be exhibited or published, any placard, handbill, card, writing, sign or
advertisement, that any house, office, room or place is kept or used for
the purpose of making bets or wagers in manner aforesaid, or for the
purpose of exhibiting lists for betting, or for the purpose of inducing
any person to resort to such house, &c., for the purpose of making bets,
or any person who on behalf of the owner or occupier of such house, &c.,
who shall invite other persons to resort thereto for the purpose of
betting, shall be liable to a penalty of £50 or two months’
imprisonment.”
What persons are forbidden by this section to advertise is: (1) That a
house or place is kept for the kind of betting mentioned in a former
part of the Act, _i.e._, Section 1. So that to understand what kind of
betting it is that must not be advertised, reference must be made to the
cases that have been decided thereon. [Sidenote: Betting lists.] (2)
People must not advertise their houses as exhibiting betting lists—that
is, people may keep lists of races, current odds, &c., but not advertise
the fact. This should be borne in mind by hotel and club proprietors,
and all persons whose premises are furnished by means of the “tape” with
the latest information as to races. Betting lists may be seized by
officers entering premises by virtue of section 11 of 16 & 17 Vict.,
which speaks of lists and “all documents relating to betting,” and also
they are expressly mentioned in section 12 of the same Act, which treats
of the powers of the Metropolitan Police.
[Sidenote: Act did not extend to Scotland.]
By section 20, Scotland is expressly excluded from the provisions of the
Act, consequently not only was that country inundated with members of
the betting fraternity who could not carry on their business in this
country, but seeing that betting houses in Scotland were not illegal,
Section 7 did not make advertisements of such places illegal.
Consequently, many of the daily papers made large sums by inserting such
advertisements, which, no doubt, acted as a powerful incentive to
certain members of the community to invest their money across the
border. As Mr. Anderson observed, in bringing his Bill before the House
of Commons,[396] that England had acted towards Scotland like the humane
gardener towards his neighbour by sending over to him all his vermin.
The Act which is known as Anderson’s Act, 37 Vict., c. 15, is described
as “an Act to be construed as one with the principal Act of 1853 and to
be cited together as the Betting Acts.”
Section 20 of the principal Act is repealed, thus extending that Act to
Scotland.
By section 3, when any letter, telegram, circular, placard, handbill,
card or advertisement is sent, exhibited or published,
(1.) Whereby it is made to appear that any person, either in the United
Kingdom or elsewhere, will, on application, give information or advice
for the purpose of, or with respect to, any bet or wager on any such
event or contingency as is mentioned in the principal Act; or will make
on behalf of any other person any such bet or wager as is mentioned in
the principal Act; or
(2.) With intent to induce any person to apply to any house, office,
room or place, or to any person with the view of obtaining any
information or advice for the purpose of any such bet or wager, or with
respect to any such event or contingency as is mentioned in the
principal Act; or
(3.) Inviting any person to make or take any share in or in connection
with any such bet or wager.
Every person sending, exhibiting or publishing, or causing the same to
be sent, exhibited or published, shall be subject to the penalties
provided in section 7 of the principal Act with respect to offences
under that section.
[Sidenote: Tipsters’ business not prohibited.]
What the latter statute prohibits people doing is, not advertising
themselves as ready to give information or “tips” with respect to
ordinary betting transactions, but only with respect to betting carried
on in any office or place used for the purpose of illegal betting within
the principal Act.
Thus in _Cox_ v. _Andrews_[397] defendant issued advertisements in the
_Licensed Victuallers’ Gazette and Hotel Courier_ that Centaur would,
for half-a-crown in stamps, give information and advice with respect to
the probable winners of races in the ensuing week. Centaur was the
defendant’s regular correspondent with respect to horse-races and
information relating thereto. There was no address given at which
persons desiring such information should apply. _Held_, that the
advertisement, contemplated in 37 Vict., c. 15, referred to bets made in
any office, house or place as referred to in the principal Act, and not
to advice with respect to ordinary betting; the Act was to be read with
the principal Act, and the only kind of betting prohibited by the latter
was that specified in section 1. Of course, this being the purport of
the statute, all the cases cited above as to what is a “place,” etc.,
and particularly as to the kind of betting prohibited by the Statute 16
& 17 Vict., c. 119, apply to the construction of the supplementary as
well as of the principal Act. [Sidenote: Betting clubs.] It is clear,
therefore, that the ordinary betting clubs so long as they themselves
are not within the Act, may advertise for members. [Sidenote: Agents.]
So also the ordinary commission agent, who does business at these clubs,
may advertise for clients.
[Sidenote: Foreign houses.]
Now that the bookmaker, having first been driven out of England has also
been banished from Scotland, he seems from the advertisements in the
papers to have betaken himself to Boulogne. Considering that any house
he may set up there is not within the Act, it follows that these
advertisements are perfectly legal.
[Sidenote: Betting and Loans (Infants) Act.]
We have now to notice an Act which has recently been passed to prohibit
the sending of advertisements or invitations to bet to persons under
age. The Betting and Loans (Infants) Act, 55 Vict., c. 4, s. 1,
provides: (1) “If any one for the purpose of earning commission, reward,
or other profit, sends or causes to be sent to a person whom he knows to
be an infant, any circular, notice, advertisement, letters, telegram or
other document which invites, or may reasonably be implied to invite,
the person receiving it to make any bet or wager, or to enter into or
take any share or interest in any betting or wagering transaction, or to
apply to any person or at any place with a view to obtaining information
or advice for the purpose of any bet or wager, or for information as to
any race, fight, game, sport, or other contingency upon which betting or
wagering is usually carried on, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanour....” The penalties imposed are, if convicted on indictment,
three months’ imprisonment, with or without hard labour, and a fine of
£100; on summary conviction, one month and £20 fine.
Sub-section 2. “If any such circular, notice, advertisement, letter,
telegram or other document, as in this section mentioned, names or
refers to any one as a person to whom any payment may be made, or from
whom information may be obtained for the purpose of or in relation to
betting or wagering, the person so named or referred to shall be deemed
to have sent, or caused to be sent, such document as aforesaid, unless
he proves that he had not consented to be so named, and that he was not
in any way party to, and was wholly ignorant of, the sending of such
document.”
By section 3: If any such circular, &c., is sent “to any person at any
university, college, school, or other place of education, and such
person is an infant, the person sending it, or causing it to be sent,
shall be deemed to have known that such person was an infant, unless he
proves that he had reasonable grounds for believing such person to be of
full age.”
By section 6: “In any proceeding against any person under this Act, such
person and his wife, or husband, as the case may be, may, if such person
thinks fit, be called, sworn, examined, and cross-examined as an
ordinary witness in the case.” Scotland is not excluded from the Act.
[Sidenote: Welshing.]
The oft-disputed question of whether “welshing” is a penal offence has
been set at rest by _Reg._ v. _Buckmaster_.[398] It was there held that
it amounted to larceny by trick, on the ground that there being no
intention on the prisoner’s part when he took the prosecutor’s money of
paying the prosecutor if he won his bet, there was no real contract
between the two which could pass the property in the money paid by the
prosecutor to the prisoner.
PROCEDURE.
[Sidenote: Procedure.]
We now come to treat of the procedure whereby the laws against gaming
and betting houses can be enforced. It will be observed that it differs
in some important respects from the ordinary procedure in criminal
cases, in being more drastic and to a great extent less considerate to
the liberty of the subject owing to the great difficulty of detecting
the offences and the facility with which the law might be evaded if
ordinary forms had to be observed.
The procedure is slightly different in the case of gaming and betting
houses, so they must be treated separately.
[Sidenote: Gaming houses.]
I. As to gaming houses, by 25 George II., c. 36, ss. 5 and 6, it was
provided that if any two inhabitants of a parish should give notice to a
constable of any person keeping a gaming house, the constable should
take such persons before a justice of the peace; that the justice
should, on the sworn information of such persons, bind them over to
prosecute at the Assizes or Sessions, and issue a warrant for the arrest
of the person accused and bind him over to answer any indictment that
might be found against him. It seems that the section leaves the
magistrate no discretion as to granting a warrant[399]; but as it only
applies to proceedings preliminary to indictments it is, in practice,
superseded by the procedure prescribed in the more modern Statutes. This
procedure is different according as the house is situated in the
Metropolis or out of that district. [Sidenote: In the Metropolis.] In
the Metropolis, by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, section 48, power was given to the
Commissioners of the Police Force, on the report of any superintendent,
that there were good grounds for believing that any house within the
district was used as a common gaming house, and on two witnesses making
oath before a magistrate, to empower the superintendent and other
constables to enter the house, arrest all persons found therein,[400]
and destroy all tables, instruments of gaming, money, and securities for
money. By 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109, section 6, the Commissioners are invested
with the same powers, except that the necessity of two witnesses making
oath before a magistrate is dispensed with; and the power to seize (and
not destroy) instruments of gaming is given.
This latter section does not empower Metropolitan magistrates to issue
such warrant as the Betting House Act does.
[Sidenote: In Ireland.]
By section 24 of the latter Act, Metropolis in Ireland means Dublin.
By section 7, special power is conferred on such superintendent or
constables to search the whole house where he shall suspect there are
instruments of gaming concealed, and any person found therein,[400] and
to seize all tables and instruments of gaming which he shall so find.
By section 8, magistrates before whom persons are brought, having been
arrested in a gaming house, may order all such tables and instruments of
gaming to be destroyed.
[Sidenote: Out of the Metropolis.]
In the case of houses out of the Metropolis, justices of the peace may,
on information on oath that there is reason to suspect any house is used
as a gaming house, issue a warrant in the form given in the schedule to
the Act to empower officers to enter such house by force, and arrest all
persons found therein. This section does not empower constables to seize
or destroy instruments of gaming. [Sidenote: Form of warrant.] An
important point to notice about the form of the warrant is that it is
directed only against a particular house, the individuals who may be
arrested need not be named or described. This is an important departure
from ordinary procedure, as generally a warrant for an arrest is bad if
the name of the person to be arrested or some description of him do not
appear on the face of the warrant, as was decided in the “general
warrant” cases in George III.’s reign.
By section 5 it is provided that it shall not be necessary in support of
any information, for keeping a gaming house, to prove that persons found
playing therein were playing for money or stakes.[401]
The power of ordering the destruction of instruments of gaming conferred
by section 8 seems to apply out of the Metropolis. The words are
“warrant or order.”
It does not appear that police magistrates in the Metropolis have the
power of issuing warrants in the form above described, as the section
expressly excludes the metropolitan district.
N.B.—In any questions arising under this Act, reference should be made
to the cases which are noted under the corresponding portions of the
Betting House Act, as the wording of the two statutes is in many cases
similar.
[Sidenote: Evidence.]
There are also important provisions in 17 & 18 Vict., c. 38, with
respect to the power of a magistrate to compel witnesses to give
evidence, under section 5 and section 6. All persons apprehended under
the powers contained in section 3 and section 6 of 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109,
may be required to give evidence touching any unlawful gambling or
obstruction of officers in the house, notwithstanding that such evidence
may tend to criminate the witness. Such person refusing to be sworn may
be dealt with as any ordinary witness so refusing. But every such person
who has made full discovery of all the facts he knows is entitled to a
certificate from the justices which frees him from criminal proceedings
in respect of matters on which he has been examined.
[Sidenote: Levying and application of penalties.]
By section 7 penalties and costs may be levied by distress, and by
section 8 half the penalty is to be paid in aid of the poor-rate of the
parish in which the offence is committed, and half to the person laying
the information.
