CHAPTER I.

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_THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND_

_Seventy-five years have passed since Lingard completed his_ HISTORY OF

ENGLAND, _which ends with the Revolution of 1688. During that period

historical study has made a great advance. Year after year the mass of

materials for a new History of England has increased; new lights have

been thrown on events and characters, and old errors have been

corrected. Many notable works have been written on various periods of

our history; some of them at such length as to appeal almost exclusively

to professed historical students. It is believed that the time has come

when the advance which has been made in the knowledge of English history

as a whole should be laid before the public in a single work of fairly

adequate size. Such a book should be founded on independent thought and

research, but should at the same time be written with a full knowledge

of the works of the best modern historians and with a desire to take

advantage of their teaching wherever it appears sound._

_The vast number of authorities, printed and in manuscript, on which a

History of England should be based, if it is to represent the existing

state of knowledge, renders co-operation almost necessary and certainly

advisable. The History, of which this volume is an instalment, is an

attempt to set forth in a readable form the results at present attained

by research. It will consist of twelve volumes by twelve different

writers, each of them chosen as being specially capable of dealing with

the period which he undertakes, and the editors, while leaving to each

author as free a hand as possible, hope to insure a general similarity

in method of treatment, so that the twelve volumes may in their

contents, as well as in their outward appearance, form one History._

_As its title imports, this History will primarily deal with politics,

with the History of England and, after the date of the union with

Scotland, Great Britain, as a state or body politic; but as the life of

a nation is complex, and its condition at any given time cannot be

understood without taking into account the various forces acting upon

it, notices of religious matters and of intellectual, social, and

economic progress will also find place in these volumes. The footnotes

will, so far as is possible, be confined to references to authorities,

and references will not be appended to statements which appear to be

matters of common knowledge and do not call for support. Each volume

will have an Appendix giving some account of the chief authorities,

original and secondary, which the author has used. This account will be

compiled with a view of helping students rather than of making long

lists of books without any notes as to their contents or value. That the

History will have faults both of its own and such as will always in some

measure attend co-operative work, must be expected, but no pains have

been spared to make it, so far as may be, not wholly unworthy of the

greatness of its subject._

_Each volume, while forming part of a complete History, will also in

itself be a separate and complete book, will be sold separately, and

will have its own index, and two or more maps._

The History is divided as follows:--

Vol. I. FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE NORMAN CONQUEST (to 1066). By

Thomas Hodgkin, D.C.L., Litt.D., Fellow of University College,

London; Fellow of the British Academy. With 2 Maps.

Vol. II. FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO THE DEATH OF JOHN (1066-1216). By

George Burton Adams, D.D., Litt.D., Professor of History in Yale

University. With 2 Maps.

Vol. III. FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY III. TO THE DEATH OF EDWARD III.

(1216-1377). By T. F. Tout, M.A., Bishop Fraser Professor of

Mediæval and Ecclesiastical History in the University of Manchester;

formerly Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford. With 3 Maps.

Vol. IV. FROM THE ACCESSION OF RICHARD II. TO THE DEATH OF RICHARD III.

(1377-1485). By C. W. C. Oman, M.A., LL.D., M.P., Chichele Professor

of Modern History in the University of Oxford; Fellow of the British

Academy. With 3 Maps.

Vol. V. FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VII. TO THE DEATH OF HENRY VIII.

(1485-1547). By the Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, M.A., M.P.,

President of the Board of Education; Fellow of the British Academy.

With 2 Maps.

Vol. VI. FROM THE ACCESSION OF EDWARD VI. TO THE DEATH OF ELIZABETH

(1547-1603). By A. F. Pollard, M.A., Litt.D., Fellow of All Souls'

College, Oxford, and Professor of English History in the University

of London. With 2 Maps.

Vol. VII. FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I. TO THE RESTORATION (1603-1660).

By F. C. Montague, M.A., Astor Professor of History in University

College, London; formerly Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. With 3

Maps.

Vol. VIII. FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE DEATH OF WILLIAM III.

(1660-1702). By Sir Richard Lodge, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D., Professor

of History in the University of Edinburgh; formerly Fellow of

Brasenose College, Oxford. With 2 Maps.

Vol. IX. FROM THE ACCESSION OF ANNE TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE II.

(1702-1760). By I. S. Leadam, M.A., formerly Fellow of Brasenose

College, Oxford. With 8 Maps.

Vol. X. FROM THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III. TO THE CLOSE OF PITT'S FIRST

ADMINISTRATION (1760-1801). By the Rev. William Hunt, M.A., D.Litt.,

Trinity College, Oxford. With 3 Maps.

Vol. XI. FROM ADDINGTON'S ADMINISTRATION TO THE CLOSE OF WILLIAM IV.'S

REIGN (1801-1837). By the Hon. George C. Brodrick, D.C.L., late

Warden of Merton College, Oxford, and J. K. Fotheringham, M.A.,

D.Litt., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford; Lecturer in Ancient

History at King's College, London. With 3 Maps.

Vol. XII. THE REIGN OF QUEEN VICTORIA (1837-1901). By Sir Sidney Low,

M.A., Fellow of King's College, London; formerly Scholar of Balliol

College, Oxford, and Lloyd C. Sanders, B.A. With 3 Maps.

The Political History of England

IN TWELVE VOLUMES

EDITED BY WILLIAM HUNT, D.LITT., AND

REGINALD L. POOLE, M.A.

XI.

THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND

FROM ADDINGTON'S ADMINISTRATION TO

THE CLOSE OF WILLIAM IV.'S REIGN

1801-1837

BY THE

HON. GEORGE C. BRODRICK, D.C.L.

LATE WARDEN OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD

COMPLETED AND REVISED BY

J. K. FOTHERINGHAM, M.A., D.LITT.

FELLOW OF MAGDALEN COLLEGE, OXFORD; LECTURER IN

ANCIENT HISTORY AT KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON

_NEW IMPRESSION_

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

FOURTH AVENUE & 30TH STREET, NEW YORK

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND MADRAS

1919

_NOTE._

_When the late Warden of Merton undertook the preparation of this volume

he invited the assistance of Dr. Fotheringham in the portions dealing

with foreign affairs. At the time of the late Warden's death in 1903

three chapters (x., xii. and xviii.) were unwritten, and one (xx.) was

left incomplete. It was also found that the volume had to be recast in

order to meet the plan of the series. The necessary alterations and

additions have been made by Dr. Fotheringham, who has been scrupulous in

retaining the expression of the late Warden's views, and, where

possible, his words._

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

ADDINGTON.

PAGE

Mar., 1801. The new ministry 1

Condition of Ireland 2

Expedition to Copenhagen 3

Sept. Egypt evacuated by the French 6

French diplomatic successes 6

Bonaparte's concordat with the pope 7

Peace negotiations with France 8

Cornwallis at Amiens 10

25 Mar., 1802. The treaty of Amiens 12

Parliamentary criticism of the treaty 14

July. General election 15

Nov. Colonel Despard's conspiracy 16

Further aggressions of Napoleon 17

His colonial policy 18

Negotiations between Whitworth and the French government 19

18 May, 1803. Renewal of the war with France 22

CHAPTER II.

THE RETURN OF PITT.

23 July, 1803. Emmet's rebellion 23

Pitt's discontent with the ministry 24

Ministerial changes 27

Jan., 1804. The king's illness 29

April. Addington's resignation 31

The exclusion of Fox 32

18 May. Napoleon declared emperor 33

Pitt's ministry 34

The impeachment of Melville 36

July. The third coalition 37

Nelson's pursuit of Villeneuve 39

21 Oct., 1805. The battle of Trafalgar 40

Napoleon marches into Germany 41

Dec. Austerlitz: the peace of Pressburg 42

Collapse of the coalition 43

23 Jan., 1806. Death of Pitt 43

CHAPTER III.

GRENVILLE AND PORTLAND.

