I. A Decisive Discourse on the Delineation of the Relation between
Religion and Philosophy.
I a. Appendix: On the Problem of Eternal Knowledge which Averroes has
mentioned in his Decisive Discourse.
II. An Exposition of the Methods of Argument concerning the Doctrines
of the Faith, and a Determination of Doubts and misleading Innovation
brought into the Faith through Interpretations.
I
A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION
OF THE
RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY
A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION
OF THE
RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.[1]
And after: Praise be to God for all His praiseworthy acts, and
blessings on Mohammad, His slave, the Pure, the Chosen One and His
Apostle. The purpose of the following treatise is to inquire through
sacred Law[2] whether the learning of philosophy and other sciences
appertaining thereto is permitted, or called dangerous, or commended
by the Law, and if commended, is it only approved or made obligatory.
We maintain that the business of philosophy is nothing other than to
look into creation and to ponder over it in order to be guided to the
Creator,--in other words, to look into the meaning of existence. For
the knowledge of creation leads to the cognisance of the Creator,
through the knowledge of the created. The more perfect becomes the
knowledge of creation, the more perfect becomes the knowledge of
the Creator. The Law encourages and exhorts us to observe creation.
Thus, it is clear that this is to be taken either as a religious
injunction or as something approved by the Law. But the Law urges
us to observe creation by means of reason and demands the knowledge
thereof through reason. This is evident from different verses of the
Quran. For example the Quran says: “Wherefore take example _from them_,
ye who have eyes.”[3] That is a clear indication of the necessity
of using the reasoning faculty, or rather both reason and religion,
in the interpretation of things. Again it says: “Or do they not
contemplate the kingdom of heaven and earth and the things which God
hath created.”[4] This is a plain exhortation to encourage the use of
observation of creation. And remember that one whom God especially
distinguishes in this respect, Abraham, the prophet. For He says: “And
this did we show unto Abraham: the kingdom of heaven and earth.”[5]
Further He says: “Do they not consider the camels, how they are
created; and the heaven, how it is raised.”[6] Or still again: “And
(who) meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord thou
hast not created this in vain.”[7] There are many other verses on this
subject: too numerous to be enumerated.
Now, it being established that the Law makes the observation and
consideration of creation by reason obligatory--and consideration
is nothing but to make explicit the implicit--this can only be done
through reason. Thus we must look into creation with the reason.
Moreover, it is obvious that the observation which the Law approves
and encourages must be of the most perfect type, performed with the
most perfect kind of reasoning. As the Law emphasises the knowledge of
God and His creation by inference, it is incumbent on any who wish to
know God and His whole creation by inference, to learn the kinds of
inference, their conditions and that which distinguishes philosophy
from dialectic and exhortation from syllogism. This is impossible
unless one possesses knowledge beforehand of the various kinds of
reasoning and learns to distinguish between reasoning and what is not
reasoning. This cannot be done except one knows its different parts,
that is, the different kinds of premises.
Hence, for a believer in the Law and a follower of it, it is necessary
to know these things before he begins to look into creation, for
they are like instruments for observation. For, just as a student
discovers by the study of the law, the necessity of knowledge of legal
reasoning with all its kinds and distinctions, a student will find out
by observing the creation the necessity of metaphysical reasoning.
Indeed, he has a greater claim on it than the jurist. For if a jurist
argues the necessity of legal reasoning from the saying of God:
“Wherefore take example _from them_ O ye who have eyes,”[8] a student
of divinity has a better right to establish the same from it on behalf
of metaphysical reasoning.
One cannot maintain that this kind of reasoning is an innovation in
religion because it did not exist in the early days of Islam. For legal
reasoning and its kinds are things which were invented also in later
ages, and no one thinks they are innovations. Such should also be our
attitude towards philosophical reasoning. There is another reason why
it should be so, but this is not the proper place to mention it. A
large number of the followers of this religion confirm philosophical
reasoning, all except a small worthless minority, who argue from
religious ordinances. Now, as it is established that the Law makes the
consideration of philosophical reasoning and its kinds as necessary
as legal reasoning, if none of our predecessors has made an effort to
enquire into it, we should begin to do it, and so help them, until the
knowledge is complete. For if it is difficult or rather impossible for
one person to acquaint himself single-handed with all things which it
is necessary to know in legal matters, it is still more difficult in
the case of philosophical reasoning. And, if before us, somebody has
enquired into it, we should derive help from what he has said. It is
quite immaterial whether that man is our co-religionist or not; for the
instrument by which purification is perfected is not made uncertain
in its usefulness, by its being in the hands of one of our own party,
or of a foreigner, if it possesses the attributes of truth. By these
latter we mean those Ancients who investigated these things before the
advent of Islam.
Now, such is the case. All that is wanted in an enquiry into
philosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the
Ancients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to
their books and see what they have said in this connection. If all
that they say be true, we should accept it and if there be something
wrong, we should be warned by it. Thus, when we have finished this
kind of research we shall have acquired instruments by which we can
observe the universe, and consider its general character. For so long
as one does not know its general character one cannot know the created,
and so long as he does not know the created, he can have no knowledge
of the Creator. Thus we must begin an inquiry into the universe
systematically, such as we have learned from the trend of rational
inference. It is also evident that this aim is to be attained by the
investigation of one part of the universe after another, and that help
must be derived from predecessors, as is the case in other sciences.
