WILSON--THE LONE HAND
It has often been said by certain gentlemen who were associated with
President Wilson on the other side that he was unyielding and dogmatic,
that he insisted upon playing a "lone hand," that he was secretive and
exclusive, and that he ignored the members of the Peace Commission and the
experts who accompanied him to the Conference.
Contrary to this criticism, after an uninterrupted, continuous, and most
intimate association with him for eleven years, an association which
brought me into close contact with him in the most delicate crises through
which his administration and the nation passed, a time which threw upon
the Chief Executive of the nation a task unparalleled in the history of
the world, I wish to say that there is no franker or more open-minded man,
nor one less dogmatic in his opinion than Woodrow Wilson. In him the
desire for information and guidance is a passion. Indeed, the only thing
he resents is a lack of frankness upon the part of his friends, and no man
is more ready courageously to act and to hold to his opinions after he has
obtained the necessary information upon, which he bases his position. It
is his innate modesty and a certain kind of shyness that people mistake
for coldness and aloofness. He is not a good fellow in the ordinary sense
of that term. His friendship does not wear the cheap or tawdry trappings
of the politician, but there is about it a depth of genuineness and
sincerity, that while it does not overwhelm you, it wins you and holds
you. But the permanent consideration upon which this friendship is based
is sincerity and frankness.
No man ever worked under greater handicaps than did Woodrow Wilson at
Paris. Repudiated by his own people in the Congressional elections;
harassed on every side and at every turn by his political enemies, he
still pursued the even tenor of his way and accomplished what he had in
mind, against the greatest odds.
In the murky atmosphere of the Peace Conference, where every attitude of
the President was grossly exaggerated, in order that his prestige might be
lessened, it was not possible to judge him fairly, but it is now possible
in a calmer day to review the situation from afar through the eyes of
those who were actual participants with him in the great assembly,
onlookers, as it were, who saw every move and witnessed every play of the
Peace Conference from the side lines, and who have not allowed petty
motives to warp their judgments.
This testimony, which forms part of "What Really Happened in Paris,"
edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour, comes from gentlemen who
were his friends and co-labourers and who daily conferred with him upon
the momentous questions that came up for consideration at the Peace
Conference.
Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, a member of the great banking house of J. P. Morgan
& Company, one of the representatives of the United States Treasury with
the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, gives the lie to the unfair
criticisms uttered about the President, to the effect that he was
exclusive, secretive, and refused to confer with those associated with
him. Mr. Lamont in speaking of the President's attitude throughout the
Peace Conference said:
I am going to take this opportunity to say a word, in general, as to
President Wilson's attitude at the Peace Conference. He is accused of
having been unwilling to consult his colleagues. I never saw a man
more ready and anxious to consult than he. He has been accused of
having been desirous to gain credit for himself and ignore others. I
never saw a man more considerate of those of his co-adjutors who were
working immediately with him, nor a man more ready to give them credit
with the other chiefs of state. Again and again would he say to Mr.
Lloyd George or Mr. Clemenceau: "My expert here, Mr. So-and-So, tells
me such-and-such, and I believe he is right. You will have to argue
with him if you want me to change my opinion." President Wilson
undoubtedly had his disabilities. Perhaps, in a trade, some of the
other chiefs of state could have "out-jockeyed" him; but it seldom
reached such a situation, because President Wilson, by his manifest
sincerity and open candour, always saying precisely what he thought,
would early disarm his opponents in argument. President Wilson did not
have a well-organized secretarial staff. He did far too much of the
work himself, studying until late at night papers and documents that
he should have largely delegated to some discreet aides. He was, by
all odds, the hardest worked man at the Conference; but the failure to
delegate more of his work was not due to any inherent distrust he had
of men--and certainly not any desire to "run the whole show" himself--
but simply to his lack of facility in knowing how to delegate work on
a large scale. In execution, we all have a blind spot in some part of
our eye. President Wilson's was in his inability to use men; and
inability, mind you, not a refusal. On the contrary, when any one of
us volunteered or insisted upon taking responsibility off his
shoulders he was delighted. Throughout the Peace Conference, Mr.
Wilson never played politics. I never witnessed an occasion when I saw
him act from unworthy conception or motive. His ideals were of the
highest, and he clung to them tenaciously and courageously. Many of
the so-called "Liberals" in England have assailed Mr. Wilson bitterly
because, as they declare, he yielded too much to their own Premier,
Mr. Lloyd George, and to Mr. Clemenceau. But could he have failed to
defer to them on questions in which no vital principle was involved? I
well remember his declaration on the question, whether the Allies
should refuse, for a period of five years during the time of France's
recuperations to promise Germany reciprocal tariff provisions. What
Mr. Wilson said to Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau was this:
"Gentlemen, my experts and I both regard the principle involved as an
unwise one. We believe it will come back to plague you. But when I see
how France has suffered, how she has been devastated, her industries
destroyed--who am I to refuse to assent to this provision, designed,
wisely or unwisely, to assist in lifting France again to her feet."