In _Wray_ v. _Ellis_[402] a question arose as to whether this section
applied to penalties paid in the Metropolis. By the Statute 2 & 3 Vict.,
c. 71, section 47, it is provided that all fines paid in London Police
Courts shall be paid to the Receiver of Police. The question was whether
the enactment was superseded by section 8 of 17 & 18 Vict., c. 38. The
Court held that it was not; and that in the latter section an implied
exception was contained in the case of penalties paid in the Metropolis,
and that therefore the Receiver was entitled.
[Sidenote: Neglect to prosecute.]
By section 9, if the person who shall have laid the information neglects
to prosecute, the justices may authorise some other person to proceed.
[Sidenote: Appeal.]
Any person convicted summarily under this Act may appeal to the Quarter
Sessions on entering into recognisances and finding sureties within 48
hours of his conviction.
[Sidenote: No certiorari.]
By section 11 no information under the Act is to be removed by
certiorari into the Queen’s Bench.
[Sidenote: Action against officers.]
In the case of actions brought against officers for any trespass or
other wrongful proceeding done or committed in the execution of the Act,
it is provided (section 13) that no action shall be brought if
sufficient tender of amends shall have been made before action brought,
and by section 14 no action or other proceeding shall be brought, unless
one month’s notice in writing shall have been given to the intended
defendant, nor unless the action shall have been commenced within three
months of the act or omission complained of.
In _Blake_ v. _Beach_[403] it was contended for the defendant that by
section 14 a month’s notice of the information ought to have been given
to him, but this point was abandoned by Counsel as untenable, when the
case came before the Divisional Court; and was also said by the Court to
have been “founded on an obvious mistake!”
[Sidenote: Vexatious indictments.]
Keeping a gambling house is one of the offences mentioned in the
Vexatious Indictments Act, 22 & 23 Vict., c. 17, which by section 1
provides that no bill of indictment for any of the offences named shall
be presented to the Grand Jury unless the prosecutor or person
preferring such indictment has been bound by recognisance to prosecute
or give evidence; though, by section 2, if the justices decline to
commit for trial, prosecutors may require them to bind him over to
prosecute.
[Sidenote: Betting houses.]
The procedure in the case of betting houses is to a certain extent
similar to that in the case of gaming houses, except that the power of
magistrates to issue a warrant in the form already described is not
limited to places out of the metropolitan district.
By section 11 of 16 & 17 Vict., c. 119, justices of the peace are
empowered, on information on oath that any house suspected of being used
as a betting house, [Sidenote: Search warrant.] to issue a warrant
authorising the forcible entry into any such house, and the arrest and
searching of all persons found therein, and also the seizure of all
lists and cards and other documents relating to racing or betting found
in such house. Such warrant may be in the form given in the schedule to
8 & 9 Vict., c. 109.
In _Anderson_ v. _Hume_[404] it was decided (1) that this section
empowers the search of licensed houses as well as others, although they
are subject in some respects to special regulations; (2) that the power
to arrest persons found therein is not confined to persons found engaged
in gaming.
In _Blake_ v. _Beach_[405] a warrant was issued under section 11 of this
Act for the search of a house suspected, as was stated in the warrant,
of being used as a common gaming house within 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109. Under
this warrant defendant and other persons found therein were arrested.
Defendant was afterwards charged under section 3 of 16 & 17 Vict., c.
119, with keeping a betting house. Ample evidence was given that
defendant was manager of the place, and that it was used for betting
purposes, but this charge was made without any fresh information being
laid against defendant. [Sidenote: Whether fresh information necessary.]
It was objected on his behalf that as the information on which the
warrant was granted was laid under 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109, a fresh
information ought to have been issued before he could be charged under
the Statute of 16 & 17 Vict., c. 119.
The Court differed, FIELD, J., holding that no fresh information was
necessary. In this case a specific charge was made against the accused
sufficient to give the magistrates jurisdiction. The information
provided for by section 11 took away the necessity of any further
information. Further, according to the current of modern authority, when
a man is before a magistrate who has jurisdiction as to time and place,
no further information is necessary before bringing any fresh charge
against him, though it might be proper to adjourn the hearing.
The rest of the Court, CLEASBY and GROVE, JJ., differed. In the ordinary
course a charge is preceded by information or summons. In this case the
defendant was brought up on a charge different from that contained in
the information. In a penal matter the charge ought to be comprised
within the information. There is nothing in section 11 to dispense with
the regular information or summons; it only enables persons to be
brought before the magistrates so as to know who is to be charged. The
conviction was therefore quashed.[406]
The information may be laid before one justice only.[407]
Where an information under the Betting House Act charged defendant with
having kept a house for betting purposes on the 5th October “and divers
other days.” The evidence proved the offence alleged on the 8th of
November only. _Held_, that under section 9 of 11 & 12 Vict., c. 113,
the variance was immaterial.[408]
For an instance in which a warrant was, under this section, issued in
the Metropolis, see _Clarke_ v. _Wright_ (quoted above).
[Sidenote: Powers of Commissioners of Police in Metropolis.]
Section 12 confers the same powers on the Commissioners of Police in the
Metropolis, on the report in writing of any superintendent, to authorise
such superintendent, with other constables, to enter suspected betting
houses, as is contained in the Gaming House Act; to take into custody
all persons found therein,[409] and to seize all lists, cards, or other
documents relating to racing or betting.
The Act also contains provisions similar to those of the Gaming House
Act, with respect to appeals to Quarter Sessions, certiorari, and
limitations of action (see above, p. 199).
GAMING IN LICENSED PREMISES.
[Sidenote: Gaming.]
By 35 and 36 Vict., c 94, if any licensed person (1) suffers any gaming
or any unlawful game to be carried on on his premises, (2) opens, uses,
or suffers his house to be opened or used in contravention of 16 & 17
Vict., c. 119, he is liable for the first offence to a penalty of £10,
and for every subsequent offence to a penalty of £20; the conviction to
be endorsed on such person’s license.
[Sidenote: I. Gaming. Knowledge of owner necessary.]
The following cases go to show how far actual or constructive knowledge
on the part of the owner of the premises is necessary.
In _Redgate_ v. _Haynes_,[410] defendant was the landlady of an hotel at
Epsom; witnesses proved that three men and a horse-trainer, a jockey,
and an inhabitant of Newmarket, were playing cards for money in the
sitting room from 11 p.m. The defendant retired to bed, leaving the hall
porter in charge of the house. The latter closed the door and retired to
his chair in the parlour, at the farthest end of the house. The usual
place for such chair was in the hall, and it was his duty to wait upon
his guests in the sitting room. From the Judgment delivered the
following rules may be extracted: (1) The defendant would not be liable
merely for the fact of gaming unless she knew of it or connived at it.
(2) In her absence she was responsible for the conduct of those she left
in charge. (3) The fact of the porter moving his chair out of the way
was some evidence that he suffered or connived at what was going on, but
the judges declined to say whether they would have drawn the same
conclusion.
In _Bosley_ v. _Davies_[411] there was evidence that persons were
playing at cards in the house, but none that the manageress or the
attendants knew that gaming was on. One of the players deposed that all
the brandies and sodas were served before the playing commenced. The
case was sent back to the magistrates with an intimation of opinion from
the Court that some knowledge, actual or constructive, or connivance on
the part of the owner was necessary.
In _Somerset_ v. _Hart_,[412] defendant was keeper of licensed premises.
On market day when the inn was very full, two men began gambling with a
mug and three nuts. It was proved that the potman knew of gambling, but
took no steps to prevent it, nor did he communicate it to the landlord,
who was engaged serving customers at the bar. COLERIDGE, C.J., in giving
judgment, distinguished the case of _Redgate_ v. _Haynes_,[413] on the
ground that there the magistrates thought there was evidence of
connivance. _Mullins_ v. _Collins_ was a case of serving a constable
with liquor while on duty; but there the liquor was served by a woman
who was probably defendant’s wife, to whom the management of the
business had been entrusted. Here the magistrates find that there was no
evidence that defendant had actual knowledge of the gaming, or that the
potman communicated it to him, or that he wilfully shut his eyes to what
was going on. All the cases show that there must be something in the
nature of connivance. See, too, _ante_ p. 175.
The case of _Bond_ v. _Evans_,[414] carried the matter somewhat further.
The defendant, a licensed victualler, had a skittle alley attached to
his premises, the management of which he entrusted to a servant. It was
proved that cards were played for money in the alley, and that the
servant was cognisant of the fact, though the defendant was not. It was
held that, the landlord of licensed premises “suffered” gaming to be
carried on when there was connivance at it, either on his own part or on
the part of any servant in charge of that part of the house where gaming
went on.
[Sidenote: What is gaming within the Act?]
To be within the act there must be either gaming for money or playing
some unlawful game. Thus in _Reg._ v. _Ashton_[415] (a case within 9
Geo. IV., c. 61, section 21) it was held that playing at dominoes, but
not for money, was lawful, dominoes not being an unlawful game.
In _Danford_ v. _Taylor_,[416] the game of ten-pins, the losers standing
beer all round, was held to be within the Act.
In _Bew_ v. _Harston_,[417] a licensed person allowed to be played on
his premises a game called “puff and dart,” the object of which is to
hit a mark on a target with a small dart blown through a tube. The
players each contributed 2d. as entrance money, the total sum so
contributed being applied to the purchase of a rabbit as a prize for the
winners. _Held_ that he was rightly convicted of gaming on licensed
premises. Cockburn, C.J., doubted whether the term “gaming” did not
apply to games of chance alone.
Except for the doubts thus expressed in the last case, the authorities
seemed to be all one way, that playing for money, even at a game
exclusively of skill, is “gaming”: this view has since been adopted in
_Dyson_ v. _Mason_.[418]
[Sidenote: Card playing.]
In _Patten_ v. _Rymer_[419] an innkeeper, whose license forbade him to
suffer gaming on his premises, was held liable under 9 George IV., c.
61, section 21, for playing cards for money with his friends.
Although 37 & 38 Vict., c. 49, permits licensed persons to serve liquors
to private friends after hours, there is nothing in that act which
justifies him in allowing the friends in his house to play cards for
money.[420] Section 25 of the Act of 1872, which imposes a penalty on
persons found in licensed premises during prohibited hours for the
purpose of being served with liquor, does not extend to cases where they
are only playing cards or other games.[421]
[Sidenote: Unlawful games.]
As to what are unlawful games, see _ante_ p. 152.
[Sidenote: Money lent by publican for gaming cannot be recovered.]
In _Foot_ v. _Baker_[422] it was held that money lent by a publican for
the purpose of gaming in his premises contrary to his license cannot be
recovered.
[Sidenote: II. Using the house for betting.]
Reference should be made to the notes on “What is Illegal Betting” in
the chapter on Betting Houses. It would seem, therefore, that there is
no objection to a publican keeping a room in his house for other people
to bet in, in the same way as betting is practised at the Clubs; but he
must not bet with his customers himself, nor allow anyone else to use
the house for the purpose of betting with all comers.
In _Sim_ v. _Page_[423] it was held that licensed victuallers are still
liable to be proceeded against, under the Gaming and Betting House Acts,
notwithstanding this Statute see section 59.
BETTING IN A PUBLIC PLACE.
By 5 George IV., c. 83, section 4, any person playing or betting in any
street, road, highway or other open or public place, at or with any
table or instrument of gaming, at any game or pretended game of chance,
shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond.
[Sidenote: Instruments of gaming.]
In _Watson_ v. _Martin_[424] it was held that tossing for halfpence was
not within the statute. To supplement this defect in the statute, by 31
& 32 Vict., c. 52, section 3, the words “coin, card, token or other
article used as an instrument or means of such wagering or gaming,” are
added so as to include pitch and toss. But in _Hirst_ v.
