We are now called upon to go into Committee on a Bill which has never
been read a second time.[23] The two halves of it have been read,
each of them a second time, but the whole measure we have never until
this moment had before. The first half this House was induced--or
shall I say coerced?--into reading a second time without knowledge of
the other part. The second half was really hurried on so fast to a
second reading--only an interval of a week being given to master all
its complicated details--that I, for one, was quite unable to take
part in the discussion on the second reading for want of time to make
up my mind as to an opinion by which I should be willing to stand.
I hope, therefore, the House will allow me, even at this stage, to
question the principle of the measure. What is that principle? I must
apologize to the House for the monotonous nature of my complaints,
which are, I think, justified by the uniform nature of the provocation
I receive. That provocation is that the Government keeps continually
bringing in measures, attacking, as it seems to me, the very vital and
fundamental institutions of the country, and purposely abstains from
telling us the principle of those measures. I made the same complaint,
I am sorry to say, against the Chancellor of the Exchequer on that
Franchise Bill. I make it again now. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in
introducing the Redistribution Bill said that the Government was not
desirous of innovation--that is to say, they went upon no principle.
Their principle, he said, was the same as the principle of every
Redistribution Bill. Now, that appears to me to be impossible, because
Redistribution Bills may be divided into two classes. There is one,
the great Reform Bill,--the only successful Redistribution Bill that
any one ever heard of,--and then there are the four which succeeded
it, and which all failed from one cause or another.[24] The principle
of the Reform Bill was one thing, and the principle of the four bills
which followed it was another. The principle of the Reform Bill was,
no doubt, disfranchisement. The feeling of the country at that time
was that the deliberations of this House were overruled, and the
public opinion of the country stifled by an enormous number of small
boroughs under the patronage of noblemen and persons of property.
That state of things was considered a public nuisance, and one which
it was desirable to abate, and hence the principle of the Reform Bill
was disfranchisement, and 141 members were taken away from the small
boroughs. The Government proposition was to reduce the number of the
House of Commons by fifty, because they were very anxious to get rid of
these members, and they had no means which appeared suitable of filling
up the vacancies they had created. It was only on an amendment carried
against the Government that it was determined not to diminish the
number of members in this House. But has that been the principle of any
subsequent Reform Bill? I think not; it has been quite the contrary. It
has been the principle of enfranchisement; and of disfranchisement only
so far as may be necessary in order to fill up the places which require
enfranchisement. As I have shown the House, there are two different
principles, and the Right Honorable Gentleman does not tell me which is
his, but says the principle is that of all other Redistribution Bills.
This puts me in mind of the story of a lady who wrote to a friend to
ask how she was to receive a particular lover, and the answer was, “As
you receive all your other lovers.” Well, as the Chancellor of the
Exchequer will not tell us what the principle of his measure is, I
must, I am sorry to say, with the same monotony of treatment, try to
puzzle it out for myself; for it seems to me preposterous to consider
the Bill without the guiding thought of those who constructed it. There
is one principle of redistribution upon which it clearly ought not to
be founded, and that is the principle of abstract right to equality of
representation. The principle of equal electoral districts is not the
principle upon which a Redistribution Bill ought to be based. To adopt
such a principle would be to make us the slaves of numbers--very good
servants, but very bad masters. I do not suppose we are generally eager
to see the time
“When each fair burgh, numerically free,
Returns its Members by the Rule of Three.”
And yet, though few persons stand up for the principle of equality
of representation, I cannot escape the conclusion that it has had a
good deal to do with the matter, and that the Government will find it
exceedingly difficult to point out what other principle than that of
a sort of approximation towards numerical equality has guided them.
For if it be not a principle of _a priori_ rights, it must be some
good to the State, some improvement of the House, or the Government,
some practical good in some way. Now, the House has had the advantage
of hearing the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, and the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster,
and I ask if any of these Right Honorable Gentlemen has pointed out
any good of any practical nature whatever to be expected from the
Bill. I set myself, therefore, according to my old method, to try
and puzzle out what ought to be the principle of a Bill for the
Redistribution of Seats. In the first place, I should like to be shown
some practical evil to be remedied, but I give that up in despair,
for I have so often asked for it and failed to obtain it that I am
quite sure I shall not have it on this occasion. But it seems to me
a reasonable view of a Redistribution Bill that it should make this
House more fully and perfectly than it is at present a reflection of
the opinion of the country. That, I think, is a fair ground to start
from. We have suffered in many respects from the arbitrary division
of these two measures, and in none more than this--that the arguments
for the Redistribution of Seats has been transferred to this Bill for
enlarging the franchise. For, although it is quite true that a Bill
for the Redistribution of Seats should aim at making Parliament a
mirror of the country, it is also true that there can be nothing more
inappropriate than the argument when applied to the enlargement of
the franchise. For to pass a Bill which puts the power in a majority
of the boroughs into the hands of the working classes is not to make
this House a faithful reflection of the opinion of the country, but
is to make it an inversion of that opinion by giving political power
into the hands of those who have very little social power of any kind.
