_Neither the Indian Ocean nor the right of navigation thereon belongs
to the Portuguese by title of occupation_
If therefore the Portuguese have acquired no legal right over the
nations of the East Indies, and their territory and sovereignty,
let us consider whether they have been able to obtain exclusive
jurisdiction over the sea and its navigation or over trade. Let us
first consider the case of the sea.
Now, in the legal phraseology of the Law of Nations, the sea is
called indifferently the property of no one (_res nullius_), or
a common possession (_res communis_), or public property (_res
publica_). It will be most convenient to explain the signification of
these terms if we follow the practice of all the poets since Hesiod,
of the philosophers and jurists of the past, and distinguish certain
epochs, the divisions of which are marked off perhaps not so much by
intervals of time as by obvious logic and essential character. And we
ought not to be criticised if in our explanation of a law deriving
from nature, we use the authority and definition of those whose
natural judgment admittedly is held in the highest esteem.
It is therefore necessary to explain that in the earliest stages of
human existence both sovereignty and common possession had meanings
other than those which they bear at the present time.[44] For
nowadays sovereignty means a particular kind of proprietorship, such
in fact that it absolutely excludes like possession by any one else.
On the other hand, we call a thing ‘common’ when its ownership
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quodam aut consensu collata est exclusis aliis. Linguarum paupertas
coegit voces easdem in re non eadem usurpare. Et sic ista nostri
moris nomina ad ius illud pristinum similitudine quadam et imagine
referuntur. Commune igitur tunc non aliud fuit quam quod simpliciter
proprio opponitur; dominium autem facultas non iniusta utendi re
communi, quem usum Scholasticis[45a] visum est facti non iuris
vocare, quia qui nunc in iure usus vocatur, proprium est quiddam, aut
ut illorum more loquar, privative ad alios dicitur.
Iure primo Gentium, quod et Naturale interdum dicitur, et quod poetae
alibi aetate aurea, alibi Saturni aut Iustitiae regno depingunt,
nihil proprium fuit; quod Cicero dixit: ‘Sunt autem privata nulla
natura’. Et Horatius:[46a]
_Nam PROPRIAE telluris ERVM NATVRA neque illum
Nec me nec quemquam statuit._
Neque enim potuit natura dominos distinguere. Hoc igitur significatu
res omnes eo tempore communes fuisse dicimus, idem innuentes quod
poetae cum primos homines in medium quaesivisse, et Iustitiam casto
foedere res medias tenuisse* dicunt; quod ut clarius explicent,
negant eo tempore campos limite partitos, aut commercia fuisse ulla.
* [in medium quaerebant, Vergil, Georgica I, 127; medias casto res
more tenebas, Avienus, Aratus, 298 (W. P. Mustard)].
_promiscua rura per agros
Praestiterant cunctis COMMVNIA cuncta VIDERI._[47a]
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or possession is held by several persons jointly according to a kind
of partnership or mutual agreement from which all other persons are
excluded. Poverty of language compels the use of the same words for
things that are not the same. And so because of a certain similarity
and likeness, our modern nomenclature is applied to that state of
primitive law. Now, in ancient times, ‘common’ meant simply the
opposite of ‘particular’; and ‘sovereignty’ or ‘ownership’, meant
the privilege of lawfully using common property. This seemed to the
Scholastics[45] to be a use in fact but not in law, because what now
in law is called use, is a particular right, or if I may use their
phraseology, is, in respect to other persons, a privative right.
In the primitive law of nations, which is sometimes called Natural
Law, and which the poets sometimes portray as having existed in a
Golden Age, and sometimes in the reign of Saturn or of Justice, there
was no particular right. As Cicero says: ‘But nothing is by nature
private property’. And Horace:[46] ‘For nature has decreed to be
the master of private soil neither him, nor me, nor anyone else’.
For nature knows no sovereigns. Therefore in this sense we say that
in those ancient times all things were held in common, meaning what
the poets do when they say that primitive men acquired everything in
common, and that Justice maintained a community of goods by means
of an inviolable compact. And to make this clearer, they say that
in those primitive times the fields were not delimited by boundary
lines, and that there was no commercial intercourse. [As Avienus
says]:[47] ‘The promiscuity of the fields had made everything seem
common to all’.
The word ‘seemed’ is rightly added, owing to the changed meaning of
the words, as we have noted above.
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Recte additum est ‘videri’ propter translationem ut diximus vocabuli.
Communio autem ista ad usum referebatur:[48a]
_pervium cunctis iter,
COMMVNIS VSVS omnium rerum fuit._
Cuius ratione dominium quoddam erat, sed universale, et indefinitum;
Deus enim res omnes non huic aut illi dederat, sed humano generi,
atque eo modo plures in solidum eiusdem rei domini esse non
prohibebantur; quod si hodierna significatione sumamus dominium,
contra omnem est rationem. Hoc enim proprietatem includit, quae tunc
erat penes neminem. Aptissime autem illud dictum est:[49a]
_omnia rerum
Vsurpantis erant,_
Ad eam vero, quae nunc est, dominiorum distinctionem non impetu
quodam, sed paulatim ventum videtur, initium eius monstrante natura.
Cum enim res sint nonnullae, quarum usus in abusu consistit, aut
quia conversae in substantiam utentis nullum postea usum admittunt,
aut quia utendo fiunt ad usum deteriores, in rebus prioris generis,
ut cibo et potu, proprietas statim quaedam ab usu non seiuncta
emicuit.[50a] Hoc enim est proprium esse, ita esse cuiusquam ut et
alterius esse non possit; quod deinde ad res posterioris, generis,
vestes puta, et res mobiles alias aut se moventes ratione quadam
productum est.
Quod cum esset, ne res quidem immobiles omnes, agri
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But that kind of common possession relates to use, as is seen from a
quotation from Seneca:[48]
“_Every path was free,
All things were used in common._”
According to his reasoning there was a kind of sovereignty, but it
was universal and unlimited. For God had not given all things to
this individual or to that, but to the entire human race, and thus
a number of persons, as it were en masse, were not debarred from
being substantially sovereigns or owners of the same thing, which is
quite contradictory to our modern meaning of sovereignty. For it now
implies particular or private ownership, a thing which no one then
had. Avienus has said very pertinently:[49] ‘All things belonged to
him who had possession of them’.
It seems certain that the transition to the present distinction of
ownerships did not come violently, but gradually, nature herself
pointing out the way. For since there are some things, the use of
which consists in their being used up, either because having become
part of the very substance of the user they can never be used again,
or because by use they become less fit for future use, it has become
apparent, especially in dealing with the first category, such things
as food and drink for example, that a certain kind of ownership is
inseparable from use.[50] For ‘own’ implies that a thing belongs to
some one person, in such a way that it cannot belong to any other
person. By the process of reasoning this was next extended to things
of the second category, such as clothes and movables and some living
things.
When that had come about, not even immovables, such,
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puta, indivisae manere potuerunt; quamquam enim horum usus non
simpliciter in abusu consistat, eorum tamen usus abusus cuiusdam
causa comparatus est, ut arva et arbusta cibi causa, pascua etiam
vestium; omnium autem usibus promiscue sufficere non possunt.
Repertae proprietati lex posita est, quae naturam imitaretur. Sicut
enim initio per applicationem corporalem usus ille habebatur, unde
proprietatem primum ortam diximus, ita simili applicatione res
proprias cuiusque fieri placuit. Haec est quae dicitur occupatio,
voce accommodatissima ad eas res quae ante in medio positae fuerant;
quo Seneca Tragicus alludit:[51a]
_IN MEDIO est scelus
POSITVM OCCVPANTI._
Et Philosophus:[52a] ‘Equestria OMNIVM equitum Romanorum sunt.
In illis tamen locus meus fit PROPRIVS, quem OCCVPAVI’. Hinc
Quintilianus dicit,[53a] quod omnibus nascitur, industriae esse
praemium; et Tullius,[54a] factas esse veteri occupatione res eorum
qui quondam in vacua venerant.
