the constant interference with domestic life, arising from the great
number of female conversions. The Christian teacher was early noted for
his unrivalled skill in playing on the chords of a woman’s heart.(802) The
graphic title of “Earpicker of ladies,”(803) which was given to a
seductive pontiff of a somewhat later period, might have been applied to
many in the days of the persecution; and to the Roman, who regarded the
supreme authority of the head of the family, in all religious matters, as
the very foundation of domestic morality, no character could appear more
infamous or more revolting. “A wife,” said Plutarch, expressing the
deepest conviction of the Pagan world, “should have no friends but those
of her husband; and, as the gods are the first of friends, she should know
no gods but those whom her husband adores. Let her shut the door, then,
against idle religions and foreign superstitions. No god can take pleasure
in sacrifices offered by a wife without the knowledge of her
husband.”(804) But these principles, upon which the whole social system of
Paganism had rested, were now disregarded. Wives in multitudes deserted
their homes to frequent the nocturnal meetings(805) of a sect which was
looked upon with the deepest suspicion, and was placed under the ban of
the law. Again and again, the husband, as he laid his head on the pillow
by his wife, had the bitterness of thinking that all her sympathies were
withdrawn from him; that her affections belonged to an alien priesthood
and to a foreign creed; that, though she might discharge her duties with a
gentle and uncomplaining fidelity, he had for ever lost the power of
touching her heart—he was to her only as an outcast, as a brand prepared
for the burning. Even to a Christian mind there is a deep pathos in the
picture which St. Augustine has drawn of the broken-hearted husband
imploring the assistance of the gods, and receiving from the oracle the
bitter answer: “You may more easily write in enduring characters on the
wave, or fly with feathers through the air, than purge the mind of a woman
when once tainted by the superstition.”(806)
I have already noticed the prominence which the practice of exorcism had
acquired in the early Church, the contempt with which it was regarded by
the more philosophic Pagans, and the law which had been directed against
its professors. It is not, however, probable that this practice, though it
lowered the Christians in the eyes of the educated as much as it elevated
them in the eyes of the populace, had any appreciable influence in
provoking persecution. In the crowd of superstitions that were invading
the Roman Empire, exorcism had a prominent place; all such practices were
popular with the masses; the only form of magic which under the Empire was
seriously persecuted was political astrology or divination with a view to
discovering the successors to the throne, and of this the Christians were
never accused.(807) There was, however, another form of what was deemed
superstition connected with the Church, which was regarded by Pagan
philosophers with a much deeper feeling of aversion. To agitate the minds
of men with religious terrorism, to fill the unknown world with hideous
images of suffering, to govern the reason by alarming the imagination, was
in the eyes of the Pagan world one of the most heinous of crimes.(808)
These fears were to the ancients the very definition of superstition, and
their destruction was a main object both of the Epicurean and of the
Stoic. To men holding such sentiments, it is easy to perceive how
obnoxious must have appeared religious teachers who maintained that an
eternity of torture was reserved for the entire human race then existing
in the world, beyond the range of their own community, and who made the
assertion of this doctrine one of their main instruments of success.(809)
Enquiry, among the early theologians, was much less valued than
belief,(810) and reason was less appealed to than fear. In philosophy the
most comprehensive, but in theology the most intolerant, system is
naturally the strongest. To weak women, to the young, the ignorant, and
the timid, to all, in a word, who were doubtful of their own judgment, the
doctrine of exclusive salvation must have come with an appalling power;
and, as no other religion professed it, it supplied the Church with an
invaluable vantage-ground, and doubtless drove multitudes into its pale.
To this doctrine we may also, in a great degree, ascribe the agony of
terror that was so often displayed by the apostate, whose flesh shrank
from the present torture, but who was convinced that the weakness he could
not overcome would be expiated by an eternity of torment.(811) To the
indignation excited by such teaching was probably due a law of Marcus
Aurelius, which decreed that “if any one shall do anything whereby the
weak minds of any may be terrified by superstitious fear, the offender
shall be exiled into an island.”(812)
There can, indeed, be little doubt that a chief cause of the hostility
felt against the Christian Church was the intolerant aspect it at that
time displayed. The Romans were prepared to tolerate almost any form of
religion that would tolerate others. The Jews, though quite as obstinate
as the Christians in refusing to sacrifice to the emperor, were rarely
molested, except in the periods immediately following their insurrections,
because Judaism, however exclusive and unsocial, was still an unaggressive
national faith. But the Christian teachers taught that all religions,
except their own and that of the Jews, were constructed by devils, and
that all who dissented from their Church must be lost. It was impossible
that men strung to the very highest pitch of religious excitement, and
imagining they saw in every ceremony and oracle the direct working of a
present dæmon, could restrain their zeal, or respect in any degree the
feelings of others. Proselytising with an untiring energy, pouring a
fierce stream of invective and ridicule upon the gods on whose favour the
multitude believed all national prosperity to depend, not unfrequently
insulting the worshippers, and defacing the idols,(813) they soon stung
the Pagan devotees to madness, and convinced them that every calamity that
fell upon the empire was the righteous vengeance of the gods. Nor was the
sceptical politician more likely to regard with favour a religion whose
development was plainly incompatible with the whole religious policy of
the Empire. The new Church, as it was then organised, must have appeared
to him essentially, fundamentally, necessarily intolerant. To permit it to
triumph was to permit the extinction of religious liberty in an empire
which comprised all the leading nations of the world, and tolerated all
their creeds. It was indeed true that in the days of their distress the
apologists proclaimed, in high and eloquent language, the iniquity of
persecution, and the priceless value of a free worship; but it needed no
great sagacity to perceive that the language of the dominant Church would
be very different. The Pagan philosopher could not foresee the ghastly
histories of the Inquisition, of the Albigenses, or of St. Bartholomew;
but he could scarcely doubt that the Christians, when in the ascendant,
would never tolerate rites which they believed to be consecrated to
devils, or restrain, in the season of their power, a religious animosity
which they scarcely bridled when they were weak. It needed no prophetic
inspiration to anticipate the time, that so speedily arrived, when, amid
the wailings of the worshippers, the idols and the temples were shattered,
and when all who practised the religious ceremonies of their forefathers
were subject to the penalty of death.
There has probably never existed upon earth a community whose members were
bound to one another by a deeper or a purer affection than the Christians,
in the days of the persecution. There has probably never existed a
community which exhibited in its dealings with crime a gentler or more
judicious kindness, which combined more happily an unflinching opposition
to sin with a boundless charity to the sinner, and which was in
consequence more successful in reclaiming and transforming the most
vicious of mankind. There has, however, also never existed a community
which displayed more clearly the intolerance that would necessarily follow
its triumph. Very early tradition has related three anecdotes of the
apostle John which illustrate faithfully this triple aspect of the Church.
It is said that when the assemblies of the Christians thronged around him
to hear some exhortation from his lips, the only words he would utter
were, “My little children, love one another;” for in this, he said, is
comprised the entire law. It is said that a young man he had once confided
to the charge of a bishop, having fallen into the ways of vice, and become
the captain of a band of robbers, the apostle, on hearing of it, bitterly
reproached the negligence of the pastor, and, though in extreme old age,
betook himself to the mountains till he had been captured by the robbers,
when, falling with tears on the neck of the chief, he restored him to the
path of virtue. It is said that the same apostle, once seeing the heretic
Cerinthus in an establishment of baths into which he had entered,
immediately rushed forth, fearing lest the roof should fall because a
heretic was beneath it.(814) All that fierce hatred which during the Arian
and Donatist controversies convulsed the Empire, and which in later times
has deluged the world with blood, may be traced in the Church long before
the conversion of Constantine. Already, in the second century, it was the
rule that the orthodox Christian should hold no conversation, should
interchange none of the most ordinary courtesies of life, with the
excommunicated or the heretic.(815) Common sufferings were impotent to
assuage the animosity, and the purest and fondest relations of life were
polluted by the new intolerance. The Decian persecution had scarcely
closed, when St. Cyprian wrote his treatise to maintain that it is no more
possible to be saved beyond the limits of the Church, than it was during
the deluge beyond the limits of the ark; that martyrdom itself has no
power to efface the guilt of schism; and that the heretic, who for his
master’s cause expired in tortures upon the earth, passed at once, by that
master’s decree, into an eternity of torment in hell!(816) Even in the
arena the Catholic martyrs withdrew from the Montanists, lest they should
be mingled with the heretics in death.(817) At a later period St.
Augustine relates that, when he was a Manichean, his mother for a time
refused even to eat at the same table with her erring child.(818) When St.
Ambrose not only defended the act of a Christian bishop, who had burnt
down a synagogue of the Jews, but denounced as a deadly crime the decree
of the Government which ordered it to be rebuilt;(819) when the same
saint, in advocating the plunder of the vestal virgins, maintained the
doctrine that it is criminal for a Christian State to grant any endowment
to the ministers of any religion but his own,(820) which it has needed all
the efforts of modern liberalism to efface from legislation, he was but
following in the traces of those earlier Christians, who would not even
wear a laurel crown,(821) or join in the most innocent civic festival,
lest they should appear in some indirect way to be acquiescing in the
Pagan worship. While the apologists were maintaining against the Pagan
persecutors the duty of tolerance, the Sibylline books, which were the
popular literature of the Christians, were filled with passionate
anticipations of the violent destruction of the Pagan temples.(822) And no
sooner had Christianity mounted the throne than the policy they
foreshadowed became ascendant. The indifference or worldly sagacity of
some of the rulers, and the imposing number of the Pagans, delayed, no
doubt, the final consummation; but, from the time of Constantine,
restrictive laws were put in force, the influence of the ecclesiastics was
ceaselessly exerted in their favour, and no sagacious man could fail to
anticipate the speedy and absolute proscription of the Pagan worship. It
is related of the philosopher Antoninus, the son of the Pagan prophetess
Sospitra, that, standing one day with his disciples before that noble
temple of Serapis, at Alexandria, which was one of the wonders of ancient
art, and which was destined soon after to perish by the rude hands of the
Christian monks, the prophetic spirit of his mother fell upon him. Like
another prophet before another shrine, he appalled his hearers by the
prediction of the approaching ruin. The time would come, he said, when the
glorious edifice before them would be overthrown, the carved images would
be defaced, the temples of the gods would be turned into the sepulchres of
the dead, and a great darkness would fall upon mankind!(823)
And, besides the liberty of worship, the liberty of thought and of
expression, which was the supreme attainment of Roman civilisation, was in
peril. The new religion, unlike that which was disappearing, claimed to
dictate the opinions as well as the actions of men, and its teachers
stigmatised as an atrocious crime the free expression of every opinion on
religious matters diverging from their own. Of all the forms of liberty,
it was this which lasted the longest, and was the most dearly prized. Even
after Constantine, the Pagans Libanius, Themistius, Symmachus, and Sallust
enforced their views with a freedom that contrasts remarkably with the
restraints imposed upon their worship, and the beautiful friendships of
St. Basil and Libanius, of Synesius and Hypatia, are among the most
touching episodes of their time. But though the traditions of Pagan
freedom, and the true catholicism of Justin Martyr and Origen, lingered
long, it was inevitable that error, being deemed criminal, should be made
penal. The dogmatism of Athanasius and Augustine, the increasing power of
the clergy, and the fanaticism of the monks, hastened the end. The
suppression of all religions but one by Theodosius, the murder of Hypatia
at Alexandria by the monks of Cyril, and the closing by Justinian of the
schools of Athens, are the three events which mark the decisive overthrow
of intellectual freedom. A thousand years had rolled away before that
freedom was in part restored.
The considerations I have briefly enumerated should not in the smallest
degree detract from the admiration due to the surpassing courage, to the
pure, touching, and sacred virtues of the Christian martyrs; but they in
some degree palliate the conduct of the persecutors, among whom must be
included one emperor, who was probably, on the whole, the best and most
humane sovereign who has ever sat upon a throne, and at least two others,
who were considerably above the average of virtue. When, combined with the
indifference to human suffering, the thirst for blood, which the
spectacles of the amphitheatre had engendered, they assuredly make the
persecutions abundantly explicable. They show that if it can be proved
that Christian persecutions sprang from the doctrine of exclusive
salvation, the fact that the Roman Pagans, who did not hold that doctrine,
also persecuted, need not cause the slightest perplexity. That the
persecutions of Christianity by the Roman emperors, severe as they
undoubtedly were, were not of such a continuous nature as wholly to
counteract the vast moral, social, and intellectual agencies that were
favourable to its spread, a few dates will show.