The question has often been asked, whether the President freely consulted
his experts on the other side, or ignored them. The experience of the
gentlemen who conferred with him is the best refutation of this
insinuation against the President. Charles Homer Haskins, Chief of the
Division of Western Europe, a member of the American Peace Conference,
answers this question in these words:
The President was anxious to have the exact facts before him in every
situation. Doubtless, there were a number of occasions when he could
not consult with experts at a particular moment, but, in general, the
President sought such advice, although he naturally had to use his own
judgment whether that advice was to be adopted in any particular case.
Answering this same question, Mr. Douglas Wilson Johnson, Chief of the
Division of Boundary Geography, and a member of the Peace Commission,
says:
Whenever we, in our capacity as specialists, thought we had found
something that the President ought to know about, and believed we
could not get it across effectively in any other manner, we could ask
for a personal conference with him. He was, of course, a very busy man
because, unlike the experts who usually had only one problem to
consider, he had to do not only with all the territorial problems but
in addition with all the problems bearing on the League of Nations,
the economic problems, and many other aspects of the peace. Despite
this fact I wish to state that while I repeatedly asked for personal
conferences with the President on this and certain other problems, he
never failed to respond immediately with an appointment. He had a
private wire and on occasion he would call us at the Crillon to make
appointments on his own initiative or to secure papers, maps, or other
documents that he needed in his studies. I will not forget that in one
instance he called me on the telephone late at night in my bedroom,
asking for some papers which I had promised to supply him, and which
had not reached him with sufficient promptness. You can judge from
this that he kept closely in touch with the problems he was called
upon to consider.
Another question that has been asked is: Did the President have an
intimate knowledge of the complicated questions that came before him like
the Adriatic problem, for instance? That criticism was answered by Mr.
Douglas Wilson Johnson in these words:
In answer to that question I will say that the President kept in
constant touch with the experts on the Adriatic problem, not only
through the memoranda furnished by the experts but in other ways. I
can assure you that there was sent to him a voluminous quantity of
material, and I want to say that when we had personal discussions with
him upon the question it immediately became apparent that he had
studied these memoranda most carefully. _It is only fair to say that
of the details and intricacies of this most difficult problem the
President possessed a most astonishing command._
It has also been said that the President in his attitude toward Germany
was ruthless, and yet we have the testimony of Mr. Isaiah Bowman, Chief
Territorial Adviser of the Peace Commission who, in answer to the direct
question: "Was there not a time when it looked as if the Peace Conference
might break up because of the extreme policy of one of the Allies?" said:
"Yes, there were a number of occasions when the Peace Conference might
have broken up. Almost anything might have happened with so many nations
represented, so many personalities and so many experts--perhaps half a
thousand in all! Owing to the fact that President Wilson has been charged
on the one hand with outrageous concessions to the Allies and on the other
hand that he had always been soft with the Germans, particularly with
Bulgaria, let us see just how soft he was! On a certain day three of us
were asked to call at the President's house, and on the following morning
at eleven o'clock we arrived. President Wilson welcomed us in a very
cordial manner. I cannot understand how people get the idea that he is
cold. He does not make a fuss over you, but when you leave you feel that
you have met a very courteous gentleman. You have the feeling that he is
frank and altogether sincere. He remarked: 'Gentlemen, I am in trouble and
I have sent for you to help me out. The matter is this: the French want
the whole left bank of the Rhine. I told M. Clemenceau that I could not
consent to such a solution of the problem. He became very much excited and
then demanded ownership of the Saar Basin. I told him I could not agree to
that either because it would mean giving 300,000 Germans to France.'
Whereupon President Wilson further said: 'I do not know whether I shall
see M. Clemenceau again. I do not know whether he will return to the
meeting this afternoon. In fact, I do not know whether the Peace
Conference will continue. M. Clemenceau called me a pro-German and
abruptly left the room. I want you to assist me in working out a solution
true to the principles we are standing for and to do justice to France,
and I can only hope that France will ultimately accept a reasonable
solution. I want to be fair to M. Clemenceau and to France, but I cannot
consent to the outright transfer to France of 300,000 Germans.' A solution
was finally found--the one that stands in the Treaty to-day."
Among the unfair things said about the President during the last campaign
and uttered by a senator of the United States, was that the President
promised Premier Bratiano of Rumania to send United States troops to
protect the new frontiers. Mr. Charles Seymour, a member of the American
Peace Commission, answers this charge in the following way:
The evidence against it is overwhelming. The stenographic notes taken
during the session indicate that nothing said by President Wilson
could be construed into a promise to send United States troops abroad
to protect frontiers. The allegation is based upon the report of the
interpreter, Mantoux, and a book by a journalist, Dr. E. W. Dillon,
called "The Inside Story of the Peace Conference," M. Mantoux, though
a brilliant and cultivated interpreter, whose work enormously
facilitated the progress of the Conference, did not take stenographic
notes and his interpretations sometimes failed to give the exact
meaning of the original. Doctor Dillon's evidence is subject to
suspicion, since his book is based upon gossip, and replete with
errors of fact. The stenographic report, on the other hand, is worthy
of trust. I have heard the President on more than one occasion explain
to M. Clemenceau and Lloyd George _that if troops were necessary to
protect any troubled area, they must not look to the United States for
assistance, for public opinion in this country would not permit the
use of American forces_.