_Molesbury_[425] it was held that the latter statute did not apply to a
deposit of money by a person in the hands of another, in a public place,
to abide the event of a wager.
In _Tollett_ v. _Thomas_,[426] defendant was on a race course, and had a
machine called a pari-mutuel. This machine had on it numbers, beside
each of which were three holes, and behind these holes were figures
which by a mechanical contrivance were made to shift on the turning of a
key, so that any number from 0 to 999 would be exhibited behind these
holes. On the top of the machine was the word “total,” and beside it
were holes in which could be exhibited in similar manner figures
shifting on the turn of a key. The defendant appropriated each of these
numbers to designate a horse about to run in a race. Any person who
wished to bet on a particular horse, deposited with the appellants
half-a-crown, and received a ticket with the number of the horse. The
defendants then by a turn of the key altered the figures, increasing the
sum indicated alongside that number by one, and the same turn of the key
increased the figure beside “total” by one.
After the race had been run, the holders of tickets with the numbers of
the winning horse had divided among them all the half-crowns deposited,
less 10 per cent. which defendants retained as their profit.
_Held_ (1) That this was an instrument of wagering or gaming within the
Act. (2) That as the amount to be won depended on an event other than
the issue of the race (_i.e._, it varied according to the number of
persons who backed a particular horse), it was a game of chance. It was
like a lottery, which (_semble_ at p. 514) would be a game of chance
within the act.
It was left open whether a horse-race was a game of chance (but see
_post_ as to games of chance).
[Sidenote: What is a public place?]
An _omnibus_[427] is a public place at any rate for some purposes.
In _Turnbull_ v. _Appleton_,[428] colliers and their families were
allowed by a company to use a large field of 30 acres for recreation.
Strangers were also allowed to go and play there. On one occasion
defendant played pitch and toss in the field. _Held_ that this field was
a place to which the public had access.
It has lately been decided that _a railway carriage_ is a public place
while in the course of a journey.[429]
So, too, _a race course_. See _Tollett_ v. _Thomas_ (_ubi sup._).
[Sidenote: 36 & 37 Vict., c. 94.]
The Statute 36 & 37 Vict., c. 94, repeals the Act of 1868 and provides
“that any person playing or betting, by way of wagering or gaming, in
any street, road, highway or other open and public place, or in any open
place to which they have or are permitted to have access, at or with any
table or instrument of gaming, or any coin, card, token or other article
used as an instrument or means of such wagering or gaming, at any game
or pretended game of chance, shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond”
within the meaning of the Act of George IV., and punished under the
provisions of that Act (_i.e._, three months’ imprisonment), or may be
fined 40s. for a first offence and £5 for a subsequent offence.
It would seem that this statute is wide enough to take in a case like
_Doggett_ v. _Catterns_[430]—where it will be remembered a man had a
table in Hyde Park for betting purposes.
[Sidenote: Games of chance.]
We have now to consider what really is comprehended in the term “game of
chance” as used in this Statute. The writers are not aware that the
exact term has been used in any other statute, though the converse
expression, “game of skill,” is to be found in the Act of 1845. It is,
however, to be found in various cases such as _Turpin_ v. _Jenks_[431]
and _Dyson_ v. _Mason_[432] (see Table of Cases). In _Tollett_ v.
_Thomas_ (_ubi sup._) that a pari-mutuel was an instrument of wagering
on a game of chance, although the owner was not betting himself with the
depositors on the ground, that the amount which each depositor could win
was a matter of uncertainty, until it was finally ascertained how many
in the total had backed such depositor’s horse; the result being
entirely independent of his skill.
It is submitted that the true test of whether or not a game is a game of
chance, including in the term a game partially of skill and partially of
chance is, whether according to the rules or scheme of the game any
material part of or step in the game is determined by chance. But the
term “chance” must be used in a more definite and limited sense than
mere uncertainty, or even the possibility of uneven luck. The idea of
chance seems to be the same as that of lot, _e.g._, the dealing of
cards, the throwing of dice, or the spinning of a teetotum. Uncertainty
is the essence of every game even if of skill; and frequently inequality
of luck is an important factor. Thus in billiards or pool every stroke
is an effort of skill both as to the stroke itself and the placing of
the balls for next stroke; and probably (with ordinary players) few
games of skill are more influenced by luck; yet in _Dyson_ v. _Mason_,
billiards was assumed on all sides to be a game of skill. Again, the
design and scheme of a horse-race is a contest involving a trial of the
speed and staying power of the horses, and the skill and nerve of the
jockeys; though doubtless attended by uncertainties which need no
enlargement. Still, what was assumed in _Dyson_ v. _Mason_ supports the
view that mere uncertainty is not tantamount to chance; and if so, the
question which was reserved in _Tollett_ v. _Thomas_, viz.: whether or
not horse-racing was a game of chance must be answered in the negative.
[Sidenote: In Metropolis.]
30 & 31 Vict., c. 134, section 24, provides that three or more persons
assembled in the streets in the Metropolis for betting purposes may be
fined £5 as for an obstruction.
APPENDIX A.
_Higginson_ v. _Simpson_, _ante_ p. 36.—The author begs, with great
respect, to suggest that this decision is erroneous, and that the case
is really within the principal of _Beeston_ v. _Beeston_, which, it will
be remembered, decides that a partner or agent is liable to account to
his co-partner or principal for winnings received on a betting
transaction. The real nature of the agreement in the present case seems
to have been as follows:—The defendant, accepting the plaintiff’s “tip,”
backed the horse “Regal” at 25 to 1, laying, say £4 on him, so that if
the horse won, his winnings would be £100, of which he was to account
for £50 to plaintiff, while if the horse lost, plaintiff was to pay him
£2, _i.e._, share the loss in the same proportion as the profit. The
author submits that this arrangement amounted to a partnership in a
betting transaction and nothing else—it was a contract to share profit
and loss. Suppose plaintiff had prepaid the £2 to defendant with
instructions to back the horse on their joint account, plaintiff to
receive £50 as his share of the winnings, would not that have been
almost on all-fours with _Beeston_ v. _Beeston_? Does, then, the fact of
there having been no prepayment make any difference? or the fact that
here the plaintiff was to win or lose a fixed sum, instead of a certain
proportion of the profits or losses? The real distinction would seem to
be between an independent wager between A and B and an agreement between
A and B with respect to profits and losses to be won or incurred by a
wager with a third party. The transaction in this case seems to come
under the latter category; it was not like a “hedging” operation on the
part of the defendant; it was not as if defendant had first made a wager
with a third party backing the horse, and then made a separate wager
with plaintiff betting against the horse, taking advantage, perhaps, of
a change in the odds to cover his risks. The agreement clearly had
reference to a betting transaction to be effected with a third party,
and the plaintiff’s right to the £50 was clearly conditional on the bet
being made, on the horse winning, and, it would even appear, on the
defendant’s being paid what he won; plaintiff was to receive £50 _out of
the winnings_. It was not an unconditional, personal agreement to pay on
a future event.
No doubt in form it was very like a wager between plaintiff and
defendant, plaintiff backing the horse for £2 at 25 to 1; but the cases
cited in the text seem fully to establish the principle, which was
indeed accepted by the Court in the present case, that it is the
substance and not the form that is material.
N.B.—There is a misprint in the “Law Report,” 2 C. P. D. 76, which would
give a totally different character to the transaction. The report reads,
the “_Defendant_ was to pay £2 to the plaintiff.” It is clear from the
arguments and the judgment that it was the plaintiff who was to pay £2
to the defendant.
APPENDIX B.
RULES ON BETTING.[433]
Although the Stewards of the Jockey Club take no cognisance of betting,
yet, for the convenience of such persons as are interested in the
subject, we subjoin a copy of the Rules as re-arranged by the Committee
of the Subscription Rooms, at Tattersall’s, on February 8th, 1886.
1. The Committee of Tattersall’s and the Committee of the Newmarket
Rooms have authority to settle all questions relating to bets, to
adjudicate on all cases of default, and, _at their discretion_, to
report defaulters and persons guilty of any malpractice to the Jockey
Club. In the following rules the words “the Committee” refer to either
of those bodies.
2. In all bets there must be a possibility to win when the bet is made:
“you cannot win when you cannot lose.”
[On September 25th, 1890, the following addition was made to this rule].
“No betting ‘first past the post’ will be recognised by either of the
Committees.”
For betting purposes, the time of starting for any race shall be decided
in accordance with Rule 38 of the Rules of Racing.
3. All bets are P. P.—play or pay—with the following exceptions—1. When
the nominator dies before the decision of the race. 2. When the race is
postponed to a future week, or the conditions are altered after the bets
are made. 3. Bets on matches. 4. Bets made after the running numbers are
telegraphed about a horse that is not subsequently under the starter’s
orders.
4. If no objection is lodged within seven days of the race, exclusive of
the day on which the race was won, bets go to the horse placed first by
the Judge, and the settling, except in cases of fraud, shall not be
disturbed. If an objection is made within the said time, bets go with
stakes.
5. Bets made on one horse against another, or that one horse beats
another, are determined if either of them _should win_: unless agreed by
the parties, it is not indispensable that both horses should start. Bets
made between horses 1, 2, 3 are determined by the places assigned by the
Judge—it is not necessary to say _the best_ of 1, 2, 3.
6. If odds are laid in running or immediately after the horses pass the
post, and a dead heat is the result: and in “double events,” if _either_
is decided in the backer’s favour, and the other results in a dead heat,
the money betted must be put together and equally divided. As, according
to racing custom, matches which result in a dead heat are void, bets are
void also.
7. If a bet is made on one of the horses that runs a dead heat against a
beaten horse, and the owners agree to divide, he who backed the horse
that ran the dead heat wins half his bet. If odds are laid on one horse
against another 1, 2, 3, and they run a dead heat for either place, the
money betted must be put together and equally divided.
8. The person who lays the odds has the right to choose a horse or the
field; when a person has chosen a horse, the field is what starts
against him. If odds are laid without mentioning the horse before the
race is over, the bet must be determined by the state of the odds at the
time of making it.
9. Bets made after a race that the winner will be disqualified, stand,
even if no objection be made.
10. Any bet made from signal or indication when the race has been
determined shall be considered fraudulent and void.
11. All bets on matches and private sweepstakes depending between any
two horses shall be void if those horses subsequently become the
property of the same person, or of his avowed confederate.
12. Double event bets are determined when the first is lost.
13. Bets made on horses winning any number of races within the year
shall be understood to mean between the 1st of January and the 31st of
December.
14. Money given to have a bet laid shall not be returned, though the
race be not run.
15. Confirmed bets cannot be declared off except by mutual consent, but
on any allegation of fraud or corrupt practice, the Committee will
investigate the case and may declare the bet void. Either of the bettors
may demand stakes to be made on proving to the satisfaction of the
Committee that he has just cause for doing so. _If ordered_, the bets
must be covered or sufficient security offered, and a person refusing to
cover shall be expelled the Subscription Room at Newmarket and at
Tattersall’s.
16. The Committee will not _necessarily_ enforce the settlement of a
compromised account. Before giving a decision they may require the books
of the debtor and a statement of his accounts to be submitted to them;
but they have authority, in all such cases, to order the account to be
settled if they think a reasonable offer is made.
17. If a debtor does not satisfy the claims of his creditors within
twelve months, he shall not be entitled to receive any debts which may
be due to him; but if he does so within the prescribed time, viz., “one
year,” _i.e._, 365 days, inclusive of the day when the money was won,
the Committee will support his just claims to receive payment from his
debtors.
18. If any extraordinary occasion should arise, or in cases of notorious
and palpable fraud, any of the before-mentioned rules may be suspended
by the Committee.
19. The Stewards of races have no authority _ex officio_ to take
cognisance of any disputes or claims with respect to bets.
