IN THE KILWA AREA—GOLD COAST HILL
The reason for the transfer of the Gold Coast Regiment, from the region
lying to the north of the Rufiji to a scene of operations situated to
the southward of that river, can be explained in a few words.
The enemy having been driven, in the course of the 1916 campaign, first
across the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika railway, and thereafter through
the hilly country to the south of that line to the southernmost fringe
of the Uluguru Mountains, it was the object of the British command to
confine him, if possible, to the lowlying valley of the Rufiji during
the coming wet season. He, on the other hand, it was thought, would try
to establish his winter quarters in some convenient spot on the southern
side of the valley, and it was believed that two of the places which he
had selected for this purpose were the mission stations of Kibata and
Mtumbei Juu, which are charmingly situated among the group of mountains
that rises from the plain within a mile or two of the sea-shore between
the Rufiji and Matandu rivers. In order to frustrate any such intention,
Brigadier-General Hannyngton had been dispatched some weeks earlier to
conduct the operations in the area above described, and it was for the
purpose of acting as a reserve to General Hannyngton’s Force that the
Gold Coast Regiment was now being dispatched to Kilwa Kisiwani. Another
factor in the situation was the great difficulty which the supply of the
troops operating to the north of the Rufiji would present during the
rainy season. It had become evident that their number must be reduced,
and that even when this had been effected so far as safety allowed, the
maintenance of the remainder, in a country which ere long would become
water-logged, would be no easily solved problem.
* * * * *
The Regiment arrived at Kilwa Kisiwani on the 19th November, and
disembarking during the afternoon, marched to Mpara, where it encamped.
Here on the following day the Battalion was joined by the Depôt Company,
which had hitherto remained at Korogwe, on the Tanga-Moschi Railway
under Major Read; but owing to the difficulties of transport, its stores
did not arrive with it. On the 24th November the Regiment marched up the
coast, along a sandy track within sight of the sea, to a camp situated
four miles to the west of Bliss Hill near Kilwa. Arrangements were made
for forming a Depôt Company and store accommodation at Mpara as a
regimental base, and G Company was broken up, the men composing it being
posted to other companies.
On the 25th November the Regiment began its march along the road which
leads in a westerly direction from Kilwa to Chemera, but owing to the
late arrival of the transport-carriers and water-carts a start was not
made until the afternoon. The Regiment halted for the night in the bush,
six miles from their starting-point and a like distance from
Nigeri-geri, about six miles down the road; and on the following day it
moved on to a camp about two and a half miles to the east of Mitole.
The line of march this day led across a villainous arid flat, covered
with mean and dusty scrub and coarse rank grass, wilted and sun-dried.
There was not an atom of shade to be found during the whole day’s march;
the heat from on high was great, and was vied with in intensity by the
heat refracted from the ground; and across this weary expanse officers
and men plodded painfully, ankle-deep in the sandy surface of the road,
and racked with unappeasable thirst. In spite of the assurance given to
the Regiment that water would be procurable along the route, not a drop
was to be obtained until the camp was reached late in the afternoon. The
Gold Coast soldier is a toughish fellow, and as a rule is not greatly
affected by extremes of heat. Like all Africans, however, he is blessed
with very open pores, and an insufficient supply of drinking-water hits
him peculiarly hard. On this day no less than forty men fell out, and
sank exhausted on the line of march, and it would have gone hard with
them had not some motor-drivers hurried to the rear and returned, after
an absence of some hours, with a supply of water. Many of these
exhausted men did not get into camp until the following day, and all of
them, together with eight officers—for they, too, were “foot-slogging
it” with their men—had forthwith to be sent to hospital as the result of
this one day’s march.
None the less, on the 27th November, the Regiment shifted camp to a spot
lying three miles to the west of Mitole; and on the following day it
moved on to Chemera, where it relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
Regiment of the King’s African Rifles. As soon as this had been
effected, I Company with 2 officers, 1 British non-commissioned officer
and 182 rank and file, marched off to Namaranje to occupy an outpost
position at that place.
The strength of the Regiment at this time was already very considerably
reduced, as the breaking up of G Company and the distribution of its
_personnel_ among the remaining Companies indicated. The field-state on
November 28th—the day upon which the Regiment went into camp at
Chemera—showed that only 19 British officers were present, as against
the 36 who had started from Sekondi at the beginning of the preceding
July, and that during the intervening period, the number of British
non-commissioned officers had been reduced from 15 to 10, and that of
the rank and file from 980 to 715. The principal battle casualties have
been noted in the course of this narrative, but much greater havoc had
been wrought to the _personnel_ of the force by ill-health occasioned by
exposure, over-exertion, bad food, and water insufficient in quantity
and often vile in quality.
