_Neither the Sea nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the
Portuguese by title of prescription or custom_
The last defense of injustice is usually a claim or plea based on
prescription or on custom. To this defense therefore the Portuguese
have resorted. But the best established reasoning of the law
precludes them from enjoying the protection of either plea.
Prescription is a matter of municipal law; hence it cannot be applied
as between kings, or as between free and independent nations.[114]
It has even less standing when it is in conflict with that which is
always stronger than the municipal law, namely, the law of nature
or nations. Nay, even municipal law itself prevents prescription in
this case.[115] For it is impossible to acquire by usucaption or
prescription things which cannot become property, that is, which
are not susceptible of possession or of quasi-possession, and which
cannot be alienated. All of which is true with respect to the sea and
its use.
And since public things, that is, things which are the property of a
nation, cannot be acquired by mere efflux of time, either because of
their nature, or because of the prerogatives of those against whom
such prescription would act, is it not vastly more just that the
benefits accruing from the enjoyment of common things should be given
to the entire human race than to one nation alone? On this point
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quod Papinianus scriptum reliquit,[116a] ‘praescriptionem longae
possessionis ad obtinenda loca iurisgentium publica concedi non
solere’; eiusque rei exemplum dat in litore, cuius pars imposito
aedificio occupata fuerat. Nam eo diruto, et alterius aedificio in
eodem loco postea exstructo, exceptionem opponi non posse; quod
deinde similitudine rei publicae illustrat, nam et si quis in
fluminis diverticulo pluribus annis piscatus sit, postea, interrupta
scilicet piscatione, alterum eodem iure prohibere non posse.
Apparet igitur Angelum et qui cum Angelo dixerunt[117a] Venetis
et Genuensibus per praescriptionem ius aliquod in sinum maris suo
litori praeiacentem acquiri potuisse, aut falli, aut fallere, quod
sane Iurisconsultis nimium est frequens, cum sanctae professionis
auctoritatem, non ad rationes et leges, sed ad gratiam conferunt
potentiorum. Nam Martiani quidem responsum, de quo et ante egimus,
si recte cum Papiniani verbis comparetur,[118a] non aliam accipere
potest interpretationem, quam eam quae et Iohanni olim et Bartolo
probata est, et nunc a doctis omnibus recipitur:[119a] ut scilicet
ius prohibendi procedat quamdiu durat occupatio,
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Papinian has said:[116] ‘Prescription raised by long possession is
not customarily recognized as valid in the acquisition of places
known to international law as “public”’. As an example, to illustrate
this point, he cites a shore some part of which had been occupied by
means of a building constructed on it. But if this building should be
destroyed, and some one else later should construct a building on the
same spot, no exception could be taken to it. Then he illustrates the
same point by the analogous case of a _res publica_. If, for example,
any one has fished for many years in a branch of a river, and has
then stopped fishing there, after that he cannot prevent any one else
from enjoying the same right that he had.
Wherefore it appears that Angeli[117] and his followers who have said
that the Venetians and Genoese were able to acquire by prescription
certain specific rights in the gulfs of the sea adjacent to their
shores, either are mistaken, or are deceiving others; a thing which
happens all too frequently with jurists when they exercise the
authority of their sacred profession not for justice and law, but in
order to gain the gratitude of the powerful. There is also an opinion
of Marcianus, already cited above in another connection, which, when
carefully compared with the words of Papinian,[118] can have no
other interpretation than the one formerly adopted by Johannes and
Bartolus,* and now accepted by all learned men,[119] namely, that the
_jus prohibendi_ is in effect only while occupation lasts; it loses
its force if occupation
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non autem si ea omissa sit; omissa enim non prodest, nec si per
mille annos fuisset continuata, ut recte animadvertit Castrensis.
Et quamvis hoc voluisset Martianus, quod minime credendus est
cogitasse, in quo loco occupatio conceditur, in eodem praescriptionem
concedi, tamen absurdum erat quod de flumine publico dictum erat
ad Mare commune, et quod de diverticulo ad sinum proferre, cum
haec praescriptio usum qui est Iuregentium communis, impeditura
sit, illa autem publico usui non admodum noceat. Alterum autem
Angeli argumentum quod ex aquaeductu sumitur,[120a] eodem Castrensi
monstrante, ut a quaestione alienissimum, ab omnibus merito
exploditur.