APPENDIX C.
Since the observations on page 34 were written, the case of Carlill v.
The Smoke Ball Company (see daily papers, 5th July, 1892) has been
decided by Hawkins, J. The case can only be very shortly noticed here.
The contract was that the Defendants would, if any person after having
used their smoke ball for a given time should contract an attack of
influenza, pay such persons £100. The Defendants contended that this was
a wager contract. If tested by the light of the criteria suggested at
page 34, it would seem to be far removed from a wager. The consideration
received by the Defendants was the exploitation and experimenting by the
Plaintiff of their smoke ball; and it was only after that had become an
accomplished fact—_a certainty_—that they came under their conditional
liability to the Plaintiffs. The learned Judge enters into a discussion
of the essentials of a wager contract, on which the following
observations may with deference be suggested:—(1) The backing or
expressing of an opinion is not essential, as suggested at page 34. The
man who is party to a wager selects a chance: an unknown or uncertain
event in which he is to receive payment.
(2) A wager involves the selection of more than one event, otherwise the
essential of mutuality is lost. Each party selects the event, positive
or negative, on which he is to be paid by the other. A backs a horse
with B; B of course may select the negative event that A’s horse will
not win, or what is the ordinary contract of “the layer,” he merely
backs the field, _i.e._, all the other horses but A’s horse. It is quite
possible in the latter case that both events may happen, _e.g._, A’s
horse may run a dead heat with one of the field. The rule here is that
each party whose horse runs a dead heat wins half his stake, or in other
words the money is put together and evenly divided. If A backed the
horse at evens the bet is practically off; if he backed it at 5 to 1 he
wins £2. A walk over of course counts as a win to the party whose horse
walks over.
INDEX.
ADDED MONEY,
Recoverable, 73, 74
ADVERTISING
Betting House, illegal, 191
Betting Lists, do., _ibid._
Betting Clubs legal, 194
Commission business, _ibid._
Foreign houses, _ibid._
Information as to betting, 193
To Induce betting, _ibid._
To Infant, penal, 194
Lotteries (_see_ LOTTERY)
AGENT
Authority of,
to pay bets if lost, when implied, 45
to bet according to custom, 53
to make bets in his own name, 51
irrevocable after bets made, 47
personally responsible for bets, 51
_secus_, where bet made in principal’s name, 51
indemnity,
none in respect of wagers, 53
nor of illegal transaction, 164
winnings,
must account for to principal, 40
not liable for default in making bet, 43
estoppel from denying agency, 44
business (_see_ COMMISSION AGENT)
(_see_ BROKER, LOTTERY)
ART UNIONS
Exempt from Lottery Laws, 147
AUSTRALIAN LAW
of wagering similar to English, 79, note
BANK (_see_ GAMING HOUSE)
BANKER
cannot set up illegality of customer’s business, 164
not liable for receiving deposits on bets, 190
BANKRUPTCY
of principal determines agent’s authority, 61
of depositor, determines authority of stakeholder, _ibid._
BANK SHARES (_see_ LEEMAN’S ACT)
BARNARD’S ACT, 87
BAZAARS,
_semble_, within Lottery Act, 141
BETTING (_see_ WAGER-CONTRACT, BETTING HOUSE, AGENT: PUBLIC PLACE,
METROPOLIS)
BETTING HOUSE (_see_ PERSONS RESORTING THERETO)
a common nuisance, 165
advertising, 191
illegal betting within Act, 181, _et seq._
by correspondence, legal, 184
betting clubs, 183 (_see_ TATTERSALLS)
Deposits (_see_ DEPOSIT)
keeping house for receiving, 187
receiving, 190
acknowledgment of, _ibid._
commission agent taking (_see_ COMMISSION AGENT)
stakeholder, not liable, 167, 190
inviting persons to resort to, 192, _et seq._
manager of (_see_ MANAGER)
owner, occupier permitting user, 175
user of, 176, _et seq._
Warrant (_see_ PROCEDURE, PERSONS FOUND THEREIN)
BETTING LISTS
advertising illegal, 191
exhibiting not illegal, _ibid._
seizable when, 181, 200
BILL OF EXCHANGE (for betting debt), 11 (_see_ CHEQUE)
given for illegal consideration, 11 (_see_ ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION)
_secus_, if bet not on game or pastime, 11
or if bet made after race finished, 11
cheque for under £10 prepaid, 14
for gaming debt incurred abroad, 14
acceptor
liable to holder in due course, 19
paying indorsee can recover from
drawer or payee, 26
ditto with interest, 26
payment may be by cheque, 26
injunction against negotiation, 26
cheque, bill includes, 27
defect in title, meaning of, 19
gaming debt is, 19
shifts burden of proof on to holder, 19
notice, 21
overdue bill subject to, 19
void consideration is not, 20
drawer of, liable to acceptor who has paid, 26
indorsee for value
can sue acceptor when, 19
ditto indorser, 24
burden of proof on to show bonâ fides, 19
notice to, of illegality, 21
BILLIARDS (_see_ LICENSED PREMISES)
a lawful game, 85
a game of skill, 85, 208
BONDS
are within 5 & 6 Wm. IV., c. 41, 28
BREEDER
_query_, his right to recover prize in Breeders’ Stakes, 76
BROKER (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE)
differences paid on client’s behalf, can recover, 97
on sale of bank shares, his position, 117 _et seq._
BUCKET SHOP
transactions in, sometimes wagers, 103
deposit in, right to recover, 66
query within Betting House Act, 184, 189
CARRYING OVER (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE)
CHEATING AT PLAY, 165
CHEQUE (_see_ BILL OF EXCHANGE)
included in “bill” in 5 & 6 Win. IV., c. 41, 28
amounts to “payment” within do. 27, _ibid._
drawer of, for gaming debt, can recover from payee, 26
for gaming debt abroad, 14
CLUB
for gaming purposes illegal, 160
for betting purposes when legal, 183 (_see_ TATTERSALL’S)
committee of, liable as managers, 155, 160, 179
lottery in, illegal (_see_ LOTTERY), 132
COCK-FIGHTING, 85
COMMISSION AGENT (_see_ Agent)
business of lawful, 185
advertising lawful, 194
_secus_ if he takes money in advance, 190
cannot recover commission, 53
partnership in, 191
COMPANY (_see_ PARTNERSHIP LOTTERY)
COMPETITIONS, 186
CONFLICT OF LAWS,
general rules as to, 66 _et seq._
gaming debts contracted abroad not recoverable here, 68
money lent for gaming abroad, 16
CONSPIRACY (_see_ CHEATING)
CONSTRUCTION OF SPORTING CONTRACT,
steward’s decision generally final, 80
by Court, _ibid._
parol evidence admissible to explain, _ibid._
stamp necessary, 81
Newmarket Meeting, meaning of, 80
gentleman rider, do., _ibid._
evidence of usage, _ibid._
Rules of racing and betting evidence, 53, 81
CONTINUATIONS (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE)
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRIZE (_see_ WINNER, SUBSCRIPTION STAKES), 73
COUPONS, legal, 186
COVER (_see_ DEPOSIT)
CUP, meaning of, 74
_query_, within “prize,” 74
DEATH
of principal or depositor revokes authority, 60
of agent or stakeholder, _ibid._
of one party, bet off, _ibid._
of competitor in race,
_semble_, stakes recoverable by executors (_see_ EXECUTOR)
of nominator of horse avoids entry, 38
DEED (_see_ ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION)
DEPOSIT (_see_ SUBSCRIPTION TO PRIZE)
on bet when recoverable, 64
with keeper of Betting House, 65
in bucket shop transaction, right to recover, 66
_query_, illegal, 189
receiving, and keeping house for receiving (_see_ BETTING HOUSE
COMMISSION AGENT), 187, 190
race, to abide, equivalent to a wager, 36
subscription to prize, not the test of, 69, _et seq._
under £10, not within Statute of Anne and Wm. IV., 12
with stakeholder (_see_ STAKEHOLDER)
does not pass under gift of “money,” 60
in lotteries, recovery of, 143
DIFFERENCES (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE, BROKER)
DIVIDENDS
sale of future, not void as wager, 102
forbidden on Stock Exchange, 103
distribution by lot, not a lottery, 138
ENTRANCE MONEY (_see_ SUBSCRIPTION TO PRIZE)
when it goes with stakes, 61, 74
when recoverable by executors, _ibid._
EXCESSIVE GAMING
under old statute, 6
_query_, illegal now, 160, 162
evidence of gaming house, _ibid._
EXECUTOR,
must not pay betting debts of testator, 38, 64,
nor sums deposited on bets, _ibid._, 64,
_secus_, where testator kept a Betting House, 65
of betting agent, _semble_, most account to principal for winnings,
41
must not pay stakes or forfeits, 38
_semble_, can recover stakes, deposited by testator, 61
do. entrance money when, _ibid._
FISH PONDS,
_semble_, illegal as lotteries, 142
FOREIGN LAWS (_see_ CONFLICT OF LAWS)
FORFEIT,
not enforceable, 38, 63
(_see_ PENALTY, EXECUTOR)
FRAUD (_see_ CHEATING)
GAMES
within statute of Anne, 7
“lawful games” within 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109, 82
unlawful games, _ibid._, 129, 152, 160
players at unlawful, 152, 161
cheating at, 165
of chance, what is, 207
in public place, _ibid._, 205
GAMING (_see_ GAMING HOUSE, UNLAWFUL GAMING, LOTTERY, WAGER-CONTRACT,
LICENSED PREMISES, PUBLIC PLACE, INSTRUMENTS OF GAMING, EXCESSIVE
GAMING, BETTING HOUSE)
GAMING HOUSE (_see_ BETTING HOUSE, LICENSED PREMISES)
illegal at common law, 148 _et seq._
a common nuisance, _ibid._
Evidence of, 156
bank kept by some of players, _ibid._
excessive gaming, 157, 160
unequal chances of game, 156
unlawful game, playing of, _ibid._
obstruction of officers entering under powers of Act, 154, 156
instruments of gaming, _ibid._
contrivances,
for destroying instruments, _ibid._
for barring doors or access, _ibid._
for giving alarm, _ibid._
MANAGER (_see_ MANAGER)
liability of, 155, 160
includes banker or croupier, _ibid._
obstructing or assaulting officers entering, 154
giving false names and addresses, _ibid._
Partnership in (_see_ PARTNERSHIP)
(_see_ PERSONS FOUND THEREIN)
club or private house may be, 160
procedure in respect of (_see_ PROCEDURE)
user of, 160 (_see_ Players)
warrant, 196, _et seq._ (_see_ PROCEDURE)
GRAND STAND,
_semble_ may be a “place” for betting, 171–174
stewards authority in, 191
GUARANTEE OF BET, 63
HAWKINS, Sir HENRY,
His judgments in
Read _v._ Anderson, 49
Taylor _v._ Smetton, 133
Jenks _v._ Turpin, 159
Reg. _v._ Cook, 180
Reg. _v._ Preedie, 174
HORSE-RACING,
a game within the Statute of Anne, 7
formerly illegal for over £10, 82 _et seq._
now all legal, _ibid._
within 10 miles of London require license, 84
chance, whether game of, 208
for stakes, equivalent to wager, 36 _et seq._
steeplechase, 84
ILLEGAL BETTING (_see_ BETTING HOUSE)
ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION (_see_ BILL OF EXCHANGE, _Lottery_)
void ditto, difference between and, 18–20
gaming debt is, 11
betting debt is, if bet on game, &c., _ibid._
bills or notes, effect of, on (_see_ BILL OF EXCHANGE)
is a defect of title, 19
should be specially pleaded, 23
deposit for, when recoverable, 143 _et seq._
should be accurately stated, 23
avoids bonds and other deeds, 24
part consideration illegal, whole avoided, 24 _et seq._
_secus_, where contract divisible, _ibid._
past race, bet on, not illegal, 11
deposit on race under £10, not an illegal consideration, 12
ILLEGALITY,
test of, 16, 162, _et seq._
3rd party cannot plead, 164
(_see_ PARTNERSHIP, AGENT, ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION, MANAGER, BANKER)
INDIAN LAW,
of wagers similar to English, 31
of speculative sales, 40
of lotteries, 131
INFANT,
sending advertisement or information to, 194
INFORMATION (_see_ PROCEDURE)
with respect to betting (_see_ ADVERTISING)
INSTRUMENT OF GAMING,
coin not included in, 205
pari-mutuel, _ibid._
in gaming houses, 156
may be seized by officers entering in Metropolis, 197
_secus_, out of Metropolis, _ibid._
superintendent entering may search for, _ibid._
evidence of gaming houses, 156
means for destroying ditto, _ibid._
magistrate may order destruction, 197–8
I O U,
not within 5 & 6 Wm. IV., c. 41, 28
IRELAND (_see_ METROPOLIS)
IRISH CASES,
Lynn _v._ Bell, }
Crofton _v._ Colgan, }
Graham _v._ Thompson, } (_see_ TABLE OF CASES.)