We have seen that when the Egyptian rites were introduced into Rome, they
were met by prompt and energetic measures of repression; that these
measures were again and again repeated, but that at last, when they proved
ineffectual, the governors desisted from their opposition, and the new
worship assumed a recognised place. The history of Christianity, in its
relation to the Government, is the reverse of this. Its first introduction
into Rome appears to have been altogether unopposed. Tertullian asserts
that Tiberius, on the ground of a report from Pontius Pilate, desired to
enrol Christ among the Roman gods, but that the Senate rejected the
proposal; but this assertion, which is altogether unsupported by
trustworthy evidence, and is, intrinsically, extremely improbable, is now
generally recognised as false.(824) An isolated passage of Suetonius
states that in the time of Claudius “the Jews, being continually rioting,
at the instigation of a certain Chrestus,”(825) were expelled from the
city; but no Christian writer speaks of his co-religionists being
disturbed in this reign, while all, with a perfect unanimity, and with
great emphasis, describe Nero as the first persecutor. His persecution
began at the close of A.D. 64.(826) It was directed against Christians,
not ostensibly on the ground of their religion, but because they were
falsely accused of having set fire to Rome, and it is very doubtful
whether it extended beyond the city.(827) It had also this peculiarity,
that, being directed against the Christians not as Christians, but as
incendiaries, it was impossible to escape from it by apostasy. Within the
walls of Rome it raged with great fury. The Christians, who had been for
many years(828) proselytising without restraint in the great confluence of
nations, and amid the disintegration of old beliefs, had become a
formidable body. They were, we learn from Tacitus, profoundly unpopular;
but the hideous tortures to which Nero subjected them, and the conviction
that, whatever other crimes they might have committed, they were not
guilty of setting fire to the city, awoke general pity. Some of them, clad
in skins of wild beasts, were torn by dogs. Others, arrayed in shirts of
pitch, were burnt alive in Nero’s garden.(829) Others were affixed to
crosses. Great multitudes perished. The deep impression the persecution
made on the Christian mind is shown in the whole literature of the Sibyls,
which arose soon after, in which Nero is usually the central figure, and
by the belief, that lingered for centuries, that the tyrant was yet alive,
and would return once more as the immediate precursor of Antichrist, to
inflict the last great persecution upon the Church.(830)
Nero died A.D. 68. From that time, for at least twenty-seven years, the
Church enjoyed absolute repose. There is no credible evidence whatever of
the smallest interference with its freedom till the last year of the reign
of Domitian; and a striking illustration of the fearlessness with which it
exhibited itself to the world has been lately furnished in the discovery,
near Rome, of a large and handsome porch leading to a Christian catacomb,
built above ground between the reigns of Nero and Domitian, in the
immediate neighbourhood of one of the principal highways.(831) The long
reign of Domitian, though it may have been surpassed in ferocity, was
never surpassed in the Roman annals in the skilfulness and the persistence
of its tyranny. The Stoics and literary classes, who upheld the traditions
of political freedom, and who had already suffered much at the hands of
Vespasian, were persecuted with relentless animosity. Metius Modestus,
Arulenus Rusticus, Senecio, Helvidius, Dion Chrysostom, the younger
Priscus, Junius Mauricus, Artemidorus, Euphrates, Epictetus, Arria,
Fannia, and Gratilla were either killed or banished.(832) No measures,
however, appear to have been taken against the Christians till A.D. 95,
when a short and apparently not very severe persecution, concerning which
our information is both scanty and conflicting, was directed against them.
Of the special cause that produced it we are left in much doubt. Eusebius
mentions, on the not very trustworthy authority of Hegesippus, that the
emperor, having heard of the existence of the grandchildren of Judas, the
brother of Christ, ordered them to be brought before him, as being of the
family of David, and therefore possible pretenders to the throne; but on
finding that they were simple peasants, and that the promised kingdom of
which they spoke was a spiritual one, he dismissed them in peace, and
arrested the persecution he had begun.(833) A Pagan historian states that,
the finances of the Empire being exhausted by lavish expenditure in public
games, Domitian, in order to replenish his exchequer, resorted to a severe
and special taxation of the Jews; that some of these, in order to evade
the impost, concealed their worship, while others, who are supposed to
have been Christians, are described as following the Jewish rites without
being professed Jews.(834) Perhaps, however, the simplest explanation is
the truest, and the persecution may be ascribed to the antipathy which a
despot like Domitian must necessarily have felt to an institution which,
though it did not, like Stoicism, resist his policy, at least exercised a
vast influence altogether removed from his control. St. John, who was then
a very old man, is said to have been at this time exiled to Patmos.
Flavius Clemens, a consul, and a relative of the emperor, was put to
death. His wife, or, according to another account, his niece Domitilla,
was banished, according to one account, to the island of Pontia, according
to another, to the island of Pandataria, and many others were compelled to
accompany her into exile.(835) Numbers, we are told, “accused of
conversion to impiety or Jewish rites,” were condemned. Some were killed,
and others deprived of their offices.(836) Of the cessation of the
persecution there are two different versions. Tertullian(837) and
Eusebius(838) say that the tyrant speedily revoked his edict, and restored
those who had been banished; but according to Lactantius these measures
were not taken till after the death of Domitian,(839) and this latter
statement is corroborated by the assertion of Dion Cassius, that Nerva,
upon his accession, “absolved those who were accused of impiety, and
recalled the exiles.”(840)
When we consider the very short time during which this persecution lasted,
and the very slight notice that was taken of it, we may fairly, I think,
conclude that it was not of a nature to check in any appreciable degree a
strong religious movement like that of Christianity. The assassination of
Domitian introduces us to the golden age of the Roman Empire. In the eyes
of the Pagan historian, the period from the accession of Nerva, in A.D.
96, to the death of Marcus Aurelius, in A.D. 180, is memorable as a period
of uniform good government, of rapidly advancing humanity, of great
legislative reforms, and of a peace which was very rarely seriously
broken. To the Christian historian it is still more remarkable, as one of
the most critical periods in the history of his faith. The Church entered
into it considerable indeed, as a sect, but not large enough to be
reckoned an important power in the Empire. It emerged from it so increased
in its numbers, and so extended in its ramifications, that it might fairly
defy the most formidable assaults. It remains, therefore, to be seen
whether the opposition against which, during these eighty-four years, it
had so successfully struggled was of such a kind and intensity that the
triumph must be regarded as a miracle.
Nearly at the close of this period, during the persecution of Marcus
Aurelius, St. Melito, Bishop of Sardis, wrote a letter of expostulation to
the emperor, in which he explicitly asserts that in Asia the persecution
of the pious was an event which “had never before occurred,” and was the
result of “new and strange decrees;” that the ancestors of the emperor
were accustomed to honour the Christian faith “like other religions;” and
that “Nero and Domitian alone” had been hostile to it.(841) Rather more
than twenty years later, Tertullian asserted, in language equally distinct
and emphatic, that the two persecutors of the Christians were Nero and
Domitian, and that it would be impossible to name a single good sovereign
who had molested them. Marcus Aurelius himself, Tertullian refuses to
number among the persecutors, and, even relying upon a letter which was
falsely imputed to him, enrols him among the protectors of the
Church.(842) About a century later, Lactantius, reviewing the history of
the persecutions, declared that the good sovereigns who followed Domitian
abstained from persecuting, and passes at once from the persecution of
Domitian to that of Decius. Having noticed the measures of the former
emperor, he proceeds: “The acts of the tyrant being revoked, the Church
was not only restored to its former state, but shone forth with a greater
splendour and luxuriance; and a period following in which many good
sovereigns wielded the Imperial sceptre, it suffered no assaults from its
enemies, but stretched out its hands to the east and to the west; ... but
at last the long peace was broken. After many years, that hateful monster
Decius arose, who troubled the Church.”(843)
We have here three separate passages, from which we may conclusively infer
that the normal and habitual condition of the Christians during the
eighty-four years we are considering, and, if we accept the last two
passages, during a much longer period, was a condition of peace, but that
peace was not absolutely unbroken. The Christian Church, which was at
first regarded simply as a branch of Judaism, had begun to be recognised
as a separate body, and the Roman law professedly tolerated only those
religions which were expressly authorised. It is indeed true that with the
extension of the Empire, and especially of the city, the theory, or at
least the practice, of religious legislation had been profoundly modified.
First of all, certain religions, of which the Jewish was one, were
officially recognised, and then many others, without being expressly
authorised, were tolerated. In this manner, all attempts to resist the
torrent of Oriental superstitions proving vain, the legislator had
desisted from his efforts, and every form of wild superstition was
practised with publicity and impunity. Still the laws forbidding them were
unrevoked, although they were suffered to remain for the most part
obsolete, or were at least only put in action on the occasion of some
special scandal, or of some real or apprehended political danger. The
municipal and provincial independence under the Empire was, however, so
large, that very much depended on the character of the local governor; and
it continually happened that in one province the Christians were
unmolested or favoured, while in the adjoining province they were severely
persecuted.
As we have already seen, the Christians had for many reasons become
profoundly obnoxious to the people. They shared the unpopularity of the
Jews, with whom they were confounded, while the general credence given to
the calumnies about the crimes said to have been perpetrated at their
secret meetings, their abstinence from public amusements, and the belief
that their hostility to the gods was the cause of every physical calamity,
were special causes of antipathy. The history of the period of the
Antonines continually manifests the desire of the populace to persecute,
restrained by the humanity of the rulers. In the short reign of Nerva
there appears to have been no persecution, and our knowledge of the
official proceedings with reference to the religion is comprised in two
sentences of a Pagan historian, who tells us that the emperor “absolved
those who had been convicted of impiety,” and “permitted no one to be
convicted of impiety or Jewish rites.” Under Trajan, however, some serious
though purely local disturbances took place. The emperor himself, though
one of the most sagacious, and in most respects humane of Roman
sovereigns, was nervously jealous of any societies or associations among
his subjects, and had propounded a special edict against them; but the
persecution of the Christians appears to have been not so much political
as popular. If we may believe Eusebius, local persecutions, apparently of
the nature of riots, but sometimes countenanced by provincial governors,
broke out in several quarters of the Empire. In Bithynia, Pliny the
Younger was the governor, and he wrote a very famous letter to Trajan, in
which he professed himself absolutely ignorant of the proceedings to be
taken against the Christians, who had already so multiplied that the
temples were deserted, and who were arraigned in great numbers before his
tribunal. He had, he says, released those who consented to burn incense
before the image of the emperor, and to curse Christ, but had caused those
to be executed who persisted in their refusal, and who were not Roman
citizens, “not doubting that a pertinacious obstinacy deserved
punishment.” He had questioned the prisoners as to the nature of their
faith, and had not hesitated to seek revelations by torturing two
maid-servants, but had “discovered nothing but a base and immoderate
superstition.” He had asked the nature of their secret services, and had
been told that they assembled on a certain day before dawn to sing a hymn
to Christ as to a god; that they made a vow to abstain from every crime,
and that they then, before parting, partook together of a harmless feast,
which, however, they had given up since the decree against associations.
To this letter Trajan answered that Christians, if brought before the
tribunals and convicted, should be punished, but that they should not be
sought for; that, if they consented to sacrifice, no inquisition should be
made into their past lives, and that no anonymous accusations should be
received against them.(844) In this reign there are two authentic
instances of martyrdom.(845) Simeon, Bishop of Jerusalem, a man, it is
said, one hundred and twenty years old, having been accused by the
heretics, was tortured during several days, and at last crucified.
Ignatius, the Bishop of Antioch, was arrested, brought to Rome, and, by
the order of Trajan himself, thrown to wild beasts. Of the cause of this
last act of severity we are left in ignorance, but it has been noticed
that about this time Antioch had been the scene of one of those violent
earthquakes which so frequently produced an outburst of religious
excitement,(846) and the character of Ignatius, who was passionately
desirous of martyrdom, may have very probably led him to some act of
exceptional zeal. The letters of the martyr prove that at Rome the faith
was openly and fearlessly professed; the Government during the nineteen
years of this reign never appears to have taken any initiative against the
Christians, and, in spite of occasional local tumults, there was nothing
resembling a general persecution.
During the two following reigns, the Government was more decidedly
favourable to the Christians. Hadrian, having heard that the populace at
the public games frequently called for their execution, issued an edict in
which he commanded that none should be punished simply in obedience to the
outcries against them, or without a formal trial and a conviction of some
offence against the law, and he ordered that all false accusers should be
punished.(847) His disposition towards the Christians was so pacific as to
give rise to a legend that he intended to enrol Christ among the
gods;(848) but it is probable that, although curious on religious matters,
he regarded Christianity with the indifference of a Roman freethinker; and
a letter is ascribed to him in which he confounded it with the worship of
Serapis.(849) As far as the Government were concerned, the Christians
appear to have been entirely unmolested; but many of them suffered
dreadful tortures at the hands of the Jewish insurgents, who in this
reign, with a desperate but ill-fated heroism, made one last effort to
regain their freedom.(850) The mutual hostility exhibited at this time by
the Jews and Christians contributed to separate them in the eyes of the
Pagans, and it is said that when Hadrian forbade the Jews ever again to
enter Jerusalem, he recognised the distinction by granting a full
permission to the Christians.(851)
Antoninus, who succeeded Hadrian, made new efforts to restrain the
passions of the people against the Christians. He issued an edict
commanding that they should not be molested, and when, as a consequence of
some earthquakes in Asia Minor, the popular anger was fiercely roused, he
commanded that their accusers should be punished.(852) If we except these
riots, the twenty-three years of his reign appear to have been years of
absolute peace, which seems also to have continued during several years of
the reign of Marcus Aurelius; but at last persecuting edicts, of the exact
nature of which we have no knowledge, were issued. Of the reasons which
induced one of the best men who have ever reigned to persecute the
Christians, we know little or nothing. That it was not any ferocity of
disposition or any impatience of resistance may be confidently asserted of
one whose only fault was a somewhat excessive gentleness—who, on the death
of his wife, asked the Senate, as a single favour, to console him by
sparing the lives of those who had rebelled against him. That it was not,
as has been strangely urged, a religious fanaticism resembling that which
led St. Lewis to persecute, is equally plain. St. Lewis persecuted because
he believed that to reject his religious opinions was a heinous crime, and
that heresy was the path to hell. Marcus Aurelius had no such belief, and
he, the first Roman emperor who made the Stoical philosophy his religion
and his comfort, was also the first emperor who endowed the professors of
the philosophies that were most hostile to his own. The fact that the
Christian Church, existing as a State within a State, with government,
ideals, enthusiasms, and hopes wholly different from those of the nation,
was incompatible with the existing system of the Empire, had become more
evident as the Church increased. The accusations of cannibalism and
incestuous impurity had acquired a greater consistency, and the latter are
said to have been justly applicable to the Carpocratian heretics, who had
recently arisen. The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius may have revolted from
the practices of exorcism or the appeals to the terrors of another world,
and the philosophers who surrounded him probably stimulated his hostility,
for his master and friend Fronto had written a book against
Christianity,(853) while Justin Martyr is said to have perished by the
machinations of the Cynic Crescens.(854) It must be added, too, that,
while it is impossible to acquit the emperor of having issued severe
edicts against the Christians,(855) the atrocious details of the
persecutions in his reign were due to the ferocity of the populace and the
weakness of the governors in distant provinces; and it is inconceivable
that, if he had been a very bitter enemy of the Christians, Tertullian,
writing little more than twenty years later, should have been so ignorant
of the fact as to represent him as one of the most conspicuous of their
protectors.
