It is impossible as yet even to guess the consequences of the memorable
war of 1870. It may verify the German exclamation that the hour of the
Latin race has come, and that France has ceased to be a great power, or
it may lead to the moral resurrection of that essentially noble people,
and even to the recovery of its military supremacy. It may develope a
French Republic which from its failure to turn the tide of fortune shall
be followed by a Jacobin successor, and issue in a despotism of the
sword not less fearful than that of Napoleon I. or it may be the
forerunner of a better period when France, purified by adversity, shall
win the esteem and admiration of Europe, by her constancy in affliction,
her lofty patriotism, her renewed energy, her surviving genius. Looking
at it, too, from the other side, it may accelerate the unity of Germany,
cemented by blood poured out in the field, by a brotherhood in arms, and
by common triumphs; or it may tend only to German divisions, and to the
collapse of the policy of 1866, by aggrandising Prussia out of all
proportions, and making her influence intolerable to the minor States.
Who, indeed, shall speculate on the results of this mighty and awful
conflict, when, though it seems for the time to be drawing to a close,
France refuses to acknowledge defeat, and defies the invader behind the
walls of the capital, and when, though apparently struck to the ground,
she still raises the flag of resistance, appeals to the memories of
1793, and endeavours to rally for a final effort those national forces
which, in her case, have so often proved impossible to subdue? Yet, if
we shall not attempt to forecast the remote issues of this tremendous
struggle, or to predict what it shall ultimately bring forth, the time
has come when we can briefly describe its marvellous events and
fortunes, and can truly indicate its immediate lessons of deep
significance to these kingdoms. The momentous war of 1870 is not only
one of the grandest illustrations of the art which founds and destroys
Empires; it not only is an astonishing drama, every scene which the
military student should examine carefully and lay to heart; it not only
fascinates the ordinary observer by its gigantic action and immense
events; it points conclusively to a solemn moral, not to be forgotten by
any country which seeks to maintain its position in the world, and
cherishes a sense of its independence. It shows how weak, in the hour of
trial, may be even a great military power which neglects the real
sources of its strength, and relies mainly on its martial traditions, on
its past honour, on the memory of a name; it proves fearfully how
imperial despotism may rear an edifice of imposing grandeur, which for a
generation shall deceive mankind, and yet fall suddenly at the first
breath of misfortune; it testifies to the old truth that material
prosperity with moral corruption are the fruitful sources of national
decline; and it teaches us what we should never forget, how terrible and
decisive, in modern warfare, are the results of rapid and great success,
and how absolutely necessary it is for England, in the present menacing
condition of Europe, to surround herself with an invulnerable shield,
to look after her national defences, and to take care that by sea and on
land she shall possess the means of repelling aggression.
It would be an unnecessary and unprofitable task to examine at length
the causes of the war. Impartial history, we believe, will pronounce
that though Napoleon gave the challenge, it had been to some degree
provoked by the policy of Bismark, by the attitude recently taken by
Prussia, by the series of events which since 1866 have changed the
centre of power in Germany. It was impossible but that the Emperor
should feel bitterly how he had been outwitted by the unscrupulous
statesman who had purchased his complicity in the spoliation of Denmark
by promises of annexation on the Rhine, and had afterwards coolly
violated his pledges; nor yet that he should not be really alarmed at
the immense development of the military power of Prussia during the
preceding five years. It would have been disregarding the traditions
which, rightly or wrongly, for two centuries have guided the foreign
policy of France, to have witnessed the absorption of the German States
into one dominant and threatening power, without an effort to break the
union; and if an attempt to obtain this, was contrary to modern ideas
and aspirations, it was only carrying out what had always been the views
of Henry IV. and Richelieu. Besides, ever since the battle of Sadowa,
France and Prussia had been watching each other, and tending inevitably
to collision; both Powers had been increasing their armaments, and
events have proved which was the more ready; and we know from the
Imperial correspondence that Napoleon had been repeatedly warned that
Prussia was meditating an invasion of France, and would avail herself of
the first opportunity. It is not, therefore, too much to say that it was
not merely French folly and arrogance which precipitated this tremendous
conflict; the conduct of Prussia and her aggressive acts contributed to
it in no slight degree; and if France, as it has turned out, was unwise
in not accepting accomplished facts, and in chafing at the military
strength of her rival, we can perfectly comprehend this sentiment,
without charging her, as a nation, with any peculiar turn for
aggrandisement, or even any extraordinary ambition. It must be admitted
that the Emperor was utterly in the wrong in the pretext on which he
declared war, and that his whole policy in this respect showed ignorance
of the real state of opinion. After the Hohenzollern candidature of
Spain had been withdrawn at the instance of England, it was an act of
extreme unwisdom to have proceeded to further demands; and the result
was that, to outward seeming, France, at the beginning of hostilities,
was alone to blame for the frightful contest, and that Prussia appeared
the injured defender of the national independence of Germany. In truth,
however, in this as in other matters, Bismark probably outgeneralled
Napoleon; he seems to have been eager for war, and to have been too glad
to find an opportunity to attack France with the support of public
opinion; and now at least when he puts forward claims to wrest from her
some of her present provinces, he can scarcely be considered by
impartial men as the mere opponent of French aggression.
Hostilities were proclaimed on the 15th of July, after efforts at
negotiation on the part of England. There can be little doubt that the
war was welcomed by the classes who form public opinion in Germany,
quite as much as in France. The passionate and foolish cry, 'to Berlin,'
was answered by shouts of defiance, 'to Paris;' and if French chauvins
and journalists talked of the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine,
and of the breaking up of the German Confederation, claims for 'the lost
patrimony of Elsass and Lothringen' were put forward prominently by the
press of Germany. In fact, amiable German professors who back the
arrogant demands of Bismark, and pleasantly insist on 'the line of the
Vosges,' as a necessary bulwark for 'peace-loving Germany,' against the
'intolerable ambition of Frenchmen,' must have a strange notion of the
facts of the case; the war fever was at least as strong in the capital
of Prussia, as in that of France; and it is about as correct to
represent the two nations as differing in this, as it is to repeat the
veracious legend--of which of course the League of Pilnitz and the
barbarous invasion of 1792 are confirmations that cannot be
gainsaid--that France has always been the assailant of her meek and
long-suffering Teutonic rival. Within a few days after the declaration
of war, the army of the Rhine was set in motion, and the heads of the
columns of eight French corps were approaching the verge of the German
frontier; the main bodies, however, being still distant. The first
corps, under the renowned MacMahon, had advanced from Algeria and the
south, and occupied Upper and Lower Alsace, its headquarters being at
Strasburg. The second and fifth corps of Frossard and De Failly were
sent forward, and at St. Avold and Bitsche held the approaches to the
Rhenish Palatinate, from MacMahon's left to near the line of the Saar.
To the left of these again, was the fourth corps, marched from the north
under L'Admirault, and stationed at and around Thionville; while, in
the rear, Bazaine with the third corps, was moving to the great fortress
of Metz; the sixth, under the orders of Canrobert, was on its way from
Chalons to Lorraine; and far behind, the Imperial Guard--the flower of
the French army--was pushing forward from the French capital. In the
meantime, the seventh corps of Douay formed the extreme right of the
great French line; far to the north it guarded Belfort, the 'gate of
France,' between the Vosges and the Jura; and it connected itself with
MacMahon's rear-guard along the Rhine and Lower Alsace. The whole French
army, in its first line, extended in a huge semicircle from Northern
Lorraine to the Southern Vosges; but its second line, massed between
Metz and Chalons, was at a considerable distance from the first; and
though it was well connected by railways, and placed as it was, it
threatened equally the Rhenish provinces and Southern Germany, it was
not yet even nearly concentrated.
