, except that
it is somewhat more elevated than most of them.
Throughout this district ant-bears abound, and their holes, which are
ubiquitous, are often large enough to admit of the entrance of a man.
* * * * *
On the 21st July, two days after the engagement at Narungombe,
Lieutenant-Colonel Rose rejoined the Regiment and took over the command.
He was accompanied by Captain Hornby, who until he had fallen ill had
long filled the post of Adjutant, and by four new officers—Captains
McElligott and Methven, M.C., and Lieutenants Lamont and S. B. Smith—all
of whom were joining the Gold Coast Regiment for the first time. Captain
Hornby resumed his work as Adjutant which, during his absence on sick
leave, had been successively performed by Lieutenant Downer and by
Colour-Sergeant Avenell, both of whom had discharged the difficult
duties assigned to them with marked success.
On the 22nd July the Regiment was for the first time supplied with Lewis
guns, and the work of training teams for them was forthwith put in hand.
On the 28th July, Captains Briscoe, Hartland and Brady, and Lieutenants
Baillie, Willoughby and Maxwell joined the Regiment with reinforcements
consisting of 354 rank and file and 7 machine-gun-carriers from the Gold
Coast. On the 29th July 50 rifles of B Company, under Lieutenant
Baillie, with Colour-Sergeant Campbell, joined the detachment of the 2nd
Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles at Gregg’s Post; and a
detachment composed of men of B Company, under Captain Methven, was sent
out to occupy an outpost at Mikikole.
During the whole of August the Regiment lay in camp at Narungombe, its
duties being confined to vigorous training, more especially of the new
drafts, and daily patrolling of the roads from the camp and from the
outposts at Mikikole and Gregg’s Post. A few more men rejoined from sick
leave during the month, and on the 31st August the Regiment was more
nearly up to strength than it had been at any time since the very early
days of the campaign. There were present 29 officers, including 2
doctors, and 2 officers attached to the transport; 17 British
non-commissioned officers, including 1 non-commissioned officer of the
Royal Army Medical Corps and 4 belonging to the Transport; 7 clerks, 957
rank and file, 133 enlisted gun and ammunition-carriers, 34 servants,
and 1 European and 4 native interpreters—a total of 2130 of all ranks.
* * * * *
On the 7th September orders were sent to Captain Methven to move to
Liwinda Ravine with 70 rifles of B Company, leaving a picket of 1
European and 20 rifles at Kitiia _en route_. His instructions were to
dig for water on his arrival at the Ravine; to take every precaution to
prevent the existence of his camp becoming known to the enemy, and to
make systematic reconnaissances throughout the neighbourhood, including
the roads leading to the fortified enemy post at Mihambia and to
Mnitshi.
Liwinda Ravine was reached without incident, but though pits were sunk
to a depth of 20 feet not a drop of water could be found. The
establishment of a water depôt at this place formed, however, an
essential feature of General Hannyngton’s plan for the advance which he
was about to undertake; and on the 10th September big water-troughs
fashioned of rubber, measuring some 20 feet in length, 3 feet in width,
15 inches in depth, were sent to the Ravine on the heads of carriers.
Water was also conveyed thither in the long tins to which in India the
name of _pakhal_ is given, each of which is a load for two men. Only two
of the troughs reached their destination in a water-tight condition; and
this attempt to establish a water depôt proved a laborious job which
only met with a qualified measure of success.
Meanwhile Captain Methven, with a patrol of twenty men, had gone on a
scouting expedition to the south-east, in order to try to ascertain the
exact position of the enemy’s camp and supply depôt at Mnitshi. This,
and two subsequent patrols in the direction of the main road, undertaken
by Lieutenant Woods, were perilous little reconnaissances penetrating
deep into the country occupied by the enemy, and they were very far from
commending themselves to the native headman, who was impressed to act as
guide. He was an ancient African, very wizened and emaciated, who in
camp sported a soiled Mohammedan robe, to which as a Pagan he had no
right, with an European waistcoat worn buttoned-up outside it. In the
bush he reverted to a dingy loin-cloth wound sparsely about his middle.
His anxiety to preserve his skin intact, amid admittedly adverse
circumstances, altogether outstripped his regard for truth; and when he
had guided Captain Methven to an eminence overlooking Mpingo, he
unhesitatingly declared that place to be Mnitshi, which, as a matter of
fact, lies five miles further to the south along the main road which
leads from Mihambia to Mpingo. This had for him the satisfactory effect
of shortening the distance to be covered by the patrol, and of
proportionately diminishing its dangers; but Captain Methven reported to
Headquarters that he was uncertain how far his guide was to be relied
upon, and expressed doubt as to whether the place identified as Mnitshi
was indeed that enemy supply depot.