Imagine that the science of geometry and astronomy had become extinct
in our day, and a single individual desired to find out by himself the
magnitude of the heavenly bodies, their forms, and their distances from
one another. Even though he were the most sagacious of men, it would be
as impossible for him as to ascertain the proportion of the sun and the
earth and the magnitude of the other stars. It would only be attainable
by aid of divine revelation, or something like it. If it be said to him
that the sun is a hundred and fifty or sixty times as big as the earth,
he would take it to be sheer madness on the part of the speaker, though
it is an established fact in the science of astronomy, so that no one
learned in that science will have any doubt about it.
The science which needs most examples from other sciences is that of
Law. For the study of jurisprudence cannot be completed except in a
very long time. If a man today would himself learn of all the arguments
discovered by the different disputants of diverse sects, in problems
which have always excited contentions in all the big cities, except
those of Al-Maghrib, he would be a proper object to be laughed at on
account of the impossibility of the task, in spite of the existence of
every favourable circumstance. This is similar not only in the sciences
but also in the arts. For no one is capable of discovering by himself
alone everything which is required. And if this is so in other sciences
and arts, how is it possible in the art of arts--philosophy?
This being so, it becomes us to go back to the Ancients, and to see
what observations and considerations they have made into the universe,
according to the tests of inference. We should consider what they have
said in this connection and proved in their books, so that whatever may
be true in them we may accept and, while thanking them, be glad to know
it, and whatever be wrong, we should be warned by it, be cautioned, and
hold them excused for their mistake.
From what has been said, it may be taken that a search into the books
of the Ancients is enjoined by the Law, when their meaning and purpose
be the same as that to which the Law exhorts us. Anyone who prevents a
man from pondering over these things, that is, a man who has the double
quality of natural sagacity and rectitude in the Law, with the merit of
learning and disposition--turns away the people from the door by which
the Law invites them to enter into the knowledge of God, and that is
the door of observation which leads to the perfect knowledge of God.
Such an action is the extreme limit of ignorance and of remoteness from
God.
If, by studying these books, a man has been led astray and gone wrong
on account of some natural defect, bad training of the mind, inordinate
passion, or the want of a teacher who might explain to him the true
significance of things, by all or some of these causes, we ought not on
this account to prevent one fit to study these things from doing so.
For such harm is not innate in man, but is only an accident of training.
It is not right that a drug which is medically useful by its nature
should be discarded because it may prove harmful by accident. The
Prophet told a man whose brother was suffering with diarrhea to
treat him with honey. But this only increased the ailment. On his
complaining, the Prophet said: “God was right and thy brother’s stomach
was wrong.” We would even say that a man who prevents another fit for
it, from studying the books of philosophy, because certain worthless
people have been misled by them, is like a man who refused a thirsty
man cold and sweet water, till he died, because some people under the
same circumstances have been suffocated by it and have died. For death
by suffocation through drinking cold water is accidental, while by
thirst it is natural and inevitable.
This state of things is not peculiar to this science only, but is
common to all. How many jurists there are in whom jurisprudence has
become the cause of worldliness and lack of piety? We should say that
a large majority of jurists are of this kind, although their science
should result in better action than other sciences which only lead to
better knowledge.
So far, then, the position is established. Now, we Muslims firmly
believe that our Law is divine and true. This very Law urges us and
brings us to that blessing which is known as the knowledge of God, and
His creation. This is a fact to which every Muslim will bear testimony
by his very nature and temperament. We say this, because temperaments
differ in believing: one will believe through philosophy; while another
will believe through dogmatic discourse, just as firmly as the former,
as no other method appeals to his nature. There are others who believe
by exhortation alone, just as others believe through inferences. For
this reason our divine Law invites people by all the three methods,
which every man has to satisfy, except those who stubbornly refuse to
believe, or those, according to whom these divine methods have not been
established on account of the waywardness of their hearts. This is why
the mission of the Prophet has been declared common to the whole world,
for his Law comprises all the three methods leading men towards God.
What we say is quite clear from the following saying of God: “Invite
men unto the way of the Lord, by wisdom and mild exhortation, and
dispute with them in the most condescending manner.”[9]
As this Law is true and leads to the consideration of the knowledge
of God, we Muslims should believe that rational investigation is not
contrary to Law, for truth cannot contradict truth, but verifies it and
bears testimony to it. And if that is so, and rational observation is
directed to the knowledge of any existent objects, then the Law may be
found to be silent about it, or concerned with it. In the former case
no dispute arises, as it would be equivalent to the absence of its
mention in the Law as injunctory, and hence the jurist derives it from
legal conjecture. But if the Law speaks of it, either it will agree
with that which has been proved by inference, or else it will disagree
with it. If it is in agreement it needs no comment, and if it is
opposed to the Law, an interpretation is to be sought. Interpretation
means to carry the meaning of a word from its original sense to a
metaphorical one. But this should be done in such a manner as will
not conflict with the custom of the Arabian tongue. It is to avoid
the naming of an object, by simply mentioning its like, its cause,
its attribute, or associate, etc. which are commonly quoted in the
definition of the different kinds of metaphorical utterances. And if
the jurist does so in many of the legal injunctions, how very befitting
would it be for a learned man to do the same with his arguments. For
the jurist has only his fanciful conjectures to depend upon, while a
learned man possesses positive ones.