Occupatio autem haec in his rebus quae possessioni renituntur, ut
sunt ferae bestiae, perpetua esse debet, in aliis sufficit, corpore
coeptam possessionem animo retineri. Occupatio in mobilibus est
apprehensio, in immobilibus
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for instance, as fields, could remain unapportioned. For although
their use does not consist merely in consumption, nevertheless
it is bound up with subsequent consumption, as fields and plants
are used to get food, and pastures to get clothing. There is,
however, not enough fixed property to satisfy the use of everybody
indiscriminately.
When property or ownership was invented, the law of property was
established to imitate nature. For as that use began in connection
with bodily needs, from which as we have said property first arose,
so by a similar connection it was decided that things were the
property of individuals. This is called ‘occupation’, a word most
appropriate to those things which in former times had been held in
common. It is this to which Seneca alludes in his tragedy Thyestes,
“_Crime is between us to be seized by one._”[51]
And in one of his philosophical writings he also says:[52] ‘The
equestrian rows of seats belong to all the equites; nevertheless,
the seat of which I have taken possession is my own private place’.
Further, Quintilian remarks[53] that a thing which is created for
all is the reward of industry, and Cicero says[54] that things which
have been occupied for a long time become the property of those who
originally found them unoccupied.
This occupation or possession, however, in the case of things which
resist seizure, like wild animals for example, must be uninterrupted
or perpetually maintained, but in the case of other things it is
sufficient if after physical possession is once taken the intention
to possess is maintained. Possession of movables implies seizure, and
possession of
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instructio aut limitatio; unde Hermogenianus cum dominia distincta
dicit, addit, agris terminos positos, aedificia collocata.[55a] Hic
rerum status a poetis indicatur:
_Tum laqueis captare feras, et fallere visco
Inventum._
_Tum primum subiere domos._[56a]
_COMMVNEMQVE PRIVS, ceu lumina solis et auras
Cautus humum longo signavit LIMITE mensor._[57a]
Celebratur post haec, ut Hermogenianus indicat, commercium cuius
gratia
_Fluctibus ignotis insultavere carinae._[58a]
Eodem autem tempore et respublicae institui coeperunt. Atque ita
earum quae a prima communione divulsa erant duo facta sunt genera.
Alia enim sunt publica, hoc est, populi propria (quae est genuina
istius vocis significatio) alia mere privata, hoc est, singulorum.
Occupatio autem publica eodem modo fit, quo privata. Seneca:[59a]
‘Fines Atheniensium, aut Campanorum vocamus, quos deinde inter se
vicini privata terminatione distinguunt’. Gens enim unaquaeque
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immovables either the erection of buildings or some determination of
boundaries, such as fencing in. Hence Hermogenianus, in speaking of
separate ownerships, adds the boundaries set to the fields and the
buildings thereon constructed.[55] This state of things is described
thus by the poets Vergil and Ovid:
“_Then toils for beasts, and lime for birds, were found_,”[56]
_Then first men made homes._
“_Then landmarks limited to each his right,
For all before was common as the light._”[57]
In still another place, as Hermogenianus points out, Ovid praises
commerce, for the sake of which:[58]
‘_Ships in triumph sail the unknown seas_’.
At the same time, however, states began to be established, and so
two categories were made of the things which had been wrested away
from early ownership in common. For some things were public, that
is, were the property of the people (which is the real meaning of
that expression), while other things were private, that is, were the
property of individuals. Ownership, however, both public and private,
arises in the same way. On this point Seneca says:[59] ‘We speak in
general of the land of the Athenians or the Campanians. It is the
same land which again by means of private boundaries is divided among
individual owners’.
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_PARTITA FINES regna constituit, novas
Extruxit VRBES._[60a]
Hoc modo dicit Cicero agrum Arpinatem Arpinatium dici, Tusculanum
Tusculanorum: ‘similisque est’, inquit, ‘privatarum possessionum
discriptio. Ex quo quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae natura fuerant
COMMVNIA, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat’.[61a] Contra autem
Thucydides[62a] eam terram quae in divisione populo nulli obvenit,
ἀόριστον hoe est, indefinitam, et limitibus nullis circumscriptam
vocat.[63a]
Ex his quae hactenus dicta sunt duo intelligi possunt. Prius est,
eas res quae occupari non possunt, aut occupatae numquam sunt,
nullius proprias esse posse; quia omnis proprietas ab occupatione
coeperit. Alterum vero, eas res omnes, quae ita a natura comparatae
sunt, ut aliquo utente nihilominus aliis quibusvis ad usum promiscue
sufficiant, eius hodieque condicionis esse, et perpetuo esse
debere cuius fuerant cum primum a natura proditae sunt. Hoc Cicero
voluit:[64a] ‘Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos,
omnibus inter omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad
communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas’. Sunt
autem omnes res huius generis, in quibus sine detrimento alterius
alteri commodari potest. Hinc illud esse dicit Cicero:[65a] ‘Non
prohibere aqua profluente’. Nam aqua profluens qua talis non qua
flumen
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‘For each nation’, Seneca says in another place, ‘made its
territories into separate kingdoms and built new cities’.[60]
Thus Cicero says: “On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said
to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and
similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch
as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common
property became the property of individuals, each one should retain
possession of that which has fallen to his lot.”[61] On the other
hand Thucydides[62] calls the land which in the division falls
to no nation, ἀόριστος, that is, undefined, and undetermined by
boundaries.[63]
Two conclusions may be drawn from what has thus far been said. The
first is, that that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been
occupied, cannot be the property of any one, because all property
has arisen from occupation. The second is, that all that which has
been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person
it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today
and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when
it was first created by nature. This is what Cicero meant when he
wrote: “This then is the most comprehensive bond that unites together
men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all
things that nature has produced for the common use of man is to be
maintained.”[64] All things which can be used without loss to any one
else come under this category. Hence, says Cicero, comes the well
known prohibition:[65] ‘Deny no one the water that flows by’. For
running water considered as such and not as a
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est, inter communia omnium a Iurisconsultis refertur: et a Poeta:[66a]
_Quid prohibetis AQVAS? VSVS COMMVNIS aquarum est.
Nec solem PROPRIVM NATVRA nec AERA fecit.
Nec tenues VNDAS: in PVBLICA munera veni._
Dicit haec non esse natura propria, sicut Vlpianus[67a] natura
omnibus patere, tum quia primum a natura prodita sunt, et in nullius
adhuc dominium pervenerunt (ut loquitur Neratius[68a]); tum quia ut
Cicero dicit, a natura ad usum communem genita videntur. Publica
autem vocat tralatitia significatione, non quae ad populum aliquem,
sed quae ad societatem humanam pertinent, quae publica Iuris gentium
in Legibus vocantur, hoc est, communia omnium, propria nullius.
Huius generis est Aër, duplici ratione, tum quia occupari non potest,
tum quia usum promiscuum hominibus debet. Et eisdem de causis commune
est omnium Maris Elementum, infinitum scilicet ita, ut possideri non
queat, et omnium usibus accommodatum: sive navigationem respicimus,
sive etiam piscaturam. Cuius autem iuris est mare, eiusdem sunt si
qua mare aliis usibus eripiendo sua fecit, ut arenae maris, quarum
pars terris continua litus dicitur.[69a] Recte igitur Cicero:[70a]
‘quid tam COMMVNE quam Mare fluctuantibus,
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stream, is classed by the jurists among the things common to all
mankind; as is done also by Ovid:[66] ‘Why do you deny me water? Its
use is free to all. Nature has made neither sun nor air nor waves
private property; they are public gifts’.
