Thomas contended against Duns Scotus that man is free so far as he
follows his knowledge of the good. The intellect is therefore primal,
for it determines the will by showing the will what the good is.
The question next arose as to the priority of the faculties in God.
Does God’s will dominate His intellect or His intellect dominate His
will? This was a vital point in the Augustinian theodicy. Does God will
the good to be good, or does His will act according to what He knows
to be good? Here lies the point at issue between the Dominican Thomas
and the Franciscan Scotus. Thomas maintained that the intellect of
God determines His will. The intellect is determined by the truth so
long as the intellect is true to itself. Why should not the will be
determined by the truth in the same way? With God this freedom for the
truth is God himself. The world is the best possible world, for God has
willed it out of himself.
The world is determined by goodness and man’s will is determined by
the same goodness. When the sense conquers the morally determined will,
there is sin. The senses, and not the will, are the cause of sin.
=Duns Scotus (1270–1308), the Founder of the Franciscan Tradition――Life
and Philosophical Position.= Thus the Middle Ages did not come to a
standstill with Thomas. A greater movement existed after him than is
often thought. The leading minds who succeeded Thomas refused to follow
the middle course which he had mapped out. New attempts were made to
relate the world of grace and the world of nature. One was mysticism,
represented by Eckhart (d. 1372). The other was the reaction of the
Augustinians against the intellectualism of the new Aristotelianism as
represented by Thomas. The leader in this was Duns Scotus. The seat of
this movement was Oxford.[66]
Duns Scotus was born in Ireland and at an early age he joined the
Franciscan order. He graduated from Oxford, which at that time was
anti-Thomistic. He then taught theology and philosophy at Oxford for
ten years. His lectures were largely attended and his fame spread over
Europe. He went to Paris in 1304, where he taught for four years. He
was then transferred to Cologne, where he died.
Scotus was the Kant of scholasticism. The time of construction of
scholasticism had passed, and the time of criticism and analysis had
come. Scotus was the intellectual knight-errant who refused to accept
any theory without subjecting it to criticism. He was the acutest mind
of the Middle Ages and was called the _doctor subtilis_.
=Duns Scotus’s Conception of the Twofold Truth.――The Separation of
Science and Religion.= The distinction between revelation, theology,
and philosophy, that appears in this period of Classic Scholasticism,
was sharply drawn by Scotus. In Thomas’s conception of a graded world
of development the distinction between theology and philosophy was
not emphasized. Philosophy now in the hands of Scotus becomes science,
having the marks of exactness that compel belief, but is, however,
restricted to its own realm. By philosophy Scotus means logic. In
matters of faith logic has nothing whatever to say, for at that extreme
stands revelation possessing the absolute truth that compels faith.
Between revelation and philosophy Scotus squeezes theology――the science
that his predecessors had used to clarify revelation. With Scotus it
becomes a domain that is poor indeed. Its objects are the highest, but
it can never reach them. It has not the divine assurance of revelation
nor the exactness of logical science. Its highest conclusions are only
probable, and it can help revelation only in a negative way. It cannot
prove the doctrine of the Trinity, incarnation, creation, immortality,
and even its proofs for the existence of God have no cogency.
Philosophy and revelation both profit at the expense of scholastic
theology. After Scotus scientific heresy frequently shielded itself
on the ground that its conclusions apply only to the realm of science,
while the opposite may be true in revelation.
=The Inscrutable Will of God.= Revelation is thus placed beyond the
reach of the human reason because it rests on the inscrutable will
of God. Revelation is God’s free act. God must be free. If Thomas’s
conception of God’s will as determined by his intellect were true, God
would not be free. The intellect in man or God must be the servant of
the will, if the will be free. In man consciousness produces at first
a number of indistinct and imperfect ideas. Those ideas become distinct
upon which the will fixes its attention, while the others cease to
exist because they are unsupported by the will.
God’s will is more fundamental than the good. God makes the good to
be good. Both Thomas and Scotus say that the moral law is the command
of God. Thomas conceives it to be God’s command because it is in
accord with the good; Scotus, for no other reason than that it is
God’s command. The good might be different if God so created it. In
opposition to Thomas, Scotus maintained that God does not have to
create what He does create, and that this is not the best possible
world. God creates what He wills; He can, therefore, grant dispensation,
and so can the church. If God’s will were determined by His intellect,
He would have no independence, He would not even exist, He would be
only nature or one of its causes, there could be no evil nor accident.
He can supersede the moral law by a new law, just as He superseded the
Mosaic law by the Gospel. Individuality, revelation, salvation, and
all objects of faith have their existence only in the groundless and
inscrutable will of God. For this reason there can be no rational
theology.
This founder of the “Franciscan tradition” of practical piety and
meritorious action could not have other than the freedom of the will
as his central principle. An Augustinian he refused, however, to follow
Augustine in centralizing freedom in God. The object of faith is the
will of God, the subject of faith is the will of man. Human freedom
consists in coöperation with divine grace. Man can help in the work
of God. His freedom is partly formal: he can will or not will. It is
partly material: he can will A or B. There is no ulterior ground to
determine the human will, and this undetermined freedom is the ground
for merit, provided the human will coincides with the divine.
=The Problem of Individuality.= The problem of individuation was
a favorite one with Scotus. While Scotus agrees with Thomas as
to the threefold existence of the universal, the individual and
not the universal is the ultimate fact. The individual cannot
be deduced from the universal, nor can it be constituted by the
quantitative determinations of matter. It is already individualized
and substantialized. Form, not matter, individualizes. The definite
individual form, the “thisness” (_hæcceitas_), is the ultimate fact.
The individual can only be verified as actual fact. The individual
is irreducible, and no further explanation can be made than to say
that it is an individual. Thus the inquiry into the _Principium
individuationis_ has no meaning.
=After Duns Scotus.= The church failed to canonize Scotus; for
though he claimed to be its most faithful son, he taught the dangerous
doctrine of freedom of the individual will. His doctrine also marks
the beginning of empirical investigation of nature and the decadence
of formal logic. Although a most faithful follower of the church, he
brought scholasticism to the point where it no longer served the church.
The result was ultrarationalism――not what Scotus intended. But when
revelation no longer rests upon rational ground, and when there exists
by its side a philosophical science whose basis is rational, it is
only a question of time when revelation shall lose its authority for
men. When philosophy passed from Scotus to Ockam, Ockam’s conception
of the individual as the ultimately real and of the unrationality of
revelation gave him the old name of nominalist. This is a misnomer,
for the doctrine of Ockam is quite different from the nominalism of
Roscellinus. The temper of the time was different from those days
when Roscellinus followed upon Anselm, for the superior minds were
now turning away from orthodoxy. Disciples of both Thomas and Scotus
were becoming nominalists. It was an epoch when scholasticism was being
discredited by the universities, when theology was less a study in the
curricula, when religion was being superseded by magic, when there were
rival claimants for the Pope’s chair, when there was strife between the
church and the state. The spirit of the age was toward nominalism in
every form. The command, in 1339, to the University of Paris not to use
Ockam’s works shows how powerful had become his following during his
lifetime. Dominicans and Augustinians went over in crowds to nominalism.