But that principle applies, to a certain extent, to a Redistribution
Bill, and from that point I take my departure. Any one who makes an
examination as to the nature of the deficiency will see whether this
House fails in any considerable degree to reflect the opinion of the
country. I confess I have found it exceedingly difficult to discover
in what respects it fails to do so. I have, indeed, observed some
tendency of a kind which, if we are to have a Redistribution Bill,
ought to be corrected. I think there is a visible tendency to too great
a uniformity and monotony of representation. I think there is a danger
that we may become too much like each other--that we may become merely
the multiple of one number. That is a danger which has occurred to
thinking men, and I think it very desirable that in a Redistribution
Bill we should find a remedy if possible for the tendency to this
level of monotony, and perhaps mediocrity. I think another great
object we must have in view in a Redistribution Bill should be
enfranchisement; and by that I mean not the aggregation of fresh
members to large constituencies, and by the enfranchisement of such
constituencies the giving more variety and life to the representation
of the country, and thus making the House what the country is--a
collection of infinite variety of all sorts of pursuits and habits.
I think the second advantage is that, by making fresh constituencies
by fresh enfranchisements, you do the most efficient thing you can do
towards moderating the frightful, enormous, and increasing expense of
elections. This is one of the greatest evils of our present system. I
am not speaking of the illegitimate expenses of elections, but of the
legitimate expenses. We had a paper laid upon our tables this morning
giving an account of the expenses of elections from “S” downwards.
I take the first few large boroughs, and I will read the expenses.
The expense of election for Stafford is £5400; Stoke-upon-Trent,
£6200; Sunderland, £5000; and Westminster, £12,000. These are the
aggregate expenses of all the candidates. I take them as they come,
without picking and choosing. I wish to call particular attention
to the case of Westminster, not for the purpose of saying anything
disagreeable to my honorable friend (Mr. J. Stuart Mill), for we know
he was elected in a burst--I will say a well-directed burst--of
popular enthusiasm. That was honorable to him and honorable to them,
and I have no doubt that in the course of the election all that could
be done by industry and enthusiasm was accomplished--gratuitously;
and I am sure that my honorable friend did not contribute in any
way to swell any unreasonable election expenses. His election ought
to have been gratuitous, but mark what it cost--£2302. I believe it
did not cost him 6_d._ He refused to contribute anything, and it was
very much to the honor of his constituents that they brought him in
gratuitously. But look to the state of our election practices when such
an outburst of popular feeling could not be given effect to without
that enormous sacrifice of money. I will now call attention to two or
three counties. This subject has not been sufficiently dwelt upon, but
it bears materially upon the question before us to-night. I will take
the southern division of Derbyshire. The election cost £8500, and this
is the cheapest I shall read. The northern division of Durham cost
£14,620, and the southern division, £11,000. South Essex cost £10,000.
West Kent cost £12,000; South Lancashire, £17,000; South Shropshire,
£12,000; North Staffordshire, £14,000; North Warwickshire, £10,000;
South Warwickshire, £13,000; North Wiltshire, £13,000; South Wiltshire,
£12,000; and the North Riding of Yorkshire, £27,000--all legitimate
expenses, but by no means the whole expense. Now, I ask the House
how it is possible that the institutions of this country can endure
if this kind of thing is to go on and increase. Do not suppose for a
moment that this is favorable to anything aristocratic. It is quite the
contrary. It is favorable to a plutocracy working upon a democracy.