He says that these things are not by nature private possession, but
that, as Ulpian claims,[67] they are by nature things open to the
use of all, both because in the first place they were produced by
nature, and have never yet come under the sovereignty of any one, as
Neratius says;[68] and in the second place because, as Cicero says,
they seem to have been created by nature for common use. But the poet
uses ‘public’, in its usual meaning, not of those things which belong
to any one people, but to human society as a whole; that is to say,
things which are called ‘public’ are, according to the Laws of the
law of nations, the common property of all, and the private property
of none.
The air belongs to this class of things for two reasons. First, it is
not susceptible of occupation; and second, its common use is destined
for all men. For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because
it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and
because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from
the point of view of navigation or of fisheries. Now, the same right
which applies to the sea applies also to the things which the sea
has carried away from other uses and made its own, such for example
as the sands of the sea, of which the portion adjoining the land is
called the coast or shore.[69] Cicero therefore argues correctly:[70]
‘What is so common as
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LITVS eiectis’? Etiam Vergilius auram, undam, litus cunctis patere
dicit.
Haec igitur sunt illa quae Romani vocant communia omnium iure
naturali[71a] aut quod idem esse diximus, publica iurisgentium, sicut
et usum eorum modo communem, modo publicum vocant. Quamquam vero
etiam ea nullius esse, quod ad proprietatem attinet, recte dicantur,
multum tamen differunt ab his quae nullius sunt, et communi usui
attributa non sunt, ut ferae, pisces, aves; nam ista si quis occupet,
in ius proprium transire possunt, illa vero totius humanitatis
consensu proprietati in perpetuum excepta sunt propter usum, qui cum
sit omnium, non magis omnibus ab uno eripi potest, quam a te mihi
quod meum est. Hoc est quod Cicero dicit inter prima esse Iustitiae
munera, rebus communibus pro communibus uti. Scholastici dicerent
esse communia alia affirmative, alia privative. Distinctio haec non
modo Iurisprudentibus usitata est, sed vulgi etiam confessionem
exprimit; unde apud Athenaeum convivator mare commune esse dicit, at
pisces capientium fieri. Et in Plautina Rudente servo dicenti,[72a]
‘Mare quidem commune certost omnibus’, assentit piscator, addenti
autem, ‘In mari inventust communi’ recte occurrit:
_Meum quod rete atque hami nancti sunt, meum potissimumst._
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the sea for those who are being tossed upon it, the shore for those
who have been cast thereon’. Vergil also says that the air, the sea,
and the shore are open to all men.
These things therefore are what the Romans call ‘common’ to all men
by natural law,[71] or as we have said, ‘public’ according to the
law of nations; and indeed they call their use sometimes common,
sometimes public. Nevertheless, although those things are with reason
said to be _res nullius_, so far as private ownership is concerned,
still they differ very much from those things which, though also _res
nullius_, have not been marked out for common use, such for example
as wild animals, fish, and birds. For if any one seizes those things
and assumes possession of them, they can become objects of private
ownership, but the things in the former category by the consensus
of opinion of all mankind are forever exempt from such private
ownership on account of their susceptibility to universal use; and
as they belong to all they cannot be taken away from all by any one
person any more than what is mine can be taken away from me by you.
And Cicero says that one of the first gifts of Justice is the use
of common property for common benefit. The Scholastics would define
one of these categories as common in an affirmative, the other in a
privative sense. This distinction is not only familiar to jurists,
but it also expresses the popular belief. In Athenaeus for instance
the host is made to say that the sea is the common property of all,
but that fish are the private property of him who catches them. And
in Plautus’ Rudens when the slave says:[72] ‘The sea is certainly
common to all persons’, the fisherman agrees; but when the slave
adds: ‘Then what is found in the common sea is common property’, he
rightly objects, saying: ‘But what my net and hooks have taken, is
absolutely my own’.
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Mare igitur proprium omnino alicuius fieri non potest, quia natura
commune hoc esse non permittit, sed iubet, immo ne litus quidem;[73a]
nisi quod haec addenda est interpretatio; ut si quid earum rerum per
naturam occupari possit, id eatenus occupantis fiat, quatenus ea
occupatione usus ille promiscuus non laeditur. Quod merito receptum
est; nam cum ita se habet, cessat utraque exceptio per quam evenisse
diximus, ne omnia in eius proprium transcriberentur.
Quoniam igitur inaedificatio species est occupationis, in litore
licet aedificare, si id fieri potest sine ceterorum incommodo,[74a]
ut Pomponius loquitur, quod ex Scaevola explicabimus, nisi usus
publicus, hoc est communis impediretur. Et qui aedificaverit, soli
dominus fiet, quia id solum nec ullius proprium, nec ad usum communem
necessarium fuit. Est igitur occupantis; sed non diutius quam durat
occupatio, quia reluctari mare possessioni videtur, exemplo ferae,
quae si in naturalem se libertatem receperit, non ultra captoris est,
ita et litus postliminio mari cedit.
Quicquid autem privatum fieri occupando, idem et publicum, hoc est
populi proprium posse ostendimus.[75a] Sic litus Imperi Romani
finibus inclusum, populi Romani esse Celsus
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Therefore the sea can in no way become the private property of any
one, because nature not only allows but enjoins its common use.[73]
Neither can the shore become the private property of any one. The
following qualification, however, must be made. If any part of these
things is by nature susceptible of occupation, it may become the
property of the one who occupies it only so far as such occupation
does not affect its common use. This qualification is deservedly
recognized. For in such a case both conditions vanish through which
it might eventuate, as we have said, that all of it would pass into
private ownership.
Since therefore, to cite Pomponius, building is one kind of
occupation, it is permissible to build upon the shore, if this can
be done without inconvenience to other people;[74] that is to say (I
here follow Scaevola) if such building can be done without hindrance
to public or common use of the shore. And whoever shall have
constructed a building under the aforesaid circumstances will become
the owner of the ground upon which said building is; because this
ground is neither the property of any one else, nor is it necessary
to common use. It becomes therefore the property of the occupier, but
his ownership lasts no longer than his occupation lasts, inasmuch
as the sea seems by nature to resist ownership. For just as a wild
animal, if it shall have escaped and thus recovered its natural
liberty, is no longer the property of its captor, so also the sea may
recover its possession of the shore.
We have now shown that whatever by occupation can become private
property can also become public property, that is, the private
property of a whole nation.[75] And so Celsus considered the shore
included within the limits of the Roman Empire to be the property of
the Roman people.
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existimat; quod si ita est, minime mirandum est, eundem Populum
subditis suis occupandi litoris modum per Principem aut Praetorem
potuisse concedere. Ceterum et haec occupatio non minus quam privata
ita restringenda est, ne ulterius porrigatur, quam ut salvus sit usus
Iurisgentium. Nemo igitur potest a Populo Romano[76a] ad litus maris
accedere prohiberi, et retia siccare, et alia facere, quae semel
omnes homines in perpetuum sibi licere voluerunt.
Maris autem natura hoc differt a litore, quod mare nisi exigua sui
parte nec inaedificari facile, nec includi potest; et ut posset, hoc
ipsum tamen vix contingeret, sine usus promiscui impedimento. Si quid
tamen exiguum ita occupari potest, id occupanti conceditur. Hyperbole
est igitur[77a]
_Contracta pisces aequora sentiunt
Iactis in altum molibus._
Nam Celsus iactas in mare pilas eius esse dicit qui iecerit.[78a]
Sed id non concedendum si deterior maris usus eo modo futurus sit.
Et Vlpianus eum qui molem in mare iacit, ita tuendum dicit si nemo
damnum sentiat. Nam si cui haec res nocitura sit, interdictum utique,
‘Ne quid in loco publico fiat’ competiturum. Vt et Labeo, si quid
tale in mare struatur, interdictum vult competere, ‘Ne quid in mari,
quo portus, statio, iterve navigiis deterius sit, fiat’.[79a]
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There is not therefore the least reason for surprise that the Roman
people through their emperors or praetors were able to grant to its
subjects the right of occupying the shore. This public occupation,
however, no less than private occupation, was subject to the
restriction that it should not infringe on international rights.
