THE LAST DAY
I was greatly concerned lest the President should be unable by reason of
his physical condition to stand the strain of Inauguration Day. Indeed,
members of his Cabinet and intimate friends like Grayson and myself had
tried to persuade him not to take part, but he could not by any argument
be drawn away from what he believed to be his duty--to join in the
inauguration of his successor, President-elect Harding. The thought that
the people of the country might misconstrue his attitude if he should
remain away and his firm resolve to show every courtesy to his successor
in office were the only considerations that led him to play his part to
the end. When I arrived at the White House early on the morning of the 4th
of March, the day of the inauguration, I found him in his study, smiling
and gracious as ever. He acted like a boy who was soon to be out of school
and free of the burdens that had for eight years weighed him down to the
breaking point. He expressed to me the feeling of relief that he was
experiencing now that his term of office was really at an end. I recalled
to him the little talk we had had on the same day, four years before, upon
the conclusion of the ceremonies incident to his own inauguration in 1917.
At the time we were seated in the Executive office. Turning away from his
desk and gazing out of the window which overlooked the beautiful White
House lawn and gardens, he said: "Well, how I wish this were March 4,
1921. What a relief it will be to do what I please and to say what I
please; but more than that, to write my own impressions of the things that
have been going on under my own eyes. I have felt constantly a personal
detachment from the Presidency. The one thing I resent when I am not
performing the duties of the office is being reminded that I am President
of the United States. I feel toward this office as a man feels toward a
great function which in his working hours he is obliged to perform but
which, out of working hours, he is glad to get away from and resume the
quiet course of his own thought. I tell you, my friend, it will be great
to be free again."
On this morning, March 4, 1921, he acted like a man who was happy now that
his dearest wish was to be realized. As I looked at Woodrow Wilson, seated
in his study that morning, in his cutaway coat, awaiting word of the
arrival of President-elect Harding at the White House, to me he was every
inch the President, quiet, dignified; ready to meet the duties of the
trying day upon which he was now to enter, in his countenance a calm
nobility. It was hard for me to realize as I beheld him, seated behind his
desk in his study, that here was the head of the greatest nation in the
world who in a few hours was to step back into the uneventful life of a
private citizen.
A few minutes and he was notified that the President-elect was in the Blue
Room awaiting his arrival. Alone, unaided, grasping his old blackthorn
stick, the faithful companion of many months, his "third leg," as he
playfully called it, slowly he made his way to the elevator and in a few
seconds he was standing in the Blue Room meeting the President-elect and
greeting him in the most gracious way. No evidence of the trial of pain he
was undergoing in striving to play a modest part in the ceremonies was
apparent either in his bearing or attitude, as he greeted the President-
elect and the members of the Congressional Inaugural Committee. He was an
ill man but a sportsman, determined to see the thing through to the end.
President-elect Harding met him in the most kindly fashion, showing him
the keenest consideration and courtesy.
And now the final trip to the Capitol from the White House. The ride to
the Capitol was uneventful. From the physical appearance of the two men
seated beside each other in the automobile, it was plain to the casual
observer who was the out-going and who the in-coming President. In the
right sat President Wilson, gray, haggard, broken. He interpreted the
cheering from the crowds that lined the Avenue as belonging to the
President-elect and looked straight ahead. It was Mr. Harding's day, not
his. On the left, Warren Gamaliel Harding, the rising star of the
Republic, healthy, vigorous, great-chested, showing every evidence in his
tanned face of that fine, sturdy health so necessary a possession in order
to grapple with the problems of his country. One, the man on the right, a
battle-scarred veteran, a casualty of the war, now weary and anxious to
lay down the reins of office; the other, agile, vigorous, hopeful, and
full of enthusiasm for the tasks that confronted him. Upon the face of the
one were written in indelible lines the scars and tragedies of war; on
that of the other, the lines of confidence, hope, and readiness for the
fray.
The Presidential party arrived at the Capitol. Woodrow Wilson took
possession of the President's room. Modestly the President-elect took a
seat in the rear of the room while President Wilson conferred with
senators and representatives who came to talk with him about bills in
which they were interested, bills upon which he must act before the old
clock standing in a corner of the room should strike the hour of twelve,
noon, marking the end of the official relationship of Woodrow Wilson with
the affairs of the Government of the United States. It was about eleven-
thirty. Senators and congressmen of both parties poured into the office to
say good-bye to the man seated at the table, and then made their way over
to congratulate the President-elect.
It was a few minutes before twelve o'clock. The weary man at the table was
still the President, still the ruler of a great people, the possessor for
a little while longer, just a little while longer, of more power than any
king in Christendom.
Presently there appeared at the door a gray-haired man of imperious
manner. Addressing the President in a sharp, dry tone of voice, he said:
"Mr. President, we have come as a committee of the Senate to notify you
that the Senate and House are about to adjourn and await your pleasure."
The spokesman for the committee was Henry Cabot Lodge, the distinguished
senator from Massachusetts, the implacable political foe of the man he was
addressing.
It was an interesting study to watch the face and manner of Woodrow Wilson
as he met the gaze of Senator Lodge who by his attacks had destroyed the
great thing of which the President had dreamed, the thing for which he had
fought and for which he was ready to lay down his life. It appeared for a
second as if Woodrow Wilson was about to give full sway to the passionate
resentment he felt toward the man who, he believed, had unfairly treated
him throughout the famous Treaty fight. But quickly the shadow of
resentment passed. A ghost of a smile flitted across his firm mouth, and
steadying himself in his chair, he said in a low voice: "Senator Lodge, I
have no further communication to make. I thank you. Good morning."
Senator Lodge and the committee withdrew from the room. I looked at the
clock in the corner. A few minutes more and all the power which the weary
man at the table possessed would fall from his shoulders. All left the
room except the President, Mrs. Wilson, Admiral Grayson, and myself.
The old clock in the corner of the room began to toll the hour of twelve.
Mechanically I counted, under my breath, the strokes: "One, two, three,"
on through "twelve," and the silent room echoed with the low vibration of
the last stroke.
Woodrow Wilson was no longer President. By the votes of the American
people he had been returned to the ranks of his fellow countrymen. A great
warrior had passed from the field, a leading actor had made his exit. The
dearest wish of his political enemies had at last been realized. The
prayers of his devoted friends that he would live to see the eight years
of his administration through, had been answered. His own bearing and
attitude did not indicate that anything unusual had happened.
