FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER WILLIAM IV.
In 1830 the closing months of Wellington's administration were disturbed
by the French and Belgian revolutions. The former of these was
occasioned by the publication on July 25 of three ordinances,
restricting the liberty of the press, dissolving the chambers, and
amending the law of elections. The Parisian populace rose against this
infringement of the constitution. In the course of a three days'
street-fight (the 27th to the 29th) the troops were driven out of Paris.
On the 30th a few members of the chambers, who had continued in session,
invited Louis Philippe, Duke of Orléans, to assume the office of
lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and he was proclaimed on the
following day. On August 7 the chamber of deputies offered him the
crown, which he accepted, and on the 9th he was proclaimed "King of the
French". On the 2nd Charles X. and the dauphin had renounced their
rights in favour of the young Duke of Bordeaux, and on the 16th they
sailed from Cherbourg to England. The change of dynasty was accompanied
by a transference to the _bourgeoisie_ of such political influence as
had hitherto belonged to the clergy and _noblesse_. It remained to be
seen whether it would also be accompanied by a change of foreign policy.
[Pageheading: _RECOGNITION OF LOUIS PHILIPPE._]
The new French revolution occasioned no slight perturbation in the
European courts. To say nothing of the fear of the precedent being
followed in other lands, there was no longer any guarantee that France
would respect the arrangements effected by the treaties of Vienna and
Paris. Austria, Prussia, and Russia agreed not to recognise Louis
Philippe, and entered into a convention for mutual aid in the event of
French aggression. Aberdeen, the British foreign secretary, declared
that the time had come for applying the treaty of Chaumont, which, as
extended at Paris, pledged Great Britain and the three eastern powers to
act together in case fresh revolution and usurpation in France should
endanger the repose of other states. Wellington, however, saw that the
cause of the elder Bourbon line was hopeless, and held now, as in 1815,
that if France was not to menace the peace of Europe, her political
position must be one with which she could be contented. He considered
that the arguments which justified the admission of France to the
councils of the powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 applied with no less
cogency to the government of Louis Philippe than to that of Louis XVIII.
He therefore determined to acknowledge the new French government at an
early date after the notification of its assumption of power. Nor were
the other powers slow in taking the same course. It is true that
Metternich suggested a closer bond between Austria, Prussia, and Russia,
partly to restore amicable relations between Austria and Russia, partly
to oppose any possible designs of France on Italy. Prussia, fearing war,
resisted the proposal, and preferred to draw France into a guarantee of
the _status quo_ by recognising Louis Philippe. Russia was last of the
great powers to acknowledge the new _régime_ in France, and she only did
so on condition that the powers should hold the French king responsible
for the execution of the international engagements of the fallen
dynasty. Louis Philippe was certainly not the man wilfully to embroil
France in a war with her neighbours, and, had he been independent of
French public opinion, there would have been no reason to fear French
aggression.
The state which had most to fear from an aggressive France was the new
kingdom of the Netherlands. Trusting for protection to the great powers
rather than to its own forces, the Netherlands government had adopted a
system which left it almost entirely without troops except during the
military exercises of September and October. Wellington, who knew the
pacific character of the new French government, advised the garrisoning
of certain isolated points on the frontier, but thought no further
preparation necessary. A few weeks were however to prove that the new
French revolution had aroused a more implacable enemy, against whom the
house of Orange would have needed all the troops it could summon to its
aid. The union of Holland and Belgium had been resolved on by the
powers at Paris in 1814, mainly for military reasons. Austria had been
unwilling to resume the heavy burden of guarding the Belgian Netherlands
and southern Germany against French aggression, and the powers had
consequently resolved on strengthening those smaller states on whom the
duty of resistance would fall. In these days, accustomed as we are to
the distinction between the Teutonic and Latin races, it might seem
reasonable that two countries in which the prevailing languages are low
German should be subject to the same government. But it was not yet
customary to turn the principles of comparative philology into arguments
for the rearrangement of political boundaries. The French language and
culture had moreover made considerable progress among the upper and
middle classes of Belgium, while religious differences alienated the
clergy from the house of Orange. In the states-general of the
Netherlands the Dutch had half the votes, and, as the Orange party was
strong in Antwerp and Ghent, commanded a majority. The fiscal system
adopted by the government favoured the Dutch rather than the Belgian
population. Dutchmen were generally preferred for state offices, and an
attempt to control the education of the clergy was deeply resented as an
attack on the Roman catholic religion. Belgium in consequence presented
the curious spectacle of the liberal and clerical parties working on the
same side, united against the Dutch government.
[Pageheading: _BELGIAN REVOLUTION._]
The example afforded by France turned a discontent which might have led
to local riots into a national conflagration. On August 25 there was a
rising of the populace at Brussels, which the troops proved unable to
quell. On the 27th it was suppressed by a body of burgher guards, a
volunteer force drawn from the _bourgeoisie_ of the town. The
_bourgeoisie_ finding themselves in possession of the Belgian capital,
at first presented a series of minor demands to the king, but on
September 3 they went the length of demanding a separate administration
for Belgium. The king undertook to lay this proposal before the states,
which assembled on the 13th. But before the states could come to any
conclusion the question had assumed a new aspect. All the leading towns
of Belgium had followed the example of Brussels by forming burgher
guards and had thus joined in the revolution; and on the 20th a fresh
rising of the populace of Brussels had overthrown the burgher guard and
instituted a provisional government. This was followed by an attempt on
the part of Prince Frederick of Orange, a younger son of the King of the
Netherlands, to occupy Brussels with a military force. After five days'
fighting he was compelled to retire, and when on the 30th the
states-general gave their consent to the proposal for a separate
administration, their decision fell upon deaf ears. All the Belgian
provinces were in revolt.