Feb., 1806. Formation of the Grenville ministry 45

13 Sept. Death of Fox 46

14 Oct. Jena and Auerstädt 47

General election 48

25 Mar., 1807. Abolition of the slave trade 48

Fall of the whig government 49

The Portland administration 50

General election 50

7 July. The treaty of Tilsit 52

Seizure of the Danish fleet 54

The "continental system" and orders in council 55

Fruitless expeditions 56

12 Oct. Conference of Erfurt 59

Army scandals 60

The Wagram campaign 63

July, 1809. The Walcheren expedition 64

21 Sept. Duel between Canning and Castlereagh 67

Oct. Perceval's administration 68

Capture of the Ionian Isles and Bourbon 69

25. Jubilee of George III. 69

CHAPTER IV.

PERCEVAL AND LIVERPOOL.

Jan., 1810. Debates on the Walcheren expedition 71

April. The arrest of Burdett 72

Appointment of the "Bullion committee" 73

The king's insanity: regency bill 74

11 May, 1812. Assassination of Perceval 76

1809-11. Social reforms in his ministry 77

July, 1810. Deposition of Louis Bonaparte 78

Opposition in Europe to the continental system 78

Alliances formed by Russia and France 81

Conquest of Java and Sumatra 81

June, 1812. The formation of Liverpool's cabinet 81

1811-12. Distress in town and country 83

Oct., 1812. General election 85

1813. Confirmation of the East India Company's charter 86

CHAPTER V.

THE PENINSULAR WAR.

1807, 1808. The origin of the war 87

Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. seek the

protection of Napoleon 87

1808. Napoleon's plans for the conquest of Spain 88

24 July. Joseph Bonaparte proclaimed King of Spain 89

13 Aug. Landing of Wellesley 90

21. Battle of Vimeiro 91

Oct., 1808.- Expedition of Sir John Moore 92

Jan., 1809.

16 Jan. Battle of Coruña 95

Wellesley returns to Portugal 97

27 July. Battle of Talavera 98

Sept., 1810. Bussaco: the lines of Torres Vedras 101

Struggle for the frontier fortresses 103

16 May, 1811. Battle of Albuera 103

Jan.-April, Sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz 105

1812.

22 July. Battle of Salamanca 107

1812, 1813. Wellington reorganises the Spanish and Portuguese armies 109

21 June, 1813. Battle of Vitoria 110

Battle of the Pyrenees 113

Siege of St. Sebastian 113

8 Oct. Wellington crosses the Bidassoa 115

Battles round Bayonne 115

Feb., 1814. The investment of Bayonne 117

10 April. Battle of Toulouse 119

CHAPTER VI.

THE DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON.

1812. French treaties with Prussia and Austria 122

Alliances made by Russia 123

June. Napoleon's advance into Russia 124

His retreat 125

War between England and the United States 126

Attacks on Canada 129

American successes at sea 131

Feb., 1813. Treaty of Kalisch 134

Austrian diplomacy 135

2, 21 May. Lützen and Bautzen 135

Aug., Oct. Dresden and Leipzig 137

France loses Saxony, Holland, and Switzerland 138

American war continued 138

1 June. Duel of the _Shannon_ and _Chesapeake_ 142

Jan.-Mar., Campaign in France 143

1814.

April. Napoleon deposed: Louis XVIII. recalled 145

24 Dec. Treaty of Ghent 147

July. Visit of Alexander and Frederick William to England 148

CHAPTER VII.

VIENNA AND WATERLOO.

30 May, 1814. The first treaty of Paris 149

English blockade of Norwegian ports 150

Union of Sweden and Norway 150

Restoration of Ferdinand VII. and Pius VII. 150

Attempts to abolish the slave trade 151

Sept., 1814- Congress of Vienna 152

June, 1815.

3 Jan., 1815. Secret treaty between England, France, and Austria 153

1 March. Napoleon's return from Elba 153

Flight of Louis XVIII.: the _Acte Additionnel_ 155

Plans of the allies 156

Defeat and death of Murat 157

June. Wellington at Brussels: his army 158

16. Ligny and Quatre Bras 159

18. Waterloo 160

July. Paris occupied by the allies 163

22 June. Second abdication of Napoleon 165

His surrender to England 165

Restoration of Louis XVIII.: treaty of Vienna 166

Resettlement of Europe 166

20 Nov. Second treaty of Paris: English gains 167

26 Sept. The Holy Alliance 168

Napoleon at St. Helena 169

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST YEARS OF PEACE.

1816. Depression and discontent 171

Vansittart's financial policy 173

Union of British and Irish exchequers 174

2 Dec., 1816. Spa Fields riot 175

Prosecution of Hone 177

1818. General election 178

16 Aug., 1819. The "Manchester massacre" 178

Dec. The six acts 180

1817, 1819. Institution of savings banks: currency reform 182

6 Nov., 1817. Death of Princess Charlotte 184

1818. Royal marriages 184

29 Jan., 1820. Death of George III. 185

Royalist reaction in Europe 187

1816. Expedition against the Barbary states 187

1819. Murder of Kotzebue 189

30 Sept., Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle 189

1818.

Spain asks for assistance from the allies 190

The European alliance 190

CHAPTER IX.

THE LAST YEARS OF LORD LIVERPOOL.

1820. The Cato Street conspiracy 192

Dissolution of parliament 193

The "queen's trial" 194

7 Aug., 1821. Her death 196

1822. Changes in the cabinet 199

12 Aug. Death of Castlereagh 199

Sept. Canning foreign secretary 200

Jan. Peel home secretary 201

1823. Reform of the navigation laws 202

Agricultural discontent 203

1825. Speculative frenzy and financial panic 205

1823-26. Robinson's finance 206

General election of 1826 207

Close of Liverpool's ministry 208

CHAPTER X.

PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE.

1820. Revolution in Spain: policy of non-intervention 210

July, Aug. Revolutions in the Two Sicilies and Portugal 211

20 Oct. Congress of Troppau 211

Jan., 1821. Congress of Laibach 212

Mar., April. Revolution in Piedmont: Austrian intervention 213

Insurrections in the Morea and Central Greece 214

Aug. "Sanitary cordon" 215

Ultra-royalist parties in France and Spain 215

Loss of Spanish colonies in America 215

1822. Conference at Vienna 216

20 Oct. Congress of Verona 217

Offer of mediation declined 218

7 April, 1823. War between France and Spain 220

12 Oct., 1822. Independence of Brazil 221

July, 1825. Conference at London 222

2 Dec., 1823. The Monroe doctrine 223

1824-25. Conference at St. Petersburg 224

1 Dec., 1825. Death of the Tsar Alexander I. 225

CHAPTER XI.

TORY DISSENSION AND CATHOLIC RELIEF.

April, 1827. Formation of Canning's ministry 227

Additions to the ministry 228

8 Aug. Death of Canning 228

Sept. Goderich's cabinet 229

Dissensions: resignation of Goderich 230

9 Jan., 1828. Wellington accepts office 230

The Eastern question 232

20 Oct., 1827. Navarino 233

1828. Repeal of the test and corporation acts 235

May, June. Changes in the ministry 236

June, July. The Clare election 237

1821. Measures for catholic relief 239

1825. Further measures 241

George IV.'s opposition to catholic relief 244

1829. Wellington and Peel adopt catholic relief 245

Mar., April. Debates on the bill 246

13 April. The royal assent 249

21 Mar. Duel between Wellington and Winchilsea 250

Exclusion of O'Connell from Parliament 251

CHAPTER XII.

PORTUGAL AND GREECE.

10 Mar., 1826. Death of John VI. of Portugal 253

2 May. Peter abdicates in favour of his daughter Maria 254

31 July. Miguel proclaimed king by the absolutists 254

Dec. England sends troops to help the Portuguese government 255

3 Mar., 1828. Peter appoints Miguel regent for Maria 258

Dec., 1827. The sultan defies Russia 260

26 April, Russia makes war on the Turks 263

1828.

Negotiations for settlement of Greek question 264

Oct., Nov. French troops expel the Turks from the Morea 265

Terms of settlement agreed on at Poros and London 266

14 Sept., Peace of Adrianople 267

1829.

3 Feb., 1830. Greece independent: throne offered to Prince Leopold 268

France conquers Algiers 269

CHAPTER XIII.

PRELUDE OF REFORM.

