FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE
The first movement in this concerted plan was taken by the German
extreme right. This was the closing in of General von Kluck's army in
a southeasterly direction. It was a hazardous move, for it required
General von Kluck to execute a flank march diagonally across the
front of the Sixth French Army and the British Expeditionary Force.
At this time, according to the dispatches from Sir John French, the
British army lay south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets,
defending the passage of the river and blowing up the bridges before
General von Kluck.
On September 4, 1914, air reconnaissances showed that General von
Kluck had stopped his southward advance upon Paris, and that his
columns were moving in a southeasterly direction east of a line
drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. Meanwhile the French
and British generals more effectually concealed their armies in
the forests, doing so with such skill that their movements were
unmarked by the German air scouts. All that day General von Kluck
moved his forces, leaving his heavy artillery with about 100,000
men on the steep eastern bank of the Ourcq and taking 150,000 troops
south across the Marne toward La Ferté Gaucher. He crossed the
Petit Morin and the Grand Morin, all unconscious that scores of
field glasses were trained upon his troops.
Probably believing that the British army had been hurried to the
aid of General Sarrail, General von Kluck advanced confidently.
Having concealment in view, the commanders of the French army and
the British army between them had left a wide gap between the two
armies. Through one of these apparently unguarded openings a strong
body of uhlan patrols advanced, riding southward until they reached
Nogent, south of Paris, and seemingly with the whole rich country
of central France laid wide open to a sharp and sudden attack.
Among the many strange features of this series of the battles of
the Marne this must certainly be reckoned as one. Though possessing
an unequaled military organization, though priding itself on its
cavalry scouts, though aided by aerial scouts, and though well
supplied with spies, yet the Allied armies, with the age-old device
of a forest, were able to cloak their movements from this perfectly
organized and powerful invading army. Much of the credit of this
may be assigned to the French and English aircraft, which kept
German scouting aircraft at a distance. But the Allied generals
were astounded at the result of their maneuver, which, as they
admitted afterward, was merely a military precautionary measure
against the discovery of artillery sites, and a device to keep
the enemy in general ignorance.
On Saturday, September 5, 1914, at the extreme north of the line
of the two armies facing each other across the Ourcq, an artillery
duel began. The offensive was taken by the French, and though in
itself it was not more striking than any of the artillery clashes
that had marked the previous month's fighting, it was significant,
for it marked the beginning of the battles of the Marne. The plans
of General Joffre were complete, but the actual point at which
the furious contest should begin was not yet determined. In the
northern Ourcq section, however, the realization by the French
that they were actually on the offensive at last, that the long
period of retreat was over, could not be restrained. The troops
were eager to get to work with the bayonet, and greatly aided by
their field artillery, in which mobility had been sacrificed to
power, they quickly cleared the hills to the westward of the Ourcq.
By nightfall of September 5, 1914, the country west of the Ourcq
was in French hands. But to cross that river seemed impossible.
General von Kluck's heavy artillery had been left behind to hold
that position, and every possible crossing was covered with its
own blast of death.
Here General von Kluck's generalship was successful. It might have
been regarded as risky to leave 100,000 men to guard a river confronted
by 250,000 picked and reenforced French troops. But General von Kluck's
faith in German guns and German gunnery was not ill-founded. This
was the first of the open-air siege conflicts, and the French army
had no guns which could be used against the German heavy artillery.
Hence it followed that the brilliant work of the Sixth French Army
on this first day of the battles of the Marne achieved no important
result, for the long-range hidden howitzers, manned by expert German
gunners and well supplied with ammunition, defied all attempts at
crossing the little stream of the Ourcq.
This first day's fighting on the Marne revealed one of France's
chiefest needs--heavy artillery. The French light quick-firing gun
was a deadly weapon, but France had neglected the one department
of artillery in which the Germans had been most successful--the
use of powerful motor traction to move big guns without slackening
the march of an army. General von Kluck's artillery was impregnable
to the French. Indeed, the Germans could not be dislodged from the
Ourcq until the British Expeditionary Force sent up some heavy
field batteries. It was then too late for the withdrawal from the
Ourcq to be of any serious consequence in determining the result
along the battle front.
The afternoon of that day, when the Zouaves were driving the Germans
across the Ourcq with the bayonet and were themselves effectually
stopped by the German wall of artillery fire, General Joffre and
Sir John French met. At last the British commander received the
welcome news from the generalissimo that retreat was over and advance
was about to be begun.
"I met the French commander in chief at his request," runs the
official dispatch, "and he informed me of his intention to take
the offensive forthwith by wheeling up the left flank of the Sixth
Army, pivoting on the Marne, and directing it to move on the Ourcq;
cross and attack the flank of the First German Army, which was
then moving in a southeasterly direction east of that river.