But, whatever may be thought on these points, there can, unhappily, be no
question that in this reign Rome was stained by the blood of Justin
Martyr, the first philosopher, and one of the purest and gentlest natures
in the Church, and that persecution was widely extended. In two far
distant quarters, at Smyrna and at Lyons, it far exceeded in atrocity any
that Christianity had endured since Nero, and in each case a heroism of
the most transcendent order was displayed by the martyrs. The persecution
at Smyrna, in which St. Polycarp and many others most nobly died, took
place on the occasion of the public games, and we may trace the influence
of the Jews in stimulating it.(856) The persecution at Lyons, which was
one of the most atrocious in the whole compass of ecclesiastical history,
and which has supplied the martyrology with some of its grandest and most
pathetic figures, derived its worst features from a combination of the
fury of the populace and of the subserviency of the governor.(857) Certain
servants of the Christians, terrified by the prospect of torture, accused
their masters of all the crimes which popular report attributed to them,
of incest, of infanticide, of cannibalism, of hideous impurity. A fearful
outburst of ferocity ensued. Tortures almost too horrible to recount were
for hours and even days applied to the bodies of old men and of weak
women, who displayed amid their agonies a nobler courage than has ever
shone upon a battle-field, and whose memories are immortal among mankind.
Blandina and Pothinus wrote in blood the first page of the glorious
history of the Church of France.(858) But although, during the closing
years of Marcus Aurelius, severe persecutions took place in three or four
provinces, there was no general and organised effort to suppress
Christianity throughout the Empire.(859)
We may next consider, as a single period, the space of time that elapsed
from the death of Marcus Aurelius, in A.D. 180, to the accession of
Decius, A.D. 249. During all this time Christianity was a great and
powerful body, exercising an important influence, and during a great part
of it Christians filled high civil and military positions. The hostility
manifested towards them began now to assume a more political complexion
than it had previously done, except perhaps in the later years of Marcus
Aurelius. The existence of a vast and rapidly increasing corporation, very
alien to the system of the Empire, confronted every ruler. Emperors like
Commodus or Heliogabalus were usually too immersed in selfish pleasures to
have any distinct policy; but sagacious sovereigns, sincerely desiring the
well-being of the Empire, either, like Marcus Aurelius and Diocletian,
endeavoured to repress the rising creed, or, like Alexander Severus, and
at last Constantine, actively encouraged it. The measures Marcus Aurelius
had taken against Christianity were arrested under Commodus, whose
favourite mistress, Marcia, supplies one of the very few recorded
instances of female influence, which has been the cause of so much
persecution, being exerted in behalf of toleration;(860) yet a Christian
philosopher named Apollonius, and at the same time, by a curious
retribution, his accuser, were in this reign executed at Rome.(861) During
the sixty-nine years we are considering, the general peace of the Church
was only twice broken. The first occasion was in the reign of Septimus
Severus, who was for some time very favourable to the Christians, but who,
in A.D. 202 or 203, issued an edict, forbidding any Pagan to join the
Christian or Jewish faith;(862) and this edict was followed by a
sanguinary persecution in Africa and Syria, in which the father of Origen,
and also St. Felicitas and St. Perpetua, perished. This persecution does
not appear to have extended to the West, and was apparently rather the
work of provincial governors, who interpreted the Imperial edict as a sign
of hostility to the Christians, than the direct act of the emperor,(863)
whose decree applied only to Christians actively proselytising. It is
worthy of notice that Origen observed that previous to this time the
number of Christian martyrs had been very small.(864) The second
persecution was occasioned by the murder of Alexander Severus by
Maximinus. The usurper pursued with great bitterness the leading courtiers
of the deceased emperor, among whom were some Christian bishops,(865) and
about the same time severe earthquakes in Pontus and Cappadocia produced
the customary popular ebullitions. But with these exceptions the
Christians were undisturbed. Caracalla, Macrinus, and Heliogabalus took no
measures against them, while Alexander Severus, who reigned for thirteen
years, warmly and steadily supported them. A Pagan historian assures us
that this emperor intended to build temples in honour of Christ, but was
dissuaded by the priests, who urged that all the other temples would be
deserted. He venerated in his private oratory the statues of Apollonius of
Tyana, Abraham, Orpheus, and Christ. He decreed that the provincial
governors should not be appointed till the people had the opportunity of
declaring any crime they had committed, borrowing this rule avowedly from
the procedure of the Jews and Christians in electing their clergy; he
ordered the precept “Do not unto others what you would not that they
should do unto you” to be engraven on the palace and other public
buildings, and he decided a dispute concerning a piece of ground which the
Christians had occupied, and which the owners of certain eating-houses
claimed, in favour of the former, on the ground that the worship of a god
should be most considered.(866) Philip the Arab, who reigned during the
last five years of the period we are considering, was so favourable to the
Christians that he was believed, though on no trustworthy evidence, to
have been baptised.
We have now reviewed the history of the persecutions to the year A.D. 249,
or about two hundred years after the planting of Christianity in Rome. We
have seen that, although during that period much suffering was
occasionally endured, and much heroism displayed, by the Christians, there
was, with the very doubtful exception of the Neronian persecution, no
single attempt made to suppress Christianity throughout the Empire. Local
persecutions of great severity had taken place at Smyrna and Lyons, under
Marcus Aurelius; in Africa and some Asiatic provinces, under Severus;
popular tumults, arising in the excitement of the public games, or
produced by some earthquake or inundation, or by some calumnious
accusation, were not unfrequent; but there was at no time that continuous,
organised, and universal persecution by which, in later periods,
ecclesiastical tribunals have again and again suppressed opinions
repugnant to their own; and there was no part of the Empire in which whole
generations did not pass away absolutely undisturbed. No martyr had fallen
in Gaul or in great part of Asia Minor till Marcus Aurelius. In Italy,
after the death of Nero, with the exception of some slight troubles under
Domitian and Maximinus, probably due to causes altogether distinct from
religion, there were, during the whole period we are considering, only a
few isolated instances of martyrdom. The bishops, as the leaders of the
Church, were the special objects of hostility, and several in different
parts of the world had fallen; but it is extremely questionable whether
any Roman bishop perished after the apostolic age, till Fabianus was
martyred under Decius.(867) If Christianity was not formally authorised,
it was, like many other religions in a similar position, generally
acquiesced in, and, during a great part of the time we have reviewed, its
professors appear to have found no obstacles to their preferment in the
Court or in the army. The emperors were for the most part indifferent or
favourable to them. The priests in the Pagan society had but little
influence, and do not appear to have taken any prominent part in the
persecution till near the time of Diocletian. With the single exception of
the Jews, no class held that doctrine of the criminality of error which
has been the parent of most modern persecutions; and although the belief
that great calamities were the result of neglecting or insulting the gods
furnished the Pagans with a religious motive for persecution, this motive
only acted on the occasion of some rare and exceptional catastrophe.(868)
In Christian times, the first objects of the persecutor are to control
education, to prevent the publication of any heterodox works, to institute
such a minute police inspection as to render impossible the celebration of
the worship he desires to suppress. But nothing of this kind was
attempted, or indeed was possible, in the period we are considering. With
the exception of the body-guard of the emperor, almost the whole army,
which was of extremely moderate dimensions, was massed along the vast
frontier of the Empire. The police force was of the scantiest kind,
sufficient only to keep common order in the streets. The Government had
done something to encourage, but absolutely nothing to control, education,
and parents or societies were at perfect liberty to educate the young as
they pleased. The expansion of literature, by reason of the facilities
which slavery gave to transcription, was very great, and it was for the
most part entirely uncontrolled.(869) Augustus, it is true, had caused
some volumes of forged prophecies to be burnt,(870) and, under the tyranny
of Tiberius and Domitian, political writers and historians who eulogised
tyrannicide, or vehemently opposed the Empire, were persecuted; but the
extreme indignation these acts elicited attests their rarity, and, on
matters unconnected with politics, the liberty of literature was
absolute.(871) In a word, the Church proselytised in a society in which
toleration was the rule, and at a time when municipal, provincial, and
personal independence had reached the highest point, when the ruling
classes were for the most part absolutely indifferent to religious
opinions, and when an unprecedented concourse of influences facilitated
its progress.
When we reflect that these were the circumstances of the Church till the
middle of the third century, we may readily perceive the absurdity of
maintaining that Christianity was propagated in the face of such a fierce
and continuous persecution that no opinions could have survived it without
a miracle, or of arguing from the history of the early Church that
persecution never has any real efficacy in suppressing truth. When, in
addition to the circumstances under which it operated, we consider the
unexampled means both of attraction and of intimidation that were
possessed by the Church, we can have no difficulty in understanding that
it should have acquired a magnitude that would enable it to defy the far
more serious assaults it was still destined to endure. That it had
acquired this extension we have abundant evidence. The language I have
quoted from Lactantius is but a feeble echo of the emphatic statements of
writers before the Decian persecution.(872) “There is no race of men,
whether Greek or barbarian,” said Justin Martyr, “among whom prayers and
thanks are not offered up in the name of the crucified.”(873) “We are but
of yesterday,” cried Tertullian, “and we fill all your cities, islands,
forts, councils, even the camps themselves, the tribes, the decuries, the
palaces, the senate, and the forum.”(874) Eusebius has preserved a letter
of Cornelius, Bishop of Rome, containing a catalogue of the officers of
his Church at the time of the Decian persecution. It consisted of one
bishop, forty-six presbyters, seven deacons, seven subdeacons, forty-two
acolytes, fifty-two exorcists, readers, and janitors. The Church also
supported more than fifteen hundred widows, and poor or suffering
persons.(875)
The Decian persecution, which broke out in A.D. 249, and was probably
begun in hopes of restoring the Empire to its ancient discipline, and
eliminating from it all extraneous and unpatriotic influences,(876) is the
first example of a deliberate attempt, supported by the whole machinery of
provincial government, and extending over the entire surface of the
Empire, to extirpate Christianity from the world. It would be difficult to
find language too strong to paint its horrors. The ferocious instincts of
the populace, that were long repressed, burst out anew, and they were not
only permitted, but encouraged by the rulers. Far worse than the deaths
which menaced those who shrank from the idolatrous sacrifices, were the
hideous and prolonged tortures by which the magistrates often sought to
subdue the constancy of the martyr, the nameless outrages that were
sometimes inflicted on the Christian virgin.(877) The Church, enervated by
a long peace, and deeply infected with the vices of the age, tottered
beneath the blow. It had long since arrived at the period when men were
Christians not by conviction, but through family relationship; when the
more opulent Christians vied in luxury with the Pagans among whom they
mixed, and when even the bishops were, in many instances, worldly
aspirants after civil offices. It is not, therefore, surprising that the
defection was very large. The Pagans marked with triumphant ridicule, and
the Fathers with a burning indignation, the thousands who thronged to the
altars at the very commencement of persecution, the sudden collapse of the
most illustrious churches, the eagerness with which the offer of
provincial governors to furnish certificates of apostasy, without exacting
a compliance with the conditions which those certificates attested, was
accepted by multitudes.(878) The question whether those who abandoned the
faith should afterwards be readmitted to communion, became the chief
question that divided the Novatians, and one of the questions that divided
the Montanists from the Catholics, while the pretensions of the confessors
to furnish indulgences, remitting the penances imposed by the bishops, led
to a conflict which contributed very largely to establish the undisputed
ascendancy of the episcopacy. But the Decian persecution, though it
exhibits the Church in a somewhat less noble attitude than the
persecutions which preceded and which followed it, was adorned by many
examples of extreme courage and devotion, displayed in not a few cases by
those who were physically among the frailest of mankind. It was of a kind
eminently fitted to crush the Church. Had it taken place at an earlier
period, had it been continued for a long succession of years,
Christianity, without a miracle, must have perished. But the Decian
persecution fell upon a Church which had existed for two centuries, and it
lasted less than two years.(879) Its intensity varied much in different
provinces. In Alexandria and the neighbouring towns, where a popular
tumult had anticipated the menaces of the Government, it was extremely
horrible.(880) In Carthage, at first, the proconsul being absent, no
capital sentence was passed, but on the arrival of that functionary the
penalty of death, accompanied by dreadful tortures, was substituted for
that of exile or imprisonment.(881) The rage of the people was especially
directed against the bishop St. Cyprian, who prudently retired till the
storm had passed.(882) In general, it was observed that the object of the
rulers was much less to slay than to vanquish the Christians. Horrible
tortures were continually employed to extort an apostasy, and, when those
tortures proved vain, great numbers were ultimately released.
