UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Agents
THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON AND EDINBURGH
THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO
KARL W. HIERSEMANN
LEIPZIG
THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK
[Illustration:
MAP
_showing Election Districts,
in which an Elector of Winnetka,
Illinois votes_
(_except State of Illinois (United States)_)
Compiled by
_ALBERT M KALES_
See pages 26-29]
Unpopular Government
in the United States
_By_
ALBERT M. KALES
_Professor of Law in Northwestern University_
[Illustration]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
COPYRIGHT 1914 BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
All Rights Reserved
Published February 1914
Second Impression February 1915
Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 1
PART I
THE RISE OF THE POLITOCRATS
CHAPTER I
UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT--DEFINED--HOW FORMERLY
MAINTAINED--PRECAUTIONS TAKEN TO AVOID IT 7
CHAPTER II
UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT--HOW ESTABLISHED IN THE UNITED
STATES IN SPITE OF THE PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT IT 21
SEC. 1. Introductory 21
SEC. 2. The Burden upon the Electorate--The
Inverted Pyramid of Governmental and
Electoral Districts--The Offices to Be
Filled and the Number of Electors in Each District 26
SEC. 3. The Resulting Political Ignorance of the
Voter and His Consequent Disfranchisement 39
SEC. 4. The Power of the Electorate Passes to
Those Who Take Advantage of Its
Ignorance to Direct It How to Vote 48
SEC. 5. The Power of Government Passes into the
Hands of Those Who Are Able to Direct
the Majority of the Politically Ignorant
How to Vote. They Constitute an
Extra-legal but None the Less Real Government 61
SEC. 6. The Extra-legal Government Uses Its
Power Selfishly to Maintain Itself and to
Benefit Those Who Have Organized and Supported It 67
SEC. 7. The Extra-legal Government Is Able to
Maintain Itself in the Face of Popular Disapproval 73
PART II
THE WAR ON POLITOCRACY
CHAPTER III
DISSIPATION OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE BY SELF-TAUGHT
POLITICAL EDUCATION 91
CHAPTER IV
THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT AND CIVIL-SERVICE ACTS 95
CHAPTER V
ALTRUISTIC EFFORTS TO ENLIGHTEN THE VOTER 99
CHAPTER VI
ABOLITION OF THE PARTY CIRCLE AND PARTY COLUMN 104
CHAPTER VII
THE PRIMARIES 107
CHAPTER VIII
THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM 118
CHAPTER IX
THE RECALL 122
CHAPTER X
INDEPENDENT MOVEMENTS AND THE NEW PARTY 128
CHAPTER XI
THE SECURITY OF EXTRA-LEGAL UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT
BY POLITOCRATS IN THE UNITED STATES 133
CHAPTER XII
THE MENACE TO UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE
COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR SMALLER CITIES 139
CHAPTER XIII
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT
APPLIED TO THE LARGER CITIES 162
CHAPTER XIV
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT
APPLIED TO THE STATE 166
CHAPTER XV
CONTEMPORARY PLANS LOOKING TOWARD THE UNION
OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS 181
CHAPTER XVI
THE SECOND-CHAMBER PROBLEM 193
CHAPTER XVII
METHODS OF SELECTING AND RETIRING JUDGES 225
CHAPTER XVIII
CHANGES IN THE PLAN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 252
CHAPTER XIX
CONCLUSION 262
INTRODUCTION
The plan for state and municipal governments generally accepted in
the United States in the middle period of the nineteenth century gave
great satisfaction in the provincial and frontier communities where
it was adopted and which then composed the principal part of the
United States. In many nooks and corners of the country today we have
relics of this provincial and frontier society. In such districts this
plan for state and municipal governments is entirely satisfactory
in practice. To depart from it would be unwise, for the reason that
in matters of government that which is and which is not positively
objectionable should be let alone. Frequently men of talent and power,
whose youth was spent in the provincial and frontier era of our social
and political development, still find conditions about them not so
much changed. To them the mid-nineteenth-century plan and its practice
are entirely satisfactory. Any criticism of it would at once meet
with a vigorous and, no doubt, from the point of view of provincial
and frontier conditions, a complete defense. To the inhabitants of
those parts of the United States where such provincial and frontier
conditions still exist the following essay is not addressed.
So long as the more simple and primitive conditions of society which
obtained in the first half of the nineteenth century were all but
universal in the United States, any criticism of the plan of state
and municipal government which prevailed was a purely academic
exercise. Even when, in some districts, conditions had changed and
great cities had arisen with enormous wealth and population, to which
the mid-nineteenth-century plan of government did not seem to fit in
practice, the majority were still so far satisfied as to make any
criticism of that plan of merely speculative value. But in the second
decade of the twentieth century the provincial and frontier type of
society will be found to embrace a distinct minority of the population
of the country. The social conditions presented by a large population
in a small area, with a highly organized and differentiated social
structure, have become common to a large portion of the population of
the entire country. Whether the application of a mid-nineteenth-century
plan of government to these conditions is satisfactory is, therefore,
no longer an academic or speculative question. Its due consideration
has perhaps rather become to the last degree vital to the life of the
nation. To those who are face to face with this problem the following
essay is addressed.
PART I
THE RISE OF THE POLITOCRATS
CHAPTER I
UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT--DEFINED--HOW FORMERLY MAINTAINED--PRECAUTIONS
TAKEN TO AVOID IT
Unpopular government is, and indeed always has been, a government of
the few, by the few, and for the few, at the expense and against the
wish of the many.
In a former era unpopular government was achieved and maintained
with simple directness. All governmental power was, by a monarchical
or oligarchical plan, openly placed in the hands of the few. Human
characteristics insured the selfish use of that power. The maintenance
of such selfish use of governmental power against the wish of the
majority was accomplished by denying any legal opportunity to the
majority to express itself, and by the perpetuation of power in the
hands of the few by inheritance or appointment.
The makers of our mid-nineteenth-century state and municipal
governments undertook to free this land from unpopular government.
If all governments must be tyrannical from the point of view of some,
they preferred the tyranny of the majority to the tyranny of the
minority. Their aim was to establish and maintain a government “of
the people, by the people, and for the people,” as distinguished from
a government of the few, by the few, and for the few, at the expense
of the many and against their wish. They could not, however, change
human characteristics. The tendency, therefore, to use power selfishly
continued. They did endeavor to prevent the concentration of power in
the hands of the few by splitting the power of government up among
many separate and distinct offices and limiting the power which any
one officeholder might exercise. They sought to make impossible the
retention of power in the face of popular disapproval by requiring
all offices of importance in the government to be filled by popular
election and the elections to be held frequently. For the greater part
of a century these ways and means of heading off unpopular government
have been constantly employed in the development of our state and
municipal governments. The belief of the people in popular government
has become a belief in these two means of obtaining it. In popular
estimation the means have become the end. Inevitably these expedients
for securing immunity from unpopular government have been pressed to
great extremes.
The application of the principle that governmental power must be
kept out of the hands of the few is responsible for that fundamental
characteristic of American constitutions known as the separation of
powers among the three departments of government. The entire power
of the government is exercised by the executive, the legislative,
and the judicial departments. None is allowed to perform any of the
functions which belong to either of the others. If it does so, its
action is unconstitutional and void. Each department is, therefore,
supreme and independent in its own field. This is the beginning of
decentralization. In the distribution of powers, each department is
designed to be a check upon the others. The legislature, being the
most powerful by reason of its control over the making of the laws and
appropriations, is naturally a substantial check upon the executive
and judicial departments. Our constitution-makers have, therefore,
been particular to devise checks upon the legislature by the other
two departments. The executive is given a wide veto power upon all
legislation, although the veto may be overridden by a two-thirds
vote of the legislature. The courts in their power to declare laws
unconstitutional are given, potentially at least, an effective
veto power upon legislation. The scope of it is narrower than the
executive veto, but on the other hand the veto of the courts cannot
be overridden by any action of the legislature. The actual operation
of these checks and balances, coupled with the complete separation
of powers, has resulted in irritation and bickering between the
departments. The trouble between the executive and the legislative
departments especially is frequent and acute. The executive is the
most conspicuous single official. He is elected upon a platform of
pledges for legislation. He seeks to redeem those pledges by promoting
the introduction of bills and pushing them through the legislature.
The legislature feels hostile toward the executive for attempting to
coerce its action. The executive loses patience with the legislature
for not redeeming the pledges of the executive to the electorate.
The legislature is frequently hostile toward the Supreme Court for
declaring laws unconstitutional. The executive also comes in conflict
with the judiciary by reason of the fact that the latter upsets
legislation which the executive has sometimes been able to secure only
by trading for votes important appointments which cannot be recalled.
