SECT. I. Character of the Quaker women--Women share in the virtues of
the men, but do not partake of all their reputed imperfections.
SECT. II. Quaker women have a public character--Influence of this upon
their minds.
* * * * *
MISCELLANEOUS PARTICULARS.
CHAPTER I.
Quakers a happy people--Subordinate causes of this happiness.
CHAPTER II.
Good, which the Quakers have done as a society upon earth.
CHAPTER III.
Quakers in England on the decline in point of numbers, as a religious
society--Certain causes of this decline.
CHAPTER IV.
Supposed remedies for the diminution of some of these causes--These of
various kinds--One of these a superior education--Supposed effect of
this education.
CHAPTER V.
_Component parts of this education--Favourable state of the society for
the admission of it,_
CHAPTER VI.
_Various arguments against it--These examined,_
CHAPTER VII.
_Conclusory remarks, as they relate to those who may have had thoughts
of leaving the society,_
CHAPTER VIII.
_Conclusory remarks, as they relate to those who may be called the
world,_
GREAT TENETS
OF THE
QUAKERS.
CHAP. I.
_Civil government--First tenet is, that governors have no right to
interfere with the governed on the subject of Religion--and that if they
interfere, and insist upon things which the conscience disapproves, the
governed ought to refuse a compliance with them, and to bear patiently
all the penalties annexed to such a refusal, but never to resist the
governors by violence on this or any other account._
The Quakers hold four principles, which I shall distinguish by the name
of Great Tenets. These are considered as arising out of the implied or
positive injunctions of Christianity, and were insisted upon as
essentials on the formation of the society. The first of these is on the
subject of Civil Government.
Civil Government had existed long before the appearance of Christianity
in the world. Legislators since that era, as they have imbibed its
spirit, so they have introduced this spirit more or less into their
respective codes. But, no nation has ever professed to change its system
of jurisprudence, or to model it anew, in consequence of the new light
which Christianity has afforded: neither have the alterations been so
numerous in any nation, however high its profession of Christianity,
with respect to laws, as to enable us to say, that there is any
government in the known world, of Christian origin, or any government
wholly upon the principles of the gospel.
If all men were to become real Christians, civil government would become
less necessary. As there would be then no offences, there would be no
need of magistracy or of punishment. As men would then settle any
differences between them amicably, there would be no necessity for
courts of law. As they would then never fight, there would be no need of
armies. As they would then consider their fellow-creatures as brethren,
they would relieve them as such, and there would be no occasion of laws
for the poor. As men would then have more solicitude for the public
good, and more large and liberal notions, than at any former time, they
would of themselves conceive and raise all necessary public institutions
and works. Government then is not so necessary for real Christians. It
is necessary principally, as the apostle says, for evil-doers. But if it
be chiefly necessary for evil-doers, then governors ought to be careful
how they make laws, which may vex, harrass, and embarrass Christians,
whom they will always find to be the best part of their communities, or,
in other words, how they make laws, which Christians, on account of
their religious scruples, cannot conscientiously obey.
It is a tenet of the Quakers, on the subject of government, that the
civil magistrate has no right to interfere in religious matters, so as
either to force any particular doctrines upon men, or to hinder them
from worshipping God in their own way, provided that, by their creeds
and worship, they do no detriment to others. The Quakers believe,
however, that Christian churches may admonish such members as fall into
error, and may even cut them off from membership, but this must be done
not by the temporal, but by the spiritual sword.
This tenet the Quakers support, first, by reason. Religion, they say, is
a matter solely, between God and man, that is, between God and that man
who worships him. This must be obvious, they conceive, because man is
not accountable to man for his religious opinions, except he binds
himself to the discipline of any religious society, but to God alone. It
must be obvious again, they say, because no man can be a judge over the
conscience of another. He can know nothing of the sincerity or hypocrisy
of his heart. He can be neither an infallible judge, nor an infallible
correcter of his religious errors. "The conscience of man, says Barclay,
is the seat and throne of God in him, of which he alone is the proper
and infallible judge, who, by his power and spirit, can rectify its
mistakes." It must be obvious again, they say, from the consideration
that, if it were even possible for one man to discern the conscience of
another, it is impossible for him to bend or controul it. But conscience
is placed both out of his sight and of his reach. It is neither visible
nor tangible. It is inaccessible by stripes or torments. Thus, while the
body is in bondage, on account of the religion of the soul, the soul
itself is free, and, while it suffers under torture, it enjoys the
divinity, and feels felicity in his presence. But if all these things
are so, it cannot be within the province either of individual
magistrates or of governments, consisting of fallible men, to fetter the
consciences of those who may live under them. And any attempt to this
end is considered by the Quakers as a direct usurpation of the
prerogative of God.
This tenet the Quakers adopt again on a contemplation of the conduct and
doctrines of Jesus Christ and of his apostles. They find nothing in
these, which can give the least handle to any man to use force in the
religious concerns of another. During the life of Jesus Christ upon
earth, it is no where recorded of him, that he censured any man for his
religion. It is true that he reproved the Scribes and Pharisees, but
this was on account of their hypocrisy, because they pretended to be
what they were not. But he no where condemned the devout Jew, who was
sincere in his faith. But if he be found no where to have censured
another for a difference in religious opinions, much less was it ever
said of him, that he forced him to the adoption of his own. In the
memorable instance, where James and John were willing to have called
fire from Heaven, to burn those who refused to receive him, he rebuked
them by an assurance, that "they knew not what spirit they were of."
And, with respect to his doctrines, nothing can be more full to the
point than his saying, that "his kingdom was not of this world," by
which he meant that his dominion was wholly of a spiritual nature, and
that men must cast off all worldly imaginations, and become spiritually
minded, before, they could belong to him. But no application of outward
force, in the opinion of the Quakers, can thus alter the internal man.
Nor can even the creeds and doctrines of others produce this effect,
except they become sanctioned by the divine influence on the heart.
Neither is it recorded of any of the apostles, that they used any other
weapons than those of persuasion and the power of God in the propagation
of their doctrines, leaving such as did not choose to follow them to
their own way. They were explicit also in stating the spiritual nature
of Christ's kingdom, from whence an inference similar to the former is
deducible, namely, that no compulsory interference can be effectual in
matters of religion. And St. Paul, in particular, tells the Corinthians,
that, in his spiritual services to them, he does not consider himself
[1]"as having any dominion over their faith, but as helpers of their
joy."
[Footnote 1: 2 Cor. i. 24.]
But if neither Jesus Christ, who was the author of that religion, which
many civil governments have established, nor the apostles, who
afterwards propagated it, forced their doctrines upon other men, or
hindered them by force from worshipping in their own way, even though
the former could have called legions of angels to his support, it
certainly does not become weak, ignorant, and fallible men, because they
are placed in the situation of governors, to set up their own creeds as
supreme, and to throw penalties and restrictions in the way of the
religious exercise of others.
But if governors, contrary to the example of Jesus Christ and of his
apostles, should interfere in religious matters, and impose laws upon
the governed, of which, as Christians, they cannot but disapprove, then
the Quakers are of opinion, that the governed ought always to obey the
laws of Jesus Christ, rather than the laws of any governors, who are
only men. Thus when Peter and John were commanded by the rulers of the
Jews to speak no more in the name of Jesus, they dared not yield
obedience to their commands, reasoning thus,[2] "Whether it be right in
the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye."
[Footnote 2: Acts iv. 19.]
And as the governed in such case ought, in obedience to God, the Supreme
Ruler of the Universe, and the King of Kings, to refuse a compliance
with the laws of their own governors, so they ought to be prepared
patiently to submit to the penalties which are annexed to such refusal,
and on no account, if just representations made in the meek and quiet
spirit of their religion, are not likely to be effectual, to take up
arms or resist them by force. And this doctrine they ground, first, on
the principle, that it is not only more noble, but more consistent with
their duty as Christians, to suffer, than to give growth to the passions
of revenge, or by open resistance to become the occasion of loss of life
to others. And, secondly, on the example of Jesus Christ, and of the
apostles and primitive Christians, all of whom patiently submitted to
the pains and penalties inflicted upon them by the governments of their
respective times for the exercise of their religion.
CHAP. II.
_Oaths--Quakers conceive it unlawful for Christians to take an
oath--their sufferings on this account--Consider oaths as
unnecessary--as having an immoral tendency, which even the Heathens
allowed--and as having been forbidden by Jesus Christ--Explanation of
the scriptural passages cited on this occasion--Christianity not so
perfect with the lawfulness of oaths as without it--Other reasons taken
from considerations relative to the ancient oath "by the name of God"_
A second tenet, which the Quakers hold, is, that it is unlawful for
Christians to take a civil oath.
Many and grievous were the sufferings of the Quakers, in the early part
of their history, on account of their refusing to swear before the civil
magistrate. They were insulted, fined, and imprisoned. Some of the
judges too indulged a rancour against them on this account, unworthy of
their high office, which prescribed justice impartially to all. For when
they could not convict them of the offences laid to their charge, they
administered to them the oath of allegiance, knowing that they would not
take it, and that confiscation of property and imprisonment would
ensue. But neither ill usage, nor imprisonment, nor loss of property,
ever made any impression upon the Quakers, so as to induce them to swear
in judicial cases, and they continued to suffer, till the legislature,
tired out with the cries of their oppression, decreed, that their
affirmation should in all cases except criminal, or in that of serving
upon juries, or in that of qualifications for posts of honour or
emolument under government, be received as equivalent to their oath. And
this indulgence towards them is continued to them by law to the present
day.
The Quakers have an objection to oaths, as solemn appeals to God,
because they are unnecessary.
It is an old saying among the Quaker writers, that "truth was before all
oaths." By this they mean, there was a time, when men's words were
received as truths, without the intervention of an oath. Ancient fable,
indeed, tells us, that there were no oaths in the golden age, but that,
when men departed from their primitive simplicity, and began to quarrel
with one another, they had recourse to falsehood to substantiate their
own case, after which it became necessary, that some expedient should be
devised, in the case of disputes, for the ascertaining the truth. Hence
Hesiod makes the god of oaths the son of Esis or of contention. This,
account differs but little from that of Polybuis, who says, that the use
of oaths in judgment was rare among the ancients, but that, as perfidy
grew, oaths increased.
And as it is a saying of the Quakers, that "truth was before all oaths,"
so they believe, that truth would be spoken, if oaths were done away.
Thus, that which is called honour by the world, will bind men to the
truth, who perhaps know but little of religion. But if so, then he, who
makes Christianity his guide, will not be found knowingly in a
falsehood, though he be deprived of the opportunity of swearing.
But if it be true, that truth existed before the invention of oaths, and
that truth would still be spoken, even if all oaths were abolished, then
the Quakers say, that oaths are not so necessary as some have imagined,
because they have but a secondary effect in the production of the truth.
This conclusion they consider also as the result of reason. For good men
will speak truth without an oath, and bad men will hardly be influenced
by one. And where oaths are regarded, it is probable that truth is
forced out of men, not so much, because they consider them as solemn
appeals to God, as that they consider the penalties, which will follow
their violation; so that a simple affirmation, under the same pains and
penalties, would be equally productive of the truth.
The Quakers consider oaths again as very injurious to morality. For
first, they conceive it to be great presumption in men to summon God as
a witness in their trilling and earthly concerns.