The Decian persecution is remarkable in Christian archæology as being, it
is believed, the first occasion in which the Christian catacombs were
violated. Those vast subterranean corridors, lined with tombs and
expanding very frequently into small chapels adorned with paintings, often
of no mean beauty, had for a long period been an inviolable asylum in
seasons of persecution. The extreme sanctity which the Romans were
accustomed to attach to the place of burial repelled the profane, and as
early, it is said, as the very beginning of the third century, the
catacombs were recognised as legal possessions of the Church.(883) The
Roman legislators, however unfavourable to the formation of guilds or
associations, made an exception in favour of burial societies, or
associations of men subscribing a certain sum to ensure to each member a
decent burial in ground which belonged to the corporation. The Church is
believed to have availed itself of this privilege, and to have attained,
in this capacity, a legal existence. The tombs, which were originally the
properties of distinct families, became in this manner an ecclesiastical
domain, and the catacombs were, from perhaps the first, made something
more than places of burial.(884) The chapels with which they abound, and
which are of the smallest dimensions and utterly unfit for general
worship, were probably mortuary chapels, and may have also been employed
in the services commemorating the martyrs, while the ordinary worship was
probably at first conducted in the private houses of the Christians. The
decision of Alexander Severus, which I have already noticed, is the
earliest notice we possess of the existence of buildings specially devoted
to the Christian services; but we cannot tell how long before this time
they may have existed in Rome.(885) In serious persecution, however, they
would doubtless have to be abandoned; and, as a last resort, the catacombs
proved a refuge from the persecutors.
The reign of Decius only lasted about two years, and before its close the
persecution had almost ceased.(886) On the accession of his son Gallus, in
the last month of A.D. 251, there was for a short time perfect peace; but
Gallus resumed the persecution in the spring of the following year, and
although apparently not very severe, or very general, it seems to have
continued to his death, which took place a year after.(887) Two Roman
bishops, Cornelius, who had succeeded the martyred Fabianus, and his
successor Lucius, were at this time put to death.(888) Valerian, who
ascended the throne A.D. 254, at first not only tolerated, but warmly
patronised the Christians, and attracted so many to his Court that his
house, in the language of a contemporary, appeared “the Church of the
Lord.”(889) But after rather more than four years his disposition changed.
At the persuasion, it is said, of an Egyptian magician, named Macrianus,
he signed in A.D. 258 an edict of persecution condemning Christian
ecclesiastics and senators to death, and other Christians to exile, or to
the forfeiture of their property, and prohibiting them from entering the
catacombs.(890) A sanguinary and general persecution ensued. Among the
victims were Sixtus, the Bishop of Rome, who perished in the
catacombs,(891) and Cyprian, who was exiled, and afterwards beheaded, and
was the first Bishop of Carthage who suffered martyrdom.(892) At last,
Valerian, having been captured by the Persians, Gallienus, in A.D. 260,
ascended the throne, and immediately proclaimed a perfect toleration of
the Christians.(893)
The period from the accession of Decius, in A.D. 249, to the accession of
Gallienus, in A.D. 260, which I have now very briefly noticed, was by far
the most disastrous the Church had yet endured. With the exception of
about five years in the reigns of Gallus and Valerian, the persecution was
continuous, though it varied much in its intensity and its range. During
the first portion, if measured, not by the number of deaths, but by the
atrocity of the tortures inflicted, it was probably as severe as any upon
record. It was subsequently directed chiefly against the leading clergy,
and, as we have seen, four Roman bishops perished. In addition to the
political reasons that inspired it, the popular fanaticism caused by great
calamities, which were ascribed to anger of the gods at the neglect of
their worship, had in this as in former periods a great influence.
Political disasters, which foreshadowed clearly the approaching downfall
of the Empire, were followed by fearful and general famines and plagues.
St. Cyprian, in a treatise addressed to one of the persecutors who was
most confident in ascribing these things to the Christians, presents us
with an extremely curious picture both of the general despondency that had
fallen upon the Empire, and of the manner in which these calamities were
regarded by the Christians. Like most of his co-religionists, the saint
was convinced that the closing scene of the earth was at hand. The
decrepitude of the world, he said, had arrived, the forces of nature were
almost exhausted, the sun had no longer its old lustre, or the soil its
old fertility, the spring time had grown less lovely, and the autumn less
bounteous, the energy of man had decayed, and all things were moving
rapidly to the end. Famines and plagues were the precursors of the day of
judgment. They were sent to warn and punish a rebellious world, which,
still bowing down before idols, persecuted the believers in the truth. “So
true is this, that the Christians are never persecuted without the sky
manifesting at once the Divine displeasure.” The conception of a converted
Empire never appears to have flashed across the mind of the saint;(894)
the only triumph he predicted for the Church was that of another world;
and to the threats of the persecutors he rejoined by fearful menaces. “A
burning, scorching fire will for ever torment those who are condemned;
there will be no respite or end to their torments. We shall through
eternity contemplate in their agonies those who for a short time
contemplated us in tortures, and for the brief pleasure which the
barbarity of our persecutors took in feasting their eyes upon an inhuman
spectacle, they will be themselves exposed as an eternal spectacle of
agony.” As a last warning, calamity after calamity broke upon the world,
and, with the solemnity of one on whom the shadow of death had already
fallen, St. Cyprian adjured the persecutors to repent and to be
saved.(895)
The accession of Gallienus introduced the Church to a new period of
perfect peace, which, with a single inconsiderable exception, continued
for no less than forty years. The exception was furnished by Aurelian, who
during nearly the whole of his reign had been exceedingly favourable to
the Christians, and had even been appealed to by the orthodox bishops, who
desired him to expel from Antioch a prelate they had excommunicated for
heresy,(896) but who, at the close of his reign, intended to persecute. He
was assassinated, however, according to one account, when he was just
about to sign the decrees; according to another, before they had been sent
through the provinces; and if any persecution actually took place, it was
altogether inconsiderable.(897) Christianity, during all this time, was
not only perfectly free, it was greatly honoured. Christians were
appointed governors of the provinces, and were expressly exonerated from
the duty of sacrificing. The bishops were treated by the civil authorities
with profound respect. The palaces of the emperor were filled with
Christian servants, who were authorised freely to profess their religion,
and were greatly valued for their fidelity. The popular prejudice seems to
have been lulled to rest; and it has been noticed that the rapid progress
of the faith excited no tumult or hostility. Spacious churches were
erected in every quarter, and they could scarcely contain the multitude of
worshippers.(898) In Rome itself, before the outburst of the Diocletian
persecution, there were no less than forty churches.(899) The Christians
may still have been outnumbered by the Pagans; but when we consider their
organisation, their zeal, and their rapid progress, a speedy triumph
appeared inevitable.
But before that triumph was achieved a last and a terrific ordeal was to
be undergone. Diocletian, whose name has been somewhat unjustly associated
with a persecution, the responsibility of which belongs far more to his
colleague Galerius, having left the Christians in perfect peace for nearly
eighteen years, suffered himself to be persuaded to make one more effort
to eradicate the foreign creed. This emperor, who had risen by his merits
from the humblest position, exhibited in all the other actions of his
reign a moderate, placable, and conspicuously humane nature, and, although
he greatly magnified the Imperial authority, the simplicity of his private
life, his voluntary abdication, and, above all, his singularly noble
conduct during many years of retirement, displayed a rare magnanimity of
character. As a politician, he deserves, I think, to rank very high.
Antoninus and Marcus Aurelius had been too fascinated by the traditions of
the Republic, and by the austere teaching and retrospective spirit of the
Stoics, to realise the necessity of adapting institutions to the wants of
a luxurious and highly civilised people, and they therefore had little
permanent influence upon the destinies of the Empire. But Diocletian
invariably exhibited in his legislation a far-seeing and comprehensive
mind, well aware of the condition of the society he ruled, and provident
of distant events. Perceiving that Roman corruption was incurable, he
attempted to regenerate the Empire by creating new centres of political
life in the great and comparatively unperverted capitals of the provinces;
and Nicomedia, which was his habitual residence, Carthage, Milan, and
Ravenna, all received abundant tokens of his favour. He swept away or
disregarded the obsolete and inefficient institutions of Republican
liberty that still remained, and indeed gave his government a somewhat
Oriental character; but, at the same time, by the bold, and, it must be
admitted, very perilous measure of dividing the Empire into four sections,
he abridged the power of each ruler, ensured the better supervision and
increased authority of the provinces, and devised the first effectual
check to those military revolts which had for some time been threatening
the Empire with anarchy. With the same energetic statesmanship, we find
him reorganising the whole system of taxation, and attempting, less
wisely, to regulate commercial transactions. To such an emperor, the
problem presented by the rapid progress and the profoundly anti-national
character of Christianity must have been a matter of serious
consideration, and the weaknesses of his character were most unfavourable
to the Church; for Diocletian, with many noble qualities of heart and
head, was yet superstitious, tortuous, nervous, and vacillating, and was
too readily swayed by the rude and ferocious soldier, who was impetuously
inciting him against the Christians.
The extreme passion which Galerius displayed on this subject is ascribed,
in the first instance, to the influence of his mother, who was ardently
devoted to the Pagan worship. He is himself painted in dark colours by the
Christian writers as a man of boundless and unbridled sensuality, of an
imperiousness that rose to fury at opposition, and of a cruelty which had
long passed the stage of callousness, and become a fiendish delight, in
the infliction and contemplation of suffering.(900) His strong attachment
to Paganism made him at length the avowed representative of his party,
which several causes had contributed to strengthen. The philosophy of the
Empire had by this time fully passed into its Neoplatonic and Pythagorean
phases, and was closely connected with religious observances. Hierocles
and Porphyry, who were among its most eminent exponents, had both written
books against Christianity, and the Oriental religions fostered much
fanaticism among the people. Political interests united with superstition,
for the Christians were now a very formidable body in the State. Their
interests were supposed to be represented by the Cæsar Constantius
Chlorus, and the religion was either adopted, or at least warmly favoured,
by the wife and daughter of Diocletian (the latter of whom was married to
Galerius(901)), and openly professed by some of the leading officials at
the Court. A magnificent church crowned the hill facing the palace of the
emperor at Nicomedia. The bishops were, in most cities, among the most
active and influential citizens, and their influence was not always
exercised for good. A few cases, in which an ill-considered zeal led
Christians to insult the Pagan worship, one or two instances of Christians
refusing to serve in the army, because they believed military life
repugnant to their creed, a scandalous relaxation of morals, that had
arisen during the long peace, and the fierce and notorious discord
displayed by the leaders of the Church, contributed in different ways to
accelerate the persecution.(902)
For a considerable time Diocletian resisted all the urgency of Galerius
against the Christians, and the only measure taken was the dismissal by
the latter sovereign of a number of Christian officers from the army. In
A.D. 303, however, Diocletian yielded to the entreaties of his colleague,
and a fearful persecution, which many circumstances conspired to
stimulate, began. The priests, in one of the public ceremonies, had
declared that the presence of Christians prevented the entrails from
showing the accustomed signs. The oracle of Apollo, at Miletus, being
consulted by Diocletian, exhorted him to persecute the Christians. A
fanatical Christian, who avowed his deed, and expiated it by a fearful
death, tore down the first edict of persecution, and replaced it by a
bitter taunt against the emperor. Twice, after the outburst of the
persecution, the palace at Nicomedia, where Diocletian and Galerius were
residing, was set on fire, and the act was ascribed, not without
probability, to a Christian hand, as were also some slight disturbances
that afterwards arose in Syria.(903) Edict after edict followed in rapid
succession. The first ordered the destruction of all Christian churches
and of all Bibles, menaced with death the Christians if they assembled in
secret for Divine worship, and deprived them of all civil rights. A second
edict ordered all ecclesiastics to be thrown into prison, while a third
edict ordered that these prisoners, and a fourth edict that all
Christians, should be compelled by torture to sacrifice. At first
Diocletian refused to permit their lives to be taken, but after the fire
at Nicomedia this restriction was removed. Many were burnt alive, and the
tortures by which the persecutors sought to shake their resolution were so
dreadful that even such a death seemed an act of mercy. The only province
of the Empire where the Christians were at peace was Gaul, which had
received its baptism of blood under Marcus Aurelius, but was now governed
by Constantius Chlorus, who protected them from personal molestation,
though he was compelled, in obedience to the emperor, to destroy their
churches. In Spain, which was also under the government, but not under the
direct inspection, of Constantius, the persecution was moderate, but in
all other parts of the Empire it raged with fierceness till the abdication
of Diocletian in 305. This event almost immediately restored peace to the
Western provinces,(904) but greatly aggravated the misfortunes of the
Eastern Christians, who passed under the absolute rule of Galerius.