Such was the disposition of the army of the Rhine about the 21st or 22nd
of July. It will be seen at once that it was well adapted for an
offensive movement against Germany, if made rapidly and in full force,
for Baden and the Palatinate were threatened, and the exact point of
attack was concealed. Placed as they were, the forces of France could
either pour into the Rhineland, drawing after them their reserves on all
sides, or they could cross the Rhine, and, advancing from Strasburg,
interpose between Northern and Southern Germany and endeavour to break
up their uniting armies. On the other hand, the position of the French
was badly chosen as a line of defence; for their foremost corps were
widely disseminated, and in case of a sudden attack, were thrown too far
beyond their supports; and if they were assailed by a resolute foe,
converging against them in full strength, they would be exposed to
serious disaster. For these reasons we may certainly infer that the
strategic plan of the French Emperor was to march upon the Germans with
much rapidity, and whether the recently published pamphlet does or does
not disclose his purpose, it is evident that he intended to advance
either by the Rhineland on Landau and Mayence, or by Strasburg into the
territory of Baden. Besides, he must have known perfectly well that a
brilliant initiative was his best chance; for not only was it in
accordance with the traditions and genius of the French soldier; not
only was it calculated to sow dissensions and alarm among his foes and
perhaps prevent them from combining; it was the sole means to give full
effect to the one great advantage which France would possess over
Prussia at the beginning of a campaign, the imposing strength of a
standing army, supposed to be ready at all points and formidable in its
numerical proportions, compared with levies, immense indeed when brought
together and set in motion, but believed to be inferior in military
power, and requiring time to be fully arrayed. It may therefore be said
with confidence, that a sudden and vigorous spring on Germany was the
real scheme of Napoleon III.; and, notwithstanding all that has
occurred, it is impossible to say what the result would have been had
this design been carried out boldly, with the promptness and skill of a
great commander who would have led his troops to immediate victory.
Unhappily, however, for the interests of France, vacillation at the
decisive moment took the place of resolution and genius; and her armed
arrays, however imposing to outward seeming, were not in a state to
undertake great and rapid operations. The Emperor lingered a fortnight
at Paris before he went to his headquarters at Metz; even when he had
arrived he passed nearly a week, uncertain, it would appear, how to
strike; and thus the favourable opportunity was lost which might have
changed the whole course of the war. In addition to this, it is now well
known that the army was not ready to march; its commissariat was not
complete; it was deficient in ammunition and supplies; and its real
strength was considerably less than Napoleon III. had been led to
expect. Between the irresolution of its chief, and its own ill-prepared
condition, it had already forfeited its most hopeful chances before even
a blow had been struck.
During these delays of the army of the Rhine Germany had been making
astonishing efforts. If Bismark's reports are to be believed, the German
nation was not prepared for immediate war on a gigantic scale. But
considering that since the battle of Sadowa Prussia had been steadily
increasing her armaments, and that it is tolerably clear from her
government press that she was eager to measure her strength with France,
we shall scarcely credit the Northern Confederation with any want of
military readiness; still immense as their exertions were, it is not
impossible that the Southern States were taken to some extent by
surprise. However this may have been, the summons to arms against the
ancient and dreaded foe met with but one answer from the Teutonic race;
and whatever may be thought of the policy of its rulers, its patriotism
and heroic attitude are entitled to the highest admiration. From the
sandy wastes that border the Niemen to the valleys watered by the
Moselle, and from the shores of the Northern Sea to the Danube and the
Bohemian hills, the martial cry 'to the war' was heard; the integrity of
the Fatherland was the one thought of the whole people; and whatever may
have been the divisions caused by the events of 1866, and whatever the
hopes of dispossessed sovereigns, of blind diplomatists, or of
discontented nobles, it was soon evident that Napoleon III. would have
to contend against an united Germany. This single circumstance shows how
impolitic had been the course of the French Emperor, and how badly he
had been advised; and, in fact, unless, as is not improbable, the
conduct of Prussia shall tend to disunion, the war will have done more
to make Germany a concordant people than any event since 1813. Within a
few days the military system of the nation was in full operation; the
army was 'mobilized' and increased to its war strength within the local
limits assigned to its different divisions, and in an exceedingly short
time a gigantic array composed of regular troops in the first line, with
reserves of landwehr in the second, was in a state to commence
operations under the guidance of leaders of proved ability. Those who
witnessed that mighty torrent of war pouring through Germany towards the
Rhenish frontier have described its tremendous power and impulse; and
none who have observed how it was directed can doubt that it had been
long held in hand to commence as well as to repel aggression. Towards
the last days of July and the first of August, while the French were
still disseminated in Lorraine, three vast German armies had taken
possession of the territory of the Rhenish Palatinate, and, already in
communication with each other, were being marshalled to pour into France
an overwhelming tide of invasion. The first army, numbering about 80,000
men, was under the command of the aged Steinmetz, and was approaching
the Saar from Treves, its outposts reaching to near Saar-Louis. The
second army, nearly 200,000 strong, had crossed the Rhine at and above
Mayence, and, led by King William and Prince Frederick Charles, held the
centre of the Rhenish Palatinate, its outposts almost advanced to the
Saar, and its rearward divisions stretching far backwards. To the left
was the third army, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, about
150,000 strong; it touched the right of the second army, and extended
thence to the course of the Rhine, and its vanguard, along the stream of
the Lauter, approached the northern frontier of Alsace, the main body
being not distant, and concealed behind the adjoining fortresses. From
Treves on the west to Landau on the east, and pressing forward to the
very edge of France, the huge German masses were already in a state to
fall on their enemy with tremendous force.
The manner in which these immense armies were formed, organised, and
moved in concert within a short distance of the French frontier, was one
of the most notable of strategic exploits. In the space of nineteen or
twenty days 430,000 men in the highest state of efficiency for war, with
guns, horses, and other material, had been arrayed and prepared for the
field, and now stood on the verge of the Rhineland ready to overrun
Alsace and Lorraine. We know of no finer military movement, except
perhaps the splendid concentration of Napoleon's forces on the Belgian
frontier on the 14th of June, 1815; and it attests clearly the
calculating forethought and ability of the Prussian Government, the high
training and skill of its generals, and the discipline and power of the
German troops. The French army, scattered and divided on the semicircle
from Thionville to Belfort, and with its first line widely separated
from the second, was already in no condition to offer a successful
resistance to its mighty foe; it was not only much weaker in strength,
being outnumbered fully two to one at the decisive points where it was
threatened, it was also so disunited in its parts, that it could hardly
collect 60,000 men in any position to withstand an attack. In fact, a
glance at the map will show that along the whole line of the Saar and
the Lauter it was exposed to be defeated in detail by a force infinitely
superior in power; and this peril was aggravated by the circumstance,
placed beyond dispute by the clearest evidence, that it believed itself
completely secure, and that its leaders were planning a forward movement
while their enemy was close at hand to destroy them.