They believe, secondly, that, if men accustom themselves to call upon
God on civil occasions, they render his name so familiar to them, that
they are likely to lose the reverence due to it, or so to blend
religious with secular considerations, that they become in danger of
losing sight of the dignity, solemnity, and awfulness of devotion. And
it is not an unusual remark, that persons, most accustomed to oaths, are
the most likely to perjury. A custom-house oath has become proverbial in
our own country. I do not mean by this to accuse mercantile men in
particular, but to state it as a received opinion, that, where men make
solemn things familiar, there is a danger of their moral degradation.
Hence the Quakers consider the common administration of oaths to have a
tendency that is injurious to the moral interests of men.
This notion relative to the bad tendency of oaths, the Quakers state to
have prevailed even in the Gentile world. As Heathen philosophy became
pure, it branded the system of swearing as pernicious to morals. It was
the practice of the Persians to give each other their right hand as a
token of their speaking the truth. He, who gave his hand deceitfully,
was accounted more detestable than if he had sworn the Scythians, in
their conference with Alexander the Great, addressed him thus: "Think
not that the Scythians confirm their friendship by an oath. They swear
by keeping their word." The Phrygians were wholly against oaths. They
neither took them themselves, nor required them of others. Among the
proverbs of the Arabs, this was a celebrated one, "Never swear, but let
thy word be yes or no." So religious was Hercules, says Plutarch, that
he never swore but once. Clinias, a Greek philosopher, and a scholar of
Pythagoras, is said to have dreaded an oath so much, that, when by
swearing he could have escaped a fine of three talents, he chose rather
to pay the money than do it, though he was to have sworn nothing but the
truth. Indeed, throughout all Greece, the system of swearing was
considered as of the most immoral tendency, the very word, which
signified "perjured," in the Greek language, meaning, when analysed, "he
that adds oath to oath," or "the taker of many oaths."
But, above all, the Quakers consider oaths as unlawful for Christians,
having been positively forbidden by Jesus Christ.
The words, in which they conceived this prohibition to have been
contained, they take from the sermon on the Mount.
[3] "Again, ye have heard, that it hath been said by them of old time,
Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shall perform unto the Lord thine
oaths."
[Footnote 3: Matt. v. 33.]
"But I say unto you, swear not at all, neither by heaven, because it is
God's throne."
"Nor by the earth, for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem, for it
is the city of the great King."
"Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one
hair white or black."
"But let your communication be yea, yea; nay, nay: for whatsoever is
more than this cometh of evil."
It is said by those, who oppose the Quakers on this subject, that these
words relate, not to civil oaths, but to such as are used by profane
persons in the course of their conversation. But the Quakers deny this,
because the disciples, as Jews, must have known that profane swearing
had been unlawful long before this prohibition of Jesus Christ. They
must relate, therefore, to something else, and to something, which had
not before been forbidden.
They deny it also on account of the construction of the sentences, and
of the meaning of the several words in these. For the words, "Swear not
at all," in the second of the verses, which have been quoted, have an
immediate reference to the words in the first. Thus they relate to the
word "forswear," in the first. But if they relate to the word
"forswear," they must relate to perjury, and if to perjury, then to a
civil oath, or to an oath, where an appeal is made to God by man, as to
something relating to himself. The word oath also is explicitly
mentioned in the first of these verses, and mentioned as an oath which
had been allowed. Now there was one oath, which had been allowed in
ancient time. The Jews had been permitted, in matters of judgment, to
swear by the name of God. This permission was given them, for one, among
other reasons, that they might be prevented from swearing by the name of
those idols by which their neighbours swore; for a solemn appeal to any
Heathen god necessarily includes an acknowledgment of the omnipresence
of the same.
That they related to this oath in particular, the Quakers conceive to be
obvious from the prohibition in the verses which have been cited, of
swearing by heaven, by earth, and by other things. The Jews, knowing the
sacredness of the name of God, had an awful notion of the consequences
of perjury, if committed after an appeal to it, and therefore had
recourse to the names of the creatures, in case they should swear
falsely. But even the oaths, thus substituted by them, are forbidden by
Jesus Christ; and they are forbidden upon this principle, as we find by
a subsequent explanation given by St. Matthew, that whosoever swore by
these creatures, really and positively swore by the name of God. But if
they are forbidden, because swearing by these creatures is the same
thing as swearing by God who made them, then the oath "by the name of
God," which had been permitted to the Jews of old, was intended by Jesus
Christ to be discontinued, or to have no place in his new religion.
The Quakers then, considering the words in question to have the meaning
now annexed to them, give the following larger explanation of what was
the intention of our Saviour upon this occasion.
In his sermon on the Mount, of which these words on the subject of oaths
are a part, he inculcated into his disciples a system of morality, far
exceeding that of the Jews, and therefore in the verses which precede
those upon this subject, he tells them, that whereas it was said of old,
"thou shall not kill," he expected of them, that they should not even
entertain the passion of revenge. And whereas it was said of old, "thou
shalt not commit adultery," he expected, that they should not even lust
after others, if they were married, or after those in a married state.
Thus he brings both murder and adultery from act to thought. He attaches
a criminality to unlawful feelings if not suppressed, or aims at the
subjugation of the passions, as the springs of the evil actions of men.
Going on to shew the farther superiority of his system of morality over
that of the Jews, he says again, whereas it was said of old, "thou
shall not forswear thyself," he expects that they should not swear at
all, not even by the name of God, which had been formerly allowed, for
that he came to abrogate the ancient law, and perjury with it. It was
his object to make the word of his true disciples equal to the ancient
oath. Thus he substituted truth for oaths. And he made this essential
difference between a Jew and a Christian, that, whereas the one swore in
order that he might be believed; the other was to speak truth in order
that he might not swear. Such was the intended advance from Jew to
Christian, or from Moses to Christ.
The Quakers are farther confirmed in their ideas upon this subject, by
believing, that Christianity would not have been as perfect as they
apprehend it to have been intended to be, without this restriction upon
oaths. Is it possible, they say, that Jesus Christ would have left it to
Christians to imagine, that their words were to be doubted on any
occasion? Would he have left it to them to think so dishonourably of one
another, or of their new vocation, that their words were to be tried by
the touchstone of oaths, when his religion was to have a greater effect
than any former system of morality ever known, in the production of
truth? Is it possible, when oaths sprung out of fraud and falsehood, as
he himself witnesses, (for whatever is more than yea and nay, cometh of
evil) that he would have left this remnant of antiquity standing, as if
his religion was not intended to extirpate the very ground-work of it?
Finally, the Quakers are confirmed in their ideas upon this subject from
a belief that oaths were to cease, either at the coming of Jesus Christ,
or as men became Christians. For, in the first place, the oath "by the
name of God," is considered by some, as I have before noticed, to have
been permitted to the Jews during their weak state, that they might not
swear by the idols of their cotemporary neighbours, and thus lose sight
of the only and true God. But what Christian stands in need of any
preservative against idolatry, or of any commemorative of the existence
and superintendence of an almighty, wise, beneficent, and moral Governor
of the world? Some again have imagined, that, as the different
purifications among the Jews, denoting the holiness of God, signified
that it became men to endeavour to be holy, so the oath "by the name of
God," denoting the verity of God, signified, that it became men to
devote themselves to the truth. But no true Christian stands in need of
such symbols, to make him consider his word as equivalent to his oath.
Others again have imagined, that the oath "by the name of God," typified
the truth, or the eternal word. But as the type ceases when the
antitype appears, so the coming of Jesus Christ, who in the gospel
language is called both the truth and the eternal word, may be
considered as putting an end to this, as to other types and shadows, of
the Jewish church.
CHAP. III.
SECT. I.
_War--Tenet on war--Quakers hold it unlawful for Christians to
fight--Scriptural passages, which they produce in support of this
tenet--Arguments which others produce from scriptural authority against
it--Reply of the Quakers to these arguments._
The next of the great tenets which the Quakers hold, is on the subject
of war. They believe it unlawful for Christians to engage in the
profession of arms, or indeed to bear arms under any circumstances of
hostility whatever. Hence there is no such character as that of a Quaker
soldier. A Quaker is always able to avoid the regular army, because the
circumstance of entering into it is a matter of choice. But where he has
no such choice, as is the case in the militia, he either submits, if he
has property, to distraints upon it, or, if he has not, to prison.[4]
[Footnote 4: The Quakers have been charged with inconsistency in
refusing military service, and yet in paying those taxes, which are
expressly for the support of wars. To this charge they reply, that they
believe it to be their duty to render to Caesar the things which are
Caesar's, and to leave the application of them to Caesar himself, as he
judges best for the support of government. This duty they collect from
the example of Jesus Christ, who paid the tribute money himself, and
ordered his disciples to do it, and this to a government, not only
professedly military, but distinguished for its idolatry and despotism.
Personal service, however, they conceive to militate against a positive
command by our Saviour, as will be explained in this chapter.]
The Quakers ground the illicitness of war on several passages, which are
to be found in the New Testament. I shall not quote all the texts they
bring forward, but shall make a selection of them on this occasion.
Jesus Christ, in the famous sermon, which he preached upon the Mount,
took occasion to mention specifically some of the precepts of the Jewish
law, and to inform his hearers, that he expected of those, who were to
be his true disciples, that they would carry these to a much higher
extent in their practice under the new dispensation, which he was then
affording them. Christianity required a greater perfection of the human
character than under the law. Men were not only not to kill, but not
even to cherish the passion of revenge.[5] And "whereas it was said of
old, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, I say unto you, says
Christ, that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy
right cheek, turn to him the other also." And farther on in the same
chapter, he says, "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love
thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy: But I say unto you, love your
enemies,[6] bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you,
and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you. For if ye
love them which love you, what reward have you? do not even the
Publicans the same? Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which
is in heaven is perfect." Now the Quakers are of opinion, that no man
can receive this doctrine his heart, and assist either offensively or
defensively in the operations of war.
[Footnote 5: Matt. v. 38.]
[Footnote 6: The Heathen nations, on account of their idolatry, were
called enemies by the Jews.]
Other passages, quoted by the Quakers, in favour of their tenet on war,
are taken from the apostles Paul and James conjointly.
The former, in his[7] second epistle to the Corinthians, says, "For
though we walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh: For the
weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the
pulling down of strong holds, to the casting down imaginations, and
every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and
bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." From
hence the Quakers argue, that the warfare of Christianity, or that which
Christianity recognises, is not carnal, but spiritual, and that it
consists in the destruction of the evil imaginations, or of the evil
lusts and passions of men. That is, no man can be a true soldier of
Christ, unless his lusts are subdued, or unless the carnal be done away
by the spiritual mind. Now this position having been laid down by St.
Paul, or the position having been established in Christian morals, that
a state of subjugated passions is one of the great characteristic marks
of a true Christian, the Quakers draw a conclusion from it by the help
of the words of St. James. This apostle, in his letter to the dispersed
tribes, which were often at war with each other, as well as with the
Romans, says,[8] "From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come
they not hence even of your lusts that war in your members?" But if wars
come from the lusts of men, then the Quakers say, that those who have
subdued their lusts, can no longer engage in them, or, in other words,
that true Christians, being persons of this description, or being such,
according to St. Paul, as are redeemed out of what St. James calls the
very grounds and occasions of wars, can no longer fight. And as this
proposition is true in itself, so the Quakers conceive the converse of
it to be true also: For if there are persons, on the other hand, who
deliberately engage in the wars and fightings of the world, it is a
proof, that their lusts are not yet subjugated, or that, though they may
be nominal, they are not yet arrived at the stature of true or of
full-grown Christians.
