COREA A JAPANESE PROTECTORATE.
Having been responsible for two great foreign wars fought by Japan, it
was natural that at the end of each campaign the position of Corea
among nations should be notably altered. The war with the Middle
Kingdom blew to pieces the Chinese doctrine of universal sovereignty,
besides making the once vassal state independent. In name, at least,
Corea was made an empire. The war with Russia annihilated the dogma so
long held in Europe, that Asiatic nations exist for conquest and
spoliation, with the corollary that “the break-up of China” was
imminent. Japanese success in the war of 1894–95 was a vindication of
the American doctrine as expounded by men from the United States during
a century, and formulated by John Hay—“China for the Chinese.”
Had Corea been a state fitted, by the power of unselfish patriotism and
love of industry among her leaders, to survive amid modern political
and economic conditions, Japan’s triumph over Russia would have made
her all the stronger. Her independence would have been assured, had the
virtue of her own sons responded to the opportunity.
On the contrary, the history of Corea since 1866, as outlined on these
pages, reveals the fatal weakness of the ruling class in Corea. Instead
of giving themselves to patriotic sacrifice and personal industry, the
yang-ban, or men of privilege, have made their capital a hot-bed of
intrigue and Corea the storm centre of the Far East. Instead of
developing their own strength and the nation’s resources, they have
plied the arts of cunning and the crafts of the weak. Yet modern
civilization, rich in powerful governments, has no place for the weak.
Least of all is self-chosen weakness allowable.
Being neither skilful merchants like the Chinese, nor brave warriors
like the Japanese, the Corean noblemen—on whom lies the burden of
responsibility—might at least have imitated the good example of their
island neighbors. In Japan the outstanding event of modern times was
the renunciation, in 1871, by 400,000 knights or gentry, of their
hereditary pensions paid out of the public treasury. [62] After this
sacrifice, made in the interests of true patriotism, they put off their
swords and silk petticoats, got to work, paid taxes, and began to earn
an honest living. Even China has broken with her unsocial past and
conceit of perfection, and has entered upon the path of modern
civilization.
The Corean yang-ban abused their independence by intrigue. They failed
to discern that the petty arts of the plotter endangered their
existence as a nation. After her second great war, Japan saw clearly
that to allow her neighbor state, wherein there was no sharp
distinction between the Court and the Government, to remain, as of old,
the hot-bed of intrigue, would jeopard her own existence. She therefore
did for Corea what Great Britain has done for Egypt, the United States
for Cuba, and the French for Annam. Corea is now numbered among
protectorates.
When our narrative closed in September, 1904, the Japanese were
building a trunk line of railroad, nearly six hundred miles long, which
should traverse the whole peninsula from Fusan to Wiju (Ai-chiu, pp.
181, 364). Port Arthur had not surrendered. The real goal of the
Japanese armies, the city of Mukden, containing the mausoleums of the
Manchiu dynasty now ruling in Peking, “the possession of which would
put the heart of China in the palm of Japan’s hand,” was yet unreached.
Yet those who in the early seventies had helped to train the boys who
made the public-school army of Japan, had no fear of its ultimate
triumph.[62]
On the 3d of January, 1905, Port Arthur was formally surrendered, and
its evacuation completed January 7th. The main Japanese army fronting
Mukden was quickly reënforced by Nogi’s division on the left, or west,
and by Kawamura’s army, out of Corea, on the right, or east. The great
campaign of hard fighting, destined to last nearly a month, opened amid
a snow-storm on the 23d of February. By the 28th the fighting was
general along the whole front of nearly one hundred miles. On the 10th
of March Oku’s columns entered, by the southern gate, the city of
Mukden. The Russians lost nearly thirty thousand in dead and over forty
thousand prisoners. The Japanese pursuit northward lasted until April
14th.
On the 27th and 28th of March “the battle of The Sea of Japan” took
place, in which the Russian armada of thirty-eight modern ships of war
was, “by the grace of Heaven and the help of the gods,” annihilated.
By invitation of President Roosevelt, the envoys of the two warring
nations, de Witte and Rosen for Russia, and Komura and Takahira for
Japan (both of the latter the writer’s former pupils in Tokio), met at
Portsmouth, N. H.; whence, in the thirties, had sailed Captain Edmund
Roberts, commissioned by President Jackson, and the first American
diplomatist in the Far East. The Japanese won a signal diplomatic
victory, securing the main points of their contention.
The peace treaty which was signed recognized in the first article
Japan’s predominant position in Corea, political, military, economic,
as well as her right to supervise that country’s affairs and to protect
it, Russia agreeing not to obstruct Japan’s proceedings in any respect.
