THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE WAR
Long before war was declared the United States Government had been
engaged in preparation. It had realized that unrestricted submarine
warfare was sure to lead to war, and though for a time it was
preserving what it was pleased to call “an armed neutrality” the
President doubtless was well aware what such an “armed neutrality”
would lead to. Merchant ships were being armed for protection against
the submarine, and crews from the Navy assigned to work the guns. The
first collision was sure to mean an active state of war. The Naval
Department, therefore, was working at full speed, getting the Navy
ready for active service as soon as war should be declared.
Secretary Daniels made every effort to obtain the crews that were
necessary to man the new ships which were being fully commissioned
with the greatest possible speed and called upon newspapers all through
the country to do their utmost to stimulate enlistment.
On March 26th President Wilson issued an order increasing the enlisted
strength of the United States Marine Corps to 17,400 men, the limit
allowed under the law. On March 29th a hundred and three ensigns were
graduated from the Naval Academy three months ahead of their time, and
on April 6th, as soon as war was declared, the Navy was mobilized.
Within a few minutes after Secretary Daniels had signed the order for
this purpose one hundred code messages were sent out from the office of
Admiral W. S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, which placed the Navy
on a war basis, and put into the control of the Navy Department the
naval militia of all the states as well as the Naval Reserves and the
Coast Guard Service. In the Naval Militia were about 584 officers, and
7,933 men. These were at once assembled and assigned to coast patrol
service. All of the ships that were in active commission in the Navy
were already ready for duty. But there were reserve battleships and
reserve destroyers, besides ships which had been out of commission
which had to be manned as quickly as possible.
At the beginning of the war there were 361 vessels ready for service,
including twelve first-line battleships, twenty-five second-line
battleships, nine armored cruisers, twenty-four other cruisers, seven
monitors, fifty destroyers, sixteen coast torpedo vessels, seventeen
torpedo boats, forty-four submarines, eight tenders to torpedo boats,
twenty-eight gunboats, four transports, four supply ships, one hospital
ship, twenty-one fuel ships, fourteen converted yachts, forty-nine
tugs, and twenty-eight minor vessels. There were about seventy thousand
regularly enlisted men, besides eight thousand five hundred members of
the naval militia. Many yachts together with their volunteer crews had
been offered to the government by patriotic citizens.
For the complete mobilization of the Navy, as it then stood, 99,809
regularly enlisted men and 45,870 reserves were necessary. About
twenty-seven thousand of these were needed for coast defense, and
twelve thousand at the various shore stations. Retired officers were
called out, and assigned to duty which would permit officers on the
active list to be employed in sea duty. The Navy therefore still lacked
thirty-five thousand men to bring it up to its full authorized strength
at the beginning, but after the declaration of war an active recruiting
campaign brought volunteers by thousands. The service was a popular one
and recruits were easily obtained.
One of the first phases of the mobilization was the organization of a
large fleet of mosquito craft to patrol the Atlantic Coast, and keep on
the watch for submarines. Many of these boats had been private yachts,
and hundreds of young men volunteered from the colleges and schools of
the country for this work. Many boat builders submitted proposals to
construct small boats for this kind of patrol duty, and on March 31st a
coast patrol fleet was organized by the Government under the command
of Captain Henry B. Wilson.
[Illustration: MAP OF THE UNITED STATES SHOWING THE IMMENSE LENGTH OF
COAST-LINE TO BE DEFENDED]
The Navy took possession immediately on the declaration of war of all
wireless stations in the United States dismantling all that could not
be useful to the Government. War zones were established along the whole
coast-line of the United States, making a series of local barred zones
extending from the larger harbors in American waters all along the
line. These harbors were barred at night to entering vessels in order
to guard against surprise by German submarines. Contracts were awarded
for the construction of twenty-four destroyers even before war was
declared, and many more were already under construction.
[Illustration: © _Underwood and Underwood, N. Y._
A “SMOKE CURTAIN” VIEWED FROM BEHIND THE SCENES
The U. S. battleship Wyoming pours out from her funnels the heavy
opaque smoke screen which is designed to lie low on the water and
prevent observation by the enemy.]
The growth of the Navy in one year may give some idea of the efficiency
of the Navy Department. In April, 1917, the regular Navy contained
4,366 officers and 64,680 men. In April, 1918, it contained 7,798
officers and 192,385 men. In the Marine Corps in 1917 there were 426
officers and 13,266 men. In one year this was increased to 1,389
officers and 38,629 men. In the organization of the Naval Reserves,
naval volunteers and coast guards there were in 1917, 24,569 men; in
1918, 98,319 men, and 11,477 officers.