Quickly Woodrow Wilson, now the private citizen, turned to make his way to
the elevator, leaning on his cane, the ferrule striking sharply on the
stone pavement as he walked; but his spirit was indomitable. A few minutes
before all interest had been centred upon him. Now but a few loyal friends
remained behind. Interest was transferred to the scene being enacted a few
feet away in the Senate Chamber, the induction into office of Vice-
President Coolidge. By the time we reached the elevator, the brief
ceremony in the Senate Chamber had ended, and the multitude outside were
cheering Mr. Harding as he appeared at the east front of the Capitol to
deliver his inaugural address. We heard the United States Marine Band
playing "Hail to the Chief." For a few seconds I looked toward the
reviewing stand. The new President, Warren G. Harding, was taking his
place on the stand amid the din and roar of applause. He was the focus of
all eyes, the pivot around which all interest turned. Not one of the
thousands turned to look at the lonely figure laboriously climbing into
the automobile. The words of Ibsen flashed into my mind:
The strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone.
THE END
APPENDIX "A"
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
10 December, 1918.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris, France.
Stories that you have agreed to sinking of German ships have caused great
deal of unfavourable comment here.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
16 December, 1918.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
C/O American Embassy, Paris, France.
Most popular note in this country in your speech are the words _Quote_ We
must rebuke acts of terror and spoliation and make men everywhere aware
that they cannot be ventured upon without certainty of just punishment
_End Quote._
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
21 December, 1918.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
If it is America's intention to back up the Allies in sinking German
ships, the idea is so vague in this country that there ought to be a great
deal of elucidation if the President intends to take this stand. Hope the
President will be more definite than he has been in speeches in reference
to League of Nations and freedom of the seas. His enemies here and abroad
hope that he will particularize so that they can attack him. People of the
world are with him on general principles. They care little for details.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
22 December, 1918.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
American Embassy, Paris.
Springfield _Republican _editorially gives expression to fear that
President may be made captive by Allied Imperialism and says _Quote_ The
conditions and atmosphere which now envelop him may be calculated to fill
his mind with doubts as to the wisdom of his previous views and to expose
him to the peril of vacillation, compromise, and virtual surrender of
vital principles _End Quote_. Country deeply pleased by impression Mrs.
Wilson has made abroad.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
24 December, 1918
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Care Of American Embassy, Paris, France.
Stories appearing here stating in effect that you intend to appeal to
people of Europe bound to do great deal of harm. My affectionate Christmas
Greetings to Mrs. Wilson and you.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
31 December, 1918.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris, France.
Clemenceau's speech, wherein he advocated a world settlement based upon
the old balance of power ideas, demonstrates necessity for and wisdom of
your trip, and has set stage for final issue between balance of power and
League of Nations. If America fails now, socialism rules the world and if
international fair-play under democracy cannot curb nationalistic
ambitions, there is nothing left but socialism upon which Russia and
Germany have already embarked. You can do nothing more serviceable than
without seeming to disagree with Clemenceau, drive home in your speeches
differences between two ideals, one, the balance of power means
continuance of war; other, concert of nations means universal peace. One
has meant great standing armies with larger armaments and burdensome
taxation, consequent unrest and bolshevism. If the statesmanship at
Versailles cannot settle these things in the spirit of justice, bolshevism
will settle them in a spirit of injustice. The world is ready for the
issue. Clemenceau has given you great chance; this country and whole world
will sustain you. Country ready to back you up when you ask for its
support. Everything fine here.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
6 January, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Hope you will consider the suggestion for your return trip. Your personal
contact with peoples of Europe has done much to help your programme. Our
people will be with your programme, but it (the programme) must be
personally conducted. If you return here without reception or ovation,
public opinion on other side liable to misunderstand. The time of your
return (in my opinion) is the hour for you to strike in favour of League
of Nations. Lodge and leading Republicans constantly attacking, excepting
Taft, who is daily warning them of political dangers of their opposition
to your programme. Could you not consider stopping upon your return at
Port of Boston instead of New York. The announcement of your stopping at
Boston would make ovation inevitable throughout New England and would
centre attack on Lodge. You have not been to New England in six years. It
would be a gracious act and would help much. It would strengthen League of
Nations movement in House and Senate and encourage our friends in Senate
and House and throughout country. Our people just as emotional as people
of Europe. If you return without reception, Lodge and others will construe
it as weakness. If the people of our country could have seen you as people
of Europe, our situation would be much improved, especially result of last
November would have been different. My suggestion would be speech at
Faneuil Hall, Boston; speech in Providence, New Haven, New York and
reception upon return to Washington, to be participated in by returning
soldiers.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
6 January, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
The attitude of the whole country toward trip has changed. Feeling
universal that you have carried yourself magnificently through critical
situations, with prestige and influence greatly enhanced here and abroad.
The criticisms of the cloak-room statesmen have lost their force. I
realize difficulties still to be met, but have no doubt of result. Trip
admitted here by everybody to be wonderful success. Last week with perils
of visit to Vatican most critical. The whole psychology favours the
success of your trip. The peoples of Europe and the United States with you
for League of Nations and against settlements based upon balance of power.
Opinion here is that cards are stacked against you. My own opinion your
influence so great in Europe that European leaders cannot stand in your
way. Now is the critical moment and there must be no wasting away of your
influence in unnecessary delay of conference. Hearts of the peoples of the
world for League of Nations and they are indifferent to its actual terms.
They are against militarism and for any reasonable plan to effectuate
peace.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
13 January 1919.
THE PRESIDENT,
Paris.
In past two weeks the trend of newspaper dispatches from Paris has
indicated a misunderstanding of your general attitude towards problems
pending at peace conference. One newspaper cablegram says today that
France, Italy and Great Britain have agreed to subordinate your league of
nations programme to the need for counteracting bolshevism and collecting
damages from Germany. Another a few days ago reported that Clemenceau had
made headway with his insistence upon maintenance of balance of power.
Still another outlined victory of Great Britain in her opposition to
freedom of seas, stating that you had abandoned your position in response
to arguments of France, supporting Great Britain. Similar stories would
give impression that you were yielding, although we are aware that some of
the suggestions for compromise are probably your own. Situation could
easily be remedied if you would occasionally call in the three press
association correspondents who crossed on _George Washington_ with you,
merely giving them an understanding of the developments as they occur and
asking them not to use information as coming from you, but merely for
their own guidance. It would show wisdom of various compromises as well as
circumstances of such compromises. Proposal of Lloyd George that the
Russian Bolshevik be invited to send peace delegates to Paris produced
very unfavourable impression everywhere. It is denounced here as amazing.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
16 January 1919.
REAR ADMIRAL CARY T. GRAYSON,
Care of President Wilson, Paris.
