The affair of Smolensko took place. The battle was obstinate, the
cannonade violent. The Russians, taken in flank and enfiladed, were
defeated. They could not defend those walls which so many times had
witnessed their victories; they evacuated them; but the bridges and
public buildings were a prey to the flames. The churches in particular
poured out torrents of fire and smoke. The domes, the spires, and the
multitude of small towers which arose above the conflagration, added
to the effect of the picture, and produced those ill-defined emotions
which are only to be found on the field of battle. We entered the
place. It was half consumed, of a barbarous appearance, encumbered
with the bodies of the dead and wounded, which the flames had already
reached. The spectacle was frightful. What a train is that of glory!
We were obliged to turn our views from these scenes of slaughter. The
Russians were flying; our cavalry rushed to the pursuit, and soon
came up with the rear-guard. Korff attempted to make a stand; he was
overwhelmed. Barclay came forward with his masses. We, on our side,
received reinforcements; the action became terrible: Ney attacked in
front, Junot on the flank: the enemy's army would have been cut off
if the Duke had pressed forward. Wearied with not seeing him appear,
Murat ran to him, “What are you about? Why do you not come on?” “My
Westphalians are wavering.” “I will give them an impetus.” The King
of Naples put himself at the head of a few squadrons, charged, and
overthrew every thing that opposed him. “There is thy Marshal's staff
half gained; complete the work, the Russians are lost.” Junot did
not complete it; whether from fatigue or distrust, the brave of the
brave slumbered amidst the sound of the cannon, and the enemy, who
were coming up to support their rear, again fell back on their line.
The engagement became terrible; the brave Gudin lost his life, and
the Russian army escaped us. Napoleon visited the places where the
battle had been fought. “It was not at the bridge—it is there—at the
village, where the eighth corps ought to have debouched—that the
battle hinged. What was Junot doing?” The King of Naples endeavoured
to extenuate his fault: the troops, the obstacles, all the customary
commonplaces were employed. Berthier, who had always loved the Duke,
interested himself for him; Caulincourt did the same. Every one
pleaded to the utmost in favour of a brave man who could be reproached
with nothing but a moment of forgetfulness. But the advantages we
had lost were too great. Napoleon sent for me. “Junot has just
lost for ever his Marshal's staff. I give you the command of the
Westphalian corps: you speak their language, you will show them an
example, you will make them fight.” I was flattered with this mark
of confidence, and expressed my sense of it; but Junot was covered
with wounds, he had signalized himself in Syria, in Egypt, every
where; I begged the Emperor to forget a moment's absence of mind on
account of twenty years' courage and devotion. “He is the cause of
the Russian army not having laid down its arms. This affair will,
perhaps, hinder me from going to Moscow. Put yourself at the head
of the Westphalians.” The tone with which he pronounced these last
words was already much softened. The services of the old aide-de-camp
extenuated the inactivity of the 8th corps. I resumed: “Your Majesty
has just talked to me of Moscow. The army is not in expectation of
such an expedition.” “The glass is full, I must drink it off. I have
just received good news: Schwartzenberg is in Wolhinia, Poland is
organizing, I shall have every kind of assistance.”
I left Napoleon to make known to the Prince of Neuchâtel and the
Duke de Vicenze the disgrace with which Junot was threatened. “I am
afflicted,” said the Prince to me, “to see his troops taken from him;
but I cannot but own that he has caused the failure of one of the
finest operations of the campaign. See on what the success of war
depends; on the forgetfulness, on the absence of a moment: you do not
seize the occasion in its flight, it disappears, and returns no more.
No one has more courage or more ability. He adds to the qualities of
the soldier the most extensive knowledge; he is intrepid, clever,
agreeable, and good-natured. He forgot himself for an hour; he has
made himself many enemies. However, I and Caulincourt will see what
is to be done.” They managed so well that Junot kept his post. I was
very glad of it; first, because it saved him from disgrace, and next
because I did not much like his troops. Unfortunately, lassitude had
succeeded the impetuosity of his youth. He did not show at the battle
of Moscowa that elasticity, that energy, of which he had so many times
given an example; and the affair of Vereia raised to its height the
dissatisfaction of the Emperor.
We learnt, some days after, the irruption of Tormasoff. We were
uneasy; we discussed these long points, on the dangers to which one is
exposed in advancing to an excessive distance beyond the line of one's
operations. Without doubt Napoleon heard us. He came to us, talked a
good deal of the manner in which he had secured the rear, of the corps
which formed our wings, and of that chain of posts which extended
from the Niemen to our actual position. “Tormasoff,” he said to us,
“has put all the children at Warsaw in alarm. They saw him already
officiating at Prague; but see, he is sent back quicker than he came.”
He went into his closet, and began to dictate with indifference, but
loud enough to prevent us losing a word, instructions for the Duke de
Belluno.
NAPOLEON TO THE MAJOR-GENERAL.
“Dorogobuj, August 26, 1812.
“My cousin, write to the Duke de Belluno to go in person to
Wilna, in order that he may see there the Duke de Bassano,
and inform himself of affairs and the state of things; that
I shall be the day after to-morrow at Wjaezma, that is, five
days' march from Moscow; that it is possible that, in that
situation, communications will be intercepted; that some one
then must take the command, and act according to circumstances;
that I have ordered the 129th regiment, the Illyrian regiment,
the Westphalian regiment which was at Kœnigsberg, and the two
Saxon regiments, to march for Minsk; and that, moreover, I have
placed between Minsk and Mohilow the Dombrowski division, twelve
battalions strong, with a brigade of light cavalry; that it is
important for his corps to approach Wilna, and that he must
guide himself according to circumstances, in order to be in a
condition to support Smolensko, Witepsk, Mohilow, and Minsk; that
the Dombrowski division ought to be sufficient to keep up the
communications from Minsk by Orza as far as Smolensko, since it
has only to watch the Russian division of General Hetzel which
is at Mozyr, from 6 to 8000 men strong, most of them recruits,
and against which, moreover, General Schwartzenberg can act;
that the new reinforcements which I shall send to Minsk will
also be able to assist against all accidents; and at all events
the movement of the Duke de Belluno to Minsk and Orza, and from
thence to Smolensko, appears to me calculated to support our
rear; that I have four towns and men in garrison at Witepsk, and
as many at Smolensko; that the Duke de Belluno taking position
thus, between the Dnieper and Dwina, can easily communicate with
me, will be able quickly to receive my orders, and will find
himself in condition to protect the communications from Minsk
and from Witepsk, as well as those from Smolensko to Moscow;
that I suppose that General Gouvion Saint-Cyr has sufficient of
the second and sixth corps to keep in check Witgenstein, and to
have nothing to fear from him; that the Duke de Tarentum can
march on Riga and invest the fortress; in fine, that I order
the four demi-brigades, making 9000 men, who formed part of the
Lagrange division, to march for Kowno; that also it should only
be in case General Gouvion Saint-Cyr should be beaten by General
Witgenstein, and obliged to pass the Dwina, that the Duke de
Belluno is to march to his support in the first instance; that,
this case excepted, he is to follow his course for Smolensko. On
this, &c.
(Signed) “NAPOLEON.”