We hold it to be an established truth that if the Law is apparently
opposed to a truth proved by philosophy it admits of an interpretation
according to the canons of the Arabic language. This is a proposition
which a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer cannot mistrust. One who is
accustomed to these things divine can experience for himself what we
have said. The aim of this discourse is to bring together intellectual
and traditional science. Indeed, we would even say that no logical
conclusion will be found to be opposed to the Law, which when sifted
and investigated in its different parts will be found in accordance, or
almost so, with it.
* * * * *
That is why all Muslims are agreed that all the words of the Law are
not to be taken literally, nor all of them given an interpretation.
But they vary in verses, which are or are not to be interpreted.
For example, the Asharites put an interpretation upon the verse
of Equalisation[10] and on the Tradition of Descent,[11] while
the Hanbalites take them literally. The Law has made two sides of
these--exoteric and esoteric--because of the differences of human
nature and minds in verifying a thing. The existence of an opposed
esoteric meaning is in order to call the attention of the learned to
find out a comprehensive interpretation. To this the following verse
of the Quran refers: “It is he who hath sent down unto thee the book,
wherein are some verses clear to be understood--they are the foundation
of the book--and others are parabolical. But they whose hearts are
perverse will follow that which is parabolical therein, out of love of
schism, and a desire of the interpretation thereof; yet none knoweth
the interpretation thereof except God. But they who are well grounded
in knowledge say: We believe therein, the whole is from our Lord, and
none will consider except the prudent.”[12]
Here it may be objected that in the Law there are things which all
Muslims have agreed to take esoterically, while there are others on
which they have agreed to put an interpretation, while there are some
about which they disagree. Is it justifiable to use logic in the
interpretation of those which have been taken literally, or otherwise?
We would say that if the agreement is positive there is no need to
apply logic; but if it be conjectural there is. For this very reason
Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and Abu Ma’ali and other learned doctors have
ordained that a man does not become an unbeliever by forsaking the
common agreement and applying the principle of interpretation in such
things. It will certainly be agreed that complete consensus of opinion
is not possible in metaphysical questions, in the manner in which it is
possible to establish it in practical things. For it is not possible to
establish unanimity of opinion at any time, unless we confine ourselves
to a small period and know perfectly all the learned doctors living in
it, that is, their personalities, their number and their views about
any question to be quoted to us directly from them without a break in
the chain. With all this we should know for certain that the doctors
living at that time are agreed that there is no distinction of exoteric
and esoteric meanings in the Law, that the knowledge of no proposition
should be concealed from anybody, and that the method of teaching the
Law should be the same with all men. But we know that a large number
of people in the early days of Islam believed in exoteric and esoteric
meanings of the Law, and thought that the esoteric meanings should
not be disclosed to an ignorant person who cannot understand them.
For example, Bukhari has related on the authority of Ali that he said
“Talk to men what they can understand. Do you intend to give the lie
to God and His Apostle?” There are many Traditions to the same effect
related from other people. So, how is it possible to conceive of any
consensus of opinion coming down to us in metaphysical questions when
we definitely know that in every age there have been doctors who take
the Law to contain things the real significance of which should not be
disclosed to all men? But in practical affairs it is quite different.
For all persons are of opinion that they should be revealed to all men
alike. In these things unanimity of opinion can be easily obtained if
the proposition is published, and no disagreement is reported. That may
be sufficient to obtain unanimity of opinion in practical things as
distinct from the sciences.
If it be maintained that one does not become an unbeliever by ignoring
consensus of opinion in interpretation, as no unanimity is possible
in it, what shall we say of such Muslim philosophers as Abu Nasr (Al
Farabi) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna)? For Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) has
charged them with positive infidelity in his book: _The Refutation
of the Philosophers_, in regard to three things: The eternity of
the world; God’s ignorance of particulars; and the interpretation
concerning the resurrection of bodies and the state of the Day of
Judgment. To this we should reply that from what he has said it
is not clear that he has charged them positively with infidelity.
For in his book _Al Tafriqah bain’al Islami w’al Zindiqah_ he has
explained that the infidelity of a man who ignores the consensus of
opinion is doubtful. Moreover we have definitely pointed out that it
is not possible to establish a consensus of opinion in such matters,
especially when there are many people of the early times who have
held that there are interpretations which should not be disclosed to
all but only to those who are fit for them and those are men who are
“well grounded in knowledge”[13], a divine injunction which cannot
be overlooked. For if such people do not know the interpretation in
these matters they will have no special criterion of truth for their
faith, which the common people have not, while God has described
them as believing in Him. This kind of faith is always produced by
the acceptance of the arguments, and that is not possible without a
knowledge of interpretation. Otherwise, even the common people believe
in the words of God without any philosophy whatever. The faith which
the Quran has especially ascribed to the learned must be a faith
strengthened with full arguments, which cannot be without a knowledge
of the canons of interpretation. For God has said that the Law admits
of interpretation which is its real significance, and this is what is
established by arguments. Yet though this is so, it is impossible to
establish any well grounded consensus of opinion in the interpretations
which God has ascribed to the learned men. That is quite evident to
anyone with insight. But with this we see that Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali)
has made a mistake in ascribing to the Peripatetic Philosophers the
opinion that God has no knowledge of particulars. They are only of
opinion that the knowledge of God about particulars is quite different
from ours. For our knowledge is the effect of the existence of a thing.
