ON THE PROBLEM OF ETERNAL KNOWLEDGE, WHICH AVERROES HAS MENTIONED IN
HIS DECISIVE DISCOURSE.
May God perpetuate your honour and bless you, and screen you always
from the eyes of misfortune. Through your excellent intelligence and
good understanding you have learned a great part of all these sciences,
till your insight informed you of the doubt which arises concerning the
eternal knowledge of God, with its being at the same time concerned
with created things. Thus, in the interests of truth, it is now
incumbent upon us to remove the doubt from your mind, after we have
stated it clearly. For one who does not know the problem adequately
cannot very well solve the doubt.
The question may be stated thus: If all this universe was in the
knowledge of God before its creation, then, was it in His knowledge
after its creation as it was before it came into existence; or was it
in His knowledge before its creation quite different from that after
its coming into being? If we say that the knowledge of God about it
after its creation is quite different from that which it was before
its creation, it becomes necessary for us to admit that the eternal
knowledge is changeable; or that when the universe came into existence
out of non-existence, then there is an addition to the eternal
knowledge; which is impossible. Again, if we say that the knowledge of
it was the same in both the conditions, then it would be said: Was the
created universe the same before its coming into existence as it was
after its creation? To this objection it will have to be answered that
it was not the same before its creation as it was after it, otherwise
the existent and the non-existent thing would be the same. When the
opponent has admitted this much, he may be asked whether the real
knowledge does not consist in the cognizance of an existent thing as
it is. If he says: “Yes,” then accordingly it becomes necessary that
when a thing changes in itself the knowledge of it must also change,
otherwise it would be a knowledge of something other than the real
object. Thus it would then be necessary to admit one of two things:
either the eternal knowledge itself will change, or the created things
would be unknown to God. And both of these alternatives are impossible
with regard to God. This doubt is still further strengthened by the
apparent condition of man, that is, the relation of his knowledge
about non-existent things by the supposition of their existence and
its relation when the thing in question is found. It is self-evident
that both kinds of knowledge are different, otherwise God would have
been ignorant of its existence at the time he found it. The argument
which the Mutakallimun advance to meet this objection does not by any
means deliver us from the doubt. They say that God knows the things
before their coming into being, as they would be after they come into
existence. If they say that no change occurs, they fall into mistake.
If on the other hand they admit a change, they may be asked whether
this change was known in the eternal knowledge or not. Thus the first
doubt occurs again. On the whole it is difficult to imagine that the
knowledge of a thing before and after its existence can be one and the
same.
This is the statement of the doubt in the briefest terms possible, as
we have put it for your sake. A solution of this doubt requires a very
long discussion, but here we intend to state a point which might easily
solve it. Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) has also tried to solve this doubt in
his work: _The Refutation of the Philosophers_, but his method is by no
means satisfactory. For he says something to this effect: he thinks the
known and the knowledge are not connected with each other, so that when
a change takes place in the one the other does not change in itself. So
it is possible that it may happen in the case of Divine knowledge and
the things existent, that is, they may change in themselves while God’s
knowledge may remain the same. For instance a pillar may be on the
right hand of Zaid, it may be changed to his left without any change
taking place in Zaid himself. But the illustration is not at all a
correct one, for the relation has changed, that is, that which was on
the right side is now on the left. That in which no change has taken
place is the condition of that relation--Zaid. It being so, and the
knowledge is only the relation itself, it is necessary that it should
change with a change in the thing known, as the change in the relation
of the pillar to Zaid, for it is now on the left after being on the
right.
The view which might solve this question is that it should be
maintained that the condition of eternal knowledge of existent things
is quite other than the created knowledge with regard to them. For
the existence of a thing is the cause and means of our knowledge of
it, while the eternal knowledge is itself the cause and means of the
existent thing. So if a change takes place in the eternal knowledge
after the coming into being of an existent thing, as it does in the
created knowledge then it is involved that the former cannot be
the cause but only the effect of the existent things. Thus it is
necessary that there should be no change in it, as there is in the
created knowledge. This mistake always occurs by our taking eternal
knowledge to be like the created one, by an analogy from the seen
to the unseen. The error in this analogy has already been exposed.
Just as no change takes place in any agent after the creation of his
act--that is, change of kind which was not found before--so no change
in the eternal knowledge of God after the creation of the thing which
was in His knowledge. So this doubt is removed. At the same time it
is not necessary for us to say that as there is no change in eternal
knowledge, therefore, He does not know an existent at the time of
its creation, as it is. But we must believe that He knows not by a
created but by His eternal knowledge. For a change in knowledge with
a change of the existent thing is a condition of the knowledge which
depends upon the existent thing, such a knowledge being created. Thus
the relation of the eternal knowledge with the existent things is not
the same as that of the created knowledge. It is not that there is
no connection between them at all as some philosophers are said to
maintain, who as the people think, say, at the time of doubt, that
God has no knowledge of particulars at all. But this is not as is
commonly supposed. They only say that He does not know particulars by
any created knowledge, one of the conditions of which is its being
created by them, by which it is an effect and not a cause. This is the
last of the things about it which must be remembered. For our reason
leads us to the fact that God is the Knower of things, all of them
emanating from Him. This is so because He is a knower, not because
of His existence, nor of His existence in any form, but only because
of His being a Knower. God has said, “Shall not He know all things
who hath created them, since He is the sagacious, the knowing.”[24]
The arguments also tell us that He knows by a knowledge which may be
akin to created knowledge. So it is necessary that there should be
some other knowledge for the existent things--and this is the eternal
of God. Moreover, how is it possible to suppose that the Peripatetic
Philosophers think that the eternal knowledge does not include
particulars, while they say that these are a cause of admonition to us
in our dreams, divine revelations, and other kinds of inspiration?
That is what we think about the solution of the problem--a solution in
which there is no doubt or suspicion. God is the only helper to right
judgment, and leader to truth. Peace be upon you, and blessings of God
and His beatitude. God is the best knower of truth: and to Him is the
return and the refuge.