Therefore the Roman people could not forbid any one from having
access to the seashore,[76] and from spreading his fishing nets there
to dry, and from doing other things which all men long ago decided
were always permissible.
The nature of the sea, however, differs from that of the shore,
because the sea, except for a very restricted space, can neither
easily be built upon, nor inclosed; if the contrary were true yet
this could hardly happen without hindrance to the general use.
Nevertheless, if any small portion of the sea can be thus occupied,
the occupation is recognized. The famous hyperbole of Horace must be
quoted here: “The fishes note the narrowing of the waters by piers of
rock laid in their depths.”[77]
Now Celsus holds that piles driven into the sea belong to the man
who drove them.[78] But such an act is not permissible if the use
of the sea be thereby impaired. And Ulpian says that whoever builds
a breakwater must be protected if it is not prejudicial to the
interests of any one; for if this construction is likely to work an
injury to any one, the injunction ‘Nothing may be built on public
property’ would apply. Labeo, however, holds that in case any such
construction should be made in the sea, the following injunction
is to be enforced: ‘Nothing may be built in the sea whereby the
harbor, the roadstead, or the channel be rendered less safe for
navigation’.[79]
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Quae autem navigationis eadem piscatus habenda est ratio, ut communis
maneat omnibus. Neque tamen peccabit si quis in maris diverticulo
piscandi locum sibi palis circumsepiat, atque ita privatum faciat;
sicut Lucullus exciso apud Neapolim monte ad villam suam maria
admisit.[80a] Et huius generis, puto fuisse piscinas maritimas quarum
Varro et Columella meminerunt. Nec Martialis alio spectavit, cum de
Formiano Apollinaris loquitur:[81a]
_Si quando NEREVS sentit Aeoli regnum,
Ridet procellas tuta de SVO mensa._
Et Ambrosius:[82a] ‘Inducis mare intra praedia tua ne desint
belluae’. Hinc apparere potest quae mens Pauli fuerit, cum
dicit,[83a] si maris proprium ius ad aliquem pertineat, _uti
possidetis_ interdictum ei competere. Esse quidem hoc interdictum ad
privatas causas comparatum, non autem ad publicas, (in quibus etiam
ea comprehenduntur quae iure gentium communi facere possumus) sed hic
iam agi de iure fruendo quod ex causa privata contingat, non publica,
sive communi. Nam teste Marciano, quicquid occupatum est et occupari
potuit,[84a] id iam non est iurisgentium, sicut est mare. Exempli
causa, si quis Lucullum aut Apollinarem in privato suo, quatenus
diverticulum maris incluserant, piscari prohibuisset, dandum illis
interdictum
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Now the same principle which applies to navigation applies also to
fishing, namely, that it remains free and open to all. Nevertheless
there shall be no prejudice if any one shall by fencing off with
stakes an inlet of the sea make a fish pond for himself, and so
establish a private preserve. Thus Lucullus once brought the water
of the sea to his villa by cutting a tunnel through a mountain near
Naples.[80] I suspect too that the seawater reservoirs for fish
mentioned by Varro and Columella were of this sort. And Martial
had the same thing in mind when he says of the Formian villa of
Apollinaris:[81] ‘Whenever Nereus feels the power of Aeolus, the
table safe in its own resources laughs at the gale’. Ambrose also
has something to say on the same subject:[82] ‘You bring the very
sea into your estates that you may not lack for fish’. In the light
of all this the meaning of Paulus is clear when he says[83] that if
any one has a private right over the sea, the rule _uti possidetis_
applies. This rule however is applicable only to private suits,
and not to public ones, among which are also to be included those
suits which can be brought under the common law of nations. But
here the question is one which concerns the right of use arising in
a private suit, but not in a public or common one. For according
to the authority of Marcianus whatever has been occupied and can
be occupied[84] is no longer subject to the law of nations as the
sea is. Let us take an example. If any one had prevented Lucullus
or Apollinaris from fishing in the private fish ponds which they
had made by inclosing a small portion of the sea, according to the
opinion of Paulus they would have the right of bringing
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Paulus putavit non solum iniuriarum actionem, ob causam scilicet
privatae possessionis.[85a]
Immo in diverticulo maris, sicut in diverticulo fluminis, si locum
talem occuparim, ibique piscatus sim, maxime si animum privatim
possidendi plurium annorum continuatione testatus fuerim, alterum
eodem iure uti prohibebo; ut ex Marciano colligimus, non aliter quam
in lacu qui mei domini est. Quod verum quam diu durat occupatio,
quemadmodum in litore antea diximus. Extra diverticulum idem non
erit, ne scilicet communis usus impediatur.[86a]
Ante aedes igitur meas aut praetorium ut piscari aliquem prohibeant
usurpatum quidem est, sed nullo iure, adeo quidem ut Vlpianus
contempta ea usurpatione si quis prohibeatur iniuriarum dicat agi
posse[87a] Hoc Imperator Leo (cuius Legibus non utimur) contra iuris
rationem mutavit, voluitque πρόθυρα, hoc est, vestibula maritima
eorum esse propria, qui oram habitarent, ibique eos ius piscandi
habere;[88a] quod tamen ita procedere voluit, ut septis quibusdam
remoratoriis quas ἐποχάς Graeci vocant, locus ille occuparetur;
existimans nimirum non fore ut quis exiguam maris portionem alteri
invideret qui ipse toto mari ad piscandum admitteretur. Certe ut
quis magnam maris partem, etiam si possit, publicis utilitatibus
eripiat, non tolerandae est improbitatis, in quam merito Vir Sanctus
invehitur:[89a]
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an injunction, not merely an action for damages based on private
ownership.[85]
Indeed, if I shall have staked off such an inclosure in an inlet
of the sea, just as in a branch of a river, and have fished there,
especially if by doing so continuously for many years I shall have
given proof of my intention to establish private ownership, I shall
certainly prevent any one else from enjoying the same rights. I
gather from Marcianus that this case is identical with that of the
ownership of a lake, and it is true however long occupation lasts, as
we have said above about the shore. But outside of an inlet this will
not hold, for then the common use of the sea might be hindered.[86]
Therefore if any one is prevented from fishing in front of my town
house or country seat, it is a usurpation, but an illegal one,
although Ulpian, who rather makes light of this usurpation, does
say that if any one is so prevented he can bring an action for
damages.[87] The Emperor Leo, whose laws we do not use, contrary to
the intent of the law, changed this, and declared that the entrances,
or vestibules as it were, to the sea, were the private property of
those who inhabited the shore, and that they had the right of fishing
there.[88] However he attached this condition, that the place should
be occupied by certain jetty or pile constructions, such as the
Greeks call ἐποχαἰ, thinking doubtless that no one who was himself
allowed to fish anywhere in the sea would grudge any one else a small
portion of it. To be sure it would be an intolerable outrage for any
one to snatch away, even if he could do so, from public use a large
area of the sea; an act which is justly reprehended by the Holy
Man,[89] who says: ‘The lords of the earth claim for
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‘SPATIA MARIS sibi vindicant IVRE MANCIPII, pisciumque iura sicut
vernaculorum conditione sibi servitii subiecta commemorant. Iste,
inquit, SINVS maris meus est; ille alterius. Dividunt elementa sibi
potentes’.
Est igitur Mare in numero earum rerum quae in commercio non
sunt,[90a] hoc est, quae proprii iuris fieri non possunt. Vnde
sequitur si proprie loquamur, nullam Maris partem in territorio
populi alicuius posse censeri. Quod ipsum Placentinus sensisse
videtur, cum dixit: Mare ita esse commune, ut in nullius dominio sit
nisi solius Dei; et Ioannes Faber, cum mare asserit relictum in suo
iure, et esse primaevo, quo omnia erant communia.[91a] Alioquin nihil
differrent quae sunt omnium communia ab his quae publica proprie
dicuntur, ut mare a flumine. Flumen populus occupare potuit, ut
inclusum finibus suis, mare non potuit.
