CONTEMPORARY PLANS LOOKING TOWARD THE UNION OF THE EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
Our state legislatures are now for the most part composed of members
elected from fairly wieldy districts. Governmental changes then which
look toward the application of the principles of commission government
to the state, as outlined in the preceding chapter, have to do
principally with the union of the executive and legislative powers.
Several recent proposals for changes, coming from Illinois, Wisconsin,
Kansas, and Oregon, indicate that legislators, governors, and political
scientists with practical experience have concluded that the executive
and legislative powers must be brought nearer together. The interesting
fact, however, is that no plans have been suggested by which the
legislature is to absorb the control of the executive power by placing
it in the hands of the leaders of a majority of the legislature. On
the contrary, the proposals for bringing the executive and legislature
nearer together have, with one exception, been along the line of
conferring upon the executive greater power to control and coerce the
legislature.
The Illinois House of Representatives at its 1913 session adopted
a rule for which Representative Morton D. Hull was responsible. It
provided as follows:
When any bill or resolution is introduced for the purpose of
carrying into effect any recommendation of the governor, it may by
executive message addressed to the speaker of the house be made
an administration measure. An administration measure may be sent
to the appropriate committee, or it shall, upon request of its
introducer, be sent to committee of the whole house. When such a
measure has been reported out of committee, it shall have precedence
in the consideration of the house over all other measures except
appropriation bills. The house shall sit in committee of the whole
for the consideration of administration measures on Tuesday morning
immediately after the reading of the house journal.
This rule very plainly brings the executive and the legislature nearer
together. It does so, however, only by conferring upon the governor
an important privilege which enables him to advance his legislative
program.
The proposed amendment to the Wisconsin constitution providing for an
initiative by the electorate at large for legislation[18] gives to
the governor a practical method of coercing or “steam-rollering” the
opposition of a hostile legislature. It provides for the submission to
the electorate at large of any bill introduced into the legislature
any time within the first thirty days of the session. This enables the
governor to present all administration bills to the legislature and if
they fail of passage he may then present them for enactment into law by
the electorate at large. This is giving the governor power to promote
and control legislation to a very great degree.
Governor Hodges of Kansas in his message to the legislature of March
10, 1913, in terms advocated the adoption of the commission plan
of government for the state. As there outlined, the details of the
plan were somewhat vague. It consisted apparently of a unicameral
legislature containing one or two members from each of the eight
congressional districts of the state, with terms of from four to
six years. This legislative commission was to be in session as the
exigencies of the public business demanded. The governor was to
be ex officio a member and presiding officer of the commission or
legislative assembly. We observe here no other union of the executive
and legislative powers than occurs in a city government like that
of Chicago, where the mayor is elected at large and vested with the
executive power and presides over a unicameral council of comparatively
few members exercising the municipal legislative power. Governor
Hodges’ suggestion would vest more power in the state executive than
he now has, by reason of his being the presiding officer of the
legislative body. Apart from this, it does not go farther than to
propose a reduction in the size of the legislature. But even that
part of the plan may be open to the objection that it violates the
fundamental principle of the selection of representatives from wieldy
geographical districts or by wieldy “quotas.” On the whole, Governor
Hodges’ plan would seem to be one which, like the Hull rule in Illinois
and the Wisconsin provision for an initiative, increased the power of
the executive elected at large and diminished the importance and power
of the representatives of the electorate.
The latest plans of the People’s Power League of Oregon are set out in
detail in certain constitutional amendments which are to be submitted
to the people upon a referendum.[19]
We notice first of all a concentration of executive power in the
governor by reason of the fact that he appoints his cabinet consisting
of an attorney-general, a secretary of state, a treasurer, a printer,
a superintendent of public instruction, a secretary of labor, a
state business manager, and such others as may be provided by law.
He appoints also all sheriffs and district attorneys throughout the
state. These local officers, however, are subject to a recall by
the electorate. The powers and duties of all state commissions are
consolidated and vested in the governor and become a part of the
executive powers and functions, excepting the rail-road commission,
the members of which are, however, appointed by the governor. The
governor’s power is further increased by giving to him and his cabinet
officers seats in a unicameral legislature. It is made the duty of the
governor to introduce all bills for appropriating money. While the
legislature may reduce the amount of appropriations, it cannot increase
them without the consent of the governor. The general veto power of
the governor is taken away, but he would still seem to have power by
promoting a referendum, to appeal to the electorate to override the
legislature.[20]
The single-chamber legislature is to consist of 60 members not less
than 2 of whom are elected from each district containing approximately
as many sixtieths of the population as there are members to be elected
from the district. The voter in no case is permitted to vote for more
than one candidate. Hence each party would be expected to put up as
many candidates as it estimated its strength to be in sixtieths of
the population. The result is bound to be a minority representation,
if there be any substantial minority. To obviate the minority having
as much power as the majority each member elected casts as many votes
in the legislature as there are voters who cast their ballots for
him. The unsuccessful candidate for governor who receives the highest
number of votes in his party is made a member of the legislature with a
voting strength equal to the number of votes cast for the unsuccessful
candidates of his party for places in the legislature. One might
hazard the guess that a legislature so precisely representing the
voting strength of all factions and parties was peculiarly liable to
legislative deadlocks which would again vastly increase the opportunity
of power in a governor who, with his cabinet, had places in the
legislative body and who possessed a vast power over appropriations.