This beginning of nominalism betrays the growth of European national
life, modern languages, art, and the sciences. It shows the beginning
of Protestantism in all departments. The church attempted to crush it
in the way that it had crushed Roscellinus. But this nominalism had too
deep root.
=William of Ockam (1280–1349): Life and Teaching.= Ockam was called
_Doctor Invincibilis_. He was born in Ockam, England, and studied
at Oxford, where he probably had Scotus as a teacher. After teaching
in Paris (1320–1325), he left Paris and joined the opponents of the
temporal power of the Pope. He was imprisoned at Avignon, but escaped
to the court of Louis of Bavaria, where he died. To Louis he made his
celebrated promise, “If you will defend me with your sword, I will
defend you with my pen.” He has been called “the first Protestant.”
The nominalism of Ockam was more complex than that of Roscellinus, and
yet it was essentially a tendency to simplification by discarding all
metaphysics and psychology as useless. “Ockam’s razor” was the nickname
of his philosophy. He regarded concepts as subjective signs or “terms”
of actual facts. Hence his philosophy was also called terminism. There
was also in it a naturalistic tendency which was the result of the
scientific studies of the Aristotelian Arabians. With these logical and
naturalistic motives were united the Augustinian doctrine of the will.
These were the three factors of a nominalism that felt the conviction
of the importance of the inner life as well as the need of an extended
investigation of nature.
It is, moreover, no accident that Ockam was conservative, for he
belonged to the Franciscans, the most conservative of the monastic
bodies. This nominalism was a reaction against scholasticism, in order
to strengthen the supernatural character of dogma. Ockam felt that
scholasticism had waxed too great――that under the guise of serving
religion it had virtually subordinated religion. The reactionary
Franciscans proclaimed the entire separation of religion and philosophy
in order to make room for faith. Faith could be purified only by
renouncing scholasticism. The temporal power must be given up by the
church, the state and the church must be separated. No new knowledge
about faith can be obtained. The dogma must be left impregnable, even
though scientifically men become skeptics.
Consistent, therefore, was it for this movement to disjoin entirely
the parts of the twofold truth. Scotus had almost crowded out natural
theology; Ockam completed the work of Scotus. Scholasticism or natural
theology is a rubbish-heap of hypotheses. The church should abandon
speculation and emphasize faith. It should return to the simplicity
and holiness of the Apostolic church. Ockam was devoted to the true
upbuilding of the church and was a follower of St. Francis. It was his
love for the church that made him take sides against her pretensions to
temporal power.
Ockam was the natural precursor of his fellow countryman John Locke,
and the English empirical school. Individual things have the reality
of original Forms, for they come to us intuitively. Our ideas are
only signs of them. This is a relation of the “first intention.” As
individual ideas are related to individual things, so general ideas
are related to individual ideas. This is the relation of the “second
intention.” The general idea referring thus indirectly to an individual
thing is therefore arbitrary and capricious. Real science deals with
things intuitively observed; rational science only with the relations
between ideas. Nevertheless real science deals only with an inner
world, even if its material is intuitively known. Intuitions are only
representatives of the real world. How much less real must the world of
rational science then be, since it presupposes these inner intuitions
of real science. The universal, therefore, has no reality. It is a name,
a sign of many things, a term. Only the individual is real.
=After Ockam.= William of Ockam was the last schoolman. When his
doctrine of terminism was united with Augustine’s powerful doctrine
of the will,――forming an extreme individualism,――the glimmering of
the dawn of modern times appears. The movement was made still stronger
by the study of the history of development psychologically, and it
became a kind of idealism of the inner life. Already, too, there were
beginning investigations in natural science, based upon empirical study.
Modern subjectivism was at hand; scholasticism had run its course.
The representatives of the scholastic philosophy of the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries forgot the principle of the Classic Schoolmen and
became mere commentators of the leaders of the tradition to which they
belonged. Their verbal subtleties were too refined to be understood.
The efforts of Nicolas Cusanus to bring secular science under a system
of scholastic mysticism only promoted the modern movement. Cusanus
therefore belongs to the next period, and of him we shall subsequently
hear.
INDEX
Abdera
107, 119.
_See_ Atomists.
Abelard
life of, 363;
his conceptualism, 364;
his rationalism, 365–367.
Academy, the
what it was, 124;
after the death of Plato, 166;
and Aristotle, 169–171;
Older, Middle, and New, 220, 221;
the skepticism of, 266–268;
eclecticism in, 270.
Adams, G. B.
_Civilization during the Middle Ages_, 374 n.
Adamson, Robert
_The Development of Greek Philosophy_ quoted, 255.
Ænesidemus
Skeptic, 268.
Agrippa
Skeptic, 268, 269.
Albertus Magnus
_See_ Bollstaedt.
Alcidamus
Sophist, 68.
Alcuin
349, 350.
Alexander of Hales
379.
Alexandria
a centre of Hellenism, 215;
in the Middle Ages, 282.
Alexandrian School of neo-Platonism
290–298.
Ammonius Saccas
290, 314.
_Anamnesis_
147–149.
Anaxagoras
his life, 43;
his philosophy, 45–47.
Anaximander
24, 25.
Anaximenes
25.
Ancient Philosophy
length of, 1;
underlying character of, 2;
divisions of, 4, 5;
literary sources of, 6.
Animism
19.
Anselm
life and position in mediæval philosophy, 359–361;
his arguments for the existence of God, 361;
on reason and dogma, 365.
Anthropological period of Greek philosophy
12, 13;
discussion of, 55–97;
historical summary of, 55.
Anthropologists
103.
Anthropology
defined, 13.
Antiochus of Ascalon
270, 271.
Antisthenes
founder of the Cynic school, 93, 95.
Apathy
Stoic, 251.
Apollonius
neo-Pythagorean, 285.
Apologists, the
307–309.
Aquinas, Thomas
on the problem of reason and faith, 369, 377;
the predecessors of, 379, 380;
life of (founder of the Dominican tradition), 380, 381;
the central principle of his doctrine, 381–383;
the problem of individuality according to, 383–385;
on the will and the intellect, 385, 386.
Arabian
schools, 371, 372;
translations of Greek works, 372, 373.
Arcesilaus
267.
ἀρετή
meaning of, 84.
Aristippus
founder of the Cyrenaic school, 93, 96;
and Epicurus, 229, 230.
Aristophanes
opposed the Sophists, 74.