1830. Amalgamation of English and Welsh benches 271

Motions for reform 271

26 June. Death of George IV. 272

General election 274

15 Sept. Death of Huskisson 275

Wellington's opposition to reform 277

Fall of his ministry 278

Nov. Grey accepts office 278

His cabinet 279

The regency bill 281

Feb., 1831. Althorp's first budget 283

Public demand for reform 285

Draft of the first reform bill 287

System of representation in the unreformed house 288

Popular excitement: second reading of the bill 291

Dissolution of parliament 292

CHAPTER XIV.

THE REFORM.

1831. General election 293

24 June. Second reform bill introduced 294

8 Oct. Rejection by the lords 296

Reform bill riots 296

Attempts at compromise in the lords 299

12 Dec. Final reform bill introduced 300

Gradual loss of the king's confidence in the ministry 302

9 May, 1832. Grey resigns 302

Wellington unable to form a ministry 303

The king recalls Grey 304

4 June. Third reading of the bill 304

Scotch and Irish reform bills carried 306

26 Oct. The cholera epidemic 309

1831. The census 311

State of Ireland 312

O'Connell's agitation 312

The "tithe-war" in Ireland 314

Legislation for Ireland 316

The Kildare Place Society 317

CHAPTER XV.

FRUITS OF THE REFORM.

1832. General election 318

1833. Irish coercion bill 320

Irish Church temporalities bill 322

Ministerial changes 325

Abolition of colonial slavery 326

Factory acts 327

The East India Company act 328

Bank charter act 330

Formation of judicial committee of the privy council 332

Act for the abolition of fines and recoveries 333

1831, 1832, Althorp's budgets 334

1833.

CHAPTER XVI.

RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND POOR LAW REFORM.

1833. The Tractarian movement 336

1832. First meeting of the British Association 338

Foundation of the Catholic Apostolic Church 339

1834. The "new poor law" 340

Creation of a central poor law board 343

Ministerial discord 344

9 July. Grey's resignation 346

Formation of Melbourne's ministry 347

16 Oct. Destruction of the houses of parliament 349

14 Nov. Melbourne's resignation 350

Wellington's provisional government 351

Dec. Peel's cabinet 352

The Tamworth manifesto 353

CHAPTER XVII.

PEEL AND MELBOURNE.

Jan., 1835. General election 354

Feb. Abercromby elected speaker 354

The "Lichfield House compact" 356

April. Peel's resignation 356

Melbourne's second ministry 357

Exclusion of Brougham 357

Municipal corporations act 360

Jan., 1836. Cottenham lord chancellor 363

Conflict with the lords on Irish bills 365

Tithe commutation act (English) 365

Reformed marriage law 366

Registration system 366

1835, 1836. Crusade against Orange lodges 367

1836. The paper duties lowered 369

Committee on agricultural distress 370

1836, 1837. Agitation in Ireland 371

1837. Irish municipal bill 372

Church rates 373

Burdett secedes from the whig party 374

20 June. Death of William IV. 375

CHAPTER XVIII.

FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER WILLIAM IV.

July, 1830. The revolution of July 376

Recognition of Louis Philippe by the Powers 377

Sept. Belgian provinces in revolt 379

20 Dec. Protocol of London 381

June, 1831. Election of Leopold as King of the Belgians 383

Aug. War between Belgium and Holland 384

French troops enter Belgium 384

Nov. British and French fleets blockade the Scheldt 386

Nov., 1833. Convention between Holland and Belgium 387

1830. Insurrections in Switzerland, Poland, Italy, etc. 387

1831, 1832. Capture of Warsaw; Polish constitution abolished 388

7 April, 1831. Peter leaves Brazil for Portugal 388

Carlist rebellion in Spain 389

22 April, The quadruple alliance 389

1834.

26 May. Miguel renounces his claims 390

9 Oct., 1831. Capodistrias (Greek president) assassinated 392

1832. Otto of Bavaria becomes King of Greece 392

1831. War between Ibrahim and the Sultan 393

1833. Treaties of Kiutayeh and Unkiar Skelessi 394

8 Sept. Secret convention at Münchengrätz 395

CHAPTER XIX.

BRITISH INDIA.

1801. Annexation of the Karnátik 397

1803. Assaye and Argáum 399

1805. Resignation of Lord Wellesley 399

10 July, 1806. Mutiny at Vellore 400

Lord Minto's pacific policy 401

1801-10. Treaties with Persia 402

Elphinstone in Afghánistán 403

1813. Lord Moira appointed governor-general 404

The Pindárí war 405

1818. Subjugation of the Pindárís 407

First Burmese war 408

Abolition of satí 410

Extirpation of thagí 411

Defence of Herat 412

Communication with India 413

Burnes's mission to Kábul 413

CHAPTER XX.

LITERATURE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

The "Lake school" 416

Scott's novels 418

Minor poets: philosophical works 420

Newspapers and reviews 422

Essayists and historians 425

The arts: painting, sculpture 427

Scientific discoveries 428

University reform 429

Formation of London University 431

Improvements in agriculture 433

Steam navigation 434

The first railways 435

Geographical discovery 436

Philanthropy 436

Canada 437

South Africa 438

Convict settlements in Australia 438

Development of Australia 439

APPENDIX I. On Authorities 443

II. Administrations, 1801-37 451

MAPS.

(AT THE END OF THE VOLUME.)

1. Great Britain, showing the parliamentary representation after the

reform.

2. Spain and Portugal, illustrating the Peninsular war.

3. India.

CHAPTER I.

ADDINGTON.

When, early in March, 1801, Pitt resigned office, he was succeeded by

Henry Addington, who had been speaker of the house of commons for over

eleven years, and who now received the seals of office as first lord of

the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer on March 14, 1801. He was

able to retain the services of the Duke of Portland as home secretary,

of Lord Chatham as president of the council, and of Lord Westmorland as

lord privy seal. For the rest, his colleagues were, like himself, new to

cabinet rank. Lord Hawkesbury (afterwards the second Earl of Liverpool)

became foreign secretary, and Lord Hobart, son of the Earl of

Buckinghamshire, secretary for war. Loughborough reaped the due reward

of his treachery by being excluded from the ministry altogether; with a

curious obstinacy he persisted in attending cabinet councils, until a

letter from Addington informed him that his presence was not desired. He

received some small consolation, however, in his elevation to the

Earldom of Rosslyn. Lord Eldon was the new chancellor and was destined

to hold the office uninterruptedly, except for the brief ministry of Fox

and Grenville, till 1827. Lord St. Vincent became first lord of the

admiralty, and Lord Lewisham president of the board of control.

Cornwallis had resigned with Pitt, but it was not till June 16 that a

successor was found for him as master general of the ordnance. It was

then arranged that Chatham should take this office. Portland succeeded

Chatham as lord president, and Lord Pelham, whose father had just been

created Earl of Chichester, became home secretary instead of Portland.

An important change was introduced into the distribution of work between

the different secretaries of state, the administration of colonial

affairs being transferred from the home to the war office, so that

Hobart and his successors down to 1854 were known as secretaries of

state for war and the colonies. Soon afterwards Lewisham succeeded his

father as Earl of Dartmouth.

Though the Addington ministry has, not without justice, been derided for

its weakness as compared with its immediate predecessor, it is

interesting to observe that in it one of the greatest of English judges

as well as a future premier, destined to display an unique power of

holding his party together, first attained to cabinet rank; and in the

following year it was reinforced by Castlereagh, who disputes with

Canning the honour of being regarded as the ablest statesman of what was

then the younger generation. The weakness of the ministry must therefore

be attributed to a lack of experience rather than a lack of talent. It

was unfortunate in succeeding a particularly strong administration, but

is well able to bear comparison with most of the later ministries of

George III. Addington himself was in more thorough sympathy with the

king than any premier before or after. Conversation with Addington was,

according to the king, like "thinking aloud"; and with a king who, like

George III., still regarded himself as responsible for the national

policy, hearty co-operation between king and premier was a matter of no

slight importance.