[Footnote 7: 2 Cor. x. 3, 4, 5.]
[Footnote 8: James iv. I.]
A third quotation, made by the Quakers, is taken from St. Paul
exclusively.[9] "Now if any man have not the spirit of Christ, he is
none of his." That is, if men have not the same disposition which Jesus
Christ manifested in the different situations of his life, the same
spirit of humility and of forbearance, and of love, and of forgiveness
of injuries, or if they do not follow him as a pattern, or if they do
not act as he would have done on any similar occasion, they are not
Christians. Now they conceive, knowing what the spirit of Jesus was by
those things which have been recorded of him, that he could never have
been induced or compelled, by any earthly consideration or power, to
have engaged in the wars of the world. They are aware that his mission,
which it became him to fulfil, and which engrossed all his time, would
not have allowed him the opportunity of a military life. But they
believe, independently of this, that the spirit which he manifested upon
earth, would have been of itself a sufficient bar to such an employment.
This they judge from his opinions and his precepts. For how could he
have taken up arms to fight, who enjoined in the new dispensation, that
men were not to resist evil; that they were to love their enemies; that
they were to bless those who cursed them, and to do good to those who
hated them? This they judge also from his practice. For how could he
have lifted up his arm against another, who, "when he was reviled,
reviled not again;" and who, in his very agony upon the Cross, prayed
for his persecutors, saying, "Father, forgive them, for they know not
what they do." But if Jesus Christ could not have been induced or
compelled to have engaged in a profession, which would have subjected
him to take away the life of another, so neither can any Christian; "for
if a man have not the spirit of Christ, he is none of his."
[Footnote 9: Rom. viii. 9.]
Three arguments are usually brought against the Quakers on this subject.
The first is, that John the Baptist,[10] when the soldiers demanded of
him what they should do, did not desire them to leave the service in
which they were engaged, but, on the other hand, to be content with
their wages. To this the Quakers reply, that John told them also, "to do
violence to no man." But even if he had not said this, they apprehend
that nothing could be deduced from his expressions, which could become
binding upon Christians. For John was the last prophet of the old
dispensation, but was never admitted into the new. He belonged to the
system which required an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, but
not to that which required no resistance to evil, and which insisted
upon the love of enemies as well as of friends. Hence Jesus Christ said
of him, that "he who was least in the kingdom of heaven, was greater
than he."
[Footnote 10: Luke iii. 14.]
The second argument brought against the Quakers on this occasion, is of
a similar nature with the former. It is said that, if war had been
unlawful, our Saviour, when the centurion[11] came to him at Capernaum,
would have found fault with his profession; but he did not do this, but
on the other hand he highly commended him for his religion. In answer to
this the Quakers observe, first, that no solid argument can be drawn
from silence on any occasion. Secondly, that Jesus Christ seems, for
wise purposes, to have abstained from meddling with many of the civil
institutions of his time, though in themselves wicked, thinking
probably, that it was sufficient to have left behind him such general
precepts, as, when applied properly, would be subversive of them all.
And, thirdly, that he never commended the centurion on account of his
military situation, but on account of his profession of his faith.
[Footnote 11: Matt. viii. 5.]
They say farther, that they can bring an argument of a much more
positive nature than that just mentioned, from an incident which took
place, and where Jesus was again concerned. When Peter cut off the ear
of one of the servants of the high priest, who was concerned in the
apprehension of his Lord, he was not applauded, but reprimanded for the
part which he thus took in his defence in the following words:[12] "Put
up again thy sword in its place, for all they that take the sword, shall
perish by the sword." Now the Quakers conceive, that much more is to be
inferred against the use of the sword from this instance, than from the
former in favour of it.
[Footnote 12: Matt. xxvi, 52.]
The last argument, which is usually adduced against the Quakers on this
subject, is, that they have mistaken the meaning of the words of the
famous sermon upon the Mount. These words teach us the noble lesson,
that it is more consistent with the character of a Christian to forgive,
than to resist an injury. They are, it is said, wholly of private
import, and relate solely to private occurrences in life. But the
Quakers have extended the meaning of them beyond private to public
injuries or wars.
The Quakers, in answer to this observe, that they dare not give to the
words in question a less extensive meaning. They relate to every one who
reads them. They relate to the poor. They relate to the rich. They
relate to, every potentate who may be the ruler of a land. They relate
to every individual of his council. There is no exception, or
dispensation to any one, in favour of any case.
That they relate to public as well as private wars, or that they extend
themselves naturally to those which are public, the Quakers conceive it
reasonable to suppose from the following consideration. No man, they
apprehend, can possess practically the divine principle of loving an
individual enemy at home, or of doing good to the man who hates him, but
he must of necessity love his enemy in any and every other place. He
must have gone so for forward on the road to Christian perfection, as to
be unable to bear arms against any other person whatsoever, and
particularly when, according to the doctrines of the New Testament, no
geographical boundaries fix the limits of love and enmity between man
and man, but the whole human race are considered as the children of the
same parent, and therefore as brothers to one another. But who can truly
love an enemy and kill him? And where is the difference, under the
Gospel dispensation, between Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian, bond
and free?
That these words were meant to extend to public as well as to private
ware, the Quakers believe again from the views which they entertain
relative to the completion of prophecy. They believe that a time will
come, in one or other of the succeeding ages, "when men shall bent their
swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks, and when
nation shall not lift up sword against nation, and they shall not learn
war any more." Now other Christians, who differ from them in the
interpretation of the words in question, believe equally with them, that
the times thus predicted will come to pass. The question then is,
whether the more enlarged interpretation of these words, as insisted
upon by the Quakers, or of the less enlarged as insisted upon by others,
be the most consistent with the belief of the future accomplishment of
the prophecy just mentioned. And in this case the Quakers are of
opinion, that if wars were ever to cease, one ought to expect that some
foundation would have been previously laid in Christianity for this
great and important end. The subjugation of the passions, which it is
the direct tendency of Christianity to effect, would produce this end.
And so far such a foundation has already been laid in this system. But
as the admission of moral precepts into the education of man, so as to
form habits of moral opinion, is another, way of influencing conduct in
life, the Quakers think it likely that some such maxim as "that
Christians should not fight," would have been introduced also, because
the adoption of such a maxim would have had a similar tendency with the
subjugation of the passions in producing the same end. For it seems
absurd, they conceive, to suppose that wars should cease, and that no
precept should have been held out that they were wrong. But the more
enlarged interpretation of the words in question furnishes such a
precept, and therefore another foundation seems to have been laid in
Christianity for the same end. They admit, therefore, the larger
interpretation as included in the less, because it comports more with
the design of Providence, who, by the mouth of his prophets wills
universal peace, that the prohibition of public as well as of private
wars should be understood as a Christian doctrine, than that the words
in question should be confined to private injuries alone.
The last reason, which the Quakers give for adopting the larger
interpretation of the words in the sermon upon the Mount, as well as the
less, is the following. They are of opinion, that, as Christians, they
ought not to lessen the number of the moral obligations of the Gospel.
They ought not to abridge its dignity, nor to put limits to its
benevolence. If it was the desire of Jesus Christ, that men should love
their enemies, it is their duty to believe, that his wish could not have
been otherwise than universal. If it was an object with him to cure
moral evil, it is their duty to suppose, that it was his desire to
destroy it, not partially, but to the utmost possible extent. If it was
his design to give happiness to man, it is their duty to determine, that
he intended to give it not in a limited proportion, but in the largest
measure. But when they consider the nature of wars, that they militate
against the law of preservation, that they include the commission of a
multitude of crimes, that they produce a complication of misery and
suffering to man, they conceive they would not be doing their duty as
Christians, or giving to Christianity its due honour, if they were not
to admit the larger meaning of the words in question as well as the
less. Reason too, pleads for the one as well as for the other.
Consistency of moral doctrine again demands both. But if we admit the
restricted interpretation, and exclude the larger, we offend reason. All
consistency is at an end. Individual responsibility for moral turpitude
will be taken from man. Crimes, clearly marked and defined in the page
of Christianity, will cease to be crimes at the will of princes. One
contradiction will rush in after another; and men will have two
different standards of morality, as they adhere to the commands of the
Gospel, or to the customs of governments or of the world.
SECT. II.
_Meaning of the scriptural passages advanced by the Quakers, supported
by the opinions and practice of the early Christians--Early Christian
writers held it unlawful for Christians to fight, as appears from
Justin--Tatian--Clemens--and others--Christians would not enter into the
armies for more than two centuries, as appears from Ireneus--Tertullian
--Celsus--Origen and others--and generally left the military service,
if they happened to be converted in it.
It may be presumed to be difficult for Christians, who have been in the
habit of seeing wars entered into and carried on by their own and other
Christian governments, and without any other censure than that they
might be politically wrong, to see the scriptural passages of
"non-resistance to evil and love of enemies," but through a vitiated
medium. The prejudices of some, the interests of others, and custom with
all, will induce a belief among them, that these have no relation to
public wars. At least they will be glad to screen themselves under such
a notion. But the question is, what a Heathen would have said to these
passages, who, on his conversion to Christianity, believed that the New
Testament was of divine origin, that it was the book of life, and that
the precepts, which it contained, were not to be dispensed with, to suit
particular cases, without the imputation of evil. Now such a trial, the
Quakers say, has been made. It was made by the first Christians, and
they affirm, that these interpreted the passages, which have been
mentioned, differently from those of most of the Christians of the
present age; for that both their opinions and their practice spoke
loudly against the lawfulness of war.
Upon this new subject I shall enter next. And I confess I shall enter
upon it willingly. First, because I know of none that is more important.
Secondly, because, though controversy may have thrown some light upon
it, much remains to be added. And, thirdly, because the assertions of
the Quakers on this point are disputed by many at the present day. With
respect to the opinions of the early Quakers, which I shall notice
first, it must be premised, that such of them as have written books,
have not all of them entered on this subject. Some of them have not had
even occasion to mention it. But where they have, and where they have
expressed an opinion, I believe that this will be found unfavourable to
the continuance of war.
Justin the Martyr, one of the earliest writers in the second century,
considers war as unlawful. He makes also the devil "the author of all
war." No severer sentence could have been passed upon it than this, when
we consider it as coming from the lips of an early Christian. The
sentiment too was contrary to the prevailing sentiments of the times,
when, of all professions, that of war was most honourable, and was the
only one that was considered to lead to glory. It resulted, therefore,
in all probablity, from the new views, which Justin had acquired by a
perusal of such of the scriptures, as had then fallen into his hands.
Tatian, who was the disciple of Justin, in his oration to the Greeks,
speaks precisely in the same terms on the same subject.
From the different expressions of Clemens of Alexandria, a contemporary
of the latter, we collect his opinion to be decisive against the
lawfulness of war.