The executive and legislative departments are likely to feel that
the Supreme Court has gone beyond its judicial power in declaring
laws unconstitutional. The result is that each of the departments of
government fails to work in harmony with the others. Each tends to
retire to its own constitutional sphere and there spend considerable
time in doing what it pleases, regardless of the other departments,
and from time to time blocking and hampering them. In this way the
least progress is made with the important business of legislation and
the functioning of the executive and the judicial departments.
Our constitution-makers, however, went even farther in preventing the
concentration of the powers of government. They split up and dissipated
the powers of each department among as many different offices as
possible. They split up the legislative power between two chambers,
each operating as a check upon the other. In Illinois they went a
step farther and split up the power of the lower house by providing
a method whereby every third member might be the representative of
a minority party. A general check upon the power of the legislature
is frequently found in the provision that it can meet for general
legislative business only every two years, or that it can remain
in session for such general legislative purposes only a specified
number of days. The result is that the legislative power is not only
hampered from without by executive and judicial vetoes and the
limited time in which to act, but it is divided within among bodies
which are more or less antagonistic to each other. The executive
power of the state, if lodged wholly in the governor, acting through
his appointees, might still have been a very extensive power, but it
would have been too much power in one man to meet the approval of our
constitution-makers. Hence the executive power has been split up among
several independently elected executive officers, viz., the governor,
the attorney-general, the secretary of state, the state treasurer,
the state auditor, the state superintendent of public instruction,
and the trustees of the state university. Each one of these officers
is independent in the discharge of his statutory or constitutional
duties. So far as they divide executive power among them, they take
power from the chief executive. In the judicial department we find
the same pains to give out the minimum amount of power to any single
judge or group of judges. We find usually several courts of original
jurisdiction, each with power to handle limited and defined classes
of cases. There are justices of the peace, municipal courts, probate
courts, juvenile courts, criminal courts, and circuit courts, the
last having the most general jurisdiction. Then follow a succession
of appellate tribunals, each with a limited jurisdiction to hear
appeals. The trial judges have had their power restricted by being
forbidden to exercise any control over juries by oral instructions
upon the law. They have no power to give any instructions upon the
evidence. They have been reduced in jury trials to the position of
umpires for forensic duels between lawyers. In the appellate tribunals
they are usually forbidden to review questions of fact. Their function
is confined very narrowly to the affirming of the decision below, or
reversing it without remanding it, or reversing and remanding it for
a new hearing. They are denied any power of hearing further evidence
or making a proper order so as to settle the litigation if possible
in the appellate tribunal. The work of appellate courts consists to
so large an extent of opinion writing and closet work that the office
is inconspicuous and not very attractive. In most states the judges
are elected. Each one is independent in the exercise of the duties of
his statutory jurisdiction. Even the clerks of the various separate
courts are in many instances elected. They are absolutely independent
of the judiciary or of any other officer of the legal government in the
exercise of their statutory duties. There is no administrative head of
the court with large powers over the direction of the work of other
judges and the clerical force and a corresponding responsibility for
the conduct of judicial business. In the everyday work of his office
the judge, under the present plan of government, is amenable to no
authority except his own conscience and a fear of unfavorable public
comment upon his actions.
In our municipal governments the legislative power is usually exercised
by a single chamber, though there are instances of double chambers in
the city council. In the less important municipal governments, such
as counties, villages, and special commissions, we frequently find a
part of the executive power vested in the municipal legislative body
or in some member of it. Thus, in county governments we frequently
find the chief executive the presiding and most influential member of
the board of commissioners. In the cities, however, there is usually
a complete separation of the legislative and executive functions,
the legislative power being committed to a council and the executive
functions to a mayor and other subordinate officers. There is a
general tendency toward the splitting-up of the executive power among
different executive officers who are elected and are independent of any
superior authority in the performance of their statutory duties. A city
government will usually distribute the executive power among a mayor, a
treasurer, a comptroller, and a clerk. The executive power of a county
government will be split up among a president of the county board, a
county clerk, a sheriff, a county treasurer, a county superintendent of
schools, members of the board of assessors, and the board of review.
A great deal of unobserved splitting-up of executive and legislative
functions in municipal governments has been accomplished by the
creating of several municipal corporations with special functions
operating in the same territory. For instance, where a city and county
government cover the same territory we have two municipal legislatures
operating in the same territory, and also two sets of executive
officers. Thus is the legislative and executive power necessary for a
given district split in half. If a drainage district, a park district,
a school district, a public library district, each controlled by
commissioners or trustees with executive and legislative power, be
added, all operating in the same territory with a city government and
a county government, we have still further split up the municipal
executive and legislative power. Such situations are common enough.
The principle of decentralization has even been applied so as to
prevent the assistance to the government which might be derived from
experts in various lines. The place where the largest number and
variety of experts in the most departments of learning can be found
is the largest city of the state. If that city happens to be one of
the great cities of the country and of the world, it will also be an
important center of intellectual activity of all sorts. It will very
likely have in or near it one or more great universities. Yet in such
states we are likely to find that an ancient fear of mob influence over
legislation has placed the state capital at some distant geographical
center which is not even a transportation center. Not infrequently the
state university will be found at some point more or less inaccessible
to both the largest city of the state and the capital. These are
arrangements which tend directly to the separation of the government
from the aid of expert knowledge and the best intelligence of the
state.[1]
Members of the state and municipal legislatures are, of course,
elective. Moreover, the judges and state, county, and city
administrative officers are also elective. In addition to preventing
any officer from holding his place and his power against the will of
the majority, the wide application of the elective principle aids in
the decentralization of the executive power. It tends to make every
elective officer independent of every other officer in the discharge of
his statutory duties. By subjecting to an election at a given time a
part only of the total number of officers elected, a further check upon
the concentration of power is secured. The officers who do not come up
for election at a particular time may be of a different political faith
from those who are elected. In the same administration, therefore, some
officeholders may stand as a check upon the actions of the others. In
obedience to the principle of frequent elections all officers hold for
brief terms of one, two, four, or six years--usually for two or four
years.
Those who devised this plan of government for use in the United States
no doubt thought that the citadel of popular government as thus guarded
was absolutely impregnable. How could the power of government fall into
the hands of the few when it had been so carefully split up among so
many who could not possibly work together in harmony? How could the
power of government be retained in the face of popular disapproval
when those who exercised it were subject to such frequent elections?
Nevertheless, the impossible has again happened. The impregnable
citadel has been taken. The manner of its assault and capture is even
now one of the unexpected and, to many who appreciate only in a general
way what has occurred, one of the incomprehensible events of history.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Compare Godkin, _Essays on Problems of Modern Democracy_, pp. 305-6.
CHAPTER II
UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT--HOW ESTABLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES IN SPITE OF
THE PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT IT
Section 1
Introductory
In brief outline this is what has occurred: As the population of the
country has grown and communities and states have passed more and more
beyond the frontier stage of development, the decentralization of
governmental power has constantly increased and the elective principle
has been more and more extensively applied. As a consequence the burden
placed upon the electorate has become more and more onerous. The voter
has been called upon to vote more often and for an increasing number
of officers. He must theoretically examine into the qualifications of
a large number of candidates at frequent intervals. This has placed
upon intelligent voting an enormous educational qualification. The task
of the voter to obtain sufficient information about candidates long
ago passed beyond what even the very intelligent citizen could fulfil
and still maintain his place in competitive industry. The result is
that the voter, though extremely intelligent in general, comes to the
polls in utter ignorance of candidates and their qualifications for
office. Nevertheless, he insists, in spite of his political ignorance,
upon voting for someone. He takes his voting seriously and endeavors
to make a show of voting intelligently. This attitude necessarily
requires him to secure advice from someone as to whom to vote for. At
once there is created the opportunity for the adviser to the voter. He
first appears naturally as a local leader whom the electorate trusts.
Soon, however, there arises the man who makes advising the politically
ignorant voter his profession. Then this professional adviser becomes
more of a director to the politically ignorant voter. This process
goes on in every electoral district where the voter is politically
ignorant enough to need some advice. It is not long before there is
developed a hierarchy of professional advisers and directors to the
politically ignorant voter. Sometimes there are competing hierarchies
of such advisers and directors. One or the other, however, is the more
generally successful, or both by agreement divide the privilege of
advising the politically ignorant voter how to vote--each helping the
other in its exclusive territory. Those who direct the politically
ignorant majority how to vote have filled the state and municipal
offices with those who are loyal to them first and to the governed
afterward. The leaders of the successful organization of advisers
and directors to the politically ignorant electorate have become an
extra-legal but none the less real government. A decentralized legal
government has been replaced by a centralized extra-legal government.