Even Mr. Lansing himself in his book testified to the open-mindedness and
candour of the President in these words:
It had always been my practice as Secretary of State to speak to him
with candour and to disagree with him whenever I thought he was
reaching a wrong decision in regard to any matter pertaining to
foreign affairs. There was a general belief that Mr. Wilson was not
open-minded and that he was quick to resent any opposition however
well founded. I had not found him so during the years we had been
associated. Except in a few instances he listened with consideration
to arguments and apparently endeavoured to value them correctly.
No men ever winced less under the criticism or bitter ridicule of his
enemies than did Woodrow Wilson. Whether the criticism was directed at him
or at some member of his Cabinet, or, mayhap, at a subordinate like
myself, for some act, statement, or even an indiscretion, he bore up under
the criticism like a true sportsman. I remember how manfully he met the
storm of criticism that was poured upon him after the issuance of the
famous Garfield Fuel Order. He courageously took the responsibility for
the issuance of the order and stood by Doctor Garfield to the last.
It will be recalled what a tremendous impression and reaction the Garfield
order caused when it was published throughout the country. Many about the
President were greatly worried and afraid of the disastrous effect of it
upon the country. Cabinet officers rushed in upon him and endeavoured to
persuade him to recall it and even to repudiate Garfield for having issued
the order without consulting the Cabinet, but their remonstrances fell
unheeded upon the President's ears. I remember at the time that I wrote
the President regarding the matter and called his attention to what
appeared to me to be the calamitous results of the issuance of the Fuel
Order.
My letter to the President is as follows:
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON
17 January, 1918.
DEAR GOVERNOR:
At twelve o'clock last night, Mr. Lincoln of the New York World called
me out of bed by telephone to notify me that the Fuel Administration
had issued a drastic order shutting down the factories of the country
for five days, etc.
I do not know about the details of the order. I assume of course that
it was necessary because of the tremendous shortage throughout the
country. But what I am afraid of is that my own readiness to accept
this assumption may not be shared by people outside. In other words,
has the groundwork been laid for this radical step? Do the people know
how much coal we have on hand and what the real shortage is? Have they
not been led to believe that our chief ill was transportation and that
by subjecting themselves to hardships by cutting down trains, etc.,
enough cars have been provided to carry coal?
In other words, I am afraid the country will want to be shown that the
step just taken was absolutely necessary and if this cannot be proved,
I greatly fear the consequences upon the morale of the people. I am so
afraid that it will weaken their confidence in any action the
Government may take hereafter which depends for its execution on the
voluntary cooperation of the people. Again, it seems to me unjust that
all industries are put on the same footing. It is a difficult thing I
know to distinguish between the essential and non-essential
industries, but I am sure the country will understand if such a
distinction is made of, for instance, institutions that make pianos
and talking machines and candy and articles that are not immediately
necessary for our life, were cut down altogether and things necessary
to our sustenance kept.
Sincerely yours,
TUMULTY
THE PRESIDENT
[Illustration: An inside view of a well-remembered national crisis.
[Transcriber's note: contains a reproduction of the above-quoted letter.]]
The President's reply, written on his own typewriter, is as follows:
DEAR TUMULTY:
Of course, this is a tremendous matter and has given me the deepest
concern, but I really think this direct road is the road out of
difficulties which never would have been entirely remedied if we had
not taken some such action. We must just bow our heads and let the
storm beat.
WOODROW WILSON.
Even to Mr. James M. Beck, a prominent Republican lawyer and one of his
bitterest opponents and critics, he showed a tolerance and magnanimity
that were worthy of the man himself. It appears that Mr. Beck was invited
to confer at the White House on a matter having to do with the war, and
the question was presented to the President by Mr. Creel as to whether the
President considered Mr. Beck _persona non grata_. The President at once
sent me the following note:
DEAR TUMULTY:
Mr. James M. Beck expressed some hesitation about coming with the
committee which Creel has organized and which is coming to see me on
Monday afternoon, because he was not sufficiently _persona grata_ at
the White House. I think his criticism and his whole attitude before
we went into the war were abominable and inexcusable, but I "ain't
harbouring no ill will" just now and I hope that you will have the
intimation conveyed to him through Mr. Creel or otherwise that he will
be welcomed.
WOODROW WILSON.
While the President was busily engaged in France in laying the foundation
stones of peace, his partisan enemies were busily engaged in destroying
the things he held so dear, and had industriously circulated the story
that the mission to France was a mere political one, that the purpose back
of it was personal exploitation, or an attempt on the part of the
President to thrust himself into the councils of the Democratic party as
an active and aggressive candidate for a third term. The President's
attitude in this matter, his fear that talk of this kind would embarrass
the League of Nations, is disclosed by the following correspondence:
Received at the White House,
June 2, 1919.
Paris.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.