Tertullian, who may be mentioned next in order of time, strongly
condemned the practice of bearing arms, as it related to Christians. I
shall give one or two extracts from him on this subject. In his
dissertation on the worship of idols, he says, "Though the soldiers came
to John, and received a certain form to be observed, and though the
centurion believed, yet Jesus Christ, by disarming Peter, disarmed every
soldier afterwards: for custom never sanctions an illicit act." And in
his "Soldier's Garland," he says, "Can a soldier's life be lawful, when
Christ has pronounced, that he who lives by the sword shall perish by
the sword? Can one, who professes the peaceable doctrines of the Gospel,
be a soldier, when it is his duty not so much as to go to law? and shall
he, who is not to revenge his own wrongs, be instrumental in bringing
others into chains, imprisonment, torment, death?"
Cyprian, in his Epistle to Donatus, takes a view of such customs in his
own times, as he conceived to be repugnant to the spirit or the letter
of the Gospel. In looking at war, which was one of them, he speaks thus:
"Suppose thyself, says he, with me on the top of some very exalted
eminence, and from thence looking down upon the appearances of things
beneath thee. Let our prospect take in the whole horizon, and let us
view, with the indifference of persons not concerned in them, the
various motions and agitations of human life. Thou wilt then, I dare
say, have a real compassion for the circumstances of mankind, and for
the posture in which this view will represent them. And when thou
reflectest upon thy condition, thy thoughts will rise in transports of
gratitude and praise to God for having made thy escape from the
pollutions of the world. The things thou wilt principally observe, will
be the highways beset with robbers, the seas with pirates, encampments,
marches, and all the terrible forms of war and, bloodshed. When a single
murder is committed, it shall be deemed perhaps a crime; but that crime
shall commence a virtue, when committed under the shelter of public
authority, so that punishment is not rated by the measure of guilt, but
the more enormous the size of the wickedness is, so much the greater is
the chance for impunity." These are the sentiments of Cyprian, and that
they were the result of his views of Christianity, as taken from the
divine writings, there can be little doubt. If he had stood upon the
same eminence, and beheld the same sights previously to his conversion,
he might, like others, have neither thought piracy dishonourable, nor
war inglorious.
Lactantius, who lived some time after Cyprian, in his treatise
"Concerning the True Worship of God," says, "It can never be lawful for
a righteous man to go to war, whose warfare is in righteousness itself,"
And in another part of the same treatise he observes, that "no exception
can be made with respect to this command of God. It can never be lawful
to kill a man, whose person the Divine Being designed to be sacred as to
violence."
It will be unnecessary to make extracts from other of the early
Christian writers, who mention this subject. I shall therefore only
observe, that the names of Origen, Archelaus, Ambrose, Chrysostom,
Jerom, and Cyril, may be added, to those already mentioned, as the names
of persons who gave it as their opinion, that it was unlawful for
Christians to go to war.
With respect to the practice of the early Christians, which is the next
point to be considered, it may be observed, that there is no well
authenticated instance upon record, of Christians entering into the army
for the first two centuries; but it is true, on the other hand, that
they declined the military profession, as one in which it was not lawful
for them to engage.
The first species of evidence, which I shall produce to this point, may
be found in the following facts, which reach from the year 169 to the
year 198, Avidius Crassus had rebelled against the emperor Verus, and
was slain in a short time afterwards. Clodius Albinus in one part of the
world, and Pescenninus Niger in another, rebelled against the emperor
Severus, and both were slain likewise. Now suspicion fell, as it always
did in these times, if any thing went wrong, upon the Christians, as
having been concerned upon these occasions. But Tertullian, in his
Discourse to Scapula, tells us, that no Christians were to be found in
these armies. And yet these armies were extensive. Crassus was master of
all Syria, with its four legions, Niger of the Asiatic and Egyptian
legions, and Albinus of those of Britain, which legions together
contained between a third and an half of the standing legions of Rome.
And the fact, that no Christians were to be found in these, is the more
remarkable, because, according to the same Tertullian, Christianity had
reached all the places, in which these armies were.
A second species of evidence, as far as it goes, may be collected from
expressions and declarations in the works of certain authors of those
times. Justin the Martyr, and Tatian, make distinctions between
soldiers and Christians; and the latter says, that the Christians
declined even military commands. Clemens of Alexandria, gives the
Christians, who were cotemporary with him, the appellation of
"peaceable, or of the followers of peace," thus distinguishing them from
the soldiers of his age. And he says expressly, that "those, who were
the followers of peace, used none of the instruments of war."
A third species of evidence, which is of the highest importance in this
case, is the belief which the writers of these times had, that the
prophecy of Isaiah, which stated, that men should turn their swords into
ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks, was then in the act
of completion.
Irenæus, who flourished about the year 180, affirms, that this famous
prophecy had been completed in his time; "for the Christians, says he,
have changed their swords and their lances into instruments of peace,
and they know not how to fight," Justin Martyr, who was cotemporary with
Irenæus, asserted the same thing, which he could not have done if the
Christians in his time had engaged in war. "That the prophecy, says he,
is fulfilled, you have good reason to believe, for we, who in times past
killed one another, do not now fight with our enemies." And here it is
observable, that the word "fight" does not mean to strike, or to beat,
or to give a blow, but to fight as in war; and the word "enemy" does
not mean a common adversary, or one who has injured us, but an enemy of
the state; and the sentence, which follows that which has been given,
puts the matter again out of all doubt. Tertullian, who lived after
these, speaks in those remarkable words: "Deny that these (meaning the
turning of swords into ploughshares) are the things prophesied of, when
you see what you see, or that they are the things fulfilled, when you
read what you read; but if you deny neither of these positions, then you
must confess, that the prophecy has been accomplished, as far as the
practice of every individual is concerned, to whom it is applicable." I
might go from Tertullian even as far as Theoderet, if it were necessary,
to shew, that the prophecy in question was considered as in the act of
completion in those times.
The fourth and last proof will be found in the assertions of Celsus, and
in the reply of Origen to that writer. Celsus, who lived at the end of
the second century, attacked the Christian religion. He made it one of
his charges against the Christians, that they refused in his time to
bear arms for the emperor, even in the case of necessity, and when their
services would have been accepted. He told them farther, that if the
rest of the empire were of their opinion, it would soon be overrun by
the Barbarians. Now Celsus dared not have brought this charge against
the Christians, if the fact had not been publicly known. But let us see
whether it was denied by those, who were of opinion that his work
demanded a reply. The person, who wrote against him in favour of
Christianity, was Origen, who lived in the third century. But Origen, in
his answer, admits the fact as stated by Celsus, that the Christians
would not bear arms, and justifies them for refusing the practice on the
principle of the unlawfulness of war.
And as the early Christians would not enter into the armies, so there is
good ground to suppose, that, when they became converted in them, they
relinquished their profession. Human nature was the same both in and out
of the armies, and would be equally worked upon, in this new state of
things, in both cases. Accordingly we find, from Tertullian, in his
"Soldier's Garland," that many in his time, immediately on their
conversion, quitted the military service. We are told also, by
Archelaus, who flourished under Probus in the year 278, that many Roman
soldiers, who had embraced Christianity, after having witnessed the
piety and generosity of Marcellus, immediately forsook the profession of
arms. We are told also by Eusebius, that, about the same time, "Numbers
laid aside a military life, and became private persons, rather than
abjure their religion." And here it may not be unworthy of remark, that
soldiers, after their conversion, became so troublesome in the army,
both on account of their scruples against the idolatrous practices
required of the soldiery, and their scruples against fighting, that they
were occasionally dismissed the service on these accounts.
SECT. III.
_Objection to the foregoing statement, that the idolatry, which was then
connected with the military service, and not the unlawfulness of war,
was the reason why Christians declined it--Idolatry admitted to be a
cause--Instance in Marinus--But the belief of the unlawfulness of
fighting was another, and an equally powerful cause--Instances in
Maximilian--Marcellus--Cassian--Marlin--The one scruple as much then a
part of the Christian religion as the other._
As an objection may be made to the foregoing statement, I think it
proper to notice it in this place.
It will be said, that the military oath, which all were obliged to take
alike in the Roman armies, and which was to be repeated annually, was
full of idolatry; that the Roman standards were all considered as gods,
and had divine honours paid to them by the soldiery; and that the images
also of the emperors, which were either fixed upon these standards, or
placed in the midst of them in a temple in the camp, were to be adored
in the same manner. Now these customs were interwoven with the military
service. No Roman soldier was exempted from them. It will be urged,
therefore, that no Christian could submit to these services. Indeed when
a person was suspected of being a Christian in those times, he was
instantly taken to the altars to sacrifice, it being notorious, that if
he were a Christian he would not sacrifice, though at the hazard of his
life. Is it not, therefore, to be presumed, that these idolatrous tests
operated as the great cause, why Christians refused to enter into the
army, or why they left it when converted as described in the former
section?
That these tests operated as a cause, we must allow. And let this be
considered as an insuperable argument against those, who contend that
there were Christian soldiers in these times, for no Christian could
submit to such idolatrous homage; but, if so, no Christian could be a
soldier.
That these tests must have operated as a cause, we may infer from the
history of Marinus. Marinus, according to Eusebius, was a man of family
and fortune, and an officer in a legion, which, in the year 260, was
stationed at Caesarea of Palestine. One of the centurion's rods happened
to become vacant in this legion, and Marinus was appointed to it. But
just at this moment another, next to him in rank, accused him before the
tribunal of being a Christian, stating, that "the laws did not allow a
Christian, who refused to sacrifice to the emperors, to hold any dignity
in the army." Achæus, the judge, asked Marinus if it was true, that he
had become a Christian. He acknowledged it. Three hours were then
allowed him to consider, whether he would sacrifice or die. When the
time was expired, he chose the latter. Indeed, so desirous were the
early Christians of keeping clear of idolatry in every shape, that they
avoided every custom that appeared in the least degree connected with
it. Thus when a largess was given in honour of the emperors, L.
Septimius Severus the father, and M. Aurelius Caracalla the son, a
solitary soldier, as we learn from Tertullian, was seen carrying the
garland, which had been given him on that occasion, in his hand, while
the rest wore it upon their heads. On being interrogated by the
commander, why he refused wearing it, he replied, that[13] he had become
a Christian. He was immediately punished before the army, and sent into
prison. What became of him afterwards is not related. But it must be
clear, if he lived and cherished his Christian feelings, that, when the
day of the renewal of his oath, or of the worshipping of the standards,
or of any sacrifice in the camp, should arrive, he would have refused
these services, or abandoned his profession.
[Footnote 13: The priests wore the garland, when they sacrificed to the
Heathen gods.]
But though unquestionably the idolatrous services, required of the
soldiers of those times, hindered Christians from entering into the
armies, and compelled those, who were converted in them, to leave them,
nothing is more true, than that the belief, that it was unlawful for
Christians to fight, occasioned an equal abhorrence of a military life.
One of the first effects, which Christianity seems to have produced upon
its first converts, when it was pure and unadulterated, and unmixed
with the interpretations of political men, was a persuasion, that it
became them, in obedience to the divine commands, to abstain from all
manner of violence, and to become distinguishable as the followers of
peace. We find accordingly from Athenagoras, and other early writers,
that the Christians of his time, abstained, when they were struck, from
striking again, and that they carried their principles so far, as even
to refuse to go to law with those who injured them. We find also, from
the same Athenagoras, and from Theophilus Antiochenus, Tatian, Minucius
Felix, and others, that they kept away from the shews of the gladiators.
