Moscow was destroyed: the occupation of its ruins was neither safe nor
advantageous: we were too far removed from our wings; we could not
procure subsistence, and we had no interest in guarding the ruins.
Every one was of opinion that we must not remain there, but it was not
agreed what it was best to do. The King of Naples proposed to march
towards Kaluga, to destroy there the only establishments which Russia
possessed, and to return and go into cantonments on the Boristhenes.
The Cossacks could not be followed to the extremity of the world; the
longest flight must have its end; we were ready for fighting, but we
did not wish to persevere longer in a chase. Such was the purport
of the proclamation that he recommended before putting the army in
motion. The Viceroy thought, on the contrary, that we should march
towards the Russians, give them battle, and push them on Petersburg,
and then march for Riga: we could thus have rejoined Macdonald, and
afterwards established ourselves on the Dwina. Others presented
other plans; all were good—all were practicable; but the Emperor
had some particular information; he would have judged correctly,
if the Russians had not received inspirations from England. Much
fault has been found with this delay: it is an error, since events
have condemned it; but those who exclaim against it were not in the
secret of our affairs or negotiations; they may, without too much
modesty, believe that the sagacity of that great man was not below
that which Nature has given to them. He was deceived; we have felt
the consequences; perhaps one day it will be known what combinations
misled him. However that may be, we delayed, we negotiated, we gave
battle; we decided nothing. The army of Moldavia was continuing its
movement; it was advancing, but it was not yet known in what line it
was to act. Some pretended that it would unite with Kutusow, others
feared that it would march upon our rear. We were uncertain of what
was preparing; the Emperor himself was not free from uneasiness, but
he knew to a man what troops he had in _echelon_ from the Rhine to
Moscow; he thought his calculations safe; he confined himself to the
despatching of instructions: those that he addressed to the Duke de
Belluno are worth citing. They prove what kind of _slumber_ it was
that he has been reproached with.
NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.
“My cousin, inform the Duke de Belluno that I have not yet given
orders for his movement, because that depends on the movement
of the enemy: that the Russian army from Moldavia, consisting
of three divisions, or twenty thousand men strong, infantry,
cavalry, and artillery included, passed the Dnieper in the
beginning of September; that it may march towards Moscow to
reinforce the army under the command of General Kutusow, or
towards Volhinia to reinforce that of Tormasoff; that General
Kutusow's army, beaten at the battle of Moskowa, is at present
on the Kaluga, which would lead us to believe that it expects
reinforcements which might come from Moldavia, by the road of
Kiow; that, in this case, the Duke de Belluno would receive
orders to join the great army, either by the road of Jelnia
and Kaluga, or any other; that if, on the contrary, the twenty
thousand men from Moldavia relieve Tormasoff, this reinforcement
will raise Tormasoff's force to forty thousand men; but that
our right, under the command of Prince Schwartzenberg, would be
still of equal force—as that Prince, with the Austrians, Poles,
and Saxons, has about forty thousand men; that moreover I have
demanded of the Emperor of Austria, that the corps which the
Austrian General Reuss commands at Leinberg should move; and
that Prince Schwartzenberg should receive a reinforcement of ten
thousand men; that, on the other side, the Emperor Alexander
reinforces as much as he can the garrison of Riga, and the corps
of Wittgenstein, in order to dislodge Marshal Saint-Cyr from
Polozk, and the Duke of Tarentum from Riga and Dünaburg; that
letters which came from Prince Schwartzenberg, dated the 24th,
would tend to prove that the army of Moldavia, instead of coming
towards Moscow, has reached the army of Tormasoff and reinforced
it; that it is necessary then to know what will be done; that,
in this state of things, I desire that the Duke de Belluno will
canton his corps from Smolensko to Orsza; that he will keep up
an exact correspondence by all the estafettes with the Duke de
Bassano, in order that that Minister may write to him and give
him all the news that he shall have from different parts; that
he will send a steady, discreet, and intelligent officer to
General Schwartzenberg and General Regnier; that this officer
shall learn from General Schwartzenberg what is passing, and
from General Regnier the true state of affairs; that he will
regularly correspond with the Governor of Minsk; and lastly,
that he will send agents in different directions to know what is
passing; that the division of Gerard shall be placed on the side
of Orsza, where it will be four or five days' march from Minsk,
three from Witepsk, four or five from Polozk; that the other