Aristotle
his place in Greek history, 98–100, 103;
conceptualist, 104;
advanced age at which he finished his education, 125;
in the Academy and Lyceum, 166–168;
chronological sketch of his life, 168, 169;
his biography in detail, 169–173;
the writings of, 173–176;
his starting-point, 176, 177;
the fundamental principle in his philosophy, 177–180;
his logic, 180–185;
his metaphysics, 185–194;
development is purposeful, 185–187;
his two different conceptions of purpose, 187–190;
his conception of God, 190, 191;
his conception of matter, 191, 192;
his conception of nature, 192–194;
his theory of physics, 194–196;
his psychology, 196–199;
his ethics, 199–202;
his political philosophy, 202, 203;
in the Middle Ages, 332, 363, 368, 369;
Arabic versions of his works, 372, 373;
works of, introduced into Western Europe, 375–378;
the strength and burden of, to the church, 378, 379;
and Thomas Aquinas, 380, 381.
Arnold, Matthew
43 n.
Astronomy
of the Pythagoreans, 49–52, 53;
Ptolemaic, 322–325.
_Ataraxia_
of Epicurus, 231, 233;
of the Skeptics, 266.
Athenian school of neo-Platonism
290, 299–301.
Athens
rise of, 57, 58;
and Socrates, 91;
and Abdera, 119;
a centre of Hellenism, 213–215.
Atomism of Epicurus, the
238–240.
Atomistic school, the
107.
Atomists, the
philosophy of, 47, 48.
Atoms of Democritus, the
109–114, 116, 117.
Augustine
the historical position of, 306, 318, 335–338;
the life of, 339, 340;
the two elements in his teaching, 340, 341;
the neo-Platonic element: the inner certainties of
consciousness, 341–345;
the authority of the church according to, 345–347.
Aurelius, Marcus
243, 246.
Bacon, Francis
_Essay on Love_, 153 n.
Bacon, Roger
387 n.
Bardesanes
Gnostic, 310.
Basilides
Gnostic, 310.
Becoming
word how used, 22;
in Heracleitus’s doctrine, 29;
according to Plato, 133, 136, 139.
Being
word how used, 22;
in Parmenides’ doctrine, 33–35;
Pythagorean conception of, 49–51;
aspects under which it was conceived of, in Greek philosophy,
103, 104;
according to Plato, 133, 136, 139.
Benedictine Age, the
350.
Berengar of Tours
359.
Boëthius
300.
Bollstaedt, Albert
377, 379.
Bologna
University of, 377.
Burnet, John
_Early Greek Philosophers_ cited, 17 n.
Bury, J. B.
_History of Greece_ cited, 12 n.;
quoted, 16.
Carneades
267.
Carpocrates
Gnostic, 310.
Carthage
15, 16.
Catechists
the School of, 314–318.
Catholic theologians
the old, 312–314.
Cause
teleological, final, mechanical, and efficient, 105 n.
_See_ Final cause, Efficient cause.
Causes
Aristotle’s, 187.
Change
Heracleitus’s doctrine of, 28, 29;
has no existence in Parmenides’ philosophy, 34, 35;
as conceived by the Pluralists, 40.
Charlemagne
the revival of, 349, 350.
Christianity
and neo-Platonism, difference in their conception of
inspiration, 276, 277;
rise of, 279, 280;
summary of its history, 281;
and neo-Platonism, 288–290;
the Hellenizing of, 302–318;
the early situation of, 302–305;
the philosophies influencing, 305, 306;
early, the periods of, 306, 307;
the Apologists, 307–309;
the Gnostics, 310–312;
the reaction against Gnosticism (the old Catholic theologians),
312–314;
Origen and the School of Catechists, 314–318;
and Mohammedanism, 371–375.
Chrysippus
242, 244, 245.
Church
authority of, according to Augustine, 345–347;
strength and burden of Aristotle to, 378, 379;
and state, Aquinas’s and Dante’s views of, 382.
Cicero
on Aristotle, 167;
his work, 271, 272.
Civilizations
Christian and Mohammedan, 369–372;
the first contact of, 372, 373;
the conflict between, 374, 375.
Classic Scholasticism
period of, 333, 368–394.
Cleanthes
242, 244–246.
Clement
314.
Conception
and perception, 83 n.;
importance of, to Socrates, 83;
according to Plato, 134, 135;
in Aristotle, 177–179.
Conceptualism
of Aristotle, 104;
in the Middle Ages, 358, 364, 365.
Consciousness
formulation of the psychological conception of, 294;
the inner certainties of, according to Augustine, 341–345.
Constantinople
an intellectual centre, 372 n.
Cosmas map, the
335.
Cosmological period of Greek philosophy
12, 13;
treated, 15–54.
Cosmologist
characteristics of the, 18–20;
table of, 20;
their philosophical question, 20, 21;
where they lived, 21;
results of their philosophy, 53, 54.
Cosmology
defined, 13.
Crates of Thebes
95.
Critical attitude of mind
among the Greeks, 61–64;
of Socrates, 80.
Crusades, the
374, 375.
Cusanus, Nicolas
394.
Cynic school, the
93–97.
Cynics and Stoics
246, 247.
Cyrenaic school, the
93–97.
Cyrenaics
their teaching, and Epicureanism, 229, 230.
Dante
on Aristotle, 167;
used Ptolemaic conception of the universe, 324, 325;
diagram of his poetic conception of the universe, 376;
his view of the state and the church, 382 n.;
placed the intellectual virtues above the practical, 383 n.
Dark Ages, the
347–349.
Deduction
182.
Definition
Socrates one of the first to use it correctly, 92.
Democritus
his place in Greek history, 98–100, 103;
and Plato, their similarities and differences, 104–106;
life of, 106–108;
comprehensiveness of his aim, 108;
the enriched physics of, 109–111;
the materialistic psychology of, 111–114;
his theory of knowledge, 114–116;
the ethical theory of, 116–118;
a wide traveler, 123;
advanced age at which he finished his education, 125.
Development
according to Aristotle, 178, 179, 185–187.
De Wulf
_History of Mediæval Philosophy_, 336 n., 384.
Dialectic
defined, 60, 131.
Dill, Samuel
_Roman Society_ cited, 274 n.
Diogenes
95.
Dionysiodorus
68.
Dogma
_See_ Reason.
Dominican tradition
Thomas Aquinas the founder of, 380, 381;
intellectualism the central principle in, 385.
Doxography
6.
Drama
the Greek, 60, 61.
Dualism
defined, 51 n.;
the Pythagorean, 51, 52;
of the Systematic period of Greek philosophy, 102, 103.
Dynamic pantheism of Plotinus
293.
Eckhart
369, 386.
Eclectic Platonists, the
285.
Eclecticism
264, 265, 269–272.
Efficient cause
introduction of conception of, by the Pluralists, 41;
defined, 105 n.;
Aristotle’s conception of, 187.
Elean-Eretrian school, the
93.
Eleatic school
and Milesian school, Xenophanes the connecting link between, 26;
lives of Parmenides and Zeno, 32, 35;
teaching of, compared with that of the Milesians and
Heracleitus, 22 f.;
the philosophy of, 33–37;
and Heracleitus, results of the conflict between, 37, 38.
Element, the
as conceived by the Pluralists, 40, 41.
Eleusinian
_See_ Mysteries.
Emanations
the world of, according to Plotinus, 294–297.