Think of the persons excluded by such a system! You want rank, wealth,
good connections, and gentleman-like demeanor, but you also want
sterling talent and ability for the business of the country, and how
can you expect it when no man can stand who is not prepared to pay a
considerable proportion of such frightful expenses? I think I am not
wrong in saying that another object of the Redistribution Bill might
very well be to diminish the expense of elections by diminishing the
size of the electoral districts. These are the objects which I picture
to myself ought to be aimed at by a Redistribution Bill. It should aim
at variety and economy, and should look upon its disfranchisement as
a means of enfranchisement. And now, having done with that, I will
just approach the Bill, and having trespassed inordinately on former
occasions upon the time of the House, I will now only allude to two
points. One is the grouping, and the other is adding the third member
to counties and boroughs.[25] This word “group” is very pretty and
picturesque. It reminds one of Watteau and Wouvermans--of a group of
young ladies, of pretty children, of tulips, or anything else of that
kind. But it really is a word of most disagreeable significance when
analyzed, because it means disfranchising a borough and in a very
uncomfortable manner re-enfranchising it. It means disfranchising the
integer and re-enfranchising and replacing it by exceedingly vulgar
fractions. Well, now, I ask myself, why do we disfranchise and why
do we enfranchise? I do not speak now of the eight members got by
taking the second member from boroughs, but of the forty-one got by
grouping--by disfranchisement and enfranchisement. And I ask, in the
first place, why disfranchise these small boroughs? I have heard no
answer to this from the Government. All that was attempted was said
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer--that he had in 1859 advocated the
maintenance of small boroughs on the ground that they admitted young
men of talent to that House, but that he found on examination that
they did not admit young men of talent; and, therefore, he ceased to
advocate the retention of small boroughs. My Right Honorable friend is
possibly satisfied with his own reasoning. He answered his own argument
to his own satisfaction; but what I wanted to hear is not only that the
argument he used seven years ago had ceased to have any influence on
his own mind, but what the argument is which has induced the Government
to disfranchise the boroughs. Of this, he said not a single syllable.
I know my own position too well to offer anything in favor of small
boroughs. That would not come with a good grace from me, but I have a
duty to perform to some of my constituents. They are not all ambitious
of the honors of martyrdom. So I will give a very good argument in
favor of small boroughs. What is the character of the House of Commons?
“It is a character of extreme diversity of representation. Elections
by great bodies, agricultural, commercial, or manufacturing, in our
counties and great cities are balanced by the right of election in
boroughs of small or moderate population, which are thus admitted to
fill up the defects and complete the fulness of our representation.”
I need not say that I am reading from the work of a Prime Minister.[26]
Not only that, but he republished it in the spring of last year, and in
that edition this passage is not there. But he published a second and
more popular edition in the autumn, and in the autumn of last year he
inserted the passage I am now reading. The Prime Minister differs from
the Chancellor of the Duchy, for he seems fonder of illustration than
argument:
“For instance, Mr. Thomas Baring” (he goes on to say) “from his
commercial eminence, from his high character, from his world-wide
position, ought to be a member of the House of Commons. His political
opinions, and nothing but his political opinions, prevent his being the
fittest person to be a member for the City of London.”
It would have been better to have said, “his political opinions prevent
his being a member for the City of London,” without saying they
prevent his being “the fittest person,” which is invidious.
“But the borough of Huntingdon, with 2654 inhabitants and 393
registered voters, elects him willingly.”
Next he instances my Right Honorable friend, the Secretary of State for
the Home Department; but, as he happily stands aside and looks upon the
troubles of the small boroughs as the gods of Lucretius did upon the
troubles of mankind, I will not read all the pretty things the Prime
Minister says of him. Then we come next to the Attorney-General:
“Sir Roundell Palmer is, _omnium consensu_, well qualified to enlighten
the House of Commons on any question of municipal or international law,
and to expound the true theory and practice of law reform. He could not
stand for Westminster or Middlesex, for Lancashire or Yorkshire, with
much chance for success.”
The House will observe that that was written last autumn. If it had
been written this morning, I think very possibly the Prime Minister
might have cancelled these words, and said, “that honorable and learned
gentleman would have stood for one of those large constituencies with
every prospect of success.” Now, is it credible, is it possible to
conceive, that the writer of these words should actually be the Premier
of the Government which, not six months after these illustrations were
given, has introduced this new Reform Bill to group and disfranchise
the very boroughs he thus instanced? Well, there is a little more:
“Dr. Temple says, in a letter to the _Daily News_, ‘I know that when
Emerson was in England he regretted to me that all the more cultivated
classes in America _abstained from politics because they felt
themselves hopelessly swamped_.’”
These last words were given in italics, the only construction I can
put upon which is that the noble Lord thought if many of these small
boroughs were disfranchised the persons he desires to see in this House
would not come here, else I do not see what is the application of the
passage. He goes on to say:
“It is very rare to find a man of literary taste and cultivated
understanding expose himself to the rough reception of the election of
a large city.”
There is a compliment to many of the noble Lord’s most ardent
supporters. But he continues:
“The small boroughs, by returning men of knowledge acquired in the
study, and of temper moderated in the intercourse of refined society--”