considering--the prohibition or permission of slavery. The ordinance of
1787 prohibited slavery in the territory northwest of the Ohio. In 1790
Congress passed an act accepting the cession which the State of North
Carolina had made of the western part of her territory, with the
proviso, that in reference to the territory thus ceded Congress should
pass no laws "tending to the emancipation of the slaves." Here was a
precisely parallel case. Here was a territory in which, in 1787, slavery
was prohibited. Here was a territory ceded by North Carolina, which
became the territory of the United States south of the Ohio, in
reference to which it was stipulated with North Carolina, that Congress
should pass no laws tending to the emancipation of slaves. But I believe
it never occurred to any one that the legislation of 1790 acted back
upon the ordinance of 1787, or furnished a rule by which any effect
could be produced upon the state of things existing under that
ordinance, in the territory to which it applied.
I certainly intend to do the distinguished chairman of the committee
no injustice; and I am not sure that I fully comprehend his argument in
this respect; but I think his report sustains the view which I now take
of the subject: that is, that the legislation of 1850 did not establish
a principle which was designed to have any such effect as he intimates.
That report states how matters stood in those new Mexican territories.
It was alleged on the one hand that by the Mexican _lex loci_ slavery
was prohibited. On the other hand that was denied, and it was maintained
that the Constitution of the United States secures to every citizen the
right to go there and take with him any property recognized as such
by any of the States of the Union. The report considers that a similar
state of things now exists in Nebraska--that the validity of the eighth
section of the Missouri Act, by which slavery is prohibited in that
Territory, is doubtful, and that it is maintained by many distinguished
statesmen that Congress has no power to legislate on the subject.
Then, in this state of the controversy, the report maintains that
the legislation of Congress in 1850 did not undertake to decide these
questions. Surely, if they did not undertake to decide them, they could
not settle the principle which is at stake in them; and, unless they did
decide them, the measures then adopted must be considered as specific
measures, relating only to those case and not establishing a principle
of general operation. This seems to me to be as direct and conclusive as
anything can be.
At all events, these are not impressions which are put forth by me under
the exigencies of the present debate or of the present occasion. I have
never entertained any other opinion. I was called upon for a particular
purpose, of a literary nature, to which I will presently allude more
distinctly, shortly after the close of the session of 1850, to draw up a
narrative of the events that had taken place relative to the passage of
the compromise measures of that year. I had not, I own, the best sources
of information. I was not a member of Congress, and had not heard
the debates, which is almost indispensable to come to a thorough
understanding of questions of this nature; but I inquired of those who
had heard them, I read the reports, and I had an opportunity of personal
intercourse with some who had taken a prominent part in all those
measures. I never formed the idea--I never received the intimation until
I got it from this report of the committee--that those measures were
intended to have any effect beyond the Territories of Utah and New
Mexico, for which they were enacted. I cannot but think that if it
was intended that they should have any larger application, if it was
intended that they should furnish the rule which is now supposed, it
would have been a fact as notorious as the light of day.
* * * * *
And now, sir, having alluded to the speech of Mr. Webster, of the 7th
March, 1850, allow me to dwell upon it for a moment. I was in a position
the next year--having been requested by that great and lamented man to
superintend the publication of his works--to know very particularly the
comparative estimate which he placed upon his own parliamentary efforts.
He told me more than once that he thought his second speech on Foot's
resolution was that in which he had best succeeded as a senatorial
effort, and as a specimen of parliamentary dialectics; but he added,
with an emotion which even he was unable to suppress, "The speech of the
7th of March, 1850, much as I have been reviled for it, when I am dead,
will be allowed to be of the greatest importance to the country." Sir,
he took the greatest interest in that speech. He wished it to go forth
with a specific title; and, after considerable deliberation, it was
called, by his own direction, "A Speech for the Constitution and the
Union." He inscribed it to the people of Massachusetts, in a dedication
of the most emphatic tenderness, and he prefixed to it that motto--which
you all remember--from Livy, the most appropriate and felicitous
quotation, perhaps, that was ever made: "True things rather than
pleasant things"--_Vera progratis:_ and with that he sent it forth to
the world.
In that speech his gigantic intellect brought together all that it
could gather from the law of nature, from the Constitution of the United
States, from our past legislation, and from the physical features of
the region, to strengthen him in that plan of conciliation and peace,
in which he feared that he might not carry along with him the public
sentiment of the whole of that, portion of the country which he
particularly represented here. At its close, when he dilated upon the
disastrous effects of separation, he rose to a strain of impassioned
eloquence which had never been surpassed within these walls. Every
topic, every argument, every fact, was brought to bear upon the point;
and he felt that all his vast popularity was at stake on the issue. Let
me commend to the attention of Senators, and let me ask them to consider
what weight is due to the authority of such a man, speaking under such
circumstances, and on such an occasion, when he tells you that
the condition of every foot of land in the country, for slavery or
non-slavery, is fixed by some irrepealable law. And you are now about
to repeal the principal law which ascertained and fixed that condition.
