In the last number of this Review we endeavoured to describe what may be
called the first act of the tremendous contest which has convulsed
Europe during the last eight months. We glanced at the original causes
of the war long impending between Germany and France, reviewed the
opening passages of the struggle, the gathering of the antagonist hosts,
the false strategy of Napoleon III., the great ability of his opponents,
the first victories that were the result,--Wörth, Forbach, and the
battles at Metz; and examined the remarkable movements which led to the
catastrophe of Sedan, an event unparalleled in military history.
Pursuing the narrative, we noticed briefly the consequences of that
awful disaster--the advance of the German armies to Paris, and their
investment of the famous capital; and said a few words on the grand
spectacle afforded by France at this conjuncture, when, after her
unprecedented reverses, she unrolled the banner of national resistance,
and tried to stem the flood of Teutonic invasion. We felt, however, that
it would be premature to dwell at length on the scenes of the latter
conflict, because their issue was as yet uncertain, and we postponed to
the present number a more elaborate survey of them. We now propose to
give a short account of the second and closing act of the drama,
comprising the marvellous siege of Paris, the efforts of France to
relieve the city, and their defeat by the German hosts, and, finally,
the fall of the beleaguered capital after an heroic resistance. This
phase of the war is altogether different from that which preceded it,
and in many respects is more interesting. It is not a mere succession of
dazzling triumphs caused by genius and force on one side and incapacity
and weakness on the other; it is a frightful international strife, in
which, owing to peculiar circumstances, the result was for a long time
doubtful; in which the belligerent which at first seemed prostrate made
a rally of an extraordinary kind, and placed its opponent in comparative
danger; and in which victory was decided at last through the continued
efforts of rare ability wielding perfectly organized military force, and
prevailing over patriotic energy, strong in the elements of warlike
power, but untrained, undisciplined, and badly directed. This part of
the campaign shows us how the defences of Paris caused the invading
armies, which had never expected that they would hold out, to be exposed
to formidable attacks; how the breathing-time obtained in this way
enabled France to rise again, and to put immense masses of men into the
field; and how, in consequence of their military situation, the Germans,
although at all points victorious, necessarily occupied a precarious
position; and it shows not less clearly how superiority of generalship,
of skill, and of efficiency in war, turned the scale at last against
mere numbers, though possessing some remarkable advantages. As for the
lessons to be deduced from the straggle, it lays bare painfully the real
causes of the overwhelming calamities of France; it reveals very plainly
the true nature of the gigantic Power now dominant in Europe; and it
makes thinking persons sadly admit that, notwithstanding civilization
and progress, the passions of man remain little changed, that the lust
of conquest burns as fiercely at the close as at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, that experience seems unable to teach that the
triumphs of mere ambition and force are often a curse even to the
victor.
After the disaster of Sedan, the German armies proceeded at once to
march on Paris. At this moment the last regular army of France in the
field was a mass of prisoners; the Army of the Rhine, the hope of the
nation, was shut up with Bazaine at Metz, hemmed in by the corps of
Prince Frederic Charles; and France seemed so utterly vanquished that
even the cautious German leaders could see no possible danger in moving
into the heart of the invaded country, though they had not taken one
important fortress, or even occupied one line of railway. Besides, it
was assumed in the German camp that the advance to Paris would be little
more than a military pageant or demonstration; the city had fallen in
1814 and 1815 after a resistance of a mere nominal kind; though it had
been since fortified, the fortifications were known to be within the
range of modern heavy guns; and, in any case, it was taken for granted
that a population like the Parisians would never venture to make a
stand, or submit to anything like privations. Accordingly, the
magnificent German hosts were directed in two enormous masses from Sedan
against the devoted city, the Fourth Army under the Crown Prince of
Saxony advancing by Vouziers and Rheims towards the Marne, the Third,
under the Crown Prince of Prussia, descending from Rheims upon the
Seine, the object of both being to converge and hem in Paris in an
investing circle. Eye-witnesses have recorded with admiration how superb
was the aspect of these mighty arrays as, flushed with astonishing
success, and in the most perfect military discipline, they rolled on
through the plains of Champagne in all the pomp and circumstance of war,
finding literally nothing to check their progress. By the 15th or 16th
of September the two armies had made good their way to the rivers which,
in their uniting bends, form the first lines of the defence of Paris;
the Crown Prince of Saxony having reached Meaux, and his colleague
having pushed forward to Mélun. Soon after these points had been passed,
the first signs of opposition appeared. After the fall of the Imperial
_régime_, General Trochu, who had been President of the Government of
National Defence, had been making great preparations to enable Paris to
stand a siege; and as it was of vital importance to retard the
assailants as long as possible, he had sent one detachment to hold in
check the Germans in the valley of the Marne, and another to attack the
Crown Prince of Prussia as he crossed the Seine to the south of the
city. Their efforts, however, completely failed, the French troops with
Vinoy and Ducrot, demoralized by repeated defeats, being wholly unable
to withstand the Germans; and on the 19th of September the invading
armies had closed on all sides around the beleaguered city, the Crown
Prince of Prussia having mastered a range of heights overlooking the
defences to the north, and having captured some temporary works erected
by Trochu along their position. The army of the Crown Prince of Saxony
spread along the northern and eastern parts of Paris, from Charenton to
about Argenteuil; that of his brother Prince completed the circle from
the Marne across the Seine to St. Germains, the head-quarters being at
Versailles.
In this way, within two or three days after their first appearance on
the Marne and Seine, the German invaders had encompassed Paris, and by
the 22d of September the investment was complete. It is said that the
fortifications merely saved the city from the terrors of an assault;
but, however this may have been, these works were already in a condition
which compelled the Germans to pause, and to make their approaches with
circumspection. In fact, the natural strength of Paris as a defensible
position is exceedingly great; and the artificial defences, though
constructed before the invention of the artillery of this day, had
rendered the capital a powerful fortress. Paris is protected along its
eastern front by the converging streams of the Marne and Seine, thrown
before it like a series of fosses, and by the succession of heights
extending from the plain of St. Denis to Vincennes; to the west it is
covered by the winding returns of the Seine, from Sèvres to beyond St.