MacElwaine _v._ Mercer, }
Irwin _v._ Osborne, }
Newcomen _v._ Lynch, }
JUDGE (in race),
jurisdiction of, 76 _et seq._
decision final, _ibid._
LEEMAN’S ACT (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE BROKER)
LICENSED PREMISES,
gaming in, permitting illegal, 202
knowledge or connivance of owner
necessary, _ibid._
what is gaming, 204
may be entered under Gaming and Betting House Acts, 200
betting in, when legal, 205
billiards, in, 85
public table, when legal, 157
LISTS (_see_ BETTING LISTS)
LOAN OF MONEY,
for gaming purposes, _semble_ illegal, 15, 16
for betting on game, &c., illegal, _ibid._, 15, 16
for paying lost bets recoverable, 15, 16
for illegal gaming, penalty, 15, 16, 162
cheques given to repay, 15, 16
for gaming abroad, 15, 16
LOTTERY (_see_ PLACE),
adventurers in, penalty on, 129, 130, 132
advertising illegal, _ibid._
penalty recoverable only in Attorney-General’s name, _ibid._, 131,
146
aiding and abetting, 130, 133
Art Unions, when legal, 147
bonus in companies, distribution of by lot, 137
companies formed for (_see_ PARTNERSHIP)
characteristics of, 140
charter for, void, 128
in club or private house, 132
Bazaars,
proceedings in, _qy._ within Lottery Acts, 142
definition of, 128, 140
fish ponds, 142
foreign lotteries, 133
illegality of, 142
deposits recoverable on notice, 143
vitiates subsidiary contract, _ibid._
little-goes illegal, 130
partnership in, 145
patent for, void, 128
sale under guise of setting up, 129, 130
stakeholder of, 133
sweepstakes, 134
tickets, sale of, 128 _et seq._
proceedings in case, 146
warrant for arrest, 130
Royal Palaces, exception in favour of, 86
no privilege of Parliament, 148
MANAGES OF BETTING HOUSE, GAMING HOUSE,
liability of 155, 160, 179
committee of club, _ibid._
banker or croupier, _ibid._
profits, cannot be sued for, 164
salary, cannot sue for, _ibid._
_secus_, if manager only of legal part of business, 180
METROPOLIS (_see_ PUBLIC PLACE)
cock-fighting in, 85
horse-race within 10 miles require licence, 84
Gaming Houses in,
Commissioners of Police may issue warrant to superintendent to
search, 197
superintendent entering may seize instruments of gaming, 197
Betting Houses (_see_ PROCEDURE)
penalties recovered in payable to Receiver of Police, 198
betting in streets of, 208
Ireland, in, means Dublin, 197
NEWMARKET MEETING,
exempt from old laws against horse-racing, 83
a moveable feast, 81
NOMINATOR,
death of, avoids entry of horse, 38
NOTICE,
to determine authority (_see_ STAKEHOLDER)
of illegal consideration (_see_ BILL OF EXCHANGE)
OCCUPIER (_see_ BETTING HOUSE PLACE)
OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE)
OPTIONS (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE)
PALACES, ROYAL,
exempt from laws against unlawful games and lotteries, 86
PARTITION BY LOT,
among joint tenants, &c., exempt from Lotteries Act, 129, 141
PARTNERSHIP,
right to account of profits
in betting transactions, 41, 191
in lotteries, 115
in gaming house, 162
in commission agency business, 191
PENALTY TO ENFORCE WAGER NOT RECOVERABLE, 63
PERSON FOUND THEREIN (_see_ GAMING HOUSE, BETTING HOUSE)
may be arrested, 197
what to be done with, _ibid._, note
need not be found gaming, 198
presumption against, 156
penalty on (_see_ PLAYERS)
PERSONS RESORTING THERETO (_see_ BETTING HOUSE)
meaning of, 183
not within Act, 179
PLACE (_see_ PUBLIC PLACE BETTING HOUSE)
within Lottery Acts, 130
within Betting House Act
enclosures, 171
roof immaterial, 170
moveable structures, _ibid._
grand stand, 174
stool, 171
umbrella, 170
user of what amounts to, 176
habitual not necessary, _ibid._
occupier of, 169
person using same, 179
must be limited in space, 174
a room, 174
for cock-fighting, 169
PLATE, meaning of, 74, 82
“PLAY OR PAY,” meaning, 81 (_see_ APP. B.)
PLAYERS (in illegal games) 118, 121, 152, 161
in lotteries, consent of Attorney-General to prosecution, 132, 152
PRIVILEGE OF PARLIAMENT,
none in lottery prosecutions, 148
in gaming house, do., 165
PRIZE (_see_ SUBSCRIPTIONS TO PRIZE)
PROCEDURE,
1. Gaming Houses
_In Metropolis._
Commissioners of Police may issue order to superintendent to
search, 196 _et seq._
Power of superintendent to search for and seize instruments of
gaming, 197
Justices may order destruction of ditto, 197
_Out of Metropolis._
Justices may on information issue search warrant, 197
form of warrant, _ibid._
information need not show that persons were found playing for
money, 198
no power to authorize seizure of instruments of gaming, 197
may authorize destruction of ditto, 198
Persons found therein (_see_ PERSONS FOUND THEREIN), 197
may be apprehended on spot, _ibid._
whether gaming or not, 198
may be required to give evidence, _ibid._
but then free from prosecution, _ibid._
Vexatious Indictment Act applies, 199
penalties application of, 198
appeal, 199
no certiorari, _ibid._
actions against officers, _ibid._
2. Betting Houses
Justices may issue warrant to search and seize lists and documents,
200
in metropolis Commissioners’ powers same as in gaming houses, 200
information, fresh, necessary after arrest before prisoner charged,
200
may be before one justice, _ibid._ 201
licensed premises subject to Act. 200, 205
PRODUCE STAKES,
breeders cannot recover, 76
PROMISSORY NOTE (_see_ BILL OF EXCHANGE)
PUBLIC HOUSE (_see_ LICENSED PREMISES)
PUBLIC PLACE,
what is a, 206
PUNTERS (_see_ PLAYERS)
PURCHASE (speculative)
not a wager, 39
RACE COURSE,
_qy._ a place, 174
a public place, 206
READY MONEY BETTING,
place kept or used for illegal betting, 187 _et seq._
(_see_ BETTING HOUSE, COMMISSION AGENT, DEPOSIT)
RESCISSION (by wager)
void, 38
ROOM (_see_ PLACE)
ROYAL PALACE
gaming in, lawful, 86
RULES OF RACING EVIDENCE, 53, 81
RULES OF BETTING do., _ibid._ (_see_ APP. B.)
SALE,
wager under guise of, void, 35
lottery under guise of, illegal, 129, 139
bank shares (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE)
speculative sales not wagers, 39
nor sales with contingencies, 36
of things first in possession, valid (_see_ INDIAN LAW), _ibid._
of public stocks not in possession formerly void under Barnard’s Act,
40, 87
of future dividends
not a wager, 102
forbidden by Stock Exchange Rules, 103
SCOTLAND,
Betting House Act applies to, 193
STAKEHOLDER,
agent for depositor only, 54 _et seq._
deposits revocable before paid over, _ibid._
notice necessary, 57
authority determined, 60
(1.) by express revocation
(2.) by impossibility of performing his trust
(3.) by death of depositor
(4.) by bankruptcy of depositor (_see_ LOTTERY)
liability of
for paying wrong person (_see_ WINNER), 62
for default in payment of stakes, _ibid._
cannot sue for stakes, _ibid._
not liable under Betting House Act, 190
STAKES
race for a wager contract, 36
difference between, and subscription to prize, 37, 73
cheque for, when for illegal consideration, 12
(see SUBSCRIPTIONS, STAKEHOLDER)
STAMP _semble_,
sporting agreement should have, 81
STARTER,
when necessary, 81
STEEPLECHASE (_see_ HORSE-RACE)
STEWARD OF RACE,
decision final (_see_ CONSTRUCTION), 78
difference between and arbitrators, 78
grand stand, can order off, 191
self-interest no disqualification, 78
liability of
for not appointing judge, 82
for default of stakeholders, _ibid._
STOCK EXCHANGE (_see_ BROKER)
bargains for differences not known, 96 _et seq._ (_but see_ BUCKET
SHOP)
test of difference, bargain, 91
customs of binding on principal, 117, 123
_secus_ if contrary to law, _ibid._
broker liable personally to jobber, 96
bank shares, sale of, 116
Leeman’s Act not regarded, 117
liability of broker for not complying with, _ibid._
_qy._ if principal has acquiesced, 119, 122
actual transfer not affected, 122
vendors indemnity against calls, 123
continuations, nature of, 108 _et seq._
whether in nature of wagers, 110
“taking in” by, different from loan, _ibid._
Contango, 109
Backwardation, 113
_Options_, puts, calls, nature of, 106
_semble_ not in nature of wager, 107
_Differences_,
bargains for, not known on, 90, _et seq._
test of, 94
broker can recover for, from client, 97
defaulter, due to, payable to official assignee, 89
_Official Assignee_,
receives differences due to defaulter, 89
claims against, for differences due to defaulter, _ibid._
Trustee in bankruptcy of defaulter cannot recover differences from,
_ibid._
_Time Bargains_, meaning of, 95, 101 (_see_ SALES)
_Wagering_,
unknown on, 96
test of, in transactions on, 94
SUBSCRIPTION TO PRIZE,
deposit with stakeholder not test of, 69 _et seq._
stakes are not, 36, 69
sum added by outsider, may be, 73
entrance money, 74
forfeits, _ibid._
cups, _ibid._
“SUM ADDED” by OUTSIDER,
recoverable, 73 (_see_ ADDED MONEY)
may be a subscription to a prize, _ibid._ (_see_ STAKES)
SUPERINTENDENT
(_see_ PROCEDURE, INSTRUMENTS OF GAMING, METROPOLIS)
SWEEPSTAKES (_see_ LOTTERY, STAKEHOLDER)
TATTERSALL’S,
not within Act, 183
TELEGRAM (_see_ ADVERTISING)
TICKET (_see_ LOTTERY)
TIME BARGAINS (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE)
TIPSTER,
agreement with, 36, and note in APPENDIX A.
business of, not illegal, 193
advertising do., _ibid._ (_but see_ INFANT)
UMPIRE (_see_ JUDGE, WINNER)
UNLAWFUL GAMING
what is, 159
houses kept for, 154, 159
in licensed premises, 202
(_see_ EXCESSIVE GAMING, PLAYERS)
UNLAWFUL GAMES
what are, 129, 162
legal effect of, 162
in licensed premises, 202
USER (_see_ PLACE GAMING HOUSE)
VEXATIOUS INDICTMENT (_see_ PROCEDURE)
WAGER CONTRACT (_see_ SUBSCRIPTION TO PRIZE DEPOSIT)
nature and test of, 32 _et seq._
agent and principal, agreement between not in nature of, 40
consensus and knowledge of both parties necessary, 32
construction of (_see_ CONSTRUCTION)
dividends, sale of future, not, 102
games, &c., for money, are, 36
guarantee of, enforceable, 63
mutuality necessary, 33
parties select their own events, 33
penalty for non-performance not recoverable
rescission of contract by, void, 38
sale, under guise of, void, 35
sale of things not in possession, 39
time bargains (_see_ STOCK EXCHANGE)
winner and loser is of essence of, 33
Tipster, agreement with, 36 (but _see_ note in APPENDIX A.)