Thus the power of government has again drifted into the hands of the
few. These, pursuant to well-known human characteristics, use that
power selfishly. The decentralized character of the legal governmental
power, the fact that only part of the offices are filled at any
time, and the enormous advantage which comes from having a standing
army of advisers and directors to guide the mass of politically
ignorant voters, make it difficult to replace at the polls with real
representatives of the electorate the appointees of this extra-legal
government. We have, therefore, come finally to a well-defined
extra-legal but none the less real government of the few, by the few,
and for the few, at the expense and against the wish of the many. We
have, in a word, achieved the establishment of a substantial unpopular
government.
In form the politically ignorant voter is aided by the altruistic
advice of those who know who should be elected. In form the voter
can take the advice or not as he pleases. In reality, however, and
in actual practice, the power of the electorate to fill the state
and municipal offices has been confided by the politically ignorant
majority to the leaders in the successful hierarchy of professional
advisers and directors to the politically ignorant voter. The elector,
by being required to vote too much, has been compelled to surrender to
a large extent his right to vote at all, and to permit others to cast
his ballot as they see fit. Formerly people were disfranchised when
they were given no opportunity to vote. Today they are disfranchised
by being required to vote too much. Formerly the legal rulers of
the disfranchised masses were selected for them by the few without
equivocation. Today our legal rulers are selected for us by the few
through the subterfuge of the masses casting their ballots according
to the directions of the few. In other forms of unpopular government
the central figure has been the monarch, the autocrat, the oligarch, or
the aristocrat. In ours it is the politocrat. We have avoided monarchy,
autocracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy, only to find ourselves tightly
in the grasp of a politocracy.
So startling a conclusion with respect to our governmental condition
invites a detailed consideration of each step upon which that
conclusion is founded.
Section 2
The Burden upon the Electorate--The Inverted Pyramid of Governmental
and Electoral Districts--The Offices to Be Filled and the Number of
Electors in Each District
No doubt the average American voter in most districts will readily
concede the great burden of his political duties. But unless he has
analyzed his particular situation he will hardly realize how great is
that burden. Of course, the condition of voters in different places
will differ in detail, but the important features are much the same
everywhere. For the sake of example I will analyze my own situation as
a voter of the Village of Winnetka, Township of New Trier, County of
Cook, and State of Illinois.[2]
I am one of about 600 voters in a village which elects each spring,
on one day, about one-half of the following officers: a president,
6 trustees, a clerk, a treasurer, a marshal and collector, 2 police
magistrates, and 6 library trustees; and on another day, shortly
afterward, a common-school trustee.
I am one of about 2,000 voters in a township which elects, on the same
day that the principal village officers are elected, but at a different
polling place, about one-half of the following officers: a supervisor,
a clerk, an assessor, a collector, a commissioner of highways, 5
justices of the peace, 5 constables, and a poundmaster; and at a
later day (but on the same day that the trustee for common schools is
elected), 2 high-school trustees.
I am one of about 18,000 voters to elect one member of the state Senate
every four years and 3 members of the House of Representatives of the
state legislature every two years at the regular November election.
I am one of about 28,000 voters who elect 5 county commissioners at the
regular November election every other year.
I am one of about 42,000 voters who elect one member of Congress at
the regular November election and one member of the State Board of
Equalization every two years.
I am one of about 322,000 voters who elect 3 sanitary trustees every
two years at the regular November election and a president of the
Sanitary District every five years.
I am one of about 350,000 voters who elect the following county
officers every other year at the November election: 2 of the 5 members
of the Board of Assessors, 1 of the 3 members of the Board of Review,
6 of the 18 judges of the Superior Court of Cook County; also about
one-half of the following officers: president of the Board of County
Commissioners, judge of the Probate Court, judge of the County Court,
state’s attorney, recorder of deeds, clerk of the Circuit Court, clerk
of the Superior Court, clerk of the Criminal Court, clerk of the
Appellate Court, clerk of the Probate Court, coroner, sheriff, county
clerk, county superintendent of schools, and county surveyor. I am
one of about 350,000 voters to elect, every other June at a special
election, about 5 of the 15 judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
I am one of about 380,000 voters to elect 1 of the 7 justices of the
Supreme Court of the state every nine years.
I am one of about 1,100,000 to elect at the regular November election
every two years about one-half of the following state officers: a
governor, a lieutenant-governor, a secretary of state, an auditor, a
treasurer, a state superintendent of public instruction, 6 trustees
of the state university, clerk of the state Supreme Court, and 2
congressmen at large.
I am one of about 15,000,000 voters who elect a president and
vice-president of the United States every four years at the regular
November election.
When I entered the voting booth at the regular November election in
1912, the ballot given me to mark was 22 × 28 inches in size. It called
upon the voter to do his part in filling, exclusive of presidential
electors, 34 offices. It presented for his consideration, exclusive of
presidential electors, 181 names from which to make selections.[3]
An enumeration of the offices to be filled by election merely
emphasizes the number of candidates whom the voter should inform
himself about. The extent of the burden upon the voter is not fully
appreciated until it is perceived how difficult actual conditions make
it for him to obtain information regarding candidates for office. The
least important and most inconspicuous state and local offices, as well
as the most important and conspicuous, must engage the attention of
the electorate of the entire governmental district. But the candidates
for inconspicuous and unimportant offices must usually be men who
are inconspicuous or unimportant in the community. Furthermore, the
importance and conspicuousness of subordinate offices do not increase
in proportion to the increase of population. The clerk of a court
or a county surveyor is not a more conspicuous officer because he
holds his office in a county having over two million inhabitants. He
is, therefore, proportionately less conspicuous and important as the
population increases. The voter is, therefore, constantly presented
with candidates whose reputations are in inverse ratio to the size
and population of the electoral district. The more electors there are
in the district the smaller in proportion is the reputation of the
candidate. The more the character and qualifications of the candidates
are hidden, the more difficult it is for the voter to obtain the
information which he should have in order to vote intelligently. For
instance, the 600 voters in the village where the writer resides are
called upon to select a clerk, a treasurer, a marshal and collector,
2 police magistrates, and library and school trustees. In so small
a community the voter may with some effort actually know who the
candidates for these places are. As a matter of fact, however, that
effort is considerably more than the large majority of voters will
push themselves to perform. The 2,000 voters in the township where
the writer resides are called upon to elect a supervisor, a clerk, an
assessor, a collector, a commissioner of highways, 5 justices of the
peace, 4 constables, a poundmaster, and high-school trustees. These
offices are not intrinsically more conspicuous or more important than
the village offices just enumerated. Hence the enlargement from 600 to
2,000 voters causes the candidates for office to be proportionately
less conspicuous in the community. To the same extent the difficulty to
the voter of obtaining information as to the character and attainments
of the candidates has been increased. The members of the state Senate
and House of Representatives are important officers because they
exercise the legislative power of the state. The conspicuousness and
importance of each of these offices is, however, weakened by the
existence of the other, for between the representatives and senators
the legislative power is divided and each is a check upon the other.
The members of the House of Representatives in the state legislature
are hidden to some extent from the voters because 3 are elected at
large from a senatorial district containing 18,000 voters. It is more
difficult for the voter to find out about a legislator when he is one
of 18,000 than when he is one of 6,000 voters. Twenty-eight thousand
electors of the County of Cook outside of the city of Chicago are
called upon to vote for 5 of the 15 county commissioners. The office is
not likely to be held by men whom it is easy for the average voter of
the district to pick up direct information about. To elect one member
of the state Board of Equalization 42,000 voters are called upon.
Again, the size of the electorate makes it difficult to know who the
candidates for the place may be. Three hundred and twenty-two thousand
voters are called upon to elect 7 sanitary trustees. Here the darkness
of the average voter becomes Egyptian, and he is practically excluded
from any means of a personal knowledge of who the candidates for the
sanitary trustees are. The same is equally true of the members of the
Board of Review, members of the Board of Assessors, the 30 judges
of Cook County, the president of the Board of County Commissioners,
the judge of the Probate Court, the judge of the County Court, the
state’s attorney, the recorder, the 5 clerks of the different courts,
the sheriff, the county clerk, the county superintendent of public
instruction, and the county surveyor. There are 350,000 voters who
regularly cast their ballots for these officers. Among a population
containing so many voters it is practically impossible, even for the
voter who makes an unusual effort, to acquire any personal knowledge
of who the candidates for these offices are. Take the most prominent
officials in the list--the judges and state’s attorney. The intelligent
man who is a voter has very little chance to acquire any personal
knowledge of the fitness of the candidates for these offices. A
particular judge or a particular candidate for state’s attorney may
become to some extent known to the voter and have the confidence of
the voter. But these are exceptional cases. The average candidate for
these offices is beyond the reach of any thoroughgoing knowledge on
the part of the voter. The difficulty of obtaining information about
one inconspicuous member of so large a population is too great. In
Illinois, to select a secretary of state, an auditor, a treasurer, a
state superintendent of schools, 6 trustees of the state university, a
clerk of the state Supreme Court, and 2 congressmen at large, 1,100,000
voters are called upon. Here again the inconspicuousness of the offices
compared with the size of the electorate is such that the obstacle to
the voter informing himself about candidates is practically insuperable.