Germains; and to the north and south, though at these points weaker, it
is not without a barrier marked out by nature. The result is that Paris
is, as it were, designed for a vast entrenched camp, very difficult to
surround or attack; for its situation on the rivers which wind about it
not only compels an enemy to divide his forces if he would invest it,
but exposes him to considerable danger, especially if a defending army
held the eastern heights before referred to. This naturally strong and
vast position had been fortified with great care in 1841, by engineers
of the school of the first Napoleon. A ditch had been thrown around the
city, and a rampart with regular bastions made; but these were merely
the internal lines. The real and external defences were a series of
powerful detached forts, so arranged as to support each other, and to
constitute a zone on all sides of great dimensions, difficult to
approach. For this purpose every advantage had been taken of the
character of the place; the forts were so built as to command the
obstacles formed by the Marne and Seine, and thus to enable troops to
bar the passage of an enemy across these streams. They also crowned the
eastern heights, and thence covered St. Denis to the north; and while
one fort only--that of Valérien--threw a shield over the western front,
four or five, along a range of projecting eminences, protected the
southern and southwestern. It must be added, however, that those who
designed the fortifications of Paris always supposed that an army would
be within the zone comprised by the range of the forts, and would thus
be able to oppose an enemy; and, owing to the invention of heavy rifled
guns, the southern forts, from Charenton to Versailles, were
comparatively weak, and liable to attack.
Such was the aspect of the defences of Paris when, at the end of the
third week of September, they were surrounded by their Teutonic foes.
The forts and ramparts were extremely formidable, but they were, as yet,
ill-armed with heavy guns, and, above all, the great element required
for a successful defence--a well-regulated and disciplined army, to
prevent an enemy from closing round--was, for the present, altogether
wanting. General Trochu, in concert with subordinate officers, had for
several weeks laboured hard in bringing into the city artillery and
munitions of war. Paris had become a vast arsenal for constructing
fieldpieces, manufacturing gunpowder, and fabricating all kinds of
military appliances; and an immense number of men fit for service,
amounting, it is said, to half a million, including 250,000 National
Guards, had been congregated within the walls to form the materials of
an organized force. But though the efforts of the Governor and his
assistants, and the patriotism of the population, had been admirable;
though stores of provisions had been laid in; though foundries and
workshops had toiled day and night in casting ordnance and preparing
cartridges; and though the multitude of recruits had been subjected to
continual drill, Paris was not ready when the Germans appeared; and, in
consequence, after the feeble resistance of Vinoy and Ducrot on the
17th, the investment was completed without difficulty, and the first
great object of the besiegers was attained. Yet, though Trochu was thus
driven to a passive defence--what had hardly been seriously contemplated
by those who had fortified Paris--he did not despair or lose heart; and
we may believe that he had good hopes that France would be saved
through the resistance of Paris. He knew that the city possessed
resources of food for several months; he was aware that it was possible
to create a vast supply of cannon and arms; he thought that he would
have time to make out of the crude masses of men in his hands an
efficient army inside the walls; and on these data he formed a scheme
for the defence of the country, which, though it failed, and though, as
we think, it was open to censure, was, nevertheless, not without
grandeur. He would render Paris impregnable to attack, and detain the
Germans around the ramparts for a time passing their calculations; he
would form into soldiers the levies he commanded, while provincial
armies would be raised in France. And if these forces could be made to
combine, and attack the besiegers from without and within, how critical
might their position become, divided, as they would be, around the
capital, and distant from the frontier, perhaps in the depths of winter!
In that case, it was not impossible that the siege would be raised,
perhaps after a great defeat, and that the Germans would be compelled to
retire; and the retreat might become one of extraordinary loss and
disaster.
To make, therefore, Paris as strong as possible, although defended
passively at first; to allow the besiegers to invest it without
molestation for some time, inasmuch as this was unhappily necessary; to
consider the capital the main pivot and cardinal point of the national
war; and to combine operations by means of which an army, to be formed
under his own auspices, was to fall on the Germans, while an army
outside was to cooperate in the attack--such were the leading features
of Trochu's project; and though, as we have said, it invites criticism,
and it did not lead to the deliverance of France, it was nearer success
than may perhaps be imagined. The Governor of Paris addressed himself
energetically and steadily to carrying it out; and during the first few
weeks after the investment, his whole care was directed to the
increasing and strengthening of the defences, and the fashioning into
military shape the enormous levies which had been collected. Heavy guns
were turned out in quantities, and mounted upon the forts and ramparts;
new works were constructed to add their fire to that of the original
fortifications; redoubts were thrown up at several points, and armed
with batteries of a formidable kind; the southern forts especially were
protected; and at Avron and Villejuif, on the eastern and south-eastern
fronts of the city, the investing circle began to be threatened by what,
technically, are called counter-approaches, bristling with large and
destructive artillery. The result was that although the armed masses
within Paris were almost quiescent, and the besiegers were only slightly
molested by an occasional and distant cannonade, their lines were
gradually removed and forced back, and the obstacles to continuing the
siege became more and more evident. At the same time, the organization
of the masses inside the city went on regularly, and before long a real
army of 150,000 men, supplied with artillery, officers and a staff, and
in a fair state of military power, was formed out of the chaotic
multitude crowded together when the siege had commenced--an achievement
marvellous under the circumstances. Meanwhile, having escaped in a
balloon, M. Gambetta had devoted the singular powers of his enthusiastic
and passionate nature to raising and equipping provincial armies; and,
aided by the patriotism of France, his success had been, on the whole,
surprising. Old soldiers were recalled to the standard, recruits joined
the ranks in hundreds of thousands, and immense efforts were made to
procure field guns and small arms in sufficient quantities. In a few
weeks four armies seemed to start, as it were, from the earth, in
France--those of the North, the East, the West, and the Loire--all
intended either to resist the farther advance of the German foe, or to
co-operate in the relief of the capital. The first three armies were, as
yet, in a very bad and ill-disciplined state; but the fourth army--that
of the Loire--composed largely of veteran troops, and numbering nearly
100,000 men, with from 300 to 350 guns, was by no means to be despised
by an enemy.
While France had thus been collecting her strength for a great effort of
national resistance, the Germans on their side had not been idle. Though
disappointed, as days rolled on, that Paris still held resolutely out,
and though conscious that its defences were assuming a very formidable
shape, they seem not yet to have supposed that a long siege was already
certain. Nevertheless, they proceeded to clear their communications with
the frontier, and to collect supplies from all parts of the country
within tolerably easy reach of Paris; and for this purpose the sieges of
some of the north-eastern fortresses of France were begun, and flying
columns were despatched as far as Dreux, Chartres, Beauvais, and
Orleans, to sweep the adjoining districts of their crops and cattle.