Such knowledge is produced by the existence of a thing, and changes
with changes in the thing. On the other hand the knowledge of God is
the cause of an existent thing. Thus one who compares these two kinds
of knowledge ascribes the same characteristics to two quite different
things--and that is extreme ignorance. When applied both to eternal
and to transitory things the word _knowledge_ is used only in a formal
fashion, just as we use many other words for objects essentially
different. For instance the word _Jalal_ is applied both to great and
small; and _sarim_ to light and darkness. We have no definition which
can embrace both these kinds of knowledge, as some of the Mutakallimun
of our times have thought. We have treated this question separately at
the request of some of our friends.
How can it be supposed that the Peripatetic Philosophers say that God
has no knowledge of particulars when they are of opinion that man is
sometimes warned of the coming vicissitudes of the future through
visions, and that he gets these admonitions in sleep, through a great
and powerful Director, who directs everything? These philosophers
are not only of opinion that God has no knowledge of details such as
we have but they also believe that He is ignorant of universals. For
all known universals with us are also the effect of the existence of
a thing, while God’s knowledge is quite other than this. From these
arguments it is concluded that God’s knowledge is far higher than that
it should be called universal or particular. There is therefore no
difference of opinion concerning the proposition, that is, whether they
are called infidel or not.
As to the eternal or transitory nature of the world: I think that in
this matter the difference of opinion between the Asharite Mutakallimun
and the Ancient Philosophers is for the most part a verbal difference,
at least so far as the opinion of some of the Ancients is concerned.
For they are agreed on the fact that there are three kinds of
creation--the two extremes and a medial one. They again agree on the
nomenclature of the two extremes, but they disagree as to the medial
one. As to the one extreme, it has come into existence from something
other than itself, or from anything else--that is from a generative
cause or matter--while time existed before it. All those things whose
existence is perceived by the senses, as water, animals, vegetation,
etc., are included in this. All Ancient and Asharite philosophers are
agreed in denominating this creation _Originated_.
The other extreme is that which came into existence from nothing, not
out of anything, and time did not precede it. The two parties are
agreed in calling this _Eternal_. This extreme can be reached by logic.
This is God, the Creator, Inventor, and Preserver of all.
The medial kind of creation is that which has neither been made from
nothing, “matter,” nor has time preceded it, but it has been created
by some generative cause. In this is included the whole world. Again
they all agree on the existence of all the three categories of the
universe. The Mutakallimun admit, or they ought to admit, that
before the universe there was no time, for according to them time is
contemporaneous with motion and body. They are also agreed with the
Ancients that future time and creation have no end, but they differ as
to past time and its creation. The Mutakallimun are of opinion that it
had a beginning.
This is the belief of Plato and his disciples, while Aristotle and
his followers are of opinion that it had no beginning, just as the
future has no end. It is clear that the last mentioned kind of creation
resembles both the _originated_ and the _eternal_ creation. So one who
thinks that in the past creation there are more characteristics of the
eternal than the originated takes it to be eternal and vice versa.
But in reality it is neither truly originated nor eternal. For the
originated creation is necessarily subject to destruction while the
eternal is without a cause. There are some, for example, Plato and his
followers, who have called it _infinitely originated_, for according
to them time has no end. There is not here so great a difference about
the universe, for it to be made the basis of a charge of infidelity.
In fact, they should not be so charged at all, for opinions which are
worthy of this are far removed from ours, those quite contrary to them,
as the Mutakallimun have thought them to be in this proposition. I mean
that they take the words _originated_ and _eternal_ to be contrary
expressions, which our investigation has shown not to be the case.
The strange thing about all these opinions is that they are not in
agreement with the literal sense of the Law. For if we look closely
we shall find many verses which tell us of the creation of the
universe--that is, of its _originated_ nature. Creation and time are
said to be without end. For according to the verse: “It is He who hath
created the heavens and the earth in six days, but His Throne was above
the waters before the creation thereof”[14] it is clear that there was
a universe before this one, and that is the throne and the water, and
a time which existed before that water. Then again the verse “The day
will come when the earth shall be changed into another earth and the
heavens into other heavens”[15] shows equally when taken literally that
there will be a universe after this one. Again, the verse: “Then He set
his mind to the creation of heaven and it was smoke”[16] shows that the
heavens were created from something.
Whatever the Mutakallimun say about the universe is not based on a
literal sense of the Law, but is an interpretation of it. For the Law
does not tell us that God was even before mere non-existence, and
moreover, this is not found as an ordinance in it. How can we suppose
that there could be any consensus of opinion about the interpretation
of verses by the Mutakallimun? In fact, there is much in the sayings
of some philosophers which supports what we have quoted from the Law,
taken literally.