American newspapers filled with stories this morning of critical character
about rule of secrecy adopted for Peace Conference, claiming that the
first of the fourteen points has been violated. In my opinion, if
President has consented to this, it will be fatal. The matter is so
important to the people of the world that he could have afforded to go any
length even to leaving the conference than to submit to this ruling. His
attitude in this matter will lose a great deal of the confidence and
support of the people of the world which he has had up to this time.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
January 16, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Your cable about misunderstandings concerning my attitude toward problems
created by the newspaper cablegrams concerns a matter which I admit I do
not know how to handle. Every one of the things you mention is a fable. I
have not only yielded nothing but have been asked to yield nothing. These
manoeuvres which the cablegram speaks of are purely imaginary. I cannot
check them from this end because the men who sent them insist on having
something to talk about whether they know what the facts are or not. I
will do my best with the three press associations.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
January 17, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Distressed to hear of your illness. Beg that you will make it your chief
duty to take care of yourself and get well. All unite in most affectionate
messages. Everything going well here. Very few of the troubles spoken of
by the newspapers are visible to me on the spot.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
January 21, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
The issue of publicity is being obscured by the newspaper men and we have
won for the press all that is possible or wise to win, namely, complete
publicity for real conferences. Publicity for the conversations I am
holding with the small group of the great powers will invariably break up
the whole thing, whereas the prospects for agreement are now, I should
say, very good indeed. Delighted that you are up and beg that you will not
expose yourself or exert yourself too soon. Affectionate messages from us
all.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
29 January, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Notice in morning papers discussion with reference to disposition of
German colonies. Call your attention to speech of British Premier
delivered in January as follows: _Quote_ with regard to German colonies, I
have repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a
conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes of the
native inhabitants. The general principle of national self-determination
therefore is applicable in their cases as in those of the occupied
European territories _End quote_. I believe that Balfour made a similar
statement.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris_.
Received at White House, Washington,
March 15, 1919.
President's Residence, Paris
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
The Plenary Council has positively decided that the League of Nations is
to be part of the Peace Treaty. There is absolutely no truth in report to
the contrary.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
16 March 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
Believe your most critical time in setting forward America's position at
conference has come. Opposition to League growing more intense from day to
day. Its bitterness and pettiness producing reaction. New polls throughout
country indicate strong drift toward league. League of Nations and just
peace inseparable. Neither half can stand alone. Know you will not be
drawn away from announced programme to incorporate League covenant in
treaty. You can afford to go any length in insisting upon this. There is
no doubt of your success here and abroad. The real friends of a
constructive peace have not begun to fight. Everything fine here.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
25 March, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
There is great danger to you in the present situation. I can see signs
that our enemies here and abroad would try to make it appear that you are
responsible for delay in peace settlement and that delay has increased
momentum of bolshevism and anarchy in Hungary and Balkans. Can
responsibility for delay be fixed by you in some way?
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cable From the Associated Press at Paris._
Paris, March 27, 1919.
President Wilson to-day issued the following statement:
_Quote_ in view of the very surprising impression which seems to exist in
some quarters, that it is the discussions of the commission on the league
of nations that are delaying the final formulation of peace, I am very
glad to take the opportunity of reporting that the conclusions of this
commission were the first to be laid before the plenary conference.
They were reported on February 14, and the world has had a full month in
which to discuss every feature of the draft covenant then submitted.
During the last few days the commission has been engaged in an effort to
take advantage of the criticisms which the publication of the covenant has
fortunately drawn out. A committee of the commission has also had the
advantage of a conference with representatives of the neutral states, who
are evidencing a very deep interest and a practically unanimous desire to
align themselves with the league.
The revised covenant is now practically finished. It is in the hands of a
committee for the final process of drafting, and will almost immediately
be presented a second time to the public.
The conferences of the commission have invariably been held at times when
they could not interfere with the consultation of those who have
undertaken to formulate the general conclusions of the conference with
regard to the many other complicated problems of peace, so that the
members of the commissions congratulate themselves on the fact that no
part of their conferences has ever interposed any form of delay _End
quote_.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
25 March, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
St. Louis _Republic_ of Saturday reporting speech of Senator Reed
referring to provision naming members of League says: _Quote_ he told of
what he called a secret protocol and intimated that Germany is included in
this secret protocol _End quote_. Advise whether or not there is any
secret protocol such as Senator claims or of any character, attached to
League Covenant.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris_.
Received at White House, Washington,
March 27, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Statement that there is any sort of secret protocol connected with or
suggested in connection with the League of Nations is absolutely false.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
March 28, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
Stories here this morning that amendment for Monroe Doctrine and racial
discrimination to be excluded from covenant causing a great deal of
uneasiness.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
March 30, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
In an editorial entitled _Treat or Fight_, Springfield _Republican_ says:
_Quote_ It is plain that the Allies dare not commit themselves to an
avowed war on the soviets and that it is not possible for the Allies with
the world in its present temper to take the position that the existence of
the soviet form of government in any country constitutes a casus belli;
that the world would recoil from the proposal to begin a new series of war
with so dubious an object; that Russia should be left to manage her own
affairs _End Quote_. Editorial disagreed with policy of French Government
towards Russia and soviets. Calls attention to disastrous results of
foreign intervention during French Revolution, Editorial further says:
_Quote_ Impossible to fight revolution in one place and be at peace
elsewhere. If Allies mean to fight Hungary because it has set up a soviet
form of government and allied itself to Russia they will have to fight
Russia. If they fight Russia they will have to fight the Ukraine. Such a
war would mean the end of the League of Nations. It is plain that the
Allies dare not commit themselves to an avowed war on the Soviets _End
Quote_.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
March 30, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
Dispatches from Simonds and others prove stories of weeks ago were most
optimistic now touched with deep pessimism. Simonds in article on Saturday
says: Quote No common objective in council; no dominating influence;
drifting, etc. End Quote. I fear your real position in council not
understood here and that lack of publicity strengthening many false
impressions. The responsibility attaching to those associated with you,
including France and England, when they accepted Fourteen Points evidently
lost sight of by them. Do not know what your real situation is, but it
appears to me that Germany is not prepared to accept the kind of peace
which is about to be offered, or if she does accept, with its burdensome
conditions, it means the spread of bolshevism throughout Germany and
central Europe. It seems to me that you ought in some way to reassert your
leadership publicly. I know the danger, but you cannot escape
responsibility unless you do so. Now is the moment in my opinion to strike
for a settlement permanent and lasting.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
2 April, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
The proposed recognition of Lenine has caused consternation here.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 4, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Am still confident that President will win. Encountering difficulties;
situation serious. President is the hope of the world more than ever, and
with his courage, wisdom, and force he will lead the way. Have you any
suggestions as to publicity or otherwise?
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 4, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
The President took very severe cold last night; confined to bed. Do not
worry; will keep you advised.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 5, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
We are naturally disappointed at progress being made but not discouraged.