division, which shall be between Orsza and Smolensko, shall be
in a condition to give it speedy assistance; and that lastly,
the third division shall be near Smolensko. That, by this means,
his corps d'armée will rest itself, and be able easily to find
subsistence; that it will be necessary to station it above the
route, in order to leave the great communications free for the
troops which arrive; that in this position he will be equally
able to march upon Minsk, or upon Wilna, if the centre of our
communications and of our depôts be threatened; or if Marshal
Saint-Cyr should be driven from Polozk, or to execute the order
that he might receive to return to Moscow by the road of Jelnia
and of Kaluga—if the taking of Moscow and the new state of things
should determine the enemy to reinforce himself with a portion of
the troops from Moldavia; that the Duke de Belluno will thus form
the chief reserve, to go either to the relief of Schwartzenberg
and cover Minsk, or to the assistance of Marshal Saint-Cyr and
cover Wilna, or to Moscow to reinforce the main army. That
General Dombrowski, who has a division of 8000 infantry, and
12,000 Polish horse, is under his orders, which will increase
his corps d'armée to four divisions; that the brigade of reserve
from Wilna, composed of four Westphalian regiments, of two
battalions from Hesse-Darmstadt, which towards the end of the
month will arrive from Swedish Pomerania, and of eight pieces
of cannon, will also be under his orders; that, in fine, in the
course of November, two new divisions will assemble;—the one
at Warsaw, that is, the thirty-second division, which will be
augmented by three battalions from Wurtsburg, and will remain
under the command of General Durutte; the other at Kœnigsberg,
that is, the thirty-fourth, which was in Pomerania under the
orders of General Morand, and which, also increased by some
battalions, will be commanded by General Loison. Thus, whether it
be necessary to march to the assistance of Prince Schwartzenberg,
or to the assistance of Marshal Saint-Cyr, the Duke de Belluno
will always assemble a mass of forty thousand men; that, as the
correspondence by estafette is quick, I always give my orders;
and that it would only be in the event of Minsk or Wilna being
threatened or menaced, that the Duke de Belluno should march
of his own authority to protect these two grand depôts of the
army; that the Duke de Belluno, having the general command over
all Lithuania and the governments of Smolensko and of Witepsk,
should every where accelerate the progress of the administration,
and especially take efficacious measures that the requisitions
for corn and forage be carried into effect; that there are
ovens at Mohilow, at Orsza, at Rasasna, and at Dubrowna; that
he must get a great deal of biscuit ready, and put himself in
a situation to have thirty days' provisions secured for his
corps, without taking any thing from the military transports, or
from the convoys which may be passing for the army. The Duke de
Belluno will take care to keep up a correspondence at Witepsk:
he is at liberty to send troops to support that point, and to
maintain himself there; he can then go in person to Mohilow,
to Witepsk, or Smolensko, to know the ground, and to expedite
the administration. If, by any accident, the communication with
Moscow should be intercepted, he would take care to send cavalry
and infantry to open it again.”
We had no longer either food or forage; men and horses were alike
exhausted; retreat became indispensable. A question arose as to the
means of carrying away our wounded. I began to be able to walk; on
the 13th I went to the palace: Napoleon asked with kindness in what
state my wounds were, how I was going on. He showed me the portrait of
the King of Rome, which he had received at the moment we were going
to begin the battle of the Moskowa. He had shown it to most of the
Generals. I had to carry orders; the battle began; we had other things
to attend to. He wished now to make me amends; he looked for the
medallion, and observed, with a satisfaction which betrayed itself in
his eyes:—“My son is the finest child in France.”
A moment after, a memorial was brought from the Intendant-general,
who required forty-five days to remove the wounded. “Forty-five days!
he is deceived. If nothing were done, part would get well and part
would die; there would only be the remainder to remove; and experience
proves, that three months after a battle there remains but the sixth
part of the wounded. I wish to remove them; I will not let them remain
here exposed to the brutality of the Russians.” We perceived from
the saloon the workmen who were busy in taking away the cross of the
great Ivan. “Do you see what a flock of ravens hover around that lump
of old iron? Do they think to hinder us from taking it away? I will
send that cross to Paris, I will have it placed on the dome of the
Invalids.”
It was the 18th of October; the departure was fixed for the 19th. My
wound was not quite closed up. I mounted on horseback to see if I
could bear the motion.