These raiders, however, although they formed a kind of observing force
for the investing lines, were not properly a covering army strong enough
to defeat a real effort made in strength to relieve the capital; they
were little more than petty detachments; and there can be no doubt that
the German leaders were not yet sufficiently aware of the power of
France to renew the contest. They seem, indeed, to have specially
under-rated the real force of the Army of the Loire, which was now
collected just north of Orleans, and had between it and the capital only
a Bavarian corps about 25,000 strong; the reason being that in the first
week of October a part of this army had been defeated easily, and had
shown remarkable want of discipline. Yet even at this period--that is
about six weeks after the beginning of the siege--the situation of the
Germans in France, in consequence of her great exertions, was one of
increasing difficulties. Nearly the whole forces of the invaders were
spread around the capital and Metz,--that is, were detained by two vast
entrenched camps, and were liable to attack from within, and that in the
depths of an enemy's country; and while an army far from contemptible
was being slowly created in Paris, immense levies were gathering in the
provinces, and were being trained into regular armies in a condition of
more or less efficiency. The German chiefs, however, elated by success,
disregarded all these menacing preparations, and even now reckoned that
a few days would see them victorious inside Paris, and would bring the
war to a triumphant close. So confident, indeed, were they that no
attack from any quarter was probable, that, instead of sending for
reinforcements to strengthen the army around Paris, they had detached,
after the fall of Strasburg, a force which might have been so employed,
to reduce the fortresses of Alsace, and to Dijon, Besançon, and Lyons.
Such were the positions of the belligerents in the last days of the
month of October. The fall of Metz increased immensely the power and
advantages of the Germans, and threw a weight into the scale against
France which ultimately it became impossible to counterbalance. It was
not only that 200,000 invaders were now let loose to overrun the country
and to strengthen the investment of Paris, nor yet that the whole army
of the Rhine, with the garrison of a first-rate fortress--170,000 men,
four marshals of France, and 6,000 officers--were swept off into
captivity in Germany; the surrender of Metz, it is now well known,
prevented operations which, at this juncture, were being planned for the
relief of Paris, and which, but for that circumstance, would probably
have been successful. As we have seen, the Germans had allowed the Army
of the Loire to collect near Orleans, with only a small Bavarian corps
interposed between it and the French capital; and they still so utterly
despised this army that, although after Metz had capitulated, their
leaders had ordered one corps of those around the fortress to advance to
Paris, the bulk of the troops of Prince Frederic Charles were separated
into two great masses, one directed against the North of France, and the
other towards Troyes, Nevers, and Bourges,--that is, against the centre
of the country, and not immediately on the Loire and Orleans. These
dispositions, which showed plainly that the real strength of the Army of
the Loire was inadequately understood in the invaders' camp, permitted
the commander of that body--a veteran named D'Aurelles de Paladines, who
had done much to improve its discipline--to attempt a design he had been
meditating, and even to strike a blow at his enemy which possibly might
have had extraordinary results. D'Aurelles, aware that the only obstacle
to his reaching the lines around Paris was one corps of 25,000 men,
resolved to attack and overwhelm that detachment; and there can be
little doubt that, in the event of success, he contemplated a march on
the besieged city, even though he must have known that Prince Frederic
Charles had been set free, and was moving from Lorraine. The plan of
D'Aurelles was well designed, though not executed with equal ability. On
the 7th of November he crossed the Loire below Orleans with the mass of
his army, a single column having crossed higher up, his intention being
to surround and destroy the few divisions which stood in his path, and
then to advance, if fortune favoured. Von der Tann, the commander of the
Bavarians, either unaware of his enemy's strength, or confident in the
prestige of success, moved boldly to attack the main French column; but,
finding himself opposed by irresistible forces, he fell back rapidly and
with great skill on the main roads from Orleans to Paris. Although this
retreat was very well executed, and, indeed, was in part effected at
night, Von der Tann suffered a good deal in a series of sharp and
repeated engagements at Marchenoir, Coulmiers, and Baum; and had the
French column which had crossed the Loire above Orleans been
sufficiently quick, he could hardly have escaped a serious defeat. As it
was, when upon the 11th he stood concentrated at Arthenay and Toury,
covering the main route to Paris from D'Aurelles, he had certainly lost
more than 3,000 men, and what is more important, the ascendancy of
success; he had been, in fact, decidedly overmatched; and a French army,
70,000 strong, which could have been increased to 90,000, stood in his
front, eager for battle and revenge.
It is not impossible that at this moment D'Aurelles could have forced
his way to Paris had he known how to seize his opportunity. Considerable
alarm prevailed at Versailles: it had become evident that a powerful
force was only five or six marches from the lines, with nothing between
but one reduced corps; there really was no covering army to repel a bold
attempt at relief, and it was expected that the army of the Loire would
advance obliquely by Chartres and Dreux, and attack the Germans to the
west of the city. Such an attack, which would, of course, be combined
with an attack from the armed masses within, would be too formidable to
be resisted, for it would place the Germans between two fires, spread as
they were on an immense circumference; and accordingly the remarkable
man who directed the operations of the invaders made preparations to
raise the siege, and to incur the consequent moral loss, in case the
columns of D'Aurelles' army should be descried on their way from the
south. As, however, the French general might pause, a corps of about
20,000 men was sent off to the aid of Von der Tann under the command of
the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg; one-half of this corps, however, being
ordered to diverge towards Dreux to observe the French Army of the West,
supposed to be moving from that quarter. Thus, even as late as the 13th
of November, not more than about 30,000 Germans were interposed between
D'Aurelles and Paris; and it is difficult to suppose, had he moved on
the 11th, that he would not have broken down with ease the only barrier
in his way, and not improbably have defeated Von der Tann and the Grand
Duke in detail. The French commander, however, hesitated; he had not
destroyed Von der Tann; he was evidently not thoroughly confident in
himself; and, at this crisis of the affairs of France, he drew back
instead of advancing, and finally retired to a camp at Orleans which he
had marked out for ulterior operations, his success being thus rendered
wholly fruitless. This was a calamitous mistake for the French; yet we
can account for it without charging D'Aurelles with entire incapacity.