This they did, not only because these shews were cruel; but because, as
Theophilus says, "lest we should become partakers of the murders
committed there." A similar reason is also given by Athenagoras on this
occasion: "Who is there, says he, that does not prize the shews of the
gladiators, which your emperors make for the people? But we, thinking
that there is very little difference whether a man be the author or
spectator of murder, keep away from all such sights." And here it may be
observed, that the gladiators themselves were, generally prisoners of
war, or reputed enemies, and that the murder of these was by public
authority, and sanctioned; as in war, by the state. Now what conclusion
are we to draw from these premises? Can we think it possible, that
those, who refused to strike again, or to go to law with those who
injured them, and who thought an attendance at the gladiatorial
spectacles criminal on the principle, that he who stood by was a
murderer, though the murder was sanctioned by law; should not have an
objection to the military service, on the principle, that it was
unlawful to fight?
In short, the belief of the unlawfulness of war, was universal among
Christians in those times. Every Christian writer of the second century,
who notices the subject, makes it unlawful for Christians to bear arms.
And if the Christian writers of this age were of this opinion, contrary
to all their sentiments before their conversion, and wholly from their
knowledge of divine truths, why should not others, who had a common
nature with these, be impressed, on receiving the same truths, in a
similar manner? And so undoubtedly they were. And as this belief was
universal among the Christians of those times, so it operated with them
as an impediment to a military life, quite as much as the idolatry, that
was connected with it, of which the following instances, in opposition
to that of Marinus, may suffice.
The first case I propose to mention shall be, where there was an
objection to entering into the military service upon this principle. And
here, I apprehend none can be more in point than that of Maximilian, as
preserved in the acts of Ruinart.
Maximilian, having been brought before the tribunal, in order to be
enrolled as a soldier, Dion, the proconsul, asked him his name.
Maximilian, turning to him, replied, "Why wouldst thou know my name? I
am a Christian, and cannot fight."
Then Dion ordered him to be enrolled, and when he was enrolled, it was
recited out of the register, that he was five feet ten inches high.
Immediately after this, Dion bade the officer mark him. But Maximilian
refused to be marked, still asserting that he was a Christian. Upon
which Dion instantly replied, "Bear arms, or thou shalt die."
To this Maximilian answered, "I cannot fight, if I die. I am not a
soldier of this world, but a soldier of God." Dion then said, "Who has
persuaded thee to behave thus?" Maximilian answered, "My own mind, and
he who called me." Dion then spoke to his father, and bade him persuade
his son. But his father observed, that his son knew his own mind, and
what it was best for him to do.
After this had passed, Dion addressed Maximilian again in these words,
"Take thy arms, and receive the mark." "I can receive, says Maximilian,
no such mark. I have already the mark of Christ." Upon which Dion said,
"I will send thee quickly to thy Christ." "Thou mayest do so, said
Maximilian, but the glory will be mine."
Dion then bade the officer mark him. But Maximilian still persisted in
refusing, and spoke thus: "I cannot receive the mark of this world, and
if thou shouldst give me the mark, I will destroy it. It will avail
nothing. I am a Christian, and it is not lawful for me to wear such a
mark about my neck, when I have received the saving mark of the Lord
Jesus Christ, the Son of the living God, whom thou, knowest not, who
died to give us life, and whom God gave for our sins. Him all we
Christians obey. Him we follow as the restorer of our life, and the
author of our salvation."
Dion instantly replied to this, "Take thy arms, and receive the mark, or
thou shalt suffer a miserable death."--"But I shall not perish, said
Maximilian. My name is already enrolled with Christ. I cannot fight."
Dion said, "Consider then thy youth, and bear arms. The profession of
arms becomes a young man." Maximilian replied, "My arms are with the
Lord. I cannot fight for any earthly consideration. I am now a
Christian."
Dion the proconsul, said, "Among the life-guards of our masters
Dioclesian and Maximian, and Constantius and Maximus, there are
Christian soldiers, and they fight." Maximilian answered, "They know
best what is expedient for them, but I am a Christian, and it is
unlawful to do evil."
Dion said, "Take thy arms. Despise not the profession of a soldier, lest
thou perish miserably."--"But I shall not perish, says Maximilian; and
if I should leave this world, my soul will live with Christ the Lord."
Dion then ordered his name to be struck from the roll, and, when this
was done, he proceeded, "Because, out of thy rebellious spirit, thou
hast refused to bear arms, thou shall be punished according to thy
deserts for an example to others." And then he delivered the following
sentence: "Maximilian! because thou hast with a rebellious spirit
refused to bear arms, thou art to die by the sword." Maximilian replied,
"Thanks be to God."
He was twenty years, three months, and seventeen days old, and when he
was led to the place of execution, he spoke thus: "My dear brethren,
endeavour with all your might, that it may be your portion to see the
Lord, and that he may give you such a crown;" and then, with a pleasant
countenance, he said to his father, "Give the executioner the soldier's
coat thou hast gotten for me, and when I shall receive thee in the
company of the blessed martyrs, we may also rejoice together with the
Lord."
After this he suffered. His mother Pompeiana obtained his body of the
judge, and conveyed it to Carthage, and buried it near the place where
the body of Cyprian the Martyr lay. And thirteen days after this his
mother died, and was buried in the came place. And Victor, his father,
returned to his habitation, rejoicing and praising God, that he had sent
before such a gift to the Lord, himself expecting to follow after.
I shall only observe, upon this instance, that it is nearly pure and
unmixed, or that it is but little connected with idolatrous
circumstances, or rather, that the unlawfulness of fighting was
principally urged by Maximilian as a reason against entering upon a
military life. Let us now find a case, where, when a person was
converted in the army, he left it, pleading this principle, as one among
others, for his dereliction of it.
Marcellus was a centurion in the legion called "Trajana." On a festival,
given in honour of the birth-day of Galerius, he threw down his military
belt at the head of the legion, and in the face of the standards,
declared with a loud voice, that he would no longer serve in the army,
for that he had become a Christian. "I hold in detestation, said he,
addressing himself to all the soldiers, the worship of your gods: gods,
which are made of wood and stone, gods which are deaf and dumb." So far
Marcellus, it appears, seems to have been influenced in his desertion of
a military life by the idolatry connected with it. But let us hear him
farther on this subject. "It is not lawful, says he, for a Christian,
who is the servant of Christ the Lord, to bear arms for any earthly
consideration." After a delay of more than three months in prison after
this transaction, which delay was allowed for the purpose of sparing
him, he was brought before the prefect. There he had an opportunity of
correcting his former expressions. But as he persisted in the same
sentiments, he suffered. It is remarkable, that, almost immediately
after his execution, Cassian, who, was the notary to the same legion,
refused to serve any longer, by publicly throwing his pen and
accompt-book upon the ground, and declaring, at the same time, that the
sentence of Marcellus was unjust. When taken up by the order of
Aurelianus Agricolanus, he is described by the record, preserved by
Ruinart, to have avowed the same sentiments as Marcellus, and, like him,
to have suffered death.
It may not be necessary, perhaps, to cite any other instances, as
opposed to that of Marinus, to the point in question. But, as another
occurs, which may be related in few words, I will just mention it in
this place. Martin, of whom Sulpicius Severus says so much, had been
bred to the profession of arms, but, on his conversion to Christianity,
declined it. In the answer, which he gave to Julian the Apostate for his
conduct on this occasion, we find him making use only of these words, "I
am a Christian, and therefore I cannot fight."
Now this answer of Martin is detached from all notions of idolatry. The
unlawfulness of fighting is given as the only motive for his
resignation. And there is no doubt, that the unlawfulness of fighting
was as much a principle of religion in the early times of Christianity,
as the refusal of sacrifice to the Heathen gods; and that they operated
equally to prevent men from entering into the army, and to drive them
out of it on their conversion. Indeed these principles generally went
together, where the profession of arms presented itself as an occupation
for a Christian. He, who refused the profession on account of the
idolatry connected with it, would have refused it on account of the
unlawfulness of fighting. And he, who refused it on account of the guilt
of fighting, would have refused it oh account of the idolatrous services
it required. Both and each of them were impediments, in the early times
of Christianity, to a military life.
SECT. IV.
_Early Christians then declined the army on account, of one, among other
persuasions, that it was unlawful for Christians to fight--Their
practice examined farther, or into the fourth century--shewn from hence,
that while Christianity continued pure, Christians still declined the
military profession--but as it became less pure, their scruples against
it became less--and when it became corrupt, their scruples against it
ceased--Manner in which the Quakers make the practice of these early
times support the meaning of the scriptural passages, which they adduce
in favour of their tenet on war._
As it will now probably be admitted, that the early Christians refused
to enter into the army, and that they left it after their conversion, on
account of one, among other persuasions, that it was unlawful for them
to fight, I must examine their practice, as it related to this subject,
still farther, or I must trace it down to a later period, before I can
show how the Quakers make the practice of these early times support the
meaning of the scriptural passages, which they advance in favour of
their tenet on war.
It may be considered as a well founded proposition, that, as the lamp of
Christianity burnt bright, in those early times, so those, who were
illuminated by it, declined the military profession; and, that, as its
flame shone less clear, they had less objection to it. Thus, in the two
first centuries, when Christianity was the purest, there were no
Christian soldiers. In the third century, when it became less pure,
there is frequent mention of such soldiers. And in the fourth, when its
corruption was fixed, Christians entered upon the profession of arms
with as little hesitation, as they entered upon any other occupation in
life.
That there were no Christian soldiers in the first and second centuries,
has already been made apparent.
That Christianity also was purest in these times, there can be no doubt.
Let us look at the character which is given of the first Christians by
Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Minucius Felix, and others of the early
Christian writers. According to these they were plain and neat in their
apparel, and frugal in their furniture. They were temperate in their
eating and drinking. They relinquished all the diversions of the times,
in which they saw any tendency to evil. They were chaste in their
conversation, tempering mirth with gravity. They were modest and chaste
in their deportment and manners. They were punctual to their words and
engagements. They were such lovers of the truth, that, on being asked,
if they were Christians, they never denied it, though death was the
consequence of such a religious profession. They loved each other as
brethren, and called one another by that name. They were kind, and
courteous, and charitable, beyond all example, to others. They abstained
from all manner of violence. They prayed for those who persecuted them.
They were patterns of humility and patience. They made no sacrifice of
their consciences, but would persevere in that which was right, never
refusing to die for their religion. This is the character, which is
uniformly given of them by the Christian writers of those times.
That their conduct was greatly altered in the third century, where we
are now to view it, we may collect from indisputable authority. I stated
in the former section, that a Christian soldier was punished for
refusing to wear a garland, like the rest of his comrades, on a public
occasion. This man, it appears, had been converted in the army, and
objected to the ceremony on that account. Now Tertullian tells us, that
this soldier was blamed for his unseasonable zeal, as it was called, by
some of the Christians at that time, though all Christians before
considered the wearing of such a garland as unlawful and profane. In
this century there is no question but the Christian discipline began to
relax. To the long peace the church enjoyed from the death of Antoninus
to the tenth year of Severus, is to be ascribed the corruption that
ensued. This corruption we find to have spread rapidly; for the same
Tertullian was enabled to furnish us with the extraordinary instance of
manufacturers of idols being admitted into the ecclesiastical order.