Falsum igitur est talem praescriptionem etiam eo tempore gigni,
cuius initium omnem memoriam excedat. Vbi enim lex omnem omnino
tollit praescriptionem, ne istud quidem tempus admittitur, hoc
est, ut Felinus loquitur,[121a] materia impraescriptibilis tempore
immemoriali non fit praescriptibilis. Fatetur haec vera esse
Balbus;[122a] sed Angeli sententiam receptam dicit hac ratione,
quia tempus extra memoriam positum idem valere creditur privilegio,
cum titulus amplissimus ex tali tempore praesumatur. Apparet hinc
non aliud illos sensisse, quam si pars aliqua reipublicae, puta
Imperi Romani, supra omnem memoriam usa esset tali iure, ei dandam
praescriptionem hoc colore, quasi Principis
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cease; and occupation once interrupted, even if it had been
continuous for a thousand years, loses its rights, as Paul de
Castro† justly observes. And even if Marcianus had meant--which
certainly was not in his mind at all--that acquisition by
prescription is to be recognized wherever occupation is recognized,
still it would have been absurd to apply what had been said about a
public river to the common sea, or what had been said about an inlet
or a river branch to a bay, since in the latter case prescription
would hinder the use of something common to all by the law of
nations, and in the former case would work no great injury to public
use. Moreover, another argument brought forward by Angeli based on
the use of aqueducts,[120] has quite properly been rejected by every
one, being, as de Castro pointed out, entirely aside from the point.
* [Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314-1357) the most famous of the
Post-glossators, was called by many of his biographers ‘Optimus
auriga in hac civili sapientia’.]
† [The celebrated Italian jurist (?-1420 or 1437) of whom Cujas
said: “Si vous n’avez pas Paul de Castro, vendez votre chemise pour
l’acheter.” (Note from page 55 of the French translation of Grotius
by de Grandpont.)]
It is not true then that such prescription rises even at a time
beyond the period of the memory of man. For since the law absolutely
denies all prescription, not even immemorial time has any effect on
the question; that is, as Felinus[121] says, things imprescriptible
by nature do not become prescriptible by the mere efflux of
immemorial time. Balbus admits the truth of these arguments,[122] but
says that the opinion of Angeli is to be accepted on the ground that
time immemorial is believed to have the same validity as prerogative
for setting up a title, since a perfect title is presumed from such
efflux of time. Hence it appears that the jurists thought if some
part of a state, say of the Roman empire for example, at a period
before the memory of man had exercised such a right, that a title by
prescription would
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concessio praeiisset. Quare cum nemo sit dominus totius generis
humani, qui ius illud adversus homines omnes homini, aut populo
alicui potuisset concedere, sublato illo colore, necesse est etiam
praescriptionem interimi. Et sic ex illorum etiam sententia inter
reges aut populos liberos prodesse nihil potest lapsus infiniti
temporis.
Vanissimum autem et illud est quod Angelus docuit, etiamsi ad
dominium praescriptio proficere non potest, tamen dandam esse
possidenti exceptionem. Nam Papinianus disertis verbis exceptionem
negat:[123a] et aliter non potuit sentire, cum ipsius saeculo
praescriptio nihil esset aliud quam exceptio. Verum igitur est
quod et leges Hispanicae exprimunt[124a] in his rebus quae communi
hominum usui sunt attributae, nullius omnino temporis praescriptionem
procedere, cuius definitionis illa praeter ceteras ratio reddi
potest, quod qui re communi utitur, ut communi uti videtur, non autem
iure proprio, et ita praescribere non magis quam fructuarius potest
vitio possessionis.[125a]
Altera haec etiam non contemnenda est, quod in praescriptione
temporis cuius memoria non exstat, quamvis titulus et bona fides
praesumantur, tamen si re ipsa appareat titulum omnino nullum dari
posse, et sic manifesta sit fides mala, quae in populo maxime quasi
uno corpore perpetua esse
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have to be admitted on that ground, exactly as if there had been a
previous grant from a Prince. But inasmuch as there is no one who
is sovereign of the whole human race with competence to grant to
any man or to any nation such a right against all other men, with
the annihilation of that pretext, title by prescription is also
necessarily destroyed. Therefore the opinion of the jurists is that
not even an infinite lapse of time is able to set up a right as
between kings or independent nations.
Moreover Angeli brought forward a most foolish argument, affirming
that even if prescription could not create ownership, still an
exception ought to be made in favor of a possessor. Papinian however
in unmistakable words says there is no exception,[123] nor could
he think otherwise, because in his day prescription was itself an
exception. It is therefore true, as expressed also in the laws of
Spain,[124] that prescription based on no matter how immemorial a
time, sets up no title to those things which are recognized as common
to the use of mankind. One reason among others which can be given for
this definition is that any one who uses a _res communis_ does so
evidently by virtue of common and not private right, and because of
the imperfect character of possession he can therefore no more set up
a legal title by prescription than can a usufructuary.[125]
A second reason not to be overlooked is that although a title and
good faith are presumed in a prescriptive right created by the efflux
of immemorial time, nevertheless if it appears from the nature of the
thing itself that no title at all can be established, and if thus
there becomes evident bad faith--a thing held to be permanent in a
nation as well as in an individual--then prescription fails because
of a
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censetur, et ex duplici defectu praescriptio corruit.[126a] Tertia
vero, quia res haec est merae facultatis, quae non praescribitur, ut
infra demonstrabimus.