Emerson, R. W.
_Essay on Love_, 153 n.;
_Initial, Dæmonic, and Celestial Love_, 153 n.
Emerton, Ephraim
_Mediæval Europe_, 374 n.
Empedocles
his conception of change, 40;
his conception of the element, 40;
his doctrine of the efficient cause, 41;
his life, 43;
the philosophy of, 44, 45.
Empiricism
104 n.
End
defined, 105 n.
_Entelechy_
186.
Epic, Greek
importance of the, 8–10.
Epictetus
243, 246.
Epicureanism
one of the New Schools, 222–225;
and Stoicism, summary of agreements and differences, 225, 226;
and the teaching of Aristippus, 229;
ideal of, 230–233;
the place of virtue in, 233;
the Wise Man of, 234–236.
_See_ Epicurus.
Epicureans, the
228.
Epicurus
life of, 227, 228;
and Aristippus, 229;
his ideal, 230–233;
his conception of the physical world, 238–240.
_See_ Epicureanism.
Epistemology
Democritus’ contribution to, 114–116.
Erigena, John Scotus
349, 350;
life and teaching of, 350–352;
the Greek principle which he formulated for the Middle Ages,
352, 353.
Eristic
defined, 60.
Ethical period of the Hellenic-Roman period
208;
general characteristics of, 215–218.
Ethics
tendency toward, among early Greeks, 11, 12;
of the Sophists, 71–73;
of Democritus, 116–118;
Plato’s theory of, 153–158;
of Aristotle, 199–202;
of Plotinus, 297, 298.
Eucken, Rudolf
_Problem of Human Life_, 336 n.
Euclid
founder of the school at Megara, 93.
Eudæmonism
87.
Euhemerism
96.
Eusebius
on Aristotle, 167.
Euthydemus
68.
Evil
the problem of, according to Stoicism, 260, 261.
Fairbanks, Arthur
_First Philosophers of Greece_, 6 n.
Falckenberg, Richard
_History of Modern Philosophy_, 3 n.
Final cause
defined, 105 n.;
according to Aristotle, 187.
Fire
Heracleitus’s doctrine of, 30–32.
Form and Matter
in Aristotle, 186–192, 197–199;
in Thomas Aquinas, 384.
Formal cause
187.
Franciscan tradition, the
385–387.
Freedom
the problem of, according to Epicurus, 240;
according to Stoicism, 260, 261;
according to Origen, 316, 317;
according to Augustine, 345;
according to Duns Scotus, 389.
Gerbert
350.
Glaber
quoted, 354.
Gnomic poets
Greek, 10–12.
Gnosticism
310–312;
the reaction against, 312–314.
God
Plato’s conception of, 141, 142;
Aristotle’s conception of, 190, 191;
His will and His intellect, 386, 388, 389.
Goethe
quoted, 129, 167.
Good
Plato’s Idea of the, 140–142, 144;
Plato’s theory of the, development of, 153, 154;
the, of the Stoics, 250, 251.
Gorgias
66, 67;
the nihilism of, 70, 71.
Gospel
the Hellenizing of, 302–318.
_See_ Christianity.
Greece
after the Persian Wars, 57–64.
Greek Enlightenment, the
58–64, 82.
Greek-Jewish philosophy of Philo
281–284;
and neo-Platonism, 288.
Greek nation
the fall of, and the persistence of its civilization, 204–208.
Greek national spirit
waning of, 98.
Greek philosophy
three periods of, 12–14;
summary of, 102, 103.
Greek thought
was objective, 2, 100, 101.
Greeks, early
geographical environment of, 7;
political environment of, 8, 9, 15, 16;
native tendencies of, 9–12;
perils to, in the new religion, 16–18;
monistic philosophies, 22 f.
Grote, George
_History of Greece_, 61 n.;
_Plato_, 267 n.
Happiness
according to Socrates, 86;
according to the Cynics and the Cyrenaics, 94–97;
according to Democritus, 117, 118;
according to Aristotle, 200;
according to Epicurus, 233–238.
Harnack, Adolf
_Outlines of the History of Dogma_ quoted, 308, 336, 344, 354;
cited, 315 n., 345 n.
Hatch, Edwin
_Hibbert Lectures_ quoted, 305.
Hedonism
and eudæmonism, 87;
some types of, 228, 229.
Hellenic-Roman period
204–318;
its time length, 204;
the fall of the Greek nation and the persistence of its
civilization, 204–208;
the two parts of, 208, 209;
the undercurrent of skepticism in, 209–211;
the fundamental problem of, 211–213.
Hellenism
205–208;
the centres of, 213–215.
Hellenizing of the Gospel
302–318.
Heracleitus
life, 28;
his teaching compared with that of the Milesians and Eleatics,
22, 23;
his philosophy, 28–31;
and Parmenides, results of the conflict between, 37, 38;
practical philosophy of, 31.
Hesiod
11.
Hicks, R. D.
_Stoic and Epicurean_, 227 n.;
cited, 267 n.
Hipparchia
95.
Hippias
66, 68.
Hippodamus
68.
Hippolytus
313.
_Homoiomeriai_
46.
Human nature
value set upon, by Socrates, 81.
Hylozoism
defined, 19;
and Pluralism, 41;
the breaking up of pre-Socratic, 47;
becomes materialism with Democritus, 109–111.
Hylozoists
the Cosmologists were, 19.
Hypatia
298.
Idea
development of the meaning of (Democritus and Plato), 105.
Ideal of Socrates, the
83–85;
what it involves, 85–88.
Idealism
of the Greeks, 100;
objective, 104.
Ideas
of Plato, 133, 135;
the development of, in the two drafts, 136, 137;
brief comparison of the two drafts of 137;
fuller comparison of the two drafts of, 137–141;
in the doctrine of _anamnesis_, 147, 148.
Immortality
Plato’s doctrine of, 146–150.
Individuality
the problem of, according to Thomas Aquinas, 383–385;
the problem of, in Duns Scotus, 389, 390.
Induction
92, 183.
Intellect or will
the question of the primacy of, 385, 386, 388, 389.
Ionic School
_See_ Milesian school.
Irenæus
313.
Irish learning, the
349.
Irony
Socratic, 90.
Jackson, H.
article “Sophists,” in _Encyclopædia Britannica_, 68 n.
Jamblichus
298, 299.
Jewish (Greek-) philosophy of Philo
281–284;
and neo-Platonism, 288.
Julian, Emperor
298.
Justin Martyr
308.
Kingsley, Charles
_Hypatia_, 298 n.
Knight, William A.
_Life and Teaching of Hume_, 3 n.
Knowledge
in Socrates’ ideal, 83–86, 88;
according to the Cynics, 95;
Democritus’ theory of, 114–116.
Lanfranc
359.
Law
positive and natural, 72.
Learning
the impulse for, among the Greeks, 58, 59;
the Revival of, 375–378.
Leucippus
his life, 43, 44;
his philosophy, 47, 48, 109, 110;
founder of the Atomistic school, 107.
