furnished no other clue. Whether my brother wished to open or lock the
chest (in the first explanation it was a “cupboard”), why I cried,
and what bearing the arrival of my mother had, all these questions
were dim to me; I was tempted to explain to myself that it dealt with
the memory of a hoax by my older brother, which was interrupted by my
mother. Such misunderstandings of childhood scenes retained in memory
are not uncommon; we recall a situation, but it is not centralized;
we do not know on which of the elements to place the psychic accent.
Analytic effort led me to an entirely unexpected solution of the
picture. I missed my mother and began to suspect that she was locked in
this cupboard or chest, and therefore demanded that my brother should
unlock it. As he obliged me, and I became convinced that she was not in
the chest, I began to cry; this is the moment firmly retained in the
memory, which was directly followed by the appearance of my mother, who
appeased my worry and anxiety.
But how did the child get the idea of looking for the absent mother
in the chest? Dreams which occurred at the same time pointed dimly to
a nurse, concerning whom other reminiscences were retained; as, for
example, that she conscientiously urged me to deliver to her the small
coins which I received as gifts, a detail which in itself may lay claim
to the value of a concealing memory for later things. I then concluded
to facilitate for myself this time the task of interpretation, and
asked my now aged mother about that nurse. I found out all sorts of
things, among others the fact that this shrewd but dishonest person had
committed extensive robberies during the confinement of my mother, and
that my half-brother was instrumental in bringing her to justice.
This information gave me the key to the scene from childhood, as
through a sort of inspiration. The sudden disappearance of the nurse
was not a matter of indifference to me; I had just asked this brother
where she was, probably because I had noticed that he had played a
part in her disappearance, and he, evasive and witty as he is to this
day, answered that she was “boxed in.” I understood this answer in
the childish way, but asked no more, as there was nothing else to be
discovered. When my mother left me shortly thereafter I suspected that
the naughty brother had treated her in the same way as he did the
nurse, and therefore pressed him to open the chest.
I also understand now why in the translation of the visual childhood
scene my mother’s slenderness was accentuated; she must have struck
me as being newly restored. I am two and a half years older than the
sister born at that time, and when I was three years of age I was
separated from my half-brother.
V
MISTAKES IN SPEECH
Although the ordinary material of speech of our mother-tongue seems to
be guarded against forgetting, its application, however, more often
succumbs to another disturbance which is familiar to us as “slips
of the tongue.” What we observe in normal persons as slips of the
tongue gives the same impression as the first step of the so-called
“paraphasias” which manifest themselves under pathologic conditions.
I am in the exceptional position of being about to refer to a previous
work on the subject. In the year 1895 Meringer and C. Mayer published
a study on _Mistakes in Speech and Reading_, with whose view-points I
do not agree. One of the authors, who is the spokesman in the text,
is a philologist actuated by a linguistic interest to examine the
rules governing those slips. He hoped to deduce from these rules the
existence “of a definite psychic mechanism,” “whereby the sounds of a
word, of a sentence, and even the words themselves, would be associated
and connected with one another in a quite peculiar manner” (p. 10).
The authors grouped the examples of speech-mistakes collected by
them first according to purely descriptive view-points, such as
interchangings (_e.g._, the Milo of Venus instead of the Venus of
Milo), as anticipations (_e.g._, the shoes made her sorft ... the shoes
made her feet sore), as echoes and post positions, as contaminations
(_e.g._, “I will soon him home,” instead of “I will soon go home and
I will see him”), and substitutions (_e.g._, “he entrusted his money
to a savings crank,” instead of “a savings bank”).[13] Besides these
principal categories there are some others of lesser importance (or
of lesser significance for our purpose). In this grouping it makes no
difference whether the transposition, disfigurement, fusion, etc.,
affects single sounds of the word or syllables, or whole words of the
concerned sentence.