Sed nullus est finis argutiarum. Inventi sunt qui in hoc argumento
a praescriptione consuetudinem distinguerent, ut illa scilicet
exclusi, ad hanc confugerent. Discrimen autem quod hic statuunt sane
ridiculum est: ex praescriptione aiunt ius unius quod ab eo aufertur
alteri applicari;[127a] sed cum aliquod ius ita alicui applicatur
ut alteri non auferatur, tum dici consuetudinem; quasi vero cum ius
navigandi quod communiter ad omnes pertinet, exclusis aliis ab uno
usurpatur, non necesse sit omnibus perire quantum uni accedit. Errori
huic ansam dederunt Pauli verba non recte accepta, qui cum de iure
proprio maris ad aliquem pertinente loqueretur,[128a] fieri hoc posse
dixit Accursius per privilegium aut consuetudinem: quod additamentum
ad Iurisconsulti textum nullo modo accedens mali potius coniectoris
esse videtur quam boni interpretis. Mens Pauli supra explicata
est. Ceterum illi si vel sola Vlpiani verba,[129a] quae paulo ante
praecedunt, satis considerassent, longe aliud dicturi erant. Fatetur
enim ut quis ante aedes meas piscari prohibeatur, esse quidem
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double defect.[126] Also a third reason is that we have under
consideration a merely facultative right which is not prescriptible,
as we shall show below.*
* [See chapter XI.]
But there is no end to their subtilties. There are jurists who in
this case would distinguish custom from prescription, so that if they
are debarred from the one, they may fall back upon the other. But
the distinction which they set up is most absurd. They say that the
right of one person which is taken away from him is given to another
by prescription;[127] but that when any right is given to any one
in such a way that it is not taken away from any one else, then it
is called custom. As if indeed the right of navigation, which is
common to all, upon being usurped by some one to the exclusion of all
others, would not necessarily when it became the property of one be
lost to all!
This error receives support from misinterpretation of what Paulus
has to say about a private right of possession on the sea.[128]
Accursius† said that such a right could be acquired by privilege or
custom. But this addition which in no way agrees with the text of
the jurist seems to be rather the interpretation of a mischievous
guesser than of a faithful interpreter. The real meaning of the
words of Paulus has been already explained. Besides, if more careful
consideration had been given to the words of Ulpian[129] which almost
immediately precede those of Paulus, a very different assertion would
have been made. For Ulpian acknowledges that if any one is prohibited
from fishing in front of
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usurpatum;[130a] hoc est receptum consuetudine, sed nullo iure,
ideoque iniuriarum actionem prohibito non denegandam.
Contemnit igitur hunc morem, et usurpationem vocat, ut et inter
Christianos Doctores Ambrosius.[131a] Et merito. Quid enim clarius
quam non valere consuetudinem, quae iuri naturae, aut gentium ex
adverso opponitur?[132a] Consuetudo enim species est iuris positivi,
quod legi perpetuae obrogare non potest. Est autem lex illa perpetua
ut Mare omnibus usu commune sit. Quod autem in praescriptione
diximus, idem in consuetudine verum est, si quis eorum qui diversum
tradiderunt sensus excutiat, non aliud reperturum, quam consuetudinem
privilegio parari. Atqui adversus genus humanum concedendi
privilegium nemo habet potestatem; quare inter diversas respublicas
consuetudo ista vim non habet.
Verum omnem hanc quaestionem diligentissime tractavit Vasquius,[133a]
decus illud Hispaniae, cuius nec in explorando iure subtilitatem,
nec in docendo libertatem umquam desideres. Is igitur posita thesi:
‘Loca publica et iure gentium communia praescribi non posse’, quam
multis firmat auctoribus; exceptiones deinde subiungit ab Angelo et
aliis confictas, quas supra retulimus. Haec autem examinaturus recte
iudicat istarum rerum veritatem pendere a vera iuris, tam naturae
quam gentium cognitione. Ius enim naturae cum a
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my house, such prohibition is a usurpation of right,[130] allowed,
it is true, by custom, but based on no law, and that an action for
damages could not be denied the person thus prohibited from fishing.
† [Franciscus (?) Accursius (?-1259) (a pupil of the famous Monarcha
juris Azzo), with whose name the Glossa Magna is almost synonymous.
He was called Advocatorum Idolum.]