Horrible, varied, and prolonged tortures were employed to quell their
fortitude, and their final resistance was crowned by the most dreadful of
all deaths, roasting over a slow fire. It was not till A.D. 311, eight
years after the commencement of the general persecution, ten years after
the first measure against the Christians, that the Eastern persecution
ceased. Galerius, the arch-enemy of the Christians, was struck down by a
fearful disease. His body, it is said, became a mass of loathsome and
fœtid sores—a living corpse, devoured by countless worms, and exhaling the
odour of the charnel-house. He who had shed so much innocent blood, shrank
himself from a Roman death. In his extreme anguish he appealed in turn to
physician after physician, and to temple after temple. At last he relented
towards the Christians. He issued a proclamation restoring them to
liberty, permitting them to rebuild their churches, and asking their
prayers for his recovery.(905) The era of persecution now closed. One
brief spasm, indeed, due to the Cæsar Maximian, shot through the long
afflicted Church of Asia Minor;(906) but it was rapidly allayed. The
accession of Constantine, the proclamation of Milan, A.D. 313, the defeat
of Licinius, and the conversion of the conqueror, speedily followed, and
Christianity became the religion of the Empire.
Such, so far as we can trace it, is the outline of the last and most
terrible persecution inflicted on the early Church. Unfortunately we can
place little reliance on any information we possess about the number of
its victims, the provocations that produced it, or the objects of its
authors. The ecclesiastical account of these matters is absolutely
unchecked by any Pagan statement, and it is derived almost exclusively
from the history of Eusebius, and from the treatise “On the Deaths of the
Persecutors,” which is ascribed to Lactantius. Eusebius was a writer of
great learning, and of critical abilities not below the very low level of
his time, and he had personal knowledge of some of the events in Palestine
which he has recorded; but he had no pretensions whatever to impartiality.
He has frankly told us that his principle in writing history was to
conceal the facts that were injurious to the reputation of the
Church;(907) and although his practice was sometimes better than his
principle, the portrait he has drawn of the saintly virtues of his patron
Constantine, which we are able to correct from other sources, abundantly
proves with how little scruple the courtly bishop could stray into the
paths of fiction. The treatise of Lactantius, which has been well termed
“a party pamphlet,” is much more untrustworthy. It is a hymn of exultation
over the disastrous ends of the persecutors, and especially of Galerius,
written in a strain of the fiercest and most passionate invective, and
bearing on every page unequivocal signs of inaccuracy and exaggeration.
The whole history of the early persecution was soon enveloped in a thick
cloud of falsehood. A notion, derived from prophecy, that ten great
persecutions must precede the day of judgment, at an early period
stimulated the imagination of the Christians, who believed that day to be
imminent; and it was natural that as time rolled on men should magnify the
sufferings that had been endured, and that in credulous and uncritical
ages a single real incident should be often multiplied, diversified, and
exaggerated in many distinct narratives. Monstrous fictions, such as the
crucifixion of ten thousand Christians upon Mount Ararat under Trajan, the
letter of Tiberianus to Trajan, complaining that he was weary of
ceaselessly killing Christians in Palestine, and the Theban legion of six
thousand men, said to have been massacred by Maximilian, were boldly
propagated and readily believed.(908) The virtue supposed to attach to the
bones of martyrs, and the custom, and, after a decree of the second
Council of Nice, in the eighth century, the obligation, of placing saintly
remains under every altar, led to an immense multiplication of spurious
relics, and a corresponding demand for legends. Almost every hamlet soon
required a patron martyr and a local legend, which the nearest monastery
was usually ready to supply. The monks occupied their time in composing
and disseminating innumerable acts of martyrs, which purported to be
strictly historical, but which were, in fact, deliberate, though it was
thought edifying, forgeries; and pictures of hideous tortures, enlivened
by fantastic miracles, soon became the favourite popular literature. To
discriminate accurately the genuine acts of martyrs from the immense mass
that were fabricated by the monks, has been attempted by Ruinart, but is
perhaps impossible. Modern criticism has, however, done much to reduce the
ancient persecutions to their true dimensions. The famous essay of
Dodwell, which appeared towards the close of the seventeenth century,
though written, I think, a little in the spirit of a special pleader, and
not free from its own exaggerations, has had a great and abiding influence
upon ecclesiastical history, and the still more famous chapter which
Gibbon devoted to the subject rendered the conclusions of Dodwell familiar
to the world.
Notwithstanding the great knowledge and critical acumen displayed in this
chapter, few persons, I imagine, can rise from its perusal without a
feeling both of repulsion and dissatisfaction. The complete absence of all
sympathy with the heroic courage manifested by the martyrs, and the frigid
and, in truth, most unphilosophical severity with which the historian has
weighed the words and actions of men engaged in the agonies of a deadly
struggle, must repel every generous nature, while the persistence with
which he estimates persecutions by the number of deaths rather than by the
amount of suffering, diverts the mind from the really distinctive
atrocities of the Pagan persecutions. He has observed, that while the
anger of the persecutors was at all times especially directed against the
bishops, we know from Eusebius that only nine bishops were put to death in
the entire Diocletian persecution, and that the particular enumeration,
which the historian made on the spot, of all the martyrs who perished
during this persecution in Palestine, which was under the government of
Galerius, and was therefore exposed to the full fury of the storm, shows
the entire number to have been ninety-two. Starting from this fact,
Gibbon, by a well-known process of calculation, has estimated the probable
number of martyrs in the whole Empire, during the Diocletian persecution,
at about two thousand, which happens to be the number of persons burnt by
the Spanish Inquisition during the presidency of Torquemada alone,(909)
and about one twenty-fifth of the number who are said to have suffered for
their religion in the Netherlands in the reign of Charles V.(910) But
although, if measured by the number of martyrs, the persecutions inflicted
by Pagans were less terrible than those inflicted by Christians, there is
one aspect in which the former appear by far the more atrocious, and a
truthful historian should suffer no false delicacy to prevent him from
unflinchingly stating it. The conduct of the provincial governors, even
when they were compelled by the Imperial edicts to persecute, was often
conspicuously merciful. The Christian records contain several examples of
rulers who refused to search out the Christians, who discountenanced or
even punished their accusers, who suggested ingenious evasions of the law,
who tried by earnest and patient kindness to overcome what they regarded
as insane obstinacy, and who, when their efforts had proved vain,
mitigated by their own authority the sentence they were compelled to
pronounce. It was only on very rare occasions that any, except conspicuous
leaders of the Church, and sometimes persons of a servile condition, were
in danger; the time that was conceded them before their trials gave them
great facilities for escaping, and, even when condemned, Christian women
had usually full permission to visit them in their prisons, and to console
them by their charity. But, on the other hand, Christian writings, which
it is impossible to dispute, continually record barbarities inflicted upon
converts, so ghastly and so hideous that the worst horrors of the
Inquisition pale before them. It is, indeed, true that burning heretics by
a slow fire was one of the accomplishments of the Inquisitors, and that
they were among the most consummate masters of torture of their age. It is
true that in one Catholic country they introduced the atrocious custom of
making the spectacle of men burnt alive for their religious opinions an
element in the public festivities.(911) It is true, too, that the immense
majority of the acts of the martyrs are the transparent forgeries of lying
monks; but it is also true that among the authentic records of Pagan
persecutions there are histories which display, perhaps more vividly than
any other, both the depth of cruelty to which human nature may sink, and
the heroism of resistance it may attain. There was a time when it was the
just boast of the Romans, that no refinements of cruelty, no prolongations
of torture, were admitted in their stern but simple penal code. But all
this was changed. Those hateful games, which made the spectacle of human
suffering and death the delight of all classes, had spread their
brutalising influence wherever the Roman name was known, had rendered
millions absolutely indifferent to the sight of human suffering, had
produced in many, in the very centre of an advanced civilisation, a relish
and a passion for torture, a rapture and an exultation in watching the
spasms of extreme agony, such as an African or an American savage alone
can equal. The most horrible recorded instances of torture were usually
inflicted, either by the populace, or in their presence, in the
arena.(912) We read of Christians bound in chairs of red-hot iron, while
the stench of their half-consumed flesh rose in a suffocating cloud to
heaven; of others who were torn to the very bone by shells, or hooks of
iron; of holy virgins given over to the lust of the gladiator, or to the
mercies of the pander; of two hundred and twenty-seven converts sent on
one occasion to the mines, each with the sinews of one leg severed by a
red-hot iron, and with an eye scooped from its socket; of fires so slow
that the victims writhed for hours in their agonies; of bodies torn limb
from limb, or sprinkled with burning lead; of mingled salt and vinegar
poured over the flesh that was bleeding from the rack; of tortures
prolonged and varied through entire days. For the love of their Divine
Master, for the cause they believed to be true, men, and even weak girls,
endured these things without flinching, when one word would have freed
them from their sufferings. No opinion we may form of the proceedings of
priests in a later age should impair the reverence with which we bend
before the martyr’s tomb.
FOOTNOTES
1 The opinions of Hume on moral questions are grossly misrepresented
by many writers, who persist in describing them as substantially
identical with those of Bentham. How far Hume was from denying the
existence of a moral sense, the following passages will show:—“The
final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and
actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy or blameable ... depends on
some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in
the whole species.”—_Enquiry Concerning Morals_, § 1. “The
hypothesis we embrace ... defines virtue to be whatever mental
action or quality gives to the spectator the pleasing sentiment of
approbation.”—Ibid. Append. I. “The crime or immorality is no
particular fact or relation which can be the object of the
understanding, but arises entirely from the sentiment of
disapprobation, which, by the structure of human nature, we
unavoidably feel on the apprehension of barbarity or
treachery.”—Ibid. “Reason instructs us in the several tendencies of
actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which
are useful and beneficial.”—Ibid. “As virtue is an end, and is
desirable on its own account without fee or reward, merely for the
immediate satisfaction it conveys, it is requisite that there should
be some sentiment which it touches, some internal taste or feeling,
or whatever you please to call it, which distinguishes moral good
and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.”—Ibid.
The two writers to whom Hume was most indebted were Hutcheson and
Butler. In some interesting letters to the former (Burton’s _Life of
Hume_, vol. i.), he discusses the points on which he differed from
them.
2 “The chief thing therefore which lawgivers and other wise men that
have laboured for the establishment of society have endeavoured, has
been to make the people they were to govern believe that it was more
beneficial for everybody to conquer than to indulge his appetites,
and much better to mind the public than what seemed his private
interest ... observing that none were either so savage as not to be
charmed with praise, or so despicable as patiently to bear contempt,
they justly concluded that flattery must be the most powerful
argument that could be used to human creatures. Making use of this
bewitching engine, they extolled the excellency of our nature above
other animals ... by the help of which we were capable of performing
the most noble achievements. Having, by this artful flattery,
insinuated themselves into the hearts of men, they began to instruct
them in the notions of honour and shame, &c.”—_Enquiry into the
Origin of Moral Virtue._
3 “I conceive that when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing
or not do it, he does nothing else but consider whether it be better
for himself to do it or not to do it.”—Hobbes _On Liberty and
Necessity._ “Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and
aversions.”—Ibid. _Leviathan_, part i. ch. xvi. “Obligation is the
necessity of doing or omitting any action in order to be
happy.”—Gay’s dissertation prefixed to King’s _Origin of Evil_, p.
36. “The only reason or motive by which individuals can possibly be
induced to the practice of virtue, must be the feeling immediate or
the prospect of future private happiness.”—Brown _On the
Characteristics_, p. 159. “En tout temps, en tout lieu, tant en
matière de morale qu’en matière d’esprit, c’est l’intérêt personnel
qui dicte le jugement des particuliers, et l’intérêt général qui
dicte celui des nations.... Tout homme ne prend dans ses jugements
conseil que de son intérêt.”—Helvétius _De l’Esprit_, discours ii.
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what
we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.... The
principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for
the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the
fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which
attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice
instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.”—Bentham’s
_Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. i. “By the principle of
utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears
to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose
interest is in question.”—Ibid. “Je regarde l’amour éclairé de
nous-mêmes comme le principe de tout sacrifice moral.”—D’Alembert
quoted by D. Stewart, _Active and Moral Powers_, vol. i. p. 220.
4 “Pleasure is in itself a good; nay, even setting aside immunity from
pain, the only good; pain is in itself an evil, and, indeed, without
exception, the only evil, or else the words good and evil have no
meaning.”—Bentham’s _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. x.
5 “Good and evil are nothing but pleasure and pain, or that which
occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil
then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions
to some law whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and
power of the law maker, which good and evil, pleasure or pain,
attending our observance or breach of the law by the decree of the
law maker, is that we call reward or punishment.”—Locke’s _Essay_,
book ii. ch. xxviii. “Take away pleasures and pains, not only
happiness, but justice, and duty, and obligation, and virtue, all of
which have been so elaborately held up to view as independent of
them, are so many empty sounds.”—Bentham’s _Springs of Action_, ch.
i. § 15.