While personnel of the Navy was thus expanding the United States
battle fleet had grown to more than twice the size of the fleet before
the war. When war was declared there were under construction 123 new
naval vessels. These were completed and contracts made for 949 new
vessels. Among the ships completed are fifteen battleships, six battle
cruisers, seven scout cruisers, twenty-seven destroyers, and sixty-one
submarines. About eight hundred craft were taken over and converted
into transports, patrol service boats, submarine chasers, mine sweepers
and mine layers.
The Government also seized 109 German ships which had been interned in
American ports. The Germans had attempted to damage these ships so that
they would be useless, but they were all repaired, and carried American
troops and supplies in great quantities to France.
As the fleet grew the training of the necessary officers and crews
was conducted on a grand scale. Naval camps were established at
various points. The main ones were those at Philadelphia, (League
Island); Newport, Rhode Island; Cape May, New Jersey; Charleston,
South Carolina; Pensacola, Florida; Key West, Florida; Mare Island,
California; Puget Sound, Washington; Hingham, Massachusetts; Norfolk,
Virginia; New Orleans, San Diego, New York Navy Yard, Great Lakes,
Illinois; Pelham, New York; Hampton Roads, Virginia; and Gulfport,
Mississippi. Schools in gunnery and engineering were established and
thousands of gunners and engineers were trained, not only for the Navy
but for the armed merchant vessels.
The training of gun crews by target practice was a feature of this
work. Long before the war began systematic training of this kind
had been done, but mainly in connection with the big guns, and
great efficiency had been obtained by the steady practice. With the
introduction of the submarine, it became necessary to pay special
attention to the training of the crews of guns of smaller calibre, and
it was not long before the officers of our Navy were congratulating
themselves on the efficiency of their men. It is not easy to hit so
small a mark as the periscope of a submarine, but it could be done and
many times was done.
Twenty-eight days after the declaration of war a fleet of United States
destroyers under the command of Admiral William S. Sims reported for
service at a British port.
The American destroyer squadron arrived at Queenstown after a voyage
without incident. The water front was lined with an excited crowd
carrying small American flags, which cheered the destroyers from the
time they were first seen until they reached the dock. They cheered
again when Admiral Sims went ashore to greet the British senior officer
who had come to welcome the Americans. It was a most informal function.
After the usual handshakes the British Commander congratulated the
Americans on their safe voyage and then asked:
“When will you be ready for business?”
“We can start at once,” was the prompt reply of Admiral Sims.
This rather took the breath away from the British Commander and he said
he had not expected the Americans to begin work so soon after their
long voyage. Later after a short tour of the destroyers he admitted
that the American tars looked prepared.
“Yes,” said the American Commander, “we made preparations on the way
over. That is why we are ready.”
[Illustration: “HAIL COLUMBIA”
England greets the first American destroyer squadron to arrive in
European waters after the United States entered the war. The British
admiral asked Admiral Sims, who was in command, how long he needed to
refit and get ready for action. He replied “We are ready now.”]
Everything on board the destroyers was in excellent condition. The
only thing lacking was heavier clothing. The American uniforms were too
light for the cool weather which is common in the English waters. This
condition, however, was quickly remedied, and the American ships at
once put out to sea all in splendid condition and filled with the same
enthusiasm that the Marines showed later at Château-Thierry.
“They are certainly a fine body of men, and what’s more, their craft
looked just as fit,” declared the British Commander.
One of the American destroyers, even before the American fleet had
arrived at Queenstown, had begun war duty. It had picked up and
escorted through the danger zone one of the largest of the Atlantic
liners. The passengers on board the liner sent the Commander of the
destroyer the following message:
British passengers on board a steamer, bound for a British port,
under the protection of an American destroyer, send their hearty
greetings to her Commander and her officers and crew, and desire
to express their keen appreciation of this practical co-operation
between the government and people of the United States and the
British Empire, who are now fighting together for the freedom of the
seas.
Moving pictures were taken by the official British Government
photographer as the American flotilla came into the harbor, and sailors
who received shore leave were plied with English hospitality. The
streets of Queenstown were decorated with the Stars and Stripes. As
soon as American residents in England learned that American warships
were to cross the Atlantic they held a conference to provide recreation
buildings, containing sleeping, eating, and recreation accommodations
for the comfort of the American sailors. The destroyer flotilla was the
first contribution of American military power to the Entente Alliance
against Germany.