He therefore condemns this practice, and calls it a usurpation;
of the Christian jurists Ambrose[131] does likewise, and both are
right. For what is clearer than that custom is not valid when it
is diametrically opposed to the law of nature or of nations?[132]
Indeed, custom is a sort of affirmative right, which cannot
invalidate general or universal law. And it is a universal law that
the sea and its use is common to all. Moreover what we have said
about prescription applies with equal truth and force to custom; and
if any one should investigate the opinions of those who have differed
upon this matter, he would find no other opinion but that custom is
established by privilege. No one has the power to confer a privilege
which is prejudicial to the rights of the human race; wherefore such
a custom has no force as between different states.
This entire question however has been most thoroughly treated by
Vasquez,[133] that glory of Spain, who leaves nothing ever to be
desired when it comes to subtle examination of the law or to the
exposition of the principles of liberty. He lays down this thesis:
‘Places public and common to all by the law of nations cannot
become objects of prescription’. This thesis he supports by many
authorities, and then he subjoins the objections fabricated by Angeli
and others, which we have enumerated above. But before examining
these objections he makes the just and reasonable statement that the
truth of all these matters depends upon a true conception both of the
law of nature and the law of nations.
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divina veniat providentia, esse immutabile. Huius autem iuris
naturalis partem esse ius gentium, primaevum quod dicitur, diversum
a iure gentium secundario sive positivo, quorum posterius mutari
potest. Nam si qui mores cum iure gentium primaevo repugnent, hi non
humani sunt ipso iudice, sed FERINI, corruptelae et abusus, non leges
et usus. Itaque nullo tempore praescribi potuerunt, nulla lata lege
iustificari, nullo multarum etiam gentium consensu, hospitio, et
exercitatione stabiliri, quod exemplis aliquot et Alphonsi Castrensis
Theologi Hispani testimonio confirmat.[134a]
‘Ex quibus apparet’, inquit, ‘quam suspecta sit sententia eorum,
quos supra retulimus, existimantium Genuenses, aut etiam Venetos
posse non iniuria prohibere alios navigare per Gulfum aut pelagus
sui maris, quasi aequora ipsa praescripserint, id quod non solum
est contra leges,[135a] sed etiam est contra ipsum ius naturae, aut
gentium primaevum, quod mutari non posse diximus. Quod sit contra
illud ius constat, quia non solum maria aut aequora eo iure communia
erant sed etiam reliquae omnes res immobiles. Et licet ab eo iure
postea recessum fuerit ex parte, puta quoad dominium et proprietatem
terrarum, quarum dominium iure Naturae commune, distinctum et
divisum, sicque ab illa communione segregatum fuit; tamen[136a]
diversum fuit et est in dominio maris,
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For, since the law of nature arises out of Divine Providence, it is
immutable; but a part of this natural law is the primary or primitive
law of nations, differing from the secondary or positive law of
nations, which is mutable. For if there are customs incompatible
with the primary law of nations, then, according to the judgment of
Vasquez, they are not customs belonging to men, but to wild beasts,
customs which are corruptions and abuses; not laws and usages.
Therefore those customs cannot become prescriptions by mere lapse
of time, cannot be justified by the passage of any law, cannot be
established by the consent, the protection, or the practice even of
many nations. These statements he confirms by a number of examples,
and particularly by the testimony of Alphonse de Castro[134] the
Spanish theologian.
‘It is evident therefore’, he says, ‘how much to be suspected is the
opinion of those persons mentioned above, who think that the Genoese
or the Venetians can without injustice prohibit other nations from
navigating the gulfs or bays of their respective seas, as if they
had a prescriptive right to the very water itself. Such an act is
not only contrary to the laws,[135] but is contrary also to natural
law or the primary law of nations, which we have said is immutable.
And this is seen to be true because by that same law not only the
seas or waters, but also all other immovables were _res communes_.
And although in later times there was a partial abandonment of that
law, in so far as concerns sovereignty and ownership of lands--which
by natural law at first were held in common, then distinguished and
divided, and thus finally separated from the primitive community of
use;--nevertheless[136] it was different as regards sovereignty over
the sea, which from the beginning of the world down to this
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quod ab origine Mundi, ad hodiernum usque diem est, fuitque semper in
communi, nulla ex parte immutatum, ut est notum’.
‘Et quamvis ex LVSITANIS magnam turbam saepe audiverim in hac
esse opinione ut eorum Rex ita praescripserit navigationem INDICI
Occidentalis (forte Orientalis) eiusdemque VASTISSIMI MARIS, ita
ut reliquis gentibus aequora illa transfretare non liceat, et ex
nostrismet HISPANIS VVLGVS in eadem opinione fere esse videtur,
ut per VASTISSIMVM IMMENSVMQVE PONTVM ad Indorum regiones quas
potentissimi Reges nostri subegerunt reliquis mortalium navigare
praeterquam Hispanis ius minime sit, quasi ab eis id ius praescriptum
fuerit, tamen istorum omnium non minus INSANAE sunt opiniones, quam
eorum qui quoad Genuenses et Venetos in eodem fere SOMNIO esse
adsolent, quas sententias INEPTIRE vel ex eo dilucidius apparet,
quod istarum nationum singulae contra seipsas nequeunt praescribere:
hoc est, non respublica Venetiarum contra semetipsam, non respublica
Genuensium contra semetipsam, non Regnum Hispanicum contra
semetipsum, non Regnum Lusitanicum contra semetipsum.[137a] Esse enim
debet differentia inter agentem et patientem’.