"He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left
resting on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army--to fill the
gap between that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against
the enemy on my front and join in the general offensive movement.
German troops, which were observed moving southeast up the left
bank of the Ourcq on the Fourth, were now reported to be halted and
facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing
at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château-Thierry, and Mezy.
"Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging
on Montmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy
were located in the neighborhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais,
La Ferté-Gaucher, and Dagny.
"These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September
6, at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle
opened on a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in
front of the left flank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy on
the Marne, Maupertuis, which was about the British center, Courtaçon,
which was the left of the Fifth French Army, to Esternay and
Charleville, the left of the Ninth Army under General Foch, and
so along the front of the Ninth, Fourth, and Third French Armies
to a point north of the fortress of Verdun."
Sunrise on Sunday morning, on a summer day in sunny France, was
the setting for the grim and red carnage which should show in the
next five consecutive days that the German advance was checked,
that the southernmost point had been reached, and that for a long
time to come it would tax the resources of the invaders to hold
the land that already had been won. General Joffre had so arranged
his forces that the most spectacular--and the easiest--part fell to
the British, and it was accomplished with perfection of detail. But
the honors of the battles of the Marne lay with General Sarrail's
army and with the "Iron Division of Toul."
On the same morning, this special army order, issued by Sir John
French, was read to the British troops:
"After a most trying series of operations, mostly in retirement,
which have been rendered necessary by the general strategic plan
of the allied armies, the British forces stand to-day formed in
line with their French comrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled
in their attempt to invest Paris, the Germans have been driven to
move in an easterly and southeasterly direction with the apparent
intention of falling in strength upon the Fifth French Army. In
this operation they are exposing their right flank and their line
of communications to an attack from the combined Sixth French Army
and the British forces.
"I call upon the British army in France to now show the enemy its
power and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the Sixth
French Army.
"I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on the
contrary, by another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which
they have shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy's
flank with all their strength and, in unison with the Allies, drive
them back."
As before, the day's fighting began with the efforts of the Sixth
French Army against the Ourcq. Before the Germans could be driven
from the east bank the few villages they occupied on the west bank
had to be taken, and as these were covered by heavy artillery from
the farther bank, the French loss of life was very severe. Yet
these several combats--of which there were as many as there were
villages--were stationary. In every case the Germans were compelled
to cross the river; in every case the artillery made it impossible
for the French to follow them.
At dawn also everyone of the French armies advanced, and within
two or three hours of sunrise found themselves engaged with the
German front. The spirited order to the troops issued that morning
by General Joffre had left no doubt in the minds of Frenchmen on
the importance of the issue. It read:
"At a moment when a battle on which the welfare of the country
depends is going to begin, I feel it incumbent upon me to remind
you all that this is no longer the time to look behind. All our
efforts must be directed toward attacking and driving back the
enemy. An army which can no longer advance must at all costs keep
the ground it has won, and allow itself to be killed on the spot
rather than give way. In the present circumstance no faltering
can be tolerated."
Yet in spite of the powerful efforts of the French armies they
were all held in check, and General Sarrail was beginning to give
way.
Though the fighting in the center had been stationary on this sixth
of September, 1914, it had been desperate. D'Espérey was facing
the 150,000 men of Von Kluck's army, and the effect of the British
attack on Von Kluck's flank had not yet been felt. He more than
held his own, but at great cost. General Foch, with the Ninth Army,
had a double problem, for he was wrestling with General von Bülow
to hold the southern edge of the Sézanne Plateau, while General von
Hausen's Saxon Army was trying to turn his right flank. A violent
attack, which, for the space of over two hours seemed likely to
succeed, was launched by the Duke of Württemberg against General
Langle and the Fourth Army. The attack was repelled, but the French
losses were proportionately great. There could be no denial that
many such attacks could break through the line. General Sarrail's
army, fighting a losing game, showed marvelous stubbornness and
gameness, but even so, it could not resist being pushed south of
Fort Troyon, itself unable to support the battering it might expect
to receive when the German siege guns should be brought into place.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--END OF GERMAN RETREAT AND THE
INTRENCHED LINE ON THE AISNE RIVER]
At every point but one the Germans had a right to deem the day
successful. The only reversal had been a minor one before the forest
of Crécy. Yet, of all the generals on that front Von Kluck alone
was in a position to see the gravity of the situation. The British
had caught him on the flank as he tried to pierce the left wing
of General d'Espérey's army, and if he should now retreat, that
army could envelop him and thus catch him between two fires.