To explain the various forms of mistakes in speech, Meringer assumes a
varied psychic value of phonetics. As soon as the innervation affects
the first syllable of a word, or the first word of a sentence, the
stimulating process immediately strikes the succeeding sounds, and the
following words, and in so far as these innervations are synchronous
they may effect some changes in one another. The stimulus of the
psychically more intensive sound “rings” before or continues echoing,
and thus disturbs the less important process of innervation. It is
necessary therefore to determine which are the most important sounds
of a word. Meringer states: “If one wishes to know which sound of a
word possesses the greatest intensity he should examine himself while
searching for a forgotten word, for example, a name. That which first
returns to consciousness invariably had the greatest intensity prior to
the forgetting (p. 160). Thus the most important sounds are the initial
sound of the root-syllable and the initial sound of the word itself, as
well as one or another of the accentuated vowels” (p. 162).
Here I cannot help voicing a contradiction. Whether or not the initial
sound of the name belongs to the most important elements of the word,
it is surely not true that in the case of the forgetting of the word
it first returns to consciousness; the above rule is therefore of no
use. When we observe ourselves during the search for a forgotten name
we are comparatively often forced to express the opinion that it begins
with a certain letter. This conviction proves to be as often unfounded
as founded. Indeed, I would even go so far as to assert that in the
majority of cases one reproduces a false initial sound. Also in our
example _Signorelli_ the substitutive name lacked the initial sound,
and the principal syllables were lost; on the other hand, the less
important pair of syllables _elli_ returned to consciousness in the
substitutive name _Botticelli_.
How little substitutive names respect the initial sound of the lost
names may be learned from the following case. One day I found it
impossible to recall the name of the small country whose capital is
Monte Carlo. The substitutive names were as follows: _Piedmont_,
_Albania_, _Montevideo_, _Colico_. In place of Albania _Montenegro_
soon appeared, and then it struck me that the syllable _Mont_
(pronounced _Mon_) occurred in all but the last of the substitutive
names. It thus became easy for me to find from the name of Prince
Albert the forgotten name _Monaco_. _Colico_ practically imitates the
syllabic sequence and rhythm of the forgotten name.
If we admit the conjecture that a mechanism similar to that pointed
out in the forgetting of names may also play a part in the phenomena
of speech-blunders, we are then led to a better founded judgment of
cases of speech-blunders. The speech disturbance which manifests
itself as a speech-blunder may in the first place be caused by the
influence of another component of the same speech, that is, through a
fore-sound or an echo, or through another meaning within the sentence
or context which differs from that which the speaker wishes to utter.
In the second place, however, the disturbance could be brought about
analogously to the process in the case _Signorelli_, through influences
outside this word, sentence or context, from elements which we did not
intend to express, and of whose incitement we became conscious only
through the disturbance. In both modes of origin of the mistake in
speech the common element lies in the simultaneity of the stimulus,
while the differentiating elements lie in the arrangement within or
without the same sentence or context.
The difference does not at first appear as wide as when it is taken
into consideration in certain conclusions drawn from the symptomatology
of speech-mistakes. It is clear, however, that only in the first case
is there a prospect of drawing conclusions from the manifestations of
speech-blunders concerning a mechanism which connects together sounds
and words for the reciprocal influence of their articulation; that is,
conclusions such as the philologist hopes to gain from the study of
speech-blunders. In the case of disturbance through influence outside
of the same sentence or context, it would before all be a question of
becoming acquainted with the disturbing elements, and then the question
would arise whether the mechanism of this disturbance cannot also
suggest the probable laws of the formation of speech.
We cannot maintain that Meringer and Mayer have overlooked the
possibility of speech disturbance through “complicated psychic
influences,” that is, through elements outside of the same word or
sentence or the same sequence of words. Indeed, they must have observed
that the theory of the psychic variation of sounds applies, strictly
speaking, only to the explanation of sound disturbances as well as to
fore-sounds and after-sounds. Where the word disturbances cannot be
reduced to sound disturbances, as, for example, in the substitutions
and contaminations of words, they, too, have without hesitation sought
the cause of the mistake in speech outside of the intended context,
and proved this state of affairs by means of fitting examples.[14]
According to the author’s own understanding it is some similarity
between a certain word in the intended sentence and some other not
intended, which allows the latter to assert itself in consciousness
by causing a disfigurement, a composition, or a compromise formation
(contamination).