Hopeful everything will turn out all right. Will advise you if anything
definite develops. The President is better this morning but confined to
bed. No cause for worry.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 5, 1919.
GRAYSON,
% President Wilson, Paris.
In my opinion the President must in some dramatic way clear the air of
doubts and misunderstandings and despair which now pervade the whole world
situation. He must take hold of the situation with both hands and shake it
out of its present indecision, or political sabotage and scheming will
triumph. Only a bold stroke by the President will save Europe and perhaps
the world. That stroke must be made regardless of the cries and
admonitions of his friendly advisers. He has tried to settle the issue in
secret; only publicity of a dramatic kind now can save the situation. This
occasion calls for that audacity which has helped him win in every fight.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 6, 1919.
TUMULTY,
Washington.
The President says the situation here is extremely complex and intricate,
but seems to be improving and he expects to have it in hand this week, but
if necessary will act according to your suggestions. The President is
confined to bed but steadily improving. Thanks for your telegram.
Grayson.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 8, 1919.
TUMULTY,
Washington.
President attended conference in his study this afternoon. Situation shows
some improvement. President has ordered _George Washington_ to proceed
here immediately.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
April 9,1919.
GRAYSON,
Care President Wilson, Paris.
The ordering of the _George Washington_ to return to France looked upon
here as an act of impatience and petulance on the President's part and not
accepted here in good grace by either friends or foes. It is considered as
an evidence that the President intends to leave the Conference if his
views are not accepted. I think this method of withdrawal most unwise and
fraught with the most dangerous possibilities here and abroad, because it
puts upon the President the responsibility of withdrawing when the
President should by his own act place the responsibility for a break of
the Conference where it properly belongs. The President should not put
himself in the position of being the first to withdraw if his 14 points
are not accepted. Either he should put himself in the position of being
the one who remained at the Conference until the very last, demanding the
acceptance of his 14 principles. Nothing should be said about his leaving
France, but he ought when the time and occasion arrive to re-state his
views in terms of the deepest solemnity and yet without any ultimatum
attached and then await a response from his associates. In other words,
let him by his acts and words place his associates in the position of
those who refuse to continue the Conference because of their unwillingness
to live up to the terms of the Armistice. Then the President can return to
this country and justify his withdrawal. He cannot justify his withdrawal
any other way. Up to this time the world has been living on stories coming
out of Paris that there was to be an agreement on the League of Nations.
Suddenly out of a clear sky comes an order for the _George Washington_ and
unofficial statements of the President's withdrawal. A withdrawal at this
time would be a desertion.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
9 April, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
A great number of your friends here fear that the interposition of United
States in matter of indemnity and reparation which is a paramount question
with European nations and only of indirect interest to us will solidify
the opposition of England, France, Italy, and Belgium to a league of
nations. Our friends believe that any necessary sacrifices to assure a
league of nations should be made. Your supporters would be happy if you
could throw upon the other nations the burden of exacting indemnities and
at the same time win their support to a league of nations.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
10 April, 1919.
TUMULTY,
Washington.
President made good progress to-day by hammering ahead with his own force.
His health is improving; out for a short drive this afternoon; first
outing since last Thursday.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 10, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Have shown your message to the President. From your side of the water your
points are well taken, but he has formed his ideas through immediate
contact with actual conditions on this side of the world.... More progress
has been made in the last two days than has been made for the last two
weeks. Am spending all the time I can in guiding correspondents and
showing them every attention. I confer with Grasty every day. The
President is working too hard following his recent illness. To know that
things are going on and not properly handled, and yet be responsible for
them, causes him more worry and anxiety and does more harm than actual
participation. This is a matter that worries me. If his health ca hold out
I am still confident he will win handsomely. Am keeping as cheerful a
front as possible over here.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 12, 1919.
TUMULTY,
Washington.
So far as it is possible to tell amidst complexity of selfish interests
things seem to be slowly clearing. President sends you his love and says
keep stiff upper lip.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
April 24, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House.
Thank you for your cable about Industrial Board. On the whole I think they
have got into a blind alley, but I am glad you are going to obtain Hines'
opinion. _Do not give yourself any concern about secret treaties. You may
be sure I will enter into none._
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
30 April, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Beg to call your attention to following editorial from Springfield
_Republican_. _Quote_ The critical period in the peacemaking has been
reached when progress can win over reaction the very least of victories
only by a resolute stand of the most commanding figure in Paris. France
and England cannot desert the President without branding themselves as
hypocrites and ingrates. Worse things could happen than for the President
to come home without a peace treaty, leaving Europe to wallow in the mire
of national rivalries and hates to which reaction would sentence it for
all time. There is no compelling reason why America should sign a treaty
that would merely perpetuate ancient feuds and make new wars a certainty.
Our chief interest in the Conference at Paris, as the President declared
at Manchester, is the peace of the world. Unless that can be made
reasonably sure, with Europe's sincere cooperation, the time is near when
'pack up and come home' will be America's only policy _End Quote_.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
8 May, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
In your cable you spoke of forwarding message to Congress. Have you made
up your mind as to what you will discuss? Would like to suggest certain
things I believe vital.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
Received at White House, Washington,
May 9, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Happily there is no mystery or privacy about what I have promised the
Government here. I have promised to propose to the Senate a supplement in
which we shall agree, subject to the approval of the Council of the League
of Nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France in case of
unprovoked attack by Germany, thus merely hastening the action to which we
should be bound by the Government of the League of Nations.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
22 May, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Great demonstration New York last night, addressed by Hughes, to protest
killings in Poland, Galicia, Roumania and elsewhere. Feeling in this
matter growing more intense throughout the country. Cannot something be
done? It is evident that Germany is doing everything to separate the
Allies. A great many newspapers in this country are worried lest you be
carried away by the pleadings of Germany for a _Quote_ softer peace _End
Quote_. I know you will not be led astray. There is an intense feeling in
the Senate in favour of the publication of the terms of the Treaty. Can
anything be done to straighten this out?
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
23 May, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Mr. Taft in signed article this morning says: _Quote_ Find it hard to
believe that President Wilson sent sympathetic note to women who plead for
Huns _End Quote_. I think this matter of sufficient importance to be
cleared up from this side. There is great deal of unrest here owing to
talk in newspapers of return of German ships to Great Britain.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
May 24,1919.
TUMULTY,
Washington.
I think our friends in the Senate ought to be furnished very frankly with
the following reason, which seems to me quite convincing, for not at
present publishing the complete treaty: namely, that if our discussion of
the treaty with the Germans is to be more than a sham and a form it is
necessary to consider at least some of the details of the treaty as
subject to reconsideration and that, therefore, it would be a tactical
blunder to publish the details as first drafted, notwithstanding the fact
that there is no likelihood that they will be departed from in any
substantial way.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
May 25, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
No one need have any concern about the return of the German ships in our
possession. Full understanding has been reached about them. As for Mr.