One of the first and worst results for Corea was the immediate entrance
within her borders of a horde of low-class, insolent Japanese
adventurers, who, by their cruelties and spoliations of natives, nearly
neutralized the well-meant plans of good men in Tokio.
Following up the results of the decisive war, the Mikado sent his
highly honored servant, Baron Komura, to Peking to arrange matters
amicably with China, and then turned his attention to Corea. The
protocol of March, 1904 (p. 495), had been quickly followed by the
abolition of the Peddlers’ Guild (so long used by pro-Russian
intriguers) and by the visit of Marquis Ito, who bore a reassuring
message of fraternity and good-will. Mr. I. Megata, one of the most
experienced and skilful officers of the Treasury Department in Tokio,
was sent to Seoul as financial adviser, and Mr. Durham Dwight Stevens,
an American gentleman, who united ability and tact to long and varied
experience in diplomacy in the Far East, accepted the post of assistant
at the Corean Foreign Office. These gentlemen, like all their
predecessors, encountered insuperable difficulties in dealing with a
government that was nominally carried on at the Council Board, but in
reality directed from the harem or by clan factions in secret intrigue.
Occupied so seriously with other matters, few attempts were made at
first by the Japanese Government in the interest of real reforms that
could benefit the Corean people. Meanwhile, it must be repeated, tens
of thousands of the Mikado’s subjects, many of them of the most
truculent temper and disreputable character, crowded into the
peninsula, committing acts of rapine and brutality which neutralized
many of the best measures of wise statesmen. When the proposition,
approved of in Tokio, was made that all uncultivated land in the
peninsula should be open to Japanese occupation and enterprise, and the
water rights and supply be shared by these aliens, the Corean people,
as a body, made systematic protest. All the circumstances considered,
this sudden act of virtual spoliation was a colossal blunder. In the
eyes of the Coreans it was not only “stealing water from another man’s
field”—so terrible a crime in lands of rice culture, where irrigation
is a vital necessity—but the theft of the very soil itself. At once a
storm of opposition arose that swept the peninsula from end to end. The
Corean Emperor was besieged with petitions to resist the Japanese
demands. A society called Po-an, for the preservation of safety and
peace, was formed, which met in Seoul in excited discussion, and began
the propagation of what seemed to the Japanese authorities a campaign
of sedition. The meetings of the Po-an were broken up by the police,
and the Japanese garrison of Seoul was augmented to six thousand men.
Though other Corean societies were formed, the excitement died out, the
Japanese not pushing their scheme, the Corean noblemen showing little
or no real patriotism, and the people little power of persistent unity.
On October 13, 1904, General Hasegawa took control of the military
situation.
Yet it is the simple truth to state that while the Japanese soldier,
superb in discipline and noble in human qualities, is respected by the
Corean, the low Japanese, who so often proves himself a rascal, is
feared and despised. It is unfortunate that these disreputable
characters were so long under such slight control from Tokio. On the
other hand, notwithstanding that Japan, in the treaty of 1904, had
guaranteed the independence of Corea, yet the Government in Seoul,
choked by palace cliques, languished in chronic feebleness. Unable to
keep order at home, to pay its legation bills abroad, or to separate
itself from that “Forbidden Interior” of mystery in the boudoir
inhabited by a mob of women, eunuchs and hangers-on, which curses
China, Corea, and so long cursed old Japan in both Yedo and Kioto, what
guarantee was there for the peace of Asia and the world? For the
preservation of this, the Mikado’s Government was responsible, while
every complication in Corea involved Japan also.
After long deliberation, the statesmen in Tokio agreed that the surest
exit out of the labyrinthine difficulty was to take charge of Corea’s
foreign relations and place a controller-general at the capital, with
subordinates at the chief cities and seaports, leaving internal affairs
to be directed from Seoul. The Mikado despatched Marquis Ito—“patient,
able, and authoritative”—to Seoul.
On the 17th of November, 1905, the Corean Emperor’s minister, Pak Che
Soon, and the Mikado’s representative, Hayashi, signed a treaty, of
which the following is the official translation into English:
The Governments of Japan and Corea, desiring to strengthen the
principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have with
that object in view agreed upon and concluded the following
stipulations to serve until the moment arrives when it is
recognized that Corea has attained national strength:—
Article I. The Government of Japan, through the Department of
Foreign Affairs at Tokio, will hereafter have control and direction
of the external relations and affairs of Corea, and the diplomatic
and consular representatives of Japan will have the charge of the
subjects and interests of Corea in foreign countries.