It is now well known that a German advance was not suspected in the
French camp even during the first three days of August: the woods along
the edge of the frontier were not searched by the French outposts, and
the German columns were allowed to collect in force behind this
deceptive screen while the Emperor and his Marshals were dreaming of a
march without an obstacle into the Rhenish provinces. The consequences
of this ruinous neglect and self-deception became soon evident. On the
4th of August the Crown Prince of Prussia detached a part of his vast
army to attack the extreme right of the whole French line, this movement
being only the first step of a general advance across the French
frontier. The Prince, with about 40,000 men, fell upon a single
division of about 10,000 which lay encamped near the town of
Weissenburg, surprised it, it is said, when at breakfast, and drove it
back in a state of confusion. The French, rallying on the Geisberg, made
a gallant resistance for a short time; but the hill having been stormed
by the enemy, they were ultimately driven in utter rout from beyond
Weissenburg on the road to Strasburg. The first success, so important in
war, had thus been decisively won; the trophies of the day were 500
prisoners, a gun, and a great deal of material; and the advanced guard
of the German army stood in triumph upon the soil of France, the right
wing of the French forces having been already threatened and struck, and
the secret of their want of preparation having been disclosed to their
able antagonists.
The affair at Weissenburg was only the prelude of operations of a more
serious kind. The 5th of August was spent by the Crown Prince in
bringing the mass of his troops forward, and in arraying them for a
formidable attack on the French forces in his immediate front. There can
be no doubt that in making these dispositions he exposed his flank to
the corps of De Failly, which, stationed at Bitsche, beyond the Vosges,
ought to have combined with that of McMahon, and fallen on the right of
the Prussian commander, while, as yet, his columns were not closed up,
and his whole line was somewhat out of order. This movement, however,
was not executed; the want of intelligence and the vacillation which
characterised the operations of the French, were again too painfully
conspicuous; and though De Failly sent one division through the hill
passes to the aid of his colleague, he remained at Bitsche with the bulk
of his troops, and left MacMahon completely isolated. Meanwhile that
brave, but unfortunate chief, made preparations to resist the attack of
the Germans, now evidently impending. It is a misconception to suppose,
as some have done, that he advanced recklessly against his foe; what he
did was to take and occupy a defensive position on the flank of the
Germans, where he could hope to give them battle, under circumstances of
the least disadvantage, and De Failly, if he wished, could come to his
aid; and we assert, with confidence, that this strategy was the best
open to the Duke of Magenta. The marshal by the evening of the 5th had
drawn up his forces along the crest of a range which extends from
Reichsofen on the left by Woerth to Elsasshausen, and Marbronn on the
right, and which, with the stream of the Sauer in front, and with broken
ground along the rising slopes, formed a strong position against his
enemy. MacMahon's object evidently was to compel the Germans to turn
against him, and assail him as they changed their front; he would thus
divert them from the road to Strasburg, and engage them as favourably
for himself as possible; and at the same time, he as it were summoned
the corps of De Failly to join his rear, while he kept open several
lines of retreat. These were the arrangements of an able commander; and
considering that MacMahon had not more than 50,000 men in his band, his
dispositions certainly give proof of the tactical skill for which he is
renowned. On the morning of the 6th, the Crown Prince advanced to the
attack, with 130,000 men, and not less than 440 guns. As MacMahon had
calculated, the change of front, which the Germans were compelled to
make, threw their line for some time into confusion; and the French
repelled for several hours a somewhat feeble and disunited effort
against their left, at and near Reichsofen. Meantime the French centre
at Woerth had been engaged; there too, for a considerable time,
MacMahon's divisions resisted stoutly, and even for a moment assumed the
offensive. But about two o'clock the huge German line had come up on all
sides in strength; and the Crown Prince prepared to turn the French
wings at both sides, combining with this an attack in front--a movement
justified by his superiority in force, but certainly not without hazard.
MacMahon, who, at this conjuncture, De Failly not having come up, ought,
in our judgment, to have retreated, struck desperately at the German
centre at Woerth, thinned by the extension of its flanks; but the French
onset was bravely resisted, and indeed it could not have been
successful. Ere long the formidable outflanking movement developed
itself, and became decisive; and from Reichsofen to beyond Marbronn the
dense German columns extended threateningly, and overlapped the whole
French position. A sudden panic fell on MacMahon's army; its right and
centre gave way; and it was soon a mass of disheartened fugitives,
broken on all sides into disunited fragments. Six thousand prisoners and
thirty guns were the spoils of the victorious Germans; and for some time
the defeated force was annihilated, in a military point of view.
It cannot be said that the Germans' tactics were remarkable for ability
or boldness during the first part of this desperate battle. They
attacked weakly, and in divided masses; they gave MacMahon more than one
chance; and with their immense superiority of numbers their victory
ought to have been more decisive. On the other hand the French Marshal
showed talent in his original dispositions; he resisted his enemy during
several hours, and at one time placed him in much danger; and had he
when he had been assured that De Failly's corps was not coming up,
effected a rapid and confident retreat, he would have been entitled to
commendation. MacMahon, however, held his ground too long; and when the
Crown Prince, who, as soon as he had ascertained the inferiority of the
French in strength, displayed consummate energy and skill, had advanced
on Reichsofen and Marbronn, it was almost inevitable that the French
line should give way and be totally defeated. As regards the conduct of
the opposing armies, the Germans, cautious and slow at first, became at
last self-reliant and bold; the French fought long with 'consummate
bravery,'--we quote the German official report--but they broke up
hastily under the stress of disaster--a fault almost a national
characteristic. The strategic consequences of the battle were in the
highest degree important. The whole right wing of the French army,
overpowered by immensely superior forces, was driven in and almost
destroyed; it had no chance but to retreat behind the Vosges, too
fortunate if it could make its escape; Alsace was thrown open to the
enemy, and an avenue into the heart of France laid bare. This result was
in some measure due to the criminal negligence of De Failly, who, if he
had chosen, might have joined MacMahon, and whose corps might have
changed the fate of the day; but it was also caused by the bad
arrangement of the whole French line upon the position, which at no
point was in sufficient strength to offer a firm and certain resistance.
This, indeed, was made evident, at the same time, at another part of the
theatre of operations. While the Crown Prince was attacking MacMahon, a
German division of the First Army crossed the Saar and advanced to
Saarbrück, where a few days before the corps of Frossard had made a
demonstration on the frontier, in order, it has been supposed, to
gratify the curiosity of the Prince Imperial. The French were completely
surprised; but, pressing hastily forward, they advanced to repulse the
audacious foe, who with great boldness resisted steadily for some time.
Meanwhile another German division had come to the aid of their comrades;
and seizing promptly the cover of woods which overlapped the right of
the French, they wasted it away with a destructive fire; and further
supports having come up, the Germans stormed with heroic valour a line
of heights called the Spicheren hills, which formed the front of the
French position. The whole French line had begun to give way; and an
additional mass of foes appearing on their extreme left, and having
outflanked it, they retreated in precipitate haste, leaving a
considerable number of guns and prisoners.