Have just read the editorial in the Springfield _Republican_,
discussing "_Wilson the Third Term and the Treaty_," and would very
much value your opinion with regard to the situation as it analyzes
it. Please talk with Glass, Secretary Baker, Secretary Wilson, and
Cummings and let me know what your opinion is and what theirs is. _We
must let nothing stand in the way of the Treaty and the adoption of
the League._ I will, of course, form no resolution until I reach home
but wish to think the matter out in plenty of time.
WOODROW WILSON.
* * * * *
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON
2 June, 1919.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.
Cummings on campaign trip covering Middle West and coast. Will be away
six weeks. My own opinion is that it would be unwise at this time to
act upon suggestion contained in Springfield _Republican_ editorial.
[The editorial suggested that the President withdraw his name from
consideration in connection with a third term.] This is not the time
to say anything about your attitude toward matter discussed in
editorial because there is a depression in our ranks and a feeling
that our prospects for 1920 are not bright. Republicans would say you
had retreated under the threat of defeat and the cause of the League
of Nations would be weakened instead of strengthened. The issue of the
League of Nations is so clear-cut that your attitude toward a third
term at present is not a real cause of embarrassment. In fact, I can
see great advantage to be gained for the ratification of the League by
giving the impression that you are seriously considering going to the
country on the League of Nations. Am strongly of belief, as you know,
that you should not under any circumstances consider or accept
nomination for third term. In this matter I have very few supporters
in our party. A trip I just made to Illinois and St. Louis over
Decoration Day convinces me that a big drive will be made to induce
you to allow your name to be used again. The Presidency for another
four years would not add one whit to the honour that will be yours and
the place of dignity that you will occupy in the hearts of our people
when the League of Nations is consummated and your present term
expires.
Upon your return to this country and with a clearer perception of what
you are trying to do, there will come a turn of the tide in our
favour. Many factors not now very clear are leading in that direction.
The Republicans by the selection of Penrose have made the Republican
party again the stand-pat party of America and their failure, which
will become more evident as the days pass, to correct abuses that some
months ago they called grave, will prove more and more the strength
and value of Democratic policies.
Prosperity now sweeping in from coast and Middle West will soon be
upon us. Even business which turned away from us in last campaign in
the hope that Excess Profit Tax and other burdensome taxes would be
reduced, will soon find out how fatuous and futile is the Republican
policy. Many Progressive leaders will soon come to the front and will
take up the work left undone by Roosevelt. My opinion, therefore, is
that what action you take in this matter should await the turn of the
tide so that as the hopes of Democracy rise and success for 1920 looks
more promising than it does to-day, then that time in my opinion will
offer the psychological moment for you to say what really is in your
heart about a third term and thus help not only the party but the
League of Nations. Therefore, until the psychological moment comes,
the politic thing to do is to keep "mum" about this matter and await
the happenings of the future.
TUMULTY.
A clear, inside view of the feeling of the man toward the Treaty, his deep
heart interest in it, and his characterization of the opposition were
disclosed in a speech delivered by him to the members of the Democratic
National Committee at the White House on February 28, 1919. This speech is
now published for the first time, and is as follows:
The real issue of the day, gentlemen, is the League of Nations, and I
think we must be very careful to serve the country in the right way
with regard to that issue. We ought not, as I know you already feel
from the character of the action you have just taken--we ought not
even to create the appearance of trying to make that a party issue.
And I suggested this to Mr. Cummings and the others who sat by me: I
think it would be wise if the several National Committeemen were to
get in touch with their state organizations upon returning home and
suggest this course of action--that the Democratic state organizations
get into conference with the Republican state organizations and say to
them: "Here is this great issue upon which the future peace of the
world depends; it ought not to be made a party issue or to divide upon
party lines; the country ought to support it regardless of party (as
you stated in your resolution); now we propose to you that you pass
resolutions supporting it, as we intend to do, and we will not
anticipate you in the matter if you agree to that policy; let us stand
back of it and not make a party issue of it." Of course, if they
decline, then it is perfectly legitimate, it seems to me, for the
Democratic organization if it pleases to pass resolutions, framing
these resolutions in as non-partisan language as is possible, but
nevertheless doing what citizens ought to do in matters of this sort.
But not without first making it a matter of party record that it has
made these approaches to the Republican organizations and has proposed
this similarity of action. In that way we accomplish a double object.
We put it up to them to support the real opinion of their own people
and we get instructed by the resolutions, and we find where the weak
spots are and where the fighting has to be done for this great issue.