Now, in my work on the _Interpretation of Dreams_ I have shown the
part played by the process of condensation in the origin of the
so-called manifest contents of the dream from the latent thoughts of
the dream. Any similarity of objects or of word-presentations between
two elements of the unconscious material is taken as a cause for the
formation of a third, which is a composite or compromise formation.
This element represents both components in the dream content, and
in view of this origin it is frequently endowed with numerous
contradictory individual determinants. The formation of substitutions
and contaminations in speech-mistakes is, therefore, the beginning of
that work of condensation which we find taking a most active part in
the construction of the dream.
In a small essay destined for the general reader,[15] Meringer
advanced a theory of very practical significance for certain cases of
interchanging of words, especially for such cases where one word is
substituted by another of opposite meaning. He says: “We may still
recall the manner in which the President of the Austrian House of
Deputies opened the session some time ago: ‘Honoured Sirs! I announce
the presence of so and so many gentlemen, and therefore declare
the session as “closed”’!” The general merriment first attracted
his attention and he corrected his mistake. In the present case
the probable explanation is that the President wished himself in a
position to close this session, from which he had little good to
expect, and the thought broke through at least partially--a frequent
manifestation--resulting in his use of “closed” in place of “opened,”
that is, the opposite of the statement intended. Numerous observations
have taught me, however, that we frequently interchange contrasting
words; they are already associated in our speech consciousness; they
lie very close together and are easily incorrectly evoked.
Still, not in all cases of contrast substitution is it so simple
as in the example of the President as to appear plausible that the
speech-mistake occurs merely as a contradiction which arises in the
inner thought of the speaker opposing the sentence uttered. We have
found the analogous mechanism in the analysis of the example _aliquis_;
there the inner contradiction asserts itself in the form of forgetting
a word instead of a substitution through its opposite. But in order to
adjust the difference we may remark that the little word _aliquis_ is
incapable of a contrast similar to “closing” and “opening,” and that
the word “opening” cannot be subject to forgetting on account of its
being a common component of speech.
Having been shown by the last examples of Meringer and Mayer that
speech disturbance may be caused through the influence of fore-sounds,
after-sounds, words from the same sentence that were intended for
expression, as well as through the effect of words outside the sentence
intended, _the stimulus of which would otherwise not have been
suspected_, we shall next wish to discover whether we can definitely
separate the two classes of mistakes in speech, and how we can
distinguish the example of the one from a case of the other class.
But at this stage of the discussion we must also think of the
assertions of Wundt, who deals with the manifestations of
speech-mistakes in his recent work on the development of language.[16]
Psychic influences, according to Wundt, never lack in these as well as
in other phenomena related to them. “The uninhibited stream of _sound_
and _word associations_ stimulated by spoken sounds belongs here in the
first place as a positive determinant. This is supported as a negative
factor by the relaxation or suppression of the influences of the will
which inhibit this stream, and by the active attention which is here a
function of volition. Whether that play of association manifests itself
in the fact that a coming sound is anticipated or a preceding sound
reproduced, or whether a familiar practised sound becomes intercalated
between others, or finally, whether it manifests itself in the fact
that altogether different sounds associatively related to the spoken
sounds act upon these--all these questions designate only differences
in the direction, and at most in the play of the occurring associations
but not in the general nature of the same. In some cases it may be
also doubtful to which form a certain disturbance may be attributed,
or whether it would not be more correct to refer such disturbance
to a concurrence of many motives, _following the principle of the
complication of causes_[17] (cf. pp. 380-81).”
I consider these observations of Wundt as absolutely justified and very
instructive. Perhaps we could emphasize with even greater firmness
than Wundt that the positive factor favouring mistakes in speech (the
uninhibited stream of associations, and its negative, the relaxation of
the inhibiting attention) regularly attain synchronous action, so that
both factors become only different determinants of the same process.
With the relaxation, or, more unequivocally expressed, _through_ this
relaxation, of the inhibiting attention the uninhibited stream of
associations becomes active.