‘Contra reliquas vero nationes longe minus praescribere possunt,
quia ius praescriptionum est mere civile, ut fuse ostendimus supra.
Ergo tale ius cessat cum agitur inter principes vel populos,
superiorem non recognoscentes in temporalibus. Iura enim mere civilia
cuiuscumque regionis,
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very day is and always has been a _res communis_, and which, as is
well known, has in no wise changed from that status.
‘And although’, he continues, ‘I have often heard that a great many
Portuguese believe that their king has a prescriptive right over
the navigation of the vast seas of the West Indies (probably the
East Indies too) such that other nations are not allowed to traverse
those waters; and although the common people among our own Spaniards
seem to be of the same opinion, namely, that absolutely no one in
the world except us Spaniards ourselves has the least right to
navigate the great and immense sea which stretches to the regions
of the Indies once subdued by our most powerful kings, as if that
right has been ours alone by prescription; although, I repeat, I
have heard both these things, nevertheless the belief of all those
people is no less extravagantly foolish than that of those who are
always cherishing the same delusions with respect to the Genoese and
Venetians. Indeed the opinions of them all appear the more manifestly
absurd, because no one of those nations can erect a prescription
against itself; that is to say, not the Venetian republic, nor the
Genoese republic, nor the kingdom of Spain nor of Portugal can raise
prescriptions against rights they already possess by nature.[137] For
the one who claims a prescriptive right and the one who suffers by
the establishment of such a claim must not be one and the same person.
‘Against other nations they are even much less competent to raise a
prescription, because the right of prescription is only a municipal
right, as we have shown above at some length. Therefore such a right
ceases to have any effect as between rulers or nations who do not
recognize a superior in the temporal domain. For so far as the merely
municipal laws of any place are concerned, they do not
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quoad exteros populos, nationes, vel etiam homines singulos, non
magis sunt in consideratione, quam si re vera esset tale ius, aut
numquam fuisset, et ad ius commune gentium primaevum vel secundarium
recurrendum est, eoque utendum, quo iure talem maris praescriptionem
et usurpationem admissam non fuisse satis constat. Nam, et hodie
usus aquarum communis est, non secus quam erat ab origine Mundi.
Ergo et in aequoribus et aquis nullum ius est aut esse potest humano
generi, praeterquam quoad usum communem. Praeterea de iure naturali
et divino est illud praeceptum, ut _Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri
non facias_. Vnde cum navigatio nemini possit esse nociva nisi
ipsi naviganti, par est ut nemini possit, aut debeat impediri,
ne in re sua natura libera, sibique minime noxia navigantium
libertatem impediat, et laedat contra dictum praeceptum et contra
regulam praesertim cum omnia intelligantur esse permissa, quae non
reperiuntur expressim prohibita.[138a] Quinimo non solum contra ius
naturale esset, velle impedire talem navigationem, sed etiam tenemur
contrarium facere, hoc est, prodesse iis quibus possumus, cum id sine
damno nostro fieri potest’.
Quod cum multis auctoritatibus tam divinis quam humanis confirmasset,
subiungit postea:[139a] ‘Ex superioribus etiam apparet suspectam esse
sententiam Iohannis Fabri, Angeli, Baldi, et Francisci Balbi, quos
supra retulimus, existimantium loca iuris gentium communia, et si
acquiri non possint praescriptione, posse tamen acquiri consuetudine,
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affect foreign peoples, nations, or even individuals, any more
than if they did not exist or never had existed. Therefore it was
necessary to have recourse to the common law of nations, primary as
well as secondary, and to use a law which clearly had not admitted
any such prescription and usurpation of the sea. For today the use of
the waters is common, exactly as it has been since the creation of
the world. Therefore no man has a right nor can acquire a right over
the seas and waters which would be prejudicial to their common use.
Besides, there is both in natural and divine law that famous rule:
‘Whatsoever ye would that men should not do to you, do not ye even
so to them’. Hence it follows, since navigation cannot harm any one
except the navigator himself, it is only just that no one either can
or ought to be interdicted therefrom, lest nature, free in her own
realm, and least hurtful to herself, be found impeding the liberty
of navigation, and thus offending against the accepted precept and
rule that all things are supposed to be permitted which are not found
expressly forbidden.[138] Besides, not only would it be contrary to
natural law to wish to prevent such free navigation, but we are even
bound to do the opposite, that is, bound to assist such navigation
in whatever way we can, when it can be done without any prejudice to
ourselves’.