Because, believe me, gentlemen, the civilized world cannot afford to
have us lose this fight. I tried to state in Boston what it would mean
to the people of the world if the United States did not support this
great ideal with cordiality, but I was not able to speak when I tried
fully to express my thoughts. I tell you, frankly, I choked up; I
could not do it. The thing reaches the depth of tragedy. There is a
sense in which I can see that the hope entertained by the people of
the world with regard to us is a tragical hope--tragical in this
sense, that it is so great, so far-reaching, it runs out to such
depths that we cannot in the nature of things satisfy it. The world
cannot go as fast in the direction of ideal results as these people
believe the United States can carry them, and that is what makes me
choke up when I try to talk about it--the consciousness of what they
want us to do and of our relative inadequacy. And yet there is a great
deal that we can do, and the immediate thing that we can do is to have
an overwhelming national endorsement of this great plan. If we have
that we will have settled most of the immediate political difficulties
in Europe. The present danger of the world--of course, I have to say
this in the confidence of this company--but the present danger in this
world is that the peoples of the world do not believe in their own
governments. They believe these governments to be made up of the kind
of men who have always run them, and who did not know how to keep them
out of this war, did not know how to prepare them for war, and did not
know how to settle international controversies in the past without
making all sorts of compromising concessions. They do not believe in
them, and therefore they have got to be buttressed by some outside
power in which they do not believe. Perhaps it would not do for them
to examine us too narrowly. We are by no means such ideal people as
they believe us to be, but I can say that we are infinitely better
than the others. We do purpose these things, we do purpose these great
unselfish things; that is the glory of America, and if we can confirm
that belief we have steadied the whole process of history in the
immediate future; whereas if we do not confirm that belief I would not
like to say what would happen in the way of utter dissolution of
society.
The only thing that that ugly, poisonous thing called Bolshevism feeds
on is the doubt of the man on the street of the essential integrity of
the people he is depending on to do his governing. That is what it
feeds on. No man in his senses would think that a lot of local Soviets
could really run a government, but some of them are in a temper to
have anything rather than the kind of thing they have been having; and
they say to themselves: "Well, this may be bad but it is at least
better and more immediately in touch with us than the other, and we
will try it and see whether we cannot work something out of it."
So that our immediate duty, not as Democrats, but as American
citizens, is to concert the most powerful campaign that was ever
concerted in this country in favour of supporting the League of
Nations and to put it up to everybody--the Republican organizations
and every other organization--to say where they stand, and to make a
record and explain this thing to the people.
In one sense it does not make any difference what the Constitution of
the League of Nations is. This present constitution in my judgment is
a very conservative and sound document. There are some things in it
which I would have phrased otherwise. I am modest enough to believe
that the American draft was better than this, but it is the result of
as honest work as I ever knew to be done. Here we sat around the table
where there were representatives of fourteen nations. The five great
powers, so-called, gave themselves two delegates apiece and they
allowed the other nine one delegate apiece. But it did not count by
members--it counted by purpose.
For example, among the rest was a man whom I have come to admire so
much that I have come to have a personal affection for him, and that
is Mr. Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, as genuine a friend of man
as ever lived and as able a friend honest people ever had, and a man
on whose face a glow comes when you state a great principle, and yet
who is intensely practical and who was there to insist that nothing
was to be done which would put the small nations of the world at the
disposal of the big nations. So that he was the most influential
spokesman of what may be called the small powers as contrasted with
the great. But I merely single him out for the pleasure of paying him
this tribute, and not because the others were less earnest in pursuing
their purpose. They were a body of men who all felt this. Indeed,
several of them said this to us: "The world expects not only, but
demands of us that we shall do this thing successfully, and we cannot
go away without doing it." There is not a statesman in that conference
who would dare to go home saying that he had merely signed a treaty of
peace no matter how excellent the terms of that treaty are, because he
has received if not an official at least an influential mandate to see
to it that something is done in addition which will make the thing
stand after it is done; and he dare not go home without doing that. So
that all around that table there was coöperation--generous coöperation
of mind to make that document as good as we could make it. And I
believe it is a thoroughly sound document. There is only one
misleading sentence in it--only one sentence that conveys a wrong
impression. That can, I dare say, be altered, though it is going to be
extremely difficult to set up that fourteen-nation process again as
will have to be done if any alteration is made.
The particular and most important thing to which every nation that
joins the League agrees is this: That it won't fight on any question
at all until it has done one of two things. If it is about a question
that it considers suitable for arbitration it will submit it to
arbitration. You know, Mr. Taft and other serious advocates of this
general idea have tried to distinguish between justiciable and non-
justiciable subjects, and while they have had more or less success
with it, the success has not been satisfactory. You cannot define
expressly the questions which nations would be willing to submit to
arbitration. Some question of national pride may come in to upset the
definition. So we said we would make them promise to submit every
question that they considered suitable to arbitration and to abide by
the result. If they do not regard it as suitable for arbitration they
bind themselves to submit it to the consideration of the Executive
Council for a period not exceeding six months, but they are not bound
by the decision. It is an opinion, not a decision. But if a decision,
a unanimous decision, is made, and one of the parties to the dispute
accepts the decision, the other party does bind itself not to attack
the party that accepts the opinion. Now in discussing that we saw this
difficulty. Suppose that Power B is in possession of a piece of
territory which Power A claims, and Power A wins its claim so far as
the opinion of the Executive Council is concerned. And suppose that
the power in possession of the territory accepts the decision but then
simply stands pat and does nothing. It has got the territory. The
other party, inasmuch as the party that has lost has accepted the
decision, has bound itself not to attack it and cannot go by force of
arms and take possession of the country. In order to cure that
quandary we used a sentence which said that in case--I have forgotten
the phraseology but it means this--in case any power refuses to carry
out the decision the Executive Council was to consider the means by
which it could be enforced. Now that apparently applies to both
parties but was intended to apply to the non-active party which
refuses to carry it out. And that sentence is open to a
misconstruction. The Commission did not see that until after the
report was made and I explained this to the General Conference. I made
an explanation which was substantially the same as I have made to you,
and that this should be of record may be sufficient to interpret that
phrase, but probably not. It is not part of the Covenant and possibly
an attempt ought to be made to alter it.