One would think that the voter had difficulty enough in finding out
about candidates as a result of the simple process of requiring
comparatively inconspicuous and unimportant offices to be filled by
a very numerous electorate. But his difficulty has been enormously
increased by the process of requiring the voter to do the larger part
of his investigating for the purpose of voting at a single election.
For instance, the writer is called upon at a single election in
November to investigate the qualifications for office of a president
and vice-president of the United States, a congressman for his
district, 2 congressmen at large, about one-half of the state officers,
and about one-half of the county officers. To be exact, he must look up
candidates for 34 different offices (not including the presidential
electors) presented upon the long ballot given _supra_ (opposite p.
29), to the number of 181. Assuming that information about some of
the candidates for the more important offices, such as members of
Congress and members of the state legislature, could be looked up and
reliable information obtained, the chances are that this will not be
done because other more important offices, like that of president of
the United States and governor of the state, are to be filled. This
process of preventing the voter from investigating candidates for even
important and conspicuous offices by putting so much investigating upon
him at a single election that he cannot do it has operated to produce
political ignorance on the part of the electorate as to candidates for
Congress and the state legislature. These are important and conspicuous
offices. The candidates come from comparatively small districts. If
selected at an election where they were the only offices to be filled,
a very considerable amount of intelligence might be displayed by the
electorate. But these offices are hidden among half a hundred other
offices for which several hundred other candidates are running. In
the mass the voter is distracted and fails to a considerable extent
to distinguish the important from the unimportant. The extraordinary
amount of investigating to be done overwhelms and discourages him,
and he goes to the polls too frequently utterly ignorant of the
qualifications of candidates for members of Congress and the state
legislature.
That the decentralization of governmental power and the increased
application of the elective principle has necessarily cast upon the
electorate an enormous burden in order that it may vote intelligently
is clear enough from the everyday experience of the voter at the
polls. At least one political scientist has directed an experiment to
emphasize it. President Judson, a few years ago, gave to a graduate
class at the University of Chicago, four weeks before the regular fall
election in Cook County, a list of all the candidates for office on a
ballot substantially similar to that which appears _supra_ (p. 29),
and required them to report at the time of the election such facts as
they could ascertain about the candidates and their qualifications.
With diligent work on the part of the really mature men in Dr. Judson’s
class a satisfactory report was turned in with regard to only a small
percentage of the entire list. This, Dr. Judson thought, fairly
indicated what the average voter could do on his own responsibility in
the way of securing information respecting candidates if he had spent
the same amount of time with that object in view.
Not only is it obvious that the voter is under a great burden with
respect to seeking and securing information about the candidates
for office he is called upon to vote for, but it is clear that the
task is so great as to be impossible of fulfilment by the large mass
of the electorate who have their place in competitive industry to
maintain. A small handful of intelligent men of commanding position
in the community, after many years of experience, may be able with
comparatively little expenditure of time to inform themselves
accurately concerning a large number of the candidates of the two
or three principal parties on the ballot. But the average man whose
position in the community and experience with affairs is more limited
could not obtain the proper amount of information without an actual
neglect of his business or profession--a neglect which he dare not
permit. The voter who occupies a salaried position which demands a
full day of work for his employer throughout the year has no time,
inclination, nor opportunity for prolonged investigation into the
qualifications of candidates for public office. The residuary mass of
the electorate have neither the time, the experience, nor the interest
to investigate in advance and inform themselves of the qualifications
of candidates to be presented for a large number of offices.
Section 3
The Resulting Political Ignorance of the Voter and His Consequent
Disfranchisement
Of course, there is some political ignorance due to illiteracy and
general lack of intelligence. With this, however, we are not now
principally concerned. It is here assumed that except in small
and exceptional districts the great majority of voters are neither
illiterate nor unintelligent, but are of a fair average intelligence
and capable of reaching and following sound moral and political
judgments. The fact which is now to be emphasized is that the burden
upon the voter is such that the vote of the most intelligent man is
made quite as politically ignorant as that of the least intelligent.
The percentage of politically ignorant voting has become very high, not
because the voter is unintelligent, but in spite of the fact that he
may be extremely intelligent. An electorate that is capable of casting
an 85 per cent intelligent vote on a given matter of importance has,
by the simple process of requiring the voter to vote too much, been
reduced to the voting effectiveness of a Filipino who is not yet ready
for popular institutions. To the extent that our intelligent voter has
thus artificially been made ignorant in the discharge of his political
duties he has been disfranchised. Too much of what popularly passes
for democracy has resulted in too little real democracy.
When the voter faces in the voting booth such a ballot as that already
exhibited _supra_ (opposite p. 29), or even a much simpler one, he has
no time to analyze his condition of knowledge or ignorance. He must
vote quickly and be about his business. If we could secure a revelation
from the voter of the state of his mind as he faces the ballot, would
not his condition of ignorance be appalling? He would, of course, admit
that he knew nothing of the duties of a large number of the offices to
be filled. He would admit that he knew nothing of the qualifications of
a large number of the men who were seeking office. Indeed, many of them
he would never have heard of. The average voter would no doubt have
prepared himself, by reading, by following events, and by discussing
the matter with other voters, to vote for a particular candidate for
president of the United States. From the same sources he might acquire
a personal preference among the candidates for governor of the state.
He might have a personal preference founded upon some actual knowledge
or current rumor as to the proper candidate for congressman or member
of the state legislature or president of the county board. He might be
satisfied that some one of the several candidates running for several
vacancies on the bench ought to be elected. It is hardly probable,
however, that he will have any personal preference founded upon any
actual knowledge as to the candidates for all these places at once.
Outside the candidates for three or four places he will be utterly
and entirely devoid of any personal knowledge upon which to base an
intelligent vote.
To make this position more concrete I will describe my own state of
mind as to the ballot illustrated _supra_ (facing p. 29). I never
heard the names of any of the candidates on the Socialist Labor,
the Socialist, or Prohibition tickets except those of Debs and
Chafin, and of these I had an impression about the qualifications
for office only with respect to Mr. Debs. On the Democratic ticket I
think I was intelligent with respect to Mr. Wilson’s candidacy for
president and Mr. Dunne’s for governor. I had some personal knowledge
regarding one candidate for a trustee of the state university, the
candidates for state’s attorney and for president of the Board of
County Commissioners. The other names on the Democratic ticket
meant nothing to me. On the Republican ticket I regarded myself as
informed sufficiently to vote intelligently on Mr. Taft’s candidacy
for president, and Mr. Deneen’s for governor. I had some personal
knowledge regarding one candidate for representative at large in
Congress, the candidates for representative in Congress from the
congressional district, and for president of the Board of County
Commissioners. Of the remaining thirty-nine names on the Republican
ticket I recognized one as that of the son of a war governor, one as a
former attorney-general, one as a former county judge, three seeking
clerkships and the office of coroner, as the incumbents of the offices
for which they were running, and one as a lawyer with whom I had some
personal acquaintance. The names of the other candidates at the time I
voted meant absolutely nothing to me. On the Progressive ticket I was
intelligent with respect to Mr. Roosevelt’s candidacy for president
and Mr. Johnson’s for vice-president; also to the candidacy of those
seeking the offices of attorney-general and representative to the state
legislature. I had some acquaintance with one of the candidates for
trustee of the University of Illinois, and one of the five candidates
for county commissioner. The rest of the names meant nothing whatever
to me.
If the offices which the voter was called upon to fill while
politically ignorant were few in number and altogether insignificant in
the extent of the governmental power which they controlled, not much
harm would be done. But little by little, as population has increased
and social and governmental organization has become more complex and
the political duties of the voter have grown heavier, the political
ignorance of the voter has extended to a constantly increasing number
of candidates for office, until the sum total of the governmental
power of all the offices for which the voter casts his ballot in
political ignorance constitutes the principal part of the entire local
and state governmental power. The great sources of governmental power
are the Congress of the United States, the legislatures of the state
and local governments. When the tide of political ignorance on the part
of the intelligent voter rises so high that it embraces the candidates
for the local, state, and federal legislative bodies, the situation is
serious. When it includes the local judiciary and all but the president
of the United States, the highest executive officer of the state and of
the principal local government, the situation has become desperate.