It was now clear to everybody that the national party in Belgium would
not consent even to a personal union with Holland. As the union of the
two countries formed a part of the treaty of Vienna, every European
power had a legal right to employ force to prevent its disruption, and
Russia and Prussia both desired active intervention. In France, on the
other hand, there was a loud popular demand for the reannexation of
Belgium to France, of which it had formed a part from 1794 to 1814.
Louis Philippe saw that he could not resist this demand if the Belgian
insurgents were coerced on the side of Prussia, and therefore announced
that Prussian aggression would be met by a French expedition to Belgium
to keep the balance even, until the question should be settled by a
congress of the powers. On September 25 Talleyrand had arrived in
England. He quickly obtained the adhesion of Wellington to the principle
of non-intervention. The duke had been among the first to grasp the fact
that reconciliation of Dutch and Belgians was impossible, and that the
intervention of the powers would necessitate a European war, to avoid
which the union of the two countries had originally been designed. He
agreed therefore to a separation of the countries on condition that
France should bind herself to observe the arrangements of the congress
of Vienna in 1815 and should take no separate action in Belgium.
On Talleyrand's suggestion it was decided to refer the question to the
conference already sitting in London for the purpose of settling the
Greek question, which would of course have to be reinforced by
representatives of Austria and Prussia for the present purpose. Molé,
the French foreign minister, would have preferred Paris as the seat of
the congress, but the King of the Netherlands absolutely refused to
entrust his cause to a conference meeting in a city where opinion ran so
strongly against him. On October 5 he made a formal appeal to the
powers for the aid guaranteed him by treaty, but the demand came too
late to induce Wellington to swerve from the policy of non-intervention,
and on November 4 the conference of London began its labours by
proposing an armistice in Belgium, which was accepted by both parties.
This left Maastricht and the citadel of Antwerp in the hands of Dutch
garrisons, and Luxemburg in the hands of a garrison supplied by the
German confederation. Every other place in Belgium was in the hands of
the insurgents. But the further solution of the question was reserved
for other hands. On the 3rd Louis Philippe was compelled to accept a
revolutionary ministry, and on the 22nd Wellington and Aberdeen had to
make way for a whig ministry with Grey as premier, and Palmerston as
foreign secretary.
The new foreign secretary had served a long political apprenticeship as
secretary at war in the successive administrations of Perceval,
Liverpool, Canning, Goderich, and Wellington, and under the three
last-mentioned premiers he had enjoyed a seat in the cabinet. It will be
remembered that he had been a warm champion of Greece, and had resigned
office along with Huskisson, Dudley, and Grant. He now returned in
company with Grant as a member of a whig cabinet. Although this change
of party involved the adoption of a domestic policy far removed from
Canning's, Palmerston's foreign policy remained rather Canningite than
whig. The interest and the honour of England ranked with Palmerston as
with Canning before all questions which concerned the maintenance of
European peace. But instead of Canning's versatile diplomacy he
displayed too often a reckless disregard of the susceptibilities of
foreign governments, and, if, like Canning, he lent the moral support of
Great Britain to the liberal party in every continental country, it was
not, as it had professedly been with Canning, because their success
would promote the interests of Great Britain, but because he had a
genuine sympathy with their cause. It is impossible to deny that in his
earlier years at least Palmerston's policy met with a success such as
Castlereagh and Wellington had not attempted to gain; real or imaginary
dangers at home left the foreign governments too weak to oppose the will
of the one strong man of the moment. Yet it is doubtful whether any
resultant benefits were not more than counterbalanced by the distrust
and ill-will with which the greater nations of Europe have learned to
regard the British government and people.
[Pageheading: _PROPOSED DIVISION OF THE NETHERLANDS._]
During the first few weeks of the new administration, the Belgian
question advanced far towards a settlement. On November 10 a Belgian
national congress assembled at Brussels; on the 18th it voted the
independence of Belgium; on the 22nd it resolved that the new state
should be a constitutional monarchy, and on the 24th it proclaimed the
total exclusion of the house of Nassau. Finally the outbreak of a Polish
insurrection at Warsaw made it clear that Prussia and Russia would be
too busily occupied in the east to be able to interfere effectively in
the Belgian question. On December 20 a protocol was signed at London by
the representatives of the five powers, providing for the separation of
Belgium from Holland. When however the protocol was sent to the tsar for
ratification, he would only ratify it subject to the condition that its
execution should depend on the consent of the King of the Netherlands.