6 “Il lui est aussi impossible d’aimer le bien pour le bien, que
d’aimer le mal pour le mal.”—Helvétius _De l’Esprit_, disc. ii. ch.
v.
7 “Even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his
goodness to us.”—Hobbes _On Human Nature_, ch. vii. § 3. So
Waterland, “To love God is in effect the same thing as to love
happiness, eternal happiness; and the love of happiness is still the
love of ourselves.”—_Third Sermon on Self-love._
8 “Reverence is the conception we have concerning another, that he
hath the power to do unto us both good and hurt, but not the will to
do us hurt.”—Hobbes _On Human Nature_, ch. viii. § 7.
9 “The pleasures of piety are the pleasures that accompany the belief
of a man’s being in the acquisition, or in possession of the
goodwill or favour of the Supreme Being; and as a fruit of it, of
his being in the way of enjoying pleasures to be received by God’s
special appointment either in this life or in a life to
come.”—Bentham’s _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. v. “The
pains of piety are the pains that accompany the belief of a man’s
being obnoxious to the displeasure of the Supreme Being, and in
consequence to certain pains to be inflicted by His especial
appointment, either in this life or in a life to come. These may be
also called the pains of religion.”—Ibid.
10 “There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power, than to
find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also
to assist other men in theirs; and this is that conception wherein
consisteth charity.”—Hobbes _On Hum. Nat._ ch. ix. § 17. “No man
giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is
voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object to every man is his
own good.”—Hobbes’ _Leviathan_, part i. ch. xv. “Dream not that men
will move their little finger to serve you, unless their advantage
in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so, and never will
while human nature is made of its present materials.”—Bentham’s
_Deontology_, vol. ii. p. 133.
11 “Pity is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves,
proceeding from the sense of another man’s calamity. But when it
lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the
compassion is greater, because there then appeareth more probability
that the same may happen to us; for the evil that happeneth to an
innocent man may happen to every man.”—Hobbes _On Hum. Nat._ ch. ix.
§ 10. “La pitié est souvent un sentiment de nos propres maux dans
les maux d’autrui. C’est une habile prévoyance des malheurs où nous
pouvons tomber. Nous donnons des secours aux autres pour les engager
à nous en donner en de semblables occasions, et ces services que
nous leur rendons sont, à proprement parler, des biens que nous nous
faisons à nous-mêmes par avance.”—La Rochefoucauld, _Maximes_, 264.
Butler has remarked that if Hobbes’ account were true, the most
fearful would be the most compassionate nature; but this is perhaps
not quite just, for Hobbes’ notion of pity implies the union of two
not absolutely identical, though nearly allied, influences, timidity
and imagination. The theory of Adam Smith, though closely connected
with, differs totally in consequences from that of Hobbes on this
point. He says, “When I condole with you for the loss of your son,
in order to enter into your grief, I do not consider what I, a
person of such a character and profession, should suffer if I had a
son, and if that son should die—I consider what I should suffer if I
was really you. I not only change circumstances with you, but I
change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon
your account.... A man may sympathise with a woman in child-bed,
though it is impossible he should conceive himself suffering her
pains in his own proper person and character.”—_Moral Sentiments_,
part vii. ch. i. §3.
12 “Ce que les hommes ont nommé amitié n’est qu’une société, qu’un
ménagement réciproque d’intérêts et qu’un échange de bons offices.
Ce n’est enfin qu’un commerce où l’amour-propre se propose toujours
quelque chose à gagner.”—La Rochefoucauld, _Max._ 83. See this idea
developed at large in Helvétius.
13 “La science de la morale n’est autre chose que la science même de la
législation.”—Helvétius _De l’Esprit_, ii. 17.
14 This doctrine is expounded at length in all the moral works of
Hobbes and his school. The following passage is a fair specimen of
their meaning:—“Moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of
what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind.
Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions,
which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are
different ... from whence arise disputes, controversies, and at last
war. And therefore, so long as man is in this condition of mere
nature (which is a condition of war), his private appetite is the
measure of good and evil. And consequently all men agree in this,
that peace is good, and therefore also that the ways or means of
peace, (which, as I have showed before) are justice, gratitude,
modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature are good
... and their contrary vices evil.”—Hobbes’ _Leviathan_, part i. ch.
xvi. See, too, a striking passage in Bentham’s _Deontology_, vol.
ii. p. 132.
15 As an ingenious writer in the _Saturday Review_ (Aug. 10, 1867)
expresses it: “Chastity is merely a social law created to encourage
the alliances that most promote the permanent welfare of the race,
and to maintain woman in a social position which it is thought
advisable she should hold.” See, too, on this view, Hume’s _Inquiry
concerning Morals_, § 4, and also _note_ x.: “To what other purpose
do all the ideas of chastity and modesty serve? Nisi utile est quod
facimus, frustra est gloria.”
16 “All pleasure is necessarily self-regarding, for it is impossible to
have any feelings out of our own mind. But there are modes of
delight that bring also satisfaction to others, from the round that
they take in their course. Such are the pleasures of benevolence.
Others imply no participation by any second party, as, for example,
eating, drinking, bodily warmth, property, and power; while a third
class are fed by the pains and privations of fellow-beings, as the
delights of sport and tyranny. The condemnatory phrase, selfishness,
applies with especial emphasis to the last-mentioned class, and, in
a qualified degree, to the second group; while such terms as
unselfishness, disinterestedness, self-devotion, are applied to the
vicarious position wherein we seek our own satisfaction in that of
others.”—Bain _On the Emotions and Will_, p. 113.
17 “Vice may be defined to be a miscalculation of chances, a mistake in
estimating the value of pleasures and pains. It is false moral
arithmetic.”—Bentham’s _Deontology_, vol. i. p. 131.
18 “La récompense, la punition, la gloire et l’infamie soumises à ses
volontés sont quatre espèces de divinités avec lesquelles le
législateur peut toujours opérer le bien public et créer des hommes
illustres en tous les genres. Toute l’étude des moralistes consiste
à déterminer l’usage qu’on doit faire de ces récompenses et de ces
punitions et les secours qu’on peut tirer pour lier l’intérêt
personnel à l’intérêt général.”—Helvétius _De l’Esprit_, ii. 22. “La
justice de nos jugements et de nos actions n’est jamais que la
rencontre heureuse de notre intérêt avec l’intérêt public.”—Ibid.
ii. 7. “To prove that the immoral action is a miscalculation of
self-interest, to show how erroneous an estimate the vicious man
makes of pains and pleasures, is the purpose of the intelligent
moralist. Unless he can do this he does nothing; for, as has been
stated above, for a man not to pursue what he deems likely to
produce to him the greatest sum of enjoyment, is, in the very nature
of things, impossible.”—Bentham’s _Deontology_.
19 “If the effect of virtue were to prevent or destroy more pleasure
than it produced, or to produce more pain than it prevented, its
more appropriate name would be wickedness and folly; wickedness as
it affected others, folly as respected him who practised
it.”—Bentham’s _Deontology_, vol. i. p. 142. “Weigh pains, weigh
pleasures, and as the balance stands will stand the question of
right and wrong.”—Ibid. vol. i. p. 137. “Moralis philosophiæ caput
est, Faustine fili, ut scias quibus ad beatam vitam perveniri
rationibus possit.”—Apuleius, _Ad Doct. Platonis_, ii. “Atque ipsa
utilitas, justi prope mater et æqui.”—Horace, _Sat._ I. iii. 98.
20 “We can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or
lose something by; for nothing else can be ‘violent motive’ to us.
As we should not be obliged to obey the laws or the magistrate
unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other,
depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same
reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to
obey the commands of God.”—Paley’s _Moral Philosophy_, book ii. ch.
ii.
21 See Gassendi _Philosophiæ Epicuri Syntagma_. These four canons are a
skilful condensation of the argument of Torquatus in Cicero, _De
Fin._ i. 2. See, too, a very striking letter by Epicurus himself,
given in his life by Diogenes Laërtius.
22 “Sanus igitur non est, qui nulla spe majore proposita, iis bonis
quibus cæteri utuntur in vita, labores et cruciatus et miserias
anteponat.... Non aliter his bonis præsentibus abstinendum est quam
si sint aliqua majora, propter quæ tanti sit et voluptates omittere
et mala omnia sustinere.”—Lactantius, _Div. Inst._ vi. 9. Macaulay,
in some youthful essays against the Utilitarian theory (which he
characteristically described as “Not much more laughable than
phrenology, and immeasurably more humane than cock-fighting”),
maintains the theological form of selfishness in very strong terms.
“What proposition is there respecting human nature which is
absolutely and universally true? We know of only one, and that is
not only true but identical, that men always act from
self-interest.”—Review of Mill’s _Essay on Government_. “Of this we
may be sure, that the words ‘greatest happiness’ will never in any
man’s mouth mean more than the greatest happiness of others, which
is consistent with what he thinks his own.... This direction (Do as
you would be done by) would be utterly unmeaning, as it actually is
in Mr. Bentham’s philosophy, unless it were accompanied by a
sanction. In the Christian scheme accordingly it is accompanied by a
sanction of immense force. To a man whose greatest happiness in this
world is inconsistent with the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, is held out the prospect of an infinite happiness hereafter,
from which he excludes himself by wronging his fellow-creatures
here.”—_Answer to the Westminster Review’s Defence of Mill._
23 “All virtue and piety are thus resolvable into a principle of
self-love. It is what Scripture itself resolves them into by
founding them upon faith in God’s promises, and hope in things
unseen. In this way it may be rightly said that there is no such
thing as disinterested virtue. It is with reference to ourselves and
for our own sakes that we love even God Himself.”—Waterland, _Third
Sermon on Self-love_. “To risk the happiness of the whole duration
of our being in any case whatever, were it possible, would be
foolish.”—Robert Hall’s _Sermon on Modern Infidelity_. “In the moral
system the means are virtuous practice; the end, happiness.”—
Warburton’s _Divine Legation_, book ii. Appendix.
24 “There is always understood to be a difference between an act of
prudence and an act of duty. Thus, if I distrusted a man who owed me
a sum of money, I should reckon it an act of prudence to get another
person bound with him; but I should hardly call it an act of
duty.... Now in what, you will ask, does the difference consist,
inasmuch as, according to our account of the matter, both in the one
case and the other, in acts of duty as well as acts of prudence, we
consider solely what we ourselves shall gain or lose by the act? The
difference, and the only difference, is this: that in the one case
we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the
other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world
to come.”—Paley’s _Moral Philosophy_, ii. 3.
25 “Hence we may see the weakness and mistake of those falsely
religious ... who are scandalised at our being determined to the
pursuit of virtue through any degree of regard to its happy
consequences in this life.... For it is evident that the religious
motive is precisely of the same kind, only stronger, as the
happiness expected is greater and more lasting.”—Brown’s _Essays on
the Characteristics_, p. 220.
26 “If a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another
life, be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a
reason, because God, who has the power of eternal life and death,
requires it of us. But if an Hobbist be asked why, he will answer,
because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if
you do not. And if one of the old heathen philosophers had been
asked, he would have answered, because it was dishonest, below the
dignity of man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of
human nature, to do otherwise.”—Locke’s _Essay_, i. 3.
27 Thus Paley remarks that—“The Christian religion hath not ascertained
the precise quantity of virtue necessary to salvation,” and he then
proceeds to urge the probability of graduated scales of rewards and
punishments. (_Moral Philosophy_, book i. ch. vii.)
28 This view was developed by Locke (_Essay on the Human
Understanding_, book ii. ch. xxi.) Pascal, in a well-known passage,
applied the same argument to Christianity, urging that the rewards
and punishments it promises are so great, that it is the part of a
wise man to embrace the creed, even though he believes it
improbable, if there be but a possibility in its favour.
29 Cudworth, in his _Immutable Morals_, has collected the names of a
number of the schoolmen who held this view. See, too, an interesting
note in Miss Cobbe’s very learned _Essay on Intuitive Morals_, pp.
18, 19.
30 E.g. Soame Jenyns, Dr. Johnson, Crusius, Pascal, Paley, and Austin.
Warburton is generally quoted in the list, but not I think quite
fairly. See his theory, which is rather complicated (_Divine
Legation_, i. 4). Waterland appears to have held this view, and also
Condillac. See a very remarkable chapter on morals, in his _Traité
des Animaux_, part ii. ch. vii. Closely connected with this doctrine
is the notion that the morality of God is generically different from
the morality of men, which having been held with more or less
distinctness by many theologians (Archbishop King being perhaps the
most prominent), has found in our own day an able defender in Dr.
Mansel. Much information on the history of this doctrine will be
found in Dr. Mansel’s _Second Letter_ to Professor Goldwin Smith
(Oxford, 1862).
31 Leibnitz noticed the frequency with which Supralapsarian Calvinists
adopt this doctrine. (_Théodicée_, part ii. § 176.) Archbishop
Whately, who from his connection with the Irish Clergy had admirable
opportunities of studying the tendencies of Calvinism, makes a
similar remark as the result of his own experience. (_Whately’s
Life_, vol. ii. p. 339.)