But I am wandering from my real point. My point is that this is a
workable beginning of a thing that the world insists on. There is no
foundation for it except the good faith of the parties, but there
could not be any other foundation for an arrangement between nations.
The other night after dinner Senator Thomas, of Colorado, said: "Then
after all it is not a guarantee of peace." Certainly not. Who said
that it was? If you can invent an actual guarantee of peace you will
be a benefactor of mankind, but no such guarantee has been found. But
this comes as near being a guarantee of peace as you can get.
I had this interesting experience when the Covenant was framed. I
found that I was the only member of the Committee who did not take it
for granted that the members of the League would have the right to
secede. I found there was a universal feeling that this treaty could
be denounced in the usual way and that a state could withdraw. I
demurred from that opinion and found myself in a minority of one, and
I could not help saying to them that this would be very interesting on
the other side of the water, that the only Southerner on this
conference should deny the right of secession. But nevertheless it is
instructive and interesting to learn that this is taken for granted;
that it is not a covenant that you would have to continue to adhere
to. I suppose that is a necessary assumption among sovereign states,
but it would not be a very handsome thing to withdraw after we had
entered upon it. The point is that it does rest upon the good faith of
all the nations. Now the historic significance of it is this:
We are setting up right in the path that German ambition expected to
tread a number of new states that, chiefly because of their newness,
will for a long time be weak states. We are carving a piece of Poland
out of Germany's side; we are creating an independent Bohemia below
that, an independent Hungary below that, and enlarging Rumania, and we
are rearranging the territorial divisions of the Balkan States. We are
practically dissolving the Empire of Turkey and setting up under
mandatories of the League of Nations a number of states in Asia Minor
and Arabia which, except for the power of the mandatories, would be
almost helpless against any invading or aggressive force, and that is
exactly the old Berlin-to-Bagdad route. So that when you remember that
there is at present a strong desire on the part of Austria to unite
with Germany, you have the prospect of an industrial nation with
seventy or eighty millions of people right in the heart of Europe, and
to the southeast of it nothing but weakness, unless it is supported by
the combined power of the world.
Unless you expect this structure built at Paris to be a house of
cards, you have got to put into it the structural iron which will be
afforded by the League of Nations. Take the history of the war that we
have just been through. It is agreed by everybody that has expressed
an opinion that if Germany had known that England would go in, she
never would have started. What do you suppose she would have done if
she had known that everybody else would have gone in? Of course she
would never have started. If she had known that the world would have
been against her, this war would not have occurred; and the League of
Nations gives notice that if anything of that sort is tried again, the
world will be against the nation that tries it, and with that
assurance given that such a nation will have to fight the world, you
may be sure that whatever illicit ambitions a nation may have, it
cannot and will not attempt to realize them. But if they have not that
assurance and can in the meantime set up an infinite network of
intrigue such as we now know ran like a honeycomb through the world,
then any arrangement will be broken down. This is the place where
intrigue did accomplish the disintegration which made the realization
of Germany's purposes almost possible. So that those people will have
to make friends with their powerful neighbour Germany unless they have
already made friends with all the rest of the world. So that we must
have the League of Nations or else a repetition of the catastrophe we
have just gone through.
Now if you put that case before the people of the United States and
show them that without the League of Nations it is not worth while
completing the treaty we are making in Paris, then you have got an
argument which even an unidealistic people would respond to, and ours
is not an unidealistic people but the most idealistic people in the
world. Just let them catch the meaning which really underlies this and
there won't be any doubt, as to what the response will be from; the
hearts and from the judgments of the people of the United States.
I would hope, therefore, that forgetting elections for the time being
we should devote our thought and our energies and our plans to this
great business, to concert bi-partisan and non-partisan action, and by
whatever sort of action, to concert every effort in support of this
thing. I cannot imagine an orator being afforded a better theme, so
trot out your orators and turn them loose, because they will have an
inspiration in this that they have never had before, and I would like
a guarantee that the best vocabulary they can mobilize won't be equal
to the job. It surpasses past experience in the world and seems like a
prospect of realizing what once seemed a remote hope of international
morale. And you notice the basis of this thing. It guarantees the
members of the League, guarantees to each their territorial integrity
and political independence as against external aggression.