Taft's criticism, I am quite willing to be responsible for any sympathetic
reply I make to appeals on behalf of starving women and children. Please
give following message to Glass: You may take it for granted that I will
sign the Urgent Deficiency Bill and go forward with the plans you mention
in your cable.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
26 May, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Every Republican member of new Foreign Relations Committee openly opposed
to treaty, a majority in favour of its amendment. Every Democratic member
of Committee, including Thomas, for treaty and against separation. There
is a decided reaction evident against the League, caused, in my opinion,
by dissatisfaction of Irish, Jews, Poles, Italians, and Germans.
Republicans taking full advantage and liable, in order to garner
disaffected vote, to make absolute issue against League, Reaction
intensified by your absence and lack of publicity from your end and
confusion caused by contradictory statements and explanations of _Quote_
so-called compromises _End Quote_. Simonds' article appearing in certain
American newspapers Sunday, admirable, explaining reasons for Saar Valley
and French pact and other controversial matters.
There is a tremendous drive against League, resembling German propaganda,
backed by Irish and Jews. Irish openly opposing; Jews attacking along
collateral lines. Could not Lansing or perhaps White, because he is a
Republican, or yourself inspire publicity or give interview explaining--
officially or unofficially--the following matters:
_First_--America's attitude toward publication of terms of Treaty, along
lines of your last cable to me.
_Second_--That the fourteen points have not been disregarded.
_Third_--The underlying reason for French pact emphasizing the point as
Simonds' says _Quote_ That French pact is merely an
underwriting of the League of Nations during the period
necessary for that organization not merely to get to work, but
to become established and recognized by all nations
_End quote_.
I am not at all disturbed by this reaction--it was inevitable. The
consummation of your work in the signing of the Treaty will clear the air
of all these distempers. Your arrival in America, your address to the
Congress and some speeches to the country will make those who oppose the
League to-day feel ashamed of themselves. The New York _World_ had a very
good editorial favouring the mandatory of Turkey.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
June 16, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
If Germans sign the Treaty we hope to get off the first of next week,
about the 24th or 25th. It is my present judgment that it would be a
mistake to take any notice of the Knox amendment. The whole matter will
have to be argued from top to bottom when I get home and everything will
depend upon the reaction of public opinion at that time. I think that our
friends can take care of it in the meantime and believe that one of the
objects of Knox and his associates is to stir me up, which they have not
yet done. I may nevertheless take the opportunity to speak of the League
of Nations in Belgium.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
21 June, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
The fight against the League in Knox resolution faces utter collapse. Root
and Hayes here advising Republican leaders. I learned that Root is
advising Republicans to vote for the League with reservations. He is
advising Republicans to concentrate their forces upon a resolution of
ratification, which would contain specific reservations on the Monroe
Doctrine, immigration, tariff, and other purely American questions. I
believe that this is the course the Republicans will finally adopt. A
confidant of Mr. Taft's yesterday wanted to know from me what your
attitude was in this matter, saying that Mr. Taft might favour this
reservation plan. I told him I had no knowledge on the subject. It is a
thing that you might consider. To me it looks like cowardice.
The American Federation of Labour adopted a resolution favouring the
League of Nations by a vote of twenty-nine thousand seven hundred fifty
against four hundred twenty. Andrew Furuseth led the fight against it. The
resolution supporting the League contained a reservation in favour of home
rule for Ireland.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House, Washington,
June 23, 1919.
TUMULTY,
Washington.
My clear conviction is that the adoption of the Treaty by the Senate with
reservations would put the United States as clearly out of the concert of
nations as a rejection. We ought either to go in or stay out. To stay out
would be fatal to the influence and even to the commercial prospects of
the United States, and to go in would give her the leadership of the
world. Reservations would either mean nothing or postpone the conclusion
of peace, so far as America is concerned, until every other principal
nation concerned in the Treaty had found out by negotiation what the
reservations practically meant and whether they could associate themselves
with the United States on the terms of the reservations or not. Moreover,
changes in the Treaty seem to me to belong to the powers of negotiation
which belong to the President and that I would be at liberty to withdraw
the Treaty if I did not approve of the ratifications. I do not think it
would be wise for me to wait here for the appropriation bills. I hope to
sail on the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth and suggest that you consider
the plan of sending a vessel to meet me.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
June 23, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Your cable concerning reservations in ratification would make fine
statement for the public. The country would stand back of you in this. Can
I use it in this way or can I at least furnish copies to Senator Hitchcock
and Mr. Taft? If you allow me to make public use of it may I change
_Quote_ leadership of the world _End Quote_ to _Quote_ a notable place in
the affairs of the world _End Quote_. This in order to avoid possibility
of hurting feelings of other nations. Now is time to issue statement of
this kind as Lodge has practically withdrawn Knox resolution and opponents
seem to be concentrating on _Quote_ reservations _End Quote_.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
June 25, 1919.
I am quite willing that you should make public use of my cable to you
about reservations by the Senate in regard to the treaty, with this change
in the sentence to which you call my attention:
_Quote_ And to go in would give her a leading place in the affairs of the
world, _End Quote_ omitting also the last sentence about changes belonging
to power to negotiate treaties.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
June 25, 1919.
Secretary Tumulty to-day gave out a message which he had received from the
President, as follows:
My clear conviction is that the adoption of the Treaty by the Senate with
reservations would put the United States as clearly out of the concert of
nations as a rejection. We ought either to go in or stay out. To stay out
would be fatal to the influence and even to the commercial prospects of
the United States, and to go in would give her a leading place in the
affairs of the world. Reservations would either mean nothing or postpone
the conclusion of peace, so far as America is concerned, until every other
principal nation concerned in the treaty had found out by negotiation what
the reservations practically meant and whether they could associate
themselves with the United States on the terms of the reservations or not.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram from Grasty to New York_ Times
June 29, 1919.
Aboard the _Oklahoma_.
President's sailing from Brest most auspicious. Most beautiful weather and
promise of more of same. President and Mrs. Wilson showed no ill effects
from strenuous activities of past few days and while both formed sincere
attachment for France, they are glad to turn faces homeward. Contrary to
some reports current in America he is in excellent health. While element
of novelty which entered his reception on arrival last December
disappeared, there was deeper feeling manifested toward him last night in
Paris than ever before. Thousands of _Quote_ Vive Wilson _End Quote_ came
from French heart and continuous ovation. Paris showed popular recognition
of leadership of American in securing peace. One very old Frenchman sprang
in front of President's carriage in Champs Élysées and shouted in English:
_Quote_ Mr. Wilson, thank you for peace _End Quote_. That was the keynote
and same sentiment was echoed in thousands of ways. Although owing to
different American viewpoints, Wilson has been frequently antagonistic
during this month, at end relations with other governments' heads most
cordial. Lloyd George came over to Place des États-Unis last night and
told President _Quote_ You've done more to bring English-speaking people
together than ever before done by any man _End Quote_. Clemenceau looked
as if losing his best friend when he said Good Bye in Invalides Station.