Logic
Aristotle’s, 180–185.
Love
Platonic, 151–153.
Love and Hate
Empedocles’ doctrine of, 44.
Lucretius
228.
Lyceum, the
Aristotle in, 166, 167, 172, 173;
after Aristotle, 220–222;
eclecticism in, 270.
Lycophron
68.
Maine, Sir Henry
cited, 72.
Man
the philosophy of, 13, 55–97;
Plato’s conception of, 144–146.
Material cause
187.
Materialism
hylozoism becomes, with Democritus, 103, 109–111;
Stoic, 254, 255.
Materialistic psychology of Democritus
111–114.
Matter
and Form, in Aristotle, 186–192, 197–199, 384;
of Plotinus, 295, 296.
Mean, the
Aristotle’s doctrine of, 201, 202.
Mechanical series of Aristotle
194–196.
Mediæval geography
335.
Mediæval library, a
326–328.
Mediæval Man, the
320, 321;
how the universe appeared to, 322–325;
at school, 325, 326;
summary of the political and educational worlds of, 330–333.
Mediæval philosophy
length of, 1;
underlying character of, 3;
divisions of, 4;
treated, 319–394.
Megarian school
93.
Mendicants, the
368.
Metaphysical problem, the
early formulation of, 22, 23.
Metaphysics
Plato’s, the formation of, 132–136;
Plato’s, the development of, 136–141;
Aristotle’s, 185–194;
abandonment of, in Hellenic-Roman period, 216;
of Plotinus, 294–297.
Metrocles
95.
Middle Ages
characteristics and conditions of, 319–333;
and the Hellenic-Roman period, comparison of, 319, 320;
the mediæval man, 320, 321;
how the universe appeared to the mediæval man, 322–325;
the mediæval man at school, 325, 326;
a mediæval library, 326–328;
the three periods of, 328–330;
summary of the political and educational worlds of the
mediæval man, 330–333;
the early period of, 330–332, 334–353;
the transitional period of, 332, 354–367;
the period of classic scholasticism, 333, 368–394.
Milesian school
24;
the members of, 24, 25;
the philosophy of, 25, 26
the teaching of, compared with that of Heracleitus and the
Eleatics, 22, 23.
Milton, John
325.
Modern philosophy
length of, 1;
underlying character of, 3;
divisions of, 4.
Mohammedanism
growth of, during the Middle Ages, 370–372;
first contact with Christianity, 372, 373;
conflict with Christianity, 374, 375.
Monism
defined, 10 n.;
of the early Greeks, 10;
displaced by pluralism in Greek philosophy, 39.
Monists
list of early Cosmologists who were, 20;
discussion of the, 22–38.
Monotheism
defined, 10 n.;
for the first time conceptually framed, 191.
Monte Cassino
founding of the monastic school at, 348.
Moral postulate
philosophy for the first time founded upon, 85;
of Socrates, 85–88.
Motion
according to Aristotle, 195, 196.
Mysteries
Orphic and Eleusinian, 16–18, 38;
Orphic, dangers of, averted by Cosmologists, 54.
Mysticism
in neo-Platonism, 287.
Natural Science
_See_ Physics.
Nature
the philosophy of, 15–38;
the word as used by the Sophists, 72, 73;
a logical, Socrates’ attempt to find, 92;
physical, Plato’s conception of, 142–144;
Aristotle’s conception of, 192–194;
Stoic conception of, 251–257.
Neo-Platonism
and Christianity, difference in their conception of
inspiration, 276, 277;
rise of, 279, 280;
summary of its history, 281;
and Platonism, 287, 288;
and the philosophies of Philo and the neo-Pythagoreans, 288;
and Christianity, 288–290;
the periods of, 290;
the Alexandrian school (scientific theory of neo-Platonism,
life and writings of Plotinus), 290–298;
the Syrian school (the systematizing of polytheism, Jamblichus),
290, 298, 299;
the Athenian school (Proclus), 290, 299–301;
its influence on Christianity, 306.
Neo-Pythagoreanism
281, 285–287;
and neo-Platonism, 288.
Nominalism
103, 358, 362–365, 391, 392.
Norton, Arthur O.
_Readings in the History of Education_, 377 n.
_Nous_
Anaxagoras’ conception of, 47;
of Plotinus, 294.
Numbers
Pythagorean conception of, 49–51.
Objective character of Greek philosophy
2, 100, 101.
Objective Idealism
104.
Objective Realism
104.
Ockam, William of
387 n., 390;
the course of philosophy after, 393, 394.
Order
thought of, developed into clearness by Cosmologists, 54.
Origen
280, 281, 314–318.
Orphic
_See_ Mysteries.
Oxford, University of
377.
Palmer, G. H.
on Socrates, 79.
Panætius
270, 271.
Pantheism
defined, 10 n.;
dynamic, of Plotinus, 293;
of Erigena, 351–353;
of the realists, 363.
Paris, University of
377.
Parker, C. P.
cited, 258 n.
Parmenides
life, 32;
develops the doctrine of Xenophanes, 32 f.;
his philosophy, 33–35;
and Heracleitus, results of the conflict between, 37, 38.
_See_ Eleatic School.
Particulars and Universals
according to Thomas Aquinas, 383–385.
Pater, Walter
_Marius the Epicurean_, 227 n.
Patmore, Coventry
_Angel in the House_, 153 n.
Patristics
302–318.
Perception
and conception, 83 n.;
according to Plato, 134;
in Aristotle, 177–179.
Pericles
58.
Periods
of philosophy, the three general, 1–4;
of Greek philosophy, 12–14.
Peripatetics
_See_ Lyceum.
Persia
15, 16.
Persian Wars
their importance, 55–57, 62.
Personality
spiritual, increased importance of, in history, 277–279.
Pessimism
result of theory of Cyrenaics, 97.
Peter the Lombard
379, 380.
Phædo
founder of the Elean-Eretrian school, 93.
Philo
Greek-Jewish philosophy of, 281–284;
and neo-Platonism, 288.
Philoponus
299.
Philosophic skepticism
_See_ Skepticism.
Physical universe
early Greek tendency toward scientific explanation of, 10, 11.
Physics
Socrates’ view of, 80;
enrichment of, under Democritus, 109–111;
Plato’s conception of, 142–144;
Aristotle’s theory of, 194–196;
of Epicurus, 238–240.