So far as the electorate is too ignorant to vote intelligently it has
been in effect disfranchised. It does not really vote at all. If the
voter were required to vote blindfolded, or if the ballot were made up
in cipher, he would know that he was disfranchised. Suppose, however,
that the voter is blindfolded or the ballot done in cipher only in
those instances where the voter is called upon to vote without any
political information necessary to enable him to vote intelligently.
Would he be any worse off because of the cipher or the bandage on his
eyes? Does not the political ignorance of the voter as clearly deprive
him of his power to vote as the use of a cipher or blindfolding? In
both cases he goes through the mechanical act of voting, but he records
nothing at all by so doing.
The ignorance of the voter and his consequent disfranchisement
follow necessarily from our present plan of government. They result
immediately from the burdens placed upon the electorate. Those in
turn arise from the application of the two principles of government
which we have constantly heretofore applauded and proclaimed--the
decentralization of governmental power and the principle that all
offices of any consequence should be elective. These principles of
government are still regarded by the mass of the people as the true and
only sources of democracy and the necessary protection of the people
from all forms of unpopular government. The application of these
principles is in varying degrees protected by state constitutions which
provide for the separation of the powers of government, both state
and local, among departments and officers, and require local as well
as state subordinate officers to be elected at frequent intervals.[4]
Thus do the letter and the spirit of our governmental theory and
practice necessarily induce the wholesale ignorance and consequent
disfranchisement of the large majority of the electorate in regard to
candidates for offices, which, when filled, wield a very large, if not
the larger, part of the state and local governmental power.
Formerly unpopular government was founded upon the absence of any
voting. Today the electorate, while voting furiously, has nevertheless
been deprived to a large extent of the ballot because a burden of
knowledge--an educational qualification, in effect--has been placed
upon it which, under present conditions, it does not and cannot
fulfil. Thus, by the simple process of too much so-called popular
democracy--that is, too much decentralization of governmental power
and too much voting--we have arrived at the essential condition
which invites the establishment of unpopular government--namely, the
disfranchisement of the electorate.
Section 4
The Power of the Electorate Passes to Those Who Take Advantage of Its
Political Ignorance to Direct It How to Vote
The severe educational qualification which has been imposed upon the
electorate today has done more than merely deprive the voter of the
power to vote. It has presented to others the _opportunity_ to direct
the voter how to vote and thus in effect to cast his ballot for him.
That opportunity has at once been taken advantage of by men who have
been quick to perceive the vast political power which the privilege
of casting the voter’s ballot for him confers. This combination of
opportunity and selfish motive is the complete cause of the passing of
a considerable part of the political power of the electorate at large
to the few who direct it how to vote. It is important that the way in
which the effect follows from the causal conditions be set forth in as
detailed and precise a manner as possible.
The voting for a large number of the most important offices in the
state and municipal government is done during a few hours on election
day. In these few hours great masses of voters come face to face with
such a ballot as appears opposite p. 29. They have no opinion as to any
of the candidates except a very few, for the most part at the head of
the ticket. They do not, however, because of their ignorance refrain
from voting. Neither do they pitch a coin to decide for whom they shall
vote. They insist on voting, and they take their voting seriously.
It follows that when they are politically ignorant they vote the way
they are told to vote by somebody. The important questions are: Who
tells them how to vote? and By what means are they told? The small
minority, including many of the most intelligent, vote the way they
are directed by some newspaper. At one time a prominent newspaper in
Chicago was credited with the ability to direct about one-tenth of
the voters in a county or city election how to cast their ballots.
But this was possible only when the newspaper concentrated its entire
influence on the filling of one or two offices. The newspaper gives
very little advice to the voter with respect to the filling of a
considerable majority of offices for which elections are held. Even
as to the few offices with regard to the candidates for which the
newspaper makes a great effort to advise voters, its influence is
limited. A large proportion of the electorate vote the party circle.
Some are moved by sentiment or strong prejudices; others by the fact
that men of whom they know something personally are responsible for
the nominations or appear as candidates in a prominent place on a
particular ticket. In every case a vote in the party circle, which is a
blanket vote for a great number of party candidates of whom the voter
has no knowledge, is a vote according to the direction of those who
promoted or directed the nomination of the men who appear as candidates
in that party column. It is believed, however, that a very large body
of voters--especially in districts where large numbers are generally
ignorant or illiterate--need, and indeed must have, advice as to how
to vote from some individual whom they either look up to and trust,
or fear. These voters do not ask for political leadership. They do
not desire information upon which to found political opinions. All
they ask for is advice as to how to mark their ballots. In congested
centers of population this advice is sought within a few hours in a
single day by tens and even hundreds of thousands of voters. The voter
wants information as he approaches the booth. Even those who allow a
newspaper to direct them how to vote need advice in voting for offices
which the newspaper ignores. So the practice of independent voting and
splitting tickets causes the voter to seek advice from those who make
it their business to know something about the candidates. If these
masses do not obtain instruction and advice as to whom to vote for
they must refrain from voting, or pitch a coin, or fall back upon the
party circle. They do the last as the most rational, and thus take
the directions of those who are able to place the names of candidates
under the party circle. In brief, the entire situation is something
like this: As to four-fifths of the candidates for office the voters
are politically ignorant; yet they insist upon voting and in taking
seriously their duty as a citizen to vote. They will not pitch a coin.
Hence they must vote the way they are told. Nine-tenths of the voters
who cast ballots for four-fifths of the offices are directed to vote
by those who have placed the names upon the ballot or by someone
who makes a special appeal to the voter at the polls or by a special
canvass before election.
Not only, however, does the political ignorance of the voter present
an obvious opportunity to someone to direct him how to vote and thus
cast his ballot for him, but an overwhelming self-interest on the
part of individuals invokes at once the strongest motive to use the
opportunity. The man that can control the power of the electorate will
secure the power to appoint to office. He who can regularly place the
candidate in office will soon control the holder of the office and
exercise the governmental power which the officeholder wields. The
securing of such governmental power has always been an object in itself
to a proportion of the individuals in every community. When seen as a
source of personal profit and advancement, the numbers who will strive
for it and the efforts which they will make are greatly increased.
Indeed, the prize which the successful secure is such as to produce the
keenest competition and the most exhaustive effort.
It is important to notice that the necessities of candidates quickly
reveal the extent of the political ignorance of the voter and the
opportunity which this affords for someone to direct him how to vote.
The candidate, of whom the vast majority of voters are politically
ignorant because his office is obscure and inconspicuous, finds that
his election is not a matter of his policies and efficiency, but of the
efforts of workers at the polls and the canvassing of voters before
election. Such a candidate needs the support of successful advisers to
the politically ignorant voter. He needs the support of that man or
combination of men in the community that can cast the largest number of
votes of the politically ignorant. A little experience in fulfilling
this apparently innocent and legitimate demand for a campaign manager
will reveal to the manager the character of the voter’s political
ignorance and the fact that someone must always direct him how to vote,
and that this is the means by which political power is to be secured.
A slight actual experience is all that is necessary to point the real
path to the exercise by the few of governmental power.
Such conditions of opportunity revealed and ever-present selfish
motives must inevitably produce men who aspire to be successful
advisers to the electorate. Active competition for these places
naturally ensues. Success, then, means the survival of the fittest.
That means that among the professionals those win who take their
profession seriously, understand it thoroughly, and practice it
assiduously and with judgment, tact, and craft. Here, then, we have
the local political boss or professional politician. He is merely the
successful local adviser and director to the politically ignorant
voter. He is the man who can, more than anyone else, in a local
district, direct the largest number of the politically ignorant how
to vote. He advises and directs the voter how to vote principally by
personal canvasses of the voters and solicitations at the polls and
by controlling the machinery of nominations so as to determine who
shall appear as a candidate under a given party name. The political
ignorance of the voter is one of the necessary conditions to his
existence. The fact that most voters cannot make a show of voting
intelligently without someone to help them provides the opportunity
which calls him into being. The power of the successful adviser and
director to the voter is in direct ratio to the political ignorance of
the electorate. It makes no difference whether that ignorance be the
result of general lack of intelligence or be artificially produced by
placing a special educational qualification upon the voter which he
cannot or will not fulfil. To the extent that the adviser and director
of the politically ignorant voter can direct and advise the voter how
to vote, he can fill the offices of the state and local governments
with those who are loyal to him, and thus control some part of the
power of government.