The two engagements of the 6th of August, named respectively those of
Woerth and Forbach, were fraught with results of great moment. It was
not only that the renowned French army which had been supposed to be the
first in the world had suffered a double crushing defeat, in one
instance of a dishonourable kind; not only that it had lost its prestige
and given proof of want of steadiness, of indiscipline, and of
disorganization; the invasion of Germany was now impossible; the South
had been united to the North by the pledge of common military success;
and there was nothing to avert the victorious progress of the German
masses on the French frontier. The situation, in fact, had been suddenly
changed; and Europe, which up to that moment had been expecting a French
advance, was now to witness the calamitous recoil of the Imperial forces
at all points, attended with ever increasing disasters. The right wing
of the French army, well-nigh cut off and destroyed at Woerth, was
driven in rout out of Alsace and compelled to abandon Strasburg to its
fate; and it would be too fortunate if it could rally at Châlons,
drawing to it the corps of De Failly and Douay. The right centre, broken
through at Forbach, was forced backward upon Metz; and the centre and
left, involved in its defeat, were obliged to fall back in the same
direction. Meanwhile the Germans ably directed, and collected in
overwhelming strength, poured into France in the successive waves of an
invasion that nothing could resist. The Crown Prince's army, in
communication with the Second by a cordon of cavalry sent through the
Vosges, detached a part of its force to besiege Strasburg, and with its
remaining divisions poured forward through Lower Alsace in pursuit of
MacMahon. The Second Army advancing from the Rhineland, swept across the
Saar in immense forces, and passed into the north of Lorraine, driving
before it the feeble French corps now seeking a refuge under the guns of
Metz. Meanwhile, the Third Army made a parallel movement; and, uniting
with the right of the Second, marched rapidly in overwhelming front on
Metz, already threatening with its right wing to overlap and surround
the great fortress. By the 18th August, 300,000 Germans with large
reserves in their immediate rear had made good their way into France,
and from Strasburg to Thionville and thence into the heart of Lorraine,
were taking military possession of the country and menacing with ruin
the enemy in their path.
During this mighty advance of the Germans, the strategic operations of
the French, in part owing to the bad disposition of their forces for
combined movements, and in part to the weakness of their commanders, had
been characterised by much indecision. MacMahon, indeed, had effected
his retreat from the field of Woerth with the wreck of his troops, and
escaped safely through the Vosges passes; and though his corps was
almost ruined, he had shown some ability in getting away, for he ought
to have been destroyed by the Germans. In fact, the pursuit of the Crown
Prince had not been marked by energy or speed, whatever indiscriminate
flatterers may urge; his own reports more than once refer to the
comparative slackness of his cavalry or at least to their extreme
caution. De Failly, too, though the disaster at Woerth must be laid to a
great extent to his charge, had been prompt in breaking up from Bitsche,
and he had succeeded in approaching MacMahon without being caught by the
enemy; his escape, however, being in a great measure due to the
resistance made by the fortress of Bitsche, which retarded the march of
one of the Crown Prince's columns. The broken right of the French army,
though its losses had been terrible, and its morale was destroyed, was,
in a word, making good its way to Châlons; and, as the corps of Douay
was moving towards it, and as the whole mass was about to concentrate,
we cannot find fault with these arrangements. But in the remaining part
of the theatre of war the French dispositions revealed nothing but
feebleness, vacillation, and want of forethought. The instant Woerth and
Forbach were fought, and the right and right centre of the French were
forced back on either side of the Vosges, it cannot be doubted that the
whole French army ought to have retreated in a parallel line; and it
ought certainly to have retired on Châlons, having thrown a strong
garrison into Metz, for it was at Châlons only that it could hope to
reunite, and when there it would be in a position to save Paris and
defend the interior on the well-known lines of the Marne and Seine. To
effect this would not have been easy, for the disseminated state of the
corps on the frontier from Thionville to Forbach and thence backward to
Metz exposed them whatever moves they attempted; but this was what ought
to have been done, and the attempt would have probably succeeded.
Instead of this the unfortunate emperor drew in his left and centre on
the Nied--and when he had collected these behind the river, he halted
five or six days at Metz, uncertain evidently what to do next, and
hesitating, while there was time to fall back on Châlons. The reason of
this strange and fatal fault, through which the main body of the French
army was exposed to be cut off and destroyed, remains as yet to be
explained; it was probably owing to vacillation and to the dread of
terrifying Paris by the news of a general retrograde movement. While the
bulk of the Army of the Rhine was being detained in camp around Metz,
completely separated from its supports in Champagne, the German armies
advanced to the Moselle; and while a part of the First and Second Armies
were massed close to the great fortress a considerable detachment was
thrown forward, to menace and fall on the French line of retreat should
an attempt be made to retire on Châlons.
The results of these strategic arrangements, so different in ability and
forethought, were developed ere long with great distinctness. On the
14th of August one detachment of the French army with the Emperor at its
head, left Metz and crossed to the left bank of the Moselle; and this
ultimately reached Châlons, where it effected its junction with
MacMahon. The remaining corps endeavoured to begin their retrograde
movement the same day, but being on the eastern side of the fortress,
and their great numbers impeding their march, they were attacked by two
corps of the Germans, whose vigorous onset held them in check. The
combat lasted the whole day; and each side claimed to have won the
victory; but the real issue was in favour of the Germans, who detained
their antagonists round Metz, while their own troops were being pushed
forward to occupy the French line of retreat. Next day, the 15th, the
whole French army began to defile to the left bank of the Moselle; but
it marched only ten or twelve miles on the two roads to Verdun and
Etain, the avenues by which it would reach Châlons; and it bivouacked at
Mars La Tour and Doncourt, still, as it proved, not far from its enemy.
The causes of this disastrous delay, fraught with consequences of a
ruinous kind, remain yet to be explained; much was doubtless due to the
extreme difficulty of moving columns of great length and size,
encumbered with baggage and other impediments; and it is not improbable
that a desire to avoid the appearance of a hasty retreat may have had
influence on the French commanders. It is certain, however, that a
greater distance should have been accomplished by the retiring force; it
was of vital importance to get clear at once of the foes gathering on
the flank and rear; and Marshal Bazaine, who by this time certainly had
been invested with the supreme command, unquestionably committed a
grave error in not having pressed forward the movement. The next day it
was too late; and the Germans found themselves in a position to achieve
success, which it is quite clear from their own despatches, they never
expected. On the morning of the 16th, the retreating French were
attacked on the Verdun road by the cavalry and infantry of a German
corps, which continued for some hours to hold them in check; and aid
having come to the assailants, a sanguinary battle raged at Mars La
Tour, one side endeavouring to cut its way through, the other struggling
to bar the passage. Throughout the day fresh supports thrown forward
judiciously on the flanks of the French, gave terrible effect to the
German attacks; and their enemy, bound to a single road, and in their
extended columns fatally exposed, was compelled to fight at a great
disadvantage. The French, however, fought desperately, aware of the
importance of the issue; and it is possible that they would have
resisted successfully, had it not been for a brilliant charge of a large
mass of cavalry towards the evening, which forced them back a
considerable distance. Meanwhile, a simultaneous attack had been made on
the Etain road, and though the French struggled with great courage, this
too ultimately proved successful. The whole French army about nightfall
withdrew sullenly towards Metz, having failed to make its retreat good,
and the Germans, closing on its communications, already stood on its way
to Châlons.
Driven thus to bay under the guns of Metz, Bazaine resolved to
concentrate his forces in order to fight a decisive battle. He had
probably 130,000 men in hand, with from 400 to 500 guns, the flower and
strength of the French army; and his plan was to choose a defensive
position where he could resist the onslaught of the Germans, and, having
repulsed it, could break through their lines, and get off with the mass
of his troops. With this object he drew up his men along the summit of a
range of uplands, extending from Gravelotte before Metz, to beyond the
hamlet of Privat La Montagne, and which, broken by streams and difficult
ground, and with woods, villages, and thickets in front, offered a
strong barrier to an attacking enemy. The French left rested on
Gravelotte, the centre on Vionville and Amanvilliers, and the right
stretched away to Doncourt and Jaumont, the whole line thus holding the
roads which debouche to Verdun, Etain, and Sedan, protected by natural
and artificial obstacles. This was a position of the strongest kind,
considered as a scheme of defence, for it exposed the assailants at
most points, and especially at that of Gravelotte, to a terrible fire at
great disadvantage; but, as the result showed, it was deficient in this,
that it gave no opportunity for a counter attack, and it enabled the
Germans to draw round from all sides on the enemy before them. The 17th
was spent by each army in preparing for a decisive engagement. The
German commanders by this time had 240,000 men, with from 700 to 800
guns, and they resolved to attack according to a plan, which, if
perilous in some degree, was justified by their superior numbers, and
promised great and remarkable success. While the right of the Germans
was to restrain the French left, their centre and left were to march
across the whole front of Bazaine's position, and having overwhelmed his
right wing, the weakest point in his defensive lines, they were to
converge inwards upon the French and force them back in retreat on Metz.