Territoria autem sunt ex occupationibus populorum, ut privata dominia
ex occupationibus singulorum. Vidit hoc Celsus, qui clare satis
distinguit inter litora,[92a] quae Populus Romanus occupare potuit,
ita tamen ut usui communi non noceretur, et mare quod pristinam
naturam retinuit. Nec ulla lex diversum indicat.[93a] Quae vero leges
a contrariae
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themselves a wide expanse of sea by _jus mancipii_, and they regard
the right of fishing as a servitude over which their right is the
same as that over their slaves. That gulf, says one, belongs to me,
and that gulf to some one else. They divide the very elements among
themselves, these great men’!
Therefore the sea is one of those things which is not an article of
merchandise,[90] and which cannot become private property. Hence it
follows, to speak strictly, that no part of the sea can be considered
as the territory of any people whatsoever. Placentinus seems to have
recognized this when he said: ‘The sea is a thing so clearly common
to all, that it cannot be the property of any one save God alone’.
Johannes Faber[91] also asserts that the sea has been left _sui
juris_, and remains in the primitive condition where all things were
common. If it were otherwise there would be no difference between the
things which are ‘common to all’, and those which are strictly termed
‘public’; no difference, that is, between the sea and a river. A
nation can take possession of a river, as it is inclosed within their
boundaries, with the sea, they cannot do so.
Now, public territory arises out of the occupation of nations, just
as private property arises out of the occupation of individuals. This
is recognized by Celsus, who has drawn a sharp distinction between
the shores of the sea,[92] which the Roman people could occupy in
such a way that its common use was not harmed, and the sea itself,
which retained its primitive nature. In fact no law intimates a
contrary view.[93] Such laws as are cited by writers who are of
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sententiae auctoribus citantur, aut de insulis loquuntur, quas clarum
est occupari potuisse, aut de portu qui non communis est, sed proprie
publicus.
Qui vero dicunt mare aliquod esse Imperi Romani, dictum suum ita
interpretantur, ut dicant ius illud in mare ultra protectionem
et iurisdictionem non procedere; quod illi ius a proprietate
distinguunt; nec forte satis animadvertunt idipsum quod Populus
Romanus classes praesidio navigantium disponere potuit, et
deprehensos in mari piratas punire, non ex proprio, sed ex communi
iure accidisse, quod et aliae liberae gentes in mari habent. Illud
interim fatemur, potuisse inter gentes aliquas convenire, ut capti
in maris hac vel illa parte, huius aut illius reipublicae iudicium
subirent, atque ita ad commoditatem distinguendae iurisdictionis
in mari fines describi, quod ipsos quidem eam sibi legem ferentes
obligat,[94a] at alios populos non item; neque locum alicuius
proprium facit, sed in personas contrahentium ius constituit.
Quae distinctio ut naturali rationi consentanea est, ita Vlpiani
responso quodam comprobatur, qui rogatus an duorum praediorum
maritimorum dominus, alteri eorum quod venderet servitutem potuisset
imponere, ne inde in certo maris loco piscari liceret, respondet: rem
quidem ipsam, mare scilicet, servitute nulla affici potuisse, quia
per naturam hoc omnibus pateret, sed cum bona fides contractus legem
venditionis servari exposceret, personas possidentium et in ius eorum
succedentium per istam legem obligari.
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the contrary opinion apply either to islands, which evidently could
be occupied, or to harbors, which are not ‘common’, but ‘public’,
that is, ‘national’.
Now those who say that a certain sea belonged to the Roman people
explain their statement to mean that the right of the Romans did
not extend beyond protection and jurisdiction; this right they
distinguish from ownership. Perchance they do not pay sufficient
attention to the fact that although the Roman People were able to
maintain fleets for the protection of navigation and to punish
pirates captured on the sea, it was not done by private right, but
by the common right which other free peoples also enjoy on the sea.
We recognize, however, that certain peoples have agreed that pirates
captured in this or in that part of the sea should come under the
jurisdiction of this state or of that, and further that certain
convenient limits of distinct jurisdiction have been apportioned
on the sea. Now, this agreement does bind those who are parties to
it,[94] but it has no binding force on other nations, nor does it
make the delimited area of the sea the private property of any one.
It merely constitutes a personal right between contracting parties.
This distinction so conformable to natural reason is also confirmed
by a reply once made by Ulpian. Upon being asked whether the owner
of two maritime estates could on selling either of them impose on it
such a servitude as the prohibition of fishing in a particular part
of the sea, he replied that the thing in question, evidently the sea,
could not be subjected to a servitude, because it was by nature open
to all persons; but that since a contract made in good faith demands
that the condition of a sale be respected, the present possessors and
those who succeed to
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Verum est loqui Iurisconsultum de praediis privatis, et lege privata,
sed in territorio et lege populorum eadem hic est ratio, quia populi
respectu totius generis humani privatorum locum obtinent.
Similiter reditus qui in piscationes maritimas constituti Regalium
numero censentur, non rem, hoc est mare, aut piscationem, sed
personas obligant.[95a] Quare subditi, in quos legem ferendi potestas
Reipublicae aut Principi ex consensu competit, ad onera ista compelli
forte poterunt; sed exteris ius piscandi ubique immune esse debet, ne
servitus imponatur mari quod servire non potest.
Non enim maris eadem quae fluminis ratio est:[96a] quod cum sit
publicum, id est populi, ius etiam in eo piscandi a populo aut
principe concedi aut locari potest, ita ut ei qui conduxit,
etiam interdictum Veteres dederint, de loco publico fruendo,
addita condicione si is cui locandi ius fuerit, fruendum alicui
locaverit;[97a] quae condicio in mari evenire non potest. Ceterum
qui ipsam piscationem numerant inter Regalia, ne quidem illum locum
quem interpretabantur satis inspexerunt, quod Iserniam et Alvotum non
latuit.
Demonstratum est[98a] nec populo nec privato cuipiam ius
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their rights were bound to observe that condition. It is true that
the jurist is speaking of private estates and of private law, but in
speaking here of the territory of peoples and of public law the same
reasoning applies, because from the point of view of the whole human
race peoples are treated as individuals.
Similarly, revenues levied on maritime fisheries are held to belong
to the Crown, but they do not bind the sea itself or the fisheries,
but only the persons engaged in fishing.[95] Wherefore subjects, for
whom a state or a ruler is by common consent competent to make laws,
will perhaps be compelled to bear such charges, but so far as other
persons are concerned the right of fishing ought everywhere to be
exempt from tolls, lest a servitude be imposed upon the sea, which is
not susceptible to a servitude.
The case of the sea is not the same as that of a river,[96] for as
a river is the property of a nation, the right to fish in it can
be passed or leased by the nation or by the ruler, in such a way
(and the like is true with the ancients) that the lessee enjoys the
operation of the injunction _de loco publico fruendo_ by virtue of
the clause ‘He who has the right to lease has leased the exclusive
right of enjoyment’.[97] Such a condition cannot arise in respect to
the sea. Finally those who count fishing among the properties of the
Crown have not examined carefully enough the very passage which they
cite to prove their contention, as Isernia* and Alvotus† have noticed.
* [Andrea d’Isernia (c. 1480-1553), an Italian commentator, called
often Feudistarum Patriarcha.]
† [Probably a misprint for Alvarus (Alvarez).]
It has therefore been demonstrated[98] that neither a nation nor an
individual can establish any right of private ownership
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aliquod proprium in ipsum mare (nam diverticulum excipimus) competere
posse, cum occupationem nec natura, nec usus publici ratio permittat.