Admiral Sims is one of the most energetic and efficient of American
Naval officers and to him as much as to any other man is due the
efficiency of the American Navy. During the period just before the
Spanish-American War Lieutenant Sims was Naval Attaché at Paris, and
rendered invaluable services in buying ships and supplies for the
Navy. In 1900 he was assigned to duty on the Battleship Kentucky, then
stationed in the Orient. In 1902 he was ordered to the Navy Department
and placed in charge of the Office of Naval Practice, where he remained
for seven years and devoted his attention to the improvement of the
Navy in gunnery. During that time he made constant trips to England
to consult with English experts in gunnery and ordnance, and became
intimately acquainted with Sir Percy Scott, who had been knighted and
made Rear-Admiral for the improvements he had introduced in connection
with the gunnery of the British warships. In 1909 he was made Commander
of the Battleship Minnesota, and in 1911 was a member of the college
staff at the Naval War College. In 1913 he was made Commander of the
torpedo flotilla of the Atlantic fleet and in 1916 assigned to command
the Dreadnought Nevada. In 1916 he was President of the Naval War
College. He was made Rear-Admiral in 1916 and Vice-Admiral in 1917 and
assigned to the command of all American war vessels abroad.
Immediately upon their arrival the American vessels began operation in
the submarine zone. Admiral Beatty then addressed the following message
to Admiral Henry T. Mayo of the United States Atlantic Fleet:
The Grand Fleet rejoices that the Atlantic fleet will now share in
preserving the liberties of the world and in maintaining the chivalry
of the sea.
Admiral Mayo replied:
The United States Atlantic Fleet appreciates the message from the
British fleet and welcomes opportunities for work with the British
fleet for the freedom of the seas.
It may also be noted, as a fact which is not without significance, that
the losses by submarine which had reached their highest mark in the
last week in April began from that time steadily to diminish.
One of the main duties of the Navy was to convoy transports and
supplies across the Atlantic. This was done with the assistance of
Allied vessels with remarkable success. For a long period it seemed
as if the U-boats would not be able to penetrate through the Allied
convoy, but during 1918 four transports were torpedoed. The first was
the Tuscania which was sunk in February off the north coast of Ireland,
with 1,912 officers and men of the Michigan and Wisconsin guardsmen, of
whom 204 were lost. The Oronsa, which was torpedoed in April, contained
250 men and all were saved except three of the crew. The Moldavia
came next with five hundred troops, of whom fifty-five were lost. On
September 6th the troopship Persic with 2,800 American soldiers was
torpedoed but American destroyers rescued all on board, and the Persic,
which was prevented from sinking by its water-tight bulkheads, was
afterwards beached.
Several American ships, including the troop transport Mount Vernon,
were torpedoed on return trips and a number of the men of their crews
were lost, and several naval vessels were lost, including the destroyer
Jacob Jones, and the patrol vessel Alcedo. The Cassin was torpedoed,
but reached port under its own steam and later returned to service.
In September and October three more American transports were added
to the list of American losses. On September 26th the United States
steamer Tampa was torpedoed and sank with all on board, losing 118 men.
On September 30th the Ticonderoga was also torpedoed, eleven Naval
officers and 102 enlisted men being lost.
In addition to these submarine losses several ships and a number of
men were lost through collision. The United States steamer Westgate
was sunk in a collision with the steamer American on October 7th, with
the loss of seven men. On October 9th the United States destroyer
Shaw lost fifteen men in a collision, though she later succeeded in
reaching port. On October 11th the American steamer Otranto was sunk in
a collision with the British liner Cashmere. Of seven hundred American
soldiers who were on board 365 were lost. At this time about three
thousand anti-submarine craft were in operation day and night around
the British Isles, and about five thousand working in the open sea.
This was what made it possible for the Allies to win the war.
Inasmuch as the illegal use of the submarine by Germany brought America
into the war it was extremely appropriate that she should take an
active part in the suppression of the submarine menace. The methods
which were used in fighting the submarines differed much in different
cases. The action of the government in arming merchantmen and in
providing them with trained gun crews did much to lower the number of
such ships sunk by the U-boats.
The submarine, which had formerly been able to stop the unarmed
merchantman and sink him at leisure, after a few combats with an armed
merchantman began to be very wary and to depend almost entirely upon
his torpedoes. It was not always easy for the submarine to get in a
position where her torpedo would be effective, and the merchantman was
carefully directed, if attacked, to pursue a zig-zag irregular course,
and at the same time endeavor to hamper the submarine by shooting as
near her periscope as possible.
