CHANGES IN THE PLAN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The federal government is already organized upon a plan of centralized
power. The ballot which it presents to the voter is always short. The
voter casts his ballot for a president and vice-president every four
years and for one congressman from his district (and perhaps one or two
from the state at large) every two years. United States Senators hold
office for six years. Until the adoption of the recent 17th Amendment
two were elected by each state legislature. Now two are elected at
large in each state. The judges are appointed by the president with
the approval of the Senate. The Senate has a general veto power on
Executive appointments. Such in form at least is the organization of
the national government.
Today, however, extra-legal government has laid its hand to some
extent at least upon the government at Washington. In congressional
districts where extra-legal government flourishes, it has become
the strongest and most persistent single force in the election of
congressmen. Naturally it has its loyal supporters in the House of
Representatives of Congress. As the power of extra-legal government
grows and becomes more widespread its influence in that house will
grow. It is, of course, entirely immaterial whether a supporter of
the extra-legal government is labeled Democrat or Republican. He is
a Democrat when he comes from a district where the vote-directing
machine operates successfully under that name. He is a Republican when
the vote-directing machine operates successfully under that name. The
power of extra-legal government which has appeared in the Senate of the
United States is the direct consequence of the power of extra-legal
government in the state legislatures. Of course, extra-legal government
does not often control a majority of the members of both houses of a
state legislature. A considerable minority, however, who hold together
under a strong leadership can wield a large influence. One of the
reasons for the persistence of the fight upon Mr. Lorimer and its
popular support throughout the country was the fact that his election
represented to the popular mind in a striking manner the invasion of
the United States Senate by extra-legal government. No matter how free
from corruption Mr. Lorimer may have been, the power so openly wielded
by those allied with extra-legal government to place him in the United
States Senate presented itself to the people of the country as a menace
to the nation. Yet a similar invasion has been going on steadily in
quieter ways. Every gain of extra-legal government in the control
of state legislatures has been a step farther toward a predominant
influence in the United States Senate. It has been for the most part
through senators who have supported, or at least felt that they must
placate the power of extra-legal government in their states, that
that government has obtained its hold upon the federal judiciary. The
president’s appointments must be approved by the Senate. Senatorial
custom, sometimes called courtesy, places the control of the Senate’s
approval in the hands of the senators from the state for which the
judicial appointment is made. The two senators from the state sometimes
divide the federal judicial districts in the state between them. Thus
has the president’s appointment to the lower federal bench been placed
at the mercy of two, or perhaps a single senator. The president on
his part may have a popular legislative program which he is pledged
and is attempting to secure action on from Congress. The support of
senators is necessary. The tendency, therefore, on the part of the
president to allow senators the upper hand in his appointments to the
bench has been very marked. Extra-legal government has in the last
few years become a visible force in the selection of the president
of the United States through its power to control delegates sent
to the National Convention. At both the Democratic and Republican
National Conventions in 1912 the numerical strength of the delegates
representing extra-legal government in particular states or districts
of states was very marked. In the Republican Convention these delegates
and their allies not only controlled the situation, but actually took
issue with the delegates who represented the electorate and beat them.
This was not a matter which could end when one faction cast more legal
votes at the convention than the other. The contest was one between the
forces of extra-legal government and delegates for the moment actually
representing the popular choice. The contest between two such forces
can be settled only when one or the other has been swept from the
field. The triumph legally of the forces of extra-legal government in
the Republican Convention could have no other logical outcome than the
formation of a new party.
The recent change effected by the seventeenth amendment providing for
the popular election of senators was made avowedly for the purpose
of ousting the control of extra-legal government in the Senate. We
may be sure, however, that the change will not in the least tend to
drive extra-legal government from the field at large. It follows,
therefore, that the politocrats will use all their power to control
nominations and elections to the United States Senate. The office of
senator, however, is conspicuous and extremely important. This fact
alone will force the politocrats to put forward or support candidates
of some independence and popular strength. This will naturally result
in the United States Senate becoming far more representative of the
electorate than is the House. We may, therefore, expect the Senate to
become less conservative than the House. If this continues in a marked
degree, it means the entire decadence of the House as a legislative
body. Its power will be exercised by the leaders of the house majority
in the interests of a conservative check upon the Senate. Whether this
condition would survive the elimination of extra-legal government in
our local municipal and state governments seems beyond the possibility
of prediction.
Other proposals for changes in the plan of the federal government have
been made with the avowed object of eliminating extra-legal government
by politocrats. The influence of extra-legal government in national
conventions is to be permanently overthrown by presidential primaries.
If any change were to be made in respect to the judiciary it would
be in the direction of making them elective, and perhaps subject to
the recall. No doubt nominations through primary elections would be
advocated for all elective officers. Newspapers recently gave space
to the demand that the postmasters should be elected by the voters
of the post-office district. Whatever temporary advantage over the
extra-legal government there may be in any of these expedients, they
represent the application of the very principle of government which
in the long run produces, and must always produce, the disease from
which we are suffering and desire to be cured. This is our process
of curing the ills of democracy with more democracy. It is the case
of more poison for one already overcome. Have the past thirty years
not yet taught us that to increase the burden upon the voter is to
reduce the most intelligent member of the electorate to the darkest
political ignorance and thus to enable the professional adviser and
director to the politically ignorant voter to cast his ballot for him?
Every additional appeal to the electorate is a step toward that scheme
of government which is most favorable to the growth and development
of extra-legal government by politocrats. The federal government is
suffering because in the village, the township, the city, the county,
and the state, such political burdens have been placed upon the voter
that he cannot perform his political functions intelligently. He is
forced to delegate them to those who make it their profession to carry
his political burdens for him. To them he turns over the privilege of
casting his ballot for him. It would be amusing if it were not tragic
that the increase of the cause should be selected as the cure.
The elimination of extra-legal government from our villages, townships,
cities, counties, and states has become a national problem. The proper
functioning of the national government is impossible while these
sources contribute to the existence of extra-legal government. The
reduction of governmental agencies to two--a local municipal government
and a state government--the application of the principle of the
commission form of government to both, so that the electorate casts its
ballot for one officer only in each, and the consequent disruption of
extra-legal government, are essential to the restoration of the federal
government to political health. The plan of the federal government
taken by itself and as an instrument of government in its appropriate
sphere is still admirable. If it were the only governmental agency in
the field, extra-legal government would never have had a chance to
achieve power in the United States. If any improvements in the plan of
the federal government are ever found necessary they should be in the
direction, first, of uniting the executive power and the legislative
power, and second, the elimination of the Senate veto upon executive
appointments. The former may be accomplished by placing the control
of the executive power in the hands of the president and his cabinet
or in a so-called council of state composed of the president and his
cabinet officers and also requiring that each cabinet officer must be
a member of one of the houses of Congress. This would at once place
the control of the executive power of the nation in the hands of the
leaders of the majority in both branches of the legislature, or at
least in the leaders of that branch which more effectively represented
the electorate. The president would cease to carry his present load
of responsibility for executive action and legislative progress. His
office would be important, for he would be that human agency necessary
to place the representatives of the victors at the polls in control of
the executive power. His influence as a member of the council of state
would be considerable. With a veto power over legislation he would
still retain an enormous one-man power.