After Vasquez had established his point by the help of many
authorities both human and divine, he added:[139] ‘It appears then,
from what has gone before that the opinion held by Johannes Faber,
Angeli, Baldus, and Franciscus Balbus, whom we have cited above, is
not to be trusted, because they think that places common by the law
of nations, even if not open to acquisition by prescription, can
nevertheless be acquired by custom; but this is entirely false, and
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quod omnino FALSVM est, eaque traditio CAECA ET NVBILA est, OMNIQVE
RATIONIS LVMINE CARENS, legemque verbis non rebus imponens.[140a] In
exemplis enim de Mari Hispanorum, LVSITANORVM, Venetorum, Genuensium,
et reliquorum, constat consuetudine ius tale navigandi, et alios
navigare prohibendi non magis acquiri quam praescriptione.[141a]
Vtroque enim casu ut apparet, eadem est ratio. Et quia per iura et
rationes supra relatas id esset contra naturalem aequitatem, nec
ullam induceret utilitatem, sed solam laesionem, sicque ut lege
expressa introduci non possent, ita etiam nec lege tacita, qualis
est consuetudo.[142a] Et tempore id non iustificaretur, sed potius
deterius et iniurius in dies fieret’.
Ostendit deinde ex prima terrarum occupatione posse populo ut venandi
ius, ita piscandi in suo flumine competere, et postquam illa semel ab
antiqua communione separata sunt, ita ut particularem applicationem
admittant, praescriptione temporis eius, cuius initi memoria non
exstet, quasi tacita populi concessione acquiri posse. Hoc autem
per praescriptionem contingere, non per consuetudinem, quia solius
aequirentis condicio melior fiat, reliquorum vero deterior. Et
cum tria enumerasset quae requiruntur, ut ius proprium in flumine
piscandi praescribatur:
‘Quid autem’, subdit, ‘quoad mare? Et in eo magis est
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is a teaching which is both obscure and vague, which lacks the
faintest glimmer of reasonableness, and which sets up a law in word
but not in fact.[140] For it is well established from the examples
taken from the seas of the Spaniards, Portuguese, Venetians, Genoese,
and others, that an exclusive right of navigation and a right of
prohibiting others from navigation is no more to be acquired by
custom than by prescription.[141] And it is apparent that the reason
is the same in both cases. And since according to the laws and
reasons adduced above this would be contrary to natural equity and
would not bring benefit but only injury, therefore as it could not
be introduced by an express law, neither could it be introduced by a
tacit or implied law, and that is what custom is.[142] And far from
justifying itself by any lapse of time, it rather becomes worse, and
every day more injurious’.
Vasquez next shows that from the time of the earliest occupation of
the earth every people possessed the right of hunting in its own
territory, and of fishing in its own rivers. After those rights
were once separated from the ancient community of rights in such
a way that they admitted of particular attachments, they could be
acquired by prescription based upon such an efflux of time that
“the memory of its beginning does not exist,” as if by the tacit
permission of a nation. This comes about, however, by prescription
and not by custom, because only the condition of him who acquires is
bettered, while that of all other persons is made worse. Then after
Vasquez had enumerated three conditions which are requisite in order
that a private right of fishing in a river may become a right by
prescription, he continues as follows:
‘But what are we to say as regards the sea? There is
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quod etiam concursus istorum trium non sufficeret ad acquirendum ius.
Ratio differentiae inter mare ex una parte, et terram et flumina
ex altera, quia illo casu ut olim ita et hodie, et semper, tam
quoad piscandum quam quoad navigandum mansit integrum ius gentium
primaevum, neque umquam fuit a communione hominum separatum, et
alicui, vel aliquibus applicatum. Posteriore autem casu, nempe in
terra vel fluminibus aliud fuit, ut iam disseruimus’.
‘Sed quare ius gentium secundarium, ut eam separationem quoad terras
et flumina facit, quoad mare facere desiit? respondeo, quia illo casu
expediebat. Constat enim quod si multi venentur, aut piscentur in
terra vel flumine, facile nemus feris, et flumen piscibus evacuatum
redditur, id quod in mari non est. Item fluminum navigatio facile
deterior fit et impeditur per aedificia, quod in mari non est. Item
per aquaeductus facile evacuatur flumen, non ita in mari;[143a] ergo
in utroque non est par ratio’.