Plato
104;
parts of works to be read, 75 n.;
his place in Greek history, 93, 98–100, 103, 104;
and Democritus, their similarities and differences, 104–106;
the period of his life, 119, 120;
the difficulties in understanding the teaching of, 120, 121;
the chronology of his dialogues, 119, 120;
the life and writings of, 121, 126;
his student life, 121, 122;
as traveler, 122–124;
as teacher of the Academy, 124–126;
concerning his dialogues, 126–128;
the factors in the construction of his doctrine, 128–131;
his inherited tendencies, 128–130;
his philosophical sources, 130, 131;
the divisions of his philosophy, 131, 132;
summary of his doctrine, 132;
the formation of his metaphysics, 132–136;
the development of his metaphysics (the development of his
ideas in the two drafts), 136–141;
his conception of God, 141, 142;
his conception of physical nature, 142–144;
his conception of man, 144–146;
his doctrine of immortality, 146–150;
the two tendencies in, 150, 151;
Platonic love, 151–153;
his theory of ethics, 153–158;
development of his theory of the Good, 153, 154;
the four cardinal virtues, 154, 155;
his theory of political society, 155–158;
a selection of passages from, for English readers, 158–165;
in the Middle Ages, 331, 337, 338, 360, 363.
Platonism
the revival of, 279;
and neo-Platonism, 287, 288.
Platonists
Eclectic, 285.
Pleasure
of Epicurus, 230–233.
_See_ Happiness.
Plotinus
280, 287, 288;
life and writings of, 290, 291;
general character of his teaching, 291, 292;
the mystic God of, 292, 293;
the two problems of, 293;
the metaphysical problem of, 294–297;
the ethical problem of, 297, 298.
Pluralism
tried to reconcile extremes of Milesian school, 39, 40;
and hylozoism, 41.
Pluralists
list of later Cosmologists who were, 20;
their new conception of change, 40;
their new conception of the unchanging, 40, 41;
introduction of conception of efficient cause by, 41;
summary of similarities and differences in theories of,
41, 42;
their lives span the fifth century, 42.
_See_ Empedocles, etc.
Plutarch
neo-Platonist, 299.
Political philosophy of Aristotle
202, 203.
Political society
Plato’s theory of, 155–158.
Polytheism
Homeric, 19.
Polytheisms
the systematizing of, 298, 299.
Porphyry
291, 298, 357.
Posidonius
270, 271.
Primary and secondary qualities
116.
Probabilism in Stoicism
262.
Proclus
299–301.
Prodicus
66, 68.
Protagoras
66, 67;
the relativism of, 69, 70;
his point of view compared with that of Socrates, 81.
Psychology
materialistic, of Democritus, 111–114;
Plato’s, 144–146;
of Aristotle, 196–199;
the Stoic, 248–250.
Ptolemy
his cosmography, 322–325.
Purpose
Aristotle’s conceptions of, 186–190.
Pyrrho
266.
Pyrrhonism
265, 266.
Pythagoras
17.
Pythagoreanism
neo-, 281, 285–287;
and neo-Platonism, 288.
Pythagoreans
the early, 17;
the later, 44, 48, 49;
their conception of Being, 49–51;
their astronomy, 49, 52, 53;
their dualism, 51, 52.
Qualitative changes of phenomena
196–202.
Rationalism
defined, 104 n.;
of Plato and Democritus, 104;
of Abelard, 365–367.
Realism
100, 104, 358, 362–365;
objective, 104.
Reason and dogma
the relation between, 355, 356, 360–362, 365–367.
Reconcilers
_See_ Pluralists.
Relativism
of Protagoras, 69, 70;
represented by the anthropologists, 103.
Religion
of the Greeks, organization of, 8, 9, 10;
the new, perils of, 16–18;
in Epicurus’s system, 236, 237;
and science, the separation of, under Duns Scotus, 387, 388.
Religious feeling
two causes of the rise of, 272–274.
Religious period of the Hellenic-Roman period
208, 209;
treated, 273–301;
the divisions of, 280, 281.
Religious philosophies
Hellenic, rise of, 280, 282;
summary of history of, 281;
introductory period of, 281–287;
development period of, 281, 287, 288.
Revival of Learning, the
375–378.
Rhabanus Maurus
350.
Rhetoric among the Greeks
60.
Romans
their conquest of Greece, 205–208.
Roscellinus
life and teaching, 361, 362.
Rossetti, Christina
_Shadow of Dante_ cited, 325 n.
Rousseau and Epicurus
229.
St. Ambrose
306.
Salerno, University of
377.
Scholasticism
what it is, 355–359;
of Anselm, 359–361;
of Roscellinus, 361, 362;
of Abelard, 363–367;
classic, period of, 333, 368–394.
School
in early Greek philosophy, meaning of, 19.
Schools, the
214, 218–226;
fusion of doctrines in, 269;
after 150 B. C., notable names in, 271.
_See_ Academy, Lyceum, etc.
Science
early tendencies toward, among the Greeks, 10, 11;
growth of, in Hellenic-Roman period, 216, 217;
secular, of the age of Augustine, 339;
and religion, the separation of, under Duns Scotus, 387, 388.
Scotus, Duns
gave a new direction to philosophy, 369;
upheld the primacy of the Will, 385, 386;
the founder of the Franciscan tradition (life and philosophical
position of), 386, 387;
his conception of the twofold truth, 387;
the inscrutable will of God, according to, 388, 389;
the problem of individuality, according to, 389, 390;
the course of philosophy after, 390, 391.
Secondary and primary qualities
116.
Secular science of the age of Augustine
339.
Seignobos, Charles
_History of Mediæval Civilization_, 373 n.
Seneca
quoted, 234.
Sensationalism
defined, 104 n.
Sensationalistic skepticism
268, 269.
Sextus Empiricus
268.
Sill
_The Two Aphrodites_, 153 n.
Simplicius
299.
Skepticism
what it is, 69;
the undercurrent of, in the Hellenic-Roman period, 209–211;
philosophic, the appearances of, 264, 265;
the three phases of, 265–269;
of the Academy, 266–268;
sensationalistic, 268, 269.
Socrates, and Aristophanes
opposed the Sophists, 74;
works on, for reading, 75;
personality and life of, 75–80;
his dæmon, 77, 83;
and the Sophists, 80–82;
unsystematic character of his philosophy, 82, 83;
the ideal of, 83–85;
what his ideal involves, 85–88;
the two steps of his method, 88–91;
and Athens, 91;
the logical expedients of, 92, 93;
and the Lesser Socratics, 93–95.
Socratics
the Lesser, and Socrates, 93–95.
Sophists
significance of, 64–67;
the prominent, 67, 68;
the philosophy of, 68–71;
the ethics of, 71–73;
summary of their work, 73;
met in two ways by Socrates and Aristophanes, 74;
and Socrates, 80–82.
Soul
Plato’s doctrine of, 145–150;
according to Aristotle, 196, 197;
of Plotinus, 295, 297, 298.
Spenser, Edmund
_Hymn in Honor of Beauty_, 153 n.
Spiritual authority
the need of, 275–277;
the turning to the present for, 287, 288.
Spirituality
rise of the conception of, 277–279.
State
Plato’s doctrine of, 155–158;
and church, Aquinas’s and Dante’s views of, 382.
Stoic school, the
222–225;
inclines to eclecticism, 269, 270.