Huius autem rei causa instituta fuerat haec disputatio, ut appareret
Lusitanos mare quo ad Indos navigatur sui iuris non fecisse. Nam
utraque ratio quae proprietatem impedit, in hac causa est quam in
ceteris omnibus infinito efficacior. Quod in alii difficile videtur,
in hac omnino fieri non potest; quod in aliis iniquum iudicamus, in
hac summe barbarum est, atque inhumanum.
Non de mari interiore hic agimus, quod terris undique infusum alicubi
etiam fluminis latitudinem non excedit, de quo tamen satis constat
locutos Romanos Iurisconsultos, cum nobiles illas adversus privatam
avaritiam sententias ediderunt; de Oceano quaeritur, quem immensum,
infinitum, rerum parentem, caelo conterminum antiquitas vocat, cuius
perpetuo humore non fontes tantum et flumina et maria, sed nubes, sed
ipsa quodammodo sidera pasci veteres crediderunt; qui denique per
reciprocas aestuum vices terram hanc humani generis sedem ambiens,
neque teneri neque includi potest, et possidet verius quam possidetur.
In hoc autem Oceano non de sinu aut freto, nec de omni quidem eo quod
e litore conspici potest controversia est. Vindicant sibi Lusitani
quicquid duos Orbes interiacet, tantis spatiis discretos, ut plurimis
saeculis famam sui non potuerint transmittere. Quod si Castellanorum,
qui in eadem sunt
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over the sea itself (I except inlets of the sea), inasmuch as its
occupation is not permissible either by nature or on grounds of
public utility. The discussion of this matter has been taken up for
this reason, namely, that it may be seen that the Portuguese have not
established private ownership over the sea by which people go to the
East Indies. For the two reasons that stand in the way of ownership
are in this case infinitely more powerful than in all others. That
which in other cases seems difficult, is here absolutely impossible;
and what in other cases we recognize as unjust is here most barbarous
and inhuman.
The question at issue then is not one that concerns an INNER SEA, one
which is surrounded on all sides by the land and at some places does
not even exceed a river in breadth, although it is well known that
the Roman jurists cited such an inner sea in their famous opinions
condemning private avarice. No! the question at issue is the OUTER
SEA, the OCEAN, that expanse of water which antiquity describes as
the immense, the infinite, bounded only by the heavens, parent of
all things; the ocean which the ancients believed was perpetually
supplied with water not only by fountains, rivers, and seas, but
by the clouds, and by the very stars of heaven themselves; the
ocean which, although surrounding this earth, the home of the human
race, with the ebb and flow of its tides, can be neither seized
nor inclosed; nay, which rather possesses the earth than is by it
possessed.
Further, the question at issue does not concern a gulf or a strait
in this ocean, nor even all the expanse of sea which is visible from
the shore. [But consider this!!] The Portuguese claim as their own
the whole expanse of the sea which separates two parts of the world
so far distant the one from the other, that in all the preceding
centuries neither one has so much as heard of the other. Indeed, if
we take into account the share of the Spaniards, whose claim
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causa, portio accedat, parvo minus omnis Oceanus duobus populis
mancipatus est, aliis tot gentibus ad Septentrionum redactis
angustias; multumque decepta est Natura, quae cum elementum illud
omnibus circumfudit, omnibus etiam suffecturum credidit. In tanto
mari si quis usu promiscuo solum sibi imperium et dicionem exciperet,
tamen immodicae dominationis affectator haberetur; si quis piscatu
arceret alios, insanae cupiditatis notam non effugeret. At qui etiam
navigatum impedit, quo nihil ipsi perit, de eo quid statuemus?
Si quis ab igni qui totus suus est, ignem capere, lumen suo de
lumine, alterum prohiberet, lege hunc humanae societatis reum
peragerem: quia vis ea est istius naturae:
_Vt nihilominus ipsi luceat, cum illi accenderit._[99a]
Quid ni enim quando sine detrimento suo potest, alteri communicet, in
iis quae sunt accipienti utilia, danti non molesta.[100a]
Haec sunt quae Philosophi[101a] non alienis tantum, sed et ingratis
praestari volunt. Quae vero in rebus privatis invidia est, eadem in
re communi non potest non esse immanitas, improbissimum enim hoc est,
quod naturae instituto, consensu gentium, meum non minus quam tuum
est, id te ita intercipere, ut ne usum quidem mihi concedas, quo
concesso nihilominus id tuum sit, quam antea fuit.
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is the same as that of the Portuguese, only a little less than the
whole ocean is found to be subject to two nations, while all the rest
of the peoples in the world are restricted to the narrow bounds of
the northern seas. Nature was greatly deceived if when she spread the
sea around all peoples she believed that it would also be adequate
for the use of them all. If in a thing so vast as the sea a man
were to reserve to himself from general use nothing more than mere
sovereignty, still he would be considered a seeker after unreasonable
power. If a man were to enjoin other people from fishing, he would
not escape the reproach of monstrous greed. But the man who even
prevents navigation, a thing which means no loss to himself, what are
we to say of him?
If any person should prevent any other person from taking fire from
his fire or a light from his torch, I should accuse him of violating
the law of human society, because that is the essence of its very
nature, as Ennius has said:
“_No less shines his, when he his friend’s hath lit._”[99]
Why then, when it can be done without any prejudice to his own
interests, will not one person share with another things which are
useful to the recipient, and no loss to the giver?[100] These are
services which the ancient philosophers[101] thought ought to be
rendered not only to foreigners but even to the ungrateful. But the
same act which when private possessions are in question is jealousy
can be nothing but cruelty when a common possession is in question.
For it is most outrageous for you to appropriate a thing, which both
by ordinance of nature and by common consent is as much mine as
yours, so exclusively that you will not grant me a right of use in it
which leaves it no less yours than it was before.
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Tum vero etiam qui alienis incumbunt, aut communia intercipiunt,
certa quadam possessione se tuentur. Quia enim prima, ut diximus,
occupatio res proprias fecit, idcirco imaginem quandam dominii
praefert quamvis iniusta detentio. At Lusitani num sicuti terras
solemus, sic mare illud impositis praediis ita undique cinxerunt,
ut in ipsorum manu esset quos vellent excludere? An vero tantum hoc
abest, ut ipsi etiam, cum adversus alios populos mundum dividunt, non
ullis limitibus aut natura, aut manu positis, sed imaginaria quadam
linea se tueantur? quod si recipitur et dimensio talis ad possidendum
valet, iamdudum nobis Geometrae terras, Astronomi etiam caelum
eriperent.
Vbi hic igitur est ista, sine qua nulla dominia coeperunt,
corporis ad corpus adiunctio? Nimirum apparet in nulla re verius
dici posse, quod Doctores nostri prodiderunt,[102a] Mare cum sit
incomprehensibile, non minus quam aër, nullius populi bonis potuisse
applicari.
Si vero ante alios navigasse, et viam quodammodo aperuisse, hoc
vocant occupare, quid esse potest magis ridiculum? Nam cum nulla
pars sit maris, in quam non aliquis primus ingressus sit, sequetur
omnem navigationem ab aliquo esse occupatam. Ita undique excludimur.
Quin et illi qui terrarum orbem circumvecti sunt, totum sibi Oceanum
acquisivisse dicendi erunt. Sed nemo nescit
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Nevertheless, even those who lay burdens upon foreigners, or
appropriate things common to all, rely upon a possession which is
to some extent real. For since original occupation created private
property, therefore detention of a thing, though unjust, gives an
appearance of ownership. But have the Portuguese completely covered
the ocean, as we are wont to do on land, by laying out estates on
it in such a way that they have the right to exclude from that
ocean whom they will? Not at all! On the contrary, they are so far
from having done so, that when they divide up the world to the
disadvantage of other nations, they cannot even defend their action
by showing any boundaries either natural or artificial, but are
compelled to fall back upon some imaginary line. Indeed, if that
were a recognized method, and such a delimitation of boundaries were
sufficient to make possession valid, our geometers long since would
have got possession of the face of the earth, our astronomers of the
very skies.