Many representatives of smaller nations have expressed to me within past
few days hope that President be able to return to Europe and continue his
work of reconciliation and reconstruction, which they said nobody else in
position to do or able to do so well.
GRASTY.
APPENDIX "B"
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
16 March, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
Former President Taft asks if he may cable to you direct, for your
consideration only, some suggestions about which he has been thinking a
great deal and which he would like to have you consider. He said that
these suggestions do not look to the change of the structure of the
League, the plan of its action or its real character, but simply to
removing objections in minds of conscientious Americans, who are anxious
for a league of nations, whose fears have been roused by suggested
constructions of the League which its language does not justify and whose
fears could be removed without any considerable change of language.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram--Paris._
Received at White House,
March 18, 1919.
In reply to your number sixteen, appreciate Mr. Taft's offer of
suggestions and would welcome them. The sooner they are sent the better.
You need give yourself no concern about my yielding anything with regard
to the embodiment of the proposed convention in the Treaty.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
18 March, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
Following from Wm. H. Taft:
_Quote_ If you bring back the Treaty with the League of Nations in it,
make more specific reservations of the Monroe Doctrine, fix a term for the
duration of the League and the limit of armament, require expressly
unanimity of action in Executive Council and Body of Delegates, and add to
Article XV a provision that where the Executive Council of the Body of
Delegates finds the difference to grow out of an exclusively domestic
policy, it shall recommend no settlement, the ground will be completely
cut from under the opponents of the League in the Senate. Addition to
Article XV will answer objection as to Japanese immigration as well as
tariffs under Article XXI. Reservation of the Monroe Doctrine might be as
follows:
Any American state or states may protect the integrity of American
territory and the independence of the government whose territory it
is, whether a member of the League or not, and may, in the interests
of American peace, object to and prevent the further transfer of
American territory or sovereignty to any European or non-American
power.
Monroe Doctrine reservation alone would probably carry the treaty but
others would make it certain. (signed) Wm. H. Taft _End Quote_.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
21 March, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
The following letter from Hon. Wm. H. Taft. _Quote_ I have thought perhaps
it might help more if I was somewhat more specific than I was in the
memorandum note I sent you yesterday, and I therefore enclose another
memorandum _End Quote_.
_Duration of the Covenant_
Add to the Preamble the following:
_Quote_ From the obligations of which any member of the League may
withdraw after July 1, 1829, by two years' notice in writing, duly
filed with the Secretary General of the League _End Quote_.
_Explanation_
I have no doubt that the construction put upon the agreement would be
what I understand the President has already said it should be, namely
that any nation may withdraw from it upon reasonable notice, which
perhaps would be a year. I think, however, it might strengthen the
Covenant if there was a fixed duration. It would completely remove the
objection that it is perpetual in its operation.
_Duration of Armament Limit_
Add to the first paragraph of Article VIII, the following:
_Quote_ At the end of every five years, such limits of armament for
the several governments shall be reëxamined by the Executive Council,
and agreed upon by them as in the first instance _End Quote_.
_Explanation_
The duration of the obligation to limit armament, which now may only
be changed by consent of the Executive Council, has come in for
criticism. I should think this might thus be avoided, without in any
way injuring the Covenant. Perhaps three years is enough, but I should
think five years would be better.
_Unanimous Action by the Executive Council or Body of Delegates_
Insert in Article IV, after the first paragraph, the following:
_Quote_ Other action taken or recommendations made by the Executive
Council or the Body of Delegates shall be by the unanimous action of
the countries represented by the members or delegates, unless
otherwise specifically stated _End Quote_.
_Explanation_
Great objection is made to the power of the Executive Council by a
majority of the members and the Body of Delegates to do the things
which they are authorized to do in the Covenant. In view of the
specific provision that the Executive Council and the Body of
Delegates may act by a majority of its members as to their procedure,
I feel confident that, except in cases where otherwise provided, both
bodies can only act by unanimous vote of the countries represented. If
that be the right construction, then there can be no objection to have
it specifically stated, and it will remove emphatic objection already
made on this ground. It is a complete safeguard against involving the
United States primarily in small distant wars to which the United
States has no immediate relation, for the reason that the plan for
taking care of such a war, to be recommended or advised by the
Executive Council, must be approved by a representative of the United
States on the Board.
_Monroe Doctrine_
Add to Article X.
(a) _Quote_ A state or states of America, a member or members of the
League, and competent to fulfil this obligation in respect to American
territory or independence, may, in event of the aggression, actual or
threatened, expressly assume the obligation and relieve the European
or non-American members of the League from it until they shall be
advised by such American state or states of the need for their aid
_End Quote_.
(b) _Quote_ Any such American state or states may protect the
integrity of any American territory and the sovereignty of the
government whose territory it is, whether a member of the League or
not, and may, in the interest of American peace, object to and prevent
the further transfer of American territory or sovereignty to any
European or non-American power _End Quote_.
_Explanation_
Objection has been made that under Article X, European governments
would come to America with force and be concerned in matters from
which heretofore the United States has excluded them. This is not
true, because Spain fought Chili, in Seward's time, without objection
from the United States, and so Germany and England instituted a
blockade against Venezuela in Roosevelt's time. This fear could be
removed, however, by the first of the above paragraphs. Paragraph (b)
is the Monroe Doctrine pure and simple. I forwarded this in my first
memorandum. It will be observed that Article X only covers the
integrity and independence of members of the League. There may be some
American countries which are not sufficiently responsible to make it
wise to invite them into the League. This second paragraph covers
them. The expression _Quote_ European or non-American _End Quote_ is
inserted for the purpose of indicating that Great Britain, though it
has American dominion, is not to acquire further territory or
sovereignty.
_Japanese Immigration and Tariffs_
Add to Article XV.
_Quote_ If the difference between the parties shall be found by the
Executive Council or the Body of Delegates to be a question which by
international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction and
polity of one of the parties, it shall so report and not recommend a
settlement of the dispute _End Quote_.
