THE PRELIMINARY AGE.

One peculiarity of this age is the sudden acquisition of much physical

knowledge. There is scarcely a department of science or art which is

the same, or at all the same, as it was fifty years ago. A new world of

inventions--of railways and of telegraphs--has grown up around us which

we cannot help seeing; a new world of ideas is in the air and affects

us, though we do not see it. A full estimate of these effects would

require a great book, and I am sure I could not write it; but I think I

may usefully, in a few papers, show how, upon one or two great points,

the new ideas are modifying two old sciences--politics and political

economy. Even upon these points my ideas must be incomplete, for the

subject is novel; but, at any rate, I may suggest some conclusions, and

so show what is requisite even if I do not supply it.

If we wanted to describe one of the most marked results, perhaps the

most marked result, of late thought, we should say that by it

everything is made 'an antiquity.' When, in former times; our ancestors

thought of an antiquarian, they described him as occupied with coins,

and medals, and Druids' stones; these were then the characteristic

records of the decipherable past, and it was with these that

decipherers busied themselves. But now there are other relics; indeed,

all matter is become such. Science tries to find in each bit of earth

the record of the causes which made it precisely what it is; those

forces have left their trace, she knows, as much as the tact and hand

of the artist left their mark on a classical gem. It would be tedious

(and it is not in my way) to reckon up the ingenious questionings by

which geology has made part of the earth, at least, tell part of its

tale; and the answers would have been meaningless if physiology and

conchology and a hundred similar sciences had not brought their aid.

Such subsidiary sciences are to the decipherer of the present day what

old languages were to the antiquary of other days; they construe for

him the words which he discovers, they give a richness and a truth-like

complexity to the picture which he paints, even in cases where the

particular detail they tell is not much. But what here concerns me is

that man himself has, to the eye of science, become 'an antiquity.' She

tries to read, is beginning to read, knows she ought to read, in the

frame of each man the result of a whole history of all his life, of

what he is and what makes him so,--of all his fore-fathers, of what

they were and of what made them so. Each nerve has a sort of memory of

its past life, is trained or not trained, dulled or quickened, as the

case may be; each feature is shaped and characterised, or left loose

and meaningless, as may happen; each hand is marked with its trade and

life, subdued to what it works in;--IF WE COULD BUT SEE IT.

It may be answered that in this there is nothing new; that we always

knew how much a man's past modified a man's future; that we all knew

how much, a man is apt to be like his ancestors; that the existence of

national character is the greatest commonplace in the world; that when

a philosopher cannot account for anything in any other manner, he

boldly ascribes it to an occult quality in some race. But what physical

science does is, not to discover the hereditary element, but to render

it distinct,--to give us an accurate conception of what we may expect,

and a good account of the evidence by which we are led to expect it.

Let us see what that science teaches on the subject; and, as far as may

be, I will give it in the words of those who have made it a

professional study, both that I may be more sure to state it rightly

and vividly, and because--as I am about to apply these principles to

subjects which are my own pursuit--I would rather have it quite clear

that I have not made my premises to suit my own conclusions.

1st, then, as respects the individual, we learn as follows: 'Even while

the cerebral hemispheres are entire, and in full possession of their

powers, the brain gives rise to actions which are as completely reflex

as those of the spinal cord.