On the morning of the 18th, three German corps began to engage the
French at Gravelotte, while at the same time, five and a half corps
moved towards Vionville and Privat La Montagne, in order to execute the
great turning movement which was to lead to the expected victory. The
French, immoveable in their positions, were compelled to await the
circling attack which threatened to stifle and hem them in; unlike
Napoleon I. at Austerlitz, Bazaine had not secured the means of striking
his enemy as he swept round on him. Towards the afternoon, the Prussian
guards had outflanked the right of the Marshal; soon afterwards, his
centre was fiercely assailed, and by degrees the great German line
advanced snakelike to encompass its foe. It was now time for the German
right to strike fiercely at Gravelotte; and here a battle of the most
desperate kind raged until nightfall for several hours, the French
certainly having the advantage, and destroying the Germans with
frightful carnage. But gradually the German plan was worked out; the
German masses converging on all sides forced the French backward from
point to point; and at last the whole line of defence gave way, and
retreating, slowly fell back on Metz, having lost the real object of the
battle.
It is not improbable that, in this conflict, the losses of the Germans
exceeded those of the French. At Gravelotte the corps commanded by
Steinmetz was repeatedly driven back with terrific slaughter, and at
other points the ranks of the assailants were cruelly thinned by a
destructive fire. But if in a tactical point of view the battle was
hardly a German victory, and if the resistance of Bazaine with an
inferior force was honourable to him, the strategic results were great
and decisive. The Germans had now obtained possession of the entire line
of the Marshal's retreat; they barred the way to Châlons completely, and
he had been forced back with his army on Metz, where, his communications
with France being cut off, he would be ultimately compelled to
surrender. Unless he could again begin the contest and pierce through
the encircling foes, no prospect awaited him but to resist until famine
dashed the sword from his grasp, and made the army of the Rhine
captive--so ruinous had been the disastrous generalship which had
detained it in isolation at Metz, and had allowed its enemies to gather
round it instead of effecting a speedy retreat!
Leaving Bazaine in this perilous strait, we must now turn to another
part of the theatre, where folly, rashness, and above all the exigencies
of the political situation, were to complete the work of irresolute
weakness in contributing to the ruin of France. About the 16th or 17th
of August MacMahon had made good his way to Châlons with the wreck of
his corps defeated at Woerth, and he was rejoined in a day or two by De
Failly, who had contrived to elude the pursuing Germans--a retreat which
proves that the Crown Prince had moved slowly and with much caution, and
had not made the most of his brilliant victory. About the 19th of August
the corps of Douay, marched back from Belfort, arrived at Châlons; this
body, at the news of the battle of Woerth, having properly retired to
the great strategic point which nature and history have alike marked out
as the position where the defence of France should be undertaken in
front of Paris. Next day, the 20th, about 70,000 men, with more than 100
guns, came up hastily from the French capital, the Government under
Count Palikao having certainly made energetic efforts to reorganize and
recruit the army; and thus MacMahon, by the 21st, had probably about
150,000 men, with from 400 to 500 guns, under his orders at the great
camp at Châlons. When we recollect what Napoleon I. accomplished on this
very ground--the memorable lines of the Marne and Seine--with a force
greatly inferior in numbers, against more than 300,000 Germans, it
cannot be doubted that a great commander would have made such an use of
this army that he would long have kept the invaders back, and possibly
changed the whole situation. But ability and caution were especially
requisite, for the troops now under MacMahon's orders were in fact raw
or demoralized soldiers; and plain common sense ought to have suggested
that they were not fit for operations that demanded speed, or that could
bring them in contact with a superior enemy.
At this critical moment a plan was formed, the responsibility for which
is unknown, but which led to the greatest of military disasters.
Considering the state of MacMahon's forces, there can be no doubt that
his proper course was to delay his enemies as they advanced on Châlons,
to endeavour to defend the Marne and the Seine, and, retreating slowly,
to fall back until he had reached a position at which he would be in the
flank of the Germans as they approached Paris. A great general,
operating in this way, would have retarded the foe for weeks, would
certainly have inflicted much injury on him, and while he inured his own
troops to war, would assuredly have kept his army intact in order to
make a stand for the capital, the fortifications of which, with a force
before them, would perhaps have changed the issue of the campaign. It is
true that the strategy would have been an apparent abandonment of
Bazaine; but this really was inevitable. Bazaine, as the event proved,
was not in need of immediate relief; shut up, as he was, inactive at
Metz, he still detained an immense mass of Germans around the great
fortress; and in any case, as affairs now stood, the first consideration
ought to have been the security of the last army of France, and a
settled purpose to defend the capital. Had Wellington been in MacMahon's
place, we are convinced that these would have been his tactics; and we
feel certain that he would have succeeded, if not in defeating the
Germans in the field, at least in greatly reducing their strength, in
preserving Paris from real danger, and in saving his forces for an
effort to be undertaken when his raw troops were rendered more equal to
their antagonists. Instead of a rational operation like this, a resolve
was made at the French head-quarters which can only be described as
insanely rash. It was determined to relieve Bazaine with MacMahon's weak
and undisciplined army; and the manner in which this was to be done was
marked by thoughtless and strange presumption. The French troops were to
leave Châlons, and moving northwards to Rheims and Rethel, were to
strike from that place across the Argonnes, to pass the Meuse and attain
Montmédy, and descending thence upon Thionville, were to fall on the
rear of the Germans at Metz, to extricate Bazaine, and in conjunction
with him, to annihilate the astounded enemy by an attack worthy of the
first Napoleon. By this operation MacMahon's army was to slip round the
flank of the Crown Prince, known to be advancing from Nancy on Châlons;
it would probably attain the northern frontier before its destination
could be ascertained; and if it ever reached the neighbourhood of Metz
and came into communication with Bazaine, what would be the fate of the
insolent invaders, and what the triumphant issue of a campaign begun
under ill-omened auspices?
