SECTION IV

ABOUT THE SOUL, AND ABOUT OUR LITTLE KNOWLEDGE

On the testimony of our acquired knowledge, we have dared question

whether the soul is created before us, whether it comes from

non-existence into our body? at what age it came to settle between a

bladder and the intestines _cæcum_ and _rectum_? if it brought ideas

with it or received them there, and what are these ideas? if after

animating us for a few moments, its essence is to live after us into

eternity without the intervention of God Himself? if being spirit, and

God being spirit, they are both of like nature? These questions seem

sublime; what are they? questions about light by men born blind.

What have all the philosophers, ancient and modern, taught us? a child

is wiser than they are; he does not think about things of which he can

form no conception.

You will say that it is sad for our insatiable curiosity, for our

inexhaustible thirst for happiness, to be thus ignorant of ourselves! I

agree, and there are still sadder things; but I shall answer you:

_Sors tua mortalis, non est mortale quod optas._

--Ovid, Met. II. 56

"You have a man's fate, and a god's desires."

Once again, it seems that the nature of every principle of things is the

Creator's secret. How does the air carry sound? how are animals formed?

how do some of our limbs constantly obey our wills? what hand puts ideas

in our memory, keeps them there as in a register, and pulls them out

sometimes when we want them and sometimes in spite of ourselves? Our

nature, the nature of the universe, the nature of the least plant,

everything for us is sunk in a shadowy pit.

Man is an acting, feeling, thinking being: that is all we know of him:

it is not given to us to know what makes us feel and think, or what

makes us act, or what makes us exist. The acting faculty is as

incomprehensible for us as the thinking faculty. The difficulty is less

to conceive how a body of mud has feelings and ideas, than to conceive

how a being, whatever it be, has ideas and feelings.

Here on one side the soul of Archimedes, on the other the soul of an

idiot; are they of the same nature? If their essence is to think, they

think always, and independently of the body which cannot act without

them. If they think by their own nature, can the species of a soul which

cannot do a sum in arithmetic be the same as that which measured the

heavens? If it is the organs of the body which made Archimedes think,

why is it that my idiot, who has a stronger constitution than

Archimedes, who is more vigorous, digests better and performs all his

functions better, does not think at all? It is, you say, because his

brain is not so good. But you are making a supposition; you do not know

at all. No difference has ever been found between healthy brains that

have been dissected. It is even very probable that a fool's cerebellum

will be in better condition than Archimedes', which has worked

prodigiously, and which might be worn out and shrivelled.

Let us conclude therefore what we have already concluded, that we are

ignoramuses about all first principles. As regards ignoramuses who pride

themselves on their knowledge, they are far inferior to monkeys.

Now dispute, choleric arguers: present your petitions against each

other; proffer your insults, pronounce your sentences, you who do not

know one word about the matter.

Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary · 第 4 / 7 章