But where in this case is that corporal possession or physical
appropriation, without which no ownerships arise? There appears to
be nothing truer than what our learned jurists have enunciated,
namely,[102] that since the sea is just as insusceptible of physical
appropriation as the air, it cannot be attached to the possessions of
any nation.
But if the Portuguese call _occupying_ the sea merely to have sailed
over it before other people, and to have, as it were, opened the way,
could anything in the world be more ridiculous? For, as there is no
part of the sea on which some person has not already sailed, it will
necessarily follow that every route of navigation is occupied by some
one. Therefore we peoples of today are all absolutely excluded. Why
will not those men who have circumnavigated the globe be justified in
saying that they have acquired for themselves the possession of the
whole ocean! But there
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navem per mare transeuntem non plus iuris, quam vestigii relinquere.
Verum etiam quod sibi sumunt neminem ante ipsos eum Oceanum
navigasse, id minime verum est. Magna enim pars eius de quo agitur
maris, ambitu Mauritaniae, iam olim navigata est; ulterior et in
orientem vergens victoriis Magni Alexandri lustrata est, usque in
Arabicum sinum.[103a]
Olim autem hanc navigationem Gaditanis percognitam fuisse, multa
argumento sunt. Caio Caesare Augusti filio in Arabico sinu res
gerente signa navium ex Hispaniensibus naufragiis agnita. Et quod
Caelius Antipater tradidit, vidisse se qui ex Hispania in Aethiopiam
commercii gratia navigasset. Etiam Arabibus, si verum est, quod
Cornelius Nepos testatus est, Eudoxum quendam sua aetate cum Lathyrum
Regem Alexandriae fugeret, Arabico sinu egressum Gades usque
pervectum. Poenos autem, qui re maritima plurimum valuerunt, eum
Oceanum non ignorasse longe clarissimum est, cum Hanno Carthaginis
potentia florente circumvectus a Gadibus ad finem Arabiae,
praeternavigato scilicet promontorio quod nunc Bonae Spei dicitur,
(vetus videtur nomen Hesperion ceras fuisse) omne id iter, situmque
litoris et insularum scripto complexus sit, testatusque ad ultimum
non mare sibi, sed commeatum defuisse.
Ab Arabico autem sinu ad Indiam, Indicique Oceani insulas, et auream
usque Chersonesum, quam esse Iapanem credunt plerique, etiam re
Romana florente navigari solitum, iter a Plinio descriptum,[104a]
legationes ab Indis ad
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is not a single person in the world who does not know that a ship
sailing through the sea leaves behind it no more legal right than it
does a track. And as for the assumption of the Portuguese that no one
has sailed that ocean before themselves, that is anything but true.
For a great part of that sea near Morocco, which is in dispute, had
already been navigated long before, and the sea as far east as the
Arabian gulf has been made famous by the victories of Alexander the
Great, as both Pliny and Mela tell us.[103]
There is also much to substantiate the belief that the inhabitants
of Cadiz were well acquainted long ago with this route, because when
Gaius Caesar,* the son of Augustus, held command in the Arabian
gulf, pieces were found of shipwrecks recognized as Spanish. Caelius
Antipater also has told us in his writings that he himself saw a
Spaniard who had sailed from Spain to Ethiopia on a commercial
voyage. Also the Arabians knew those seas, if the testimony of
Cornelius Nepos is to be believed, because he says that in his own
day a certain Eudoxus, fleeing from Lathyrus, king of Alexandria,
sailed from the Arabian gulf and finally reached Cadiz. However, by
far the most famous example is that of the Carthaginians. Those most
famous mariners were well acquainted with that sea, because Hanno,
when Carthage was at the height of her power, sailing from Cadiz
to the farthest confines of Arabia, and doubling the promontory
now known as the Cape of Good Hope (the ancient name seems to have
been Hesperion Ceras), described in a book the entire route he had
taken, the appearance of the coasts, and the location of the islands,
declaring that at the farthest point he reached the sea had not yet
given out but his provisions had.
* [Strictly speaking, Gaius was the grandson of Augustus, but was
adopted as his son.]
Pliny’s description of the route to the East,[104] the embassies
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Augustum, ad Claudium etiam ex Taprobane insula, deinde gesta Traiani
et tabulae Ptolemaei satis ostendunt. Iam suo tempore Strabo[105a]
Alexandrinorum mercatorum classem ex Arabico sinu, ut Aethiopiae
ultima, ita et Indiae, petiisse testatur, cum olim paucis navibus id
auderetur. Inde magna populo Romano vectigalia; addit Plinius[106a]
impositis sagittariorum cohortibus piratarum metu navigatum; solamque
Indiam quingenties sestertium, si Arabiam addas et Seres, millies
annis omnibus Romano Imperio ademisse; et merces centuplicato
venditas.
Et haec quidem vetera satis arguunt primos non fuisse Lusitanos. In
singulis autem sui partibus Oceanus ille et tunc cum eum Lusitani
ingressi sunt, et numquam non cognitus fuit. Mauri enim, Aethiopes,
Arabes, Persae, Indi, eam maris partem cuius ipsi accolae sunt,
nescire neutiquam potuerunt.
Mentiuntur ergo qui se mare illud invenisse iactant.
Quid igitur, dicet aliquis, parumne videtur, quod Lusitani
intermissam multis forte saeculis navigationem primi repararunt, et,
quod negari non potest, Europaeis gentibus ignotam ostenderunt, magno
suo labore, sumptu, periculo?
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from the Indies to Augustus, and those from Ceylon to the emperor
Claudius, and finally the accounts of the deeds of Trajan, and the
writings of Ptolemaeus, all make it quite clear that in the days
of Rome’s greatest splendor voyages were made regularly from the
Arabian gulf to India, to the islands of the Indian ocean, and even
so far as to the golden Chersonesus, which many people think was
Japan. Strabo says[105] that in his own time a fleet of Alexandrian
merchantmen set sail from the Arabian gulf for the distant lands of
Ethiopia and India, although few ships had ever before attempted that
voyage. The Roman people had a large revenue from the East. Pliny
says[106] that cohorts of archers were carried on the boats engaged
in trade as protection against pirates; he states also that every
year 500,000 sesterces* were taken out of the Roman empire by India
alone, or 1,000,000 sesterces if you add Arabia and China; further,
that merchandise brought from the East sold for one hundred times its
original cost.
* [A Roman sestertius was about four cents.]
These examples cited from ancient times are sufficient proof that
the Portuguese were not the first in that part of the world. Long
before they ever came, every single part of that ocean had been long
since explored. For how possibly could the Moors, the Ethiopians,
the Arabians, the Persians, the peoples of India, have remained in
ignorance of that part of the sea adjacent to their coasts!
Therefore they lie, who today boast that they discovered that sea.
Well then, some one will say, does it seem to be a matter of little
moment that the Portuguese were the first to restore a navigation
interrupted perhaps for many centuries, and unknown--as cannot be
denied--at least to the nations of Europe, at great labor and cost
and danger to themselves?
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Immo vero si in hoc incubuerunt ut quod soli reperissent id omnibus
monstrarent, quis adeo est amens, qui non plurimum se illis debere
profiteatur? Eandem enim gratiam, laudemque et gloriam immortalem
illi promeruerint, qua omnes contenti fuerunt rerum magnarum
inventores, quotquot scilicet non sibi, sed humano generi prodesse
studuerunt. Sin Lusitanis suus ante oculos quaestus fuit, lucrum quod
semper maximum est in praevertendis negotiationibus, illis sufficere
debuit. Et scimus itinera prima proventus interdum quater decuplos,
aut etiam uberiores dedisse, quibus factum ut inops diu populus ad
repentinas divitias subito prorumperet, tanto luxus apparatu, quantus
vix beatissimis gentibus in supremo progressae diu fortunae fastigio
fuit.