Meanwhile the London conference was engaged in settling the boundary of
the new kingdom. For the most part it went on the principle of leaving
to Holland the districts that had belonged to the United Provinces
before the wars of the French revolution. The remainder of the kingdom
of the Netherlands, consisting chiefly of the former Austrian
Netherlands, but including also territories which had belonged to
France, Prussia, the Palatinate, the bishopric of Liège, and some minor
ecclesiastical states, was assigned to Belgium. An exception was,
however, made in the case of the grand duchy of Luxemburg. Luxemburg was
reputed to be, next to Gibraltar, the strongest fortress in Europe. It
was regarded as the key to the lower Rhine; it formed a part of the
German confederation, and was garrisoned by German troops. Although
Holland had no historical claim to its possession, the treaty of Vienna
granted it to the Dutch branch of the house of Nassau, as compensation
for its former possessions, merged in the duchy of Nassau; and it was
now felt that a place so important to the safety of Germany could not
safely be handed over to a state which seemed likely to fall under
French influence. The powers therefore determined that this duchy should
continue to belong to the king of the Netherlands.
There was also some difficulty over the apportionment of the debt.
Belgium was the more populous and the richer of the two countries, but
the greater part of the debt had been contracted by Holland before the
union. Belgium was, however, already responsible for its share of the
whole debt, and the powers can hardly be accused of injustice when they
determined to divide the debt in the proportion in which the
debt-charges had been borne in the three previous years, assigning
sixteen thirty-firsts to Belgium, and fifteen thirty-firsts to Holland.
Belgium was moreover to possess the right of trading with the Dutch
colonies and to contribute towards their defence. These provisions were
embodied in two protocols which were issued at London on January 20 and
27, 1831. As compared with the _status quo_ the Dutch were slightly the
gainers. The protocol permitted them to keep Maastricht and Luxemburg,
but required them to abandon the citadel of Antwerp; while the Belgians
were required to surrender those less important places which they had
occupied in Dutch Limburg and in the grand duchy of Luxemburg.
Talleyrand considered the present a favourable opportunity for claiming
for France the cession of Mariembourg and Philippeville which she had
been compelled to surrender to the kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815.
Palmerston, however, absolutely refused to hear of any extension of
French territory, for fear of imperilling the security of Europe. The
two protocols were accepted by Holland on February 13 but rejected by
Belgium. Though Talleyrand had signed the protocol of January 20, it was
repudiated by Sébastiani, the French foreign minister, on the ground
that the object of the conference was to effect a mediation, not to
dictate a settlement.
[Pageheading: _BELGIUM CHOOSES A KING._]
Meanwhile the national congress at Brussels had attempted to elect a
king. At first the most favoured candidate was Auguste Beauharnais, Duke
of Leuchtenberg, the grandson of Napoleon's first consort. Louis
Philippe naturally objected to the establishment on his frontier of a
prince so closely connected with the house of Bonaparte. The pliant
Belgians accordingly transferred their preference to the Duke of
Nemours, the second son of Louis Philippe. It was in vain that
Sébastiani declared that France could not allow such a selection, as it
would be interpreted by the powers as evidence of a French design to
reincorporate Belgium in France. On February 3, 1831, the Duke of
Nemours was actually elected king by the Belgian national congress. But
the conference of London had, two days earlier, adopted a resolution,
excluding from the Belgian throne all members of the reigning dynasties
of the five powers. Still there was a strong party in France, including
Laffitte, the revolutionary premier, who advocated the claims of
Nemours. Louis Philippe, however, stood firm on the side of European
peace, and on the 17th definitively declined the crown offered to his
son. The French now recommended the Prince of Naples, but the Belgians
declined to accept him, and on the 25th the national congress appointed
a regent to hold office till a king should be elected. On March 13 the
accession to office of an anti-revolutionary ministry in France rendered
the complete co-operation of the powers easier.
On April 17 France declared her adhesion to the protocol of January 20,
and by a new protocol the other four powers consented to the demolition
of some of the Belgian fortresses on the French frontier. Another
protocol of the same date ordered the Belgians to evacuate the grand
duchy of Luxemburg. On May 10 a further protocol even threatened Belgium
with the rupture of diplomatic relations in case she did not by June I
accept the protocol of January 20. But the powers soon adopted a more
conciliatory attitude. France and Great Britain desired that Prince
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who in the previous year had resigned the crown
of Greece, should now be offered that of Belgium. Prince Leopold would
not accept the crown so long as Belgium continued to defy the powers,
and on the other hand there was no chance of securing his election by
the Belgian congress unless he undertook to maintain the Belgian claim
to the possession of Luxemburg. Lord Ponsonby, the British minister at
Brussels, succeeded in inducing the London conference to sign a new
protocol, undertaking to negotiate with Holland for the cession of
Luxemburg to Belgium, in return for an indemnity elsewhere, provided
that Belgium should first accept the protocol of January 20. The Belgian
congress gathered that the acceptance of Prince Leopold was regarded by
the powers as more important than the maintenance of the terms of that
protocol, and they accordingly elected him as their king on June 4
without accepting the protocol. In answer to Dutch complaints Ponsonby
and General Belliard, the French minister, were recalled from Brussels
as the protocol of May 10 required. Leopold refused to accept the crown
until the conference should have offered better terms, and on the 26th
the conference signed another protocol, which differed from that of
January 20 in that it left the Luxemburg question open for future
negotiation, and rendered Holland liable for the whole of the debt that
it had incurred before the union of the two countries. On the same day
Leopold accepted the Belgian crown. The Belgian congress accepted this
last protocol on July 7, and on the 21st Leopold was proclaimed king,
and immediately recognised by Great Britain and France. The other great
powers were not long in following their example.
