The most important questions about Iraq's future are now the
responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role in
Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own
destiny.
The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for
Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army
brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the
United States should significantly increase the number of U.S.
military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and
supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat
forces could begin to move out of Iraq.
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of
supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary
responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008,
subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the
ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could
be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be
deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction
and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising,
force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support
efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and
special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al
Qaeda in Iraq.
It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the
United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out
security responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear to
the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans,
including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not
implement their planned changes. The United States must not make an
open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops
deployed in Iraq.
As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training
and education of forces that have returned to the United States in
order to restore the force to full combat capability. As equipment
returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient
funds to restore the equipment over the next five years.
The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support
the achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--on national
reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected,
but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress.
The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and the citizens
of the United States and other countries--that it deserves continued
support.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United
States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. His
list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include milestones
that can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people.
President Bush and his national security team should remain in close
and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear
message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to make
substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones.
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes
substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national
reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should
make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and
support for Iraq's security forces and to continue political,
military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make
substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national
reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should
reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi
government.
Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. They include
improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil
sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U.S. budget
process, the training of U.S. government personnel, and U.S.
intelligence capabilities.