Si vero eidem in hoc praeiverunt, ne quisquam sequeretur, gratiam
non merentur, cum lucrum suum respexerint; lucrum autem suum dicere
non possunt, cum eripiant alienum. Neque enim illud certum est
nisi ivissent eo Lusitani, iturum fuisse neminem. Adventabant enim
tempora, quibus ut artes paene omnes, ita et terrarum et marium situs
clarius in dies noscebantur. Excitassent vetera, quae modo retulimus,
exempla, et si non uno impetu omnia patuissent, at paulatim promota
velis fuissent litora alio semper aliud monstrante. Factum denique
fuisset,
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On the contrary, if they had laid weight upon the fact that they were
pointing out to all what they alone had rediscovered, there is no
one so lacking in sense that he would not acknowledge the greatest
obligation to them. For the Portuguese will have earned the same
thanks, praise, and immortal glory with which all discoverers of
great things have been content, whenever they have striven to benefit
not themselves but the whole human race. But if the Portuguese
had before their eyes only their own financial gain, surely their
profit, which is always the largest for those first in a new field
of enterprise, ought to have satisfied them. For we know that
their first voyages returned a profit sometimes of forty times the
original investment, and sometimes even more. And by this overseas
trade it has come about that a people, previously for a long time
poor, have leaped suddenly into the possession of great riches, and
have surrounded themselves with such outward signs of luxurious
magnificence as scarcely the most prosperous nations have been able
to display at the height of their fortunes.
But if these Portuguese have led the way in this matter in order
that no one may follow them, then they do not deserve any thanks,
inasmuch as they have considered only their own profit. Nor can they
call it their profit, because they are taking the profit of some one
else. For it is not at all demonstrable that, if the Portuguese had
not gone to the East Indies, no one else would have gone. For the
times were coming on apace in which along with other sciences the
geographical locations of seas and lands were being better known
every day. The reports of the expeditions of the ancients mentioned
above had aroused people, and even if all foreign shores had not been
laid open at a single stroke as it were, yet they would have been
brought to light gradually by sailing voyages, each new discovery
pointing the way to the next. And so there would finally
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quod fieri potuisse Lusitani docuerunt, cum multi essent populi non
minus flagrantes mercaturae et rerum externarum studio. Venetis qui
multa iam Indiae didicerant, cetera inquirere promptum fuit. Gallorum
Brittonum indefessa sedulitas, Anglorum audacia coepto non defuisset.
Ipsi Batavi multo magis desperata aggressi sunt.
Nulla igitur aequitatis ratio, ne probabilis quidem ulla sententia a
Lusitanis stat. Omnes enim qui mare volunt imperio alicuius subici
posse, id ei attribuunt qui proximos portus et circumiacentia litora
in dicione habet.[107a] At Lusitani in illo immenso litorum tractu
paucis exceptis praesidiis nihil habent quod suum possint dicere.
Deinde vero etiam qui Mari imperaret, nihil tamen posset ex usu
communi deminuere, sicut Populus Romanus arcere neminem potuit, quo
minus in litore imperi Romani cuncta faceret, quae iure gentium
permittebantur.[108a] Et si quicquam eorum prohibere posset,
puta piscaturam qua dici quodammodo potest pisces exhauriri, at
navigationem non posset, per quam mari nihil perit.
Cui rei argumentum est longe certissimum, quod ex Doctorum sententia
ante retulimus, etiam in terra, quae cum populis, tum hominibus
singulis in proprietatem attributa est, iter tamen, certe inerme et
innoxium, nullius gentis
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have been accomplished what the Portuguese showed could be done,
because there were many nations with no less ardor than theirs to
engage in commerce and to learn of foreign things. The Venetians, who
already knew much about India, were ready to push their knowledge
farther; the indefatigable zeal of the French of Brittany, and
the boldness of the English would not have failed to make such an
attempt; indeed the Dutch themselves have embarked upon much more
desperate enterprises.
Therefore the Portuguese have neither just reason nor respectable
authority to support their position, for all those persons who assume
that the sea can be subjected to the sovereignty of any one assign it
to him who holds in his power the nearest ports and the circumjacent
shores.[107] But in all that great extent of coast line reaching to
the East Indies the Portuguese have nothing which they can call their
own except a few fortified posts.
And then even if a man were to have dominion over the sea, still
he could not take away anything from its common use, just as the
Roman people could not prevent any one from doing on the shores of
their dominions all those things which were permitted by the law
of nations.[108] And if it were possible to prohibit any of those
things, say for example, fishing, for in a way it can be maintained
that fish are exhaustible, still it would not be possible to prohibit
navigation, for the sea is not exhausted by that use.
The most conclusive argument on this question by far however is the
one that we have already brought forward based on the opinions of
eminent jurists, namely, that even over land which had been converted
into private property either by states or individuals, unarmed
and innocent passage is not justly to be denied to persons of any
country, exactly as the right to drink from a river is not to be
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hominibus iuste negari; sicut et potum ex flumine. Ratio apparet,
quia cum unius rei naturaliter usus essent diversi, eum dumtaxat
gentes divisisse inter se videntur, qui sine proprietate commode
haberi non potest, contra autem eum recepisse, per quem domini
condicio deterior non esset futura.
Omnes igitur vident eum qui alterum navigare prohibeat nullo
iure defendi, cum eundem etiam iniuriarum teneri Vlpianus
dixerit;[109a] alii autem etiam interdictum utile prohibito competere
existimaverint.[110a]
Et sic Batavorum intentio communi iure nititur, cum fateantur omnes,
permissum cuilibet in mari navigare etiam a nullo Principe impetrata
licentia; quod Legibus Hispanicis diserte expressum est.[111a]
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denied. The reason is clear, because, inasmuch as one and the same
thing is susceptible by nature to different uses, the nations seem
on the one hand to have apportioned among themselves that use which
cannot be maintained conveniently apart from private ownership; but
on the other hand to have reserved that use through the exercise of
which the condition of the owner would not be impaired.
It is clear therefore to every one that he who prevents another from
navigating the sea has no support in law. Ulpian has said[109] that
he was even bound to pay damages, and other jurists have thought
that the injunction _utile prohibito_ could also be brought against
him.[110]
Finally, the relief prayed for by the Dutch rests upon a common
right, since it is universally admitted that navigation on the sea is
open to any one, even if permission is not obtained from any ruler.
And this is specifically expressed in the Spanish laws.[111]
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CAPVT VI
_Mare aut ius navigandi proprium non esse Lusitanorum titulo
donationis Pontificiae_
Donatio Pontificis Alexandri, quae a Lusitanis mare aut ius navigandi
solis sibi vindicantibus, cum inventionis deficiat titulus, secundo
loco adduci potest, satis ex iis quae ante dicta sunt vanitatis
convincitur. Donatio enim nullum habet momentum in rebus extra
commercium positis. Quare cum mare aut ius in eo navigandi proprium
nulli hominum esse possit, sequitur neque dari a Pontifice neque a
Lusitanis accipi potuisse. Praeterea cum supra relatum sit ex omnium
sani iudicii hominum sententia Papam non esse dominum temporalem
totius orbis, ne Maris quidem esse satis intelligitur; quamquam etsi
id concederetur, tamen ius annexum Pontificatui in Regem aliquem aut
populum pro parte nulla transferri debuisset. Sicut nec Imperator
posset Imperi provincias in suos usus convertere, aut pro suo
arbitrio alienare.[112a]
Illud saltem nemo negaturus est, cui aliquid sit frontis, cum ius
disponendi in temporalibus Pontifici nemo concedat, nisi forte
quantum eius rerum spiritualium necessitas requirit, ista autem
de quibus nunc agimus, mare scilicet et ius navigandi, lucrum et
quaestum merum, non pietatis negotium
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