Whether the pamphlet recently published at Brussels be the work of
Napoleon III. or not, it is now clear that Marshal MacMahon was not the
real author of this strategy. A glance at the map will clearly show that
it exposed the French army to ruinous disaster, and it has been proved
that it was inspired by the Government of the Regency at Paris,
ill-informed as to the real situation, and fearful lest a retrograde
movement should cause the sudden fall of the Empire. And what was the
projected operation, which it was assumed was proposed by an eminent
French Marshal, who, we may suppose, knew the art of war, and certainly
had very great experience? It was simply to make an immense flank march
with a weak and thoroughly untrained army, within full reach of an enemy
twice as strong, who would be able to arrest the movement, and to fall
on his adversary in overwhelming force; and it was to do this along a
line on which a defeat would probably entail destruction, or a surrender
upon the Belgian frontier. Let it be granted that MacMahon might expect
to cross the Meuse before he would be intercepted, still it was all but
certain that the German armies, which assuredly would turn northward at
once, would come up with him between the Meuse and Thionville; and if he
were caught, what chance had he of contending against the enormous
forces which, in that event, would be directed against him? A crushing
defeat was to be expected, and if he were defeated would not his army,
hemmed in along the narrow belt of land extending from the northern
Argmues to Lorraine, be either utterly broken to fragments or forced
helplessly to lay down its arms? And it was for a reckless scheme such
as this--one in which success was hardly conceivable, and of which ruin
would be the natural result--that the rational and legitimate course of
retreating leisurely and defending Paris from point to point, was to be
abandoned! The correspondence recently published shows that this plan
did not originate with MacMahon; and that it was adopted must be
ascribed to the necessity felt at the Tuileries of avoiding a retrograde
movement in the interest of the tottering Empire. MacMahon, however, did
consent to it; and for this he must be held responsible. Beyond all
doubt he ought to have rejected a project fraught with calamity to his
country, at the risk even of resigning his command; had he done so, the
position of France might have been different from what it is now, and
his own reputation would not have suffered from the consequences of a
dire catastrophe. Making every allowance for his difficult situation, we
cannot acquit him of want of resolution, though sheer ignorance and
incapacity did not lead him to make the greatest of blunders ever made
perhaps by a commander-in-chief.
Our space precludes us from describing at length the series of great
events that ensued. On the 22nd of August MacMahon's army, already
giving melancholy proofs of weakness, indiscipline, and insubordination,
had reached Rheims from the camp of Châlons; and on the 23rd it was on
its way to Rethel. The march of the columns was extremely sluggish, in
consequence of the bad organisation of the troops, and eye-witnesses
have recorded that the unfortunate marshal was even now evidently
dispirited and anxious. Rethel was not passed until the 25th; and as the
movement to the Meuse and the Argmues was to be accomplished as soon as
possible, MacMahon divided his army into three parts; one to go
northward, by railway to Mézières, and the other two to advance easterly
by Vouziers and Nouart, and Le Chène and Stonne. The Emperor and his
ill-fated child attended mournfully the doomed army, but if we are to
credit newspaper reports, Napoleon III. still felt confident that he was
marching to assured victory. Though the dispositions of the French
marshal were evidently made with a view to speed, the movement of his
columns was exceedingly slow, no doubt owing to their inefficient state,
and also probably to commissariat defects; and even by the morning of
the 29th they had only attained Nouart and Stonne, that is, they were
still a day's march from the Meuse, which they ought to have found on
the 28th. These delays aggravating the inherent perils of a strategic
plan essentially vicious, were sure to lead to disastrous consequences;
and while MacMahon had been going northwards the German commanders had
been preparing the means of utterly overwhelming him. On the 19th and
20th of August, after Bazaine had been shut up in Metz, a fourth German
army had been despatched, under the command of the Crown Prince of
Saxony, to co-operate with that of the Crown Prince of Prussia, and it
had been moved by Verdun, on St. Menehould, to be in readiness for any
event. Meanwhile the third German army, after passing Nancy, had
advanced on the great road to Paris to Ligny and Bar le Duc, its light
cavalry, the well-known Uhlans, having scoured the whole country to
beyond Châlons. By the 24th the Crown Prince of Prussia, who had been
rejoined by the king from Metz, had his head-quarters at Bar le Duc, and
when there the news arrived that MacMahon had broken up from the camp,
and was aiming northward toward Mézières and Rethel. The plan of the
French was immediately perceived by the eminent strategist who in this
campaign had been the genius of the German armies, and he proceeded to
defeat it, and ensure victory. Orders were at once issued to the Crown
Prince of Saxony to move northerly towards the Meuse, and intercept the
heads of MacMahon's columns; while the third German army, under the
Prussian Prince, was to advance rapidly in the same direction, and fall
on the French flank and rear. By the 25th the huge German array,
numbering nearly 250,000 men, with from 700 to 800 guns, was marching
forward in dense masses to overwhelm the much weaker force that
incautiously presented its flanks to it, and that soon would be within
its formidable reach.
By the 28th and 29th of August the game began to be gradually developed.
The vanguard of the Tenth German Army, having passed Verdun and reached
the Meuse, appears to have crossed the river at Stenay, and it struck
one of MacMahon's columns about Buzancy and again at Nouart. Meanwhile
the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia advancing by Clermont, Grand
Pré, and Suippes, had closed on the flank and rear of the Marshal and
had made it certain that he would be overtaken. Headed thus, as they
approached the Meuse, and threatened with a destructive attack, which,
if successful, would prove ruinous, the French were compelled to diverge
northwards, and MacMahon endeavoured to make his escape though his case
was already well-nigh desperate. Drawing one of his columns towards the
other, and leaving a strong rear-guard at Beaumont, with orders to make
a determined resistance, he sought to concentrate his remaining forces,
and having passed the Meuse between Sedan and Mouzon, to move rapidly on
Carignan, and thence to march direct on Montmédy, thus eluding the
tightening grasp of the Prussians. In these operations we see the
windings of a general who feels that a disaster is at hand; but,
situated as MacMahon was, they were the best that could have been made.
By the morning of the 30th the whole French army, except the corps at
Beaumont, was collected from Lethêne to near Stenay; and it has been
said that the unhappy Emperor was still confident as to the issue. His
powerful antagonists were not likely to allow their prey to slip out of
their clutches. The German columns on the 29th had closed more firmly on
their retiring enemy; and while a portion of the Fourth Army had taken
possession of both banks of the Meuse, the Third was in readiness to
attack Beaumont, and to press MacMahon as he crossed the river. These
dispositions assured success which could hardly fail to be ultimately
decisive. As the French army approached the Meuse, the Crown Prince of
Prussia made an attack on the detachment which had been left at
Beaumont; and these corps, commanded by the incapable De Failly, were
overwhelmed after a feeble resistance. Meanwhile MacMahon had contrived
to get two of his corps across the river, which had marched towards
Carignan; but as the remaining ones were passing they were caught and
routed by the Crown Prince of Prussia with a great loss of guns and men
at Mouzon. At the same time the Fourth German Army advancing from the
right bank of the Meuse, had driven the French from the road to
Carignan; and thus the whole French army baffled and defeated was forced
in confusion still further northward. By the evening of the 30th its
routed divisions had been re-formed in front of Sedan behind the
defensive line of the Chiers, the huge German forces gathering all round
and hemming in their intended victim.
We can only devote a few sentences to describe the decisive battle that
ensued. The 31st of August was spent by MacMahon in drawing up his army
in a line of defence extending from Givonne on the Belgian frontier,
across ranges of eminences in front of Sedan, and thence backward to the
rear of the town, as far as the plateaux of La Garenne and Floiny. The
left of the Marshal rested on Giomne, his centre protected by the Chiers
and by the villages of Bazeilles and Balan, spread before Sedan in
strong positions, and his right and right centre stretched beyond Sedan,
holding the Meuse nearly to Floiny northwards. The Fourth German army in
the meantime had been marched on the opposite bank of the Chiers, while
that of the Crown Prince had come up to the Meuse in full force; and the
German commanders now pursued the plan of hemming in MacMahon
completely, and having forced him upon Sedan, of destroying him by their
overwhelming strength. With this object the French left was to be turned
and passed by, the centre was to be fiercely assailed, the right was to
be surprised and struck, and the whole German armies, having united in a
perfect circle around Sedan, were to accomplish the ruin of their
entrapped enemy. Considering the extraordinary disproportion between
the hosts about to join in battle--230,000 men at least with from 600 to
700 guns against 110,000 of inferior quality with one-third less
pieces--this ambitious and astonishing design may be justified in a
military point of view; but, notwithstanding all that has been said, it
is by no means to be admired in its conception; and a great commander,
who in such a position, should break out from the centre with resolute
troops, might cause an attack of this kind to end in a terrible defeat.
