motivation of the faulty actions described above, yet it would be
desirable to discover a psychologic proof of its existence; indeed,
reasons obtained through a deeper knowledge of the unconscious make it
probable that such proofs are to be discovered somewhere. As a matter
of fact phenomena can be demonstrated in two spheres which seem to
correspond to an unconscious and hence to a displaced knowledge of
these motives.
(_a_)It is a striking and generally to be recognized feature in the
behaviour of paranoiacs, that they attach the greatest significance
to the trivial details in the behaviour of others. Details which are
usually overlooked by others they interpret and utilize as the basis
of far-reaching conclusions. For example, the last paranoiac seen by
me concluded that there was a general understanding among people of
his environment, because at his departure from the railway-station
they made a certain motion with one hand. Another noticed how people
walked on the street, how they brandished their walking-sticks, and the
like.[77]
The category of the accidental, requiring no motivation, which the
normal person lets pass as a part of his own psychic activities and
faulty actions, is thus rejected by the paranoiac in the application to
the psychic manifestations to others. All that he observes in others is
full of meaning, all is explainable. But how does he come to look at it
in this manner? Probably here as in so many other cases, he projects
into the mental life of others what exists in his own unconscious
activity. Many things obtrude themselves on consciousness in paranoia
which in normal and neurotic persons can only be demonstrated through
psychoanalysis as existing in their unconscious.[78] In a certain sense
the paranoiac is here justified, he perceives something that escapes
the normal person, he sees clearer than one of normal intellectual
capacity, but his knowledge becomes worthless when he imputes to
others the state of affairs he thus recognizes. I hope that I shall
not be expected to justify every paranoic interpretation. But the
point which we grant to paranoia in this conception of chance actions
will facilitate for us the psychologic understanding of the conviction
which the paranoiac attaches to all these interpretations. _There is
certainly some truth to it_; even our errors of judgment, which are
not designated as morbid, acquire their feeling of conviction in the
same way. This feeling is justified for a certain part of the erroneous
train of thought or for the source of its origin, and we shall later
extend to it the remaining relationships.
(_b_) The phenomena of superstition furnish another indication of the
unconscious motivation in chance and faulty actions. I will make myself
clear through the discussion of a simple experience which gave me the
starting-point to these reflections.
Having returned from vacation, my thoughts immediately turned to the
patients with whom I was to occupy myself in the beginning of my year’s
work. My first visit was to a very old woman (see above) for whom I had
twice daily performed the same professional services for many years.
Owing to this monotony unconscious thoughts have often found expression
on the way to the patient and during my occupation with her. She was
over ninety years old; it was therefore pertinent to ask oneself at the
beginning of each year how much longer she was likely to live.
On the day of which I speak I was in a hurry and took a carriage to
her house. Every coachman at the cabstand near my house knew the old
woman’s address, as each of them had often driven me there. This day
it happened that the driver did not stop in front of her house, but
before one of the same number in a near-by and really similar-looking
parallel street. I noticed the mistake and reproached the coachman, who
apologized for it.
Is it of any significance when I am taken to a house where the
old woman is not to be found? Certainly not to me; but were I
_superstitious_, I should see an omen in this incident, a hint of fate
that this would be the last year for the old woman. A great many omens
which have been preserved by history have been founded on no better
symbolism. Of course, I explain the incident as an accident without
further meaning.
The case would have been entirely different had I come on foot and,
“absorbed in thought” or “through distraction,” I had gone to the house
in the parallel street instead of the correct one. I would not explain
that as an accident, but as an action with unconscious intent requiring
interpretation. My explanation of this “lapse in walking” would
probably be that I expected that the time would soon come when I should
not meet the old woman any longer.
I therefore differ from a superstitious person in the following
manner:--
I do not believe that an occurrence in which my mental life takes no
part can teach me anything hidden concerning the future shaping of
reality; but I do believe that an unintentional manifestation of my own
mental activity surely contains something concealed which belongs only
to my mental life--that is, I believe in outer (real) chance, but not
in inner (psychic) accidents. With the superstitious person the case
is reversed: he knows nothing of the motive of his chance and faulty
actions, he believes in the existence of psychic contingencies; he
is therefore inclined to attribute meaning to external chance, which
manifests itself in actual occurrence, and to see in the accident a
means of expression for something hidden outside of him. There are two
differences between me and the superstitious person: first, he projects
the motive to the outside, while I look for it in myself; second, he
explains the accident by an event which I trace to a thought. What
he considers hidden corresponds to the unconscious with me, and the
compulsion not to let chance pass as chance, but to explain it as
common to both of us.