In the early days of the new administration Pitt loyally kept his

promise of friendly support, and it is to be deplored that Grenville and

Canning did not adopt the same course. While the issue of peace and war

was pending, domestic legislation inevitably remained in abeyance. In

Ireland serious disappointment had been caused by the abandonment of

catholic emancipation; but the disappointment was borne quietly, and the

Irish Roman catholics doubtless did not foresee to what a distance of

time the removal of their disabilities had been postponed. The just and

mild rule of the new lord lieutenant, Lord Hardwicke, contributed to the

pacification of the country. But in reality the conduct of the movement

for emancipation was only passing into new hands; when it reappeared it

was no longer led by catholic lords and bishops, but was a peasant

movement, headed by the unscrupulous demagogue O'Connell. In these

circumstances it is to be regretted that the new administration

neglected to carry that one of the half-promised concessions to the

catholics which could not offend the king's conscience, namely, the

commutation of tithe. Nothing in the protestant ascendency was so

irritating to the catholic peasantry as the necessity of paying tithe to

a protestant clergy, and its commutation, while benefiting the clergy

themselves, would have removed the occasion of subsequent agitation. The

spirit of disloyalty, however, was believed to be by no means extinct

either in Ireland or in Great Britain, and two stringent acts were

passed to repress it. The first, for the continuance of martial law in

Ireland, was supported by almost all the Irish speakers in the house of

commons, where it was carried without a division, and was adopted in the

house of lords by an overwhelming majority, after an impressive speech

from Lord Clare. The second, for the suspension of the _habeas corpus_

act in the whole United Kingdom was framed to remain in force "during

the continuance of the war, and for one month after the signing of a

definitive treaty of peace".

[Pageheading: _THE HORNE TOOKE ACT._]

The only other measure of permanent interest which became law in this

session was the so-called "Horne Tooke act," occasioned by the return of

Horne Tooke, who was in holy orders, for Old Sarum. Such a return was

contrary to custom, but the precedents collected by a committee of the

house of commons were inconclusive. It was accordingly enacted that in

future clergymen of the established churches should be ineligible for

seats in parliament, while Horne Tooke was deemed to have been validly

elected, and retained his seat. The house of commons found time,

however, for an important and well-sustained debate on India, in which

among others Dundas, now no longer in office, showed a thorough

knowledge of questions affecting Indian finance and trade.

The naval expedition which had been prepared in the last days of Pitt's

administration sailed for Copenhagen on March 12, 1801, under Sir Hyde

Parker, with Nelson as second in command. The admiral in chief was of a

cautious temper, but was wise enough to allow himself to be guided by

Nelson's judgment when planning an engagement, though not as to the

general course of the expedition. The fleet consisted of sixteen ships

of the line and thirty-four smaller vessels; all these with the

exception of one ship of the line reached the Skaw on the 18th. A

frigate was sent in advance with instructions to Vansittart, the

British envoy at Copenhagen, to present an ultimatum to the Danish

government,[1] demanding a favourable answer to the British demands

within forty-eight hours. For three days Parker waited at anchor

eighteen miles from Elsinore, and it was only when Vansittart brought an

unfavourable reply on the 23rd that he took Nelson into his counsels. He

readily adopted Nelson's plan of ignoring the Danish batteries at

Kronborg and making a circuit so as to attack Copenhagen at the weak

southern end of its defences, but set aside his project of masking

Copenhagen and making straight for a Russian squadron of twelve ships of

the line which was lying icebound at Revel. The fair weather of the 26th

was wasted in irresolution, and it was not till the 30th that the fleet

was able to weigh anchor. It passed Kronborg in safety and anchored five

miles north of Copenhagen.

Parker placed under Nelson's immediate command twelve ships of the line

and twenty-one smaller vessels, by far the greater part of the British

fleet. With these he was to pass to the east of a shoal called the

Middle Ground and attack the defences of Copenhagen from the south,

while Parker with the remainder of the fleet was to make a demonstration

against the more formidable northern defences. The wind could not of

course favour both attacks simultaneously, and it was agreed that the

attack should be made when the wind favoured Nelson. The nights of the

30th and 31st were spent in reconnoitring and laying buoys. On April 1 a

north wind brought Nelson's squadron past the Middle Ground, and on the

next day a south wind enabled him to attack the Danish fleet, if fleet

it may be called. At the north end of the Danish position stood the only

permanent battery, the Trekroner, with two hulks or blockships; the rest

consisted of seven blockships and eleven floating batteries, drawn up

along the shore. An attack on the south end of the line was also exposed

to batteries on the island of Amager. Nelson's intention was to close

with the whole Danish fleet, but three of his ships of the line were

stranded and he was obliged to leave the assault on the northern end

entirely to lighter vessels.

[Pageheading: _BATTLE OF THE BALTIC._]

The Danish batteries proved more powerful than had been anticipated, and

as time went on and the Danish resistance did not appear to lose in

strength, Parker grew doubtful of the result of the battle and gave the

order to cease action. The order was apparently not intended to be

imperative, but it had the effect of inducing Riou, who commanded the

frigate squadron, to sail away to the north. For the rest of the fleet

obedience was out of the question. Nelson acknowledged, but refused to

repeat the order, and, jocularly placing his glass to his blind eye,

declared that he could not see the signal. At length the British

cannonade told. Fischer, the Danish commander, had had to shift his flag

twice, at the second time to the Trekroner, and all the ships south of

that battery had either ceased fire or were practically helpless. The

Trekroner, however, was still unsubdued and rendered it impossible for

Nelson's squadron to retire, in the only direction which the wind would

allow, without severe loss. He accordingly sent a message to the Danish

Prince Regent, declaring that he would be compelled to burn the

batteries he had taken, without saving their crews, unless firing

ceased. If a truce were arranged until he could take his prisoners out

of the prizes, he was prepared to land the wounded Danes, and burn or

remove the prizes. A truce for twenty-four hours was accordingly

arranged, which Nelson employed to remove his own fleet unmolested.

The destruction of the southern batteries left Copenhagen exposed to

bombardment, and the Danes, unable to resist, yet afraid to offend the

tsar by submission, prolonged the time from day to day till news arrived

which removed all occasion for hostility. Unknown to either of the

combatants, the Tsar Paul, the life and soul of the northern

confederacy, had been murdered on the night of March 23, ten days before

the battle, and with his death the league was practically dissolved.

When Nelson advanced further into the Baltic, he found no hostile fleet

awaiting him, and the new tsar, Alexander, adopting an opposite policy,

entered into a compromise on the subject of maritime rights. The battle

of the Baltic is considered by some to have been Nelson's masterpiece.

It won for him the title of viscount and for his second in command,

Rear-Admiral Graves, the gift of the ribbon of the Bath, but the

admiralty, for official reasons, declined to confer any public reward

or honour on the officers concerned in it.

At the same time, the French occupation of Egypt was drawing towards its

inevitable close. Kléber, who was left in command by Bonaparte, perished

by the hand of an assassin, and Menou, who succeeded to the command, was

not only a weak general, but was prevented from receiving any

reinforcements by the naval supremacy of Great Britain in the

Mediterranean. On March 21, 1801, the French army was defeated at the

battle of Alexandria by the British force sent out under Sir Ralph

Abercromby, who was himself mortally wounded on the field. His

successor, General Hutchinson, completed his work by taking Cairo,

before the arrival of General Baird, who had led a mixed body of British

soldiers and sepoys from the Red Sea across the desert to the Nile. The

capitulation of Alexandria soon followed. In September the French

evacuated Egypt, the remains of their army were conveyed to France in

English ships, and Bonaparte's long-cherished dreams of eastern conquest

faded away for ever--not from his own imagination, but from the

calculations of practical statesmanship.