It was now Holland's turn to feel aggrieved. She refused to recognise
the changes proposed by the powers in the terms which she had already
accepted. On May 21 she had declared that if the protocol of January 20
were not accepted by June 1 she would consider herself free to act on
her own account, and on July 12 that the acceptance in Belgium of a king
who had not agreed to that protocol would be an act of hostility.
Feeling herself betrayed by the conference she gave notice on August 1
that the armistice which had existed since the previous November would
terminate on the 4th. It was soon seen how much Holland had lost in the
preceding year by being found in a state of military unpreparedness.
When hostilities began the Dutch carried everything before them. On the
8th the Belgians were routed at Hasselt, and on the 13th Leopold in
person was compelled to surrender Louvain. But Holland was now arrested
in the full tide of her success. The opportunity that French patriots
had long desired had presented itself, and Louis Philippe would only
have endangered his own throne if he had failed to come to the
assistance of Belgium against Holland. On the 4th he received Leopold's
appeal for assistance; on the 12th the first French division reached
Brussels, and on the following day the Prince of Orange, who led the
main Dutch army, received orders from the Hague to retire within the
Dutch frontier.
[Pageheading: _COERCION OF HOLLAND._]
The conference had in fact found it necessary to join in measures of
coercion. On the first news of the outbreak of hostilities it severely
reproached Holland for the breach of the armistice, and ordered the
Dutch forces to retire. By a protocol of the 6th it accepted and
justified the French expedition, which, it knew, could not safely be
recalled, and tried to minimise the danger by forbidding the French to
cross the Dutch frontier and requiring them to return to France as soon
as the Dutch should return to Holland. At the same time a semblance of
joint action was created by the despatch of a British fleet to the
Downs. If the Dutch invasion of Belgium created excitement in France,
the French expedition had a similar effect in England, and Palmerston
found it necessary to insist sternly on the immediate evacuation of
Belgium upon the withdrawal of the Dutch troops. The French government
naturally desired to point to some tangible triumph of French arms, and
requested that the troops should be allowed to remain till the frontier
fortresses should have been demolished in accordance with the protocol
of April 17. In a somewhat insulting message Palmerston threatened a
general war sooner than allow the French troops to remain. The most that
France could obtain was that 12,000 men might remain a fortnight longer
than the rest and that a number of French officers might enlist in the
Belgian service.
The conference now returned to the task of effecting a settlement in
accordance with the terms of the protocol of June 26. On October 15 it
provided for the partition of the grand duchy of Luxemburg between
Holland and Belgium and for the indemnification of Holland with a larger
portion of Limburg than had belonged to her in 1790. At the same time
provision was made for the freedom of the Scheldt, and the debt was
reassessed, 8,400,000 florins of _rentes_[136] being assigned to Belgium
and 19,300,000 to Holland. Along with this protocol a letter was sent to
the Belgian plenipotentiary, promising that if Belgium accepted it, the
powers would undertake to obtain the consent of Holland. The protocol
was converted into a treaty by the adhesion of Belgium on November 15.
Meanwhile the King of the Netherlands had appealed to the tsar against
the action of the western powers and of the Russian plenipotentiaries at
London, and the tsar had in consequence refused to ratify the treaty
till the King of the Netherlands should have given his consent. That
consent was slow in coming. It was only on June 30, 1832, that Holland
agreed to the exchange of territories and the reduction of Belgium's
share of the debt, and even then questions remained as to the dues on
the Scheldt and the transit of goods through Dutch Limburg. The Belgians
refused to negotiate further until the citadel of Antwerp should be
surrendered; the Dutch on the other hand refused to surrender it till a
definite treaty should be signed and ratified. On October 1 France, with
the approval of the British government, proposed to suspend the payment
of the Belgian share of the interest on the debt until the citadel of
Antwerp should be surrendered, and to deduct from the share of the
principal payable by Belgium, 500,000 florins of _rentes_ for each week
that should elapse before the surrender. The three eastern powers
refused to agree to any coercion of Holland, and, in consequence, Great
Britain and France determined to act alone.
On the 22nd they signed a convention providing for the coercion of
Holland by an embargo and by the despatch of a squadron to the Dutch
coast. If any Dutch troops should be still in Belgium on November 15, a
French force was empowered, subject to the consent of the Belgian
government, to advance into Belgium and expel the Dutch troops from the
country. The French were, however, to retire as soon as the Dutch
evacuation was complete. The first result of this convention was the
suspension of the conference. On the 29th the two powers made their
demand. As the Dutch refused compliance, a joint French and British
fleet sailed on November 4 to blockade the Scheldt, and the embargo was
proclaimed on the 6th. On the 15th a French army of 56,000 men,
commanded by Gérard, entered Belgium. On December 4 it opened fire on
the citadel of Antwerp, which surrendered after a nineteen days'
bombardment on the 23rd. The French army returned to its own country
before the end of the year, leaving the Dutch in possession of two small
forts on the Belgian side of the frontier, which were more than
compensated by the positions held by the Belgians in Dutch Limburg. Even
the fall of the citadel of Antwerp did not induce Holland to accept the
settlement proposed by the powers, and Great Britain and France now
attempted to effect a working agreement pending negotiations on the
details of the treaty. It was in vain that Holland asked that Belgium
should evacuate the Dutch provinces of Limburg and Luxemburg and pay
her share of the interest on the Dutch debt. Palmerston and Talleyrand
refused to include these provisions in a preliminary convention. Finally
on March 21, 1833, a convention was signed between Great Britain,
France, and Holland, which terminated the embargo and provided for the
free navigation of the Scheldt and Maas. A similar convention was signed
between Holland and Belgium on November 18. Six years, however, were to
elapse before the Dutch government would consent to the conditions drawn
up by the powers in 1831. Meanwhile the Belgians were free from their
share of debt, held the greater part of Limburg and Luxemburg, and
enjoyed the free navigation of the Maas and the Scheldt, over and above
the terms granted them in 1831.