Thus I admit that this conscious ignorance and unconscious knowledge of
the motivation of psychic accidentalness is one of the psychic roots
of superstition. _Because_ the superstitious person knows nothing of
the motivation of his own accidental actions, and because the fact of
this motivation strives for a place in his recognition, he is compelled
to dispose of them by displacing them into the outer world. If such
a connection exists it can hardly be limited to this single case. As
a matter of fact, I believe that a large portion of the mythological
conception of the world which reaches far into the most modern
religions _is nothing but psychology projected into the outer world_.
The dim perception (the endo-psychic perception, as it were) of psychic
factors and relations[79] of the unconscious was taken as a model in
the construction of a _transcendental reality_, which is destined to be
changed again by science into _psychology of the unconscious_.
It is difficult to express it in other terms; the analogy to paranoia
must here come to our aid. We venture to explain in this way the
myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good and evil, of
immortality, and the like--that is, to transform _metaphysics_ into
_meta-psychology_. The gap between the paranoiac’s displacement
and that of superstition is narrower than appears at first sight.
When human beings began to think, they were obviously compelled to
explain the outer world in an anthropomorphic sense by a multitude of
personalities in their own image; the accidents which they explained
superstitiously were thus actions and expressions of persons. In
that regard they behaved just like paranoiacs, who draw conclusions
from insignificant signs which others give them, and like all
normal persons who justly take the unintentional actions of their
fellow-beings as a basis for the estimation of their characters. Only
in our modern philosophical, but by no means finished, views of life
does superstition seem so much out of place: in the view of life of
pre-scientific times and nations it was justified and consistent.
The Roman who gave up an important undertaking because he sighted
an ill-omened flock of birds was relatively right; his action was
consistent with his principles. But if he withdrew from an undertaking
because he had stumbled on his threshold (_un Romain retournerait_),
he was absolutely superior even to us unbelievers. He was a better
psychologist than we are striving to become. For his stumbling
could demonstrate to him the existence of a doubt, an internal
counter-current the force of which could weaken the power of his
intention at the moment of its execution. For only by concentrating
all psychic forces on the desired aim can one be assured of perfect
success. How does Schiller’s Tell, who hesitated so long to shoot the
apple from his son’s head, answer the bailiff’s question why he had
provided himself with a second arrow?
“_With the second arrow I would have pierced you had I struck my dear
child--and truly, I should not have failed to reach you._”
IV. Whoever has had the opportunity of studying the concealed psychic
feelings of persons by means of psychoanalysis can also tell something
new concerning the quality of unconscious motives, which express
themselves in superstition. Nervous persons afflicted with compulsive
thinking and compulsive states, who are often very intelligent, show
very plainly that superstition originates from repressed hostile
and cruel impulses. The greater part of superstition signifies fear
of impending evil, and he who has frequently wished evil to others,
but because of a good bringing-up has repressed the same into the
unconscious, will be particularly apt to expect punishment for such
unconscious evil in the form of a misfortune threatening him from
without.
If we concede that we have by no means exhausted the psychology of
superstition in these remarks, we must, on the other hand, at least
touch upon the question whether real roots of superstition should
be altogether denied, whether there are really no omens, prophetic
dreams, telepathic experiences, manifestations of supernatural forces,
and the like. I am now far from willing to repudiate without anything
further all these phenomena, concerning which we possess so many minute
observations even from men of intellectual prominence, and which
should certainly form a basis for further investigation. We may even
hope that some of these observations will be explained by our present
knowledge of the unconscious psychic processes without necessitating
radical changes in our present aspect. If still other phenomena, as,
for example, those maintained by the spiritualists, should be proven,
we should then consider the modification of our “laws” as demanded by
the new experience, without becoming confused in regard to the relation
of things of this world.
In the sphere of these analyses I can only answer the questions
here proposed subjectively--that is, in accordance with my personal
experience. I am sorry to confess that I belong to that class of
unworthy individuals before whom the spirits cease their activities
and the supernatural disappears, so that I have never been in
position to experience anything personally that would stimulate
belief in the miraculous. Like everybody else, I have had forebodings
and experienced misfortunes; but the two evaded each other, so
that nothing followed the foreboding, and the misfortune struck me
unannounced. When as a young man I lived alone in a strange city I
frequently heard my name suddenly pronounced by an unmistakable, dear
voice, and I then made a note of the exact moment of the hallucination
in order to inquire carefully of those at home what had occurred at
that time. There was nothing to it. On the other hand, I later worked
among my patients calmly and without foreboding while my child almost
bled to death. Nor have I ever been able to recognize as unreal
phenomena any of the forebodings reported to me by my patients.
The belief in prophetic dreams numbers many adherents, because it can
be supported by the fact that some things really so happen in the
future as they were previously foretold by the wish of the dream.