On the morning of the 1st, the Fourth German Army, in consequence of the
neglect of the French outposts, effected the passage of the Chiers
without loss; and its right soon turned the French left at Givonne, the
defenders of that important point having offered only the feeblest
resistance. At the same time a considerable part of the forces of the
Crown Prince having crossed the Meuse during the previous night,
attacked Bazeilles and Balan in great strength; but here the French
showed a bold front, and the battle hung in suspense for hours.
Meanwhile, however, the remaining corps of the Third German Army had
faced the Meuse at a point much lower down the river, and falling on the
extreme right of the French at or near a hill that commands Floiny, had
driven it in after a brave defence, and placed themselves in
communication with the victorious troops of the German army which had
approached them from Givonne. The inner circle was now completed; the
French centre still fighting obstinately was obliged to evacuate
Bazeilles and Balan; and the whole French army was compelled to recoil
inwards upon Sedan, where it was crushed by a death-dealing artillery.
No alternative but a surrender remained; the German tactics had
completely succeeded; and on the 2nd of September, the last army of
France in the field had passed under the yoke, and was a mass of
prisoners of war. The Emperor was one of the trophies of the conqueror;
MacMahon, more fortunate, had been severely wounded and did not witness
the capitulation; but upwards of 90,000 men and from 400 to 500 guns in
the hands of the triumphant Germans attested the magnitude of the
catastrophe.
The results of the terrible battle of Sedan--a catastrophe unparalleled
in the annals of war--were the destruction of the only French army that
remained to the nation in the field, the complete isolation of Bazaine
at Metz with a certainty of his ultimate surrender, the exposure of
Paris to an immediate siege, and the prospect of the subjection of
France to the will of an implacable conqueror. At no conjuncture in
military history has a strategic error of the gravest kind been fraught
with such calamitous effects; and the march to Sedan will long be noted
as one of those frightful mistakes of generalship which have deeply
influenced the fate of kingdoms. A day or two after this dire event a
revolution broke out in Paris; the empire collapsed with the captive
Emperor; the Empress Regent was compelled to fly; and, although a
Government of National Defence was formed, composed of men of very great
eminence, who--after fruitless attempts to negotiate--bravely resolved
to carry on the struggle, sooner than consent to the dismemberment of
France, hardly anyone believed that the defeated nation would be able to
offer serious resistance. The situation of France, indeed, appeared
desperate even to her well-wishers--even to those who resented the
dictum of the cynical scorner of popular rights, that whether their
inhabitants liked it or not, Alsace and Lorraine 'would belong to
Prussia'--and for several weeks her exulting enemies remained absolute
masters of the situation, and trampled down the defenceless country. The
German armies which had fought at Sedan marched without a moment's delay
to Paris, arrived before the forts on the 18th September, and, having
routed a few raw troops, who endeavoured to harass them at Versailles,
invested the capital on all sides, and inclosed it in impenetrable
lines. The surging waves of the tremendous invasion meanwhile flowed
furiously over the northern provinces, carrying with them devastation
and ruin. Strasburg, after a siege which clearly indicated the temper of
the people of Alsace, and their assumed sympathy with their 'German
liberators,' fell on the 29th September; most of the fortresses of the
Vosges, with the exception of Bitsche and Phalsburg, submitted; Toul,
which had gallantly resisted for weeks a whole army, met the same fate,
and by the close of October the German hosts had cleared their
communications with Paris, were masters of the whole region between the
Seine and the Rhenish Provinces, and had laid hold of Picardy and the
valley of the Loire, which locust-like they devoured by requisitions.
The consummation seemed at hand, when after making many attempts to
break the iron ring of his foes, Bazaine on the 27th of October
surrendered the fortress he had so long held; and the whole remains of
the army of the Rhine, the garrison, and a mass of auxiliary troops,
became prisoners of war as they defiled from Metz. France seemed under
the Caudine forks; the iron had entered into her soul; and even the most
far-sighted observers believed that the end of the war was close at
hand.
For two whole months after the battle of Sedan, France thus appeared
altogether ruined, trampled under the hoof of a ruthless invader. Her
capital was invested; her provinces were overrun; fortress after
fortress became an easy prey; the grasp of the Prussian upon the country
seemed day after day to become stronger, and few signs of resistance
appeared except a desultory partisan warfare. Some military critics at
Versailles exclaimed that the 'hour of the Latin race had come;' the
King of Prussia piously resigned his spirit to the triumph that seemed
close at hand; Bismark with grim humour declared that Paris was 'frying
in its own fat;' writers disposed complacently of Lorraine and Alsace,
and congratulated France that her fate was no worse, and only a small
minority of Englishmen entertained a hope for the fallen nation. Yet
during all that terrible time vitality was returning to the stricken
frame, and France was preparing for mighty efforts which, whether they
prove successful or not, have been some of the noblest in history, and
are entitled to the highest admiration. The first symptom of reviving
animation was seen in the attitude of Paris, which, under the control of
General Trochu, a commander who has already won a high place in the
annals of fame, put off her Sybarite pride and luxury, and from behind
her ramparts prepared herself for a defence which must be pronounced
astonishing. Day after day the immense capital which the Germans
declared would consume itself by internal revolution and anarchy, and
which was not expected to hold out a fortnight, encompassed itself with
fresh defensive lines, drilled its raw levies within its walls, and
arrayed itself in such a panoply of war that before long it had become
evident that its speedy reduction was impossible. The bombardment which
it was predicted would soon 'bring these fools to their senses,' was
postponed for the simple reason, that it had not the faintest chance of
success; and as amazed Europe beheld the works of Paris growing in
formidable power, and actually threatening the investing circle, it
learned to set a proper value on the profession that 'there was no
intention to destroy by fire a noncombatant population,' as if
starvation was a more humane process. Meanwhile silently, and hardly
observed by the correspondents of the English Press, enormous
preparations for the renewal of the contest were made in every part of
the country. Arms were produced in prodigious quantities, old soldiers
were recalled to their colours, recruits were summoned in hundreds of
thousands, the nuclei of several armies were formed, and the splendid
memories of 1793-4 were invoked by the representatives of the people,
and created wide-spread martial enthusiasm. While Bismark jeered at the
'gentlemen of the pavement,' and cynically redoubled his confident
insults, while telegram after telegram announced that town after town
was capitulating, France was becoming a vast camp, and sternly, proudly,
and in a very different spirit from that in which it began the war, the
nation girded up its loins for the strife. M. Gambetta, whose journey
from Paris in a balloon excited considerable ridicule at Versailles--for
a while--was the mainspring of this remarkable movement, of which, if we
cannot predict the success, the patriotism and force cannot be disputed.
The first symptom in the turn of the tide which made itself distinctly
perceived, was an engagement which took place on the 9th of November. A
mass of raw levies and depôt battalions, to which had been given the
name of the Army of the Loire, had been driven out of Orleans in
October; and it was generally supposed that it had been all but
destroyed. But a general had been placed at its head who had given it
consistency and strength; it had been furnished with good artillery, and
on the ninth of November it recrossed the Loire and defeated the
Bavarian force in its front, which it succeeded in almost surrounding.