[Pageheading: _POLISH REBELLION._]
It is inconceivable that the Belgian question should have been left so
entirely in the hands of the two western powers, and that the settlement
should have taken the form of a foreign coercion of a legitimate king
for his unreadiness to make concessions to his revolted subjects, had
not the attention of the three absolutist powers of eastern and central
Europe been directed to another quarter. Just as the revolution of 1820
had spread through southern Europe in spite of Castlereagh's attempt to
maintain that it was not of a contagious order, so that of 1830 awakened
similar outbursts not only at Brussels but in various German states, in
Switzerland, in Poland, and in Italy. The Polish insurrection was, like
the Belgian, a national revolt, and the consequent military operations
were of the nature of a war between Poland and Russia. The revolt broke
out at Warsaw on November 29, 1830, and on January 25, 1831, the Polish
diet proclaimed the independence of Poland. On February 5 a Russian army
crossed the Polish frontier. In France there was a loud popular demand
for intervention. But even the Laffitte ministry would not move without
the co-operation of Great Britain, though the French ambassador at
Constantinople tried to stir up the Porte to hostilities. The ministry
of Casimir-Perier, which came into office in March, proposed a joint
mediation of France and Great Britain, but to this Palmerston would not
assent. He remonstrated with Russia on her violations of the Polish
constitution, which Great Britain, along with the other powers, had
guaranteed at the congress of Vienna, but he could not support the
Polish claim to independence, since Great Britain had made herself a
party to the union of the two countries. As it happened, the
remonstrance was simply a cause of annoyance, which subsequent events
were destined to intensify. It was only on September 8, 1831, that the
Russians under Paskievitch captured Warsaw, an event which was followed
on February 26, 1832, by the abolition of the Polish constitution.
Palmerston protested again but with no more success than in the previous
year.
[Pageheading: _DOM MIGUEL AND DON CARLOS._]
In the Portuguese, as in the Belgian question, Palmerston drifted from
the position of a neutral into that of a partisan. Ever since the year
1828, British subjects accused of political offences had been brutally
ill-treated in Portugal, and as time went on the excesses increased. By
despatching six British warships to the Tagus Palmerston succeeded in
obtaining a pecuniary indemnity and a public apology on May 2, 1831.
Similar insults to France were not so readily redressed. A threat of
force on the part of the French government was followed by an appeal
from Dom Miguel for British assistance. This Palmerston refused to
grant, and in July a French squadron under Admiral Roussin forced the
passage of the Tagus, and carried off the best ships of the Portuguese
navy. Meanwhile much irritation had been caused in Brazil by Peter's
advocacy of his daughter's claim to Portugal, which was considered
inconsistent with his professed adherence to the separation of the two
countries. On April 6, Peter abdicated the crown of Brazil in favour of
his infant son, Peter II., and on the following day sailed for Europe in
order to assert his daughter's right to the Portuguese throne. He
arrived in Europe towards the end of May, and visited both England and
France.
Though neither government assisted him directly, he was permitted to
raise troops and even to secure the services of naval officers, and in
December a force of 300 men sailed from Liverpool to Belleisle, which he
had appointed as the rendezvous. Palmerston had thus, unlike Wellington,
adopted the same attitude towards the Portuguese liberals that Ferdinand
VII. had adopted towards the absolutists. Peter's expedition gathered
further strength at the Azores and sailed for Portugal on June 27, 1832.
On July 8, the fleet, commanded by Admiral Sartorius, a British officer,
appeared off Oporto, which submitted on the following day. The town was,
however, blockaded by Miguel's forces and Peter's cause made no headway
until in June, 1833, the command of the fleet was transferred to Captain
(afterwards Admiral Sir Charles) Napier. On the night of June 24, he
landed at Villa Real a force of 2,500 men who conquered the province of
Algarve in a week, and on July 5 he annihilated Miguel's navy in an
engagement off Cape St. Vincent. After a further battle near Lisbon,
Peter's forces entered the capital on the 24th, and subsequently
repulsed a Miguelite attack upon the city. Miguel still held out in
northern Portugal, when another train of events caused the western
powers to substitute direct for indirect interference.
Ferdinand VII. of Spain had fallen so entirely under the influence of
his fourth and last queen, Maria Christina of Naples, as to repeal by a
pragmatic sanction the Salic law which the treaty of Utrecht had
established as the rule of succession in Spain. The result of this edict
was to leave the succession to his infant daughter Isabella instead of
his brother Don Carlos, the leader of the Spanish absolutists. When
Ferdinand died on September 29, 1833, Don Carlos was absent from the
kingdom, supporting the cause of his fellow-pretender Dom Miguel.