‘Nec ad rem pertinet, quod supra diximus, communem esse usum
aquarum, fontium etiam et fluminum. Nam intelligitur quoad bibendum
et similia, quae fluminis dominium aut ius habenti vel minime vel
levissime nocent.[144a] Minima enim in consideratione non sunt. Pro
nostris sententiis facit, quia iniqua nullo tempore praescribuntur,
et ideo lex iniqua nullo tempore praescribitur, aut iustificatur’.
Mox: ‘Et
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more to say about it, because even the combination of the three
conditions mentioned is not sufficient here for the acquisition of
such a right. The reason for the difference between the sea on one
hand and land and rivers on the other, is that in the case of the sea
the same primitive right of nations regarding fishing and navigation
which existed in the earliest times, still today exists undiminished
and always will, and because that right was never separated from the
community right of all mankind, and attached to any person or group
of persons. But in the latter case, that of the land and rivers, it
was different, as we have already set forth.
‘But why, it is asked, does the secondary law of nations which brings
about this separation when we consider lands and rivers cease to
operate in the same way when we consider the sea? I reply, because in
the former case it was expedient and necessary. For every one admits
that if a great many persons hunt on the land or fish in a river, the
forest is easily exhausted of wild animals and the river of fish, but
such a contingency is impossible in the case of the sea. Again, the
navigation of rivers is easily lessened and impeded by constructions
placed therein, but this is not true of the sea. Again, a river is
easily emptied by means of aqueducts but the sea cannot be emptied
by any such means.[143] Therefore there is not equal reason on both
sides.
‘Neither does what we have said above about the common use of waters,
springs, and rivers, apply in this case, for common use is recognized
in them all for purposes of drinking and the like, such usages namely
as do not injure at all or in the slightest degree him who owns a
river or has some other right in one.[144] These are trifles for
which we have no time. What makes for our contention is the fact that
no lapse of time will give a prescriptive right to anything unjust.
Therefore an unjust law is not capable of
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quae sunt impraescriptibilia ex legis dispositione, nec per mille
annos praescriberentur’; quod innumeris doctorum testimoniis
fulcit.[145a]
Nemo iam non videt, ad usum rei communis intercipiendum nullam
quantivis temporis usurpationem prodesse. Cui adiungendum est
etiam eorum qui dissentiunt auctoritatem huic quaestioni non posse
accommodari. Illi enim de Mediterraneo loquuntur, nos de Oceano; illi
de sinu, nos de immenso mari, quae in ratione occupationis plurimum
differunt. Et quibus illi indulgent praescriptionem, illi litora mari
continua possident, ut Veneti et Genuenses, quod de Lusitanis dici
non posse modo patuit.
Immo et si prodesse posset tempus, ut quidam posse putant in publicis
quae sunt, populi, tamen non ea adsunt quae necessario requiruntur.
Primum enim docent omnes desiderari, ut is qui praescribit
huiusmodi actum, eum exercuerit non longo dumtaxat tempore, sed
memoriam excedente; deinde ut tanto tempore eundem actum nemo alius
exercuerit, nisi concessione illius, vel clandestine; praeterea ut
alios uti volentes prohibuerit, scientibus quidem et patientibus
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erecting a prescriptive right or of being justified by efflux
of time’. A little farther on Vasquez says: ‘Things which are
imprescriptible by the disposition of the law, may not become objects
of prescription even after the lapse of a thousand years’. This
statement he supports by countless citations from the jurists.[145]
Every one perceives that no usurpation no matter how long continued
is competent to intercept the use of a _res communis_. And it must
also be added, that the authority of those who hold dissenting
opinions cannot possibly be applied to the question here at issue.
For they are talking about the Mediterranean, we are talking about
the Ocean; they speak of a gulf, we of the boundless sea; and from
the point of view of occupation these are wholly different things.
And too, those peoples, to whom the authorities just mentioned
concede prescription, the Venetians and Genoese for example, possess
a continuous shore line on the sea, but it is clear that not even
that kind of possession can be claimed for the Portuguese.
Further, even if mere lapse of time, as some think, could establish
a right by prescription over public property, still the conditions
absolutely indispensable for the creation of such a right are in this
case absent. The conditions demanded are these: first, all jurists
teach that he who sets up a prescriptive right of this sort shall
have been in actual possession not only for a considerable period,
but from time immemorial; next, that during all that time no one
else shall have exercised the same right of possession unless by
permission of that possessor or clandestinely; besides that, it is
necessary that he shall have prevented other persons wishing to use
his possession from so doing, and that such measures be a matter of
common knowledge and done by the suffrance of those concerned in the
matter. For even if
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iis ad quos ea res pertinebat; nam etsi exercuisset semper, et
quosdam exercere volentes prohibuisset semper, non tamen omnes, quia
alii fuerunt prohibiti, alii vero libere exercuerunt, id quidem non
sufficeret, ex Doctorum sententia.