But in this there is little to be wondered at, as many far-reaching
deviations may be regularly demonstrated between a dream and the
fulfilment which the credulity of the dreamer prefers to neglect.
A nice example, one which may be justly called prophetic, was
once brought to me for exhaustive analysis by an intelligent and
truth-loving patient. She related that she once dreamed that she had
met a former friend and family physician in front of a certain store
in a certain street, and next morning when she went down town she
actually met him at the place named in the dream. I may observe that
the significance of this wonderful coincidence was not proven to be due
to any subsequent event--that is, it could not be justified through
future occurrences.
Careful examination definitely established the fact that there was no
proof that the woman recalled the dream in the morning following the
night of the dream--that is, before the walk and before the meeting.
She could offer no objection when this state of affairs was presented
in a manner that robbed this episode of everything miraculous, leaving
only an interesting psychologic problem. One morning she had walked
through this very street, had met her old family physician before that
certain store, and on seeing him received the conviction that during
the preceding night she had dreamed of this meeting at this place.
The analysis then showed with great probability how she came to
this conviction, to which, in accordance with the general rule, we
cannot deny a certain right to credence. A meeting at a definite
place following a previous expectation really describes the fact of a
rendezvous. The old family physician awakened her memory of old times,
when meetings with a third person, also a friend of the physician, were
of marked significance to her. Since that time she had continued her
relations with this gentleman, and the day before the mentioned dream
she had waited for him in vain. If I could report in greater detail the
circumstances here before us, I could easily show that the illusion
of the prophetic dream at the sight of the friend of former times is
perchance equivalent to the following speech: “Ah, doctor, you now
remind me of bygone times, when I never had to wait in vain for N. when
we had arranged a meeting.”
I have observed in myself a simple and easily explained example, which
is probably a good model for similar occurrences of those familiar
“remarkable coincidences” wherein we meet a person of whom we were
just thinking. During a walk through the inner city a few days after
the title of “Professor” was bestowed on me, which carries with it a
great deal of prestige even in monarchical cities, my thoughts suddenly
merged into a childish revenge-fantasy against a certain married
couple. Some months previous they had called me to see their little
daughter who suffered from an interesting compulsive manifestation
following the appearance of a dream. I took a great interest in the
case, the genesis of which I believed I could surmise, but the parents
were unfavourable to my treatment, and gave me to understand that
they thought of applying to a foreign authority who cured by means
of hypnotism. I now fancied that after the failure of this attempt,
the parents begged me to resume my treatment, that they now had full
confidence in me, etc. But I answered: “Now that I have become a
professor, you have confidence in me. The title has made no change in
my ability; if you could not use me when I was instructor you can get
along without me now that I am a professor.” At this point my fantasy
was interrupted by a loud “Good evening, Professor!” and as I looked up
there passed me the same couple on whom I had just taken this imaginary
vengeance.
The next reflection destroyed the semblance of the miraculous. I was
walking towards this couple on a straight, almost deserted street;
glancing up hastily at a distance of perhaps twenty steps from me,
I had spied and realized their stately personalities; but this
perception, following the model of a negative hallucination, was set
aside by certain emotionally accentuated motives and then asserted
itself in the apparently spontaneous emerging fantasy.
A similar experience is related by Brill, which also throws some light
on the nature of telepathy.
“While engrossed in conversation during our customary Sunday evening
dinner at one of the large New York restaurants, I suddenly stopped
and irrelevantly remarked to my wife, ‘I wonder how Dr. R. is doing
in Pittsburg.’ She looked at me much astonished and said: ‘Why, that
is exactly what I have been thinking for the last few seconds! Either
you have transferred this thought to me or I have transferred it to
you. How can you otherwise explain this strange phenomenon?’ I had
to admit that I could offer no solution. Our conversation throughout
the dinner showed not the remotest association to Dr. R., nor, so far
as our memories went, had we heard or spoken of him for some time.
Being a sceptic, I refused to admit that there was anything mysterious
about it, although inwardly I felt quite uncertain. To be frank, I was
somewhat mystified.
“But we did not remain very long in this state of mind, for on looking
toward the cloak-room we were surprised to see Dr. R. Though closer
inspection showed our mistake, we were both struck by the remarkable
resemblance of this stranger to Dr. R. From the position of the
cloak-room we were forced to conclude that this stranger had passed
our table. Absorbed in our conversation, we had not noticed him
consciously, but the visual image had stirred up the association of his
double, Dr. R. That we should both have experienced the same thought
is also quite natural. The last word from our friend was to the effect
that he had taken up private practice in Pittsburg, and, being aware
of the vicissitudes that beset the beginner, it was quite natural to
wonder how fortune smiled upon him.