WARRANT,
general warrants bad, 197
against gaming and betting houses, form of, 196
lottery laws, breach of, 130
WELSHING, AN INDICTABLE OFFENCE, 195
WINNER,
second horse may be, 75
must be a competitor, _ibid._
there must be a loser, _ibid._
steward’s decision final, 78
umpire’s and judge’s do., 76
agent paving (_see_ AGENT), 52
stakeholder (_see_ STAKEHOLDER), 62
WINNING,
by fraud penal, 161
offence complete before payment, 165
-----
Footnote 1:
16 East, 150.
Footnote 2:
_Evans_ v. _Jones_, 5 M. & W., 77.
Footnote 3:
Cowp., 37.
Footnote 4:
1 T. R., at p. 60.
Footnote 5:
2 Cowp., 729.
Footnote 6:
4 Camp., 152.
Footnote 7:
1 B. & Ald., 683.
Footnote 8:
3 Camp., 168.
Footnote 9:
T. R., 693.
Footnote 10:
_Atherfold_ v. _Beard_, 2 T. R., 610.
Footnote 11:
_Squiers_ v. _Waiskin_, 3 Camp., 140.
Footnote 12:
_McKinnell_ v. _Robinson_, 3 M. and W., 435.
Footnote 13:
_Fisher_ v. _Waltham_, 4 Q. B., 889.
Footnote 14:
_Gilbert_ v. _Sykes_, 16 East, 150.
Footnote 15:
1 T. R., 56.
Footnote 16:
12 East, 247.
Footnote 17:
By 18 Geo. II., c. 34, the test of excess was extended to the loss of
£20 within 24 hours.
Footnote 18:
_Smith_ v. _Bond_, 11 M. & W., 549.
Footnote 19:
10 M. & W., 723.
Footnote 20:
2 Wils., 349.
Footnote 21:
10 M. & W., 723.
Footnote 22:
See _post_ p. 84.
Footnote 23:
5 Q. B., 693.
Footnote 24:
7 Bing., 405.
Footnote 25:
_Daintree_ v. _Hutchinson_, 10 M. & W., 85.
Footnote 26:
_Lynall_ v. _Longbottom_, 2 Wils., 36. 1 C. & M., 797.
Footnote 27:
_Jeffreys_ v. _Walter_, 1 Wils., 220.
Footnote 28:
3 M. & W., 435.
Footnote 29:
See _Squires_ v. _Waiskin_, 3 Camp., 140, and _Martin_ v. _Hewson_, 10
Exch., 737.
Footnote 30:
1 Q. B., 631.
Footnote 31:
_Emery_ v. _Richards_, 14 M. & W., 728.
Footnote 32:
2 Burr, 1080.
Footnote 33:
2 Camp.
Footnote 34:
2 Strange, 1249.
Footnote 35:
1 10 M. & W., 723.
Footnote 36:
See, too, _Thorpe_ v. _Coleman_, 1 C. B., 990.
Footnote 37:
7 Bing, 405.
Footnote 38:
2 Strane, 1155.
Footnote 39:
4 B. & Ald., 212.
Footnote 40:
Q. B., 631.
Footnote 41:
5 E. & B., 238.
Footnote 42:
10 M. & W., 723.
Footnote 43:
1 C. B., 990.
Footnote 44:
14 M. & W., 728.
Footnote 45:
1 Phil. 147.
Footnote 46:
8 Ch. Div., 756.
Footnote 47:
8 Ch. Div. 756.
Footnote 48:
8 L. T. N. S., 255, and see _Quarrier_ v. _Coulston_, 1 Phil. 147.
Footnote 49:
3 M. & W.
Footnote 50:
See _Foot_ v. _Baker_, 5 M. & G., 335.
Footnote 51:
7 Taunt, 246.
Footnote 52:
2 Phil. 801.
Footnote 53:
11 Ch. Div., 170.
Footnote 54:
15 Ch. Div. 247.
Footnote 55:
1 Ex Div., 13. A fuller report is in 33 L. T. n.s., 700.
Footnote 56:
_Post_, p. 42.
Footnote 57:
_Fitch_ v. _Jones_, 5 E. & B., 238. See Lord Campbell’s judgment.
Footnote 58:
45 & 46 Vict., c. 61.
Footnote 59:
23 Q. B. D. 345.
Footnote 60:
5 E. & B. 238.
Footnote 61:
56 L. J. Q. B. 248.
Footnote 62:
3 M. & K. 104.
Footnote 63:
Sm. & G. 194.
Footnote 64:
6 Ad. & E.
Footnote 65:
B. & Ald., 212.
Footnote 66:
O. XIX., r. 15.
Footnote 67:
_Harvey_ v. _Towers_, 6 Ex. 656.
Footnote 68:
2 M. & W., 641. See, too, _Bingham_ v. _Stanley_, 2 Q.B., 117.
Footnote 69:
1 Bing., N. C.
Footnote 70:
O. XXVIII, r. 6., Rules of Court, 1883.
Footnote 71:
4 B. & Ald., 212. _Ante_, p. 10.
Footnote 72:
3 Sm. & G., 194.
Footnote 73:
16 Q. B., 423.
Footnote 74:
L. R. 9 Eq., 471.
Footnote 75:
4 Taunt, 165.
Footnote 76:
1 H. & N. 278.
Footnote 77:
_Soulby_ v. _Portarlington_, 3 M. &. K., 104; _Pearce_ v. _Gray_, 2 Y.
& C. 322; _Milltown_ v. _Stewart_, 3 M. & C., 18; _Fox_ v. _Hill_, 2
D. & J., 353.
Footnote 78:
Sec. 24 (5).
Footnote 79:
13 L. T., 71 and 159.
Footnote 80:
Ir. Rep. 10, C. L., 487.
Footnote 81:
3 Sm. & G., 194.
Footnote 82:
Ir. Rep. 10 C. L. 487.
Footnote 83:
5 E. & B., 270.
Footnote 84:
1 Phil. 147; _Bubb_ v. _Yelverton_, L. R. 9, Eq. 471, was the case of
a bond but was decided on another point.
Footnote 85:
This expression did not apply to an action commenced before the Act
was passed. _Vide_ _Moon_ v. _Durden_, 2 Ex., 22.
Footnote 86:
L. R., 10 Q. B., 109.
Footnote 87:
1 Q. B., _vid. sup._, 9.
Footnote 88:
5 App. Ca. p. 344.
Footnote 89:
8 Ch. D., 756.
Footnote 90:
10 M. & W., 723.
Footnote 91:
4 Jur. N. S., 693.
Footnote 92:
4 Q. B. D., 685.
Footnote 93:
10 Q. B. D., 100.
Footnote 94:
5 E. & B., 238. _Vid. sup._, p. 11. _et seq._, as to the law relating
to bills given for an illegal consideration.
Footnote 95:
33 L. T. n.s., 561.
Footnote 96:
4 Q. B. D., 685. The cases bearing on this point are more fully
discussed in the next chapter on Stock Exchange Transactions.
Footnote 97:
Per COTTON, L. J., in _Thacker_ v. _Hardy_, p. 695.
Footnote 98:
2 Wils., 309.
Footnote 99:
See, too, _Caminada_ v. _Hulton_, 60 L. J. M. C., 116.
Footnote 100:
Each promise to pay on one event, being the consideration, and the
sole consideration for the promise to pay in the other event.
Footnote 101:
See Stutfield on “Tattersall’s Rules of Betting,” _Field_ Office,
where this view of the matter is fully elucidated.
Footnote 102:
4 H. & N., 359.
Footnote 103:
5 E. & B., 904.
Footnote 104:
11 C. B., 526.
Footnote 105:
10 Ir. Rep. Com. L., 133.
Footnote 106:
3 Bing., N. C., 88.
Footnote 107:
2 C. P. D., 76.
Footnote 108:
5 Q.B., 693.
Footnote 109:
2 Ex. Div. 422.
Footnote 110:
10 M. & W., 723.
Footnote 111:
7 D. M. & G., 55.
Footnote 112:
36 L. T. n.s., 702.
Footnote 113:
By. & M., 386.
Footnote 114:
B. & C., 1.
Footnote 115:
5 M. & W., 462.
Footnote 116:
4 Q. B. D., at p. 6.
Footnote 117:
33 L. T. n.s., at p. 563.
Footnote 118:
4 Q. B. D., at p. 688. See further on this topic the chapter on the
Stock Exchange.
Footnote 119:
26 L. J. Ch., 841.
Footnote 120:
12 C. B. 468.
Footnote 121:
36 L. J. Exch., 178.
Footnote 122:
_Ante_ p. 48, where the case is more fully set out.
Footnote 123:
15 Q. B. D., 363.
Footnote 124:
22 Q. B. D., 680.
Footnote 125:
7 T. R., 157.
Footnote 126:
See, too, and consider _MacRae_ v. _Clark_, L. R. 1 C. P., 403.
Footnote 127:
20 Q. B. D. at p. 643.
Footnote 128:
See _Ferrar’s Case_, L. R. 9 Ch. 355.
Footnote 129:
7 T. L. R. 748.
Footnote 130:
10 Ex., 572.
Footnote 131:
10 Ex., 614.
Footnote 132:
15 C. B., 562.
Footnote 133:
15 C. B. n.s., 316.
Footnote 134:
4 Taunt, 165.
Footnote 135:
W. N. C., 1870, 95.
Footnote 136:
24 L. T. n.s., 822.
Footnote 137:
4 Q. B. D., 685.
Footnote 138:
44 L. J. C. P., 309.
Footnote 139:
26 Sol. Jour., 509.
Footnote 140:
See per WILDE, C.J., in _Smart_ v. _Sandars_, 5 C.B., 895.
Footnote 141:
10 Q. B. D., 100.
Footnote 142:
15 C. B. n.s., 316.
Footnote 143:
33 L. T. n.s., 561.
Footnote 144:
10 Q. B. D., 100.
Footnote 145:
13 Q. B. D., 779; 51 L. T. n.s., 102.
Footnote 146:
15 Q. B. D., 363.
Footnote 147:
See _post_ Appendix B. and Stutfield’s “Tattersall’s Rules of
Betting:” _Field_ Office.
Footnote 148:
As bets are not recognised by law, this would seem to be the only
criterion in such matters, but see _Robinson_ v. _Mollett_, L. R., 7;
H. L. 802.
Footnote 149:
W. N. C., 89, p. 116.
Footnote 150:
_Hastelow_ v. _Jackson_, 8 B. & C., 225; _Aubert_ v. _Walsh_, 3 Taunt,
277; _Smith_ v. _Bickmore_, 4 Taunt, 474; _Howson_ v. _Hancock_, 8 T.