Stoicism
and Epicureanism, summary of agreements and differences,
225, 226;
position of, in antiquity, 241, 242;
the three periods of, 242, 243;
leaders of, 243–246;
writings of, 246;
the two prominent conceptions of, 247, 248;
the conception of personality, 248;
the psychology of, 248–250;
the highest good, 250, 251;
the conception of nature, 251–256;
conceptions of nature and personality supplement each
other, 256, 257;
and society, 257–259;
duty and responsibility, 259, 260;
the problem of evil and the problem of freedom, 260, 261;
modifications of, after the first period, 261–263;
its influence on Christianity, 305.
Stoics and Cynics
246, 247.
Storm and Stress
362, 363.
_Sums_
of Peter the Lombard, 379, 380.
Syllogism, the
182.
Syrian school of neo-Platonism
290, 298, 299.
Syrianus
299.
Systematic period of Greek philosophy
12–14;
treated, 98–203;
the three philosophers of, their place in Greek history,
98–100;
the fundamental principle of, 100–102.
Tatian
313.
Teleology
defined, 105 n.
Terminism
392.
Tertullian
313.
Teuffel, W. S.
_History of Roman Literature_, 227 n.
Thales
24, 25.
Theological series of Aristotle
196–202.
Thrasymachus
68.
Timon
266.
Transitional period of Middle Ages
332, 354–357.
Turner, William
_History of Philosophy_, 336 n.
Twofold reality
world of, Democritus’ theory of, 114–116.
Ueberweg
_History of Philosophy_, quoted, 6;
cited, 269 n.
Unchanging, the
as conceived by the Pluralists, 40, 41.
_Universalia ante rem_
104, 358, 362–365, 384.
_Universalia in re_
104, 358, 364, 365, 384.
_Universalia post rem_
103, 358, 362–365, 384.
Universals and particulars
according to Thomas Aquinas, 383–385.
Universe
diagram of Dante’s conception of, 376.
Universities
the establishment of, 377.
Useful, the
according to Socrates, 87, 88.
Valentinus
Gnostic, 310.
Vincent of Beauvais
379.
Virtue
meaning of, 84;
according to Socrates, 84–88;
according to the Cynics, 95;
according to Aristotle, 199–202;
place of, in Epicureanism, 233.
Virtues
the four cardinal, in Plato, 154, 155.
Weber
_History of Philosophy_ cited, 269 n.
Wheeler, B. I.
_Life of Alexander the Great_, cited, 56 n.;
quoted, 172.
Will
freedom of. _See_ Freedom.
Will or intellect
the question of the primacy of, 385, 386, 388, 389.
William of Aubergne
379.
William of Champeaux
363.
Windelband
_History of Ancient Philosophy_, 37 n.;
cited, 121 n., 311 n.;
quoted, 254.
Witte, Karl
_Essays on Dante_, 325 n.
Wordsworth, William
_Dion_, 123 n.;
_Ode on Intimations of Immortality_ quoted, 148.
Xenophanes
religious philosopher, 26 f.;
philosophy of, 27 f.
Xenophon
parts of works to be read, 75 n.;
on Socrates, 76, 93.
Zeller, Edward
_Pre-Socratic Philosophy_, 3 n., 100 n.;
quoted, 101, 102;
_Greek Philosophy_, 37 n.
Zeno
Eleatic, his life, 35 f.;
his philosophy, 36, 37.
_See_ Eleatic school.
Zeno
Stoic, 242, 244, 245.
Footnotes.
1 – Read Knight, _Life and Teaching of Hume_, pp. 102 f.
(Blackwood Series); Falckenberg, _Hist. Modern Phil._,
p. 10; Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, pp. 161 f.
2 – Read Fairbanks, _First Philosophers of Greece_, pp. 263
ff., especially the résumé.
3 – Ueberweg, _Hist. of Phil._, vol. i, p. 7.
4 – Monism is the belief that reality is a oneness without
any necessary implication as to the character of that
oneness. Monotheism is a kind of monism, in which some
definite character is ascribed to the oneness, like the
active principle in the world or the cause of the world.
Pantheism, on the other hand, is a kind of monism in
which the emphasis is upon the all-inclusive character of
reality. In pantheism God and nature are two inseparable
aspects of reality.
5 – Bury, _Hist. of Greece_, p. 321, calls the tradition of
the Wise Men a legend.
6 – Bury, _History of Greece_, p. 311.
7 – Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophers_, p. 104, for
injunctions upon the private life of the early
Pythagoreans.
8 – Note further that in future philosophical discussions
of this problem, the technical word “Being” is used for
the Unchanging or the substance that remains forever like
itself, and the technical word “Becoming” is used for the
changing processes of Nature.
9 – “Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do
breath and air encompass the whole world.”
10 – Read Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, pp. 67 ff.;
Zeller, _Greek Philosophy_, pp. 63 ff.
11 – Read Matthew Arnold, _Empedocles_ (a poem).
12 – Read Plato, _Phaedo_, 97, B.
13 – Dualism: the belief that the world is to be explained by
two independent and coexistent principles.
14 – Wheeler, _History of Alexander the Great_.
15 – Read Grote, _History of Greece_, vol. viii, pp. 334–347.
16 – Read H. Jackson in _Encyclopædia Britannica_, article
“Sophists”.
17 – The student should read the following references
in Plato’s dialogues and Xenophon’s _Symposium_ and
_Memorabilia_. The translations referred to here are
Jowett’s Plato and Cooper, Spelman, etc., translation,
_Whole Works of Xenophon_. (1851.)
For the method of Socrates, read _Charmides_, _Lysis_, and
_Laches_.
For the personal appearance of Socrates, read Plato,
_Symposium_, pp. 586 ff. and Xenophon, _Symposium_, p. 615.
For the physical endurance of Socrates, read Plato,
_Symposium_, p. 591.
For Socrates’ dislike of nature, read Plato, _Phædrus_,
p. 435, and Xenophon, _Memorabilia_, p. 521.
For the charges, defense, and trial of Socrates, read
Plato, _Apology_, pp. 116 and 129.
For the confinement of Socrates in prison, read _Crito_,
beginning and end of the dialogue.
For description of the death scene of Socrates, read Plato,
_Phædo_, beginning and end of the dialogue.
For description of the dæmoniacal sign, read Plato,
_Apology_, pp. 125–126, and Xenophon, _Memorabilia_,
pp. 531 ff., 585 ff.
For the oracle’s statement that Socrates is the wisest of
men, read Plato, _Apology_, p. 114.
18 – What is the difference between perception and conception?
We have heard a good deal about perceptions in the
doctrine of Protagoras. We have now reached a point
where many of the theories will involve a comparison
of perception with conception. An understanding of
the difference between perception and conception will
be necessary for an understanding of the doctrines,
especially of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle. In general,
perception is the consciousness of an object in which some
actual sensation of it is present; a conception is the
consciousness of an object in which no actual sensation
of it is present. Thus I perceive a tree, when my retina
is actually stimulated; I conceive a tree, when I turn
my head away and no sense organ is actually stimulated,
_i. e._ I do not touch, see, hear the tree. To the Greek
the perception was particular and transient; the conception
was, on the other hand, universal or general and permanent.