Many corruptions are also noticed in this century by other writers.
Cyprian complained of them, as they existed in the middle, and Eusebius,
as they existed at the end of it, and both attributed it to the peace,
or to the ease and plenty, which the Christians had enjoyed. The latter
gives us a melancholy account of their change. They had begun to live in
fine houses, and to indulge in luxuries. But, above all, they had begun
to be envious, and quarrelsome, and to dissemble, and to cheat, and to
falsify their word, so that they lost the character, which Pliny, an
adversary to their religion, had been obliged to give of them, and which
they had retained for more than a century, as appears by their own
writers.
That there were Christian soldiers in this more corrupt century of the
church, it is impossible to deny. For such frequent mention is made of
them in the histories, which relate to this period, that we cannot
refuse our assent to one or other of the propositions, either that there
were men in the armies, who called themselves Christians, or that there
were men in them, who had that name given them by others. That they were
Christians, however, is another question. They were probably such
Christians, as Dion mentioned to have been among the life-guards of
Dioclesian and Maximian, and of Constantius and Maximus, of whom
Maximilian observed, "These men may know what it is expedient for them
to do, but I am a Christian, and therefore I cannot fight." Indeed, that
real Christians could have been found in the army in this century is
impossible, for the military oath, which was full of idolatry, and the
adoration of the standards, and the performance of sacrifice, still
continued as services[14] not to be dispensed with by the soldiery. No
one, therefore, can believe, that men in the full practice of Pagan
idolatry, as every legionary soldier must then have been, were real
Christians, merely because it is recorded in history, that men, calling
themselves Christians, were found in the army in those times. On the
other hand, if any soldiers professed Christianity at this period, or
are related by authors to have professed it, and yet to have remained
soldiers, it may be directly pronounced, that they could only have been
nominal or corrupted Christians.
[Footnote 14: The military oath was not altered for Christians till the
next century, when they were allowed to swear "by God, by Christ, and by
the Holy Spirit, and by the majesty of the emperor, which, next to God,
is to be loved and honoured by mankind."]
That Christianity was more degenerate in the fourth than in the third
century (which is the next position) we have indubitable proof. One of
the first facts, that strikes us, is an extraordinary one related by
Lactantius, in his "Death of the persecuted," that there were Christians
at this time, who, having probably a superstitious belief, that the sign
of the Cross would be a preventive of pollution, were present, and even
assisted at some of the Heathen sacrifices. But it is not necessary to
detail these or other particulars. Almost every body knows, that more
evils sprang up to the church in this century, than in any other, some
of which remain at the present day. Indeed, the corruption of
Christianity was fixed as it were by law in the age now mentioned.
Constantine, on his conversion, introduced many of the Pagan ceremonies
and, superstitions, in which he had been brought up, into the Christian
religion. The Christians, rejoiced at seeing an emperor of their own
persuasion, under whom they had hopes of restoration to equal privileges
with others, and of freedom from persecution, submitted, in order to
please or flatter him, to his idolatrous customs and opinions, thus
sacrificing their consciences to their ease and safety. Many, on the
other hand, who had always been Heathens, professed themselves
Christians at once out of compliment to their emperor, and without any
real conversion of the heart. Thus there was a mixture of Christianity
and Paganism in the church, which had never been known before.
Constantine too did not dispense with the blasphemous titles of
Eternity, Divinity, and Pontifex Maximus, as they had been given to his
predecessors. After his death, he was considered also as a god. And if
Philostorgius is to be believed, the Christians, for so he calls them,
prayed to and worshipped him as such.
Now in this century, when the corruption of the church may be
considered to have been fixed, we scarcely find any mention of Christian
soldiers, or we find the distinction between them and others gradually
passing away. The truth is, that, when the Christians of this age had
submitted to certain innovations upon their religion, they were in a fit
state to go greater lengths; and so it happened, for as Heathens, who
professed to be Christians out of compliment to their emperor, had no
objection to the military service, so Christians, who had submitted to
Heathenism on the same principle, relaxed, in their scruples concerning
it. The latter too were influenced by the example of the former. Hence
the unlawfulness of fighting began to be given up. We find, however,
that here and there an ancient father still retained it as a religious
tenet, but these dropping off one after another, it ceased at length to
be a doctrine of the church.
Having now traced the practice of the Christians down to the fourth
century, as far as the profession of arms is concerned, I shall state in
few words the manner in which the Quakers make this practice support the
meaning of the scriptural passages, which they produce in favour of
their tenet on war.
The Quakers then lay it down as a position, that the Christians of the
first and second centuries, as we had already observed, gave the same
interpretation, as they themselves give, of the passages in question.
Now they say first, that if there were any words or expressions in the
original manuscripts of the Evangelists or Apostles, which might throw
light upon the meaning of these or other passages on the same subject,
but which words and expressions were not in the copies which came after,
then many of those who lived in the first and second centuries, had
advantages with respect to knowledge on this subject, which their
successors had not, inasmuch as the former were soon afterwards lost.
They say secondly, that if there was any thing in tradition which might
help to explain these passages more satisfactorily, those of the first
and second centuries had advantages again, because they lived nearer to
these traditions, or to the time when they were more pure, than those
Christians did, who succeeded them.
They say thirdly, that, if primitive practice be to be considered as the
best interpreter of the passages in question, then those of the first
and second centuries had their advantages again, because many of them
lived in the times of the Evangelists and the Apostles, and all of them
nearer to those who succeeded the Evangelists and Apostles, than those
in the subsequent ages of the Christian era.
But in direct inference, they conceive, is to be drawn from these
premises, namely, that the opinions of those who lived in the first and
second centuries, relative to the meaning of the passages in question,
are likely to be more correct on these several accounts, than those of
Christians in any of the ages that followed.
And as in the first and second centuries of the church, when
Christianity was purest, there were no Christian soldiers, but as in the
fourth century, when it became corrupt, Christians had lost their
objections to a military life, they conceive the opinions of the former
to be more correct than those of the latter, because the opinions of
real Christians, willing to make any sacrifice for their religion, must
be always less biassed and more pure, than those of persons calling
themselves Christians, but yet submitting to the idolatrous and other
corrupt practices of the world.
And as they conceive this to be true of the opinions of the second
century, when compared with those of the fourth, so they conceive it to
be true of the opinions of the second, when compared with those of the
moderns upon this subject, because, whatever our progress in
Christianity may be, seeing that it is not equal to that of the first
Christians, it is certain, besides the distance of time, that we have
prejudices arising from the practice of fourteen centuries, during all
which time it has been held out, except by a few individuals, as lawful
for Christians to fight.
SECT.V.
_Reflections of the author on the foregoing subject--Case of a superior
being supposed, who should reside in the planet nearest to us, and see
war carried on by men no larger than the race of ants--His enquiry as to
the origin of these wars--their duration--and other circumstances--supposed
answers to these questions--New arguments, from this supposed
conversation, against war._
I have now stated the principal arguments, by which the Quakers are
induced to believe it to be a doctrine of Christianity, that men should
abstain from war, and I intended to close the subject in the last
section. But when I consider the frequency of modern wars; when I
consider that they are scarcely over, before others rise up in their
place; when I consider again, that they come like the common diseases,
which belong to our infirm nature, and that they are considered by men
nearly in a similar light, I should feel myself criminal, if I were not
to avail myself of the privilege of an author, to add a few observations
of my own upon this subject.
Living as we do in an almost inaccessible island, and having therefore
more than ordinary means of security to our property and our persons
from hostile invasion, we do not seem to be sufficiently grateful to the
Divine Being for the blessings we enjoy. We do not seem to make a right
use of our benefits by contemplating the situation, and by feeling a
tender anxiety for the happiness of others. We seem to make no proper
estimates of the miseries of war. The latter we feel principally in
abridgments of a pecuniary nature. But if we were to feel them in the
conflagration of our towns and villages, or in personal wounds, or in
the personal sufferings of fugitive misery and want, we should be apt to
put a greater value than we do, upon the blessings of peace. And we
should be apt to consider the connexion between war and misery, and
between war and moral evil, in a light so much stronger than we do at
present, that we might even suppose the precepts of Jesus Christ to be
deficient, unless they were made to extend to wars, as well as to
private injuries.
I wonder what a superior being, living in the nearest planet to our
earth, and seeing us of the size of ants, would say, if he were enabled
to get any insight into the nature of modern wars.
It must certainly strike him, if he were to see a number of such
diminutive persons chasing one another in bodies over different parts of
the hills and vallies of the earth, and following each other in little
nut-shells, as it were upon the ocean, as a very extraordinary sight,
and as mysterious, and hard to be explained. He might, at first,
consider them as occupied in a game of play, or as emigrating for more
food, or for a better climate. But when he saw them stop and fight, and
destroy one another, and was assured that they were actually engaged in
the solemn game of death, and this at such a distance from their own
homes, he would wonder at the causes of these movements, and the reason
of this destruction, and, not knowing that they possessed rational
faculties, he would probably consider them as animals, destined by
nature to live upon one another.
I think the first question he would ask would be, And from whence do
these fightings come? It would be replied of course, that they came from
their lusts; that these beings, though diminutive in their appearance,
were men; that they had pride, and ambition; that they had envy and
jealousy; that they indulged also hatred, and malice, and avarice, and
anger; and that, on account of some or other of these causes, they
quarrelled and fought with one another.
Well, but the superior being would say, is there no one on the earth,
which I see below me, to advise them to conduct themselves better, or
are the passions you speak of eternally uppermost, and never to be
subdued? The reply would of course be, that in these little beings,
called men, there had been implanted the faculty of reason, by the use
of which they must know that their conduct was exceptionable, but that,
in these cases, they seldom minded it. It would also be added in reply,
that they had a religion, which was not only designed by a spirit from
heaven, who had once lived among them, but had been pronounced by him as
efficacious to the end proposed; that one of the great objects of this
religion was a due subjugation of their passions; and this was so much
insisted upon, that no one of them was considered to have received this
religion truly, unless his passions were subdued. But here the superior
being would enquire, whether they acknowledged the religion spoken of,
and the authority from whence it came? To which it would of course be
replied, that they were so tenacious of it, notwithstanding their
indulgence of their passions, and their destruction of one another, that
you could; not offend them more grievously than by telling them, that
they did not belong to the religion they professed.
It is not difficult to foresee what other questions the superior being
would ask, and probably the first of these would be, the duration of the
lives of these little beings, and the length and frequency of their
wars? It would be replied to this, that their lives were but as a
vapour, which appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away, and
that a quarter, and sometimes half of their time on earth, was spent in
those destructive pursuits. The superior being would unquestionably be
grieved at this account, because he would feel, that they really
frustrated their own happiness, or that they lost by their own fault a
considerable portion of the enjoyment of their lives.
In this impatience and anxiety for their future comfort, he would
probably ask again, if they had any notion of any generous end for which
they were born, for it is impossible they could suppose, that they came
into the world to destroy one another. It would be replied, that they
could not be ignorant of the true object or end; for the same religion,
in which they believed, and which was said before to have been given
them by a spirit sent from heaven, inculcated that they were sent there
on a life of trial, and that in a future existence they were to give an
account of their conduct, and were to be rewarded or punished
accordingly. The same religion, it would be replied, also inculcated,
notwithstanding their fightings, the utmost benevolence from one towards
another. It wished so much every one of them to live peaceably, that it
enjoined it as a duty rather to put up with an injury than to resent it,
and it carried its benevolence so far, that it made no distinction
between others of the same species, who spoke a different language, or
lived in other districts or parts of the same world.