Among the examples of the mistakes in speech collected by me I can
scarcely find one in which I would be obliged to attribute the speech
disturbance simply and solely to what Wundt calls “contact effect
of sound.” Almost invariably I discover besides this a disturbing
influence of something outside of the intended speech. The disturbing
element is either a single unconscious thought, which comes to light
through the speech-blunder, and can only be brought to consciousness
through a searching analysis, or it is a more general psychic motive,
which directs itself against the entire speech.
(_Example_ _a_) Seeing my daughter make an unpleasant face while biting
into an apple, I wished to quote the following couplet:--
“The ape he is a funny sight,
When in the apple he takes a bite.”
But I began: “The apel....” This seems to be a contamination of “ape”
and “apple” (compromise formation), or it may be also conceived as
an anticipation of the prepared “apple.” The true state of affairs,
however, was this: I began the quotation once before, and made no
mistake the first time. I made the mistake only during the repetition,
which was necessary because my daughter, having been distracted from
another side, did not listen to me. This repetition with the added
impatience to disburden myself of the sentence I must include in
the motivation of the speech-blunder, which represented itself as a
function of condensation.
(_b_) My daughter said, “I wrote to Mrs. Schresinger.” The woman’s name
was Schlesinger. This speech-blunder may depend on the tendency to
facilitate articulation. I must state, however, that this mistake was
made by my daughter a few moments after I had said _apel_ instead of
_ape_. Mistakes in speech are in a great measure contagious; a similar
peculiarity was noticed by Meringer and Mayer in the forgetting of
names. I know of no reason for this psychic contagiousness.
(_c_) “I _sut_ up like a pocket-knife,” said a patient in the beginning
of treatment, instead of “I _shut_ up.” This suggests a difficulty
of articulation which may serve as an excuse for the interchanging
of sounds. When her attention was called to the speech-blunder, she
promptly replied, “Yes, that happened because you said ‘_earnesht_’
instead of ‘_earnest_.’” As a matter of fact I received her with the
remark, “To-day we shall be in earnest” (because it was the last hour
before her discharge from treatment), and I jokingly changed the word
into _earnesht_. In the course of the hour she repeatedly made mistakes
in speech, and I finally observed that it was not only because she
imitated me but because she had a special reason in her unconscious to
linger at the word earnest (Ernst) as a name.[18]
(_d_) A woman, speaking about a game invented by her children and
called by them “the man in the box,” said “the manx in the boc.”
I could readily understand her mistake. It was while analysing
her dream, in which her husband is depicted as very generous in
money matters--just the reverse of reality--that she made this
speech-blunder. The day before she had asked for a new set of furs,
which her husband denied her, claiming that he could not afford to
spend so much money. She upbraided him for his stinginess, “for putting
away so much into the strong-box,” and mentioned a friend whose husband
has not nearly his income, and yet he presented his wife with a _mink_
coat for her birthday. The mistake is now comprehensible. The word
_manx_ (_manks_) reduces itself to the “minks” which she longs for, and
the _box_ refers to her husband’s stinginess.
(_e_) A similar mechanism is shown in the mistake of another patient
whose memory deserted her in the midst of a long-forgotten childish
reminiscence. Her memory failed to inform her on what part of the body
the prying and lustful hand of another had touched her. Soon thereafter
she visited one of her friends, with whom she discussed summer homes.
Asked where her cottage in M. was located, she answered, “Near the
_mountain loin_” instead of “_mountain lane_.”
(_f_) Another patient, whom I asked at the end of her visit how her
uncle was, answered: “I don’t know, I only see him now _in flagranti_.”
The following day she said, “I am really ashamed of myself for having
given you yesterday such a stupid answer. Naturally you must have
thought me a very uneducated person who always mistakes the meaning
of foreign words. I wished to say _en passant_.” We did not know at
the time where she got the incorrectly used foreign words, but during
the same session she reproduced a reminiscence as a continuation of
the theme from the previous day, in which being caught _in flagranti_
played the principal part. The mistake of the previous day had
therefore anticipated the recollection, which at that time had not yet
become conscious.