Along the sea coasts and at certain points in the English Channel
great nets were used effectively. Submarines, however, toward the end
of the war were made sufficiently large to be able to force their way
through these nets, and net-cutting devices were also used by them with
considerable effect. The best way to destroy the submarines seemed to
be in a direct attack by flotillas or destroyers.
By the end of the war the whole process of sinking or destroying
submarines had been thoroughly organized. Practically every portion
of the seas near Great Britain and France was carefully watched and
the appearance of a submarine immediately reported. As the submarine
would only travel at a certain well-understood speed during a given
time, it was possible to calculate, after the locality of one was
known, about how far from that point it would be found at any later
period. Destroyers were therefore sent circling around the point
where the submarine had been discovered, enlarging their distance
from the center every hour. In the course of time the submarine would
be compelled to come up for air, and then, if luck were with the
destroyer, it might find its foe before it was seen itself. Having
discovered the submarine the destroyer immediately endeavored to ram,
dropping depth bombs at the point where they supposed the enemy to be.
These bombs were so constructed that at a certain depth in the water
they would explode, and the force of the explosion was so great that
even if they did not strike the submarine they would be sure to damage
it seriously, sometimes throwing the submarine to the surface partly
out of water, and at other times driving her to come to the surface
herself ready to surrender.
In many cases it was not necessary to use the depth bomb at all. The
gunners on board the destroyers had become extraordinarily expert,
and though a shot might destroy the periscope of a submarine without
doing much damage, most submarines carrying extra periscopes to use
if necessary, yet it was soon found that it was possible by the use of
plunging shells to do effective damage. Plunging shells are somewhat
similar in their operation to bombs. Such a shell falling just short of
a periscope and fused to burst both on contact and at a certain depth
was extremely likely to do damage.
In the pursuit of the U-boat the airplane was also extremely effective.
These were sent out to patrol large districts near the Allied coast,
and also, in some cases, from ships themselves. It is possible in
certain weather conditions for the observer on an airplane to detect
a submarine even when it is submerged and the airplane can not only
attack the submarine by dropping depth bombs, but it can signal at
once the location of the enemy to the hurrying destroyers. Indeed, as
the submarine warfare proceeded the main difficulty of the Allies was
to locate the submarines. Many ingenious devices were used for this
purpose, and many of the English vessels had listening attachments
under water which were intended to make it possible to hear a
submarine as it moved. These, however, do not seem to have been very
effective. The submarine itself seems at times to have been fitted out
in a similar way and to have thus been able to hear the sound of an
approaching ship.
Many thrilling reports of naval actions against German submarines were
given out officially by the British admiralty from time to time. In
most of these cases the submarine was both rammed and attacked by depth
bombs. In nearly all of them the only proof of success was the oil and
air bubbles which came to the surface.
One interesting encounter was that in which a British submarine sighted
a German U-boat, while both were on the surface. The British submarine
dived and later was able to pick up the enemy through the periscope and
discharge a torpedo in such a way as to destroy the German vessel. When
the British submarine arose it found a patch of oil in which Germans
were swimming.
Ordinarily, however, a submarine was of little service in a fight
against another for the radius of sight from a periscope is so short
that it is practically blind so far as another periscope is concerned.
This blindness of the submarine was taken advantage of by the Allies in
every possible way.
Merchant ships were camouflaged, that is painted in such a way that
they could not be easily distinguished at a distance. In the great
convoys ships were often hidden by great masses of smoke to prevent a
submarine from finding an easy mark. At night all lights were put out
or else so shaded as not to be seen by the enemy. The result of these
methods was the gradual destruction of the U-boat menace.
In the summer of 1918, while occasionally some ship was lost, the
production of new ships was much greater than those that were sunk.
During the month of June it was announced that the completion of new
tonnage by the Allies had outstripped the losses by thousands of tons.
During this period the United States had attained its full stride in
building ships, airplanes and ordnance.
Archibald Hurd, the English naval expert, said: “When the war is over
the nation will form some conception of the debt which we owe the
American navy for the manner in which it has co-operated, not only in
connection with the convoy system, but in fighting the submarines. If
the naval position is improving today, as it is, it is due to the fact
that the British and American fleets are working in closest accord,
supported by an immense body of skilled workers on both sides of the
Atlantic, who are turning out destroyers and other craft for dealing
with the submarine, as well as mines and bombs. Some of the finest
battleships of the United States navy are now associated with the
British Grand fleet. They are not only splendid fighting ships but they
are well officered and manned.”