I found that all the other men around the conference table had a great
respect for the right of revolution. We do not guarantee any state
against what may happen inside itself, but we do guarantee against
aggression from the outside, so that the family can be as lively as it
pleases, and we know what generally happens to an interloper if you
interfere in a family quarrel. There was a very interesting respect
for the right of revolution; it may be because many of them thought it
was nearer at hand than they had supposed and this immediate
possibility breathed a respect in their minds. But whatever the reason
was, they had a very great respect for it. I read the Virginia Bill of
Rights very literally but not very elegantly to mean that any people
is entitled to any kind of government it pleases and that it is none
of our business to suggest or to influence the kind that it is going
to have. Sometimes it will have a very riotous form of government, but
that is none of our business. And I find that that is accepted, even
with regard to Russia. Even conservative men like the representatives
of Great Britain say it is not our business to dictate what kind of
government Russia shall have. The only thing to do is to see if we can
help them by conference and suggestion and recognition of the right
elements to get together and not leave the country in a state of
chaos.
It was for that reasonable purpose that we tried to have the
Conference at a place I had never heard of before--a place called
Prinkipos. I understand it is a place on the Bosphorus with fine
summer hotels, etc., and I was abashed to admit that I had never heard
of it--but having plenty of house room, we thought that we could get
the several Russian elements together there and see if we could not
get them to sit down in one room together and tell us what it was all
about and what they intended to do. The Bolshevists had accepted, but
had accepted in a way that was studiously insulting. They said they
would come, and were perfectly ready to say beforehand that they were
ready to pay the foreign debt and ready to make concessions in
economic matters, and that they were even ready to make territorial
readjustments, which meant, "we are dealing with perjured governments
whose only interest is in striking a bargain, and if that is the price
of European recognition and cooperation, we are ready to pay it."
I never saw anybody more angered than Mr. Lloyd George, who said: "We
cannot let that insult go by. We are not after their money or their
concessions or their territory. That is not the point. We are their
friends who want to help them and must tell them so." We did not tell
them so because to some of the people we had to deal with the payment
of the foreign debt was a more interesting and important matter, but
that will be made clear to them in conference, if they will believe
it. But the Bolshevists, so far as we could get any taste of their
flavour, are the most consummate sneaks in the world. I suppose
because they know they have no high motives themselves, they do not
believe that anybody else has. And Trotsky, having lived a few months
in New York, was able to testify that the United States is in the
hands of capitalists and does not serve anybody else's interests but
the capitalists'. And the worst of it is, I think he honestly believes
it. It would not have much effect if he didn't. Having received six
dollars a week to write for a socialistic and anarchistic paper which
believed that and printed it, and knowing how difficult it is to live
on nothing but the wages of sin, he believes that the only wages paid
here are the wages of sin.
But we cannot rescue Russia without having a united Europe. One of my
colleagues in Paris said: "We could not go home and say we had made
peace if we left half of Europe and half of Asia at war--because
Russia constitutes half of Europe and Siberia constitutes half of
Asia." And yet we may have to go home without composing these great
territories, but if we go home with a League of Nations, there will be
some power to solve this most perplexing problem.
And so from every point of view, it is obvious to the men in Paris,
obvious to those who in their own hearts are most indifferent to the
League of Nations, that we have to tie in the provisions of the Treaty
with the League of Nations because the League of Nations is the heart
of the Treaty. It is the only machinery. It is the only solid basis of
masonry that is in the Treaty, and in saying that I know that I am
expressing the opinion of all those with whom I have been conferring.
I cannot imagine any greater historic glory for the party than to have
it said that for the time being it is thinking not of elections, but
of the salvation of the plain people of the world, and the plain
people of the world are looking to us who call ourselves Democrats to
prove to the utmost point of sacrifice that we are indeed Democrats,
with a small d as well as a large D, that we are ready to put the
whole power and influence of America at the disposal of free men
everywhere in the world no matter what the sacrifice involved, no
matter what the danger to the cause.
And I would like, if I am not tiresome, to leave this additional
thought in your mind. I was one of the first advocates of the
mandatory. I do not at all believe in handing over any more territory
than has already been handed over to any sovereign. I do not believe
in putting the people of the German territories at the disposition,
unsubordinated disposition, of any great power, and therefore I was a
warm advocate of the idea of General Smuts--who, by the way, is an
extraordinary person--who propounded the theory that the pieces of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the pieces of the Turkish Empire and the
German colonies were all political units or territorial units which
ought to be accepted in trust by the family of nations, and not turned
over to any member of the family, and that therefore the League of
Nations would have as one of its chief functions to act as trustee for
these great areas of dismembered empires. And yet the embarrassing
moment came when they asked if the United States would be willing to
accept a mandatory. I had to say off-hand that it would not be
willing. I have got to say off-hand that in the present state of
American opinion, at any rate, it wants to observe what I may call
without offense Pharisaical cleanliness and not take anything out of
the pile. It is its point of pride that it does not want to seem to
take anything even by way of superintendence. And of course they said:
"That is very disappointing, for this reason" (The reason they stated
in as complimentary terms as I could have stated it myself): "You
would be the most acceptable mandatory to any one of these peoples,
and very few of us, if any, would be acceptable." They said that in so
many words, and it would greatly advance the peace of the world and
the peace of mind of Europe if the United States would accept
mandatories. I said: "I am perfectly willing to go home and stump the
country and see if they will do it," but I could not truthfully say
off-hand that they would, because I did not know. Now what I wanted to
suggest is this: Personally, and just within the limits of this room,
I can say very frankly that I think we ought to. I think there is a
very promising beginning in regard to countries like Armenia. The
whole heart of America has been engaged for Armenia. They know more
about Armenia and its sufferings than they know about any other
European area; we have colleges out there; we have great missionary
enterprises, just as we have had Robert College in Constantinople.