But here the superior being would interrupt.--What, he would say! Are
they not to resent injuries, and yet do they go to war? And are they not
afraid of fighting in this manner, when they are to give an account of
their conduct in a future state? It would be replied, No: they have
their philosophers among them, and most of these have determined, that,
in this particular case, responsibility lies at the door of those who
employ them. But, notwithstanding this, there are others living among
them, who think otherwise. These are of opinion, that those who employ
them cannot take the responsibility upon themselves without taking it
from those whom they thus employ. But the religion of the Great Spirit
no where says, that any constituted authorities among them can take away
the responsibility of individual creatures, but, on the other hand, in
the most positive terms, that every individual creature is responsible
wholly for himself. And this religion does not give any creature an
exemption on account of any force which may be used against him; because
no one, according to its precepts, is to do evil, not even that good may
come. But if he be persecuted, he is to adhere to that which is right,
and to expect his reward in the other state. The impossibility,
therefore, of breaking or dissolving individual responsibility, in the
case of immoral action, is an argument to many, of the unlawfulness of
these wars. And those who reason in this manner, think they have
reasoned right, when they consider besides, that, if any of the beings
in question were to kill one of his usually reputed enemies in the time
of peace, he would suffer death for it, and be considered as accountable
also for his crime in a future state. They cannot see, therefore, how
any constituted authorities among them can alter the nature of things,
or how these beings can kill others in time of war, without the
imputation of a crime, whom they could not kill without such an
imputation in time of peace. They see in the book of the Great Spirit no
dispensation given to societies to after the nature of actions, which
are pronounced to be crimes.
But the superior being would say, is it really defined, and is it
defined clearly in the great book of the Spirit, that if one of them
should kill another, he is guilty of a crime! It would be replied, not
only of a crime, but of the greatest of all crimes, and that no
dispensation is given to any of them to commit it in any case. And it
would be observed farther, that there are other crimes, which these
fightings generally include, which are equally specified and forbidden
in the great book, but which they think it proper to sanction in the
present case. Thus, all kinds of treachery and deceit are considered to
be allowable, for a very ancient philosopher among them has left a maxim
upon record, and it has not yet been beaten out of their heads,
notwithstanding the precepts of the great book, in nearly the following
words: "Who thinks of requiring open courage of an enemy, or that
treachery is not equally allowable in war?"[15]
[Footnote 15: Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat?]
Strange! the superior being would reply. They seem to me to be reversing
the order of their nature, and the end of their existence. But how do
they justify themselves on these occasions? It would be answered, that
they not only justify themselves, but they even go so far as to call
these fightings honourable. The greater the treachery, if it succeeds,
and the greater the number of these beings killed, the more glorious is
the action esteemed.
Still more strange! the superior being would reply. And is it possible,
he would add, that they enter into this profession With a belief, that
they are entering into an honourable employ? Some of them, it would be
replied, consider it as a genteel employ. And hence they engage in it.
Others, of a lazy disposition, prefer it to any other. Others are
decoyed into it by treachery in various ways. There are also strong
drinks, which they are fond of, and if they are prevailed upon to take
these to excess, they lose their reason, and then they are obliged to
submit to it. It must be owned too, that when these wars begin, the
trades of many of these little beings are stopped, so that, to get a
temporary livelihood, they go out and fight. Nor must it be concealed,
that many are forced to go, both against their judgment and against
their will.
The superior being, hurt at these various accounts, would probably ask,
and what then does the community get by these wars, as a counterbalance
for the loss of so much happiness, and the production of so much evil?
It would be replied, nothing. The community is generally worse off at
the end of these wars, than when it began to contend. But here the
superior being would wish to hear no more of the system. He would
suddenly turn away his face, and retire into one of the deep valleys of
his planet, either with exclamations against the folly, or with emotions
of pity for the situation, or with expressions of disgust at the
wickedness, of these little creatures.
"O for a lodge in some vast wilderness,
Some boundless contiguity of shade,
Where tumour of oppression and deceit,
Of unsuccessful or successful war,
Might never reach me more! My ear is pain'd,
My soul is sick with every day's report,
Of wrong and outrage, with which earth is fill'd.
Lands, intersected by a narrow frith,
Abhor each other. Mountains interpos'd,
Make enemies of nations who had else,
Like kindred drops, been mingled into one.
Thus men devotes his brother, and destroys--
Then what is man? And what man, seeing this,
And having human feelings, does not blush,
And hang his head, to think himself a man?"
COWPER
SECT. VI.
_Subject farther considered--Sad conceptions of those relative to the
Divine Being, and the nature of the Gospel, who plead for the necessity
of war--War necessary, where statesmen pursue the policy of the
world--Nature and tendency of this policy--but not necessary where they
pursue the policy of the Gospel--Nature and tendency of this
policy--This tendency farther confirmed by a supposed case of a few
Quakers becoming the governors of the world._
It is now an old maxim, and time with all its improvements has not worn
it away, that wars are necessary in the present constitution of the
world. It has not even been obliterated, that they are necessary, in
order to sweep off mankind on account of the narrow boundaries of the
earth. But they, who make use of this argument, must be aware, that, in
espousing it, they declare no less, than that God, in the formation of
his system, had only half calculated or half provided for its
continuance, and that they charge him with a worse cruelty than is
recorded of the worst of men: because, if he told men to increase and
multiply, and gave them passions accordingly, it would appear as if he
had created them only to enjoy an eternal feast in the sight of their
destruction. Nor do they make him a moral governor of the world, if he
allows men to butcher one another without an individual provocation or
offence.
Neither do persons, arguing for the necessity of wars, do less than set
themselves above the prophecies or oracles of God, which declare, that
such warfare shall some time or other cease.
Neither do they, when they consider wars as necessary, and as never to
be done away on account of the wicked passions of men, do less than
speak blasphemy against the Gospel of Jesus Christ, because they
proclaim it to be inadequate to the end proposed. For the proper
subjugation of these, among other purposes, it was that the Gospel was
promulgated. If it be thought a miracle, that the passions of men should
be subdued, it is still a miracle, which Christianity professes to work;
which it has worked since the hour of its institution; which it has
worked in men, who have placed their highest reputation in martial
glory; and which it continues to work, at the present day. Those,
therefore, who promote wars, and excite the passions of men for this
purpose, attempt to undo what it is the object of Christianity to do,
and to stop the benign influence of the Gospel in the hearts of men.
That wars are necessary, or rather that they will be begun and
continued, I do not mean to deny, while statesmen pursue the wisdom or
policy of the world.
What this wisdom or policy is, it will not be difficult to trace. And
first, when any matter is in dispute among the rulers of nations, is it
not a maxim, that a high tone is desirable in the settlement of it, in
order that the parties may seem to betray neither fear nor weakness, and
that they may not be thought to lose any of their dignity or their
spirit? Now as the human passions are constituted, except they have
previously been brought under due regulation by Christianity, what is
more likely than that a high tone of language on one side should beget a
similar tone on the other, or that spirit, once manifested, should,
produce spirit in return, and that each should fly off, as it were, at a
greater distance from accommodation than before, and that, when once
exasperation has begun, it should increase. Now what is the chance, if
such policy be resorted to on such occasions, of the preservation of
peace between them?
And, secondly, is it not also a received maxim, that, in controversies
of this sort, a nation, even during the discussion, should arm itself,
in order that it may shew itself prepared? But if any one nation arms
during the discussion; if it fits out armies or fleets of observation
with a view of deterring, or of being ready in case of necessity of
striking, as it is called, the first blow; what is more probable, than
that the other will arm also, and that it will fit out its own armies
and fleets likewise? But when both are thus armed, pride and spirit will
scarcely suffer them to relax, and what is then more probable, than that
they will begin to fight?
And, thirdly, is it not a maxim also, that, even during the attempt to
terminate the dispute, the public mind should be prepared? Are not the
public papers let loose to excite and propagate a flame? And are not
the deeds of our ancestors ushered into our ears to produce a martial
spirit? But if the national temper is roused on both sides, and if
preparations are carrying on at the same time with the utmost vigour,
where again is the hope of the prevention of war between them?
And, fourthly, after hostilities are commenced, is it not a maxim also
to perpetuate the enmity, which has been thus begun, and to give it a
deeper root, and even to make it eternal by connecting it with religion?
Thus flag-staffs are exhibited upon steeples, bells are rung to announce
victories, and sermons are preached as occasions arise, as if the places
allotted for Christian worship, were the most proper from whence to
issue the news of human suffering, or to excite the passions of men for
the destruction of one another. Nor is this all. The very colours of the
armies are consecrated. I do not mean to say, that like the banners in
the Praetorian tents, they are actually worshipped, but that an attempt
is made to render them holy in the eyes of those who are present. An
attempt is made, wonderful to relate, to incorporate war into the
religion of Jesus Christ, and to perpetuate enmity on the foundation of
the Gospel!
Now this is the policy of the world, and can it be seriously imagined,
that such a system as this can ever lead to peace? For while
discussions relative to matters of national dispute are carried on in a
high tone, because a more humble tone would betray weakness or fear;
while again, during this discussion, preparations for war are going on,
because the appearance of being prepared would convey the idea of
determined resolution, and of more than ordinary strength; while again,
during the same discussion, the national spirit is awakened and
inflamed; and while again, when hostilities have commenced, measures are
resorted to, to perpetuate a national enmity, so that the parties
consider themselves as natural enemies even in the succeeding peace,
what hope is there of the extermination of war on earth?
But let us now look at the opposite policy, which is that of the Gospel.
Now this policy would consist in the practice of meekness, moderation,
love, patience, and forbearance, with a strict regard to justice, so
that no advantages might be taken on either side. But if these
principles, all of which are preventive of irritation, were to be
displayed in our negotiations abroad, in the case of any matter in
dispute, would they not annihilate the necessity of wars? For what is
the natural tendency of such principles? What is their tendency, for
instance, in private life? And who are the negotiators on these
occasions but men? Which kind of conduct is most likely to disarm an
opponent, that of him who holds up his arm to strike, if his opponent
should not comply with his terms, or of him who argues justly, who
manifests a temper of love and forbearance, and who professes that he
will rather suffer than resist, and that he will do every thing sooner
than that the affair shall not be amicably settled? The Apostle Paul,
who knew well the human heart, says, "If thine enemy hunger, feed him,
for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head." That is,
thou shall cause him, by thy amiable conduct, to experience burning
feelings within himself, which, while they torment him with the
wickedness of his own conduct, shall make him esteem thee, and bring him
over to thy side. Thus thou shalt overcome his evil by thy good. Or, in
other words, as fire melts the hardest metals, so thy kindness shall
melt his anger. Thus Parnell--
"So artists melt the sullen ore of lead,
By heaping coals of fire upon its head.
Touch'd by the warmth, the metal teams to glow,
And pure from dress, the silver tang below."