It was hoped that on its arrival at Chemera a period of rest would be
enjoyed by the Regiment, but before it had been in camp a week word was
received that a force composed of a battalion of the King’s African
Rifles and the 129th Baluchis, which was in occupation of the mission
station at Kibata, was being very hard pressed by the enemy, and ran
some risk of being surrounded.
On the 9th December, therefore, the Regiment left Chemera and marched in
a northerly direction to Mtumbei Chini, and thence on the 10th December
to Kitambi at the foot of the mountains, in the heart of which the
mission stations of Mtumbei Juu and Kibata are situated. It should be
noted that the words “chini” and “juu,” which will be found so
frequently to occur in place-names in East Africa, signify respectively
“low” and “high.” Thus “Mtumbei Chini” means “Mtumbei on the Plain,” and
“Mtumbei Juu” means “Mtumbei on the Hill.”
A mile from Kitambi a river was met, through which the advanced guard,
under the command of Captain Harman, had to wade with the water up to
their necks. The officer commanding the rear-guard reported that when he
crossed it, the river was only knee-deep; while Captain A. J. R.
O’Brien, R.A.M.C., who passed the same place next morning, found no
river at all, but only a partially dried-up river-bed—rather an
interesting instance of the eccentricities of tropical watercourses.
They, indeed, can rarely be relied upon for very long together, either
to furnish drinking-water or to refrain from impeding transport.
From Kitambi onward only mule-transport and head-carriers could be used,
the path up which the Regiment was climbing being at once too narrow and
too steep for the passage of motors. The precipitous track was difficult
for the men, and still more difficult for the pack-animals; and though
the distance from Kitambi to Mtumbei Juu mission station was only eight
miles, the mule transport took three-and-twenty hours to make the
journey, and in the course of the day three mules were lost by falling
over precipices.
The position at Kibata mission station—which lies a few miles to the
east and slightly to the north of Mtumbei Juu, and is separated from it
by a fairly deep valley—was approximately as follows at the time when
the Gold Coast Regiment arrived at the latter station. One battalion of
the King’s African Rifles and the 129th Baluchis had occupied Kibata,
which is situated upon a prominent hill surrounded by an amphitheatre of
commanding mountains, and this force had forthwith become the object of
very severe bombardment. The Germans had brought up one of the 4·1 naval
guns, rescued by them from the _Koenigsberg_, and having placed it in a
position on the other side of the mountains at some spot slightly to the
north-west of Kibata, were shelling the mission station heavily. They
evidently had an excellent observation point concealed somewhere on the
surrounding mountains, for they were making very good practice; and the
enemy had also established himself upon the slopes overlooking Kibata in
a roughly semicircular position, with his left to the east and his right
to the west of the mission station. A ridge, which runs parallel upon
the east to the hill upon which the mission station stands had been
occupied by the garrison; and it was from this point alone that they
were able in any degree to retaliate upon the attacking force. For the
rest, the King’s African Rifles and the Baluchis, who had no means of
locating the position of the 4·1 gun, and who, even if they had done so,
possessed no artillery with which to make an adequate reply to its fire,
could only endure the punishment they were receiving with such patience
as they might command. The position, in fact, was rapidly becoming
untenable; and on the afternoon of the 13th December General Hannyngton
made a careful examination of the ground from a height in the
neighbourhood of Mtumbei Juu, and decided to attempt to turn the enemy’s
right flank.
Between Mtumbei Juu and Kibata, at a point near the base of the valley
which divides the hill upon which the mission station stands from that
occupied by the Kibata mission buildings, a hill slopes upward in a long
spur, trending in a northerly direction. Its surface, covered with grass
and strewn with outcrops of rock, is broken by many minor crests, till
the summit is reached at its most northerly extremity. Near the top a
spur juts out to the east and south, shaped somewhat like the flapper of
a seal, its slopes separated from the main hill by a semicircular
valley. The crest, on which there are a few trees but no cover of any
kind, to-day bears the name of Gold Coast Hill. The outlying spur is
called Banda Hill. From a point near Mtumbei Juu mission station and
almost directly to the north of it, a ridge of mountains runs first
north and later with a curve to the east overlooking and commanding Gold
Coast Hill. It was General Hannyngton’s hope that if the latter could be
captured while this ridge still remained unoccupied, it would be
possible thence to get round behind the enemy and so to outflank his
right. The task of capturing this hill was assigned by him to the Gold
Coast Regiment.
