SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE
The second phase of the battle of the Aisne contained two factors.
One, the simplest, was the maintenance of that line of defense
against any force that could be brought up against it by the Allies.
It meant the ability to hold strongly fortified positions against all
odds. The history of the trenches that winter, of which more will
be said later, reveals the extent to which the Germans succeeded,
aided by the iron craft of the old Prussian fighter General von
Zwehl.
The other factor depended on the vexed question of means of
communication. There was no cross-country railway linking the eastern
German wing to the western German wing. As has been previously
remarked, all supplies and munitions had to come in a roundabout
way. Verdun was a desired goal, but Field Marshal von Heeringen
was wise enough to know that if the crown prince's effort against
General Sarrail had failed, if the Third French Army had secured
heavy reenforcement, and if it had been left unmolested for a week,
the outer ring of defenses around Verdun would, by that time, have
become so amazingly strengthened that direct or frontal attack
would be impossible, while the flanking attack had failed. It was
vain, therefore, at the present time, to hope that the establishment
of the direct communication between Metz and Verdun might pass
into the hands of the invaders.
On the other hand, there was a direct line of railway running through
Rheims, Rethel, Mezières to the great war depot, Coblenz on the
Rhine. A branch line from Metz, through Luxemburg, thus gave
communication to the eastern wing. All the links of this were in
German hands, except Rheims, and if that railroad center could be
secured, the importance to the German advance would be enormous.
Under such circumstances, it can scarcely be held that Rheims was
not necessarily a point, the attack of which was due to military
necessity.
The formation for this began on September 17, 1914. Crossing the
Aisne by the old ford of Berry-au-Bac, a powerful army under the
direct leadership of Field Marshal von Heeringen debouched upon
the open country between Berry-au-Bac and Suippes, east of Rheims.
It was at this point that the German commander in chief of this
section of the battle line intended to deliver a crushing blow
by which might be regained the prestige secured at Charleroi and
lost again at the Marne.
Surprise may be felt that so important a railway center as Rheims
should not have been a strongly fortified place. It had been so
once, though the fortifications were old-fashioned. But, instead of
bringing these points of natural defense up to the highest degree
of modern efficiency, the French had dismantled them entirely,
so as to make Rheims with its glorious cathedral an open town,
safe from bombardment. It was, according to the rules of war, safe
from bombardment, but only in the event of its not being defended.
General Foch did not dare to take this stand. He knew, as well as
did General von Heeringen, the strategic value of Rheims as railroad
center, and accepted the issue of battle.
In the falling back of the several German armies from the Marne
to the Aisne, the Germans had kept possession of the chief forts
of the district around Rheims. No strong effort had been made to
dislodge them, for the forward movement of the Allies had been
directed against the fortified heights of the Aisne, facing the
Soissons-Craonne defense. It will be remembered that the armies of
General Foch and Langle, especially the latter, had taken no part
in the first phase of the Battle of the Aisne, but had stubbornly
thrown back the armies of the Duke of Württemberg, which had combined
with those of the crown prince. The right wing of this large conjoined
army had held the fort sites around Rheims and especially they had
made full use of the chief fort on the wooded heights of Nogent
l'Abbesse, a trifle less than half a mile from the cathedral city
and therefore within easy destructive shelling range. The heavy
artillery was planted here, the infantry intrenched around it, and
strong defense trenches were established along the River Suippe
that runs into the Aisne near Berry-au-Bac.
On Friday, September 18, 1914, the first movement of the second
phase was begun, when the Germans launched a sharp counterattack
on the French center. This was the first German offensive movement
since their retreat from the Marne, and it was powerful and well
handled. General Foch fell back into defensive positions, but had
much ado to hold his own. He evaded giving battle around Rheims
and took up a position at Souain, which he held with the jaunty
obstinacy he had displayed so often in the retreat through northern
France. It was obvious that he could not hold out long, but by
clever generalship, and especially by an extraordinarily brilliant
use of the cavalry arm, he held off the army for that day. That
night strong reenforcements came to his aid, and on September 19,
1914, the balance of the forces was more nearly equal.
On September 19, 1914, therefore, the situation of the armies was
much as follows: The Germans, acting under the general command of
Field Marshal von Heeringen, controlled Rheims under the gunfire
of their heavy artillery from two points, the heights of Nogent
l'Abbesse to the southeast of Rheims, and the hill of Brimont a
little over half a mile to the northeast. Their right flank was
covered by the powerful defenses of the Aisne and the guns of the
Craonne plateau, their left flank was a series of intrenchments
along the river Suippe, which merged into the second line of defense
of the main army under the Duke of Württemberg.
On the other side of Rheims, or to the west of the cathedral city,
the Allies also held two heights, one at Pouillon, between the
Aisle and the Vesle, and therefore to the northwest of the city,
and the other on a sharp steep, known as the Mountain of Rheims,
near Verzenay, on the south side of the river. This was therefore
west and a little south of Rheims. But, and herein lies the question
that has so often arisen in the discussion of the comparative strength
of the two armies--especially without the British batteries--the
French lacked heavy long-range artillery. They had no such howitzers
as those of the German forces. Thus the Germans could shell Rheims
to their hearts' content, and the Allies could not silence that
gunfire from their own fortified positions. Once more, then, it
became a battle between infantry and artillery, between men and
machines.
This time, however, the advance was not favorable to the Germans.
Their heavy artillery commanded Rheims, but it did not command the
French line to the west of Rheims. The invaders performed prodigies
of valor. Again and again they hurled themselves against the French
line. But General Foch's troops were well supplied with that terrible
engine of destruction--the French 3-inch fieldpiece, known, as the
75-mm., an extremely powerful gun for its caliber.
In four successive night attacks on September 19-20, 1914, the
heaviest onset was made. Supported by a terrific gunfire, directed
with the long pointing fingers of searchlights, the German infantry,
invigorated by a week's rest; rolled up in gray-clad tidal waves
against the French line. General Foch had known how to post his
defense, and within twenty-four hours he had made the line between
Pouillon and the Mountain of Rheims almost as strong as the German
line between Brimont and Nogent l'Abbesse. Poor Rheims lay between,
wide open to the eruption of destruction that belched from the
throats of the German howitzers.
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