French arms, and French diplomacy supported by armed force, were more

successful elsewhere. The treaty of Lunéville was only the first of a

series of treaties, by which France secured to herself a political

position commensurate with her military glory. By the treaty of Aranjuez

between France and Spain, signed on March 21, Spain ceded Louisiana to

France, reserving the right of pre-emption, and undertook to wage war on

Portugal in order to detach it from the British alliance. Spain and

Portugal were both lukewarm in this war, and on June 6 signed the treaty

of Badajoz, by which Portugal agreed to close her ports to England, to

pay an indemnity to Spain, and to cede the small district of Olivenza,

south of Badajoz. Bonaparte was intensely irritated by this treaty,

which deprived him of the hope of exchanging conquests in Portugal for

British colonial conquests in any future negotiations; he declared that

Spain would have to pay by the sacrifice of her colonies for the

conquered French colonies which he still hoped to recover. A French army

was despatched to Portugal and enabled Bonaparte to dictate the treaty

of Madrid, signed on September 29, whereby Portugal ceded half Guiana to

France and undertook, as at Badajoz, to close her ports against

England.

[Pageheading: _INFLUENCES MAKING FOR PEACE._]

This last condition was equally imposed on the King of the Two Sicilies

by the treaty of Florence, concluded on March 28, and before the end of

the year France had established friendly relations with the Sultan of

Turkey and the new Tsar of Russia. More important still, as

consolidating Bonaparte's power at home, was the concordat signed by him

and the pope on July 15 recognising Roman Catholicism as the religion of

the majority of Frenchmen, and of the consuls, guaranteeing stipends,

though on an abjectly mean scale, to the clergy, and placing the entire

patronage of the French Church in the hands of the first consul. Never

since the French revolution had the Church been thus acknowledged as the

auxiliary, or rather as the handmaid, of the state, and probably no one

but the first consul could have brought about the reconciliation. After

such exertions, even he may have sincerely desired an honourable peace,

as the crown of his victories, or at least as a breathing time, to

enable him to mature his vast designs for reorganising France. Perhaps

he did not yet fully recognise that war was a necessity of his political

ascendency, no less than of his own personal character. The French

people still clung to republican institutions; and the consulate was a

nominal republic, with all effective power vested in the first consul.

Time was to show how largely this unique position depended on his unique

capacity of conducting wars glorious to French arms; for the present,

France was satisfied, and longed for peace.

The English ministry, too, was impelled by strong motives to enter upon

the negotiations which resulted in the peace of Amiens. Not only was

Great Britain crippled by the loss of nearly all her allies, but the

high price of bread had roused grave disaffection,[2] and intensified

among British merchants a desire for an unmolested extension of

commerce; above all, English statesmen now recognised the consulate,

under Bonaparte, as the first stable and non-revolutionary government

since the fall of the French monarchy. Both countries, therefore, were

predisposed to entertain pacific overtures, but the very fact that these

were in contemplation stirred both sides to further endeavours in order

to secure better terms of peace. A French squadron, commanded by Admiral

Linois and containing three ships of the line besides smaller boats, was

making a movement for the Straits of Gibraltar in order to strengthen

the force at Cadiz. Sir James Saumarez with five ships of the line and

two smaller vessels engaged Linois off Algeciras on July 5, but the

French ships were supported by the land batteries, and one of the

British ships, the _Hannibal_ (74), ran aground, and Saumarez was

eventually compelled to leave her in the hands of the enemy. This

victory was hailed with delight throughout France, but it was fully

retrieved a week later. The French squadron had in the meantime been

reinforced by one French and five Spanish ships of the line, and on the

12th it made a fresh attempt to reach Cadiz; it was, however, engaged in

the Straits by Saumarez with five ships of the line. In the ensuing

battle two Spanish ships blew up, and the French _Saint Antoine_ was

captured. The remainder succeeded in reaching Cadiz, but Saumarez was

able to resume the blockade a few weeks later.

Meanwhile there was no relaxation of French preparations for an invasion

of England, or of naval activity on the part of Great Britain. No sooner

had Nelson returned from the Baltic than he was, on July 24, placed in

command of a "squadron on a particular service," charged with the

defence of the coast from Beachy Head to Orfordness. With this he not

only blockaded the northern French ports, but assumed the aggressive,

and bombarded the vessels therein collected. A more daring attempt to

cut out the flotilla moored at Boulogne by a boat attack was repelled

with some loss on the night of August 15. But couriers under flags of

truce were already passing between London and Paris, and hostilities

ceased in the autumn of the year 1801.

[Pageheading: _THE QUESTION OF MALTA._]

The history of the negotiations which ended in the peace of Amiens

derives a special interest from the events which followed it. The

earliest overtures for peace were made by Hawkesbury on March 21, 1801.

At first Bonaparte refused to listen to them, but the destruction of the

northern confederacy inclined him to more pacific counsels. On April 14

the British government stated its demands. They mark a distinct advance

on those which had been made in vain at Lille in 1797. France was to

evacuate Egypt, and Great Britain Minorca, but Great Britain claimed to

retain Malta, Tobago, Martinique, Trinidad, Essequibo, Demerara,

Berbice, and Ceylon. She was willing to surrender the Cape of Good Hope

on condition that it became a free port, and stipulated that an

indemnity should be provided for the Prince of Orange. At the outset,

Bonaparte opposed all cessions by France and her allies, but the steady

improvement in the fortunes of England in the north and in Egypt at last

determined him to grant some of the British demands, and as the

evacuation of Egypt became inevitable, he was resolved to gain something

in exchange for it before it was too late. The preliminary treaty was

accordingly signed by Bonaparte's agent Otto on behalf of France and

Hawkesbury on behalf of Great Britain on October 1, the day before the

news of the French capitulation in Egypt reached England. Great Britain

had already consented to relinquish Malta, provided that it became

independent. She now consented to relinquish all her conquests from

France, and with the exception of Ceylon and Trinidad all her conquests

from the French allies, requiring, however, that the Cape should be

recognised as a free port. The French were to evacuate not only Egypt,

but the Neapolitan and Roman States. Malta was to be restored to the

knights of St. John under the guarantee of a third power. Prisoners of

war were to be released on payment of their debts, and the question of

the charge for their maintenance was to be settled by the definitive

treaty in accordance with the law of nations and established usage.

No mention was made of the Prince of Orange, but Otto gave a verbal

assurance that provision would be made to satisfy his claims. He also

gave the British government to understand that France would be willing

to cede Tobago in consideration of the expenses incurred in the

maintenance of French and Dutch prisoners. The omission of all reference

to the continental relations of France is conspicuous. In France it was

interpreted as indicating that Great Britain renounced her interest in

continental politics. The Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian

republics, the kingdom of Etruria, and the whole east bank of the Rhine

were, however, supposed to be already protected against French

encroachment by the treaty of Lunéville, and Great Britain had no wish

to impose terms involving a recognition of these new creations. Again,

no mention was made of commercial relations apart from the Newfoundland

and St. Lawrence fisheries, for Great Britain was too ready to believe

that a separate commercial treaty would be practicable, and was

naturally loth to delay the conclusion of peace by a difficult

negotiation.

Cornwallis was appointed to negotiate the definitive treaty, and had

some hope that he might arrive at an informal understanding with

Bonaparte at Paris before he proceeded to Amiens. But he was offended by

Bonaparte's manner, and, dreading to be pitted against so subtle a

diplomatist as Talleyrand, he left Paris before anything was

accomplished, and arrived at Amiens on November 30. There France was

represented by Joseph Bonaparte, the first consul's elder brother, and

the negotiator of Lunéville. At Amiens, the position of the British

government was compromised from the first by its renewed insistence on a

point which had been omitted from the preliminary treaty, namely, the

compensation of the Prince of Orange. This demand was accompanied by an

endeavour to obtain compensation for the King of Sardinia. Joseph

Bonaparte, on the other hand, entrenched himself behind the letter of

the treaty, and acknowledged no further obligation. Any additional

concession to Great Britain could only be purchased by British

concessions to France. Other difficulties arose over the question of

Malta, the payment for the maintenance of prisoners, and the inclusion

of allies as parties to the treaty.