Those who differ concerning these obscure questions have either reached
the truth and have been rewarded; or have fallen into error and have
to be excused. For it is compulsory rather than voluntary to believe
a thing to be true, the proof of which has already been established;
that is, we cannot believe or disbelieve it as we like, as it depends
upon our will to stand or not to do so. So, if one of the conditions of
verification be freedom of choice, a learned man, and he alone, should
be held excused, if he makes a mistake on account of some doubt. Hence
the Prophet has said that if a magistrate judges rightly he receives
two rewards, and if he makes a mistake he deserves only one. But what
magistrate is greater than one who judges the universe, whether it
is so or not. These are the judges--the learned men--whom God has
distinguished with the knowledge of interpretation.
It is this kind of mistake of insight which learned people are
quite apt to make when they look into those obscure questions the
investigation of which the Law has imposed upon them. But the mistake
the common people make in these matters is sin pure and simple, whether
in theoretical or in practical things. As a magistrate, ignorant of
Tradition, when he makes mistakes in judgment, cannot be held excused,
so likewise a judge of the universe when not having the qualities of a
judge is also not excusable, but is either a sinner or an unbeliever.
If it be a condition that a magistrate shall have capacity of
arbitration concerning the lawful and the forbidden, that is, knowledge
of the principles of Law and their application through analogy--how
much more befitting it is for an arbitrator of the universe to be armed
with fundamental knowledge of the mental sciences, and the way of
deducing results from them.
Mistake in the interpretation of the Law is thus of two kinds--a
mistake which can be excused in one fit to look into the thing in which
it has been committed, just as an expert physician is excused if he
commits an error in the application of his science; or a magistrate
when he misjudges, and a mistake which is inexcusable in one not fit
to investigate a thing. But the error which cannot be excused for
anybody, and which, if it happens to show itself in relation to the
very principles of the Law, is infidelity, and if in universals is an
innovation, is that error which is committed in those things which have
been settled by all arguments and so the knowledge of them is possible
for everybody, for instance, the acknowledgement of the existence of
God, of Prophecy, and of the happiness or the misery of the next world.
This is so, because all these three principles are proved by those
three methods, the justification of which a man cannot deny by any
means, that is exhortative controversial and argumentative proofs. A
denier of such things, which are the very root of the principle of the
Law, is an unbeliever, a retrograde with his tongue and his heart, or
through negligence, on account of his denying them in spite of proofs.
For if he be a man believing in arguments, he can verify them through
these or if he believes in controversy, he can verify through that;
and if he believes in religions admonitions he can well justify them
through these. And hence the Prophet has said: “I have been commanded
to fight with men till they say: ‘There is no God but Allah’ and
believe in me” that is, by any of these three means of attaining the
Faith.
But there are things which, on account of their obscurity, cannot be
understood by inference. So, God has favoured such of his creatures
as cannot understand logic, either on account of their nature, habit,
or lack of mental training, by quoting examples and parables of such
things and has urged them to testify as to their truth through them.
For everyone has mental capacity enough to understand them by the
help of dogmatic and exhortatory argument which are common to all
men. This is why the Law has been divided into two kinds: exoteric
and esoteric. The exoteric part consists of those examples which have
been coined to express certain meanings; while the esoteric is the
meanings themselves, which are not manifested except to the learned in
philosophy.
These are the very four or five kinds of methods of knowing reality
mentioned by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his book called _Al Tafriqah
bain al Islam wal Zindiqah_. If it so happens as we have said that
we can know of a thing by any of the above mentioned three methods,
then we do not stand in need of any examples for understanding them.
Such things should be taken literally and interpretation should find
no place with regard to them. If these things form a part of the
principles of the Law, one who puts an interpretation upon them is an
infidel. For instance, if a man believes that there is no happiness or
misery in the next world, and that the teaching is only an artifice to
safeguard the life and property of the people from one another and that
there is no goal for men other than this life, then he is certainly an
unbeliever.
When this has once been established it will become clear to you that
interpretation is not lawful in the exoteric part of the Law. If the
canon of interpretation be used in the principles of the Law, it is
infidelity, and if used in general things it is an innovation. But
there is also a certain exoteric law which requires an interpretation
from learned men. It is not misbelief for them to take it exoterically,
but it is so or is at least an innovation in religion if ignorant men
try to interpret or explain it.
Among these is the verse of Equalisation and the Tradition of Descent.
For the Prophet said of a Negro slave girl who told him that God was in
heaven: “Emancipate her, for she is a believer.” For there are persons
who cannot believe a thing except through their imagination, that is,
it is difficult for them to believe a thing which they cannot imagine.
Among these may be classed men who cannot understand a thing except
with a reference to space, and hence believe in God as though physical,
notwithstanding that these are the very persons who have dealt very
harshly with those mentioned above. They ought to be told that things
of his character are parabolical, and that we should pause and consider
the saying of God: “Yet none knoweth the interpretation thereof except
God.” Although learned men agree that these are to be interpreted, they
differ in the interpretation according to their knowledge of principles
of philosophy. There is a third part of the Law which occupies an
intermediate position, on account of some doubt about it. Some say that
it should be taken exoterically, and that no interpretation should
be allowed in it; while there are others who say that they have some
esoteric meaning, and should not be taken exoterically by the learned.
This is on account of the obscurity of their meaning. A learned man may
be excused if he makes a mistake about them.