R., 575; _Robinson_ v. _Mearns_, 6 D. & R., 26; _Bate_ v.
_Cartwright_, 7 Price, 540.
Footnote 151:
14 M. & W. See, too, _Hudson_ v. _Terrill_, 1 Cr. & M., 797.
Footnote 152:
1 B. & Ald., 683.
Footnote 153:
14 M. & W., 728. See, too, _Maryat_ v. _Broderick_, 2 M. & W., 369,
where Parke, B., doubts the right of one depositor in a legal
horse-race to recover his stake.
Footnote 154:
5 C. B., 271.
Footnote 155:
10 Exch., 737.
Footnote 156:
9 Q. B., 431.
Footnote 157:
36 L. J. Exch., 178.
Footnote 158:
1 Q. B. D., 189.
Footnote 159:
8 B. & C., 225.
Footnote 160:
_Graham_ v. _Thompson_, Ir. R. 2 C. L., 64.
Footnote 161:
2 Ex. Div. 422.
Footnote 162:
5 App. Ca. 342. See also _MacElwaine_ v. _Mercer_, 9 Ir. Rep. C. L.,
17.
Footnote 163:
The reader should refer to the observations at p. 37, where the view
is expressed that the law relating to wagers applies to an ordinary
horse-race for stakes. The result of this would be that the present
observations as to the rights of depositors and stakeholders apply
also.
Footnote 164:
_Weller_ v. _Deakin_, 2 C. & P., 618; _Goldsmith_ v. _Martin_, 4 M. &
G., 5.
Footnote 165:
28 L. J. Q. B., 126. I. E. & E. 456.
Footnote 166:
7 D. M. & G., 55.
Footnote 167:
See _Markwick_ v. _Hardingham_, 15 Ch. Div., 339.
Footnote 168:
1 Q. B. D., 197.
Footnote 169:
5 C. & P., 147.
Footnote 170:
L. R., 2; P. C., 280.
Footnote 171:
L. R. 4, Q. B., 214 and _post_ p. 77.
Footnote 172:
5 Ir. Rep., C. L., 404.
Footnote 173:
See, too, _Daintree_ v. _Hutchinson_, 10 M. & W. 85, on this point.
Footnote 174:
7 D. M. & G., 55.
Footnote 175:
4 T. L. R., 326.
Footnote 176:
19 C. B. n.s. 765, but far better reported, 13, W. R., 390.
Footnote 177:
See _Rouquette_ v. _Overmann_, L. R., 10; Q. B., 525. For further
details and authorities reference may be made to “Story’s Conflict of
Laws,” or “Foote’s International Jurisprudence.”
Footnote 178:
2 Burr, 1,077. See, too, _Wynne_ v. _Callander_, 1 Russ., 293.
Footnote 179:
See _King_ v. _Kemp_, 8 L. T., n.s. 255.
Footnote 180:
1 Phil., 147.
Footnote 181:
12 O.B., 801.
Footnote 182:
_Vide sup._ p. 14, where this subject is dealt with in reference to
cheques.
Footnote 183:
_King_ v. _Kemp_, 8 L. T. n.s., 255.
Footnote 184:
5 C. B., 818.
Footnote 185:
1 Jur. N. S., 660. 5 E. & B. 270.
Footnote 186:
12 C. B., at p. 472.
Footnote 187:
11 Exh., 715.
Footnote 188:
5 Ir. Rep. C. L., 404.
Footnote 189:
L. R., 1 Ex., 248.
Footnote 190:
Ex. Div., 422; the facts are stated above.
Footnote 191:
5 App. Ca., 342.
Footnote 192:
5 App. Ca., 342.
Footnote 193:
L. R. 4 Q. B., 14.
Footnote 194:
L. R., 2 P. C. 78, _vide post_ p. 78.
Footnote 195:
_Vide sup._, p. 36, where this question is fully discussed.
Footnote 196:
In _Dowsen_ v. _Scriven_, 1 H. Bl., 219, “entrance money” was defined
as money which must be paid before the horse can start, but see Rule
of Racing 106.
Footnote 197:
Apply the principal of _Truman_ v. _Harris_, 9 Q. B. D., 264.
Footnote 198:
10 Ir. Rep., C. L., 133.
Footnote 199:
Defendant did not quote the saying of St. Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 24, “in a
race run all but _one receiveth_ the prize.”
Footnote 200:
1 C. P. D., 573.
Footnote 201:
5 Ir. Rep., C. L., 404.
Footnote 202:
28 L. J., Q. B., 126. 1 E. & E. 456.
Footnote 203:
L.R., 4 Q.B., 214. See, too, _Evans_ v. _Pratt_, 3 M. & G.
Footnote 204:
The point was not taken in this case that the agreement was in the
nature of a wager and the plaintiff therefore entitled to revoke the
stakeholder’s authority, but it will be observed that the defendant
had paid over the money _without receiving notice from plaintiff_.
Footnote 205:
14 M. & W., 193.
Footnote 206:
28 L. J., Q. B.
Footnote 207:
28 L. J., Exch., 1.
Footnote 208:
11 Exch., 715.
Footnote 209:
L. R., 2 P. C. 280.
Footnote 210:
The laws with regard to wagers in N. S. Wales, if, indeed, they were
in any way material to this case, seem to be a reproduction of 8 & 9
Vict., c. 109. _Trimble_ v. _Hill_, 5 App. Ca., 342.
Footnote 211:
15 D. R., 69.
Footnote 212:
Ir. Rep., 10 C. L., 248.
Footnote 213:
3 Camp. 168.
Footnote 214:
3 M. & G., 759.
Footnote 215:
10 M. & W., 85.
Footnote 216:
See Stutfield’s “Tattersall’s Rules of Betting,” p. 10.
Footnote 217:
_Dines_ v. _Woolf_, L. R. 2 P. C. 280. _Weller_ v. _Deakin_, 2 C. & P.
_Greville_ v. _Chapman_, 5 Q. B. 731.
Footnote 218:
_Evans_ v. _Pratt_, 3 M. & G., 759; and see 17 L. T., 323.
Footnote 219:
L. R. 2 P. C., 280. _Weller_ v. _Deakin_, 2 C. & P. _Greville_ v.
_Chapman_, 5 Q. B.
Footnote 220:
_Balfe_ v. _West_, 13 C. B., 466, at all events until he has done some
official act. See Rules of Racing, Part III.
Footnote 221:
See _Blaxton_ v. _Pye_, Wils, 309; _Applegarth_ v. _Colley_, 10 M. &
W., 723.
Footnote 222:
3 M. & G., 768.
Footnote 223:
3 M. & G., 765.
Footnote 224:
_Morley_ v. _Greenhalgh_, 32 L. J. M. C., 93.
Footnote 225:
See _Parsons_ v. _Alexander_, 1 Jur. N.S., 660.
Footnote 226:
_Ovenden_ v. _Raymond_, 34 L. T. N. S., 199.
Footnote 227:
As to hazard, see _McKinnell_ v. _Robinson_, 3 M. & W.
Footnote 228:
_R._ v. _Ashton_, 22 L. J. M. C., 1. 1 E. & B., 286.
Footnote 229:
See particularly the account of the Park Club Case (_post_ p. 158.)
Footnote 230:
See Stutfield’s “Rules and Usages of the Stock Exchange”; Effingham
Wilson.
Footnote 231:
_Wells_ v. _Porter_, 3 M. & W., 722; _Lyne_ v _Siesfield_, 1 H. & N.,
278; _Williams_ v. _Trye_, 23 L.J. Ch., 360.
Footnote 232:
4 Burr, 2070.
Footnote 233:
8 B. & Ald., 179; compare _Mortimer_ v. _MacCallan_, 6 M. & W., 58,
where the stock was actually delivered to the vendor.
Footnote 234:
5 E. & B., 999.
Footnote 235:
The Act provided that money paid to settle differences could be
recovered back by an action, sect. 5.
Footnote 236:
1 B. & P., 3—viz., that an agent cannot set up the illegality of a
transaction in answer to the principal’s claim for an account, but see
post pp. 162–4.
Footnote 237:
13 Ch. D., 667.
Footnote 238:
11 C. B., 526.
Footnote 239:
33 L. T., n. s., at p. 563.
Footnote 240:
4 Q. B. D., at p. 695.
Footnote 241:
W. N. C., 1 June, 1878; see, too, _Barry_ v. _Crosskey_, 2 J. & H., 1,
where this test was adopted.
Footnote 242:
At p. 694.
Footnote 243:
17 C. S. C., p. 475.
Footnote 244:
4 Q. B. D. 685.
Footnote 245:
5 M. & W., 462.
Footnote 246:
15 Ch. Div., 207.
Footnote 247:
As to carrying over, see _post_ p. 108, _et seq._
Footnote 248:
13 Ch. Div., 665.
Footnote 249:
_Byers_ v. _Beattie_, 16 W. R., 279.
Footnote 250:
4 Q. B. D., at p. 696.
Footnote 251:
16 C. S. C., 350.
Footnote 252:
33 L. T., N. S., 561.
Footnote 253:
This seems the result of the cases _Grizewood_ v. _Blane_, 11 C. B.,
526; _Ex parte Marnham_, 30 L. J., Bkpcy., 3.
Footnote 254:
4 T. L. R., 326.
Footnote 255:
17 C. S. C., 466.
Footnote 256:
“The evidence of Willis seems to make it clear that the customer had
this option, though this feature of the case was clearer in Howat’s
case (_post_). It does not appear whether the accounts were closed by
Shaw or by defendant’s instructions, but this does not seem to affect
the argument.”
Footnote 257:
30 L. J. Bkpcy. 3.
Footnote 258:
Since the above was written the case of _Stevens_ v. _Universal Stock
Exchange_ has been reported, 40 W.R. 494; in that case, however, it
does not appear that the printed conditions gave the customer the
option to treat the transactions as difference bargains.
Footnote 259:
See the Report of the Commissioners, p. 274, No. 6949.
Footnote 260:
See Report of 1878, at p. 29.
Footnote 261:
4 Q. B. D. at p. 696.
Footnote 262:
See as to this _Bongiovanni_ v. _Société Générale_, 54 L.T. n.s., 320,
and Stutfield’s “Rules and Usages of the Stock Exchange:” Effingham
Wilson.
Footnote 263:
30 L.J. Bkpcy., 1.
Footnote 264:
30 L. J. Bkpcy., 3.
Footnote 265:
In _ex parte Turner_, 3 D. & J., 46, it was held that carrying over an
account would bring a bankrupt within s. 201 of the Act of 1849, and
be a bar to his obtaining his discharge.
Footnote 266:
See Report, 1878, p. 23, Mr. Daniel’s evidence.
Footnote 267:
4 Q. B. D., 690.
Footnote 268:
33 L. T., N. S., 561.
Footnote 269:
1870, W. N. C., 95. See also the cases quoted above as to the right of
the agent to recover.
Footnote 270:
_Ex parte Ryder_, 1 De G. & J., 317; _Ex parte Wade_, 8 D. M. & G.,
241; _Ex parte Matheson_, 1 D. M. & G.
Footnote 271:
_Ex parte Turner_, 3 D. & J. 46.
Footnote 272:
See 46 & 47 Vict., c. 52, sec. 28(3) _d_.
Footnote 273:
9 Q. B. D., 546.
Footnote 274:
For the nature and incidents of this transaction, _vide_ _Coles_ v.
_Bristowe_, L. R., 4 Ch. 3., and Stutfield’s “Rules and Usages of the
Stock Exchange:” Effingham Wilson.
