THE RECALL
What has been said of the initiative and the referendum is almost
precisely applicable to the recall.
The movement for the recall began just as soon as it was generally
perceived that our system of frequent elections to fill a large number
of offices did not prevent the extra-legal government from placing in
office men loyal to it. The movement for the recall is the frankest
admission that this system of elections has been a failure. The real
cause for this failure was the fact that too much voting had overloaded
the voter and his resulting political ignorance had delivered him into
the hands of an organization which in effect cast his ballot for him.
Again, however, this was entirely neglected, and the superficial and
obvious remedy was put forward of having a new election whenever it
was discovered that an officeholder was objectionable because of his
subservience to an extra-legal government. The statutes, however, do
not undertake to submit to the electorate the question whether the
officers subject to the recall elections have been too subservient to
the extra-legal government and that alone. Instead, the voters may cast
their votes for the recall of an officer on any ground they please.
If there is an organized and effectively led revolt against extra-legal
government, then obviously the weapon of the recall may be of great
service. It will enable the attacking party to sweep out of office
adherents of the extra-legal government who would otherwise have held
until the next election, when the tide of popular sentiment in favor
of the attack might have begun to ebb. But revolts are not at all
frequent. There has always been an opportunity at regular elections for
such movements through independent nominations by petition. A revolt
of any consequence would have undertaken to use this method. In spite,
however, of the opportunity thus afforded, the general revolt against
extra-legal government in local districts is the occurrence of a
decade, if not of a generation.
It is the effect of the recall under normal circumstances, when no
revolt against extra-legal government is in progress, that must
principally concern us. At such times the recall is more valuable to
the extra-legal government than it is to the electorate at large.
The recall is as available to the extra-legal government as it is to
the electorate at large. In fact, the extra-legal government must of
necessity become familiar with its use. Every officer of the dummy
legal government must, therefore, at all times act with the knowledge
that the extra-legal government may start a recall election against
him. Imagine what this means to the host of subordinate officers that
were put in apparently by the electorate, but of whom the electorate
never had any knowledge whatever. They have no popular following.
They have no money with which to advise and instruct the voters of
the character of the fight that is being made against them. What
possible chance would such officeholders stand against the permanent
organization of advisers and directors to the ignorant voter which the
extra-legal government controls? The recall under normal, everyday
conditions would place the majority of officeholders even more
completely in the control of the extra-legal government than they are
now.
The recall, if applied to the judiciary, would in usual and normal
times operate to give the extra-legal government the same power over
the judges that it would have over other officeholders.[8] A judge
is one of the most helpless of all elective officers. He can run
on no platform; he can have no political program. He cannot point
dramatically to any achievements on behalf of the people. Whether
he is a good judge or not is a matter of expert opinion that only a
comparatively few persons are competent to pass upon. His reputation
can be easily blasted by the circulation of false statements. He may
even be hurt by the performance of his duty in a particular case. His
retention in office at elections is in a great number of instances
purely a matter of accident. If he is up at a fall presidential
election, his retention in office will practically depend upon the
success of the national party in whose column his name happens to be.
It will make little difference whether he has been one of the best
judges that the county or state has ever had, or one of the worst.
Elections place the judge very largely at the mercy of the extra-legal
government. That government may not be able to return him to office,
but the judge knows that without its support his re-election will
become practically impossible. To give the extra-legal government the
opportunity to use the recall upon a judge is to hold above the judge’s
head at all times the threat of an extra election which he is in no
wise prepared to undergo. Nothing could more clearly increase the power
of the extra-legal government over the judiciary. If the recall of
judges be advocated on the ground that they have become subservient to
the politocrats, the conditions which have caused them to become so
will have been greatly increased by the very device which is advocated
as a means of ridding us of that subserviency.
We may conclude, therefore, that there is no more danger to extra-legal
government in the recall than there is in frequent elections and
independent nominations by petition. On the other hand, the free use,
or freely threatened use, of the recall by the extra-legal government
will give it a power over officeholders and judges greater than that
which it now has.
FOOTNOTES:
[8] See _post_, chap. xvii.