On May 13, 1918, in appreciation of some remarks which had been made
by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the British Admiralty, Josephus
Daniels, the American Secretary of the Navy, addressed a letter to him
in the following terms:
“Your reference to the splendid spirit of co-operation between the
navies of our countries, and your warm praise of the officers and men
of our navy, have been most grateful to me and to all Americans. The
brightest spot in the tragedy of this war is this mutual appreciation
of the men in the naval service. Our officers who have returned confirm
the statements of Admiral Sims of the courtesies and kindness shown in
every way by the admiralty and the officers of the British fleet. I had
hoped to have the pleasure of visiting Great Britain and of personally
expressing this feeling of mutual working together, but the task here
of making ready more and more units for the fleet is a very serious
one, and my duty chains me here. The order in all the navy is ‘Full
speed ahead’ in the construction of destroyers and other craft, and
the whole service is keyed up to press this program forward. Therefore
I shall not have the pleasure, until this program shall materialize,
of a personal acquaintance and a conference which would be of such
interest and value.”
Sir Eric Geddes replied: “I am exceedingly grateful for your letter. As
you know we, all of us here, have great admiration for your officers
and men, and for the splendid help they are giving in European
waters. Further, we find Admiral Sims invaluable in council and in
co-operation. I fully appreciate how onerous your office must be and
much though I regret that you do not see your way to visiting this
country in the near future, I hope we may some day have the pleasure of
welcoming you here.”
Sir Eric afterward himself visited the United States and his visit was
made the occasion of a general expression of the high regard which the
United States felt for the splendid assistance which the great British
navy had rendered in convoying its armies across the seas.
From August, 1914, to September, 1918, German submarines sank 7,157,088
deadweight tons of shipping in excess of the tonnage turned out in
that period by the allied and neutral nations. That total does not
represent the depletion of the fleets at the command of the allied and
neutral nations, however, as 3,795,000 deadweight tons of enemy ships
were seized in the meantime. Actually, the allied and neutral nations
on September 1, 1918, had only 3,362,088 less tons of shipping in
operation than in August, 1914.
These details of the shipping situation were issued by the United
States Shipping Board along with figures to show that, with American
and allied yards under full headway, Europe’s danger of being starved
by the German submarine was apparently at an end. The United States
took the lead of all nations in shipbuilding.
In all, the allied and neutral nations lost 21,404,913 deadweight
tons of shipping since the beginning of the war, showing that Germany
maintained an average destruction of about 445,000 deadweight tons
monthly. During the latter months, however, the sinkings fell
considerably below the average, and allied construction passed
destruction for the first time in May, 1918.
The losses of the allied and neutral shipping in August, 1918, amounted
to 327,676 gross tonnage, of which 176,401 was British and 151,275
allied and neutral, as compared with the adjusted figures for July of
323,772, and 182,524 and 141,248, respectively. British losses from
all causes during August were 10,887 tons higher than in June, which
was the lowest month since the introduction of unrestricted submarine
warfare.
An official statement of the United States Shipping Board, issued
September 21, 1918, set forth the following facts:
STATUS OF WORLD TONNAGE, SEPTEMBER 1, 1918
(Germany and Austria excluded)
Deadweight
Tons
Total losses (allied and neutral) August, 1914-September
1, 1918 21,404,913
Total construction (allied and neutral) August,
1914-September 1, 1918 14,247,825
Total enemy tonnage captured (to end of 1917) 3,795,000
Excess of losses over gains 3,362,088
Estimated normal increase in world’s tonnage if
war had not occurred (based on rate of increase,
1905-1914) 14,700,000
Net deficit due to war 18,062,088
In August, deliveries to the Shipping Board and other sea-going
construction in the United States for private parties passed allied
and neutral destruction for that month. The figures:
Gross
(Actual Tons)
Deliveries to the Shipping Board 244,121
Other construction over 1,000 gross 16,918
--------
Total 261,039
Losses (allied and neutral) 259,400
America alone surpassed losses for month by 1,630
NOTE.--World’s merchant tonnage, as of June 30, 1914, totaled
49,089,552 gross tons, or, roughly, 73,634,328 deadweight tons.
(Lloyd’s Register.)
The climax to Germany’s piratical submarine adventure took place
a few days after the armistice, when a mournful procession of
shamefaced-looking U-boats sailed between lines of English cruisers to
be handed over to the tender mercies of the Allied governments.