And, sir, if the Senate will take any heed of the opinion of one so
humble as myself, I will say that I believe Mr. Webster, in that speech,
went to the very verge of the public sentiment in the non-slaveholding
States, and that to have gone a hair's-breadth further, would have been
a step too bold even for his great weight of character.
* * * * *
I conclude, therefore, sir, that the compromise measures of 1850 ended
where they began, with the Territories of Utah and New Mexico, to
which they specifically referred; at any rate, that they established
no principle which was to govern in other cases; that they had no
prospective action to the organization of territories in all future
time; and certainly no retrospective action upon lands subject to the
restriction of 1820, and to the positive enactment that you now propose
to declare inoperative and void.
I trust that nothing which I have now said will be taken in derogation
of the compromises of 1850. I adhere to them; I stand by them. I do so
for many reasons. One is respect for the memory of the great men who
were the authors of them--lights and ornaments of the country, but now
taken from its service. I would not so soon, if it were in my power,
undo their work, if for no other reason. But beside this, I am one of
those--I am not ashamed to avow it--who believed at that time, and who
still believe, that at that period the union of these States was in
great danger, and that the adoption of the compromise measures of 1850
contributed materially to avert that danger; and therefore, sir, I
say, as well out of respect to the memory of the great men who were the
authors of them, as to the healing effect of the measures themselves,
I would adhere to them. They are not perfect. I suppose that nobody,
either North or South, thinks them perfect. They contain some provisions
not satisfactory to the South, and other provisions contrary to the
public sentiment of the North; but I believed at the time they were
the wisest, the best, the most effective measures which, under the
circumstances, could be adopted. But you do not strengthen them, you do
not show your respect for them, by giving them an application which they
were never intended to bear.
* * * * *
A single word, sir, in respect to this supposed principle of
non-intervention on the part of Congress in the subject of slavery in
the territories. I confess I am surprised to find this brought forward,
and stated with so much confidence, as an established principle of the
Government. I know that distinguished gentlemen hold the opinion. The
very distinguished Senator from Michigan (Mr. Cass) holds it, and has
propounded it; and I pay all due respect and deference to his authority,
which I conceive to be very high. But I was not aware that any such
principle was considered a settled principle of the territorial policy
of this country. Why, sir, from the first enactment in 1789, down to the
bill before us, there is no such principle in our legislation. As far as
I can see it would be perfectly competent even now for Congress to pass
any law that they pleased on the subject in the Territories under this
bill. But however that may be, even by this bill, there is not a law
which the Territories can pass admitting or excluding slavery, which it
is of in the power of this Congress to disallow the next day. This
is not a mere _brutum fulmen_. It is not an unexpected power. Your
statute-book shows case after case. I believe, in reference to a
single Territory, that there have been fifteen or twenty cases where
territorial legislation has been disallowed by Congress. How, then, can
it be said that this principle of non-intervention in the government of
the Territories is now to be recognized as an established principle in
the public policy of the Congress of the United States?
Do gentlemen recollect the terms, almost of disdain, with which this
supposed established principle of our constitutional policy is treated
in that last valedictory speech of Mr. Calhoun, which, unable to
pronounce it himself, he was obliged to give to the Senate through the
medium of his friend, the Senator from Virginia. He reminded the Senate
that the occupants of a Territory were not even called the people--but
simply the inhabitants--till they were allowed by Congress to call a
convention and form a State constitution.
* * * * *
A word more, sir, and I have done. With reference to the great question
of slavery--that terrible question--the only one on which the North and
South of this great Republic differ irreconcilably--I have not, on this
occasion, a word to say. My humble career is drawing near its close,
and I shall end it as I began, with using no other words on that subject
than those of moderation, conciliation, and harmony between the two
great sections of the country. I blame no one who differs from me in
this respect. I allot to others, what I claim for myself, the credit of
honesty and purity of motive. But for my own part, the rule of my life,
as far as circumstances have enabled me to act up to it, has been, to
say nothing that would tend to kindle unkind feeling on this subject. I
have never known men on this, or any other subject, to be convinced by
harsh epithets or denunciation.
I believe the union of these States is the greatest possible
blessing--that it comprises within itself all other blessings,
political, national, and social; and I trust that my eyes may close long
before the day shall come--if it ever shall come--when that Union shall
be at an end. Sir, I share the opinions and the sentiments of the part
of the country where I was born and educated, where my ashes will be
laid, and where my children will succeed me. But in relation to my
fellow-citizens in other parts of the country, I will treat their
constitutional and their legal rights with respect, and their characters
and their feelings with tenderness. I believe them to be as good
Christians, as good patriots, as good men, as we are, and I claim that
we, in our turn, are as good as they.