That is a part of the world where already American influence extends,
a saving influence and an educating and an uplifting influence.
Colleges like Beirut in Syria have spread their influence very much
beyond the limits of Syria, all through the Arabian country and
Mesopotamia and in the distant parts of Asia Minor, and I am not
without hope that the people of the United States would find it
acceptable to go in and be the trustee of the interests of the
Armenian people and see to it that the unspeakable Turk and the almost
equally difficult Kurd had their necks sat on long enough to teach
them manners and give the industrious and earnest people of Armenia
time to develop a country which is naturally rich with possibilities.
Now the place where they all want us to accept a mandate most is at
Constantinople. I may say that it seems to be rather the consensus of
opinion there that Constantinople ought to be internationalized. So
that the present idea apparently is to delimit the territory around
Constantinople to include the Straits and set up a mandate for that
territory which will make those Straits open to the nations of the
world without any conditions and make Constantinople truly
international--an internationalized free city and a free port--and
America is the only nation in the world that can undertake that
mandate and have the rest of the world believe that it is undertaken
in good faith that we do not mean to stay there and set up our own
sovereignty. So that it would be a very serious matter for the
confidence of the world in this treaty if the United States did not
accept a mandate for Constantinople.
What I have to suggest is that questions of that sort ought to be
ventilated very thoroughly. This will appeal to the people of the
United States: Are you going to take advantage of this and not any of
the burden? Are you going to put the burden on the bankrupt states of
Europe? For almost all of them are bankrupt in the sense that they
cannot undertake any new things. I think that will appeal to the
American people: that they ought to take the burdens--for they are
burdens. Nobody is going to get anything out of a mandatory of
Constantinople or Armenia. It is a work of disinterested philanthropy.
And if you first present that idea and then make tentative expositions
of where we might go in as a mandatory, I think that the people will
respond. If we went in at Constantinople, for example, I think it is
true that almost all the influential men who are prominent in the
affairs of Bulgaria and were graduates of Robert College would be
immediately susceptible to American interests. They would take
American guidance when they would not take any other guidance.
But I wish I could stay home and tackle this job with you. There is
nothing I would like to do so much as really to say in parliamentary
language what I think of the people that are opposing it. I would
reserve the right in private to say in unparliamentary language what I
think of them, but in public I would try to stick to parliamentary
language. Because of all the blind and little, provincial people, they
are the littlest and most contemptible. It is not their character so
much that I have a contempt for, though that contempt is
thoroughgoing, but their minds. They have not got even good working
imitations of minds. They remind me of a man with a head that is not a
head but is just a knot providentially put there to keep him from
ravelling out, but why the Lord should not have been willing to let
them ravel out I do not know, because they are of no use, and if I
could really say what I think about them, it would be picturesque. But
the beauty of it is that their ignorance and their provincialism can
be made so perfectly visible. They have horizons that do not go beyond
their parish; they do not even reach to the edges of the parish,
because the other people know more than they do. The whole impulse of
the modern time is against them. They are going to have the most
conspicuously contemptible names in history. The gibbets that they are
going to be executed on by future historians will scrape the heavens,
they will be so high. They won't be turned in the direction of heaven
at all, but they will be very tall, and I do not know any fate more
terrible than to be exhibited in that future catalogue of the men who
are utterly condemned by the whole spirit of humanity. If I did not
despise them, I would be sorry for them.
Now I have sometimes a very cheering thought. On the fifth of March,
1921, I am going to begin to be an historian again instead of an
active public man, and I am going to have the privilege of writing
about these gentlemen without any restraints of propriety. The
President, if my experience is a standard, is liable some day to burst
by merely containing restrained gases. Anybody in the Senate or House
can say any abusive thing he pleases about the President, but it
shocks the sense of propriety of the whole country if the President
says what he thinks about them. And that makes it very fortunate that
the term of the President is limited, because no president could stand
it for a number of years. But when the lid is off, I am going to
resume my study of the dictionary to find adequate terms in which to
describe the fatuity of these gentlemen with their poor little minds
that never get anywhere but run around in a circle and think they are
going somewhere. I cannot express my contempt for their intelligence,
but because I think I know the people of the United States, I can
predict their future with absolute certainty. I am not concerned as to
the ultimate outcome of this thing at all, not for a moment, but I am
concerned that the outcome should be brought about immediately, just
as promptly as possible. So my hope is that we will all put on our war
paint, not as Democrats but as Americans, get the true American
pattern of war paint and a real hatchet and go out on the war path and
get a collection of scalps that has never been excelled in the history
of American warfare.