_Explanation_
Objection is made to Article XV that under its terms the United States
would be found by unanimous recommendation for settlement of a dispute
in respect to any issue foreign or domestic; that it therefore might
be affected seriously, and unjustly, by recommendations forbidding
tariffs on importations. In my judgment, we could only rely on the
public opinion of the world evidenced by the Body of Delegates, not to
interfere with our domestic legislation and action. Nor do I think
that under the League as it is, we covenant to abide by a unanimous
recommendation. But if there is a specific exception made in respect
to matters completely within the domestic jurisdiction and legislation
of a country, the whole criticism is removed. The Republican senators
are trying to stir up anxiety among Republicans lest this is to be a
limitation upon our tariff. The President has already specifically met
the objection as to limitation upon the tariff when the Fourteen
Points were under discussion. Nevertheless in this respect to the
present language of the Covenant, it would help much to meet and
remove objections, and cut the ground under senatorial obstruction.
_Prospect of Ratification_
My impression is that if the one article already sent, on the Monroe
Doctrine, be inserted in the Treaty, sufficient Republicans who signed
the Round Robin would probably retreat from their position and vote
for ratification so that it would carry. If the other suggestions were
adopted, I feel confident that all but a few who oppose any league
would be driven to accept them and to stand for the League.
(End letter)
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
28 March, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Following just received from Mr. Taft: _Quote_ Venture to suggest to
President that failure to reserve Monroe Doctrine more specifically in
face of opposition in Conference will give great weight to objection that
League as first reported endangers Doctrine. It will seriously embarrass
advocates of League, it will certainly lead to Senate amendments embodying
Doctrine and other provisions in form less likely to secure subsequent
acquiescence of other nations than proper reservation now. Deems some kind
of Monroe Doctrine amendment now to Article Ten vital to acceptance of
League in this country. I say this with full realization that
complications in Conference are many and not clearly understood here. A
strong and successful stand now will carry the League _End Quote_.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
_Letter from Mr. Taft._
New York, N, Y., April 10, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. TUMULTY:
We are very much troubled over the report that the Monroe Doctrine
amendment to the Covenant is being opposed by England and Japan. Will you
be good enough to send the enclosed to the President? We had a meeting to-
day of the Executive Council of the League to Enforce Peace. Doctor Lowell
and I, at the instance of the League, will be glad to have this matter
presented directly to the President by cable.
Sincerely yours,
WM. H. TAFT.
HON. JOSEPH P. TUMULTY,
Secretary To The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Enclosure.
* * * * *
_Cablegram_
The White House, Washington,
13 April, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
Following is sent at the request of Mr. Taft: _Quote_ Friends of the
Covenant are seriously alarmed over report that no amendment will be made
more specifically safeguarding Monroe Doctrine. At full meeting of
Executive Committee of League to Enforce Peace, with thirty members from
eighteen states present, unanimous opinion that without such amendment,
Republican senators will certainly defeat ratification of Treaty because
public opinion will sustain them. With such amendment, Treaty will be
promptly ratified.
(Signed) WILLIAM H. TAFT A. LAWRENCE LOWELL _End Quote_
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
March 27, 1919.
_Admission--Paris._
For Secretary Lansing from Polk.
Following are proposed amendments to the Constitution of the League of
Nations which have been drafted by Mr. Root:
_First Amendment_: Strike out Article XIII, and insert the following: The
high contracting powers agree to refer to the existing Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague, or to the Court of Arbitral Justice proposed at
the Second Hague Conference when established, or to some other arbitral
tribunal, all disputes between them (including those affecting honour and
vital interests) which are of a justiciable character, and which the
powers concerned have failed to settle by diplomatic methods. The powers
so referring to arbitration agree to accept and give effect to the award
of the Tribunal.
Disputes of a justiciable character are defined as disputes as to the
interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to
the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach
of any international obligation, or as to the nature and extent of the
reparation to be made for any such breach.
Any question which may arise as to whether a dispute is of a justiciable
character is to be referred for decision to the Court of Arbitral Justice
when constituted, or, until it is constituted, to the existing Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague.
_Second Amendment_. Add to Article XIV the following paragraphs:
The Executive Council shall call a general conference of the powers to
meet not less than two years or more than five years after the signing of
this convention for the purpose of reviewing the condition of
international law, and of agreeing upon and stating in authoritative form
the principles and rules thereof.
Thereafter regular conferences for that purpose shall be called and held
at stated times.
_Third Amendment_. Immediately before the signature of the American
Delegates, insert the following reservation:
Inasmuch as in becoming a member of the League the United States of
America is moved by no interest or wish to intrude upon or interfere with
the political policy or internal administration of any foreign state, and
by no existing or anticipated dangers in the affairs of the American
continents, but accedes to the wish of the European states that it shall
join its power to theirs for the preservation of general peace, the
representatives of the United States of America sign this convention with
the understanding that nothing therein contained shall be construed to
imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional
attitude towards purely American questions, or to require the submission
of its policy regarding such questions (including therein the admission of
immigrants) to the decision or recommendation of other powers.
_Fourth Amendment_. Add to Article X the following:
After the expiration of five years from the signing of this convention any
party may terminate its obligation under this article by giving one year's
notice in writing to the Secretary General of the League.
_Fifth Amendment_. Add to Article IX the following:
Such commission shall have full power of inspection and verification
personally and by authorized agents as to all armament, equipment,
munitions, and industries referred to in Article VIII.
_Sixth Amendment_. Add to Article XXIV the following:
The Executive Council shall call a general conference of members of the
League to meet not less than five nor more than ten years after the
signing of this convention for the revision thereof, and at that time, or
at any time thereafter upon one year's notice, any member may withdraw
from the League.
POLK, Acting.
* * * * *
The first suggestion made by Mr. Root is not only substantially expressed
in Article XIII of the Treaty, but almost literally, in its very text,
appears in this section of the Covenant.
Mr. Root's proposition that "the high contracting powers agree to refer to
the existing permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague or to the court
of arbitral Justice proposed at the Second Hague, when established, or to
some other arbitral tribunal, all disputes between them," etc. This is
actually done by Article 13, the reference being not to the Hague or to
the proposal of the Second Hague Convention, but to a court of arbitration
"agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention
existing between them."
As will readily be seen, Mr. Root's definition of "disputes of justiciable
character" is embodied literally in Article XIII of the Covenant, Mr.
Root's exact language having been appropriated at the Peace Commission.
Mr. Root's second proposed amendment provided for calling "a general
conference of the powers to meet in not less than two years, or more than
five years, after the signing of this convention for the purpose of
reviewing the condition of international law and of agreeing upon and
stating in authoritative form the principles and rules thereof."