19 – Read Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, pp. 138–149,
concerning the objective character of Greek morality, art,
and philosophy.
20 – Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, p. 162.
21 – Zeller, _Pre-Socratic Phil._, vol. i, p. 162.
22 – Rationalism and sensationalism refer to the sources
from which knowledge is obtained. Rationalism is to be
contrasted with sensationalism. Rationalism is the belief
that the reason is an independent source of knowledge
and has a higher authority than sense-perception.
Sensationalism is the belief that all our knowledge
originates in sensations. Empiricism is often used for
sensationalism.
23 – Teleology is the doctrine that things exist for some
purpose. A teleological cause, which is the same as “final
cause” or “end,” is the purpose involved in an action.
It is contrasted with mechanical or efficient cause.
A trolley car is moving and a man runs to catch it.
Electricity is the mechanical cause of the movement of the
car. The purpose of the man is the teleological cause of
his running; the strength in his legs is the mechanical or
efficient cause of his running.
24 – Atoms differ primarily in form (ἰδέα); size is referred in
part to form.
25 – These all reduce to form,――see above.
26 – Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, pp. 183–189.
27 – Read Wordsworth, _Dion_.
28 – B. Jowett, _Dialogues of Plato_, trans. into English with
analyses and introductions, 4 vols.
See p. 158 for selections from the dialogues made by
Jowett for English readers.
29 – Goethe.
30 – For the distinction between perception and conception, see
p. 83.
31 – Read Wordsworth’s _Ode on Intimations of Immortality_.
32 – Read Edmund Spenser, _Hymn in Honor of Beauty_; Emerson,
_Essay on Love_, also the poem on _Initial, Dæmonic, and
Celestial Love_; Bacon, _Essay on Love_; Patmore, _Angel
in the House_; Sill, _The Two Aphrodites_.
33 – B. I. Wheeler, _Life of Alexander the Great_.
34 – Read Walter Pater, _Marius the Epicurean_; Hicks,
_Stoic and Epicurean_, p. 184, for the _Golden Maxims_
of Epicurus; Teuffel, _History of Roman Literature_,
pp. 83–86.
35 – Windelband, _Hist. of Phil._, p. 183.
36 – Adamson, _The Development of Greek Philosophy_, p. 267.
37 – Professor C. P. Parker.
38 – A. Hicks, _Stoic and Epicurean_, pp. 322 ff.
39 – Read Grote, _Plato_, vol. iii, pp. 482–490, for the
interesting sophistical problems of the Liar, the Person
Disguised under a Veil, Electra, Sorites, Cornutus, and
the Bald Man.
40 – For a statement of these tropes, see Weber, _Hist. of
Phil._, p. 153.
41 – Ueberweg, _Hist. of Phil._, vol. i, p. 216.
42 – Read Dill, _Roman Society_, first three chapters.
43 – Read Charles Kingsley, _Hypatia_, a novel.
44 – Hatch, _Hibbert Lectures_, 1888, p. 182.
45 – Harnack, _Outlines of the Hist. of Dogma_, p. 120.
46 – Windelband, _Hist. of Ancient Phil._, p. 357.
47 – Harnack, _Outlines of the History of Dogma_, p. 159.
48 – Read Rossetti, _Shadow of Dante_, pp. 9–14; Karl Witte,
_Essays on Dante_, pp. 99 ff.
49 – Read Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, pp. 219–221, 232,
236, 245–248; Turner, _Hist. of Philosophy_, p. 226;
De Wulf, _Hist. of Mediæval Phil._, pp. 90–98; Harnack,
_Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, pp. 3–6.
50 – Eucken, _Problem of Human Life_, p. 247.
51 – Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 3.
52 – There is this difference between Augustine’s position and
that of Descartes. Augustine’s _Quod si fallor, sum_ is a
refutation of the doctrine of probability of the Academy,
not a demonstration; Descartes’ _Cogito, ergo sum_ is
positive,――a subtle but an important difference between
the two thinkers.
53 – Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 337.
54 – Harnack, _Hist. of Dogma_, vol. v, p. 112, n. 4.
55 – Harnack, vol. vi, p. 7.
56 – Glaber, _Hist._, lib. III, 4.
57 – In this period the conceptualists were confused with
nominalists and called nominalists.
58 – Historians are attaching more importance than formerly to
Constantinople as an intellectual centre of that time.
59 – Read on this point Seignobos, _Hist. of Mediæval
Civilization_, pp. 117 f.
60 – Read Emerton, _Mediæval Europe_, pp. 358–397; Adams,
_Civilization during the Middle Ages_, pp. 258–278.
61 – THE CRUSADES
_Major Crusades_
First Crusade, 1096–1099
Second Crusade, 1147–1149
Third Crusade, 1189–1192
Fourth Crusade, 1202–1204
Children’s Crusade, 1212
_Minor Crusades_
Fifth Crusade, 1216–1220
Sixth Crusade, 1228–1229
Seventh Crusade, 1248–1254
Eighth Crusade, 1270–1272
It will be noted that five of these nine Crusades occurred
within thirty years of the year 1200. The First Crusade
resulted in the capture of Jerusalem and the founding of
a kingdom. The other Crusades were directly or indirectly
concerned with the defense or recapture of that kingdom.
62 – Read Norton, _Readings in the Hist. of Education_,
pp. 102–103.
63 – Dante in _De Monarchia_ did not share in Thomas’s
subordination of the state to the church. Both Dante and
Thomas believed that destiny lies in the race, but the
great poet regarded man as destined equally for earthly
and heavenly happiness. To Dante the church and the state
are powers of like authority.
64 – Dante follows Thomas in placing the intellectual virtues
above the practical, and in pointing to the intellectual
intuition of God as the goal of human attainment. Beatrice
is Dante’s expression of this ideal.
65 – De Wulf, _Hist. of Mediæval Phil._, p. 323.
66 – Roger Bacon (1214–1292) lived at Oxford two generations
before Scotus. He was so versatile that he was not able
to dogmatize in any one field. He believed that theology
was based on the will of God, all other science on the
reason. He influenced both Scotus and Ockam to turn from
authority to experience. Morality was to him the content
of universal religion.
Transcriber’s Notes.
The following corrections have been made in the text:
Page 9:
Sentence starting: The passionate party strife....
– ‘familes’ replaced with ‘families’
(old, ruling families of nobles)
Page 193:
Sentence starting: On the other hand,...
– ‘evolulution’ replaced with ‘evolution’
(Darwin’s theory of evolution.)
Page 196:
Sentence starting: Studying the organic realm,...
– ‘organism’ replaced with ‘organisms’
(we find organisms to consist of)
Page 215:
Sentence starting: There were many other....
– ‘Pergamus’ replaced with ‘Pergamos’
(Rhodes, Antioch, Alexandria, Pergamos, Tarsus,)
Page 337:
Sentence starting: By means of neo-Platonism....
– ‘judye’ replaced with ‘judge’
(God as a judge )