Footnote 275:
Not yet reported except in the newspapers, August 11, 1884.
Footnote 276:
15 Q. B. D., 388.
Footnote 277:
14 Q. B. D., 460.
Footnote 278:
“Times,” 4th April, 1892.
Footnote 279:
9 M. & W.
Footnote 280:
32 Ch. D. 625.
Footnote 281:
But see next page for the law as recently altered by the Gaming
Amendment Act, 1892.
Footnote 282:
P. 53.
Footnote 283:
11 Q. B. D., at p. 210.
Footnote 284:
See _O’Connor_ v. _Bradshaw_, 5 Ex., 882; _Fisher_ v. _Bridges_, 3 E.
& B., 642.
Footnote 285:
See _ante_, p. 86, as to the exception of Royal Palaces.
Footnote 286:
See _Taylor_ v. _Smetten_, 11 Q.B.D., p. 210.
Footnote 287:
14 M. & W., 711.
Footnote 288:
See pp. 129–130.
Footnote 289:
44 Ch. D. 306.
Footnote 290:
1 C. B., 974.
Footnote 291:
The learned Serjeant is evidently using the point decided in
_Applegarth_ v. _Colley_—that the Statute of Anne contemplated a case
where a single person lost £10.
Footnote 292:
9 Q. B., 431. See, too, _Mearing_ v. _Helling_, 14 M. and W., 711.
Footnote 293:
2 H. & C., 912., 28 J. P., 199.
Footnote 294:
5 Ex., 882.
Footnote 295:
11 Ch. Div., 170.
Footnote 296:
5 App. Ca.
Footnote 297:
10 Cox, C. C., 352.
Footnote 298:
11 Q. B. D., 206.
Footnote 299:
52 J. P. 821.
Footnote 300:
60 L. J. M. C. 116.
Footnote 301:
1 C. B. 974.
Footnote 302:
See per POLLOCK, C.B., in _O’Connor_ v. _Bradshaw_, 5 Exch. at p. 891.
Footnote 303:
3 E. & B., 642.
Footnote 304:
12 Geo. II., c. 28, 1.
Footnote 305:
2 Ex. Div. 422, _ante_ p. 58.
Footnote 306:
_Wilson_ v. _Strugnell_, 7 Q.B.D., p. 551. _Kearley_ v. _Thomson_, 24
Q.B.D., 742.
Footnote 307:
_Savage_ v. _Madder_, 36 L. J. Ex. 178.
Footnote 308:
9 Q. B. 431.
Footnote 309:
Per Fry, L. J. _Kearley_ v. _Thomson_.
Footnote 310:
2 Cowper 790.
Footnote 311:
See, too, _Jacques_ v. _Golightly_, 2 Black 1073.
Footnote 312:
_Allport_ v. _Nutt_, 1 C. B. 974.
Footnote 313:
1 C. B., 974.
Footnote 314:
_Vide sup._, p. 17.
Footnote 315:
1 B. & P., 3.
Footnote 316:
1 Ex. Div. 13.
Footnote 317:
Bell C. C.
Footnote 318:
5 B. & A., 555.
Footnote 319:
5 T. R., 338.
Footnote 320:
9 Dowl, 937.
Footnote 321:
11 Q. B. D. 207.
Footnote 322:
1 B. & C., 27.
Footnote 323:
These statutes have been set out above in the Chapter on Lotteries.
Footnote 324:
See _post_ p. 161.
Footnote 325:
13 Q. B. D. p. 524.
Footnote 326:
The importance of this as bearing on the present law of unlawful games
is dealt with in _Turpin_ v. _Jenks_ (see _post_).
Footnote 327:
13 Q. B. D., 377.
Footnote 328:
The procedure by which warrants may be issued and proceedings enforced
against the keepers of gaming houses is dealt with _post_ p. 196.
Footnote 329:
See sections 3 and 6, _post_ p. 196 _et seq._
Footnote 330:
We have already discussed the nature of gaming houses at Common Law,
pp. 149–151.
Footnote 331:
See _post_ for all full account of the case, 13 Q. B. D., 505.
Footnote 332:
13 Q. B. D., 505.
Footnote 333:
The case occurred within the C Division of Police, and so properly
belonged to the Marlborough Street Police Court jurisdiction; but,
being public prosecution by the police, was heard at Bow Street.
Footnote 334:
See _Crockford_ v. _Maidenhead_, 8 L. T., 217.
Footnote 335:
Sec. 16 of the Act of Henry forbade apprentices and artificers, &c.,
to play tennis, bowls, coyting, and other games.
Footnote 336:
As to what constitutes a game of chance, see _post_ “Betting in a
public place.”
Footnote 337:
13 Q. B. D., 505.
Footnote 338:
7 Taunt, 246.
Footnote 339:
2 Phil., 801.
Footnote 340:
15 Q. B. D., 363.
Footnote 341:
11 Ch. D., at p. 195.
Footnote 342:
9 M. & W., at p. 642.
Footnote 343:
1 B. & P., 3.
Footnote 344:
1 B. & P., 296.
Footnote 345:
11 Ch. D., at p. 194.
Footnote 346:
5 E. & B., at p. 1016.
Footnote 347:
4 Q. B. D., 685 _Lyne_ v, _Siesfield_, 1 H. & N., 278.
Footnote 348:
12 C. B., 468.
Footnote 349:
45 L. T., N. S., 512; 15 Cox, C. C., 3.
Footnote 350:
8 Cox, C. C., 305; 4 Cox, 390.
Footnote 351:
See _Smith_ v. _Bond_, 11 M. & W., 549.
Footnote 352:
As to the difference between the offence under this section, also
those specified in ss. 1 and 3, see _post_ p. 190.
Footnote 353:
19 C. B. N. S., 765; 34 L. J. C. P., 159. See _ante_ p. 65 as to this
case.
Footnote 354:
L. R., 9 Q. B., at page 443. Qy. whether the case would not come with
36 & 37 Vict., c. 94.
Footnote 355:
3 B. & S., 374; 32 L. J. (M. C.), 93.
Footnote 356:
L. R., 9 Q. B., at p. 444.
Footnote 357:
L. R., 9 C. P., 339.
Footnote 358:
L. R., 3 Ex., i. 37.
Footnote 359:
L. R., 9 C. P., 339. See 36 & 37 Vict., c. 94.
Footnote 360:
L. R., 9 Q. B., 440.
Footnote 361:
L. R., 10 Q. B., 102.
Footnote 362:
8 Q. B. D., 275.
Footnote 363:
14 Q. B. D., 588.
Footnote 364:
62 L. T. n. s., 433.
Footnote 365:
13 Q. B. D., 377.
Footnote 366:
Not yet reported, but likely to be reported in Cox, C. C., during
1892.
Footnote 367:
13 C. S. C. (Just.) p. 9.
Footnote 368:
62 L. M. S., 433.
Footnote 369:
192 1 Q. B., 20.
Footnote 370:
L. R., 10 Q. B., 102.
Footnote 371:
12 Q. B., D. 36.
Footnote 372:
44 L. J. C. P., 309; 32 L. T. N. S., 825.
Footnote 373:
L. R., 9 Q. B., 440.
Footnote 374:
10 Q. B., 102.
Footnote 375:
41 J. P., 792.
Footnote 376:
62 L. T. N. S. 433.
Footnote 377:
44 L. J. C. P., 309.
Footnote 378:
14 Q. B. D., 588.
Footnote 379:
See _Morley_ v. _Greenhalge_, 32, L. J. M. C., 93.
Footnote 380:
14 Q. B. D., at p. 591.
Footnote 381:
13 Q. B. D., 505.
Footnote 382:
37 J. P., 262.
Footnote 383:
13 Q. B. D., at p. 525.
Footnote 384:
13 Q. B. D., 377.
Footnote 385:
44 L. J. C. P., 309.
Footnote 386:
8 L. T., 217.
Footnote 387:
L. R., 10 Q. B., 102.
Footnote 388:
The preamble, however, does speak of setting up betting offices.
Footnote 389:
Hansard, Vol. 129, p. 87.
Footnote 390:
See, too, per Hawkins, J., _Reg._ v. _Preedie_, referred to, _ante_ p.
174.
Footnote 391:
As to these establishments, see _ante_ p. 66, and _ante_ the chapter
on the Stock Exchange.
Footnote 392:
60 L.J.M.C. 116: The case has before been dealt with under Lotteries.
Footnote 393:
34 J.P., 661.
Footnote 394:
24 Q. B. D., 529; better reported 62 L. T. N. S., 436.
Footnote 395:
13 M. & W., 838.
Footnote 396:
Hansard, Vol. 218, p. 595.
Footnote 397:
L. R., 12 Q. B. D., 128.
Footnote 398:
20 Q. B. D., 182.
Footnote 399:
_Reg._ v. _Newton_, L.R., 1892, 1 Q. B., 648.
Footnote 400:
A question was raised in _Turpin_ v. _Jenks_, as to what was to be
done with the “persons found therein.” The answer seems to be that the
power is given to enable the officers to ascertain by inquiry how far
these persons were responsible for the gaming. See per Field, J., in
_Anderson_ v. _Hume_, 46, J.P. 825; besides, the Statute 17 & 18
Vict., c. 38, compels these persons to give their addresses. It would
seem therefore that having given their addresses they should be
released until the police are in a position to make a definite charge
against them.
Footnote 401:
See, too, _Anderson_ v. _Hume_, 46 J. P. 825.
Footnote 402:
28 L. J. M. C., 45; 1 E. & E., 276.
Footnote 403:
Ex. Div. 320.
Footnote 404:
46 J. P., 825, and see _ante_, p. 197, note.
Footnote 405:
1 Ex Div., 320.
Footnote 406:
In the same case (2 Ex. Div., 335) it was held that there was no
appeal from the Divisional Court, this being a criminal matter.
Footnote 407:
_Lee_ v. _Gold_, 44 J. P., 395.
Footnote 408:
_Onley_ v. _Gee_, 7 Jur., N.S., 570.
Footnote 409:
See _Anderson_ v. _Hume_, 46 J. P., 825.
Footnote 410:
1 Q. B. D., 89.
Footnote 411:
1 Q. B. D., 84.
Footnote 412:
12 Q. B. D., 360.
Footnote 413:
_Ubi sup._
Footnote 414:
21 Q. B. D., 249.
Footnote 415:
1 E. & A., 286; 22 L. J. M. C., 1.
Footnote 416:
20 L. T., 483.
Footnote 417:
3 Q. B. D., 454.
Footnote 418:
22. Q. B. D. 351.
Footnote 419:
29 L. J. M. C., 189.
Footnote 420:
_Hare_ v. _Osborne_, 34 L. T., 294.
Footnote 421:
_Cooper_ v. _Osborne_, 85 L. T., 347.
Footnote 422:
5 M. & G., 335.
Footnote 423:
58 L. J. M. C.
Footnote 424:
34 L. J M. C., 50.
Footnote 425:
L. R., 6 Q. B., 130.
Footnote 426:
L. R., 6 Q. B., 514.
Footnote 427:
_Reg._ v. _Holmes_, 25 L. J. M. C., 121.
Footnote 428:
45. J. P., 469;
Footnote 429:
_Langrish_ v. _Archer_, 10 Q. B. D., 44; but see _re Freestone_, 1 H.
& N., 93.
Footnote 430:
34 L. J. C. P., 159.
Footnote 431:
13 Q. B. D., 505.
Footnote 432:
22 Q. B. D., 351.
Footnote 433:
See Stutfield’s “Tattersall’s Rules on Betting,” _Field_ Office.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
1. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in
spelling.
2. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.
3. Re-indexed footnotes using numbers and collected together at the end
of the last chapter.
4. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.