Knowing that Von der Tann was still in his front, he calculated with
justice that the Bavarians would be able to obstruct his progress until
reinforcements should come up; and the news, which in all probability
reached him, that the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was being detached,
caused him perhaps to overrate the Grand Duke's strength, and to halt
until he should ascertain it. In addition, and what was, we believe,
decisive, D'Aurelles knew that Prince Frederic Charles was moving from
Metz towards the south; and though the Prince was still really distant,
the French general not unreasonably feared undertaking a march on Paris,
which might expose the Army of the Loire to be ultimately assailed in
flank and rear. This consideration, though not well-founded, was exactly
such as would influence a commander not of the first class, and thus a
favourable opportunity was missed, of which the consequences might have
been immense.
These operations, when attentively reviewed, show at once what a
terrible disaster to the French cause was the capitulation of Metz, at
the time when it actually took place. Had the fortress held out till the
9th of November, Prince Frederic Charles must have remained around it;
his movement against the centre of France would not have been even
commenced; and, in that event, there would have been no force which
could have even threatened the Army of the Loire in the rear, had it
advanced on Paris. If so, the obstacle which probably prevented
D'Aurelles from pushing forward after the actions of the 9th and 10th
could have had no existence even in his fancy, and, consequently, it is
difficult to believe that D'Aurelles would not have marched, at once,
and succeeded in raising the siege of Paris. As it was, he had, we
believe, the means of attaining this result, had he been endowed with
qualities of the highest order; but, giving him credit for the talents
he possesses, had he known that the Prince was at Metz, he would almost
certainly have pressed forward. And had the siege of Paris been raised,
as was not altogether uncontemplated by Von Moltke, if ever the Army of
the Loire came up, the effect in France would have been prodigious; and
though we differ from those who insist that it would have led to a great
German disaster, we think that it would have prevented a renewal of the
investment of Paris. The question, therefore, presents itself--Did
Bazaine hold out to the last, and is he responsible for the surrender of
Metz at the moment when it occurred? On this subject, as may be
supposed, there is a great deal of conflicting evidence, but some
conclusions seem tolerably certain. We do not think it possible to deny
that Metz really yielded to famine; the army was in a deplorable state,
horseflesh had long been the only animal food, the bread rations had
been greatly reduced, and fever and typhus had made portentous ravages
among the troops, and even the population. But, on the other hand, there
is some proof that, at the beginning of the investment, provisions had
not been carefully preserved, and that the generals and other officers
thought a great deal too much of their own comforts, and did not attend
to the wants of the army; and therefore, although we think that Bazaine
was incapable of anything like treason, and really made a stout
resistance, it is possible that a more self-denying and foresighted
commander might have slightly protracted the defence. The luxury and
pride of the imperial _régime_, it is to be feared, infected the
head-quarters and staff during the siege of Metz; and it may--though we
speak with diffidence--have been the result that the fortress fell
exactly at the least fortunate moment, so far as regards the interests
of France.
The apparition of the Army of the Loire beyond Orleans, and its
unexpected strength, caused a complete change in the plans of the
Germans. It had become evident that a powerful force was in the field
for the relief of Paris, and no one knew better than the great commander
who guided the movements of the invaders, how necessary it was to
interpose an effectual barrier against this foe if the siege of the city
was to continue. Paris, too, was showing no signs of submission; the
winter was coming on apace; and the position of the besiegers might
become critical if they were detained around the capital for months, at
an immense distance from their base on the frontier, and liable to
attacks from without and within. The battles of the 9th and 10th, in a
word, had awakened the able German chiefs to the possible dangers of
their situation, and with characteristic energy and consummate prudence
they applied themselves to avert or remove them. The corps intended to
march northward were kept back and brought nearer to Paris, and the army
commanded by Prince Frederic Charles was diverted from the centre and
east, and ordered to move as quickly as possible to the Lower Loire and
the neighbourhood of Orleans, with the view of checking D'Aurelles'
force, and attacking it, should it attempt to advance. At the same time,
the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was kept in communication with Von der
Tann along the roads leading from Orleans to Paris, while some of his
divisions were turned towards the Sarthe to face the French Army of the
West; these arrangements, however, being only temporary until the
arrival of Prince Frederic Charles should add largely to the strength of
the Germans. In this way a whole series of covering armies were in a
short time thrown in an extensive circle around the investing lines, so
as to baffle and repel the French; and these would soon become
formidable, though, as yet, they were not in sufficient force to render
an attempt to relieve Paris beyond the reach of a daring commander.
Meanwhile the French had done much on their side, though it cannot be
said that their efforts were equally important or as well conducted.
D'Aurelles retired to his camp near Orleans, entrenching himself with
great care, and meditating ulterior movements, and in a few days he made
his entrenchments exceedingly difficult to turn or attack, though their
proximity to the Loire, just behind, made them dangerous as a defensive
position. At this point, which he had made his base, he awaited his
reinforcements for some days, apparently thinking that the addition of
these would more than counter-balance Prince Frederic Charles, now
hastening forward to arrest his progress--a conclusion utterly false, in
our judgment. These reinforcements, however, it must be said, were, in
mere numbers, exceedingly great, and at the close of November
D'Aurelles' army had more than doubled its nominal strength, being now
upwards of 200,000 men, with from 400 to 500 guns; but the organization
of these new divisions was, for the most part, imperfect and crude; the
recruits were partly young raw lads; the staff and other arrangements
were bad; and not only was the second portion of the Army of the Loire
inferior to the first, but it did not throw into the scale of France a
force even nearly as great as that which, under Prince Frederic Charles,
was now reaching the theatre of war.