Art. II. The Government of Japan undertake to see to the execution
of the treaties actually existing between Corea and other Powers,
and the Government of Corea engage not to conclude hereafter any
act or engagement having an international character, except through
the medium of the Government of Japan.
Art III. The Government of Japan shall be represented at the Court
of His Majesty the Emperor of Corea by a Resident General, who
shall reside at Seoul, primarily for the purpose of taking charge
of and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs. He shall
have the right of private and personal audience of His Majesty the
Emperor of Corea. The Japanese Government shall also have the right
to station Residents at the several open ports and such other
places in Corea as they may deem necessary. Such Residents shall,
under the direction of the Resident General, exercise the powers
and functions hitherto appertaining to Japanese Consuls in Corea,
and shall perform such duties as may be necessary in order to carry
into full effect the provisions of this agreement.
Art. IV. The stipulations of all treaties and agreements existing
between Japan and Corea not inconsistent with the provisions of
this agreement shall continue in force.
Art. V. The Government of Japan undertake to maintain the welfare
and dignity of the Imperial House of Corea.
In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by the
Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.
[Signed] Hyashi Gonsuke,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
[Signed] Pak Che Soon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
November 17, 1905.
Whatever may be the real history of the transfer thus made or the means
taken to secure the document, it is certain that the governments of
Europe and America were very prompt in withdrawing their legations from
Seoul and in acknowledging Japan’s supremacy. In Washington the minds
of the President and Secretary of State were quickly made up, because
of the local eccentricities of Corean envoys, unable to pay their
grocery bills, and despite the representations of more than one private
emissary. On the accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency by
the election of the people and his change of diplomatic assistants,
Minister Horace N. Allen, long our able representative in Seoul, was
succeeded, in 1905, by Mr. Edwin Vernon Morgan, who had had experience
in Samoa, Corea, Russia, and China. He being appointed to another
position, the American legation in Seoul ceased, while the
consul-general and consuls were retained as before.
Meanwhile, under the energetic action of the Resident General Ito, real
reforms were inaugurated and disorderly Japanese characters arrested
and either sent out of the country or made to give pledges for good
behavior. The whole prospect of things brightened.
At a banquet given in his honor by his countrymen in Seoul, April 8,
1906, the Marquis Ito spoke as follows:
“According to what His Corean Majesty has repeatedly condescended to
say to me, I may be permitted to believe that I have the honor to enjoy
his confidence and trust in no small measure. He has on more than one
occasion been pleased to assure me that he wished to rely upon my loyal
services for the regeneration of the Corean Administration. His Majesty
has also given orders to his Ministers to carry out this work of
regeneration under my direction and guidance. As for the Corean
Ministers, they have assured me of their determination to do their
utmost to this end; they say that an opportunity like the present will
not occur again, and, as a matter of fact, they are now actively
engaged in the work of regeneration.”
Apparently these words were as honestly applauded by the Corean
Emperor’s servants as they were believed to be true by the speaker
himself. In mutual confidence, Corean military officers were duly
appointed, and both General Hasegawa and the Marquis Ito left with them
for Japan, to witness the grand review of the returning victorious
Japanese armies from Manchuria, which was held in Tokio April 30th.
The opportunity for intrigue and conspiracy created by the absence of
the two great men was too tempting to be lost by the factions of the
boudoir and its inmates. The Corean Conservative and Progressive
parties kept warring among themselves, hatching plots in which even the
emperor’s privy councillors, palace eunuchs, and officers of the
Imperial household were active. Two lines of policy looking to domestic
and foreign disturbance were mapped out by the conspirators. One
utilized the distress and almost chronic troubles in the southwestern
provinces, the other was based on the hope of Russian intervention. The
plot was planned by yang-ban in the palace itself.
In Chung Chong Do (p. 194) a Min and in Chulla Do (p. 199) a Choi
nobleman led the insurrections. Antiquated muskets, matchlocks, swords,
and spears were laid in store against the Japanese. In Kang-wen Do (p.
208), also, troubles were reported. Four police (out of the 350 then in
all Corea) were sent from the Residency in Seoul, but they were killed
or driven away. The Corean provincial troops being supine, two
companies of Japanese infantry were sent to the city. Attacking in
daylight in order to spare the peaceful non-combatants, the soldiers
blew up the gates with dynamite. After some street fighting the city
was in the hands of the military, 69 Coreans being killed and 145 made
prisoners. It was hoped that this affair would end further
insurrection.
But in a land so long governed by the sorcerer, where the means of
communication are slight and the people lack education and mental
initiative, news travels slowly. Choi, in the more southern city, held
out. Murderous attacks on Japanese settlers and fishermen continued.