This policy again would consist of the practical duty of attempting to
tranquillize the minds of the people, while the discussion was going on,
of exhorting them to await the event with composure, of declaring
against the folly and wickedness of wars, as if peace only could be the
result, of abstaining from all hostile preparations, and indeed from all
appearance of violence. Now what influence would such conduct have
again, but particularly when known to the opposite party? If the
opposite party were to see those alluded to keeping down the passions of
their people, would they inflame the passions of their own? If they were
to be convinced, that these were making no preparations for war, would
they put themselves to the expence of arming? Can we see any other
termination of such a contest than the continuance of peace?
That the policy of the Gospel, if acted upon by statesmen, would render
wars unnecessary, we may infer from supposed cases. And, first, I would
ask this simple question, whether, if all the world were Quakers, there
would be any more wars? I am sure the reply would be, no. But why not?
Because nations of Quakers, it would be replied, would discuss matters
in dispute between them with moderation, with temper, and with
forbearance. They would never make any threats. They would never arm,
and consequently they would never fight. It would be owing then to these
principles, or, in other words, to the adoption of the policy of the
Gospel in preference of the policy of the world, that, if the globe were
to be peopled by Quakers, there would be no wars. Now I would ask, what
are Quakers but men, and might not all, if they would suffer themselves
to be cast in the same mould as the Quakers, come out of it of the same
form and character?
But I will go still farther. I will suppose that any one of the four
continents, having been previously divided into three parts, was
governed only by three Quakers, and that these had the same authority
over their subjects, as their respective sovereigns have at present. And
I win maintain, that there would never be, upon this continent, during
their respective administrations, another war. For, first, many of the
causes of war would be cut off. Thus, for instance, there would be no
disputes about insults offered to flags. There would be none again about
the balance of power. In short, it would be laid down as a position,
that no one was to do evil, that good might come. But as,
notwithstanding, there might still be disputes from other causes, these
would be amicably settled. For first, the same Christian disposition
would be manifest in the discussion as in the former case. And,
secondly, if the matter should be of an intricate nature, so that one
Quaker government could not settle it with another, these would refer
it, according to their constitution, to a third. This would be the "ne
plus ultra" of the business. Both the discussion and the dispute would
end here. What a folly then to talk of the necessity of wars, when, if
but three Quakers were to rule a continent, they would cease there?
There can be no plea for such language, but the impossibility of taming
the human passions. But the subjugation of these is the immediate object
of our religion. To confess, therefore, that wars must be, is either to
utter a libel against Christianity, or to confess that we have not yet
arrived at the stature of real Christians.
SECT. VII.
_Subject farther examined--Case allowed, that if a cabinet of good men
had to negotiate with a cabinet of good men, there might be no wars--but
what would be the issue if good had to deal with bad--Case of American
settlers, who adopted the policy of the world, and were always at
war--and of other American settlers, who adopted the policy of the
Gospel, and were always at peace--No case stronger, than where
civilized men had to deal with savage American tribes._
I believe it will be allowed, that the Quaker instances, mentioned in
the last section, are in point. But I am aware also, it will be said
that, though different cabinets, all having the same Christian
disposition, would settle their disputes in a friendly manner, how would
a cabinet, consisting of spiritually minded men, settle with a cabinet
of other men, who had not brought their passions under due regulation,
and who, besides, had no notion of the unlawfulness of war.
I apprehend that it will not be denied, that men, as ferocious as any
recorded in history, were those, who were found in America, when that
continent was discovered. We hear nothing of Africans, or of Asiatics,
which would induce us to suppose, that they were as wild and as
barbarous as these. And nothing is more true of these, than they, were
frequently concerned in wars. I shall therefore take these for an
example, and I shall shew by the opposite conduct of two different
communities towards them, that it rests with men to live peaceably or
not, as they cultivate the disposition to do it, or as they follow the
policy of the Gospel in preference of the policy of the world.
When the English, Dutch, and others, began to people America, they
purchased land of the natives. But when they went to that continent,
notwithstanding there were amiable persons among them, and friends to
civil and religious liberty, they went with the notions of worldly
policy, and they did not take with them the Christian wisdom of the
unlawfulness of war. They acted on the system of preparation, because
there might be danger. They never settled without palisadoes and a fort.
They kept their nightly watches, though unmolested. They were, in short,
in the midst of war, though no injury had been offered them by the
natives, and though professedly in the midst of peace.
In the peopling of Connecticut, for I must begin with some one state, it
was ordered at an English court,[16] "holden at Dorchester, on the
seventh day of June, 1736, that every town should keep a watch, and be
well supplied with ammunition. The constables were directed to warn the
watches in their turns, and to make it their care, that they should be
kept according to the direction of the court. They were required also to
take care that the inhabitants were well furnished with arms and
ammunition, and kept in a constant state of defence." As these infant
settlements, the author observes, "were filled and surrounded with
numerous savages, the people conceived themselves in danger, when they
lay down, and when they rose up, when they went out, and when they came
in. Their circumstances were such, that it was judged necessary for
every man to be a soldier."
[Footnote 16: Trumbull's History of Connecticut, p. 56.]
I find from this author, looking farther into his history, that
previously to the order of the court at Dorchester, which did nothing
more than enjoin a more strict execution of the original plan, which was
that of military preparation and defence, some of the settlers had been
killed by the natives. The provocation which the natives received, is
not mentioned. But it was probably provocation enough to savage Indians,
to see people settle in their country with all the signs and symptoms of
war. Was such a system likely to have any other effect than that of
exciting their jealousy? They could see that these settlers had at least
no objection to the use of arms. They could see that these arms could
never be intended but against other persons, and there were no other
persons there but themselves. Judging therefore by outward
circumstances, they could draw no inference of a peaceable disposition
in their new neighbours. War soon followed. The Pequots were attacked.
Prisoners were made on both sides. The Indians treated those settlers
barbarously, who fell into their hands, for they did not see, on the
capture of their own countrymen, any better usage on the part of the
settlers themselves; for these settlers, again, had not the wisdom to
use the policy of the Gospel, but preferred the policy of the world.[17]
"Though the first planters of New-England and Connecticut, says the same
author, were men of eminent piety and strict morals, yet, like other
good men, they were subject to misconception, and the influence of
passion. Their beheading sachems whom they took in war, killing the male
captives, and enslaving the women and children, was treating them with a
severity, which, on the benevolent principles of Christianity, it will
be difficult to justify."
[Footnote 17: P. 112.]
After this treatment, war followed war. And as other settlements were
made by others in other states on the same principles, war fell to their
portion likewise. And the whole history of the settlement of America,
where these principles were followed, or where the policy of the world
was adopted, is full of the wars between the settlers and the Indians,
which have continued more or less, and this nearly up to the present
day.
But widely different was the situation of the settlers under William
Penn. When he and his fellow Quakers went to this continent, they went
with the principles of Christian wisdom, or they adopted the policy of
the Gospel instead of the policy of the world. They had to deal with the
same savage Indians as the other settlers. They had the same fury to
guard against, and were in a situation much more exposed to attack, and
of course much more creative of alarm; for they had neither sword nor
musket, nor pallisadoe, nor fort. They judged it neither necessary to
watch, nor to be provided with ammunition, nor to become soldiers. They
spoke the language of peace to the natives, and they proved the
sincerity of their language by their continuance in a defenceless
condition. They held out also, that all wars were unlawful, and that,
whatever injuries were offered them, they would sooner bear them, than
gratify the principle of revenge. It is quite needless to go farther
into the system of this venerable founder of Pennsylvania. But it may be
observed, that no Quaker settlers, when known to be such,[18] were
killed, and, whatever attacks were made upon the possessors of land in
their neighbourhood, none were ever made upon those who settled on the
lands purchased by William Penn.
[Footnote 18: "The Indians shot him who had the gun, says Storey in his
Journal, and when they knew the young man they killed was a Quaker, they
seemed sorry for it, but blamed him for carrying a gun. For they knew
the Quakers would not fight, or do them any harm, and therefore, by
carrying a gun, they took him for an enemy." This instance, which was in
after times, confirms still more strongly all that has been said on this
subject. Quakers at this time occasionally armed themselves against the
wild beasts of the country.]
It may not be improper to observe farther, that the harmonious
intercourse between the Quakers and the Indians continues uninterrupted
to the present day. In matters of great and public concern, of which I
could mention instances, it has been usual with the Indians to send
deputies to the Quakers for advice, and the former have even been
prevailed upon by the latter to relinquish wars, which they had it in
contemplation to undertake. It is usual also for some of these to send
their children to the Quakers for education. And so great is the
influence of the Quakers over some of these tribes, that many
individuals belonging to them, and now living together, have been
reclaimed from a savage life. These have laid aside the toilsome
occupations of the chase. They raise horses, cattle, and sheep. They
cultivate wheat and flax. They weave and spin. They have houses, barns,
and saw-mills among them. They have schools also, and civilization is
taking place of the grossest barbarism.
These facts, when contrasted, speak for themselves. A cabinet of Quaker
ministers, acting upon the policy of the Gospel, has been seated in the
heart of a savage and warlike nation, and peace has been kept with them
for ever. A cabinet of other settlers, acting on the policy of the
world, has been seated in the heart of nations of a similar description,
and they have almost constantly, been embroiled in wars. If Christian
policy has had its influence on Barbarians, it would be libellous to
say, that it would not have its influence upon those who profess to be
Christians. Let us then again, from the instances which have been now
recited, deprecate the necessity of wars. Let us not think so meanly of
the Christian religion, as that it does not forbid, nor so meanly of its
power, as that it is not ante to prevent, their continuance. Let us not
think, to the disgrace of our religion, that the human heart, under its
influence, should be so retrogade, that the expected blessing of
universal peace should be thought no improvement in our moral condition,
or that our feelings under its influence should continue so impure,
that, when it arrives, we should regard it not so much a blessing, as a
cures. But let us, on the other hand, hope and believe, that, as an
opposite and purer policy is acted upon, it will do good to our own
natures, good to the peace and happiness of the world, and honour to the
religion of the Gospel.
SECT. VIII
_Subject finally considered--Authors of wars generally justify their own
as defensive--and state that, if any nation were to give up the practice
of war, or to act on the policy of the Gospel, it would be overrun by
others, which acted upon the policy of the world--Reason to believe,
that such a nation would be held in veneration by others, and applied to
by them for the settlement of their disputes--Sentiments of Bishop
Butler in a supposed case--Case of Antoninus Pius--Conclusion._
Having now said all that I intended to say on the supposed necessity of
wars, I shall for a short time direct the attention of the reader to two
points, the only two, that I purpose to notice on this subject.
It is usually said, first, that the different powers, who go to war,
give it out that their wars are defensive, or that they justify
themselves on this principle.
I shall observe in reply to this, that it is frequently difficult to
determine, where actual aggression begins. Even old aggressions, of long
standing, have their bearings in these disputes. Not shall we find often
any clue to a solution of the difficulty in the manifestoes of either
party, for each makes his own case good in these; and if we were to
decide on the merits of the question by the contents of these, we should
often come to the conclusion, that both the parties were wrong. Thus,
for instance, a notion may have been guilty of an offence to another. So
far the cause of the other is a just one. But if the other should arm
first, and this during an attempt at accommodation, it will be a
question, whether it does not forfeit its pretensions to a just case,
and whether both are not then to be considered as aggressors on the
occasion?