SECTION II

The author of the article SOUL in the "Encyclopedia" (the Abbé Yvon)

followed Jaquelot scrupulously; but Jaquelot teaches us nothing. He sets

himself also against Locke, because the modest Locke said (liv. iv, ch.

iii, para. vi.)--"We possibly shall never be able to know whether any

mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the

contemplation of our own ideas without revelation, to discover whether

Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a

power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so

disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our

notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that

God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than

that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of

thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort

of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power which

cannot be in any created being but merely by the good pleasure and

bounty of the Creator, for I see no contradiction in it, that the first

eternal thinking Being should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of

created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of

sense, perception and thought."

Those are the words of a profound, religious and modest man.

We know what quarrels he had to undergo on account of this opinion which

appeared bold, but which was in fact in him only a consequence of his

conviction of the omnipotence of God and the weakness of man. He did not

say that matter thought; but he said that we have not enough knowledge

to demonstrate that it is impossible for God to add the gift of thought

to the unknown being called "matter", after according it the gift of

gravitation and the gift of movement, both of which are equally

incomprehensible.

Locke was not assuredly the only one who had advanced this opinion; it

was the opinion of all antiquity, who, regarding the soul as very

unrestricted matter, affirmed consequently that matter could feel and

think.

It was Gassendi's opinion, as may be seen in his objections to

Descartes. "It is true," says Gassendi, "that you know what you think;

but you are ignorant of what species of substance you are, you who

think. Thus although the operation of thought is known to you, the

principle of your essence is hidden from you; and you do not know what

is the nature of this substance, one of the operations of which is to

think. You are like a blind man who, feeling the heat of the sun and

being informed that it is caused by the heat of the sun, thinks he has a

clear and distinct idea of this luminary; because if he were asked what

the sun was, he could reply that it is a thing which heats, etc."

The same Gassendi, in his "Epicurean Philosophy," repeats several times

that there is no mathematical evidence of the pure spirituality of the

soul.

Descartes, in one of his letters to the Palatine Princess Elisabeth,

says to her--"I confess that by the natural reason alone we can make

many conjectures on the soul, and have gratifying hopes, but no

certainty." And in that sentence Descartes combats in his letters what

he puts forward in his works; a too ordinary contradiction.

In fine we have seen that all the Fathers of the first centuries of the

Church, while believing the soul immortal, believed it at the same time

material; they thought that it is as easy for God to conserve as to

create. They said--"God made the soul thinking, He will preserve it

thinking."

Malebranche has proved very well that we have no idea by ourselves, and

that objects are incapable of giving us ideas: from that he concludes

that we see everything in God. That is at the bottom the same thing as

making God the author of all our ideas; for with what should we see in

Him, if we had not instruments for seeing? and these instruments, it is

He alone who holds them and guides them. This system is a labyrinth, one

lane of which would lead you to Spinozism, another to Stoicism, another

to chaos.

When one has had a good argument about spirit and matter, one always

finishes by not understanding each other. No philosopher has been able

with his own strength to lift this veil stretched by nature over all the

first principles of things. Men argue, nature acts.

Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary · 第 2 / 7 章