Isabella received the hearty support of the constitutional party and was
almost universally acknowledged as queen. It was only in Biscay, where
the centralising tendency of the Spanish constitution, published on
April 10, 1834, seemed to entrench upon local liberty, that Don Carlos
met with much active support. His cause, like that of Miguel in
Portugal, was the more popular, but his adherents were as yet almost
entirely devoid of organisation. Peter's partisans had already made
substantial progress towards a complete victory, and Santha Martha, the
Miguelite commander-in-chief, had surrendered in the beginning of April,
when on April 22 a triple alliance, already signed between Great
Britain, Maria Christina, Queen-regent of Spain, and Peter, as regent of
Portugal, was converted into a quadruple alliance by the adhesion of
France. This treaty provided for the co-operation of Spain and Portugal
to expel Dom Miguel and Don Carlos from the Portuguese dominions. Great
Britain was to assist by the employment of a naval force, and France was
to render assistance, if required, in such manner as should be settled
afterwards by common consent of the four contracting powers. The Spanish
general, Rodil, immediately crossed the frontier. He met with no
resistance, and on May 26 Miguel signed a convention at Evora, by which
he accepted a pension, renounced his rights to the Portuguese throne,
and agreed to quit the country.
[Pageheading: _THE CARLIST WAR._]
Don Carlos, however, refused to renounce his rights to the Spanish
throne, and all that the British navy could do was to convey the two
pretenders, Carlos to England and Miguel to Genoa. Although Miguel, on
June 20, repudiated his abdication, the Portuguese question was really
at an end. The Spanish question was, however, merely entering on its
critical stage. Don Carlos secretly left London on July 1, and nine days
later appeared at the Carlist headquarters in Spain. Here he had the
assistance of the ablest general of this war, Zumalacarregui.
Melbourne's succession to the premiership in July left Palmerston at the
foreign office, and was followed by no change in foreign policy. On
August 18 an additional article to the quadruple alliance provided that
France was to prevent reinforcements or warlike stores from reaching Don
Carlos from the French side of the frontier, while Great Britain was to
supply arms and stores to the Spanish royalists and, if necessary,
intervene with a naval force. The short interlude of conservative
government, with Peel as premier and Wellington as foreign secretary,
was not marked by any change of policy nor yet by any new aggressions.
Wellington's only interference with the course of hostilities was the
mission of Lord Eliot to Navarre, which induced the combatants to
abandon for the time being those cruelties to prisoners which had been
the disgrace of the Spanish civil wars.
Shortly after the return of Melbourne and Palmerston to power,
Zumalacarregui won a victory in the valley of Amascoas on April 21 and
22, 1835, which opened to him the road to Madrid. The Madrid government
now appealed to France to send 12,000 men to occupy the Basque
provinces. By the terms of the quadruple alliance the assent of Great
Britain and Portugal was necessary in order to determine the manner in
which France was to render assistance. Thiers, on behalf of Louis
Philippe, suggested a separate French expedition on the lines of that of
1823. Palmerston, like Canning before him, refused to sanction such an
expedition, though he was prepared to allow France to make the
expedition on her own responsibility. He suggested in return that Great
Britain should intervene. But Louis Philippe was equally opposed to the
separate action of his own country and of Great Britain, and the result
was that neither government sent any troops. The Spanish government was,
however, permitted to enlist volunteers, and actually received the
assistance of an English legion, a French legion, and 6,000 Portuguese.
The immediate danger was averted by the obstinacy of Don Carlos, who
refused to permit Zumalacarregui to march on Madrid till the conquest of
Biscay was complete. The Carlist general turned aside in consequence to
the siege of Bilbao, in which a few weeks later he met his death.
In February, 1836, some changes in the French ministry increased the
power of Thiers, who had so recently advocated the policy of
intervention. Palmerston now proposed a French expedition to the Basque
provinces, while the British were to occupy St. Sebastian and Pasages.
Thiers did not, however, feel strong enough to accept this offer, and
Palmerston determined to act alone. A British squadron under Lord John
Hay was despatched to the Spanish coast with instructions to assist the
royalist forces. This squadron is probably entitled to the principal
share in the credit for the successful resistance of Bilbao to the
Carlist armies. In May, however, a conservative government entered upon
office in Spain, and France became more ready to grant assistance.
Isturiz, the new Spanish premier, persuaded Louis Philippe to send some
troops to Spain; but by leaning on foreign support Isturiz had
overreached himself. Spanish indignation found vent in a revolutionary
movement, accompanied by bloodshed; one town after another declared for
the constitution of 1812, which the queen-regent was forced to sign on
August 13, and on the following day a progressist ministry was installed
in office. Austria, Prussia, and Russia withdrew their ambassadors from
Madrid after the riots of the 13th, and Louis Philippe recalled the
forces he had sent to the assistance of the Spanish government. Had Don
Carlos listened to the advice of the eastern powers and given such
assurances as might have won over the more moderate of Isabella's
supporters, he would probably have proved successful. As it was the war
dragged on, but De Lacy Evans, who was in command of the British legion,
left Spain on June 10, 1837, and most of his men followed soon after.
The question of intervention had, however, put an end to that cordial
co-operation of Great Britain and France which had existed ever since
the July revolution, and left Great Britain as isolated in the counsels
of Europe as she had been when Canning and Wellington dissociated
themselves from the other powers at Verona.