Accordingly, at 6 a.m. on the 14th December, B Company, under Captain
Shaw, was sent forward along the mountain track which connects Mtumbei
Juu with Kibata, to get into touch with the force at Kibata, which a day
or two earlier had been reinforced by another battalion of the King’s
African Rifles, and which was now under the command of General O’Grady.
He reported that the road between the two missions was open, and at dusk
the rest of the Battalion moved along the road for a distance of two to
two and a half miles, and there camped for the night.
At dawn on the 15th December, the disposition of the Regiment was as
follows:—
The main body lay encamped about two miles along the Mtumbei Juu-Kibata
road, with an outpost line, consisting of 50 rifles and one machine-gun,
of B Company, under Captain Kelton, thrown out about a mile to the east.
Captain Wheeler, with half A Company and one machine-gun, was posted on
a line immediately in front of the main body, with a picket on the main
road, and another on Harman’s Kopje—a small hill to the north-west of
the camp. The other half of A Company, under Captain Harman, with one
machine-gun, was in occupation of a hill about 1000 yards north of
Harman’s Kopje, with an outpost on a small hill to the left of a path
which led to Kibata, and another picket some 600 yards along this path
at its point of junction with a track leading west.
At 5 a.m. the Pioneer Company, under the command of Captain Poyntz,
moved forward out of camp, and three-quarters of an hour later, Captain
Biddulph, at the head of the advanced guard, passed the post which was
being held by half A Company, under Captain Harman, and came under fire
from the outlying spur on the right which bears the name of Banda Hill.
Captain Biddulph was dangerously wounded, and Lieutenant Duncan was
killed; and the vanguard then withdrew to the main body, while the
Battery came into action from a hill to the north of Harman’s Kopje,
loosing off a dozen rounds across the valley at Banda Hill, whence the
enemy’s fire had come.
At about 8 a.m. Captain Poyntz continued his advance, and working round
the small hills on the left of the main road, reached Gold Coast Hill,
the summit of which was the main objective of the Force, at about 11
a.m. During this advance he encountered no further opposition, though he
occupied Banda Hill and another eminence situated somewhat to the
north-west of it, and left small detachments to hold each of these
points.
[Illustration: Gold Coast Hill]
While this advance was in progress, the enemy brought his big naval gun
into action, shelling very heavily the main road, behind the hill whence
the Battery had opened fire. During this bombardment, one of his shells
pitched almost at the feet of Colonel Rose, who was sitting under the
lee of the hill with the Adjutant, Captain Pye, by his side, and with an
orderly standing near. Both Captain Pye and the orderly were killed
instantly, and Colonel Rose was flung backward from this seat to a
considerable distance, but was otherwise unharmed.
At one o’clock a heavy counter-attack began on Gold Coast Hill, and upon
a small ridge in advance of that position, which was held by Lieutenant
Shields with 30 rifles and one machine-gun; and the violent shell,
howitzer, rifle and machine-gun fire concentrated upon these points
quickly caused many casualties.
By this time the remaining companies of the Regiment, under the command
of Major Goodwin, were in reserve upon Banda Hill, and upon the hill to
the north-west of it, which had originally been occupied by Captain
Poyntz in the course of his advance; and half of A Company, led by
Captain Wheeler, was sent forward in support of the Pioneers. They were
shortly followed by Lieutenant Piggott with one of B Company’s
machine-guns, who took up a position on the right flank of the crest of
Gold Coast Hill. Lieutenant Piggott was almost immediately wounded, but
he contrived none the less to continue in the firing-line.
At 2.30 p.m. Captain Poyntz was dangerously, and Captain Wheeler
severely wounded, leaving Captain Harman—who had himself been slightly
wounded—alone to command the main position, with Lieutenant Shields and
Lieutenant Piggott, the one on the ridge in advance, the other on the
right flank of the crest of the hill.
Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Kinley with one machine-gun and Lieutenant
Taylor with the rest of A Company came up in support; but Lieutenant
Taylor was severely wounded almost at the moment of his arrival on the
crest of the hill.
About 3 p.m. the enemy again opened heavy shell fire upon Gold Coast
Hill, once more causing many casualties; and Major Goodwin went forward
with the remainder of the reserves—about 50 rifles of B Company, under
Captain Shaw—who took up a position to the right of Lieutenant Piggott’s
machine-gun post.