Apparet autem debere haec omnia concurrere, tum quia praescriptioni
publicarum rerum lex inimica est, tum ut videatur praescribens iure
suo non autem communi usus, idque non interrupta possessione.
Cum autem tempus postulatur, cuius initi non exstet memoria,
non semper sufficit, ut optimi interpretes ostendunt, probare
saeculi lapsum; sed constare oportet famam rei a maioribus ad nos
transmissam, ita ut nemo supersit qui contrarium viderit, aut
audierit. Occasione rerum Africanarum in ulteriora primum Oceani
inquirere coeperunt regnante Iohanne Lusitani,[146a] anno salutis
millesimo quadringentesimo septuagesimo septimo. Viginti post annis
sub Rege Emanuele promontorium Bonae spei praeternavigatum est,
seriusque multo ventum Malaccam, et insulas remotiores, ad quas
Batavi navigare coeperunt anno millesimo quingentesimo nonagesimo
quinto, non dubie intra annum centesimum. Iam vero etiam eo quod
intercessit tempore aliorum usurpatio adversus alios etiam omnes
impedivit praescriptionem, Castellani ab anno millesimo quingentesimo
decime nono possessionem Lusitanis maris circa Moluccas ambiguam
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he had continuously exercised his right of possession, and had always
prevented from using his possession _some_ of those who wished to
do so, but not _all_; then, because _some_ had been prevented from
exercising and _others_ freely allowed to exercise that use, that
kind of possession according to the opinion of the jurists, is not
sufficient to establish a right by prescription.
It is clear therefore that all these conditions should be present,
both because law is opposed to the prescription of public things,
and in order that he who sets up such a prescription may seem to
have used his own private right, not a public right, and that too by
continuous possession.
Now, inasmuch as time beyond the period of the memory of man is
demanded for the creation of a prescriptive right, it is not always
sufficient, as the best commentators point out, to prove the lapse of
a hundred years, but the tradition handed down to us by our ancestors
ought to be undisputed, provided no one is left alive who has seen
or heard anything to the contrary. It was during the reign of King
John,[146] in the year of our Lord 1477, at the time of the wars in
Africa, that the Portuguese began to push their discoveries first
into the more distant parts of the Ocean. Twenty years later, during
the reign of King Emmanuel, they rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and
somewhat later yet, reached Malacca, and the islands beyond, the very
islands, indeed, to which the Dutch began to sail in the year 1595,
that is, well within a hundred years of the time that the Portuguese
first arrived. And in truth even in that interval, the usurpation
of rights there by other parties had interrupted the competence of
everybody else to create a prescriptive right. For example, from the
year 1519, the Spaniards rendered the possession by the Portuguese of
the sea around the Moluccas a very uncertain one. Even the French and
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fecere. Galli etiam et Angli non clanculum, sed via aperta eo
perruperunt. Praeterea accolae totius tractus Africani, aut Asiatici
partem maris quisque sibi proximam piscando et navigando perpetuo
usurparunt, numquam a Lusitanis prohibiti.
Conclusum igitur sit, ius nullum esse Lusitanis quo aliam quamvis
gentem a navigatione Oceani ad Indos prohibeant.
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English made their way to those newly discovered places not secretly,
but by force of arms. And besides these, the inhabitants of the
entire coast of Africa and Asia constantly used for fishing and
navigation that part of the sea nearest their own several coasts, and
were never interdicted from such use by the Portuguese.
The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that the Portuguese
are in possession of no right whereby they may interdict to any
nation whatsoever the navigation of the Ocean to the East Indies.
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CAPVT VIII
_Iure gentium inter quosvis liberam esse mercaturam_
Quod si dicant Lusitani cum Indis commercia exercendi ius quoddam
proprium ad se pertinere, eisdem fere omnibus argumentis refellentur.
Repetemus breviter et aptabimus.
Iure Gentium hoc introductum est, ut cunctis hominibus inter se
libera esset negotiandi facultas, quae a nemine posset adimi.[147a]
Et hoc, sicut post dominiorum distinctionem continuo necessarium
fuit, ita originem videri potest antiquiorem habuisse. Subtiliter
enim Aristoteles μεταβλητικὴν dixit, ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν
αὐταρκείας,[148a] hoc est, negotiatione suppleri id quod naturae
deest, quo commode omnibus sufficiat. Oportet igitur communem esse
iure gentium non tantum privative, sed et positive, ut dicunt
magistri, sive affirmative.[149a] Quae autem illo modo sunt iuris
gentium, mutari possunt: quae hoc modo, non possunt. Id ita intelligi
potest.
Dederat natura omnia omnibus. Sed cum a rerum multarum usu, quas vita
desiderat humana, locorum intervallo homines arcerentur, quia ut
supra diximus, non omnia ubique
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