'When the eyelids wink at a flash of light, or a threatened blow, a

reflex action takes place, in which the afferent nerves are the optic,

the efferent, the facial. When a bad smell causes a grimace, there is a

reflex action through the same motor nerve, while the olfactory nerves

constitute the afferent channels. In these cases, therefore, reflex

action must be effected through the brain, all the nerves involved

being cerebral. 'When the whole body starts at a loud noise, the

afferent auditory nerve gives rise to an impulse which passes to the

medulla oblongata, and thence affects the great majority of the motor

nerves of the body. 'It may be said that these are mere mechanical

actions, and have nothing to do with the acts which we associate with

intelligence. But let us consider what takes place in such an act as

reading aloud. In this case, the whole attention of the mind is, or

ought to be, bent upon the subject-matter of the book; while a

multitude of most delicate muscular actions are going on, of which the

reader is not in the slightest degree aware. Thus the book is held in

the hand, at the right distance from the eyes; the eyes are moved, from

side to side, over the lines, and up and down the pages. Further, the

most delicately adjusted and rapid movements of the muscles of the

lips, tongue, and throat, of laryngeal and respiratory muscles, are

involved in the production of speech. Perhaps the reader is standing up

and accompanying the lecture with appropriate gestures. And yet every

one of these muscular acts may be performed with utter unconsciousness,

on his part, of anything but the sense of the words in the book. In

other words, they are reflex acts.

'The reflex actions proper to the spinal cord itself are NATURAL, and

are involved in the structure of the cord and the properties of its

constituents. By the help of the brain we may acquire an affinity of

ARTIFICIAL reflex actions. That is to say, an action may require all

our attention and all our volition for its first, or second, or third

performance, but by frequent repetition it becomes, in a manner, part

our organisation, and is performed without volition, or even

consciousness.

'As everyone knows, it takes a soldier a very long time to learn his

drill--to put himself, for instance, into the attitude of 'attention'

at the instant the word of command is heard. But, after a time, the

sound of the word gives rise to the act, whether the soldier be

thinking of it or not. There is a story, which is credible enough,

though it may not be true, of a practical joker, who, seeing a

discharged veteran carrying home his dinner, suddenly called out

'Attention!' whereupon the man instantly brought his hands down, and

lost his mutton and potatoes in the gutter. The drill had been gone

through, and its effects had become embodied in the man's nervous

structure.

'The possibility of all education (of which military drill is only one

particular form) is based upon, the existence of this power which the

nervous system possesses, of organising conscious actions into more or

less unconscious, or reflex, operations. It may be laid down as a rule,

that if any two mental states be called up together, or in succession,

with due frequency and vividness, the subsequent production of the one

of them will suffice to call up the other, and that whether we desire

it or not.'[1]

[1] Huxley's Elementary Physiology, pp. 284-286.

The body of the accomplished man has thus become by training different

from what it once was, and different from that of the rude man; it is

charged with stored virtue and acquired faculty which come away from it

unconsciously.

Again, as to race, another authority teaches:--'Man's life truly

represents a progressive development of the nervous system, none the

less so because it takes place out of the womb instead of in it. The

regular transmutation of motions which are at first voluntary into

secondary automatic motions, as Hartley calls them, is due to a

gradually effected organisation; and we may rest assured of this, that

co-ordinate activity always testifies to stored-up power, either innate

or acquired.

'The way in which an acquired faculty of the parent animal is sometimes

distinctly transmitted to the progeny as a heritage, instinct, or

innate endowment, furnishes a striking confirmation of the foregoing

observations. Power that has been laboriously acquired and stored up as

statical in one generation manifestly in such case becomes the inborn

faculty of the next; and the development takes place in accordance with

that law of increasing speciality and complexity of adaptation to

external nature which is traceable through the animal kingdom; or, in

other words, that law, of progress from the general to the special in

development which the appearance of nerve force amongst natural forces

and the complexity of the nervous system of man both illustrate. As the

vital force gathers up, as it were, into itself inferior forces, and

might be said to be a development of them, or, as in the appearance of

nerve force, simpler and more general forces are gathered up and

concentrated in a more special and complex mode of energy; so again a

further specialisation takes place in the development of the nervous

system, whether watched through generations or through individual life.

It is not by limiting our observations to the life of the individual,

however, who is but a link in the chain of organic beings connecting

the past with the future, that we shall come at the full truth; the

present individual is the inevitable consequence of his antecedents in

the past, and in the examination of these alone do we arrive at the

adequate explanation of him. It behoves us, then, having found any

faculty to be innate, not to rest content there, but steadily to follow

backwards the line of causation, and thus to display, if possible, its

manner of origin. This is the more necessary with the lower animals,

where so much is innate.'[2]

[2] Maudsley on the Physiology and Pathology of the Mind, p. 73.