The Wi-pion party, representing inveterate conservatism, sided with the
insurgents, while the Il Ching-hoi, or Liberal Progressive, set to work
to unearth evidence and expose the Conservative plotters. Giving
information at the Residency in Seoul, five high officers, Kim, Choi,
Min, Hong, etc., of the Corean Court or Government, including a eunuch,
were arrested. The twofold plan, first, to make the world believe that
the whole Corean people was opposed to the Japanese protectorate, and
second, to enlist Russian cooperation, was exposed. One immediate
result of forcing the Japanese military hand was the quick surrender of
Choi to Corean soldiers in Chulla Do. In his camp was found
authorization from Seoul, sealed with the vermilion seal of the palace,
to raise troops. Thus collapsed the plot for internal disturbance. [63]
The prospect of drawing Russia again into hostilities which might free
Corea from the Japanese yoke shows the weak spot in the Russo-Chinese
negotiations of Ignatieff in 1860 (p. 371). In the delimitation of
frontiers then made, a strip of country containing nearly 3,000 square
miles, called Han-do, or Island Circuit, between the Tumen and its
affluent, the Hai-lan River, which, beginning about seventy-five miles
from the sea, flows nearly parallel, was left as neutral territory to
be uninhabited. This region is shown on the maps (pp. 210, 365), and
though the Chinese characters describe an island, it is interfluvial
only. In reality the land, being very fertile, did in course of time
attract many settlers, both Chinese and Corean. When Russia began to
assert her strenuous policy in the Far East, she demanded that this
neutral strip should be cleared of Coreans, or that all settlers in
this region between the rivers should be enrolled as Chinese subjects.
The Japanese War coming on in 1904, nothing further was done. Since
Russia, by the Portsmouth treaty, controls the railways of Kirin, she
may by holding this region control the trade routes to the seaboard.
Here then was the bait to make the Russian bear bite. One of the Kims,
an anti-Japanese ultra-conservative, secured a commission from the
Corean Emperor appointing him virtually governor of this Hai-lan
region. At Vladivostok, through the infamous pro-Russian Li Yong Ik and
M. Pavloff, the late envoy of the Czar in Corea, the Court of St.
Petersburg was to be sounded on the possibility of gaining control of
this strategic territory.
If it be asked, what ground of hope Kim Hseung-mun had of success, it
must be remembered that while all other foreign consuls in Corea, under
the new order of things, had received their exequaturs, or
authorizations, from the Emperor of Japan, the new Russian
Consul-General, M. Plancon, claimed that he should be recognized by the
Corean and not the Japanese emperor, thus ignoring Corea’s denunciation
of her old treaty with China and the convention of November 17, 1905.
The Russian envoy, for a little while or until he withdrew his
contention, consciously or unconsciously, gave encouragement to the
Corean conspirator, Kim. This whole plot to embroil Russia and Japan
was frustrated, getting no further than the palace, while the surrender
of Choi in Chulla Do was made sure by the arrest, on the night of June
8th, of the chief conspirators as they were leaving the palace. The
Liberals had turned state’s evidence.
Without impeaching the Corean Emperor, the Japanese Government removed
his evil advisers and resolved to persevere in using what authority he
still possesses for the good of the Corean people—as their protectors
see it.
That policy requires the public finance of Corea to be known in ledgers
and budgets, with strict accountability for every dollar; the purging
of the palace, and the thorough differentiation of Court and
Government, and of the “boudoir” from the council table; the creation
of a public school system; the building of a railway from Ping An to
Gen san; a coinage and stable monetary system; the reform of prison
methods and the judiciary; the reclamation of the vast quantities of
waste land; the encouragement of all moral forces; the development of
trade, commerce, and industry; and last, but not least, the severe
handling of unprincipled and truculent Japanese; or, in general, a
policy of righteousness and conciliation that must overcome the
traditional hatred between the Coreans and the Japanese. To make the
yang-ban get to work and earn their own living will be the great
blessing to this long-oppressed land. If Japan can satisfy the
enlightened judgment of the world that Corea is exploited for the good
primarily of the Coreans and not the Japanese, humanity will approve
and rejoice. The accomplished author of “The Passing of Korea,” which
contains the severest arraignment of the Japanese thus far made, passes
this verdict on the situation:
“The Koreans have awakened to the fact that this, which should have
been their first consideration many years ago, is now their last
resort, and they are clamoring for education.... Korea can gain nothing
by holding back and offering to the plans of Japan a sulky resistance.
They are face to face with a definite condition, and theories as to the
morality of the forces which brought about the condition are wholly
academic.”