Such, at the close of November, was the situation of the belligerent
armies. By this time Trochu had completed his arrangements for carrying
out his plan; had made Paris prodigiously strong; had greatly weakened
the besiegers' lines; had organized two armies inside the city; and he
now prepared for a gigantic sortie, while D'Aurelles should co-operate
from without. That general seems to have been in communication with
Trochu by means of balloons and pigeons; and, for the second time, he
began operations which had for their object the relief of Paris. His
army was very well placed in comparison with that of the Germans, for it
was concentrated on a much narrower front, from Chateaudun to Montargis,
its centre holding the camp at Orleans, and its wings occupying the main
roads to Paris; whereas Prince Frederic Charles was only just in line at
Pithiviers and Nemours. Von der Tann, at Toury, was extremely weak, and
the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, thrown westward, was hardly united to his
Bavarian colleague. There was thus an interval in the German line
immediately in front of the French centre, which offered a favourable
mark for attack; and had D'Aurelles been a great general, we think he
would have advanced on that point, and very probably have been
successful, especially if it is borne in mind that he had a great
superiority in numbers--200,000 to about 100,000. But D'Aurelles again
displayed timidity, indecision, and want of true insight. He commenced
his march on the 28th of November, and attacked one corps of Prince
Frederic Charles, stationed near the village of Beaune la Rolande, and
though the engagement was indecisive, he made no effort with the rest of
his army, and fell back on his camp at Orleans, having thus struck at
his enemy's line, not where it was weak, but where it was strong, having
delivered his stroke with a small part of his forces, and having only
made the Germans aware of his position and movements. Prince Frederic
Charles, who now commanded the whole German army to the south of Paris,
made immediate preparations for a counter-blow which should overwhelm
his timid antagonist. He perceived that Von der Tann and the Grand Duke
of Mecklenburg were perilously divided, and he gave orders for a general
concentration of the whole forces of these commanders, while he advanced
his own to co-operate with them. These movements went on during two
days, the German columns drawing together within easy reach of the
French general, who, however, lingered irresolutely in his camp,
unwilling or unable to attack. On the 1st of December Prince Frederic
Charles moved against his foe, with his divisions in hand; and as the
French were now disseminated, in comparison with the German front, it is
not improbable that, at the decisive points, they scarcely had a
numerical superiority. The result was, of course, thenceforward certain.
D'Aurelles' centre was pierced through and through; his wings were
separated and thrown off in broken and widely-divided parts; the camp at
Orleans, too near the Loire, proved a disadvantage rather than
otherwise; the Army of the Loire was utterly defeated with a loss of
nearly 15,000 men, and the attempt to march to the relief of Paris ended
in complete and ruinous disaster.
In these engagements we see the difference between vigorous and bad
generalship. It is not pretended that the army of the Loire was as well
organized as that of the Germans; but numerically it was nearly twice as
strong; and had it been commanded by an able chief it might not
improbably have been led to victory. But in selecting his point of
attack, in advancing with a fragment of his forces, in retreating when
it was not necessary, and above all, in allowing his enemy to unite,
literally without being molested, D'Aurelles showed want of capacity to
command; whereas Prince Frederic Charles gave convincing proof of vigour
and skill in these operations. That able commander was seriously alarmed
when, on the 28th, he ascertained the strength and positions of the
French, and perceived the space in the long line between Von der Tann
and the Grand Duke; and had he been in D'Aurelles' place, Europe might
have seen the Army of the Loire advancing between the German wings, and
forcing its way in triumph to Paris. When, however, the Prince became
aware of the real nature of the situation, he displayed talent of a very
high order; and the celerity with which he collected his army and bore
down on his vacillating foe was quite worthy of the first Napoleon.
Meanwhile, a grand but unsuccessful effort had been making by the armies
in Paris to break through or turn the lines of the Germans. On the 29th
of November two large masses of troops, commanded by Generals Vinoy and
Ducrot, covered by a terrible cannonade from the southern and
south-eastern forts, attempted to carry the positions of Choisy le Roi
and Chevilly, on the road to Orleans, and to storm Ormesson beyond the
Marne, these operations being evidently intended to be in concert with
those of D'Aurelles' army. On account of the rise in the waters of the
Marne, the attack of Ducrot was not pressed that day; but on the 30th it
was renewed with imposing forces, and four villages beyond the Marne
were seized and occupied by the French, their numbers carrying
everything before them. The German lines were now nearly reached, and
had the attack been repeated next day, it is not impossible that it
might have succeeded, for it is now known that 100,000 men could have
been opposed to about 30,000. But Trochu paused at this crisis, resolved
not to attempt to do more unless the Army of the Loire was at hand; and,
as this force still made no sign, he allowed Ducrot to remain inactive
during the 1st and part of the 2nd of December. Meanwhile the Germans
had been combining their troops for a decisive effort, and on the
morning of the 2nd they assailed their enemy in the positions he had
won. Two of the villages were retaken; but, as the assailants advanced
further, they were smitten by such a fire from the forts, the guns of
which had been unexpectedly strengthened, that they were swept away and
destroyed by thousands. The French pushed forward victoriously again. On
the night of the 2nd they were once more in overwhelming strength near
the investing line; and it may be doubted whether a bold effort would
not have forced it at this juncture. But Trochu would not pursue his
advantage, and as the army of the Loire did not appear, he soon withdrew
Ducrot's army from before the Marne in the wood of Vincennes.
Persons not versed in military science will at once conclude from this
brief narrative that Trochu was an incompetent chief. They will say that
he ought to have cut his way out at all hazards without a second
thought, and that he missed a fine opportunity during any of the first
three days of December. They will point also to the means he possessed
for concentrating on interior lines, and pouring an overwhelming mass of
men on certain selected points; and they will insist that nothing but
skill was wanting to France on this occasion. We do not wholly condemn
the assertions; but considerations of the gravest kind must be borne in
mind on the other side. It is a maxim of the art of war that an invested
fortress must be relieved by the efforts of an army without combined
with those of the garrison within; for, in the first place, it is
extremely difficult for the garrison unaided to break through the
entrenchments formed by the besiegers; and, in the second, if the
garrison breaks through, it is liable to destruction unless it is
received into the arms, as it were, of a friendly force. The case of a
great city like Paris is no exception to this principle, or at least
only in a slight degree; for it would have been an arduous task for
Ducrot to have stormed the German lines in any event; and, if he had,
what was he to have done with from 80,000 to 100,000 men, when he had
got out in the open country, with scanty supplies, and without a base?
There were special reasons also why, in this instance, Trochu should
wait for the Army of the Loire, for if it arrived, the Army of Paris
would be enabled to make its way out without running any serious risk;
and, in that case, combined with the relieving force, it might expect to
do the Germans immense injury, as they drew off from the investing
circle. In acting, therefore, as he did, Trochu was not the temporizing
fool he has been called by certain detractors; and it must be added that
he adhered strictly to the recognised rules of military science.
Nevertheless, had he been a chief of genius, we think he would have
taken the bolder course, and have endeavoured, on the 1st and 2nd of
December, to have broken through the German entrenchments. For, in the
first place, he could not reckon, with anything even approaching
certainty, that the Army of the Loire could reach Paris; and, that being
so, he should perhaps have relied upon himself and his army alone. And,
in the second place, it so happened that if his army could once sever
the lines, it would not be exposed to a want of supplies, even if no
assistance came from outside, for had he seized the great German depôts
a few miles off on the Strasburg Railway, it would have found
everything which it could have needed. Admitting, therefore, all that
can be said, Trochu perhaps showed himself too wedded to mere rules and
general notions in not having made a great effort with Ducrot at this
critical moment; and had he struck with his whole force, that effort
might have been successful.