Next morning, Monday, September 7, 1914, another glorious summer
morning, saw a resumption of the battle along exactly the same
lines, with the same persistent attack and defense along the eastern
part of the front, and with the British making full use of the
blunder made by the German right. General von Kluck had realized
his plight, but, even so, he had not secured an understanding of
the size of the force that was threatening his flank, and he sent
as a reenforcement a single army corps which had been intrenched
near Coulommiers on the Grand Morin. The British had three full
army corps and were well supplied with cavalry and artillery. Yet
Coulommiers was Von Kluck's headquarters and actually, when the
Germans were driven back and the British troops entered the town,
Prince Eitel, the second son of the kaiser; General von Kluck and
his staff were compelled to run down to their motor cars and escape
at top speed along the road to Rebais, leaving their half-eaten
breakfast on the table, and their glasses of wine half emptied.
One of the most dramatic cavalry actions of this period of the
war took place shortly before noon, when one hundred and seventeen
squadrons of cavalry were engaged. In this action the British were
successful, but the German cavalry were tired and harassed, having
been severely handled the day before.
In this engagement between the British and the German right, all
the odds had been in favor of the British, and success meant merely
the grasping at opportunities that presented themselves. Still,
by constantly striking at General van Kluck's exposed flank, his
frontal attack of General d'Espérey was so weakened, that, toward
evening at the close of two days of continuous and very severe
fighting, the Fifth French Army was able to advance and hold the
position from La Ferté-Gaucher to Esternay. The ground gained was
valuable but not essential, yet it made a profound impression.
General d'Espérey's step forward was the Germans' step back. It
meant that the road to Paris was barred. How fully this was realized
may be seen from an order signed by Lieutenant General Tuelff von
Tschepe und Weidenbach and found in the house that had been occupied
by the staff of the Eighth German Army Corps when the victorious
French entered Vitry-le-François. The order was dated "September
7, 10:30 p. m." and it read as follows:
"The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved.
The principal French troops have been forced to accept battle,
after having been continually forced back. The great decision is
undoubtedly at hand. To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of
the German army, as well as all that of our Army Corps, are bound
to be engaged all along the line from Paris to Verdun. To save
the welfare and the honor or Germany I expect every officer and
man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the last few
days, to do his duty unswervingly and to the last breath. Everything
depends on the result of to-morrow."
Much did, indeed, depend on the result of the morrow, and for the
third day, again, it was General von Kluck's initial move that
brought disaster to the German side.
Why was it that Von Kluck, instead of marching directly on Paris,
as would have been expected, made a detour, having as his object
not the capital but the French army? It may be said in favor of it
that the decision taken by the German General Staff was in conformity
with the military doctrine of Napoleon. According to this doctrine,
a capital, whatever its importance, is never more than an accessory
object, geographical or political. What is of importance is the
strategical object. The strategical object is the essential, the
geographical object is only accessory. Once the essential object
is attained, the accessory object is acquired of itself. Once the
French armies had been beaten, thrown back, and dispersed, Von
Kluck could return to the capital and take it easily.
Conceive of him, on the other hand, attacking the capital with the
army of Manoury on his right, which constituted a serious menace
to his left, and in front or him the British army and the Fifth
French Army; he might have been caught as in a vise between these
forces while all his activity was being absorbed by his attack
on the intrenchments around Paris.
It has been said that if Von Kluck had won the French capital, as
it seemed he might, the French could not have gained the Battle of
the Marne, and the result of the war might have been very different.
It was, however, no mistake on the part of Von Kluck, no false
maneuver on his part, that determined the victory of the Marne.
Von Kluck did exactly what he ought to have done; the decision
taken by the German General Staff was exactly what it ought to
have taken, and what was foreseen during the whole course of the
war.
It was on September 4, 1914, in the morning, that the observations
made by the French cavalry, as well as by British aviators and
those of the army of Manoury and the military government of Paris,
made it clear that the German right (Von Kluck's army) was bending
its march toward the southeast in the direction of Meaux and
Coulommiers, leaving behind it the road to Paris.
At this moment the Fifth French' Army of the left was ready to
meet the German forces in a frontal attack, and it was flanked
toward the northwest by the British army and by General Manoury's
army to the northeast of the capital.
The disposition of forces aimed at in General Joffre's order of
August 25 was thus accomplished; the French escaped the turning
movement, and they were in a position to counter with an enveloping
movement themselves. The wings of the French forces found support
in their maneuvering in their contact with the strongholds of Paris
and Verdun. Immediately the commander in chief decided to attack,
and issued on the evening of September 4 the series of general
orders, given as an appendix to this volume, which announced the
big offensive and eventually turned the tide of battle.
* * * * *