The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the
Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers roughly 135,000
and is responsible for local policing. It has neither the training nor
legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower
to take on organized crime, insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi
National Police numbers roughly 25,000 and its officers have been
trained in counterinsurgency operations, not police work. The Border
Enforcement Department numbers roughly 28,000.
Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in
sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture, and
targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police are organized
under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruption
and militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the
provinces.
The United States and the Iraqi government recognize the importance of
reform. The current Minister of the Interior has called for purging
militia members and criminals from the police. But he has little
police experience or base of support. There is no clear Iraqi or U.S.
agreement on the character and mission of the police. U.S. authorities
do not know with precision the composition and membership of the
various police forces, nor the disposition of their funds and
equipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers
participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and
ammunition for use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but
don't show up for work. In the words of a senior American general,
"2006 was supposed to be 'the year of the police' but it hasn't
materialized that way."