Since the business of directing the politically ignorant voter how to
vote has fallen into the hands of a professional class and since the
prize to be won is the control of governmental power, it is not to be
wondered at that the profession has become highly organized for the
purpose of achieving its object; that men of extraordinary power and
ability have arisen as its leaders, and that to a very great extent the
object of the organization has been achieved.
The political boss or adviser to the politically ignorant voter
first appears in the smaller election districts. His advent is
coincident with a certain degree of political ignorance on the part
of the electorate. At first that ignorance was the result of the
actual illiteracy which appeared in the majority of the voters of a
particular district, usually in a large city. Thus we first hear of
the ward boss in our larger cities. His ward usually contains a large
foreign population living in the densest political ignorance, easily
terrified, easily cajoled, and easily corrupted. The steady increase in
the length of ballots and the burden placed upon the electorate soon,
however, began to produce artificially a state of political ignorance
on the part of the most intelligent electorate. This at once produced
the political boss for districts where the electorate was possessed
of a high average of character and intelligence. This boss was of a
different type from a river-ward boss. It took longer to make him. He
was of a somewhat finer grain. He had some inkling of the fact that he
really bore a fiduciary relation to the politically ignorant electorate
whom he advised and directed and whose vote he cast. He had to possess
himself of the confidence and the trust of his constituents. His
success was obtained only by close attention to his profession and by
qualities of tact and leadership. His supremacy was retained only by
care and subtlety. The moment each one of any considerable number of
local election districts developed such a professional political boss
it was inevitable that they should begin to act together to direct and
advise the politically ignorant voters of the larger districts how to
vote when it came to the filling of a more important office in a larger
election district. Thus the bosses of the city wards and the country
districts combined to agree on who should be presented to the voter
for election and to direct the voter how to vote. Naturally out of
the combination some men emerged capable of leading the combination
of bosses. Thus arose the city or county machine. In extraordinary
instances a single man became a city or county boss for a particular
party organization. In the same way, when the districts of a state
were well provided with permanent political bosses, there was a
movement among the leaders to combine into a state machine. Again, in
extraordinary cases a single man was great enough to be the supreme
political leader of a political party organization in a state and to
lead it regularly to victory at the polls.
Thus almost imperceptibly, but with astonishing rapidity, there have
been developed state-wide feudal organizations for the purpose--in
form at least--of advising the politically ignorant voter how to
vote, but in reality for the purpose of casting his vote for him, and
thus securing the political power of the electorate. In each smallest
election precinct there is a regular band of workers under a precinct
captain. In each collection of precincts which make the smallest
electoral district, like a ward in a city or a township in the country,
there must be a mesne lord whom the captains obey. In larger election
districts, such as a city or a county, or a combination of counties,
there must be tenants in chief over the mesne lords. Finally, there
is the great lord paramount for the whole state. No precinct captain
is permitted to have any idea of principles or policies. It is his
duty, with his aids, to produce delegates for conventions who will
vote as the organization chiefs direct, canvass the precinct before
election and buy, command, instruct, persuade, or coerce, as the
exigencies of the case may require, votes for the candidates named by
the organization chiefs. When the precinct captain and his workers fail
to perform these services successfully, out they must go, and others,
waiting eagerly for promotion, will take their places. When they show
ability they will make progress in the organization. The district boss
must equally keep his captains in obedience and effectiveness. For him
also there is promotion or reduction to the ranks in prospect. It is
the law of life and the source of the organization’s power that its
officers render implicit obedience to their immediate chiefs and that a
mighty personality direct the whole.
Thus does the power of the electorate pass to those who take advantage
of the political ignorance of the electorate to direct it how to vote.
Section 5
The Power of Government Passes into the Hands of Those Who Are Able
to Direct the Majority of the Politically Ignorant How to Vote. They
Constitute an Extra-legal but None the Less Real Government
The professional adviser and director to the politically ignorant
voter aims to secure control of as much of the power of government as
possible. His means to that end consist in becoming the most important
single factor in the filling of the offices of the legal government.
Success in advising and directing a majority of the politically
ignorant voters how to vote places in his hands the power to fill by
appointment all offices for which candidates are presented who are
unknown to the electorate generally. Our political boss naturally
tends to appoint men who are loyal to him and to his power, and by
this means he naturally secures a certain control over part of the
local governmental power. In the same way, the prize of a combination
of successful local bosses is the power to appoint the majority of the
officeholders of some more extensive and important local municipal
government and thus obtain control of a part of its governmental power.
When the state-wide organization of the feudal army of directors
and advisers to the politically ignorant voter has been thoroughly
perfected, with a man of great ability at its head, the prize to be
obtained is the principal part of the entire governmental power,
whether state or local. More and more such an organization will fill
with men loyal to its leaders the local and state legislative bodies,
the local and state executive offices, and even places upon the bench.
Such an organization, when continuously successful for any length
of time, will have actually filled all of the less conspicuous and
less important offices in the executive, legislative, and judicial
departments of the state and local governments.
But the influence of such an organization will go farther than this.
Being in existence and efficient, it will often be a determining factor
in nominating and electing a candidate for an office so important,
and, viewed by itself, so conspicuous, that in a special election
to fill that one office the intelligence of the electorate would be
displayed at its maximum. For instance, if we look at the federal
government alone, we find that the voter casts his ballot only for
president, vice-president, and usually only one congressman. The
congressman is selected for the most part from a fairly small district.
Taking the federal government by itself, the voter’s function in
selecting a congressman is so simple and direct that no professional
advice or direction is needed except in the unusual case where the
district is filled with an actual illiterate vote. But the moment the
vote-directing organization is called into being in the congressional
district because of the artificially produced political ignorance of
the voter in respect to candidates for various local municipal offices
and state offices, such an organization at once exercises an important
control over the nomination and election of the congressman. In the
same way the organization will gain a very considerable influence over
the nomination and election of candidates for local municipal offices
where they consist only of the mayor and an alderman from each ward,
who are elected at a special election. Such an organization will have
at all times a vast influence in the nomination and election of judges,
even when they are chosen at a special election. There is no doubt that
the nomination for governor of the state and president of the United
States may from time to time be greatly influenced by politocrats whose
power is based upon the political ignorance of the voter in respect to
candidates for all manner of obscure offices in the state and local
governments. Speaking generally, if the voter is habitually so ignorant
politically that the politocrats have secured, to a considerable
extent, the power to direct him how to vote, then the politocrats
will exercise a great deal of influence in determining who shall be
elected to offices so conspicuous and important that if they were the
only ones filled by election the voter would exercise a high degree of
independence and intelligence in making his selection and the services
of the same politocrats would be wholly dispensed with.
A vote-directing organization which is steadily successful in a given
state or local government for eight years will reach a point where it
actually places in practically all the state and local offices that
are filled by election, and also in the House of Representatives, in
Congress, and in the United States Senate, men who are loyal to the
organization and its leaders before everything else. The leader of such
an organization may even have obtained a controlling influence with the
governor of the state and the president of the United States, so far
as their power extends to local appointments and affairs. When this
occurs, the leaders of the state and local vote-directing organization
have become the real though extra-legal government. The real power of
government, both state and local, and an important influence in the
power of the federal government are in their hands. Local and state
executive officers and local and state legislators will take orders
from these leaders. Judges in a more subtle way will take account of
their wishes.
Thus we have, however imperceptibly, none the less effectively changed
the character of our government. The very excess of our precautions
to prevent the power of government from coming into the hands of
the few has delivered the power of government into the hands of the
few. So obviously and completely has the elaborate effort of our
constitution-makers failed to keep governmental power out of the
hands of the few that we might as well accept it as axiomatic that
governmental authority in any highly organized society cannot be
prevented from becoming concentrated in the hands of the few. Our form
of government has indeed changed from the decentralized democracy
of the frontier to the centralized politocracy of a highly organized
civilization. We have turned our back upon the autocrat and the
aristocrat only to find ourselves in the hands of the politocrat.
Section 6
The Extra-legal Government Uses Its Power Selfishly to Maintain Itself
and to Benefit Those Who Have Organized and Supported It
Our extra-legal government is not one of altruists. It may be relied
upon to act selfishly in two respects: First, it will use all of its
influence and power to maintain itself. Then as its tenure of power
becomes more secure it will use that power to reward the leaders who
have organized and supported it.