On the 13th September Lieutenant Woods took a small patrol through the
bush to a point on the main road south of Mihambia, and on his way back
he came across water-holes near Mbombomya. As Captain Methven considered
it important that a more detailed examination should be made, Lieutenant
Woods returned to these water-holes next day. As he approached them,
however, and when he and his patrol and the ancient guide were in a
patch of grass that was not more than waist-high, the enemy suddenly
appeared from a camp which he had in the interval constructed in a
cup-like hollow on the top of a piece of rising ground overlooking the
water-holes. Shots were forthwith exchanged, and Woods, seeing that his
small party was in a fair way to be surrounded by the enemy, who were at
least one company strong, shouted to his men to disperse and to get back
to their camp as best they might. Meanwhile, he himself very pluckily
ran at top speed and in full view of the enemy, as straight as he could
go for the water-holes and the German camp, secured a good view of both,
and then plunged into a patch of thick bush, in which he succeeded in
eluding his pursuers. He and all his patrol eventually made their way
back to the Ravine, one man and one stretcher-bearer only being missing.
Of the soldier nothing more was heard, but the stretcher-bearer was
picked up many days later, very emaciated and with a bullet-wound in his
leg, having crawled through the bush nearly as far to the south and west
as Ndessa. The ancient African, who had vanished the moment the enemy
appeared, had slipped into an ant-bear’s hole, and had there passed the
night. He returned to the camp in the Ravine on the following morning.
On the 14th September a patrol from Kitiia, which had crept to within
hearing distance of the enemy camp at Mihambia, had a brush with a
hostile patrol as it was returning to its post.
Some native porters, who had deserted from the German Force at the
water-holes, also came into camp, and from them a good deal of more or
less reliable information was obtained by Captain Methven on the subject
of the enemy’s numbers and disposition. From this source it was learned
that Hauptmann Kerr, with 9 Europeans, 200 _Askari_, and 4 machine-guns
had passed through the camp at the water-holes near Mbombomya on the
14th September, from Ndessa, on his way to Mnitshi; that the force at
the water-holes consisted of 5 Europeans and 150 _Askari_ with 2
machine-guns; that there were at that time only 5 enemy companies
encamped at Ndessa; and that the main road and the track to Ndessa had
both been mined. It was also stated by the porters that the enemy were
short of food and that the Europeans were living on rations of rice and
millet.
* * * * *
On the 18th September the main body of the Gold Coast Regiment moved out
of camp at Narungombe, where they had been now for almost exactly two
months, and marched along the footpath to Mikikole, and thence to the
water depôt which Captain Methven had established at Liwinda Ravine. The
men started with full water-bottles, and each carried a little canvas
bag of water of the kind known in India as a _chaqual_, with which,
moreover, every spare carrier was also loaded. The camp at Liwinda
Ravine was reached without incident.
The orders issued to No. 1 Column, to which the Regiment was attached,
were that Mihambia should be attacked on the morning of September 19th
by the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles,
with one and a half companies of the Gold Coast Regiment, the 27th
Mountain Battery and the Stokes Battery. In order to prevent
reinforcements reaching the enemy at Mihambia, a force under Colonel
Rose, consisting of the Headquarters, the Battery, and two companies of
the Gold Coast Regiment, was to proceed on the morning of the attack to
the junction of the track from Ndessa and the water-holes, near
Mbombomya, with that from Mnitshi, at a spot situated about two and a
half miles to the south of the camp at Liwinda Ravine. It was also
intended that while, on the 19th September, No. 1 Column was attacking
the enemy on the Mihambia-Mbombomya-Mnitshi area, No. 2 Column should
take up a position on the right from whence to deliver an attack upon
Ndessa on the morning of September 20th, for the purpose of cutting off
his retreat toward the south, and this operation would be supported by
the reserve of “Hanforce,” as the force under the command of General
Hannyngton was always called.
The Nigerian Brigade, operating further on the right, was to move to
Ruale, a few miles south-west of Ndessa, on the 19th September.
These concerted movements were designed to drive the enemy from his
fortified position at Mihambia, from Mnitshi and from Ndessa, and if
possible across the Mbemkuru River into the arms of the forces thrusting
west, from their base on the sea at Lindi, along the road which leads
thence to Liwale.