32 “God designs the happiness of all His sentient creatures.... Knowing
the tendencies of our actions, and knowing His benevolent purpose,
we know His tacit commands.”—Austin’s _Lectures on Jurisprudence_,
vol. i. p. 31. “The commands which He has revealed we must gather
from the terms wherein they are promulgated. The commands which He
has not revealed we must construe by the principle of
utility.”—Ibid. p. 96. So Paley’s _Moral Philosophy_, book ii. ch.
iv. v.
33 Paley’s _Moral Philosophy_, book i. ch. vii. The question of the
disinterestedness of the love we should bear to God was agitated in
the Catholic Church, Bossuet taking the selfish, and Fénelon the
unselfish side. The opinions of Fénelon and Molinos on the subject
were authoritatively condemned. In England, the less dogmatic
character of the national faith, and also the fact that the great
anti-Christian writer, Hobbes, was the advocate of extreme
selfishness in morals, had, I think, a favourable influence upon the
ethics of the church. Hobbes gave the first great impulse to moral
philosophy in England, and his opponents were naturally impelled to
an unselfish theory. Bishop Cumberland led the way, resolving virtue
(like Hutcheson) into benevolence. The majority of divines, however,
till the present century, have, I think, been on the selfish side.
_ 34 Moral Philosophy_, ii. 3.
_ 35 Essay on the Human Understanding_, ii. 28.
_ 36 Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. iii. Mr. Mill observes
that, “Bentham’s idea of the world is that of a collection of
persons pursuing each his separate interest or pleasure, and the
prevention of whom from jostling one another more than is
unavoidable, may be attempted by hopes and fears derived from three
sources—the law, religion, and public opinion. To these three
powers, considered as binding human conduct, he gave the name of
sanctions; the political sanction operating by the rewards and
penalties of the law; the religious sanction by those expected from
the ruler of the universe; and the popular, which he
characteristically calls also the moral sanction, operating through
the pains and pleasures arising from the favour or disfavour of our
fellow-creatures.”—_Dissertations_, vol. i. pp. 362-363.
37 Hume on this, as on most other points, was emphatically opposed to
the school of Hobbes, and even declared that no one could honestly
and in good faith deny the reality of an unselfish element in man.
Following in the steps of Butler, he explained it in the following
passage:—“Hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end,
and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a
pleasure which may become the object of another species of desire or
inclination that is secondary and interested. In the same manner
there are mental passions by which we are impelled immediately to
seek particular objects, such as fame or power or vengeance, without
any regard to interest, and when these objects are attained a
pleasing enjoyment ensues.... Now where is the difficulty of
conceiving that this may likewise be the case with benevolence and
friendship, and that from the original frame of our temper we may
feel a desire of another’s happiness or good, which by means of that
affection becomes our own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the
combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment?”—Hume’s _Enquiry
concerning Morals_, Appendix II. Compare Butler, “If there be any
appetite or any inward principle besides self-love, why may there
not be an affection towards the good of our fellow-creatures, and
delight from that affection’s being gratified and uneasiness from
things going contrary to it?”—_Sermon on Compassion._
38 “By sympathetic sensibility is to be understood the propensity that
a man has to derive pleasure from the happiness, and pain from the
unhappiness, of other sensitive beings.”—Bentham’s _Principles of
Morals and Legislation_, ch. vi. “The sense of sympathy is
universal. Perhaps there never existed a human being who had reached
full age without the experience of pleasure at another’s pleasure,
of uneasiness at another’s pain.... Community of interests,
similarity of opinion, are sources from whence it
springs.”—_Deontology_, vol. i. pp. 169-170.
39 “The idea of the pain of another is naturally painful. The idea of
the pleasure of another is naturally pleasurable.... In this, the
unselfish part of our nature, lies a foundation, even independently
of inculcation from without, for the generation of moral
feelings”—Mill’s _Dissertations_, vol. i. p. 137. See, too, Bain’s
_Emotions and the Will_, pp. 289, 313; and especially Austin’s
_Lectures on Jurisprudence_. The first volume of this brilliant work
contains, I think without exception, the best modern statement of
the utilitarian theory in its most plausible form—a statement
equally remarkable for its ability, its candour, and its uniform
courtesy to opponents.
40 See a collection of passages from Aristotle, bearing on the subject,
in Mackintosh’s _Dissertation_.
41 Cic. _De Finibus_, i. 5. This view is adopted in Tucker’s _Light of
Nature_ (ed. 1842), vol. i. p. 167. See, too, Mill’s _Analysis of
the Human Mind_, vol. ii. p. 174.
_ 42 Essay_, book ii. ch. xxxiii.
43 Hutcheson _On the Passions_, § 1. The “secondary desires” of
Hutcheson are closely related to the “reflex affections” of
Shaftesbury. “Not only the outward beings which offer themselves to
the sense are the objects of the affection; but the very actions
themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and
their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become
objects. So that by means of this reflected sense, there arises
another kind of affection towards those very affections
themselves.”—Shaftesbury’s _Enquiry concerning Virtue_, book i. part
ii. § 3.
44 See the preface to Hartley _On Man_. Gay’s essay is prefixed to
Law’s translation of Archbishop King _On the Origin of Evil_.
45 “The case is this. We first perceive or imagine some real good; i.e.
fitness to promote our happiness in those things which we love or
approve of.... Hence those things and pleasures are so tied together
and associated in our minds, that one cannot present itself, but the
other will also occur. And the association remains even after that
which at first gave them the connection is quite forgotten, or
perhaps does not exist, but the contrary.”—Gay’s _Essay_, p. lii.
“All affections whatsoever are finally resolvable into reason,
pointing out private happiness, and are conversant only about things
apprehended to be means tending to this end; and whenever this end
is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the association
of ideas, and may properly enough be called habits.”—Ibid. p. xxxi.
46 Principally by Mr. James Mill, whose chapter on association, in his
_Analysis of the Human Mind_, may probably rank with Paley’s
beautiful chapter on happiness, at the head of all modern writings
on the utilitarian side,—either of them, I think, being far more
valuable than anything Bentham ever wrote on morals. This last
writer—whose contempt for his predecessors was only equalled by his
ignorance of their works, and who has added surprisingly little to
moral science (considering the reputation he attained), except a
barbarous nomenclature and an interminable series of classifications
evincing no real subtlety of thought—makes, as far as I am aware, no
use of the doctrine of association. Paley states it with his usual
admirable clearness. “Having experienced in some instances a
particular conduct to be beneficial to ourselves, or observed that
it would be so, a sentiment of approbation rises up in our minds,
which sentiment afterwards accompanies the idea or mention of the
same conduct, although the private advantage which first existed no
longer exist.”—Paley, _Moral Philos_. i. 5. Paley, however, made
less use of this doctrine than might have been expected from so
enthusiastic an admirer of Tucker. In our own day it has been much
used by Mr. J. S. Mill.
47 This illustration, which was first employed by Hutcheson, is very
happily developed by Gay (p. lii.). It was then used by Hartley, and
finally Tucker reproduced the whole theory with the usual
illustration without any acknowledgment of the works of his
predecessors, employing however, the term “translation” instead of
“association” of ideas. See his curious chapter on the subject,
_Light of Nature_, book i. ch. xviii.
48 “It is the nature of translation to throw desire from the end upon
the means, which thenceforward become an end capable of exciting an
appetite without prospect of the consequences whereto they lead. Our
habits and most of the desires that occupy human life are of this
translated kind.”—Tucker’s _Light of Nature_, vol. ii. (ed. 1842),
p. 281.
49 Mill’s _Analysis of the Human Mind_. The desire for posthumous fame
is usually cited by intuitive moralists as a proof of a naturally
disinterested element in man.
50 Mill’s _Analysis_.
51 Hartley _On Man_, vol. i. pp. 474-475.
52 “Benevolence ... has also a high degree of honour and esteem annexed
to it, procures us many advantages and returns of kindness, both
from the person obliged and others, and is most closely connected
with the hopes of reward in a future state, and of self-approbation
or the moral sense; and the same things hold with respect to
generosity in a much higher degree. It is easy therefore to see how
such associations may be formed as to engage us to forego great
pleasure, or endure great pain for the sake of others, how these
associations may be attended with so great a degree of pleasure as
to overrule the positive pain endured or the negative one from the
foregoing of a pleasure, and yet how there may be no direct explicit
expectation of reward either from God or man, by natural consequence
or express appointment, not even of the concomitant pleasure that
engages the agent to undertake the benevolent and generous action;
and this I take to be a proof from the doctrine of association that
there is and must be such a thing as pure disinterested benevolence;
also a just account of the origin and nature of it.”—Hartley _On
Man_, vol. i. pp. 473-474. See too Mill’s _Analysis_, vol. ii. p.
252.
53 Mill’s _Analysis_, vol. ii. pp. 244-247.
54 “With self-interest,” said Hartley, “man must begin; he may end in
self-annihilation;” or as Coleridge happily puts it, “Legality
precedes morality in every individual, even as the Jewish
dispensation preceded the Christian in the world at large.”—_Notes
Theological and Political_, p. 340. It might be retorted with much
truth, that we begin by practising morality as a duty—we end by
practising it as a pleasure, without any reference to duty.
Coleridge, who expressed for the Benthamite theories a very cordial
detestation, sometimes glided into them himself. “The happiness of
man,” he says, “is the end of virtue, and truth is the knowledge of
the means.” (_The Friend_, ed. 1850, vol. ii. p. 192.) “What can be
the object of human virtue but the happiness of sentient, still more
of moral beings?” (_Notes Theol. and Polit._ p. 351.) Leibnitz says,
“Quand on aura appris à faire des actions louables par ambition, on
les fera après par inclination.” (_Sur l’ Art de connaître les
Hommes._)
55 E.g. Mackintosh and James Mill. Coleridge in his younger days was an
enthusiastic admirer of Hartley; but chiefly, I believe, on account
of his theory of vibrations. He named his son after him, and
described him in one of his poems as:—
“He of mortal kind
Wisest, the first who marked the ideal tribes
Up the fine fibres through the sentient brain.”
_Religious Musings._
56 This position is elaborated in a passage too long for quotation by
Mr. Austin. (_Lectures on Jurisprudence_, vol. i. p. 44.)
57 Hobbes defines conscience as “the opinion of evidence” (_On Human
Nature_, ch. vi. §8). Locke as “our own opinion or judgment of the
moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions” (_Essay_, book i. ch.
iii. § 8). In Bentham there is very little on the subject; but in
one place he informs us that “conscience is a thing of fictitious
existence, supposed to occupy a seat in the mind” (_Deontology_,
vol. i. p. 137); and in another he ranks “love of duty” (which he
describes as an “impossible motive, in so far as duty is synonymous
to obligation”) as a variety of the “love of power” (_Springs of
Action_, ii.) Mr. Bain says, “conscience is an imitation within
ourselves of the government without us.” (_Emotions and Will_, p.
313.)
58 “However much they [utilitarians] may believe (as they do) that
actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote
another end than virtue, yet this being granted ... they not only
place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means
to the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact
the possibility of its being to the individual a good in itself....
Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and
originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so....
What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of
happiness has come to be desired ... as part of happiness.... Human
nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a
part of happiness or a means of happiness.”—J. S. Mill’s
_Utilitarianism_, pp. 54, 55, 56, 58.
59 “A man is tempted to commit adultery with the wife of his friend.
The composition of the motive is obvious. He does not obey the
motive. Why? He obeys other motives which are stronger. Though
pleasures are associated with the immoral act, pains are associated
with it also—the pains of the injured husband, the pains of the
wife, the moral indignation of mankind, the future reproaches of his
own mind. Some men obey the first rather than the second motive. The
reason is obvious. In these the association of the act with the
pleasure is from habit unduly strong, the association of the act
with pains is from want of habit unduly weak. This is the case of a
bad education.... Among the different classes of motives, there are
men who are more easily and strongly operated on by some, others by
others. We have also seen that this is entirely owing to habits of
association. This facility of being acted upon by motives of a
particular description, is that which we call disposition.”—Mill’s
_Analysis_, vol. ii. pp. 212, 213, &c. Adam Smith says, I think with
much wisdom, that “the great secret of education is to direct vanity
to proper objects.”—_Moral Sentiments_, part vi. § 3.
60 “Goodness in ourselves is the prospect of satisfaction annexed to
the welfare of others, so that we please them for the pleasure we
receive ourselves in so doing, or to avoid the uneasiness we should
feel in omitting it. But God is completely happy in Himself, nor can
His happiness receive increase or diminution from anything befalling
His creatures; wherefore His goodness is pure, disinterested bounty,
without any return of joy or satisfaction to Himself. Therefore it
is no wonder we have imperfect notions of a quality whereof we have
no experience in our own nature.”—Tucker’s _Light of Nature_, vol.
i. p. 355. “It is the privilege of God alone to act upon pure,
disinterested bounty, without the least addition thereby to His own
enjoyment.”—Ibid. vol. ii. p. 279. On the other hand, Hutcheson
asks, “If there be such disposition in the Deity, where is the
impossibility of some small degree of this public love in His
creatures, and why must they be supposed incapable of acting but
from self-love?”—_Enquiry concerning Moral Good_, § 2.