The failure of Ducrot's great sortie, and the defeats of the Army of the
Loire near Orleans, were cruel and lasting disasters to France. In
another part of the theatre of operations, the balance of fortune hung
more evenly, though the ultimate issue was not very different. The
discomfited forces of D'Aurelles, as we have seen, were broken into
three parts, the centre and wings divided from each other; and even
after the battles of the first days of December, the centre and right,
driven across the Loire, retreated hastily to Bourges and Nevers, while
the left remained on the north bank of the river, clinging to Marchenoir
and the adjoining country. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and Von der
Tann, with about 35,000 or 40,000 men, were detached to destroy this
isolated wing, while Prince Frederic Charles pursued the main body, and
a series of operations ensued which throw a ray of lustre on the French
arms. The commander of the broken French left was a general who, though
before unknown, has since given proof of no common talents, and in fact
seems to us to be entitled to no mean rank among able captains. Chanzy,
in a series of obstinate encounters, confronted and baffled his
victorious foes with a force hardly superior in numbers; and after
disputing the difficult country between Beaugency and Vendôme, effected
at last his retreat to Le Mans, where he joined the friendly Army of the
West, and succeeded in obtaining large reinforcements. This retreat was
executed with great skill, and was made exactly on the right points; and
that Chanzy was able to gain his goal in the face of the Grand Duke and
of Von der Tann, and subsequently of a corps of Prince Frederic Charles,
moved up from the Loire to overpower him, does honour to his ability and
judgment. A lull now took place in the operations along the zone of
country to the south of Paris; but from the North an unsuccessful
attempt to relieve the beleaguered capital was made. For some weeks the
French Army of the North had been in a state of comparative order, and
though it had been defeated in November, it had been entrusted to an
experienced commander, who had done much to improve its discipline. In
the third week of December, General Faidherbe advanced to attack at
Pont Noyelles a part of the German Army of the North, his object being,
should he win the battle, to press forward and march to Paris. This
engagement, however, proved indecisive, and Faidherbe in a few days
retired into the chain of fortresses on the Belgian frontier, his
antagonist, Von Goeben, holding him in check along the line of the Somme
and its affluents. Meanwhile Trochu, doubtless informed from without of
the intentions of Faidherbe, had made another effort on the 21st to
attack the German lines to the north; but though he achieved a certain
amount of success, he again declined to strike more decisively, when it
had become apparent that he was not to expect the assistance of a
relieving army. The French captured several outlying positions on the
great northern and eastern roads, and held them for two or three days;
but there being no sign of Faidherbe's approach, they once more retired,
having effected nothing.
While these combats had been taking place, the belligerents had been
making great exertions to increase their forces and renew the war. The
German commanders had discovered that France had developed resources of
which they had no previous conception, and that Paris was stronger and
better provisioned than they could possibly have imagined; and though as
yet they had been victorious, they felt their position to be insecure,
bound as they were to the besieged capital, and, in the depth of a
severe winter, exposed to the attacks of all the French armies
converging on them from every side. In fact, in a strategic point of
view their situation was extremely critical; for if a single one of the
covering armies were broken through by a relieving force, which thus
could reach the line of investment, they might have been compelled to
raise the siege, and might, perhaps, suffer a series of disasters. This
danger was, therefore, to be averted; and as the covering armies had
lost enormously from cold, hardship, and field-service, and the
besiegers' ranks had also been thinned, it was necessary to make very
large additions to the strength of the invading forces. Vast
reinforcements were accordingly despatched across the Rhine to all
points of the war; Prince Frederic Charles, the Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg, and Von der Tann received thousands of recruits; the armies
of Von Goeben and Werder were replenished to a considerable extent, and
the corps selected to protect the different lines of the communications
were increased by important reserves. In this way about 200,000 men were
joined to the armies already in France; and at the same time no pains
were spared to accelerate the arrival of siege trains before Paris, in
order to open fire on the defences. This task, however, was extremely
difficult, on account of the distance from the frontier, and the state
of the roads; and though, during more than two months, heavy guns had
been gradually sent up, it was not until near the end of December that
batteries, more nearly adequate to the purpose, had been constructed and
armed. Meantime, the French had been equally energetic, but the results
obtained had been very inferior. Recruits, indeed, had been despatched
in masses to increase the bulk of the provincial armies; munitions of
war were obtained in quantities, and nothing, it must be said, was left
undone which patriotism and devotion could accomplish. But though the
divided parts of the Army of the Loire, and though the Armies of the
North and the East became very formidable in mere numbers, the accession
of raw and unformed levies, without proper military organization, did
not much augment their real power; and as many of the best soldiers in
the force commanded by D'Aurelles had perished in the recent
engagements, it is not improbable that the strength of France was hardly
greater towards the end of December than it had been three weeks
previously, whereas that of Germany had increased to a degree that made
the German generals masters of the situation in all its aspects.
Such, about Christmas, was the relative strength and condition of the
belligerent armies. At this moment, Prince Frederic Charles, Von der
Tann, and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, held a central position between
Orleans and Chartres, having Chanzy in advance of Le Mans, and the
remainder of the Army of the Loire rallied by Bourbaki at Bourges and
Nevers; Faidherbe was held in check by Von Goeben; to the east Werder,
who had been told off after the fall of Strasburg to overrun the south,
was confronted by the French Army of the East, with an irregular force
under Garibaldi; and, as we have seen, the vast circle of the covering
armies was more formidable than it had been at any preceding time. In
this state of things an extraordinary scheme was formed for the French
provincial armies, and ultimately for the relief of Paris, which we can
only describe as the extreme of rashness. Werder had for some time
invested Belfort, while part of his forces lay in Franche Comté; and as
he had not more than 50,000 men, and Bourbaki was at no great distance
with perhaps not less than 120,000, an opportunity seemed given to
strike a blow, which it was hoped might crush this foe, and even change
the aspect of the contest. If Bourbaki were to assail Werder from
Bourges and Nevers, he would probably destroy him; and if so, he could
relieve Belfort, and furthermore, by a bold advance on Nancy and
Luneville, fall upon the great line of German communications from
Strasburg to Paris along the main railway. But a stroke of this kind
would in all probability compel the siege of Paris to be raised, for the
Germans could not so easily subsist if their supplies were cut off or
even interrupted; and if they were obliged to retire, the paramount
object of French strategy would be attained by this single operation.