If the Law is divided into these three parts, it may be asked: to which
of these does the description of the state of the Day of Judgment
belong? We would reply that it is quite clear, on the very face of
the question, that it belongs to that part in which there is some
difference of opinion. For one group of men, who class themselves
among philosophers, say that these things should be taken literally.
For, according to them, there is not a single argument which makes
their literal sense absurd and unreasonable. This is the method of the
Asharites. But another group of philosophers interpret them; but they
differ very widely in the interpretation itself. Amongst these may be
mentioned Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and a large number of Sufis. There
are some who would amalgamate the two interpretations, as Abu Hamid has
done in some of his books. These questions are among those in which, if
the learned men err they are to be excused; otherwise, they are to be
thanked and rewarded. For, if one acknowledges the reality of the Day
of Judgment, and then begins to apply the principles of interpretation
to the description, and not its reality, he does not in any way deny
it. A denial of its reality is infidelity, for it is one of the
fundamentals of the Law, and it can be easily verified by any of the
three methods of argument common to all men. But one who is not learned
should take it exoterically, an interpretation in his case is unbelief,
for it leads to infidelity. We are thus of opinion that such people
should accept the literal sense, for interpretation will certainly
lead them to infidelity. A learned man who discloses the discussions
of these things to the common people helps them towards unbelief and
one who abets another in that direction is himself no better than an
unbeliever. It is therefore unsuitable that these interpretations
should be published in any other than learned books, for in this way
they will reach none but the learned. But it is a mistake both in
religion and philosophy if they are put in other books, with dogmatic
and exhortative arguments, as Abu Hamid has done. Although the author’s
intention was good, the idea thus to increase the number of learned
men, he caused a good deal of mischief through it. For, on account of
this method some people began to find fault with philosophy, and others
to blame religion, and still others began to think of reconciling the
two. It seems that this was the very aim which Abu Hamid had in view in
writing these books. He has tried to awaken the nature of men, for he
never attached himself to any particular way of thinking in his books.
He was an Asharite with the Asharites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a
philosopher with the philosophers, so much so that he was, as has been
said: “I am a Yeminite when I meet a Yeminite; if I meet a Ma’adi I am
one of Banu Adnan.”
Hence, it is necessary for the doctors of Islam to prevent men, except
the learned, from reading his books; as it is incumbent upon them to
hinder them from reading controversial writings which should not be
studied except by those fit to do so. As a rule the reading of these
books is less harmful than those of the former. For the majority cannot
understand philosophical books, only those endowed with superior
natures. People are on the whole destitute of learning and are aimless
in their reading which they do without a teacher. Nevertheless they
succeed in leading others away from religion. It is an injustice to
the best kind of men and the best kind of creation; for in their case
justice consists in the knowledge of the best things by the best
people, fit to know it. It should be remembered that the greater the
thing is the higher will be the injustice done to it on account of
ignorance. Hence God says: “Polytheism is a great injustice.”[17]
These things we have thought proper to mention here, that is, in a
discussion of the relation between philosophy and religion and the
canons of interpretation in Law. If these matters had not become
commonly known among men, we would not have said anything about them
and would not have entered in a plea on behalf of the interpreters. For
these things are suitable only for mention in philosophical books.
You ought to be aware that the real purpose of the Law is to impart
the knowledge of truth and of right action. The knowledge of truth
consists in the cognisance of God and the whole universe with its
inner significance, especially that of religion, and the knowledge
of happiness or misery of the next world. Right action consists in
following those actions which are useful for happiness and avoiding
those which lead to misery. The knowledge of these actions has been
called practical knowledge. This is divided into two kinds: external
actions, the knowledge of which is called Fiqh, that is, Theology; and
actions pertaining to feelings, such as gratitude, patience, and other
points of character to which the Law has urged us or from which it has
prohibited us. This is called the knowledge of continence and of the
next world. Abu Hamid in his book _The Revivification of the Sciences
of Religion_ seems to be inclined to this kind, and as the people have
always turned away from the former kind of knowledge and have turned
themselves to the second which leads them easily to piety, the book
attained its name. But we have wandered from our own purpose and will
now return to it.
If the purpose of the Law is to impart the knowledge of truth and
of right action, this cannot be attained except by one of the two
methods: _viz_, by conception or verification such as Mutakallimun have
maintained in their books. There are three methods of verification open
to people: philosophy, dogmatics and exhortation. There are two methods
of conception: either by the thing itself, or by its like. As all
people cannot by their nature understand and accept philosophical and
dogmatic arguments, together with the difficulty of learning the use of
inferences and the long time it takes to learn them, and the purpose
of the Law being to be quite common among men, it is necessary that it
should contain all kinds of verifications and conceptions. Among the
methods of verification there are some which are meant for the common
people: that is, exhortative and dogmatic, the exhortative being more
common than the other. There is one method which is meant solely for
the learned, and that is the method of rational inference. Now, it is
the primary aim of the Law to improve the condition of the many without
neglecting the few, and hence the method of conception and verification
adopted are common to the majority.