[Pageheading: _CORNWALLIS AT AMIENS._]

On the first of these questions the French would appear to have aimed

throughout at reducing the knights to as impotent a position as

possible. The British, on the other hand, ostensibly desiring to see the

strength of the order maintained, were chiefly interested in securing

its neutrality. At the time of the signature of the preliminary treaty,

Russia was the power that seemed to Great Britain the fittest guarantor

of the independence of the knights. On the refusal of Russia to accept

this position, Naples appeared to be the next best alternative, but it

was eventually agreed to substitute for the guarantee of a third power

the obviously futile guarantee of all the powers. Neither party foresaw

that the impossibility of obtaining such a guarantee was destined to

leave the whole clause about Malta inoperative. After much dispute over

the future constitution of the order, France proposed to obviate the

chief source of difficulty by the demolition of the forts. This plan

commended itself to Cornwallis, but was rejected by the British

government. By the end of December it was agreed that a Neapolitan

garrison was to occupy the islands provisionally, until the new

organisation should be established. Great Britain proposed that this

garrison should be maintained at the joint expense of Great Britain and

France. It did not occur to the British government to propose any

guarantee for the preservation of the property of the order, and this

omission ultimately proved material. The question of including allies in

the treaty was less complicated. France preferred a number of separate

treaties so as to keep the British interest in Europe at a minimum.

Great Britain, on the other hand, wished to make France a party to the

cessions made by her allies, and successfully insisted on the

negotiation of a single comprehensive treaty. Joseph Bonaparte granted

this point on December 11, but, as he had not full powers to negotiate

with any power except Great Britain, he continued to interpose delays

till the end of the year.

In the meantime France had failed in her attempts to meet the British

claims on behalf of the Prince of Orange by demands for further

privileges and territory in the oceans and colonies. On the whole, the

first month's negotiations had contributed much to a settlement, without

giving a decided advantage to either side. The lapse of time, however,

turned the balance in favour of the negotiator who was the more

independent of his country's desire for peace. On January 1, 1802,

Hawkesbury wrote to Cornwallis, treating the acquisition of Tobago as

unimportant; on the 2nd Addington expressed his readiness to accept a

separate arrangement with the Batavian republic for the Prince of

Orange. By the 16th Hawkesbury had yielded the claim of Portugal to be a

party to the treaty. The refusal of the French to cede Tobago in lieu of

payment for the French prisoners, and the difficulty of assessing the

payment, opened a way to the evasion of compensation altogether.

Cornwallis, preferring to sacrifice this claim rather than re-open the

war, suggested to Joseph Bonaparte on the 22nd that the treaty should

provide for commissioners to assess the payment, while it should be

secretly provided that they should not be appointed. On the same day,

Joseph Bonaparte communicated his brother's consent to a clause engaging

France to find a suitable territorial possession in Germany for the

Prince of Orange.

If Hawkesbury and Cornwallis imagined that they had made sure of an

early peace by these extensive concessions, they were greatly mistaken.

Napoleon, flushed with this unexpected success, was encouraged to make

further trial of the pliability of the British diplomatists. Two events

occurred at this stage of the negotiations which tried the temper of

both sides to the uttermost. On January 26, Bonaparte was elected

president of the Cisalpine republic, to be styled henceforth the Italian

republic. This event seems to have taken the British government by

surprise; they thought it a distinct indication that he still

contemplated further aggressions in spite of the series of treaties by

which he appeared to be securing peace, and were therefore much less

inclined than formerly to make concessions. About the same time

Bonaparte was not unreasonably enraged at the outrageous attacks made on

him in the press conducted in London by French exiles, especially by

Jean Peltier, the editor of a paper called _L'Ambigu_, and he blamed the

British government for permitting their publication. He therefore

instructed his brother Joseph to raise further difficulties over the

garrison and permanent organisation of Malta, as well as over the

proposed accession of the sultan to the treaty. Vain attempts were also

made by Joseph to retain Otranto for France till the British should have

evacuated Malta, and to secure the inclusion of the Ligurian republic in

the treaty.

[Pageheading: _THE TREATY OF AMIENS._]

At last on March 8 Napoleon agreed that no important difference

remained, and urged his brother to conclude the treaty. A little more

time was wasted in providing for a temporary occupation of Malta by

Neapolitan troops, and a more marked division of opinion arose as to the

compensation for the Prince of Orange. In spite of instructions to the

contrary from Hawkesbury, Cornwallis accepted an engagement on the part

of France to find a compensation, not defined, for the house of Nassau,

instead of charging it on the Dutch government; and the treaty was

finally concluded on March 25. It was signed by Great Britain, France,

Spain, and the Batavian republic, while the Porte was admitted as an

accessory power. It differed from the preliminary convention in no

important respect, except in the illusory safeguards for the claims of

the Prince of Orange, the secret arrangement for evading the cost of the

French prisoners, and the provisions concerning Malta, pregnant with the

seeds of future enmity. These provisions were as follows: Malta was to

be restored to the knights of St. John, from whose order both French and

British were hereafter to be excluded. The evacuation was to take place

within three months of the ratification of the treaty, or sooner if

possible. At that date Malta was to be given up, provided the grand

master or commissaries of the order were present, and provided the

Neapolitan garrison had arrived. Its independence was to be under the

guarantee of France, Great Britain, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia.

Two thousand Neapolitan troops were to occupy it for one year, and until

the order should have raised a force sufficient, in the judgment of the

guaranteeing powers, for the defence of the islands.[3]

On October 29, 1801, parliament was opened with a speech from the throne

briefly announcing the conclusion of a convention with the northern

powers, and of preliminaries of peace with the French republic. General

Lauriston, bearing the ratification of the preliminaries by the first

consul, had reached London on the 10th, when he was received by the

populace with tumultuous demonstrations of joy. Soon afterwards the

"feast of the peace" was celebrated in Paris with equal enthusiasm.

Short-lived as they proved to be, these pacific sentiments were

doubtless genuine on both sides of the channel. The industrial, though

not the military, resources of France were exhausted by her prodigious

efforts during the last eight years; while England, suffering grievously

from distress among the working-classes and financial difficulties,

welcomed the prospect of cheaper provisions and easier times, as well as

of emerging from the political difficulties originating in the French

revolution.

The preliminary treaty, however, did not escape hostile criticism in

either house of parliament. It was the subject of discussion in the

lords on November 3, and in the commons on the 3rd and 4th. Its most

strenuous assailants were Lord Grenville, who had been foreign secretary

under Pitt, and the whigs who had joined Pitt's ministry in 1794, among

whom Lords Spencer and Fitzwilliam and above all Windham call for

special notice. Windham's powerful and comprehensive speech contained

more than one shrewd forecast of the future. For once, Pitt and Fox

supported the same measure, and Pitt, dwelling on _security_ as our

grand object in the war, specially deprecated any attempt on the part of

Great Britain "to settle the affairs of the continent". Fox, in

advocating peace, fiercely denounced the war against the French

republic, and gloated over the discomfiture of the Bourbons.[4] It was

admitted on all sides that France was stronger than ever in a military

and political sense. She had already made treaties with Austria, Naples,

Spain, and Portugal; other treaties with Russia and Turkey were on the

point of being signed; while the still more important concordat with the

pope was already ratified. On the other hand, Great Britain had largely

increased her colonial possessions, and the chief question now discussed

was whether she would be the weaker for abandoning some of these recent

conquests. The general feeling of the nation was fitly expressed by

Sheridan in the phrase: "This is a peace which all men are glad of, but

no man can be proud of". Malmesbury, the negotiator of Lille, was absent

from the debates; but he has recorded in his diary his disapproval both

of the peace and of the violent opposition to it The king told

Malmesbury on November 26 that he considered it an experimental peace,

but unavoidable.[5]

[Pageheading: _DEBATES ON TREATY OF AMIENS._]

The debates on the definitive treaty of Amiens took place on May 13 and

14, 1802, and though vigorously sustained, were to some extent a

repetition of those on the preliminaries of peace. The opposition to it

was headed by Grenville in the lords and in the commons by Windham, who

compared it unfavourably with the preliminaries; and the stipulations

with respect to Malta were justly criticised as one of its weakest

points. Strange to say, Pitt took no effective part in the discussion,

which ended in overwhelming majorities for the government. As in the

previous session, domestic affairs, except in their bearing on foreign

policy, received comparatively little attention from parliament. The

income tax was repealed, almost in silence, as the first fruits of

peace, and Addington, as chancellor of the exchequer, delivered an

emphatic eulogy on the sinking fund by means of which he calculated that

in forty-five years the national debt, then amounting to £500,000,000,

might be entirely paid off. The house of commons showed no want of

economical zeal in scrutinising the claims of the king on the civil

list, and those of the Prince of Wales on the revenues of the duchy of

Cornwall. Nor did it neglect such abuses as the non-residence of the

parochial clergy, and the cruel practice of bull-baiting, though it

rejected a bill for the suppression of this practice, after a

characteristic apology for it from Windham, in which he dwelt upon its

superiority to horse-racing. In this session, too, a grant of £10,000

was voted to Jenner for his recent invention of vaccination. In

supporting it, Wilberforce stated that the victims of small-pox, in

London alone, numbered 4,000 annually.