“What promised to be a supernatural manifestation was thus easily
explained on a normal basis; but had we not noticed the stranger before
he left the restaurant, it would have been impossible to exclude the
mysterious. I venture to say that such simple mechanisms are at the
bottom of the most complicated telepathic manifestations; at least,
such has been my experience in all cases accessible to investigation.”
Another “solution of an apparent foreboding” was reported by Otto
Rank[80]:--
“Some time ago I had experienced a remarkable variation of that
‘peculiar coincidence’ wherein one meets a person who has just been
occupying one’s thoughts. Shortly before Christmas I went to the
Austro-Hungarian Bank in order to obtain ten new silver crown-pieces
destined for Christmas gifts. Absorbed in ambitious fantasies which
dealt with the contrast of my meagre means to the enormous sums in the
banking-house, I turned into the narrow street to the bank. In front
of the door I saw an automobile and many people going in and out. I
thought to myself: ‘The officials will have plenty of time for my new
crowns; naturally I shall be quick about it; I shall put down the paper
notes to be exchanged, and say, “Please give me gold.”’ I realized my
mistake at once--I was to have asked for _silver_--and awoke from my
fantasies.
“I was now only a few steps from the entrance, and noticed a young man
coming toward me who looked familiar, but whom I could not definitely
identify on account of my short-sightedness. As he came nearer I
recognized him as a classmate of my brother whose name was _Gold_ and
from whose brother, a well-known journalist, I had great expectations
in the beginning of my literary career. But these expectations had not
materialized, and with them had vanished the hoped-for material success
with which my fantasies were occupying themselves on my way to the
bank. Thus engrossed I must have unconsciously perceived the approach
of Mr. Gold, who impressed himself on my conscience while I was
dreaming of material success, and thereby caused me to ask the cashier
for gold instead of the inferior silver. But, on the other hand, the
paradoxical fact that my unconscious was able to perceive an object
long before it was recognized by the eye might in part be explained by
the complex readiness (_Komplexbereitschaft_) of Bleuler. For my mind
was attuned to the material, and, contrary to my better knowledge, it
guided my steps from the very beginning to buildings where gold and
paper money were exchanged.”
To the category of the wonderful and uncanny we may also add that
strange feeling we perceive in certain moments and situations when it
seems as if we had already had exactly the same experience, or had
previously found ourselves in the same situation. Yet we are never
successful in our efforts to recall clearly those former experiences
and situations. I know that I follow only the loose colloquial
expression when I designate that which stimulates us in such moments as
a “feeling.” We undoubtedly deal with a judgment, and, indeed, with a
judgment of cognition; but these cases, nevertheless, have a character
peculiar to themselves, and besides, we must not ignore the fact that
we never recall what we are seeking.
I do not know whether this phenomenon of _Déjà vu_ was ever seriously
offered as a proof of a former psychic existence of the individual; but
it is certain that psychologists have taken an interest in it, and have
attempted to solve the riddle in a multitude of speculative ways. None
of the proposed tentative explanations seems right to me, because none
takes account of anything but the accompanying manifestations and the
favouring conditions of the phenomenon. Those psychic processes which,
according to my observation, are alone responsible for the explanation
of the _Déjà vu_--namely, the unconscious fantasies--are generally
neglected by the psychologists even to-day.
I believe that it is wrong to designate the feeling of having
experienced something before as an illusion. On the contrary, in such
moments something is really touched that we have already experienced,
only we cannot consciously recall the latter because it never was
conscious. In short, the feeling of _Déjà vu_ corresponds to the memory
of an unconscious fantasy. There are unconscious fantasies (or day
dreams) just as there are similar conscious creations, which every one
knows from personal experience.
I realize that the object is worthy of most minute study, but I will
here give the analysis of only one case of _Déjà vu_ in which the
feeling was characterized by particular intensity and persistence.
A woman of thirty-seven years asserted that she most distinctly
remembered that at the age of twelve and a half she paid her first
visit to some school friends in the country, and as she entered the
garden she immediately had the feeling of having been there before.
This feeling was repeated as she went through the living-rooms, so that
she believed she knew beforehand how big the next room was, what views
one could have on looking out of it, etc. But the belief that this
feeling of recognition might have its source in a previous visit to
the house and garden, perhaps a visit paid in earliest childhood, was
absolutely excluded and disproved by statements from her parents. The
woman who related this sought no psychologic explanation, but saw in
the appearance of this feeling a prophetic reference to the importance
which these friends later assumed in her emotional life. On taking into
consideration, however, the circumstance under which this phenomenon
presented itself to her, we found the way to another conception.