For two and a half more hours the Gold Coast Regiment clung to the
position which it had occupied, and in which it had sustained such heavy
and continuous losses since 11 o’clock in the morning; but at 5.30 p.m.
the 40th Pathans began to relieve it. The relief was effected without
serious loss just before darkness fell, and the Gold Coast Regiment took
up outpost positions for the night between the hill, which ever since
has been known by its name, and the main road from Mtumbei Juu to
Kibata.
It was estimated that the enemy fired 180 high explosive shells from his
naval gun from the time the hill was occupied until dark; and the men
were throughout terribly exposed, as the concentration of his rifle and
machine-gun and occasional howitzer fire was such that they were unable
to dig themselves in. Effective retaliation was impossible, yet the
behaviour of the men throughout the day was magnificent. Those who were
in occupation of the hill clung to it during more than six hours with
dogged resolution. Those who successively advanced to their support,
moved forward with alacrity, and never showed a trace of wavering or
hesitation. It was about as severe a test as any to which a body of
native troops could be subjected, but the Regiment passed splendidly
through the ordeal, the severity of which may be judged from the
following casualty list.
During this day—December 15th, 1916—the Regiment sustained no less than
140 casualties. It lost 2 officers killed and 7 wounded; 1 British
non-commissioned officer wounded; 26 soldiers killed and 87 wounded; and
5 gun and ammunition carriers killed and 12 wounded,—approximately 15
per cent. of the men engaged, and nearly 50 per cent. of the officers.
On the 16th December the Regiment remained in camp reorganizing its
shattered forces; on the 17th and 18th December it was held in reserve;
and though during the 17th detachments were moved forward in support of
the 40th Pathans, who had been retired from Gold Coast Hill to the
kopjes near its foot, they did not come into action. On that day, too,
Captain Kelton, with 75 rank and file of B Company, were sent back to
Kitambi. On the 19th December the Regiment was withdrawn, and went into
camp at the foot of Mtumbei Juu Mission Hill. On the 21st of December
the Regiment took up positions upon a roughly semicircular ridge on the
left of the road to Kibata and lying to the north-east of the mission,
and here it remained for some days, occasionally using the Battery to
support the 40th Pathans on Harman’s Kopje, and sending out patrols,
some of which had slight brushes with the enemy. On the 24th Captain
Kelton, Captain D’Amico, R.A.M.C., Lieutenant Percy, Colour-Sergeant
Beattie, and 78 rank and file, with other details, rejoined the Regiment
from Kitambi; and on this day intelligence was received that Military
Crosses had been awarded to Captain Shaw and to Captain A. J. R. O’Brien
of the West African Medical Staff, which they had earned at Kikirunga
Hill.
On the 27th December Captain Kelton, with 80 rank and file, took over
Harman’s Kopje from the 40th Pathans, and on the 29th December, a German
camp having been located on the northern slope of Gold Coast Hill, the
Battery opened fire upon it at 11 a.m., but found the target beyond its
range. The enemy replied, and quickly found the position of the Battery,
which Captain Foley at once removed to another prepared position. This
movement had hardly been completed ere a shell burst within seven feet
from the spot which had been vacated only a few moments earlier—a
striking illustration of the excellence of the enemy’s observation and
of the accuracy of his fire.
At 9 a.m. on this day Captain Wray arrived in camp with welcome
reinforcements from Kumasi and a party of Volunteers from Accra in the
Gold Coast. These reinforcements consisted of 160 men of D Company, who
were all Fulanis, and 90 Jaundis, who had originally been recruited in
the Kameruns, under Captain Wray and Lieutenant Downer, 150 men of the
Gold Coast Volunteers under Captain Hellis, and 200 Sierra Leone
carriers.
At 1.35 p.m. Captain Biddulph died from the wounds which he had
received, when in command of the advanced guard, early in the morning of
the 15th December.
On the 29th the reinforcements were paraded and allocated to the various
companies; and on the following day General Hannyngton held a parade of
details from all companies that could be spared from the firing-line,
and decorated 3926 Regimental Sergeant-Major Manasara Kanjaga, 4388
Battery Sergeant-Major Bukari Moshi, and Sergeant Palpukah Grumah with
Distinguished Conduct Medals which had been awarded to them for services
rendered in the Kamerun Campaign.
The strength of the Regiment on the 31st December, 1916, after the
reinforcements above mentioned had been received, amounted to 19
officers, 14 British non-commissioned officers, 10 clerks and dressers,
860 rank and file, 444 gun, ammunition, and transport carriers, 34
servants, and 48 stretcher-bearers, making a total of 1429 officers and
men of all ranks.