After this the nuclei of armies, in the west, the north, and the
south-east of France, have made their appearance, and are growing
formidable; and the military strength of what had been deemed the effete
and worn-out nation, has shown itself to be great and threatening. The
attitude of the armies of the Loire and of the West has compelled the
Germans to draw in almost their whole available forces to cover the
immense circle of their lines around Paris; and though as yet they have
suffered no reverse, and have even gained some important successes,
their enemies still confront them in the field with rapidly improving
power and discipline, and so long as they hold their present positions,
they are exposed to considerable danger. In fact the German armies round
Paris would be placed in imminent peril, if the covering armies on the
circumference outside, were to meet anything like a defeat; and as the
French levies are day after day acquiring an increase of numbers and
force, this is by no means an impossible contingency. Meanwhile the
beleaguered capital of France has offered to the besiegers a resistance
which has astonished and confounded the world, and its illustrious
governor, General Trochu, has literally created out of the young and
demoralised troops within its walls, armies of unquestionable valour
and worth. These armies commenced offensive operations on the 29th and
30th November, by making immense sorties from the capital; and though
they have not succeeded in breaking through the net which hems them in,
it is not impossible that they may yet do so. The situation, in fact,
has so completely changed since the beginning of the month of November,
that all competent persons now think that if Paris can hold out five or
six weeks more, the result may be fatal to the Germans. It is almost
useless to speculate on events which may be solved before these lines
shall be printed, but we venture to hazard a glance into the future. It
appears to us that in all probability Paris will ultimately succumb to
famine, that it will not be relieved from without, and that General
Trochu and his brave troops will have to yield to adverse fortune. This
blow, if it happens, will be terrible, but if France continues to evince
the resolution and energy of the last two months, its military
consequences need not be decisive. In that event the defence of France
will have to be undertaken on the Loire; and if her young armies are
carefully husbanded; if her generals and statesmen admit the truth that
the siege of Paris has gained time for developing her restored vigour;
and if no fatal mistakes are made, we believe that she yet may repel the
invader. What is most to be feared is, that if Paris falls, a collapse
of authority may ensue, that Red Republicanism may lift its head, and
that the men who have done such eminent service, may be overthrown by
popular fear and terror. But if France is true to herself, if she goes
on as she has done lately, and if her forces are rationally handled, she
may possibly succeed in shaking off her assailants, and avoid the
dismemberment with which she is threatened. Let the nation comprehend
that if Paris falls, it will have done wonders in gaining time, and in
allowing the spirit of France to revive, and then let it go on with the
contest, obedient as a man to the existing Government, and looking
steadily to the one great object, deliverance from impending
subjugation.
Such has been, up to the middle of December, the memorable war of 1870.
We have well-nigh exhausted our space, and can only make a few brief
reflections. History has yet to describe the real causes of this
terrible and devouring conflict, and the persons really responsible for
it; but, allowing that Napoleon was in the wrong for throwing down the
gauntlet to Prussia, what is now to be thought of the Power which is
carrying on an internecine contest after she has received offers of
ample compensation, and is endeavouring to dismember France, and to
annex two of her most loyal provinces for the sole purpose, we fear, of
making her former rival her vassal? Ever since the interview with
Bismark at Ferrières, when, after Sedan, M. Jules Favre proposed to give
Prussia more than satisfaction for all losses incurred by her, the war
has been one of simple conquest on the part of King William and his
minister. France, who at the outset of the conflict may have been, at
least through her ruler, in the wrong, is now fighting against an
invader for her national existence and her place in history; and beaten
down as she is, it is not impossible that she may yet succeed; certainly
she is rapidly winning the sympathy which was at first denied her. It is
creditable to the mind of England, which was at first almost unanimously
on the side of Germany, believing that it was unjustly attacked, that
the majority of our countrymen are beginning to see through the ambition
of Prussia, to distrust the cynical fraud of Bismark, and to wish well
to the nation which is now really fighting for all that makes life dear.
But it may be said, 'France has been beaten; the victor offers her peace
on the terms of the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, which after all were
at one time German; why does she not admit her overthrow, and thus
restore quiet to awed Europe?' But to such suggestions, France, we
believe, will not listen. We do not see how, until her resources are
destroyed, she can consent to abandon Alsace and Lorraine, because these
provinces are absolutely necessary to her safety as an important Power,
as any military student must know; nor ought she, as a leader of
civilization, to give up populations devoted to her to invaders whom
they detest. As for the ethnological argument derived from the German
origin of their territories, France may fairly adduce their present
attitude as evidence of the real sentiments of the inhabitants.
We cannot dwell at the present moment on the lessons to be deduced from
this war. Those who think that it conclusively proves the superiority of
the German over the French soldier, will do well to read a little
history and to study the battles of Jena and Austerlitz. No doubt on
several occasions the French have fought badly under the moral
depression of repeated and overwhelming defeats; but nothing has yet
been seen in this campaign compared to the demoralization of Prussia in
1806. Nor may we assume that the French military character has
deteriorated, though a corrupt layer of Imperialism has injured the
upper ranks of society; the nation which after crushing reverses can
still show such an indomitable front, will be yet found by its foes to
be terrible. What the campaign proves is the immense superiority of
German generalship over its antagonists, a superiority which, seconded
by irresistible force, and by great advantages in artillery, has
produced results of an astonishing kind, yet not more marvellous than
those witnessed sixty years ago on the other side when Napoleon
commanded the Grand Army. As to the military operations of the French
commanders, they have been throughout as bad as possible. From the
outset of the campaign to the first battles we see nothing but reckless
rashness; we then behold vacillation and weakness followed by the
astonishing blunders of Sedan; and the news which has just arrived of
the defeats of the Army of the Loire at Orleans, prove, we fear, that
another series of mistakes in the plainest strategy have been committed.
These have been the causes of the disasters of France of which an able
adversary has reaped the advantage; and to these we should add the
enervating results of Imperialism on the upper classes, corruption and
peculation in the higher ranks of the army, the false confidence
engendered by martial traditions, and not least, the numerical
inferiority of the French forces to those of the Germans. Yet we do not
doubt that if France continues her present resolute attitude, if common
sense prevails in her councils, if she remains united and patriotic, she
may yet pluck safety out of her dangers; and in a long and internecine
struggle the Power which has the command of the sea, superior wealth,
and more compact unity, may in our judgment ultimately triumph. For
ourselves this cruel and fearful war ought to teach us to look after our
national defences, to array ourselves in complete panopoly, to take good
assurance that this England of ours, the home of freedom and good
government, shall at least be secure in the shock of arms now crashing
over a large part of the Continent. It cannot be questioned that the
sudden rise of Bismarkian Prussia is a threat and a peril to the world;
the demands of Gortschakoff and the letters of Bernstorff already prove
that it bodes no good to England; and we shall do better to look after
our fleets, and to put our military organization in order, than to
believe the idyls of sentimental professors who assure us that the
plunderer of Silesia, the divider of Poland, and the despoiler of
Denmark, is 'wise, pious, moral, and unambitious.' If it is not our duty
to interfere actively in the interest of the balance of Europe, we, at
least, in the conflict now rending France ought to read a warning
address to ourselves; and while the boundaries of nations are being
shifted, while justice and right are in danger of being trampled under
foot, that brute force may work its will, we ought to take good heed
that this our England shall retain her high position in the world, shall
be able when necessary to lift her hand in the cause of civilization and
human progress, shall never 'lie' at the proud foot of a conqueror,
shall be as powerful as she is great and glorious.