RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of the constitution is
essential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on an
urgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, and
should play a role in this process.
RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation
requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into
national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein's regime
excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified
Iraqi professionals--Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd
or Turkmen or Christian or Arab--into the government.
RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to
the central government and be shared on the basis of population. No
formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the
regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatible
with national reconciliation.
RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial elections should
be held at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, new
provincial elections should have been held already. They are necessary
to restore representative government.
RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in
Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communal
violence. Kirkuk's mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could
make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as
required by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would be
explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the
agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New
Diplomatic Offensive.
RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching.
Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in
the government finding ways and means to reconcile with former bitter
enemies.
RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of
all minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans,
Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected.
RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop
using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a
tool for politicizing or stopping their activities. Registration
should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for government
censorship and interference.
Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of National
Reconciliation
The United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq's
reconciliation process.
The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in a
national reconciliation dialogue. The point is not for the United
States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that
we oppose. The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear
their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi
forces take on the security mission. A successful national
reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date.
RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must
be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue
takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of
participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase
the possibilities for success.
Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue must
involve those who wield power, not simply those who hold political
office. The United States must try to talk directly to Grand Ayatollah
Sistani and must consider appointing a high-level American Shia Muslim
to serve as an emissary to him. The United States must also try to
talk directly to Moqtada al-Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent
leaders. The United Nations can help facilitate contacts.
RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to
engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United
States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada
al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.
The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also presents
opportunities to seek broader support for a national reconciliation
dialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, the international community and
religious leaders can play an important role in fostering dialogue and
reconciliation across the sectarian divide. The United States should
actively encourage the constructive participation of all who can take
part in advancing national reconciliation within Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between
sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive
above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to
speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation.
Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an important
incentive in reconciliation talks and they need to be generous.
Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be difficult for the
United States to accept, just as they will be difficult for the Iraqis
to make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the Iraqis,
not by Americans. Despite being politically unpopular--in the United
States as well as in Iraq--amnesty is essential if progress is to take
place. Iraqi leaders need to be certain that they have U.S. support as
they move forward with this critical element of national
reconciliation.
RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in
Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.