The parliament, which had now lasted six years, was dissolved by the

king in person on June 28, and a general election was held during the

month of July. The new house of commons did not differ materially from

the old, and even in Ireland the recent national opposition to the union

did not lead to the unseating of a single member who had voted for

it.[6] Meanwhile the ministry was strengthened by the admission to

office of Lord Castlereagh, already distinguished for his share in the

negotiations precedent to the union with Ireland. On July 6 he was

appointed president of the board of control in succession to Dartmouth,

and was admitted to a seat in the cabinet in October. The new parliament

did not meet till November 16. During the interval members of both

houses, with vast numbers of their countrymen, flocked to Paris, which

had been almost closed to English travellers since the early days of the

revolution. Fox was presented to Napoleon, as Bonaparte, since the

decree which made him consul for life, preferred to be styled. Napoleon

conceived a great admiration for him, and afterwards persuaded himself

that, had Fox survived, the friendly relations of England and France

would not have been permanently interrupted. On the very day on which

parliament assembled, a conspiracy was discovered, which, however insane

it may now appear, attracted much attention at the time. A certain

Colonel Despard with thirty-six followers, mainly labourers, had plotted

to kill the king and seize all the government-buildings, with a view to

the establishment of what he called the "constitutional independence of

Ireland and Great Britain" and the "equalisation of all civic rights".

The conspiracy had no wide ramifications, and the arrest of its leader

and his companions brought it to an immediate end. Despard was found

guilty of high treason and was executed on February 21, 1803.

When parliament met, the king's speech referred ominously to fresh

disturbances in the balance of power on the continent; and votes were

passed for large additions to the army and navy, in spite of Fox's

declaration that he saw no reason why Napoleon, satisfied with military

glory, should not henceforth devote himself to internal improvements in

France. Nelson, on the contrary, speaking in the house of lords, while

he professed himself a man of peace, insisted on the danger arising from

"a restless and unjust ambition on the part of our neighbours," and

Sheridan delivered a vigorous speech in a like spirit. On the whole, in

January, 1803, the prospects of assured peace and prosperity were much

gloomier than they had been in January, 1802, before the treaty of

Amiens. The funds were going down, the bank restriction act was renewed,

and Despard's conspiracy still agitated the public mind. In the month of

February a strong anti-Gallican sentiment was roused by Mackintosh's

powerful defence of the royalist Jean Peltier, accused and ultimately

convicted of a gross libel on the first consul. On March 8 came the

royal message calling out the militia, which heralded the rupture of the

peace.

The renewal of the war, fraught with so much glory and misery to both

nations, can have taken neither by surprise. The ink was scarcely dry on

the treaty of Amiens when fresh causes of discord sprung up between

France and Great Britain. More than one of these, indeed, had arisen

between the signature of the preliminary convention and the actual

conclusion of peace. During the negotiations, the first consul had, as

we have seen, never ceased to protest against the violent attacks upon

himself in the English press, while Cornwallis persistently warned his

own government against the menacing attitude of France in Italy and

elsewhere. The proclamation of the concordat in April, 1802, and the

recognition of Napoleon as first consul for life in August, however they

may have strengthened his position in France, were no legitimate

subjects for resentment in England; but his acceptance of the presidency

of the "Italian" republic in January, followed by his annexation of

Piedmont in September, revived in all its intensity the British mistrust

of his aggressive policy.

[Pageheading: _FRENCH AGGRESSIONS._]

The month of October witnessed a renewed aggression on Switzerland. A

French army, commanded by Ney, advanced into the interior of the

country, and forced the Swiss, who were in the midst of a civil war, to

accept the mediation of Napoleon. The new constitution which he framed

attempted, by weakening the federal government, to place the direction

of Helvetian external relations in the hands of the French first consul.

Our government vainly endeavoured to resist this interference by sending

agents with money and promises. In Germany the redistribution of

territory necessitated by the peace of Lunéville was carried out

professedly under the joint mediation of France and Russia, but really

at the dictation of Napoleon. The final project, which destroyed all

except three of the spiritual principalities and all except six of the

free cities, was proposed by France on February 23, 1803, and accepted

by the Emperor Francis on April 27.

Against these rearrangements, Great Britain could have nothing to say;

their importance is that while the negotiations were pending, Austria,

Prussia, and Russia all had a strong motive for standing well with

France. Bonaparte's attitude towards Switzerland was, in so far as it

was backed by force, an infringement of the treaty of Lunéville, to

which, however, Great Britain was not a party. The neutrality of

Piedmont had not been safeguarded either at Lunéville or at Amiens; it

had already been occupied by France before the treaty was signed, and

Napoleon claimed to have as much right to annex territory in Europe

without the consent of Great Britain as Great Britain had to annex

territory in India without the consent of France.

Napoleon's schemes of colonial expansion, though equally within the

letter of the treaty, were not less disconcerting. The reconquest of San

Domingo appeared necessary in order to obtain a base for the effective

occupation of the new French possession, Louisiana. The despatch of an

expedition for this purpose in December, 1801, had excited grave

suspicion, and when two-thirds of the army had died of yellow fever and

the remainder had returned home, fresh troops were sent out to take

their place. A new naval expedition was prepared in the Dutch port of

Helvoetsluis, but it was impossible to persuade British public opinion

that its real destination was San Domingo. Finally, on the eve of

hostilities, in the spring of 1803 Napoleon, despairing of advance in

this direction and disregarding the Spanish right of pre-emption, sold

Louisiana to the United States for 80,000,000 francs. Still more

embarrassing was Bonaparte's eastern policy. In September, 1802, Colonel

Sébastiani was sent as "commercial agent" to the Levant. He was

instructed to inspect the condition of ports and arsenals, to assure the

sheykhs of French favour, and to report on the military resources of

Syria, Egypt, and the north African coast. His report, which was

published in the _Moniteur_ of January 30, 1803, set forth the

opportunities that France would possess in the event of an immediate

return to hostilities, and was naturally interpreted as disclosing an

intention to renew the war on the first opportunity. Six thousand French

would, he said, be enough to reconquer Egypt; the country was in favour

of France. In March, 1803, Decaen left France with open instructions to

receive the surrender of the five towns in India restored to France, but

with secret orders to invite the alliance of Indian sovereigns opposed

to Great Britain. On his appearance at Pondicherri, the British

commander prepared to seize him, but he escaped to the Mauritius, which

he put in a state of defence, and made a basis for attacks on British

commerce which lasted from 1803 to 1811.

[Pageheading: _CAUSES OF MISTRUST AFTER AMIENS._]

Ireland also was visited by political spies, passing as commercial

agents. It may not be easy to say how far Emmet's rebellion, to be

recorded hereafter, was the result of these visits. At all events a

letter fell into the hands of the British government, addressed by

Talleyrand to a French agent at Dublin, called Fauvelet, directing him

to obtain answers to a series of questions about the military and naval

circumstances of the district, and "to procure a plan of the ports, with

the soundings and moorings, and to state the draught of water, and the

wind best suited for ingress and egress". The British government

naturally complained of these instructions, but Talleyrand persistently

maintained that they were of a purely commercial character.[7] It is, of

course, true that these preparations in view of a possible recurrence of

hostilities, however obvious their intention, were not in themselves

hostile acts. Still, they were just grounds for suspicion, and, with our

retrospective knowledge of Napoleon's later career, we may seek in vain

for the grounds of confidence which had made the conclusion of a treaty

possible. Great Britain was guilty of more direct breaches of the peace

of Amiens. Russia refused her guarantee for the independence of Malta,

and the British government was therefore technically justified in

retaining it. No similar justification could, however, be alleged for

the retention of Alexandria and the French towns in India. These

measures were, as will be seen, defended on broader grounds of public

policy. Not the least of the causes of discontent with the new situation

was the refusal of Napoleon to follow up the treaty of peace with a

commercial treaty. He had even retained French troops in Holland, and

thus shown that he meant to close its ports against British commerce.