I rejoiced to hear my friend from Kentucky, (Mr. Dixon), if he will
allow me to call him so--I concur most heartily in the sentiment--utter
the opinion that a wise and gracious Providence, in his own good time,
will find the ways and the channels to remove from the land what I
consider this great evil, but I do not expect that what has been done in
three centuries and a half is to be undone in a day or a year, or a few
years; and I believe that, in the mean time, the desired end will be
retarded rather than promoted by passionate sectional agitation. I
believe, further, that the fate of the great and interesting continent
in the elder world, Africa, is closely intertwined and wrapped up with
the fortunes of her children in all the parts of the earth to which they
have been dispersed, and that at some future time, which is already
in fact beginning, they will go back to the land of their fathers, the
voluntary missionaries of Civilization and Christianity; and finally,
sir, I doubt not that in His own good time the Ruler of all will
vindicate the most glorious of His prerogatives, "From seeming evil
still educing good."
STEPHEN ARNOLD DOUGLAS,
OF ILLINOIS. (BORN 1813, DIED 1861.)
ON THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL;
SENATE, MARCH 3, 1854.
It has been urged in debate that there is no necessity for these
Territorial organizations; and I have been called upon to point out any
public and national considerations which require action at this time.
Senators seem to forget that our immense and valuable possessions on the
Pacific are separated from the States and organized Territories on this
side of the Rocky Mountains by a vast wilderness, filled by hostile
savages--that nearly a hundred thousand emigrants pass through this
barbarous wilderness every year, on their way to California
and Oregon--that these emigrants are American citizens, our own
constituents, who are entitled to the protection of law and government,
and that they are left to make their way, as best they may, without the
protection or aid of law or government. The United States mails for New
Mexico and Utah, and official communications between this Government and
the authorities of those Territories, are required to be carried over
these wild plains, and through the gorges of the mountains, where you
have made no provisions for roads, bridges, or ferries to facilitate
travel, or forts or other means of safety to protect life. As often as I
have brought forward and urged the adoption of measures to remedy these
evils, and afford security against the damages to which our people are
constantly exposed, they have been promptly voted down as not being
of sufficient importance to command the favorable consideration of
Congress. Now, when I propose to organize the Territories, and allow
the people to do for themselves what you have so often refused to do for
them, I am told that there are not white inhabitants enough permanently
settled in the country to require and sustain a government. True; there
is not a very large population there, for the very reason that your
Indian code and intercourse laws exclude the settlers, and forbid their
remaining there to cultivate the soil. You refuse to throw the
country open to settlers, and then object to the organization of the
Territories, upon the ground that there is not a sufficient number of
inhabitants. * * *
I will now proceed to the consideration of the great principle involved
in the bill, without omitting, however, to notice some of those
extraneous matters which have been brought into this discussion with the
view of producing another anti-slavery agitation. We have been told by
nearly every Senator who has spoken in opposition to this bill, that
at the time of its introduction the people were in a state of profound
quiet and repose, that the anti-slavery agitation had entirely ceased,
and that the whole country was acquiescing cheerfully and cordially
in the compromise measures of 1850 as a final adjustment of this vexed
question. Sir, it is truly refreshing to hear Senators, who contested
every inch of ground in opposition to those measures, when they were
under discussion, who predicted all manner of evils and calamities from
their adoption, and who raised the cry of appeal, and even resistance,
to their execution, after they had become the laws of the land--I say it
is really refreshing to hear these same Senators now bear their united
testimony to the wisdom of those measures, and to the patriotic
motives which induced us to pass them in defiance of their threats and
resistance, and to their beneficial effects in restoring peace, harmony,
and fraternity to a distracted country. These are precious confessions
from the lips of those who stand pledged never to assent to the
propriety of those measures, and to make war upon them, so long as
they shall remain upon the statute-book. I well understand that these
confessions are now made, not with the view of yielding their assent to
the propriety of carrying those enactments into faithful execution, but
for the purpose of having a pretext for charging upon me, as the author
of this bill, the responsibility of an agitation which they are striving
to produce. They say that I, and not they, have revived the agitation.