During the first week of January, 1917, the Regiment continued to occupy
the ridge to the north-west of the Mtumbei Juu mission station, and on
the left of the road leading to Kibata, sending out frequent patrols,
which collected some useful information, and came on more than one
occasion into touch with the enemy. The latter, meanwhile, had sustained
a fairly severe check at the hands of General O’Grady’s force, which,
from the ridge occupied by it to the eastward of the Kibata mission
station, had delivered a very successful night attack upon the extreme
left of the enemy’s position.
On the 8th January, information having been received that large bodies
of the enemy had left and were leaving the area by the road to Mwengei—a
village over the hills directly to the north of Kibata—Colonel Rose
decided to make a reconnaissance in force in order to try to reach this
road, and to retake Gold Coast Hill. At an early hour of the day,
therefore, he proceeded with 250 rifles from A and B Company, with the
Battery and with the 24th Mountain Battery, along the high ridge
overlooking Gold Coast Hill, of which mention has already been made,
starting from the north-westerly extremity of the ridge which the
Regiment had been holding. Owing, however, to the extremely difficult
character of the country through which his way led, he was not able to
reach a suitable place from which to begin operations until late in the
afternoon.
At 6.30 on the following morning Major Goodwin began to push forward
along the ridge which commanded Gold Coast Hill from the north-west. No
opposition was met with, and a patrol which was sent out to reconnoitre
Gold Coast Hill reported that it had been evacuated by the enemy. This
was later confirmed by Lieutenant Downer, who had reached Gold Coast
Hill by the old route from Harman’s Kopje, which the Regiment had
followed on the 15th December.
Other patrols were sent forward and reached the Mwengei road, effecting
a junction with the 2nd King’s African Rifles and the 129th Baluchis,
who had been operating from Kibata. The fact of the enemy’s retreat was
now established, the whole area being clear of hostile forces; but the
day being far advanced, Colonel Rose camped for the night at One-Stick
Hill, so named from a conspicuous white palm-tree on its crest, in a
position of extraordinary strength which had been established by the
Germans, and from which it was obvious most of the heavy howitzer,
rifle, and machine-gun fire poured upon Gold Coast Hill on the 15th
December had come.
On the 10th January the reconnoitring party returned to Regimental
Headquarters _viâ_ Gold Coast Hill and the main road from Kibata to
Mtumbei Juu Mission, while active patrolling of the Kibata-Mwengei road
began.
On this day word was received that Captain Poyntz had been awarded the
Military Cross, Colour-Sergeant Campbell the Distinguished Conduct
Medal, and Lance-Corporal Sully Ibadan the Military Medal for their
meritorious services in the engagement on the 15th December.
During the next few days points of strategic importance were occupied,
and patrols were sent out in various directions. By one of these, which
was furnished by the 40th Pathans, two white German prisoners were
brought in, one of whom was a certain Major von Bompkin, and the other a
gunner from the _Koenigsberg_, decorated with the Iron Cross. Major von
Bompkin had been second-in-command to von Lettow-Vorbeck, but after the
British had forced their way into the Uluguru Mountains at the beginning
of the preceding September, he had headed a deputation to the German
Commander-in-Chief, representing to him that enough had been done for
honour, and that further resistance was useless and a mere waste of
human lives. Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s reply was forthwith to degrade him to
the rank of a mere patrol commander; and at the time of his capture von
Bompkin was in charge of a party of only six men. He had apparently
taken the harsh treatment meted out to him in a fine soldierly spirit,
and as a patrol leader had shown great daring and enterprise. For
instance, on one occasion he had passed the greater part of the night in
the middle of the camp occupied by the 40th Pathans, sheltering himself
from the rain in the officers’ latrine. At dawn he had run into a very
sleepy officer of the regiment, who failed to recognize him as an enemy
in the uncertain light, and he had thereafter made good his retreat,
carrying with him the detailed information of which he had come in
search.
On the 20th January the Regiment moved down the mountain by the main
road to Kitambi, Colonel Rose returning to Mtumbei Juu mission station
in the afternoon. He came back to Kitambi on the following day with the
staff of the 3rd East African Brigade, to the command of which he had
been temporarily appointed; and on the 22nd January he left for Ngarambi
Chini, a place situated some twenty miles due west of Kibata. Major
Goodwin took over the command of the Gold Coast Regiment with effect
from the 21st January.