(_g_) In discussing her summer plans, a patient said, “I shall remain
most of the summer in _Elberlon_.” She noted her mistake, and asked me
to analyse it. The associations to _Elberlon_ elicited: seashore on
the Jersey coast--summer resort--vacation travelling. This recalled
travelling in Europe with her cousin, a topic which we had discussed
the day before during the analysis of a dream. The dream dealt with
her dislike for this cousin, and she admitted that it was mainly due
to the fact that the latter was the favourite of the man whom they met
together while travelling abroad. During the dream analysis she could
not recall the name of the city in which they met this man, and I did
not make any effort at the time to bring it to her consciousness, as we
were engrossed in a totally different problem. When asked to focus her
attention again on Elberlon and reproduce her associations, she said,
“It brings to mind _Elberlawn_--_lawn_--_field_--and _Elberfield_.”
_Elberfeld_ was the lost name of the city in Germany. Here the mistake
served to bring to consciousness in a concealed manner a memory which
was connected with a painful feeling.
(_h_) A woman said to me, “If you wish to buy a carpet, go to
_Merchant_ (Kaufmann) in _Matthew Street_ (Mathäusgasse).” I repeated,
“Then at Matthew’s--I mean at Merchant’s----” It would seem that my
repeating of one name in place of the other was simply the result of
distraction. The woman’s remark really did distract me, as she turned
my attention to something else much more vital to me than carpet. In
Matthew Street stands the house in which my wife lived as a bride.
The entrance to the house was in another street, and now I noticed
that I had forgotten its name and could only recall it through a
roundabout method. The name Matthew, which kept my attention, is thus
a substitutive name for the forgotten name of the street. It is more
suitable than the name Merchant, for Matthew is exclusively the name of
a person, while Merchant is not. The forgotten street, too, bears the
name of a person: _Radetzky_.
(_i_) A patient consulted me for the first time, and from her history
it became apparent that the cause of her nervousness was largely an
unhappy married life. Without any encouragement she went into details
about her marital troubles. She had not lived with her husband for
about six months, and she saw him last at the theatre, when she saw
the play _Officer 606_. I called her attention to the mistake, and she
immediately corrected herself, saying that she meant to say _Officer
666_ (the name of a recent popular play). I decided to find out the
reason for the mistake, and as the patient came to me for analytic
treatment, I discovered that the immediate cause of the rupture between
herself and husband was the disease which is treated by “606.”[19]
(_k_) Before calling on me a patient telephoned for an appointment,
and also wished to be informed about my consultation fee. He was told
that the first consultation was ten dollars; after the examination was
over he again asked what he was to pay, and added: “I don’t like to owe
money to any one, especially to doctors; I prefer to pay right away.”
Instead of _pay_ he said _play_. His last voluntary remarks and his
mistake put me on my guard, but after a few more uncalled-for remarks
he set me at ease by taking money from his pocket. He counted four
paper dollars and was very chagrined and surprised because he had no
more money with him, and promised to send me a cheque for the balance.
I was sure that his mistake betrayed him, that he was only _playing_
with me, but there was nothing to be done. At the end of a few weeks I
sent him a bill for the balance, and the letter was returned to me by
the post-office authorities marked “Not found.”
(_l_) Miss X. spoke very warmly of Mr. Y., which was rather strange, as
before this she had always expressed her indifference, not to say her
contempt, for him. On being asked about this sudden change of heart she
said: “I really never had anything against him; he was always nice to
me, but I never gave him the chance to cultivate my acquaintance.” She
said “cuptivate.” This neologism was a contamination of _cultivate_ and
_captivate_, and foretold the coming betrothal.
(_m_) An illustration of the mechanisms of contamination and
condensation will be found in the following _lapsus linguæ_. Speaking
of Miss Z., Miss W. depicted her as a very “straitlaced” person who
was not given to levities, etc. Miss X. thereupon remarked: “Yes,
that is a very characteristic description, she always appealed to me
as very ‘_straicet-brazed_.’” Here the mistake resolved itself into
_straitlaced_ and _brazen-faced_, which corresponded to Miss W.’s
opinion of Miss Z.