The hope of a renewal of trade with France had been a main cause of the

popular desire for peace, and had reconciled the British public to the

sacrifices with which the treaty of Amiens had been purchased. It soon

became clear that further concessions would be made the price of a

commercial treaty, and it was felt in consequence that the sacrifices

already made were made in vain.

In September, 1802, Lord Whitworth was sent as ambassador extraordinary

to the French Republic. The instructions which he carried with him from

Hawkesbury fully reflect the prevailing spirit of mistrust. He was to

watch for any new leagues which might prejudice England or disturb

Europe; he was to discover any secret designs that might be formed

against the East or West Indies; he was to maintain the closest

surveillance over the internal politics of France, but especially over

the dispositions of influential personages in the confidence of the

first consul, as well as over the financial resources and armaments of

the republic.[8] Two months later, he was expressly warned in a secret

despatch not in any way to commit His Majesty to a restoration of Malta,

even if the provisions made at Amiens for this purpose could be

completely executed; and the principle was laid down, from which the

British government never swerved, that Great Britain was entitled to

compensation for any acquisitions made by France since the treaty was

signed. Accordingly, the retention of Malta was justified as a

counterpoise to French extensions of territory in Italy, the invasion of

Switzerland, and the continued occupation of the Batavian republic.[9]

This resolution was naturally confirmed by the publication of

Sébastiani's report.

[Pageheading: _NAPOLEON AND WHITWORTH._]

The long negotiations between Whitworth and the French government,

during the winter of 1802 and the spring of 1803, only bring into

stronger relief the importance of the issues thus raised, and the

hopelessness of a pacific solution. Napoleon firmly took his stand

throughout on the simple letter of the treaty, which pledged Great

Britain, upon certain conditions, to place the knights of St. John in

possession of Malta, but did not contemplate the case of further

accessions of French territory on the continent. Although the conditions

specified were never fully satisfied, it is abundantly clear that the

British ministers, having at last grasped the value of Malta, created

all the difficulties in their power, and determined to cancel this

article of the treaty. They alleged, in self-defence, that the spirit of

the treaty had been constantly violated by Napoleon, in repeated acts of

hostility to British subjects, in the refusal of all redress for such

grievances, and, above all, in that series of aggressions on the

continent which he declared to be outside the treaty and beyond the

province of Great Britain.[10] None of the compromises laboriously

discussed in the winter of 1802 betoken any desire on the part of

either government to retreat from its main position, though it does not

follow that either sought to bring about a renewal of the war. Whitworth

constantly reported that no formidable armaments were being prepared,

and clung for months to a belief that Napoleon, knowing the instability

of his own power and the ruinous state of his finances, would ultimately

give way. On the other hand, Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte never

ceased to hope that Great Britain would make concessions which might be

accepted.

Such hopes were rudely dispelled by the king's message to parliament on

March 8, 1803, complaining of aggressive preparations in the ports of

France and Holland, and recommending immediate measures for the security

of his dominions. This message, with the consequent embodiment of the

militia, startled the whole continent, and was followed five days later

by the famous scene in which the first consul addressed Whitworth in

phrases little short of insult. During a public audience at the

Tuileries on the 13th, Napoleon, after inquiring whether the British

ambassador had received any news from home, broke out with the words:

"And so you are determined to go to war". The altercation which ensued

is best told in Whitworth's own words[11]:--

"'No, first consul,' I replied, 'we are too sensible of the advantages

of peace.' 'We have,' said he, 'been fighting these fifteen years.' As

he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, 'That is already too

long'. 'But,' said he, 'you desire to fight for fifteen years more, and

you are forcing me to it,' I told him that was very far from his

majesty's intentions. He then proceeded to Count Marcoff and the

Chevalier Azzara, who were standing together at a little distance from

me, and said to them, 'The English are bent on war, but if they are the

first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to put it back into the

scabbard. They do not respect treaties. They must be covered with black

crape.' I suppose he meant the treaties. He then went his round, and was

thought by all those to whom he addressed himself to betray great signs

of irritation. In a few minutes he came back to me, to my great

annoyance, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by

something personally civil to me. He then began again, 'Why these

armaments? Against whom these measures of precaution? I have not a

single ship of the line in the French ports; but if you wish to arm, I

will arm also; if you wish to fight, I will fight also. You may perhaps

kill France, but will never intimidate her.' 'We wish,' said I, 'neither

the one nor the other. We wish to live on good terms with her.' 'You

must respect treaties then,' replied he; 'woe to those who do not

respect treaties; they shall answer for it to all Europe.'"

Too much stress has been laid upon this incident, so characteristic of

Napoleon's studied impetuosity. Little more than a fortnight later he

received the British ambassador with courtesy. Overtures now succeeded

overtures, and much was expected on both sides from the influence of the

Tsar Alexander, to whom France suggested that Malta might be ceded.[12]

At the last moment, a somewhat more conciliatory disposition was shown

by the French diplomatists; and the British government was blamed by its

opponents, alike for having failed to break off the negotiations earlier

on the broadest grounds, and for breaking them off too abruptly on

grounds of doubtful validity. But we now see that national enmity,

fostered by the press on both sides, rendered friendly relations

impossible, and that, even had Napoleon been willing to refrain from

aggressions, peace was impossible. On May 12, two months after the

king's message, Whitworth, having presented an ultimatum, finally

quitted Paris. A few days later an order was issued for the detention of

all British subjects then resident in France, and justified on the

ground that French seamen (but not passengers) were liable to capture at

sea. On June 10 Talleyrand announced the occupation of Hanover and the

treatment as enemies of Hanoverian soldiers serving under the King of

Great Britain. Meanwhile, on May 16, the rupture of peaceful relations

was announced to both houses of parliament; on May 18 war was declared,

and in June volunteers were already mustering to resist invasion.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] So Vansittart himself, in Pellew, _Life of Sidmouth_, i., 371.

Southey and Captain Mahan have erroneously supposed that Vansittart

accompanied the naval expedition and was sent by Parker in the frigate

from the Skaw.

[2] _Annual Register_, xliii. (1801), chapter i. The average price of

wheat in 1800 was 112s. 8d. the quarter, whereas the highest annual

average in the half century before the war had been 64s. 6d. On March 5,

1801, the price of the quartern loaf stood as high as 1s. 10½d. On

July 23 it was still 1s. 8d. The harvest of this year was, however, an

excellent one. The price fell rapidly during August, and by November 12

was as low as 10½d.

[3] Cornwallis, _Correspondence_, iii., 382-487.

[4] In a letter to Charles Carey, dated October 22, Fox went the length

of expressing extreme pleasure in the triumph of the French government

over the English (_Memorials of C. J. Fox_, iii., 349).

[5] Malmesbury, _Diaries_, iv., 60, 62.

[6] Lecky, _History Of Ireland_, v., 465.

[7] Lanfrey, _Napoleon I._ (English edition), ii., 202; Pellew, _Life of

Sidmouth_, ii., 164.

[8] Browning, _England and Napoleon in 1803_, pp. 1-6.

[9] Browning, _ibid._, pp. 6-10.

[10] See especially Hawkesbury's despatch in Browning, _ibid._, pp.

65-68, and Whitworth's despatches, _ibid._, pp. 73-75, 78-85.

[11] Whitworth's despatch of March 14, in Browning, _England and

Napoleon_, p. 116.

[12] Browning, _England and Napoleon_, p. 218.

The Political History of England - Vol XI From Addington's Administration to the close of William IV.'s Reign (1801-1837) · 第 1 / 21 章