The clear perception of what is necessary for the maintenance of
the extra-legal government will provide the wise politocrat with
a deep-rooted political philosophy. His creed, if uttered, would
sound something like this: “I believe in the disfranchisement of the
voter by keeping him too ignorant politically to vote intelligently.
I believe that all voters, no matter how intelligent in general,
can be made politically ignorant in voting by placing upon them a
burden of investigating candidates and attending elections which
they can conceivably, but will not in fact, perform. I believe that
such a burden upon the voter can be produced most readily by the
decentralization of governmental power in every possible way, and the
constant application of the elective principle. I therefore believe
in fostering the popular fear of kings, the popular prejudice against
the centralization of power and the filling of offices by appointment.
Above all I believe in more democracy (i.e., more applications of the
elective principle) as the cure for the ills of democracy.”
With these deep-seated convictions, the course of action of the wise
politocrat in many respects is not difficult to predict and not
difficult to understand when it is observed. The chief executive of
the state or of the United States who, in response to any popular
demand, attempts to influence or coerce the legislature must be
publicly rebuked. It must be pointed out that he is overstepping the
bounds of his constitutional power. He must confine himself to the
limited constitutional sphere of the executive. When a man becomes
governor or president he must cease to be a citizen. The promotion
of decentralization of governmental power through the creation of
several new municipal corporations operating in the same district is
a step which should always receive the favorable attention of the
politocrats. The constant application of the elective principle to
each newly created office must be maintained. The election district
furthermore should always be kept as large as possible and always
larger than the personal reputation of anyone who would be likely to
seek a given office which the voters of the district select. Methods
of redistricting can be devised and carried out so as to yield the
maximum amount of power for the extra-legal government for the time
being in power. Election laws must be so shaped and administrative
acts so directed as to enable the organization to marshal its votes in
the most effective way. New parties and independent movements must be
discouraged. One of the neatest devices to effect such discouragement
is to retain the party circle and at the same time provide that no
candidate shall appear on more than one ticket on the ballot. That
will force all candidates who can secure the extra-legal government’s
party nomination to take it as against an independent nomination.
The fact that the extra-legal government puts up some men who are
satisfactory and who cannot also be placed upon an independent ticket
will discourage the putting in the field of any independent ticket. No
harm will be done to the extra-legal government by politocrats if the
network of governmental bodies becomes very complex, or if the details
of carrying out provisions of election laws become so difficult to
understand that the whole machinery of elections must be directed by a
few experts.
But the chief care of the wise politocrat will not be to acquire a
selfish political philosophy or a selfish program for governmental
legislation. Of paramount importance is the organizing, recruiting,
training, feeding, and caring for the feudal army of directors and
advisers to the politically ignorant voter and the rewarding of the
officers and lesser leaders of that army according to their position.
So far as possible, of course, the district and precinct workers will
be given places upon the public pay-rolls and so fed and clothed from
the public treasury. In return for what they receive from the public
they will do the minimum amount of work for the public and the maximum
amount for the organization. Places on the pay-rolls of private
corporations may also be at the disposal of the leaders among the
politocrats. In a city of any size much small graft connected with the
issuing of licenses of all sorts, the selling of liquor, the business
of vice, and the activities of the underworld may be picked up by the
privates and captains in the organization. The lesser politocrats
will take the higher salaried positions and fee offices. It will not
interfere with their obtaining these places that they must submit to an
election. The work of the office will be done by a chief deputy paid
out of the public treasury. The holder of the office will, therefore,
be enabled to spend his entire time conducting the business of advising
and directing the politically ignorant voter whom to vote for. The
larger graft connected with the protection of the business of vice
and the activities of the underworld will go to those who are still
higher up among the politocrats. This, however, is a dirty and risky
mode of reward and the protection which can be given has its limits.
Many politocrats, and among them the most powerful, will not touch
it personally. In certain districts men of excellent social standing
and mental attainments can be used to advantage by the extra-legal
government. In most instances material of this sort can be drawn from
among lawyers. The reward for those who are constant and effective in
their service will be a place in the corporation counsel’s office or
the state’s attorney’s office, and finally a place upon the bench. The
larger graft of public contracts is reserved for the overlords of the
feudal organization. But even this the great leaders will not touch.
The great prize which is reserved for the lord paramount and his
tenants in chief is the privilege of entering into an alliance,
offensive and defensive, with special business and property interests
which need the aid of the local or state governmental power to exploit
to the best advantage the many, or the protection from governmental
interference at the demand of the many who are being exploited. Indeed,
so close may the relations become between the great captains of such
special business and property interests and the extra-legal government
by politocrats, that the real power of government may to some extent
actually reside in the former rather than the latter. It will indeed
be difficult in many instances to tell which group commands and which
obeys. Where the leaders of both are equally able there will be a
complete partnership.
Section 7
The Extra-legal Government Is Able to Maintain Itself in the Face of
Popular Disapproval
The conditions under which extra-legal government exercises its power
and the manner of that exercise furnish it with certain considerable
advantages in its very natural effort to maintain itself in the face of
popular disapproval.
The extra-legal government has the advantage of being hidden from the
electorate. The mass of voters can tell who only a few conspicuous
officeholders in the legal government at any one time are. Of the
existence of a thoroughly organized extra-legal government they have
no real knowledge whatever. If they have some idea of machines and
bosses it is vague and imperfect. They see only a little at a time and
have no idea who it is that casts their ballots for them. The voter
who masters such secrets is rare indeed. Even the very intelligent
man who is a voter cannot tell anything in his own district about the
extra-legal government. He only knows that there are bosses whom he
never seems to have a chance to vote against. This secrecy on the part
of the extra-legal government is an invaluable asset in enabling it to
retain power. So long as extra-legal government remains hidden, there
is little chance of the voter causing it any serious damage.
The extra-legal government has a great advantage also in the fact that
while it is the real government, the electorate is constantly voting
for the legal but dummy government of officeholders. Of course, if the
voter knew the connection between each officeholder and the extra-legal
government he might vote intelligently, but that is information of
the most secret kind. In many instances it is impossible for anyone
to obtain it. Certainly it cannot be expected that a voter who is
in ignorance of the qualifications and personality of most of the
candidates for office will ever know what connection any of them have
with a more or less secret extra-legal government.
The wise politocrat appreciates the advantage which his extra-legal
government has in hiding behind the legal government and in the fact
that his power is not subject directly to the approval or disapproval
of the electorate. He knows, however, that from time to time some loyal
adherent of the extra-legal government will demand and must be given
the nomination for an office so prominent that his record will be fully
investigated and his relation to the extra-legal government become
widely known. Then the existence of extra-legal government will, in the
contest for that office, become an issue, especially if there be an
independent anti-politocratic candidate. But experience will make it
clear that such an issue must be avoided. The extra-legal government
must drop as a candidate for an office of any prominence a man known
by the electorate to be loyal to the politocracy. In his place may be
put a fresh dummy or a real independent, as the exigencies of the case
require. The former step is, of course, from the point of view of the
politocrat, to be preferred. When, however, the outlook is dark and
forbidding for the extra-legal government in power, its leaders will
assent with a show of enthusiasm to the nomination of a Hughes or a
Wilson. They know that the naming of an independent and popular man who
is likely to be successful at the polls will enable their extra-legal
government to appoint to office the subordinate elective officeholders
in the legal government. They know that a governor surrounded by
independent subordinate officers and opposed by legislators selected
by and loyal to the extra-legal government can do that government no
permanent damage. They know that most men can, during their term of
office, when placed in close contact with such opposition, be worn down
and disheartened, so that they are glad to quit when the opportunity
for promotion to a place where they need no longer war upon extra-legal
government is tendered them. Thus, a popular governor may be induced to
accept the position of vice-president or a place upon the Supreme Court
of the United States.
The failure to observe this principle of action at the Republican
National Convention of 1912 has started the most widespread and serious
movement against extra-legal government that we have yet had. According
to all the rules of astute politocratic management, the representatives
of extra-legal government in that convention should have acquiesced
in the selection of the most popular and prominent leader available,
in spite of the fact of his independence. They should have driven
into power with him as many of their adherents as possible, or let
him go down to defeat. Whichever happened, extra-legal government, as
conducted by means of the control of an extra-legal oligarchy over
successful candidates for office, would not have been disrupted and a
general movement inimical to the whole basis of extra-legal government
would have been averted. The revelation of the existence of a power
in a few hands which could legally override popular desires in the
selection of a candidate for the president of the United States, and
the exhibition of what, to a large number of people, must have seemed
to be the actual exercise of such a power, and the defeat of the
popular will clearly expressed could have only the result of launching
one of the greatest independent political movements of half a century,
with its principal attack upon extra-legal government as it has grown
up in the United States. This is the same sort of mistake that the
advocates of slavery made when they underestimated the unexpressed
determination of the North to preserve the Union.