The movement of Bourbaki, too, was not only promising in itself, for it
was difficult to imagine that he would not crush Werder, which, being
done, all the rest would follow; but, properly conceived, it need not
endanger the French armies in other parts of the theatre. Let it be
granted that the withdrawal of Bourbaki would relieve Prince Frederic
Charles of an enemy, would the Prince, Von der Tann, and the Grand Duke
of Mecklenburg turn round and fall in full force on Chanzy? And, even if
they did, would not Chanzy, with his large army in position at Le Mans,
be strong enough to baffle their efforts? And even supposing Chanzy
defeated, how little was to be thought of a defeat provided Bourbaki
relieved Paris by seizing and cutting the German communications?
Besides, was it not very conceivable that Prince Frederic Charles would
pursue Bourbaki, in which case that commander would escape him, and that
he would not think of attacking Chanzy?
Such was their plan, and, we repeat, it was, under the circumstances,
simply insensate. No one will deny that to overwhelm Werder, to effect
the raising of the siege of Belfort, and to sever the communications of
the Germans, were desirable objects for the French; and had Bourbaki
reached in force the main railway from Strasburg to Paris, this might
have caused the relief of the capital. But, in the actual state of the
French armies--raw, ill-provided, and ill-disciplined--a movement like
this was extremely difficult, and far from likely to be at all
successful, even as regards the mere reaching Belfort; and it was open
to the decisive objection that it enabled Prince Frederic Charles to
oppose all his forces to Chanzy and overwhelm him, in conjunction with
his German colleagues. The scheme, therefore, exposed the French on one
side to certain disaster, and, on the other, was really far from
hopeful; and it not only made it almost impossible to expect the relief
of Paris, but it might lead to terrible results should Bourbaki fail or
prove a bad General, In an unfortunate hour for France, however, this
reckless project was adopted; and in the first days of January, Bourbaki
broke up from Bourges and Nevers to reach Franche Comté, and made his
way to his first point, Belfort. The operations that ensued were just
such as might have been foreseen. The instant that Prince Frederic
Charles had ascertained that Bourbaki's army was on its way to the
distant east, he turned rapidly upon Chanzy, and directed his own
reinforced corps, with those of Von der Tann and the Grand Duke, to
converge without delay on Le Mans and overwhelm his French antagonist.
The movement began in the first days of January; and as the united
German armies were probably 140,000 strong, whereas Chanzy was hardly
superior in mere numbers, and had little but undisciplined levies in his
ranks, the issue was not for a moment doubtful. Chanzy, who had made a
feint forward, and had threatened the Prince before Vendôme, found
himself pressed by an irresistible enemy, and fell back at once on Le
Mans, not having been, we believe, informed of the project which had
detached Bourbaki. His retreat was conducted with marked ability, his
German foes closing in on all sides, and endeavouring to cut him off
from his point; and nothing save his judicious foresight enabled him to
save even a part of his army. Chanzy had fortified a strong position
before Le Mans, on the river Huisne--so strong that it has been compared
to Torres Vedras by an eye-witness--and he succeeded in making a stand
on this, and even baffling his enemy for a time. The contest, however,
was too unequal; his lines were turned on the night of the 11th; Le Mans
was captured the next day; and Chanzy's army, beaten and demoralized,
lost, it is said, 20,000 prisoners.
While these events had been in progress, Bourbaki had been making his
way across the rugged and hilly country which divides Burgundy from
Franche Comté. The cold of the winter was intense; and his divisions,
composed of young recruits, ill-clothed, ill-fed, and ill-disciplined,
suffered cruelly, and were half demoralized before they saw even the
face of an enemy. At Dijon he obtained reinforcements drawn from the
French Army of the East, and with a force, nominally 140,000 strong,
with from 300 to 400 guns, he proceeded through the intricate defiles,
between the rivers Ognon and Doubs, which lead to the hills around
Belfort. The march of his weak and untrained columns, confined to a
single narrow route, was necessarily extremely slow; and it is decisive
against Bourbaki's generalship that, at a time when speed was of the
greatest importance, he did not advance by four or five roads, and thus
make expedition possible. The French army, worn out and harassed, and
especially wanting in staff officers, moved at the rate of four or five
miles a day only, and the result was that it completely failed to cut
off Werder, as had been expected, and that that general was enabled to
retreat leisurely and cover Belfort. A rear-guard engagement took place
at Villersexel, on the 6th of January, and it was not until the 14th
that Bourbaki reached the Lisaine--a tributary of the Doubs in front of
the fortress--where he found Werder's army drawn up in entrenched
positions, and awaiting its foe. A series of combats ensued, in which
the raw and bad French troops, although numerically three to one, were
unable to gain any success; and, on the 18th, Bourbaki retreated, having
lost from 8,000 to 10,000 men, and having met nothing but heavy
disaster. His army, baffled and half starving, began to disband and go
to pieces; and, as he retreated by the narrow defiles by which he had
before advanced, he did not reach Besançon till the 22nd. Meanwhile Von
Moltke had been directing a terrible and decisive stroke against him. As
soon as the great German commander had become aware of Bourbaki's
movements, he massed a force of some 50,000 men between Auxerre and
Chatillon-sur-Seine, and launched it across the hills of Burgundy upon
the flank and rear of the Frenchman, while Werder, pressing forward from
the Lisaine, advanced against him through Franche Comté. By the 24th of
January, four German divisions had passed Dijon and reached Dôle on the
Doubs, to the south of Besançon, while a large part of Werder's forces
were threatening Bourbaki from the north; and thus the unfortunate
French army was already almost completely hemmed in by its vigorous and
indefatigable pursuers. The disgrace of a second Sedan flashed across
the mind of the French commander, and in a paroxysm of despair he shot
himself, unable to brave the impending peril. His army, a mere
dissolving mass, rolled out helplessly from Besançon, and endeavoured to
make its way southward, but finding all the roads occupied, it turned
aside and crossed the Swiss frontier. There the starving mob of
disbanding fugitives was obliged helplessly to lay down its arms.