The special laws of inheritance are indeed as yet unknown. All which is

clear, and all which is to my purpose is, that there is a tendency, a

probability, greater or less according to circumstances, but always

considerable, that the descendants of cultivated parents will have, by

born nervous organisation, a greater aptitude for cultivation than the

descendants of such as are not cultivated; and that this tendency

augments, in some enhanced ratio, for many generations.

I do not think any who do not acquire--and it takes a hard effort to

acquire--this notion of a transmitted nerve element will ever

understand 'the connective tissue' of civilisation. We have here the

continuous force which binds age to age, which enables each to begin

with some improvement on the last, if the last did itself improve;

which makes each civilisation not a set of detached dots, but a line of

colour, surely enhancing shade by shade. There is, by this doctrine, a

physical cause of improvement from generation to generation: and no

imagination which has apprehended it can forget it; but unless you

appreciate that cause in its subtle materialism, unless you see it, as

it were, playing upon the nerves of men, and, age after age, making

nicer music from finer chords, you cannot comprehend the principle of

inheritance either in its mystery or its power.

These principles are quite independent of any theory as to the nature

of matter, or the nature of mind. They are as true upon the theory that

mind acts on matter--though separate and altogether different from

it--as upon the theory of Bishop Berkeley that there is no matter, but

only mind; or upon the contrary theory--that there is no mind, but only

matter; or upon the yet subtler theory now often held--that both mind

and matter are different modifications of some one tertium quid, some

hidden thing or force. All these theories admit--indeed they are but

various theories to account for--the fact that what we call matter has

consequences in what we call mind, and that what we call mind produces

results in what we call matter; and the doctrines I quote assume only

that. Our mind in some strange way acts on our nerves, and our nerves

in some equally strange way store up the consequences, and somehow the

result, as a rule and commonly enough, goes down to our descendants;

these primitive facts all theories admit, and all of them labour to

explain.

Nor have these plain principles any relation to the old difficulties of

necessity and freewill. Every Freewillist holds that the special force

of free volition is applied to the pre-existing forces of our corporeal

structure; he does not consider it as an agency acting in vacuo, but as

an agency acting upon other agencies. Every Freewillist holds that,

upon the whole, if you strengthen the motive in a given direction,

mankind tend more to act in that direction. Better motives--better

impulses, rather--come from a good body: worse motives or worse

impulses come from a bad body. A Freewillist may admit as much as a

Necessarian that such improved conditions tend to improve human action,

and that deteriorated conditions tend to deprave human action. No

Freewillist ever expects as much from St. Giles's as he expects from

Belgravia: he admits an hereditary nervous system as a datum for the

will, though he holds the will to be an extraordinary incoming

'something.' No doubt the modern doctrine of the 'Conservation of

Force,' if applied to decision, is inconsistent with free will; if you

hold that force 'is never lost or gained,' you cannot hold that there

is a real gain--a sort of new creation of it in free volition. But I

have nothing to do here with the universal 'Conservation of Force.' The

conception of the nervous organs as stores of will-made power does not

raise or need so vast a discussion.

Still less are these principles to be confounded with Mr. Buckle's idea

that material forces have been the main-springs of progress, and moral

causes secondary, and, in comparison, not to be thought of. On the

contrary, moral causes are the first here. It is the action of the will

that causes the unconscious habit; it is the continual effort of the

beginning that creates the hoarded energy of the end; it is the silent

toil of the first generation that becomes the transmitted aptitude of

the next. Here physical causes do not create the moral, but moral

create the physical; here the beginning is by the higher energy, the

conservation and propagation only by the lower. But we thus perceive

how a science of history is possible, as Mr. Buckle said,--a science to

teach the laws of tendencies--created by the mind, and transmitted by

the body--which act upon and incline the will of man from age to age.

Physics and Politics, or, Thoughts on the application of the principles of "natural selection" and "inheritance" to political society · 第 5 / 22 题