What have I done to render me obnoxious to this charge? They say that I
wrote and introduced this Nebraska bill. That is true; but I was not a
volunteer in the transaction. The Senate, by a unanimous vote,
appointed me chairman of the Territorial Committee, and associated five
intelligent and patriotic Senators with me, and thus made it our duty
to take charge of all Territorial business. In like manner, and with the
concurrence of these complaining Senators, the Senate referred to us a
distinct proposition to organize this Nebraska Territory, and required
us to report specifically upon the question. I repeat, then, we were not
volunteers in this business. The duty was imposed upon us by the
Senate. We were not unmindful of the delicacy and responsibility of the
position. We were aware that, from 1820 to 1850, the abolition doctrine
of Congressional interference with slavery in the Territories and new
States had so far prevailed as to keep up an incessant slavery agitation
in Congress, and throughout the country, whenever any new Territory was
to be acquired or organized. We were also aware that, in 1850, the right
of the people to decide this question for themselves, subject only
to the Constitution, was submitted for the doctrine of Congressional
intervention. This first question, therefore, which the committee were
called upon to decide, and indeed the only question of any material
importance in framing this bill, was this: Shall we adhere to and carry
out the principle recognized by the compromise measures of 1850,
or shall we go back to the old exploded doctrine of Congressional
interference, as established in 1820, in a large portion of the country,
and which it was the object of the Wilmot proviso to give a universal
application, not only to all the territory which we then possessed, but
all which we might hereafter acquire? There are no alternatives. We
were compelled to frame the bill upon the one or the other of these two
principles. The doctrine of 1820 or the doctrine of 1850 must prevail.
In the discharge of the duty imposed upon us by the Senate, the
committee could not hesitate upon this point, whether we consulted our
own individual opinions and principles, or those which were known to be
entertained and boldly avowed by a large majority of the Senate. The two
great political parties of the country stood solemnly pledged before the
world to adhere to the compromise measures of 1850, "in principle and
substance." A large majority of the Senate--indeed, every member of the
body, I believe, except the two avowed Abolitionists (Mr. Chase and Mr.
Sumner)--profess to belong to one or the other of these parties, and
hence were supposed to be under a high moral obligation to carry out
"the principle and substance" of those measures in all new Territorial
organizations. The report of the committee was in accordance with
this obligation. I am arraigned, therefore, for having endeavored to
represent the opinions and principles of the Senate truly--for having
performed my duty in conformity with parliamentary law--for having been
faithful to the trust imposed in me by the Senate. Let the vote
this night determine whether I have thus faithfully represented your
opinions. When a majority of the Senate shall have passed the bill--when
the majority of the States shall have endorsed it through their
representatives upon this floor--when a majority of the South and a
majority of the North shall have sanctioned it--when a majority of the
Whig party and a majority of the Democratic party shall have voted for
it--when each of these propositions shall be demonstrated by the vote
this night on the final passage of the bill, I shall be willing to
submit the question to the country, whether, as the organ of the
committee, I performed my duty in the report and bill which have called
down upon my head so much denunciation and abuse.
Mr. President, the opponents of this measure have had much to say about
the mutations and modifications which this bill has undergone since it
was first introduced by myself, and about the alleged departure of the
bill, in its present form, from the principle laid down in the original
report of the committee as a rule of action in all future Territorial
organizations. Fortunately there is no necessity, even if your patience
would tolerate such a course of argument at this late hour of the night,
for me to examine these speeches in detail, and reply to each charge
separately. Each speaker seems to have followed faithfully in the
footsteps of his leader in the path marked out by the Abolition
confederates in their manifesto, which I took occasion to expose on a
former occasion. You have seen them on their winding way, meandering
the narrow and crooked path in Indian file, each treading close upon the
heels of the other, and neither venturing to take a step to the right or
left, or to occupy one inch of ground which did not bear the footprint
of the Abolition champion. To answer one, therefore, is to answer the
whole. The statement to which they seem to attach the most importance,
and which they have repeated oftener, perhaps, than any other, is, that,
pending the compromise measures of 1850, no man in or out of Congress
ever dreamed of abrogating the Missouri compromise; that from that
period down to the present session nobody supposed that its validity had
been impaired, or any thing done which endered it obligatory upon us to
make it inoperative hereafter; that at the time of submitting the report
and bill to the Senate, on the fourth of January last, neither I nor any
member of the committee ever thought of such a thing; and that we could
never be brought to the point of abrogating the eighth section of
the Missouri act until after the Senator from Kentucky introduced his
amendment to my bill.
Mr. President, before I proceed to expose the many misrepresentations
contained in this complicated charge, I must call the attention of
the Senate to the false issue which these gentlemen are endeavoring to
impose upon the country, for the purpose of diverting public attention
from the real issue contained in the bill. They wish to have the people
believe that the abrogation of what they call the Missouri compromise
was the main object and aim of the bill, and that the only question
involved is, whether the prohibition of slavery north of 36° 30'
shall be repealed or not? That which is a mere incident they choose to
consider the principle. They make war on the means by which we propose to
accomplish an object, instead of openly resisting the object itself.
The principle which we propose to carry into effect by the bill is this:
That Congress shall neither legislate slavery into any Territories
or State, nor out of the same; but the people shall be left free to
regulate their domestic concerns in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States.