There are, of course, as many rival vote-directing organizations as
there are political parties which have become established and have a
name with any good-will attached. If two of these organizations are at
all well matched and occupy practically the entire field, their leaders
frequently make secret agreements according to which the governmental
power is divided. One takes the city and the other the county, or one a
great metropolitan district and the other the state. Such arrangements
are preferred to a life-and-death struggle for supremacy. They result
in a combination which it is exceedingly difficult for the politically
ignorant majority of the electorate to overcome.
After all, however, do not the people rule? Does not the power of
such extra-legal government continue by their choice? Can they not
smash it if they choose? Theoretically, yes; practically, no! The
extreme decentralization of the legal government--the success of the
constitution and laws in preventing the concentration of power at
any one point in any one office in a legal government--is the very
foundation upon which the existence of the extra-legal government
rests. It is also the chief reason for its continuance in power.
The paramount power of the electorate as a whole is broken into
infinitesimal fragments by the constitution and laws providing for a
multitude of independent offices to be filled by election. To turn
out an extra-legal government which has filled practically all of
the offices in the legal government the electorate must be vigilant,
active, and successful, not in filling one office or a few offices at
a single election, but in the filling of a hundred offices voted for
at all the elections occurring during a period of from four to eight
years. The extra-legal government stands as a solid, well-organized,
single-headed army against a large but disorganized mass. The latter
may triumph at points or on occasions, but it will exhaust its
strength in comparatively small and unimportant victories. Coming
to the voting booth constantly handicapped by the densest political
ignorance, without organization and without leaders, it falls again and
again before the trained and permanent feudal army of vote-directors.
There will be no serious danger to our extra-legal government from
the electorate as a whole while the officers of the legal government
are shorn of power or the opportunity by combination to secure power
and compelled to face constantly an electorate ignorant of their
personalities and their qualifications for office. It is one of the
maxims of modern warfare that the important thing is to destroy or
disrupt the opposing army--not merely to occupy a particular place
or a particular territory. In the same way, in a war upon unpopular
government, it is important to destroy or disrupt it, not merely to
fill a few offices, or even many offices, with good men who are opposed
to an extra-legal government which still continues in existence, ready
again to seize the power of government when occasion offers. So long
as the real government is in an extra-legal oligarchy at the head of a
feudal organization of vote-directors which remains unimpaired, while
the popular army occupies for the time being a few offices denuded
of power, the campaign has accomplished next to nothing. In a few
more elections the extra-legal government will again have secured as
complete control as before.
Even when monarchy was absolute and a popular uprising overthrew it by
means of a successful revolution, the ultimate result was merely to
substitute a new absolute monarchy for the old one. So with us today,
when one extra-legal government by politocrats is overthrown by the
extraordinary and prolonged efforts of the electorate, nothing happens
ultimately but the substitution of a new extra-legal government for the
old. The fact is that so long as we know of no other form of government
except an absolute monarchy, or insist upon a plan of government
which necessarily results in a decentralized legal government being
controlled by a centralized extra-legal government of politocrats,
we shall never have any other form of government except a monarchy or
an extra-legal politocracy. The tendency of the mass of the people to
acquiesce in any governmental arrangement that they seem not to be
able to escape from is a great asset to the maintenance of power by
the extra-legal government. If it takes a supreme effort for a number
of years successively to oust a present extra-legal government, and
when the result of so doing is merely to substitute another extra-legal
government of the same sort, what is the use of the extraordinary
effort made? Why not advise the voter to concentrate his efforts
from time to time in getting good men in the more important offices
and letting the rest go? This attitude of mind becomes more and more
common, especially among intelligent men who see the actual situation.
It is substantially a surrender of all the offices to the control of
the extra-legal government.
Such are the circumstances which a priori make the continuance of our
extra-legal government, in the face of popular disapproval, probable.
The fact that it has and does now so continue is becoming every day
more apparent. Suppose, for instance, at any time in the last ten years
the direct issue could have been presented to the electorate whether
they preferred government by an extra-legal oligarchy of politocrats,
subject only indirectly and very slightly at any single election to the
electorate, or a legal government, subject directly to the will of the
electorate. Can there be any doubt that the great majority would vote
the extra-legal government out of power and abolish politocracy as they
would abolish absolute monarchy or a self-perpetuating oligarchy? If
any demonstration of the temper of the electorate on such an issue be
needed, we have it in the steady popularity of all measures which have
been put forward aimed at the so-called political bosses and government
by them. Twenty-five years ago it was apparent to the electorate that
the ward boss in some districts of our larger cities maintained himself
in part at least upon corrupt voting. Hence the Australian ballot.
Then it was observed that political machines supported their workers
by salaries from the public pay-rolls. Hence the civil service acts.
Then the extra-legal government’s control over nominations seemed to
be the true source of its power. Hence the direct primary. It was also
observed that the extra-legal government had a grip on the state and
municipal legislatures and the state and local executive offices and
the judges. Hence the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. It
was observed that the origin of the extra-legal government and the
great source of its power came from the complexity of our municipal
governments, their cumbersome administrative machinery, and the
number of offices submitted to the electorate. Hence the movement
for the consolidation of municipal governments and their control by
a commission. It has been observed that the governor often expressed
in a satisfactory manner the desires of a majority of the electorate,
but that he had no power to initiate legislation. Hence the two recent
proposals that the governor’s bills be given the right of way upon
the legislative calendar so that they could be brought to a vote and
not quietly strangled by the crowding of the legislative docket and
the action of committees; and that the governor be allowed to submit
for approval by the electorate generally any bill presented to the
legislature and not passed by it.[5] The judges, especially those of
the Supreme Court, were observed to be declaring laws, in favor of
which there was great popular sentiment, unconstitutional. The courts
were then at once placed by the electorate in the same camp with
the extra-legal government--quite unjustly perhaps--and the demand
arose for the recall of judges, or the recall of judicial decisions
on constitutional questions, or in any event the greatest possible
restriction upon the court’s power to declare acts of the legislature
unconstitutional, or the elimination of that power altogether.
Finally, we have had most recently a new national party, which has
been dedicated in general to the war on extra-legal government and
to a program of governmental reform believed to be inimical to its
existence. Every one of these movements upon analysis shows the
electorate conscious of the deprivation of its power to express its
will and to enforce responsibility to it from the officers of the legal
government.
We are obviously in the midst of a great effort to meet an overpowering
extra-legal governmental force which has been depriving the electorate
of its power and legitimate influence in the functioning of the legal
government. Such continued, increasingly aggressive, and always popular
efforts to rid ourselves of extra-legal government by politocrats
points very clearly to the conclusion that our state and municipal
governments have in a greater or less degree fallen into the hands of
that sort of government, and that it has been able for a generation,
and is even now able, to maintain itself in the face of popular
disapproval. A practical, workable form of unpopular government has, in
spite of the precautions taken to prevent it, been established in the
United States.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] See frontispiece.
[3] The ballot which the voter in Chicago faced at the same election
was even larger. It was 19 × 31 inches and presented elections to
53 offices, exclusive of the presidential electors, and 267 names,
exclusive of the presidential electors, to be voted upon. At the fall
election in Cook County in 1910 the ballot was 17 × 20 inches. It
presented 52 offices to be filled and 190 candidates for the voter to
investigate.
[4] In Illinois, for instance, the following state and local offices
are provided for in the state constitution, protected by the state
constitution, and required by the constitution to be filled by
election: governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of state, auditor of
public accounts, state treasurer, superintendent of public instruction,
attorney-general, judge of the Supreme Court, clerk of the Supreme
Court; in counties outside of Cook County: the county judge, state’s
attorney, sheriff, county clerk, treasurer, recorder, coroner, clerk
of the Circuit Court, county superintendent of schools, judge of the
Probate Court, judge of the Circuit Court; in Cook County: 15 county
commissioners, judge of the County Court, 14 judges of the Circuit
Court, 18 judges of the Superior Court, state’s attorney, recorder,
coroner, sheriff, county treasurer, county clerk, clerk of the Circuit
Court, clerk of the Superior Court, and county superintendent of
schools. This includes all the state and local offices named in the
long ballot printed opposite p. 29, except 3 trustees for the state
university, 3 representatives in Congress, 1 member of the State Board
of Equalization, 2 members of the Board of Assessors, 1 member of the
Board of Review, the county surveyor, and 3 trustees of the Sanitary
District.
[5] _Post_, chap. xv.
PART II
THE WAR ON POLITOCRACY