These methods are of four kinds: the first is that which, while
in particulars the same in both, that is, both exhortatively and
dialectically, is still true by conception and verification. These
are syllogisms of which the minor and the major premise are certain,
besides being easily imagined and well known. These are set before the
deductions which are drawn from them, and not from their likes. To
this kind of religious injunction there is no interpretation, and one
who denies them or puts an interpretation upon them is an infidel. The
second kind is that the premises of which although well known or easily
imagined are also positively established. Their conclusions are drawn
by analogy. Upon these, that is, their conclusions, an interpretation
may be put. The third kind is just the reverse of the second, that is,
the conclusions are themselves intended and their premises are well
known or easily imagined without being positively established. Upon
these also--that is, upon the conclusions, no interpretation can be
put, but the premises may sometimes be interpreted. The fourth kind is
that the premises of which are well-known or conjectural without being
positively established. Their deductions are by analogy when that is
intended. It is the duty of the learned men to interpret them and of
the common people to take them exoterically.
In short, all that should be interpreted can be grasped by philosophy
alone. So the duty of the learned person is to interpret, and of
the common people to take it literally, both in conception and in
verification. The reason for the latter is that they cannot understand
more. A student of law sometimes finds interpretations which have a
preference over others, in a general way by verification: that is,
the argument is more convincing with the interpretations than with
the literal meanings. These interpretations are common and it is
possible for them to be admitted by any whose speculative faculties
have been developed in controversy. Some of the interpretations of the
Asharites and the Mutazilites are of this type, though the arguments
of the Mutazilites are generally the more weighty. But it is the duty
of the common people who are not capable of understanding more than
exhortation to take them exoterically. Indeed, it is not proper for
them to know the interpretations at all.
Thus there are three groups into which men have been divided: Those who
are not included amongst those who should know the interpretations.
These are common people who are guided by exhortation alone. They
form a vast majority: for there is not a single rational being who
cannot accept a result by this method. The second are dogmatic
interpreters. These are so, either by their nature only, or both by
nature and habit. The third are those who can be definitely called
interpreters. These are the philosophers, both by nature and by
philosophical training. This kind of interpretation should not be
discussed with the dogmatists, not to speak of the common people. If
any of these interpretations are disclosed to those not fit to receive
them--especially philosophical interpretations--these being far higher
than common knowledge, they may be led to infidelity. For he wishes to
nullify the exoteric meaning and to prove his interpretation. But if
the exoteric meaning is shown to be false without the interpretation
being established, he falls into infidelity, if this concerns the
principles of the Law. So, the interpretations should not be disclosed
to the common people, and ought not to be put into exhortative or
doctrinal books--that is, books written with an expository purpose in
view--as Abu Hamid has done.
Hence, it is necessary that the common people should be told that those
things which are exoteric, and yet cannot be understood easily, the
interpretations of which it is impossible for them to understand, are
parabolical, and that no one knows the interpretation thereof except
God. We should stop at the following words of God: “None knoweth the
interpretation thereof except God.”[18] This is also the answer to the
question about some of those abstruse problems which the common people
cannot understand: “They will ask thee concerning the spirit: answer:
The spirit was created at the command of my Lord, but ye have no
knowledge given to you, except a little.”[19] Again, one who interprets
these to persons not fit to receive them is an infidel, because he
leads others to infidelity, which is quite in opposition to the purpose
of the Law. This is especially the case when corrupt interpretations
are put on the principles of the Law, as some men of our own times
do. We have known many people who think they are philosophers and
hence claim to find out strange things through philosophy, which are
in every way contrary to religion, and they do not admit of any other
interpretation. They think they must disclose these things to the
common people. But by the disclosure of wrong notions they lead them to
eternal destruction.
The difference between their aim and that of the jurists can be made
clear by the following example. Since it is not possible to make every
one an expert physician a certain physician laid down some principles
for the preservation of health and the prevention of diseases, and he
allowed the use of some things but prohibited others. Now a man comes
and tells the people that the principles laid down by that physician
are not correct and declares them to be false, and they become
discredited in the eyes of the people; or says that they are capable
of interpretations which they cannot understand and cannot verify by
practice. Do you think that people in these circumstances will ever
act upon those things which are useful for their health and for the
prevention of diseases or that the man himself will ever be capable of
acting on them? No, he will be quite incapable of doing so and thus
will lead them all to destruction.
This is the case when those interpretations which they cannot
understand are correct, to say nothing of those that are wrong. For
they will not believe in health to be preserved, nor disease to be
prevented, to say nothing of the things which preserve health or
prevent disease. This is the condition of that man who discloses
interpretations of the Law to the common people and those not fit to
receive them. And hence he is an unbeliever.
The simile which we have described above is a real parallel, and not
merely fanciful (as some may think) as it is correct in every respect.
For the relation of the medicine to the body is the same as that of the
Law to the soul. A physician is one who seeks to preserve the health
when he finds it good and tries to restore it when it is missed. In the
same way a religious law-giver is one who takes care of the health of
souls, which is called piety. The Quran also makes clear its purpose,
through religious action, by many verses. For instance: “O true
believers, a fast is ordained unto you as it was ordained those before
you, that ye may fear God”[20] and “Their flesh is not accepted of
God, neither their blood; but your piety is accepted by Him”[21] and:
“For prayer preserveth a man from filthy crimes and from that which is
blameable.”[22] There are many other verses of the same nature in the
Quran. Thus, we see, a religious law-giver seeks to establish this kind
of health by religious knowledge and practice. This is the health upon
which depends happiness and in the case of its absence the misery of
the next world.