The settlement of the Greek question proceeded very slowly. While the
powers were seeking a possible king, Capodistrias exercised an
autocratic sway as president. However, in the spring of 1831, the
Mainots of southern Laconia and the Hydriots revolted against him, and
got possession of the Greek fleet. Capodistrias appealed to Russia for
assistance, and a Russian squadron was sent to blockade the Greek fleet
at Poros. But Miaoulis, the Greek admiral, sank his ships in order to
save them from the Russians. The situation was simplified by the
assassination of Capodistrias on October 9, which left two rival
national assemblies struggling for the mastery. The French troops failed
to maintain order, and the way was clear for a king who would have the
prestige of an international treaty and an independent revenue to
support his position. This was the situation when on February 13, 1832,
a protocol was signed at London, offering the Greek crown to Otto, the
second son of King Lewis of Bavaria, a boy of seventeen. The boundary
was to be fixed where Palmerston, while still a member of the Wellington
administration, had wished to fix it, along a line running from the Gulf
of Arta to that of Volo. King Lewis would not, however, agree to accept
the crown for his son unless he should be granted the title of king,
instead of prince, and should be guaranteed a loan to enable him to meet
the expenses of his position. On May 7, 1832, the London protocol was
embodied in a treaty of London; the crown was definitely conferred on
Otto, who was given the title of king, guaranteed a loan, not exceeding
£2,400,000, and allowed to take out 3,500 Bavarian troops with him. The
Turkish consent to the proposed boundary was given on July 21; Greece
accepted the treaty in August, and the new king left for his kingdom in
December.[137]
[Pageheading: _VICTORIES OF IBRAHIM._]
Greece now disappears from the eastern question. But Ibrahim Pasha,
whose successes in Greece had induced Canning to interfere, had already
disclosed a new phase of that question by successes gained in another
quarter. Mehemet Ali had quickly repaired the losses which his fleet and
army had sustained in the Peloponnese. Meanwhile he demanded from
Sultan Mahmud that Ibrahim should be compensated with a part of Syria
for the loss of the Morea, which had been promised him as a reward for
his services in Greece. The sultan refused to grant this insolent
demand, and Mehemet Ali determined to conquer the province for himself.
Abdallah, Pasha of Acre, had taken under his protection some fugitive
peasants, and Mehemet Ali, in spite of the sultan's prohibition, sent
Ibrahim with an army of 30,000 men against him. He laid siege to Acre on
December 9, 1831, and took it on May 27, 1832. On July 8 he routed a
Turkish army at Homs; on the 29th he routed a larger army at the pass of
Beilan, and on the 31st he entered Antioch. In November he was at
Konieh. The Tsar Nicholas had, with Palmerston's approval, already sent
Lieutenant-General Muraviov on a mission to Constantinople, offering
military and naval support; but the sultan preferred to seek British
assistance first.
Unfortunately the message came at a time when the British fleet was
preparing to blockade the coasts of the Netherlands, and could not be
spared for service In the Mediterranean. An appeal to France was equally
unsuccessful. She had by this time formed the siege of the citadel of
Antwerp, and was moreover naturally averse from a struggle with Ibrahim,
whose army had been organised and trained by French officers. The sultan
therefore decided to avail himself of the offers made by Russia. Indeed
he had no choice, for the news now came that on December 21 Ibrahim had
completely defeated the Turkish general, Reshid, at Konieh and that
there was no army between him and Constantinople. Muraviov was sent on a
vain mission to Alexandria with authority to cede Acre to Mehemet Ali if
he would surrender his fleet to the sultan. Ibrahim advanced to Kiutayeh
and his advance-guard came as far as Broussa. The sultan on February 2,
1833, requested the assistance of the Russian navy, and on the 20th a
Russian squadron appeared at Constantinople.
The powers that had refused to move to save Turkey from Ibrahim were
quick enough to interfere when the danger was from Russia and not from
an oriental. Ibrahim might have been expected to make a stronger ruler
than the sultan, whose fall seemed imminent. A Russian protectorate was
a different matter. Roussin, the French ambassador at Constantinople,
protested against the Russian alliance and threatened to leave
Constantinople. A French envoy was, at his suggestion, permitted to
offer Mehemet the governorship of the Syrian pashaliks of Tripoli and
Acre. On March 8 Mehemet rejected these terms, and declared that if his
own terms were not accepted within six weeks his troops would march upon
Constantinople. The sultan then turned to Russia again and asked for
troops. Fifteen thousand Russians were in consequence landed on the
shores of the Bosphorus, and in the beginning of April an army of
24,000, which had remained in Moldavia ever since the war of 1828-29,
prepared to march southwards. Constantinople at least was thus rendered
safe from Ibrahim, and there was therefore more hope that Mehemet would
come to terms. The British, French, and Austrian ambassadors spared no
effort to induce the Porte to offer terms that might be accepted, and
their representations were probably rendered the more persuasive by the
appearance of British and French fleets in the Ægean. Roussin especially
urged that it was better to surrender Syria than to reconquer it by
Russian troops. At last the sultan yielded, and on April 10 a peace was
signed at Kiutayeh, though not ratified by the sultan till May 15. This
treaty granted to Mehemet Ali Syria and Cilicia, but restored the bulk
of Asia Minor to the Porte.