In Article XIX of the Covenant it is provided that the Assembly meet from
time to time to engage in "the consideration of international conditions
whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." If it may be
said that this provision of Article XIX does not make it mandatory upon
the council to meet at fixed periods, for the purpose of reviewing
international conditions, on the other hand it may be urged that it
empowers the Assembly to advise such a review at any time, and the Council
to make such review at any time and as often as the necessities might
permit. "The consideration of international conditions" certainly
comprehends a review of international law and a rectification of its
imperfections, so that substantially the whole of this suggestion by Mr.
Root is in the Covenant.
The third amendment of the Covenant suggested by Mr. Root is exceedingly
interesting in several particulars. Those who would invoke the aid and
sympathy of the Government of the United States in the effort for Irish
freedom will observe that Mr. Root herein precludes the United States from
having any interest in, or wish to intrude upon or interfere with, the
political policy of the internal administration of any foreign state.
Contrast this with Article XI of the Covenant, which President Wilson in a
speech on the Pacific coast said was peculiarly his own and in which it is
declared to be the friendly right of any member of the League to bring to
the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever
affecting international relations which threaten to disturb the internal
peace or understanding between nations, and if this may be regarded as
outside the question, let it go, and turn to another significant phrase
contained in Mr. Root's suggested amendment. It will be noted that nowhere
in his suggested modifications of the Covenant does Mr. Root suggest any
alteration whatsoever of Article X, as it stands. On the contrary, in Mr.
Root's third suggested amendment he proposed to put the United States
definitely on record as acceding "to the wish of the European states that
this nation shall join its powers to theirs for the preservation of
general peace."
The final proposition contained in Mr. Root's proposed third amendment is
broadly cared for in Article XXI of the Covenant relating to the Monroe
Doctrine, and by implication in paragraph 8 of Article XV, which prohibits
any recommendation by the Council as to the settlement of the matters
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of any member of the League.
It may, furthermore, be stated that the President cheerfully agreed to a
reservation presented by Mr. Hitchcock, of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, even more specifically withholding all domestic questions from
the jurisdiction of the League.
Mr. Root's fourth suggested amendment proposed to permit any member of the
League to terminate its obligations, under Article X, by giving one year's
notice of its desire. While no such modification of Article X was made,
the much broader right was given to any nation to renounce all of its
obligations to the League and to terminate its membership of the League
upon two years' notice at any time after joining.
The fifth suggested amendment by Mr. Root, proposing a modification of
Article IX, by empowering a commission to inspect and verify, either
personally or by authorized agents, all armaments, equipment, munitions,
and industries relating to the manufacture of war material, does not
appear to have been adopted, nor can any one rationally insist that it was
essential to accept this suggestion. Article IX provides for the
appointment of a permanent commission to advise the Council of the
execution of those provisions of the Covenant. relating to armament,
equipment, munitions, etc., in the military and naval branches of
industry.
A sane interpretation of this article would imply that the commission has
power to inspect and verify facts, because in no other way could it
possibly function.
Mr. Root's sixth proposed amendment makes it mandatory upon the Executive
Council of the League to call a general conference of members to meet not
less than five years or more than ten years after the signing of the
Covenant for purposes of revision, etc. This modification of the Covenant
was not made, but the fact that it was omitted by no manner of means
precludes the exercise of that particular function by the Council. Without
Mr. Root's amendment it is perfectly competent for the Council to convene
such a meeting of the members of the League at any time. It might do this
in less time than five years, or it might postpone the doing of it for ten
years or a longer period.
APPENDIX "C"
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON
24 April, 1919.
PRESIDENT WILSON,
Paris.
As we see it from this distance, the selfish designs of Japan are as
indefensible as are those of Italy. The two situations appear to parallel
each other in their bearing upon the fate of weak and helpless nations.
Would it not be an opportune time to cast another die, this one in the
direction of Japan, that the whole world may know once and for all where
America stands upon this, the greatest issue of the peace we are trying to
make? Now is the time to use your heavy artillery and emphasize the danger
of secret treaties and selfish designs of certain big nations.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
Received at The White House, Washington,
11:48 A.M.
April 26, 1919.
Paris.
TUMULTY,
White House,
Washington.
Am very grateful for your message of approval about the Japanese business.
It has warmed my heart mightily. The difficulties here would have been
incredible to me before I got here. Your support kept me in heart.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON
26 April, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
It appears to me from this end that the Japanese demands will soon produce
another crisis. If such a crisis arises, I hope you will in any statement
you make emphasize again America's purpose and her unwillingness to
consent to any imperialistic peace. The whole country will be with you in
this matter as never before. I think that your Italian statement was the
beginning of a real peace and a real league of nations.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
Received at The White House, Washington,
April 29, 1919.
Paris.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Situation still difficult. President putting up great fight against odds.
Japanese claims now under discussion.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
Paris.
Received at The White House, Washington.
April 30, 1919.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Japanese situation hanging by a thread. They are in conference now. These
are terrible days for the President physically and otherwise.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
Received at The White House, Washington,
May 1, 1919.
Paris.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
The solution of the Kiauchau question is regarded here both generally and
by special friends of China, like Charles R. Crane, as remarkably
favourable and fortunate considering its rotten and complicated past and
the tangle of secret treaties in which she was enmeshed and from which she
had to be extricated. It is regarded as a wonderful victory for the
President. The Japanese themselves admit that they have made far greater
concessions than they had even dreamed would be required of them. The
Chinese agreed that they have great confidence in their interests being
safeguarded in every way and they appreciate that the League of Nations
eventually will look after them.
GRAYSON.
* * * * *
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON
1 May, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
I have not made use of the Japanese statement but am keeping my ear to the
ground and waiting. My feeling is that an attempt to explain the
compromise when no demand is made, would weaken our position instead of
strengthening it. I will therefore do nothing about the Japanese matter
unless you insist. It would help if I could unofficially say: First, the
date of your probable return to this country; Second, whether tour country
to discuss the League of Nations is possible. The adoption of the labour
programme as part of the peace programme is most important, but not enough
emphasis is being placed upon it. Could you not make a statement of some
kind that we could use here, showing the importance of this programme as
helping toward the stabilization of labour conditions throughout the
world?
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON
2 May, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Sympathetic editorial New York _World_ reference Japanese settlement. I
have not given out statement as yet. It does not look now as if any would
be necessary.
TUMULTY.
* * * * *
Received at The White House, Washington,
2 May, 1919.
London.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Am perfectly willing to have you use your discretion about the use you
make of what I sent you about the Chinese-Japanese settlement. Sorry I
cannot predict the date of my return though I think it will be by June
first. Am expecting to make a tour of the country but even that is
impossible to predict with certainty.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON
4 May, 1919.
GRAYSON,
Care President Wilson, Paris.
Papers here very critical of Japanese settlement. Chinese statement given
great publicity.
TUMULTY.