This should have made it clear to you not merely that one should not
speak of the wrong interpretation. But also that it is not proper to
put even true ones in the books of the common people. These correct
interpretations are of the faith which man has and of which the whole
creation was afraid to bear the burden. By this we refer to the
following verse of the Quran: “We proposed the faith unto the heavens,
and the earth, and the mountains, and they refused to undertake the
same, and were afraid thereof, but man undertook it: verily he is
unjust to himself and foolish.”[23] These interpretations and the
idea that their discussion is necessary in the Law have given rise to
many sects in Islam, so much so that they have denounced one another
with infidelity and innovations. This is especially the effect of
wrong interpretations. The Mutazilites interpreted a large number
of verses and Traditions and disclosed them to the people. So also
did the Asharites, though their interpretations were less in number.
They only succeeded in creating hatred and wars among men, destroying
the Law, and disuniting the people completely. To add to this, the
method which they have adopted in proving these interpretations is
adapted neither to the common people nor to the learned. For if you
look closely into it, you will find that it is not correct according
to the norms of logic--this anyone who has had any training may see
for himself without the least effort. In fact, many of the principles
upon which the Asharites build their conclusions are sophistical in
their nature. They deny many fundamentals, like the proof of accidence,
the influence of one thing upon another, the necessity of cause and
effects, abstract figures and the processes leading to them. Indeed,
Asharite Mutakallimun have been in this respects unjust to Mohammadans,
for one of their sects has denounced as infidels all those who do not
recognise the existence of God by methods which they have devised for
the knowledge of Him: but in truth they themselves are in the wrong and
are unbelievers.
It is upon this point that the difference of opinion arises. Some say
that the first principle is of reason, while others allege that it is
of faith. That is to say they have thought that faith, even before
knowing the methods common to all and to which the Law has made a
call on all, is the only method of arriving at truth. Thus they have
mistaken the real purpose of the Law-giver, and being themselves in the
wrong they have led others astray.
If it be alleged that the method that the Asharites and other
Mutakallimun have devised are not those general methods in the purpose
of the Law-giver for the instruction of the common people, and that it
is not possible without some method being adopted, then the question
arises: What are those methods which are given in the Law? We maintain
that these methods are to be found in the Quran alone. For, if we
look closely we shall find that in the Quran all the three kinds of
methods are laid down, for the whole of mankind, both for the majority
and for the learned few. If we reflect we shall come to see that no
better methods can be discovered for the instruction of the common
people than those mentioned in the Quran. Anyone who changes them by
interpretations which are neither clear in themselves nor clearer than
others to the common people, makes null and void their philosophy and
their effect, the goal of which is the happiness of mankind. This is
quite evident from the early and the later condition of Islam, for in
the early days Muslims sought perfect excellence and piety by acting
on those principles without putting any interpretation upon them. And
those among them who knew any interpretation did not disclose it. In
the later days interpretations were used, and piety decreased, the love
for others was lost, and they became divided into schisms and parties.
Hence one who cares to remove this innovation from the Law, should
turn to the Book, and should pick up from it the existing arguments
for things whose belief is inculcated upon us. Further he should
deeply think over the esoteric meanings, as far as possible, without
putting interpretations upon them, except when they are not quite
clear to all. The assertions of the Book for the instructions of the
people, when thought over are things, with whose help we can reach a
stage from which none but the learned in logic can differ about the
esoteric meaning of that which is not clear. This peculiarity cannot
be found in any other assertions but that of the Book. There are
three peculiarities in the assertions, which have been explained in
the Quran, for the common people. First, that nothing can be found
more convincing and true than these. Secondly, that they can be
accepted by every nature; and they are such that none can know their
interpretations, if there be any, except the learned in logic. Thirdly,
that they possess a call to the righteous, for correct interpretations.
This is neither to be found in the school of the Asharites nor in
that of the Mutazalites _i. e._ their interpretations are neither
generally acceptable, nor do they make any call to the righteous, nor
are they right in themselves. It is for this reason that innovation
has increased, and it is our desire to write about it, as far as it is
possible for us, provided that we get leisure for it, have power to do
it, and God gives us a respite in life. It is just possible that this
may be a beginning for the coming generation; because the breach of
Law, due to evil passions, and changed beliefs is simply aggrieving and
saddening. This is still enhanced by those, who ascribe themselves to
philosophy, because an injury from a friend is worse than the injury
from an enemy. Philosophy is a companion and a foster-sister to the
Law. Hence an injury from this source is the worst kind of injury,
even if we neglect the enmity, hatred, and animosity which is created
between the two, although they are companions by nature and friends
in reality. It has also been injured by many ignorant _friends_ who
ascribe themselves to it. These are the schisms which exist in Islam.
May God set all aright, help all to His love, and bring together their
hearts for piety, and erase enmity and hatred by his favour and grace.
Indeed God has removed much of evil, ignorance and the misleading
ways through this strong government, and has led the many to good,
especially the people who have walked in the path of scholasticism, and
have a liking for the knowledge of the Truth. Because it has called
the people to the knowledge of God by mediate paths, which are higher
than the depressions of the blind followers: and lower than that of the
high-sounding Mutakallimun; and has called the learned to their duty of
considering fully the principles of Law.