[Pageheading: _CONFERENCE OF MÜNCHENGRÄTZ._]
Turkey had been saved by the western powers, but only because they
dreaded the possibility of her being saved by Russia. A few weeks later
their worst fears seemed on the point of realisation. The Russian troops
on the Bosphorus were a sure guarantee of the predominance of Russian
influence at Constantinople, and this was illustrated in a marked degree
by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, signed on July 8, which provided for a
defensive alliance for eight years between Russia and the Porte. Russia
was, when required, to provide the sultan with both military and naval
forces, to be provisioned by him, but otherwise maintained by Russia. A
secret article, soon made known, provided that Russia would not ask for
material aid if at war, but that in that event the Porte would close the
Dardanelles to the warships of other nations. Great Britain had already
obtained the rights of the most favoured nation, so far as the passage
of the Dardanelles was concerned, and therefore maintained that the
treaty did not affect her right to pass those straits; and France
joined her in presenting identical notes declaring their intention of
ignoring the treaty in event of war. British public opinion, already
wounded by the conquest of Poland, was even more vehemently affected
than British policy. The treaty was regarded as the establishment in
Turkey of a Russian protectorate, which it was necessary for Great
Britain to destroy, and the antagonism thus produced has lasted to our
own day. Matters were not improved when the tsar asked for the cession
of the Danubian principalities, which were still occupied by Russia, in
return for a remission of the war indemnity owing since 1829. Austria,
France, and Great Britain protested against this proposal, and in
consequence nothing came of it.
Austria then assumed the _rôle_ of mediator. A friendly request for
explanation elicited a declaration from Russia, disclaiming all
intention of self-aggrandisement, and promising to accept the mediation
of Austria in any case where the treaty could be invoked. Austria in
consequence endeavoured to persuade the western powers that there was no
immediate danger, and that she would use her mediation to remove any
danger that might arise. Meanwhile she endeavoured to allay distrust of
Russia by inducing that power to evacuate the Danubian principalities.
But before this result could be accomplished the negotiations between
Austria and Russia had taken a turn which gave Austria, in English eyes,
the appearance of an accomplice rather than of a mediator. The
revolutionary movements of 1830 and following years had produced grave
apprehensions in the minds of the rulers of the three eastern powers,
Austria, Prussia, and Russia; and the coercion of Holland and Portugal
caused them to feel a deep distrust of the policy of Great Britain and
France, and to grasp the necessity of united action against the
revolutionary forces at work in Europe. For this purpose it was
considered necessary to revive Metternich's policy of 1820 as defined at
Troppau. The three powers had for some time been drawing together, and
in September, 1833, the Emperors Francis and Nicholas and the Crown
Prince of Prussia met at Münchengrätz in Bohemia, where a secret
convention was signed on the 18th. They refused to recognise Isabella as
Queen of Spain in the event of Ferdinand's death; they arranged for
mutual assistance against the Poles; and agreed to combine to resist
any change of dynasty in Turkey and any extension of Arab rule into
Europe. In the event of a collapse of the Ottoman empire, Austria and
Russia were to act together in settling the reversion. On October 15 the
three powers signed a further convention at Berlin, containing one
public and two secret articles. The latter recognised the right, already
asserted at Troppau, of intervention in the internal affairs of a
country whose sovereign expressed a desire for foreign assistance. There
can be little doubt that Austria and Russia were in earnest in their
professed desire to maintain the integrity of the Turkish dominions, but
an opinion gained ground in England that they had already agreed to
partition them between themselves.
On January 29, 1834, Austrian mediation bore fruit in a definite treaty
for the evacuation of the Danubian principalities. Russia merely
reserved to herself the appointment of the first hospodar of each
principality. The first act, however, of Alexander Ghika, the new
hospodar of Wallachia, was to forbid any change of statute without the
consent of Russia. Silistria alone remained in Russian hands till a
third part of the indemnity should be paid. The remaining two-thirds
Russia consented to abandon. A revolt among the Syrian mountaineers gave
Russia an opportunity of demonstrating her pacific intentions. The
sultan supported the revolt and also sent troops to conquer Urfa which
Ibrahim had neglected to surrender. Russia, however, refused to support
the sultan in an aggressive war, and the powers negotiated a peace. The
Syrian revolt was quelled, and Urfa surrendered to the sultan. In 1835
the Tsar Nicholas and the new Austrian emperor, Ferdinand, met at
Teplitz where they renewed the agreements concluded at Münchengrätz.
Metternich proposed a conference at Vienna to settle the eastern
question, but the tsar, who really possessed the decisive voice so long
as the question remained open, refused to hear of this. Finally in
September, 1836, the Russian evacuation of Silistria was obtained by a
payment of 30,000,000 piastres, borrowed, for the most part, in England.
The Eastern question now seemed to have entered upon a quieter phase,
and the military reforms which European officers, including Moltke,
afterwards famous in a different region, were carrying out in Turkey,
gave promise that she might be able to hold her own in future against
domestic foes.
FOOTNOTES:
[136] The debt was, according to the French practice, expressed in terms
of the interest payable annually (_rentes_), not in terms of a nominal
principal as in this country.
[137] Finlay, _History of Greece_, vol. vii., chapters ii., iii.