61 “We gradually, through the influence of association, come to desire
the means without thinking of the end; the action itself becomes an
object of desire, and is performed without reference to any motive
beyond itself. Thus far, it may still be objected that the action
having, through association, become pleasurable, we are as much as
before moved to act by the anticipation of pleasure, namely, the
pleasure of the action itself. But granting this, the matter does
not end here. As we proceed in the formation of habits, and become
accustomed to will a particular act ... because it is pleasurable,
we at last continue to will it without any reference to its being
pleasurable.... In this manner it is that habits of hurtful excess
continue to be practised, although they have ceased to be
pleasurable, and in this manner also it is that the habit of willing
to persevere in the course which he has chosen, does not desert the
moral hero, even when the reward ... is anything but an equivalent
for the suffering he undergoes, or the wishes he may have to
renounce.”—Mill’s _Logic_ (4th edition), vol. ii. pp. 416, 417.
62 “In regard to interest in the most extended, which is the original
and only strictly proper sense of the word disinterested, no human
act has ever been or ever can be disinterested.... In the only sense
in which disinterestedness can with truth be predicated of human
actions, it is employed ... to denote, not the absence of all
interest ... but only the absence of all interest of the
self-regarding class. Not but that it is very frequently predicated
of human action in cases in which divers interests, to no one of
which the appellation of self-regarding can with propriety be
denied, have been exercising their influence, and in particular fear
of God, or hope from God, and fear of ill-repute, or hope of good
repute. If what is above be correct, the most disinterested of men
is not less under the dominion of interest than the most interested.
The only cause of his being styled disinterested, is its not having
been observed that the sort of motive (suppose it sympathy for an
individual or class) has as truly a corresponding interest belonging
to it as any other species of motive has. Of this contradiction
between the truth of the case and the language employed in speaking
of it, the cause is that in the one case men have not been in the
habit of making—as in point of consistency they ought to have
made—of the word interest that use which in the other case they have
been in the habit of making of it.”—Bentham’s _Springs of Action_,
ii. § 2.
63 Among others Bishop Butler, who draws some very subtle distinctions
on the subject in his first sermon “on the love of our neighbour.”
Dugald Stewart remarks that “although we apply the epithet selfish
to avarice and to low and private sensuality, we never apply it to
the desire of knowledge or to the pursuits of virtue, which are
certainly sources of more exquisite pleasure than riches or
sensuality can bestow.”—_Active and Moral Powers_, vol. i. p. 19.
64 Sir W. Hamilton.
65 Cic. _De Fin._ lib. ii.
66 “As there is not any sort of pleasure that is not itself a good, nor
any sort of pain the exemption from which is not a good, and as
nothing but the expectation of the eventual enjoyment of pleasure in
some shape, or of exemption from pain in some shape, can operate in
the character of a motive, a necessary consequence is that if by
motive be meant _sort_ of motive, there is not any such thing as a
bad motive.”—Bentham’s _Springs of Action_, ii. § 4. The first
clauses of the following passage I have already quoted: “Pleasure is
itself a good, nay, setting aside immunity from pain, the only good.
Pain is in itself an evil, and indeed, without exception, the only
evil, or else the words good and evil have no meaning. And this is
alike true of every sort of pain, and of every sort of pleasure. It
follows therefore immediately and incontestably that there is no
such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad
one.”—_Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. ix. “The search
after motive is one of the prominent causes of men’s bewilderment in
the investigation of questions of morals.... But this is a pursuit
in which every moment employed is a moment wasted. All motives are
abstractedly good. No man has ever had, can, or could have a motive
different from the pursuit of pleasure or of shunning
pain.”—_Deontology_, vol. i. p. 126. Mr. Mill’s doctrine appears
somewhat different from this, but the difference is I think only
apparent. He says: “The motive has nothing to do with the morality
of the action, though much with the worth of the agent,” and he
afterwards explains this last statement by saying that the “motive
makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent,
especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual disposition, a
bent of character from which useful or from which hurtful actions
are likely to arise.”—_Utilitarianism_, 2nd ed. pp. 26-27.
67 This truth has been admirably illustrated by Mr. Herbert Spencer
(_Social Statics_, pp. 1-8).
68 “On évalue la grandeur de la vertu en comparant les biens obtenus
aux maux au prix desquels on les achète: l’excédant en bien mesure
la valeur de la vertu, comme l’excédant en mal mesure le degré de
haine que doit inspirer le vice.”—Ch. Comte, _Traité de
Législation_, liv. ii. ch. xii.
69 M. Dumont, the translator of Bentham, has elaborated in a rather
famous passage the utilitarian notions about vengeance. “Toute
espèce de satisfaction entraînant une peine pour le délinquant
produit naturellement un plaisir de vengeance pour la partie lésée.
Ce plaisir est un gain. Il rappelle la parabole de Samson. C’est le
doux qui sort du terrible. C’est le miel recueilli dans la gueule du
lion. Produit sans frais, résultat net d’une opération nécessaire à
d’autres titres, c’est une jouissance à cultiver comme toute autre;
car le plaisir de la vengeance considérée abstraitement n’est comme
tout autre plaisir qu’un bien en lui-même.”—_Principes du Code
pénal_, 2me partie, ch. xvi. According to a very acute living writer
of this school, “The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge
in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite” (J. F.
Stephen, _On the Criminal Law of England_, p. 99). Mr. Mill observes
that, “In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete
spirit of the ethics of utility” (_Utilitarianism_, p. 24). It is
but fair to give a specimen of the opposite order of extravagance.
“So well convinced was Father Claver of the eternal happiness of
almost all whom he assisted,” says this saintly missionary’s
biographer, “that speaking once of some persons who had delivered a
criminal into the hands of justice, he said, God _forgive_ them; but
they have secured the salvation of this man at _the probable risk of
their own_.”—Newman’s _Anglican Difficulties_, p. 205.
_ 70 De Ordine_, ii. 4. The experiment has more than once been tried at
Venice, Pisa, &c., and always with the results St. Augustine
predicted.
71 The reader will here observe the very transparent sophistry of an
assertion which is repeated ad nauseam by utilitarians. They tell us
that a regard to the remote consequences of our actions would lead
us to the conclusion that we should never perform an act which would
not be conducive to human happiness if it were universally
performed, or, as Mr. Austin expresses it, that “the question is if
acts of this class were generally done or generally forborne or
omitted, what would be the probable effect on the general happiness
or good?” (_Lectures on Jurisprudence_, vol. i. p. 32.) The question
is nothing of the kind. If I am convinced that utility alone
constitutes virtue, and if I am meditating any particular act, the
sole question of morality must be whether that act is on the whole
useful, produces a net result of happiness. To determine this
question I must consider both the immediate and the remote
consequences of the act; but the latter are not ascertained by
asking what would be the result if every one did as I do, but by
asking how far, as a matter of fact, my act is likely to produce
imitators, or affect the conduct and future acts of others. It may
no doubt be convenient and useful to form classifications based on
the general tendency of different courses to promote or diminish
happiness, but such classifications cannot alter the morality of
particular acts. It is quite clear that no act which produces on the
whole more pleasure than pain can on utilitarian principles be
vicious. It is, I think, equally clear that no one could act
consistently on such a principle without being led to consequences
which in the common judgment of mankind are grossly and scandalously
immoral.
72 There are some very good remarks on the possibility of living a life
of imagination wholly distinct from the life of action in Mr. Bain’s
_Emotions and Will_, p. 246.
73 Bentham especially recurs to this subject frequently. See Sir J.
Bowring’s edition of his works (Edinburgh, 1843), vol. i. pp. 142,
143, 562; vol. x. pp. 549-550.
74 “Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives
pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral? And if exactly
in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of
selfishness they do not with one voice answer ‘immoral,’ let the
morality of the principle of utility be for ever condemned.”—Mill’s
_Dissert_. vol. ii. p. 485. “We deprive them [animals] of life, and
this is justifiable—their pains do not equal our enjoyments. There
is a balance of good.”—Bentham’s _Deontology_, vol. i. p. 14. Mr.
Mill accordingly defines the principle of utility, without any
special reference to man. “The creed which accepts as the foundation
of morals, utility or the great happiness principle, holds that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness.”—_Utilitarianism_, pp. 9-10.
75 The exception of course being domestic animals, which may be injured
by ill treatment, but even this exception is a very partial one. No
selfish reason could prevent any amount of cruelty to animals that
were about to be killed, and even in the case of previous ill-usage
the calculations of selfishness will depend greatly upon the price
of the animal. I have been told that on some parts of the continent
diligence horses are systematically under-fed, and worked to a
speedy death, their cheapness rendering such a course the most
economical.
76 Bentham, as we have seen, is of opinion that the gastronomic
pleasure would produce the requisite excess of enjoyment. Hartley,
who has some amiable and beautiful remarks on the duty of kindness
to animals, without absolutely condemning, speaks with much aversion
of the custom of eating “our brothers and sisters,” the animals.
(_On Man_, vol. ii. pp. 222-223.) Paley, observing that it is quite
possible for men to live without flesh-diet, concludes that the only
sufficient justification for eating meat is an express divine
revelation in the Book of Genesis. (_Moral Philos._ book ii. ch.
11.) Some reasoners evade the main issue by contending that they
kill animals because they would otherwise overrun the earth; but
this, as Windham said, “is an indifferent reason for killing fish.”
77 In commenting upon the French licentiousness of the eighteenth
century, Hume says, in a passage which has excited a great deal of
animadversion:—“Our neighbours, it seems, have resolved to sacrifice
some of the domestic to the social pleasures; and to prefer ease,
freedom, and an open commerce, to strict fidelity and constancy.
These ends are both good, and are somewhat difficult to reconcile;
nor must we be surprised if the customs of nations incline too much
sometimes to the one side, and sometimes to the other.”—_Dialogue._
78 There are few things more pitiable than the blunders into which
writers have fallen when trying to base the plain virtue of chastity
on utilitarian calculations. Thus since the writings of Malthus it
has been generally recognised that one of the very first conditions
of all material prosperity is to check early marriages, to restrain
the tendency of population to multiply more rapidly than the means
of subsistence. Knowing this, what can be more deplorable than to
find moralists making such arguments as these the very foundation of
morals?—“The first and great mischief, and by consequence the guilt,
of promiscuous concubinage consists in its tendency to diminish
marriages.” (Paley’s _Moral Philosophy_, book iii. part iii. ch.
ii.) “That is always the most happy condition of a nation, and that
nation is most accurately obeying the laws of our constitution, in
which the number of the human race is most rapidly increasing. Now
it is certain that under the law of chastity, that is, when
individuals are exclusively united to each other, the increase of
population will be more rapid than under any other circumstances.”
(Wayland’s _Elements of Moral Science_, p. 298, 11th ed., Boston,
1839.) I am sorry to bring such subjects before the reader, but it
is impossible to write a history of morals without doing so.
79 See Luther’s _Table Talk_.
80 Tillemont, _Mém. pour servir à l’Hist. ecclésiastique_, tome x. p.
57.
81 Τό τε ἀληθεύειν καὶ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν. (Ælian, _Var. Hist._ xii. 59.)
Longinus in like manner divides virtue into εὐεργεσία καὶ ἀλήθεια.
(_De Sublim._ § 1.) The opposite view in England is continually
expressed in the saying, “You should never pull down an opinion
until you have something to put in its place,” which can only mean,
if you are convinced that some religious or other hypothesis is
false, you are morally bound to repress or conceal your conviction
until you have discovered positive affirmations or explanations as
unqualified and consolatory as those you have destroyed.
82 See this powerfully stated by Shaftesbury. (_Inquiry concerning
Virtue_, book i. part iii.) The same objection applies to Dr.
Mansel’s modification of the theological doctrine—viz. that the
origin of morals is not the will but the nature of God.
83 “The one great and binding ground of the belief of God and a
hereafter is the law of conscience.”—Coleridge, _Notes Theological
and Political_, p. 367. That our moral faculty is our one reason for
maintaining the supreme benevolence of the Deity was a favourite
position of Kant.
84 “Nescio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium
futurorum; idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis et
exsistit maxime et apparet facillime.”—Cic. _Tusc. Disp._ i. 14.
85 “It is a calumny to say that men are roused to heroic actions by
ease, hope of pleasure, recompense—sugar-plums of any kind in this
world or the next. In the meanest mortal there lies something
nobler. The poor swearing soldier hired to be shot has his ‘honour
of a soldier,’ different from drill, regulations, and the shilling a
day. It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true
things, and vindicate himself under God’s heaven as a God-made man,
that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing
that, the dullest day-drudge kindles into a hero. They wrong man
greatly who say he is to be seduced by ease. Difficulty, abnegation,
martyrdom, death, are the allurements that act on the heart of man.
Kindle the inner genial life of him, you have a flame that burns up
all lower considerations.”—Carlyle’s _Hero-worship_, p. 237 (ed.
1858).
86 “Clamat Epicurus, is quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum
dicitis, non posse jucunde vivi nisi sapienter, honeste, justeque
vivatur, nec sapienter, honeste, juste nisi jucunde.”—Cicero, _De
Fin._ i. 18.