Such was the end of the expedition, ill-planned and still worse
executed. The detachment of Bourbaki to the east caused the overthrow of
Chanzy at Le Mans, by setting Prince Frederic Charles free; and the bad
state of Bourbaki's army, and even more, his deplorable conduct, led to
the catastrophe we have described. What, indeed, could have been more
unwise than to have moved in a single column only, when celerity was the
first consideration; and what could have been more shameful than the
management of the retreat to Besançon, and the rash act which left an
army at that place without a commander? These things are simply without
excuse; yet it must be added that the condition of Bourbaki's troops
made it very improbable that he could, under any circumstance, have
accomplished the task which he undertook, at least that he could ever
have reached the great line of the German communications; and
accordingly, even when it seemed most promising, the whole enterprise
cannot be justified. The result might have been very different if the
forces of Bourbaki and Chanzy had been concentrated for a vigorous
attack on Prince Frederic Charles and his colleagues on the line between
Orleans, Vendome, and Chartres. Had this been done the French would have
largely outnumbered their foes, and even had they failed and been
defeated, they would have been able to make good their retreat without
incurring a terrible disaster. The more we study the operations of the
French armies in the month of January, the more we see how ill-devised
they were; while, on the other hand, the strategy of the Germans--of
Werder, in the stand he made on the Lisaine, and of Von Moltke in
surrounding Bourbaki--is deserving of the highest admiration; and,
though no one would think of comparing the young French troops with
their veteran foes, it is not the less true that the final issue was
decided in the main by generalship. Everywhere else in the theatre of
war, while these disasters were taking place, the fortunes of France
were in calamitous eclipse. The German Army of the North was taking the
fortresses on her north-eastern frontier without difficulty by a brief
bombardment, the old bastions of Vauban's time being useless against
modern heavy guns, and the triple barrier of Louis XIV. was thus broken
down from within, and the Northern Departments laid open. Faidherbe had
fought two battles in a vain attempt to resist the invaders; but, though
he gained some success at Bapaume, over a small part of Von Goeben's
army, he had been unable to follow it up, and soon afterwards he was
defeated with great and ruinous loss at St. Quentin--an ominous name in
French annals. After this disaster the French Army of the North was no
longer able to keep the field. Faidherbe took refuge in Lille and
Cambrai, and the tide of German invasion flowed irresistibly to the
borders of Artois and Hainault.
Meanwhile the progress of the great siege had been tending to its
inevitable conclusion. On the 27th of December, the German batteries
commenced the reduction of the outwork constructed by Trochu on Mont
Avron, and in two days it was silenced and destroyed, the defences being
feeble and incomplete. This roused the spirits of the besiegers; and as,
by this time, their siege trains had come up in considerable numbers,
fire was opened on the southern and eastern forts, and for some weeks
was kept up with vigour. The distance, however, of the attacking
batteries from the defences of Paris was very great, nor was their
artillery powerful; and it cannot be said that they succeeded in making
a serious or lasting impression. In fact, the forts, and even the
ramparts, were armed with rather stronger ordnance, and they maintained
a combat at least equal to that of the heavy guns that were directed
against them. The bombardment of the city was next attempted, and shells
were poured into its streets and squares; but as the extreme range of
the German guns extended only to one bank of the Seine, no great damage,
fortunately, was done, and, as often has happened in other cases, the
effect on the spirits of the population was rather to stimulate than to
alarm. 'You might as well have pelted Paris with bottles,' was the
remark of an intelligent eye-witness, and there can be no doubt that the
active siege of the capital was a complete failure. Meantime, however,
famine was doing the work which fire and sword could not have
accomplished. The city had been amply provisioned, but, at the end of
four months and a half, it was reduced to the extreme of misery. For
many weeks horseflesh had been the only animal food of the population;
the bread doled out in scanty rations was a vile compound of bran and
rye; the mortality among the old and young was appalling; the supply of
fuel had fallen short, and that in the depths of a fearful winter. On
the 19th of January, Trochu made a last effort against the besiegers'
lines, but, as might have been anticipated, it failed, his troops having
lost all courage and worth. By this time all hope of relief from the
provincial armies had been frustrated, and at last, on the 130th day of
the siege, the proud capital was subdued by famine. The line of the
defences was almost uninjured; and, unquestionably, Paris would have
held out for months, nay, perhaps might have proved impregnable, had the
citizens possessed the means of subsistence.
The fall of Paris brought to a close the internecine strife between
France and Germany. The extraordinary disasters of January, indeed
(especially the ruin of Bourbaki's army), had made resistance no longer
possible; and, in all probability, had the war gone on, the vanquished
country would have been overrun. Those who, like ourselves, were of
opinion that the expected surrender of the capital need not necessarily
terminate the struggle, could not have anticipated the fatal strategy
which annihilated the provincial armies of France in futile movements
and desperate efforts. We believe the National Assembly was right in
accepting the conditions of the Germans, harsh and relentless as these
were; and we applaud the patriotism of M. Thiers in bowing before the
doom of fate, and offer him our respect and sympathy. Our space has been
already outrun, and we cannot make any general remarks on the mighty
conflict which has just closed.
As regards its consequences, we can only hazard two or three
anticipations of the future. Those who believed in the moderation and
civilization of the gigantic power of which Bismark has been the creator
must have been disappointed at the German terms; but as we are not among
the credulous, we cannot say that we have been surprised. The
annexation, however, of Alsace and Lorraine against the will of two
millions of the brave inhabitants of those provinces, the dismemberment
of France, and her spoliation, and, above all, the evident understanding
between the autocrats of Russia and Germany, are simply the triumphs of
brute force--perpetual menaces to the peace of Europe. As regards
France, her destiny is uncertain; and it remains to be seen whether, as
of old, she will rise superior to misfortune, or whether, like Spain,
she will henceforth decline and sink into an inferior power. If, as we
think, the first alternative is that which history will yet witness,
France certainly will renew the combat, and endeavour to regain from her
pitiless foe, not only her strategic position, but the conquered
territories. To effect this purpose she will avail herself of any
alliances, however abnormal--and for this she is not to be condemned.
From this point of view, also, the prospect for England is not
reassuring. France, however, if she would renew her strength, must first
learn self-government, and to combat anarchy and revolution; and, deeply
as we sympathise with her, she would, we believe, achieve more if she
were to attain these great ends than if she were to avenge Sedan by a
second Jena, and march once more in triumph to Berlin.