On the whole these new plans from Oregon tend in the direction of
magnifying a one-man-executive power at the expense of the legislature
rather than the increasing of the power of the legislature by giving to
its leaders the control of the executive power.
At the 1913 session of the Illinois legislature there was introduced
by Senator Logan Hay a bill to establish what is now known as the Hay
plan for a legislative commission. It provided for a joint legislative
commission to consist of the governor, who was made ex officio chairman
of the committee, the lieutenant-governor, the speaker, the chairmen of
the committees on appropriations and judiciary of the Senate and the
House, and five other senators and five other representatives, selected
as other committees were, viz., in the senate by the resolution of that
body, in the House by the speaker. The governor, lieutenant-governor,
and speaker were to serve on the committee during their term of
office and the other members till the convening of the next General
Assembly after their appointment. The commission was to be in session
from the commencement of one regular session of the legislature to
the commencement of the next. It was given power to prepare and
bring forward a complete legislative program, including a budget of
appropriations for the coming legislative session, and to establish
a legislative reference bureau. It was given power to investigate
the administration of any department of the state government and the
expenditure of any appropriation made by the General Assembly. Such a
plan was admirably designed to increase the power of the legislature
by centralizing in its leaders power and authority to present a
comprehensive and matured program before the legislature convened. At
the same time it conferred no additional power over legislation upon
the governor. On the contrary, it, in a mild way, actually attempted to
secure additional control over the executive power. The mere existence
of a standing legislative commission composed of the leaders of the
legislature, with power at any time to _investigate the administration
of any department of the state government_ or the expenditure of any
money appropriated, was a continuing menace to the present executive
isolation and irresponsibility.
The plan evidently met with determined opposition from the executive,
for in the House it was amended so as to provide four members from
the Senate and House instead of five, and these were to be _appointed
by the governor_. The power of investigation by the commission was
restricted to such as it was called upon to make by the governor, the
General Assembly, or either house, and the power to investigate the
administration of any department of the state government was entirely
omitted. In this form the bill became one which would vastly increase
the governor’s power by delivering into his hands the authority of the
commission and giving him recognized administration members of the
legislature. A deadlock ensued between the House and the Senate, and
the bill as finally passed contained a provision only for establishing
a legislative reference bureau. In the contest over the original plan
and the house modifications we have a clear-cut recognition of the
necessity of bringing the governor and the legislature nearer together.
We also have presented a sharp dispute as to whether the governor
shall have added to his power further authority over the promotion
of legislation or whether the legislature shall increase its power
by organization, and at the same time secure some control, if not an
actual domination, over the executive power.
It is rather startling that in all the above proposals which look
toward the closer relation of the executive and legislative powers we
should find a strong tendency toward the increasing of the power of the
single executive by giving him greater control over the legislative
power. Historically the effort has constantly been to break down the
power of the single executive. True, the executive in such cases was
not subject to the electorate at frequent intervals. But frequent
elections may not protect the governed from a vast number of errors
of judgment and smaller tyrannies, executive oppression and bad
appointments, which do not become a matter of general knowledge or make
a considerable issue before the electorate. Good executive government
in the sense of one which is just and fair, well balanced, seeking
improvements, and acting conscientiously in lesser affairs, comes more
certainly from a small committee of experienced leaders than from a
single man. The exchange of views by such a body and the reaction of
one member upon another has a value which cannot be estimated. The
single executive on the other hand is likely to have no fixed set of
responsible advisers. He is too frequently swayed by the advice of the
last man who reaches his ear.
In making constitutions it is quite as easy to unite the executive
and legislative powers by giving the control of the executive power
to a majority of the legislature as it is to hand the control of the
legislative power over to the single executive. From the point of view
of expediency there is much to be said of the plan which places the
control of the executive power in the hands of the legislature.
FOOTNOTES:
[18] Joint resolution 4A, introduced June 16, 1913.
[19] These were furnished to the author by Mr. U. S. U’Ren of Oregon
City, Oregon. One is in the form of a letter dated December 28, 1911,
asking for criticisms on the draft of constitutional changes. The
other is in the form of an initiative petition for the submission of
particular constitutional amendments (being a part of the entire plan
of changes) for adoption by the electorate.
[20] “The power of the governor to promote initiative and referendum
petitions is not, however, increased by the suggested amendment. He
has now the same rights in this as a private citizen but no official
powers” (comment of U. S. U’Ren).